Chapter XXIII: Part 23

The penalties imposed on the Luxembourgers who refused these solicitations were accompanied by a formula which shows very well the Nazi mentality and which I shall read to the Tribunal from the text of the government report. It is a very short quotation.

“Because of their attitude these persons do not offer the
guarantee that they will fulfill, in an exemplary manner at all
times and without any reservation, during and outside their
professional activity, the duties which have their foundation in
the establishment of the civil administration in Luxembourg and
in the pro-German attitude.”

The Nazis also sought to develop in Luxembourg the SA formation.

THE PRESIDENT: Have we got this report? Has this governmental report been deposited?

M. FAURE: The report of the Luxembourg Government was submitted to the Tribunal by my colleague, M. Dubost.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

M. FAURE: As I am making only very short quotations from it I did not put it in my document book.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, M. Faure, it would help me if you would give me the page of the dossier, when you are citing a document which is not in the document book.

M. FAURE: The Nazis also used all kinds of constraint to obtain members for their SA formation as well as for the motorized group of the SA which is known under the initials NSKK.

I would like now to point out to the Tribunal that a special effort was directed towards the youth, because the Nazis thought it would be easier to get young people—and I may say, even children—to accept their precepts and doctrines.

I think I may submit to the Tribunal Document Number RF-810, which is a circular dated 22 May 1941, addressed to the principals of high schools. This is a very short document and I ask your permission to read it.

“By order of the Gauleiter, all teachers are bound to buy the
book of the Führer, _Mein Kampf_, before 1 June 1941. By
September 1941 every member of the teaching profession must make
a declaration on his honor that he has read this work.”

The Germans thought that the compulsory reading of _Mein Kampf_—they allowed three months to assimilate this important work—might convince the teachers, who in turn would teach it to their pupils in the prescribed spirit.

I have here another document, Number RF-811, which I should like to read to the Tribunal, because it is not long and is also very characteristic. It is an extract from a collection of circulars addressed to the pupils of the Athenaeum:

“Luxembourg, 16 June 1941:

“1. All pupils must stand up when the teacher enters to begin
the lesson and when leaving the classroom at the end of the
lesson.

“2. The German salute will be given in the following manner: a)
Raise the outstretched right arm to shoulder level, b) Shout:
‘Heil Hitler.’

“3. The pupils must return the same salute which the teachers
use at the beginning and end of the lessons.

“4. I also expect all pupils to give the German salute in the
street, especially to those gentlemen known to be enthusiastic
partisans of the German salute.”

These German methods reached their culminating point with the imposition of the oath of allegiance to Hitler, which oath was imposed upon the gendarmes and the police. I refer here to the testimony of M. Reuter, who made the terrible statement that those who refused to do so were deported and afterwards most of them were shot. I also submit as proof of this the government report which gives the same information, on Page 12.

Naturally, as in the other annexed territories, the Luxembourgers did not yield to these German methods; and there also endeavors were made to break the resistance by terror. I must mention a quite special regulation, the ordinance of 2 June 1941. This will be Document Number RF-812, which has as title “Ordinance on the Putting into Force in Luxembourg of the Law of 10 February 1936 Concerning the Gestapo.” This title suffices to show the subject.

The Gestapo established in Luxembourg special tribunals, a special summary court known as Standgericht, and SS tribunals. These jurisdictions, if we can use the term jurisdiction, passed many sentences for political reasons. A detailed list of these convictions is appended to the government report. One tribunal, the Standgericht of which I spoke just now, passed 16 death sentences and sentenced 384 people to penalties involving loss of their liberty. But this tribunal was not the only one, and the report states—and the witnesses also confirmed it—that about 500 were condemned to death in this country, which is a considerable number, because the population is not very large.

I think I should likewise mention, in connection with the Germanization, the measures concerning deportation already known to the Tribunal through the testimony of M. Reuter. These measures concerning deportation were applied systematically to the intellectual elite of the country, to the clergy, and to persons who had served in the army. This proves that it was deliberately intended to do away with the social, intellectual, and moral structure of this country.

To the Luxembourg report is appended a list of names of deportees, including officers, magistrates, men who took part in politics in the Grand Duchy, writers, economic leaders, and in particular—I shall give only one figure which is striking—the Germans expelled or deported 75 clergymen, which, with regard to a population as small as that of Luxembourg, shows clearly the will to abolish completely the right to worship. The official report also states that the property of religious orders was confiscated, and most of the places of worship were either destroyed or desecrated.

