Chapter I: Contrition (2)

2. The sorrow which disposes for the worthy reception of the Sacrament must on the one hand be prompted by divine supernatural grace which begins, accompanies, and perfects the whole work of salvation, and on the other must proceed from some supernatural motive based on faith; for the dispositions required for a supernatural gift must be supernatural. The second condition is more important, for God will certainly give grace to a man to do that which he is obliged to do. Merely natural or worldly love or fear will give rise to natural sorrow; supernatural sorrow springs from a supernatural fear or love of God. The distinction between the two is not merely quantitative but qualitative; they have nothing in common, and no amount of natural sorrow will ever rise to the dignity of supernatural sorrow. Natural sorrow is of no efficacy in the work of conversion. When the prophets exhort to repentance they do not confine themselves to exhort the sinner, “Be converted,” but, “Be ye converted to the Lord your God.” A true penitent was, in their eyes, not one who turned from his sins; they required that he should also turn to God. Sorrow, then, must have a religious character, must be prompted by divine grace, must spring either from fear or love of God.

If sorrow is to have this supernatural character, it must be based on supernatural motives suggested by faith. Faith is the first condition for justification which the Council of Trent demands of the sinner; in addition to this other conditions are laid down, especially the act of hope. These acts need not be formally elicited, but it is required that the motive of sorrow for sin should proceed from faith if it is to be of use for salvation.

We may thus approach the question which, as Lehmkuhl says, many moralists treat with a certain scrupulosity—whether before the Sacrament is received explicit acts of faith and hope must be made, or whether implicit acts are sufficient. Lehmkuhl himself answers the question as follows:[165] To require that the penitent should elicit an act of faith with its formal object explicitly and with deliberation before or apart from the act of contrition is unreasonable; there would be reason for it only in the case of a penitent who had lost his faith by sinning against it. But an act of faith meaning the assent to a proposition of faith which springs from the habit of faith (_assensum in aliquam veritatem ut fide notam ab habitu fidei oriundum_), is rightly demanded since it is otherwise impossible to derive contrition from a supernatural motive. Thus there is no doubt that a formal and explicit act of faith is necessary; but this is certainly present if the necessary contrition be there.

Accordingly St. Alphonsus is quite justified in believing that he can reconcile the divergent views of the theologians by teaching that formal faith is certainly necessary, but not reflex faith: that is a separate and distinct consideration of the grounds of faith. It is just the same with regard to hope; for if a man receive the Sacrament in a genuine spirit of penance in order to get forgiveness of his sins, he is making an act of hope _explicite_ (though not yet _reflexe_, still _exercite_) that God will grant him pardon in the Sacrament through the merits of Christ.[166] All this, however, holds good only for the faithful who are instructed in the things necessary for salvation.

Our faith presents to our consideration many motives for contrition, which, as has been shown above, are reduced to two by the Council of Trent: fear of punishment and hatefulness of sin. This hatefulness may have many forms: the general malice which belongs to every sin (in so far as it is an injury to God our highest good, and rebellion against Him, or ingratitude to God our Father and Benefactor, or infamous unfaithfulness to Jesus our loving Redeemer), or the particular malice which is proper to each sin, since every sin has its own peculiar wickedness and is the opposite to some special virtue. A further motive is found in the sufferings and death of Christ, which may be considered a motive of _caritas_, and the loathsome state of the soul when deprived of sanctifying grace.

Among the punishments which excite us to salutary contrition are first of all the fire of hell, and then purgatory.

All these motives may be called eternal; the pains of purgatory may be numbered among the eternal motives because they begin only when a man has passed from this life into eternity.

It is to be observed that any one of these motives is sufficient to awaken in us true contrition; nor is it necessary that we should choose a motive with which we made acquaintance first by revelation; we know many of these motives as well by reason as by faith; we must only take care that the motive which impels us to sorrow appeals to us not merely from the point of view of reason, but as proposed by faith. If, however, one is moved to contrition by a particular motive, namely, the peculiar malice of some sin even when this malice is made known to us by faith, it is better to add a universal motive either of fear or of the malice residing in all sin, so that the sorrow may not be insufficient or doubtful for any sin which, having escaped observation, was not repented of.

The sorrow which comes from the thought of the temporal sufferings of this life may be regarded as supernatural if these sufferings are looked upon as inflicted by God, as being signs of His anger, and as a sort of foretaste of His eternal punishments if we do not amend. Hence the sorrow which comes from the thought of earthly pains cannot be set down at once and absolutely as supernatural sorrow; the supernatural aspect must be kept in view, and then the sorrow may be regarded as supernatural and sufficient for approaching the Sacrament. Not only reason, but faith also, teaches us that in God’s providence sin has many evil consequences, and that on account of sin God strikes mankind with pains and calamities both private and public. Moreover, the Council of Trent enumerates among the motives of attrition “the fear of hell and of punishment,” and in the punishment we are to understand the pains of this life, for the Council mentions as an example the Ninivites who repented of their sins, moved by fear of the destruction of their city, which had been prophesied by Jonas, unless they did penance; nor are the Ninivites the only instance where God has threatened temporal punishment in order to frighten sinners and move them to penance. Not all theologians, however, admit temporal punishments as motives of supernatural sorrow (among them Vasquez and Toletus); they try to weaken the argument drawn from the Council of Trent by asserting that the Council does not speak of two motives, which apart from one another can give rise to sufficient contrition, but that the words are to be taken conjunctively, so that the fear of earthly punishments must be joined to fear of the pains of hell, since the latter only are made known to us by faith. Our proof is in no way invalidated by this argument; besides, many theologians, and those the most famous, stand by the first view, so that it may be considered as the _sententia communis_. The words of one of them, the eminent Suarez, may be quoted here. He writes:[167] “Hence I infer that such sorrow [as is required for the valid reception of the Sacrament of Penance] must proceed from a divine and supernatural motive. That a temporal and human sorrow is not sufficient is plain from the words of the Council of Trent, and the reason is not to be misunderstood, for such a motive does not deprive the will of the affection towards sin.” And in another place he writes: “Vega (l. 13 in Trid. c. 14) concedes that sorrow based on the fear of other punishment apart from hell-fire is sufficient for attrition. This view is correct if we suppose that the fear is not merely human and natural. Granted that the pains be only temporal, if they are considered as inflicted by God, as proclaiming God’s anger, as being a foretaste in some way of the divine punishments in the next life if we do not reform, they can move us to a supernatural sorrow which may fairly be classed with the sorrow which is based on the fear of hell; thus we exercise the virtue of Christian hope when we look to God for temporal benefits in so far as they affect in any way our eternal life or fall under the special and supernatural providence of God.”

Since, however, the negative proposition denying the efficacy of sorrow springing from fear of earthly punishments for reception of the Sacrament is the safer one and is not altogether improbable, it is the view which must be adopted in practice; so a penitent should not confine himself to the thought of the temporal penalties, but use it to proceed to the consideration of the divine justice as revealed in eternal penalties, “for,” as Lugo expresses it, “this consideration will create the fear of God, who can inflict both one and the other penalty.” This last reflection will certainly move him to a determined resolution to avoid sin as the greatest of evils, and to avoid it even if that involves other suffering. If, however, a man dwell on the thought of the suffering which his sins have drawn upon him, or on the suffering which usually follows in the train of sin, he will not necessarily be induced thereby to resolve steadfastly to shun sin more than any other evil; for it is possible that the avoiding of sin may involve him in greater misfortunes in this life than those which would come from committing the sin; and it is impossible that the fear of a less evil will effectually nerve a man to endure the worse evil. Nevertheless the sorrow and purpose of amendment, if they are to be of any use for justification, must be such as to determine the man _implicite_ to endure all the evils of this life rather than commit sin; and though the penitent is not obliged to reflect _explicite_ on the matter, yet the motive of his sorrow and amendment must be so powerful that, as long as this motive is present, it would compel him to choose any suffering rather than sin. Finally, it may be mentioned that the consideration of the temporal suffering is a powerful weapon in the hands of the confessor to move an obstinate and unrepentant sinner to contrition, and thence to lead him to higher and safer motives.[168]