Just a word about agricultural colonization: An organization called “Für Deutsches Volkstum und Siedelung” (For the Settlement of Racial Germans) was entrusted with the liquidation of the property of Luxembourg deportees for the benefit of southern Tyroleans who were settled in the Grand Duchy. Also, industrial and economic colonization: Here we find the same methods, the same spoliations, and therefore I do not want to go over this ground again. The Tribunal already knows the way in which this was carried out. But I should like to give one example concerning Luxembourg because when dealing with points, even general points, I think the best method is to give a documentary example, and also because, from this document that I am going to cite, I think it is possible to draw some important conclusions from the point of view of the Prosecution.

The document which I am going to cite concerns many cases where the German authorities compelled private citizens and firms to transfer their assets and the control of their businesses to Germans. That was called colonization, and consisted in putting German nationals into the businesses with large assets and economic functions. The Reich Minister of Economy himself devised these illicit methods by which it was intended to plunder private citizens and to germanize the economy of the country. The document that I am going to read to the Tribunal bears the Document Number 813. It is offered as a document by the Luxembourg Government, and it is an original document with the signature, bearing the heading “The Reich Minister of Economy,” Berlin, 5 January 1942. This letter with the heading “The Minister of Reich Economy” is signed “By order: Dr. Saager.” He is a subordinate who is acting regularly, administratively, by order of his minister. It is Number RF-813, the last but one. This letter is marked “Secret.” It concerns the “Accumulateurs Tudor, S. A., Bruxelles,” and is addressed to the battery factory in the hands of Mr. Von Holtzendorff of Berlin, Askanischer Platz 3. The Tribunal will understand that the Minister of Economy is writing to the German firm which is going to benefit by the pressure to be exercised on the Luxembourg firm.

“Referring to our repeated conversations I confirm that in the
interest of the Reich it would be considered very desirable if
your company would obtain a participation in the stock of the
Tudor Batteries. The interest of the Reich is based in no small
degree on economic requirements of national defense.

“In order to obtain a majority the stock owned by M. Léon Laval,
formerly in Luxembourg and now in Bad Mergentheim, would have to
be considered first. This concerns not only the shares which M.
Laval possesses personally, but also the 3,000 shares deposited
with Sogeco.”

I now come to a very important paragraph:

“I therefore request that the necessary negotiations be started
immediately. I would point out that, first of all, you will have
to apply to the Gestapo for the authorization of the State
Police to negotiate with M. Laval, and then request them to give
their agreement to the transfer of these shares to your company
in case M. Laval should be willing to cede them.

“I have already informed the Gestapo of the matter. If the
result of your negotiations should make it necessary I am
prepared to point out once again to the Gestapo how urgent your
mission is.”

Now I should like to read to the Tribunal the sequel to this, Document Number RF-814, which shows a further stage of the maneuver by which the Reich Minister of Economy, in conjunction with the Gestapo, sought to plunder a private citizen. This is a letter addressed to a private citizen, who was going to be compelled to sell his shares, Dr. Engineer Léon Laval, and we are going to see who writes to him. Here is the text of this letter, which is dated Luxembourg, 14 January 1942, and which bears the heading of the Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and the SD in Luxembourg:

“On 19 January 1942 and the following days you must remain at
your residence to be at the disposal of the representative of
the Accumulatoren-Fabrik, A.G., Berlin, Director Von
Holtzendorff.”

The Tribunal will recognize the name of Von Holtzendorff, who was the recipient of the letter from the Reich Minister of Economy in the previous document. I continue the quotation:

“Mr. Von Holtzendorff, who is in possession of a special
authorization from the Redchssicherheitshauptamt, will discuss
business matters with you. Heil Hitler! Signed, Hartmann.”

The Tribunal will understand, I am sure, that if I have read these two documents, it is not because I think it very important in the scope of this Trial that the Tudor battery firm was despoiled, an illicit act which was to their prejudice; but I want especially, and I think it is very important in the Trial, to emphasize—and I shall do it each time when the document gives me the opportunity—the co-ordination which existed between the different German services of which these defendants here were the leaders. Certain persons are sometimes inclined to believe that all the German crimes must be imputed to the Gestapo, and it is true that the Gestapo was a characteristic criminal organization; but the Gestapo did not function all by itself. The Gestapo acted on the order of, and in conjunction with, the civil administrations and with the military command. We heard yesterday, in connection with the pontificals of the Bishopric of Strasbourg and also in connection with the University of Strasbourg, of the scheme which allowed the civil minister or his representative to have recourse to the police agents for the enforcement of orders. We also noted this fact when reading these documents which dealt with economic matters.