3. The sorrow must be universal (_universalis_), _i.e._ it must extend to all past sins, at least to those which are mortal. No single mortal sin can be forgiven unless it is repented of, nor without other mortal sins of which one has been guilty being forgiven, for none can be forgiven without sanctifying grace; but sanctifying grace is incompatible with mortal sin, for it is impossible that any one should be at the same time a child of God and the slave of the devil, worthy of everlasting reward and deserving eternal punishment; because “there is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus” (Rom. viii. 1). Hence it is promised in Holy Scripture: “If the wicked do penance for all the sins which he hath committed, and keep all My commandments, ... living he shall live”;[169] and the second Lateran Council says, that a repentance would evidently be useless in which a man left out several sins and repented only of one; for it is written: “Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all.” He who is attached to one sin shall no more cross the threshold of eternal life than one who is addicted to all possible sins.[170]

There are only two ways of attaining universal contrition; one way is to apply special motives of sorrow to each particular sin, the other is to repent of all sins, both the known and the unknown, through a universal motive. This universality does not require that one should reflect on all his sins so as to elicit an act of contrition for each particular sin; this is necessary only if a man confines himself to those motives which of their own nature do not apply to all mortal sins. In practice, however, it is strongly recommended to base the sorrow on universal motives. If, then, a man is sorry for his sins, his mortal sins at least, from a universal motive, and afterwards recalls other sins, he may confess them along with the rest and receive absolution for them without having to make a new act of contrition; this fresh act would be required if his repentance had proceeded from motives peculiar to each sin. Besides there arises at the fresh recollections of his other sins in a repentant sinner a renewal of his sorrow; this renewal is useful, for it insures a more perfect preparation, but it is not necessary.

We must distinguish between the universality of the sorrow and the universality of the purpose of amendment. The sorrow is general when it extends to all sins committed, at least to those which are mortal; the resolution, however, must be to avoid all mortal sins whether they have been committed or not.

If a penitent has only venial sins to confess, the sorrow need not be universal; it must have, however, the other properties.[171] Since venial sin may coexist in the soul along with sanctifying grace, the love of God is not lost, and since one venial sin may be forgiven apart from others, it is enough in preparing for confession to make an act of sorrow for one or other of the venial sins. Of course in such a case only those sins are forgiven which are repented of; nor is it incompatible with the essence of venial sin that a man should be really sorry for one, especially if it be peculiarly vile, without being sorry for the rest.

Still, the penitent should exert himself to be sorry for all the venial sins of which he accuses himself. It is no sin to confess venial sins for which one is not sorry, so long as _materia sufficiens_ for which there is actual sorrow is offered to the power of the keys. It may be assumed that the penitent, confessing venial sins for which he is not sorry, does not care to be absolved from them; from these the confessor does not intend to absolve. Reasons may exist for confessing venial sins for which there is no real sorrow, _e.g._ in order to practice humility, to be better known and guided by one’s confessor, etc.[172]

4. The sorrow must be a sorrow surpassing all other sorrow (_sovereign_, _supreme_) which shrinks from past sin as a greater evil than any in the world, so that a man is prepared to forego every good and suffer any evil rather than fall into sin again. This sorrow must be supreme _appretiative_. Yet it is not required that the sensible feeling of pain should be infinitely great or surpassing all other pain; nor is it necessary that the heart should feel more keenly, or be more disturbed, or be more cast down than it would be by some earthly suffering or loss which should appeal more immediately to the sensitive faculties. Thus a man may experience a more intense and lively sorrow for temporal losses, such as the death of a dear friend or relation, and yet his contrition may be appreciatively much greater. Of this he would give ample proof if he were disposed to avoid sin, even though the sin could make good his losses. Hence it is not by the acuteness of the sensible suffering that sorrow for sin must surpass other pain, but by the displeasure at past sin and the determination of the will to endure all kinds of suffering and every temporal calamity and evil rather than consent to a single mortal sin. The sorrow for sin must therefore be appreciatively sovereign, not necessarily intensively so. The intensity makes no change whatever in the substance of an act. Though contrition is usually the more perfect the more intense it is, yet the intensity ought not to be aimed at, for it would only prepare the way for scruples; moreover, there is no proof that such intensity is necessary.[173]

Though the penitent must have a greater horror of sin than of any other evil, it is not necessary that he should make a deliberate comparison of it with other evils, and make a vivid picture of each particular misfortune, putting to himself the question whether he is ready to endure it in preference to committing sin. Indeed such a course would be highly imprudent and dangerous and likely to destroy the real contrition and purpose of amendment which he had, as well as to excite an inclination for the sin which he detested. Hence when such comparisons obtrude themselves on the mind of the penitent, he should positively reject them and cling to the absolute and unconditional general resolution of never sinning again, helping himself by the reflection that God’s grace will never be wanting at the right moment, and resolving with the help of that grace never more to sin.[174]

The question whether the sorrow can ever be excessive is already answered from the foregoing. The sorrow which is of the essence of contrition, _i.e._ displeasure at our past sins in so far as they are an injury to God, can never be excessive; the greater our love, the greater must be our displeasure, and love cannot be too great. As to the sensible feeling of sorrow which is not at all necessary for true contrition, this should never be carried so far as to interfere with the duty of self-preservation, though as a matter of course there is little occasion to fear that sensible sorrow will go so far. For the sensible sorrow over a spiritual evil is always somewhat remote and cannot easily be so acute as direct physical suffering or as the pain which comes from a misfortune appealing directly to the senses.[175]

As in contrition there is no definite intensity required, neither is any certain duration; for a man may in one moment elicit an act of perfect or imperfect contrition; it may be quite suddenly aroused by divine grace, as in the case of David when he exclaimed in his sorrow, “I have sinned against the Lord,” or as in the case of St. Peter, who at one glance of Jesus was melted into bitter tears. The moment contrition becomes actual it is sufficient for absolution. In practice, however, the faithful should be urged to spend some time before confession in rousing a genuine sorrow that will answer all demands, by reflecting with the help of God’s grace on the nature of sin and its consequences; moreover, they should be cautioned not to be satisfied with a mechanical repetition of an act of contrition, otherwise the sorrow may be wanting, or at its best be very weak. Yet sorrow is of the highest importance because it is the most essential of the _actus pœnitentis_, the very soul of confession.[176]

15. The Relation of Contrition to the Sacrament.

Finally, the sorrow must be sacramental, _i.e._ in connection with the Sacrament of Penance. For instance, in order that attrition along with the Sacrament may be able to restore a man to sanctifying grace, it must be joined with at least the implicit intention of receiving the Sacrament, and coexist virtually with the absolution.

A man who in preparing for confession bewails the sins which he has discovered in examining his conscience, makes an act of contrition _ex intentione implicita_ of receiving the Sacrament. If, however, his sorrow is expressed without any intention of receiving the Sacrament or without any thought of confession, he must renew his act of sorrow in order to be sure of receiving absolution validly, unless he afterwards decides to go to confession in consequence of the still virtually enduring contrition, so that his confession proceeds from his sorrow. Hence the following conclusions are drawn:—

I. An act of contrition made without reference to the receiving of absolution makes the validity of the absolution doubtful.

II. It is not necessary, however, that the penitent should make the act of contrition in consequence of his resolution to go to confession. This is the usual practice, it is true, and certainly a very good one, but it is enough if by his contrition he be moved to make his confession, and if he thus unite his sorrow, still persevering, with the sacramental act. It is also sufficient if the penitent makes an act of sorrow in the interval between the confession of his sins and the giving of the absolution.[177]

The reason for making these demands upon the penitent is that the acts of the penitent are not only an interior preparation for, but they are the _materia ex qua_ of, the Sacrament. The sorrow, therefore, must be brought into relation to the Sacrament; and since this doctrine is probable and is the common teaching, this relation must be established in practice at least _ante factum_, _i.e._ the confessor must before giving absolution take care that the penitent makes his act of sorrow with a view to the Sacrament.