I now conclude the first chapter of my brief. I should like to mention that the work on the documentation and the preparation of this chapter was carried out with the aid of my assistant, M. Albert Lentin.

I should like now to hand to the Tribunal the first part of the second chapter, concerning the seizure of sovereignty. This first part includes general ideas which I think I should expound to the Tribunal before supporting them by documents. Consequently, the Tribunal will have before them a file entitled “Exposé” for which there is no corresponding document book.

The Germans occupied the territories of five powers, without counting Luxembourg which was annexed and of which I spoke just now. Of these five countries, three kept governmental authority. These are Denmark, Norway, and France, but even in these three countries the cases are entirely different. The government of Denmark was a legitimate government; the government of France was a _de facto_ government, which at the beginning exercised real authority over unoccupied territories; the government of Norway was also a _de facto_ government, typical example of a puppet government. The two other powers, Belgium and Holland, retained no governmental authority but only administrative authorities, of which the highest were the general secretariats of the ministerial departments.

In view of these situations, the Germans, as I said previously, varied their methods of domination. On the other hand, they did not establish a specific form of government corresponding to the internal organization of each country; therefore looking at it as a whole, it would seem at first sight to be somewhat complex. The usurpation of sovereignty by the occupying power assumed three different forms. We are speaking here of the external procedure.

First form: Direct exercise of power to legislate or issue regulations. By this we mean the exercise of power above and beyond the limited power to issue regulations accorded by international law to occupation armies.

Second form: The indirect exercise of power to legislate or issue regulations through local authorities. This was also done in two ways: 1. By injunction, pure and simple, which is the case when the local authorities are the administrative authorities. 2. By pressure, which is the case when the local authorities are authorities of a governmental character, either _de facto_ or _de jure_. It should be noted, moreover, that the pressure is sometimes such that it bears a complete resemblance to an injunction, pure and simple. We also understand such pressure to include recourse to the complicity of traitors.

Third form: The third form is purely and simply that of assault and battery. We do not mean physical force used in individual cases, for this does not concern us here: but physical force used as a result of the order of a competent occupation authority, which consequently entails the responsibility of a superior.

If we now consider the question of determining who or what the instruments of usurpation were, we observe that these instruments fall into five categories:

In the first place, we have the Reich Commissioner, who was appointed in Norway and Holland only, that is to say, in the one case in a country which retained governmental authority at least in appearance and for a certain length of time, and in the other, in a country which retained administrative authority only.

In the second place, we have the military administration. In all countries the military authorities exercised powers absolutely disproportionate to those which belonged to them lawfully.

I must note here that only these two instruments, the Reich Commissioner and the military authority, were able to carry out usurpation by issuing direct legislative or regulatory decrees. In each of the two powers where there was a Reich Commissioner, the powers conferred were naturally shared by the Reich Commissioner and the military authority.

A third instrument of usurpation took the form of diplomatic administration responsible to the Foreign Office. Diplomatic representations existed only in countries which had governmental authorities and where there was no Reich Commissioner. We refer to Denmark and France.

These diplomatic representatives of the Reich, unlike the Reich Commissioner and the military occupation authority, did not have power—illicit but formal power—to legislate or issue regulations. However, this does not mean that their role in the usurpation of sovereignty is a secondary one. On the contrary, it is an important one. Their principal activity consisted, naturally, in bringing pressure to bear on local authorities to whom they were accredited.

I should like to bring out two points here. It might be thought from a logical point of view, that in an occupied country such as France, the intervention by the occupying power in the administration of the local authorities would be the exclusive competence of the diplomatic representatives. That is not the case. The military authority also intervened on frequent occasions through direct contact with the French authorities. In their turn, the diplomatic representatives did not limit themselves to the powers conferred by their functions. One of the characteristics of the Nazi method is this exceeding of powers conferred. It is, moreover, when one thinks of it, a necessary result of the Nazi enterprise.

In view of the fact that the usurpation of sovereignty in a country which is militarily occupied is an illegal and abnormal thing, it does not come within the normal competency of the categories of public functions as understood by civilized nations. Thus the diplomats, as well as the military authorities, exceeded their powers; and there was also an overlapping of functions. The diplomats and the military authorities dealt with the same things. We see this in regard to propaganda, for instance; and in regard to the persecution of the Jews. Generally speaking, the military authority acted in a more obvious way; the diplomatic administration preferred to act in domains where publicity could be evaded. There was a constant liaison between them on all questions concerning the occupied country.