Hence the question amounts really to this: What relation is demanded between the act of sorrow and the Sacrament? not whether such a relation be necessary; for, on the one hand, it cannot be defended with any probability that such relation is unnecessary, and, on the other hand, it is not in accordance with either truth or prudence that the penitent, before making the act of contrition, should establish its relation to the confession or be obliged to have the intention of receiving the Sacrament.

Some sort of bond, however, must exist between the contrition and the Sacrament. It is false to infer from the Catholic teaching of the Council of Trent that the eliciting of the act of sorrow or _dolor in fieri_, as it is called, is the _materia proxima_ of the Sacrament; it is rather the sorrow already elicited or the _dolor in facto esse_, which is the matter of the Sacrament; it is not in or by itself _proxima materia_: it becomes so by means of the confession and in union with the confession. That sorrow is sufficient which coexists in any way with the will of receiving the Sacrament. In other words, the sorrow must _inform_ the confession, _i.e._ make the accusation a penitent or sorrowful confession, and apt to effect a reconciliation with God. If then the sorrow coexists in any way with the confession and is referred to it, that sorrow constitutes _proxime_ the matter of the Sacrament and there is no necessity for the penitent to have the intention of confessing before making the act of contrition. In a similar way water is the matter of Baptism; it is not necessary that the water should be procured with the intention of conferring the Sacrament; it is quite enough to take the water which comes to hand and to apply it to the sacramental use. Now there can be no doubt that the sorrow also, though not elicited with a view to the Sacrament, can remain present in some way in the soul, and while so present may later on be brought into contact with and applied to the Sacrament. A man, for instance, who under the influence of his contrition seeks an opportunity of going to confession, or makes use of the opportunity of going which presents itself, has certainly not lost his contrition; he has it rather in greater abundance, though he reflects no more on his sorrow, nor even retains any certain recollection of it afterwards.

Lacroix has no sufficient reason for demanding that sorrow must be aroused with the view of going to confession, saying that otherwise the sorrow would not be a sacramental act, just as the pouring of water made without the intention of baptizing, though referred immediately afterwards to the baptismal act and the form added, is not a sacramental function. The comparison, we answer, is not to the point, for the sorrow is not _in et per se materia proxima_ as is the pouring of the water in Baptism. If, however, a man poured out the water with some other intention, and then still in the act of pouring formed the intention of baptizing, the Baptism would be valid. The same argument holds for penance; hence that sorrow is sufficient which coexists in any way with the wish to receive the Sacrament.

In the case quoted above where the penitent first confesses his sins and then makes his act of sorrow before receiving the Sacrament, or when he is moved to contrition by the words of his confessor, a difficulty may arise, since the confession must be a sorrowful one. Such an enumeration of the sins cannot, of course, be considered as informed by sorrow; the humble demand for absolution, however, takes up the accusation again and perfects it; and makes it _materia proxima_ of the Sacrament.

If, on the contrary, the sorrow has been elicited with no idea at all of confessing the sin, there is reason for doubting whether an act so completely independent of the confession will become _materia_ of the Sacrament. Absolution cannot be demanded in face of the probability of such an essential defect; yet one can hardly acquire sufficient certainty of the existence of such defect to make the repetition of the confession obligatory.[178]

III. The sorrow must coexist at least virtually with the absolution if it is to be sacramental. This virtual coexistence is secured if the sorrow is excited immediately before the accusation or the absolution, or even one, two, or four hours before confession; and St. Alphonsus admits that real sorrow may last one or two days and still be sufficient for absolution, when it comes from the desire of being reconciled with God, or when it urges a man to go to confession in order to avoid the sins along with the occasion of them. On the other hand, a sorrow removed by so long an interval would not be sufficient for valid absolution if the confession were made out of mere devotion, or in fulfilment of a vow, or for some similar reason. In these latter instances one or two hours is the widest limit which could be assigned for the virtual duration of the contrition. Hence we must condemn the teaching of some moralists that the act of sorrow endures over an unlimited time, and that it is quite sufficient if it is not retracted in the interval. Of course the act of contrition loses completely all its value for absolution by any retraction; and sorrow is retracted expressly by any new complacency in the sin or by any fresh mortal sin.

The reasons for the doctrine just given have already been laid down in the preceding paragraphs on the relation between contrition and absolution. The theologians fall back in particular on the analogy between the civil and sacramental tribunals. As in a civil process some time may elapse between the hearing of the case and the passing of the sentence without invalidating the sentence, so some interval may elapse between the sorrow and the absolution by which sentence is pronounced; this delay, however, must not be too long.[179]

In practice the priest must teach the faithful and insist on their renewing the act of sorrow immediately before confession, if it is some time since they made it, and also on a due amount of time being given to eliciting contrition, since the fruit of the Sacrament is more abundant in proportion to the care taken in preparing for it.

In the case, however, where confession has been made with genuine sorrow but without the necessary reference to the Sacrament, the penitent should not be obliged to repeat the confession, for the other view with regard to the sorrow, that it is not _materia sacramenti_, but only a disposition on the part of the penitent, is not altogether without probability; besides it is scarcely probable that the former act of contrition has not been renewed when the man intended to confess, and that it has no sufficient coexistence with the confession, or at least with the intention to confess. Only when there is danger of death or any risk of the penitent dying before receiving absolution again, the safer course, as far as possible, should be adopted; for on such important occasions prudence counsels us to guard against even slight doubts, so as not to jeopardize our eternal salvation.

It is certain, as we remarked above, that the act of contrition is retracted by a fresh mortal sin, and its effect, in consequence, no longer endures. It is not so easy to settle the question, with regard to venial sins, as to whether the sorrow for venial sin based on a universal motive is revoked by a fresh venial sin, or whether the sorrow continues. If it is conceded that the sorrow is revoked, scruples may easily arise if the sorrow has not been renewed immediately before confession. This practice is very good; but not necessary, if the fresh venial sin is less grievous than those which the penitent intended to confess when he made his act of sorrow.[180]

There is still another question to consider. An act of contrition is made, extending to all past sins, those which are forgotten as well as those which are remembered; must this be renewed if the penitent afterwards confesses the forgotten sins and desires a second absolution?

A renewal of the sorrow in this case does not seem necessary, provided that the sorrow in the first confession extended to all past sins, even those which by chance had escaped the memory; for in this case the process was not objectively complete. The sorrow and the implicit intention of receiving absolution were applied to all sins, even those inculpably forgotten; and as the renewal of the sorrow would not be at all necessary if the penitent, after making an act of contrition on universal grounds, recalls just before the absolution some sins forgotten and confesses them before the absolution is pronounced, so it is not necessary in the case mentioned, since it is much the same whether one receives many particular absolutions or a general one embracing all the sins. Such is the view of the greater number of the moralists. Lugo, St. Alphonsus, and Reuter may be mentioned particularly as favoring it; St. Alphonsus calls this teaching _communis_, Roncaglia _moraliter certa_, Sporer, Elbel, and many others _probabilissima_; it has been declared even _indubitata apud omnes_; _pro ea stat_, says Lugo, _communis praxis_. If in this case one or two confessors perhaps insist on the renewal of the sorrow, the greater number agree in acting differently or in suggesting it merely as a piece of advice.

The champions of the other view urge that the case is closed by the first absolution; if then absolution is to be given again, a new _materia proxima_ is required, and even if the sorrow continue, it has no relation to the second absolution. It is easily seen that this is not a strong reason.[181] Yet though the renewal of the sorrow be not necessary for the validity of the absolution, it is advisable to make again the act of sorrow, which is easy to do and certainly increases the grace. The confessor deals prudently with a penitent under such circumstances when he requires him to make a short renewal of his act of contrition.[182]

The doctrine just developed is not only adopted _ex communi sententia_ in the case more or less frequent, where a mortal sin which had been forgotten is confessed immediately after or very soon after absolution, but also in two other cases. For instance, a penitent in immediate danger of death must be absolved after one or two sins have been confessed; after this, if he be still alive, the confession is continued and completed. The other example is when a penitent (a very rare case) is absolved by his superior from the reserved sins only, and from the remaining sins by another confessor.[183]

The result of this doctrine ought not to be, however, that confessors and penitents become less solicitous about contrition for sins already remitted by the Sacrament. It may, however, as Ballerini remarks, be very useful in quieting scruples, especially of those who accuse themselves of venial sins and in addition tell some mortal sin already confessed and absolved; for if there is little ground for doubting the sorrow for past mortal sins in a penitent who has usually only venial sins to confess, and shows by his constant victories over temptation his aversion to mortal sin, yet certain anxious penitents are frequently troubled with scruples about their want of contrition, especially if they happen to hear a preacher who, with a zeal sometimes devoid of prudence, condemns the repeated confession of past sins made without true contrition. Such scruples may be overcome by various means, but especially by the doctrine just given.[184]

To conclude with a few practical questions:—

1. How must the confessor deal with a penitent who thinks he has only very slight contrition? He must first of all not be too hasty in deciding that this penitent is indisposed and without the necessary contrition; there are men whose hearts are so hard and inaccessible to sensible impressions that it is only with difficulty and at rare intervals that they are moved to a sensible sorrow, and such are easily inclined to think that they have not the proper dispositions. The confessor must remember that the feeling of sorrow is not at all required, but that a real grief over the past life and an earnest desire to amend are sufficient; he must satisfy himself that these dispositions are present and cannot demand more. He may, moreover, reasonably assume the presence of these dispositions in the penitent if the latter be willing to listen to warning and instruction, if he has at any time really endeavored to amend, if he is ready to perform the penance imposed, and to carry out other prescriptions of a like nature.[185]

2. When with regard to former confessions the priest wishes to ascertain whether the penitent has had real sorrow, the following points may serve as indications:—

(_a_) If the penitent has made use of the means suggested to him for overcoming the sin.

(_b_) If he has avoided at least the proximate occasions of sin.

(_c_) If the number of sins has become less.

(_d_) If the penitent is convinced that he had real sorrow and purpose of amendment; for it is a first principle in the Sacrament of Penance that the penitent’s word is to be taken, since he is there his own accuser and witness.[186]

The priest must act here with great prudence so as not to frighten away the penitent, and at the same time not to indulge in an indiscreet leniency by which he would himself commit sin and involve both the penitent and himself in ruin.

3. It is not easy for the confessor to discover when the penitent has not real contrition; the following directions, which Cardinal Denoff in his pastoral brought to the notice of all the confessors of his diocese, may be of use:—

(_a_) If the penitent approaches with a proud bearing as though despising the minister of Christ.

(_b_) If he answers with impatience and anger the questions which the confessor is bound to put.

(_c_) If in the course of his confession he constantly makes excuses and accuses others more than himself.

(_d_) If he mentions the gravest sins as though they were ordinary occurrences.

(_e_) If it is evident that he is trying to conceal a mortal sin which the confessor in the course of his examination has detected.

(_f_) If he refuses to accept a penance proportioned to the number and gravity of his sins, and given with all consideration for his circumstances.

(_g_) If he is unwilling to employ the necessary means to reform.

(_h_) If, finally, he belongs to the number of those unhappy sinners who seek ignorant or easy-going confessors, with a view of getting absolution only, without any intention of reforming.[187]

4. If the priest has to deal with an obstinate sinner, he must discreetly unite mildness and severity, but above all pray to God for him, since every good gift comes from the Father of light. He may picture to him God’s great mercy and the love of Jesus to give him courage; or he may try to soften the hardness of his heart by reminding him of God’s justice (cf. S. Alph. Praxis Confessar. cp. I).