The fourth instrument of usurpation was the police administration. The German police was installed in all occupied countries, often under several distinct administrations, according to the principles which were presented to the Tribunal when the American Prosecution revealed the inner workings of the immense, complex, and terrible police organism of the Nazis. Neither did the police have limited or exclusive functions. They acted in close and constant liaison with the other instruments we have defined.

The fifth instrument which we must mention consisted of the local branches of the National Socialist Party and the similarly inspired organizations which sought to organize nationals in the occupied country. These organizations served as auxiliaries to the German authorities; and in a specific case, that of Norway, they provided the foundation of a so-called government.

I have thought fit to outline this picture, as it seems to me that the Prosecution may draw from it an interesting conclusion in regard to the points I have already touched on in my statement on Luxembourg.

We have seen, in effect, that the German line of policy for the usurping of sovereignty was carried out by means of various organs which were associated with this action. In the occupied countries—and we must not forget that this usurpation provided the method for the commission of crimes—this usurpation was not the exclusive work of an official, or of an ambassador, or of a military commander. In countries which had a Reich Commissioner there also existed a military administration. A country placed under the sole regulating authority of the Army also had diplomatic agents. In all countries there were police authorities.

In all these occupied countries, as a result of the occupation and the usurpation of sovereignty, there were systematic abuses and crimes. Many of them are already known to the Tribunal. Others have still to be mentioned.

From what I have just said, we see that the responsibility for these abuses does not exist only with one or the other of these administrations which we have mentioned, it exists with all of them. It may be true that in Belgium, for instance, there was no diplomatic representation; but there was such representation in France and in Denmark. It therefore follows that the Department of Foreign Affairs and its head could not help being aware of the conditions under the occupation which, as far as the principal features are concerned, were similar in the different countries.

Moreover, as I have just said, these coexisting administrations had no fixed division of functions. Even if this division of functions had existed, it must be pointed out that the responsibility and the complicity of each in the action of the others would have been sufficiently proved by their knowledge and their approval—which was at least implicit with regard to this action. But even this division did not exist, and we shall show that all were associated and accomplices in a common action.

Now, this very fact involves a more far reaching consequence. The association and complicity of these various departments involves all the leaders and all the organizations here accused in a general responsibility. I shall explain this point by giving an example. If, for instance, all the abuses and all the crimes had been committed only by the Army without a single interference, perhaps it would be possible for one important person, or organization, having no military functions, to claim that it had no knowledge of these abuses and of these crimes. Even in this case I think this claim would be difficult to uphold, because the vast scope of the enterprises which we denounce made it impossible for anyone who exercised a higher authority not to know of these things. However, since several administrations are jointly responsible, it necessarily follows that the other authorities are also responsible, because the question at this point is no longer the question whether one administration is involved, or even three, but all the administrations; it involves the consubstantial element of all the authorities of the State.

I shall speak later of the order concerning the deportation of the Jews; and I shall show that this order was the result of a common action of the military administration, the diplomatic administration, and the Security Police, in the case of France. It follows that in the first place the Chief of the High Command, in the second place, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in the third place, the Chief of the Security Police and Reich Security Service—these three persons—were all necessarily informed and necessarily approved this action, for it is clear that their offices did not keep them in ignorance of such plans concerning important affairs and that, moreover, decisions were agreed upon on the same level in the three different administrations.

Therefore these three persons are responsible and guilty. But is it possible that, by an extraordinary chance, among the persons who directed the affairs of the Reich, as ministers or as persons holding equivalent offices, these three persons turned out to be criminals and the only ones to be criminals and that they had conspired among themselves to hide from the others their criminal actions? This idea is manifestly absurd. In view of the interpenetration of all the executive departments in a modern state, all the leaders of the Reich were necessarily aware of and agreed with the usurpation of sovereignty in the occupied countries, as well as the criminal abuses resulting therefrom.

In this chapter I shall go on to speak first of Denmark, which is a special case. Then I shall speak of the civil administration which existed in Norway and in Holland, and finally I shall speak of the military administration which was the regime in Belgium and in France.

I think it would be a suitable time now for the Tribunal to have a recess; or if the Tribunal prefers, I can continue my brief.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

M. FAURE: After the recess I should like to call the witness of whom I spoke to the Tribunal yesterday. I should like to mention one fact, however. Yesterday the lawyer for Seyss-Inquart requested that he be allowed to cross-examine this witness on Monday. Senator Vorrink, who is my witness, is absolutely obliged to leave Nuremberg this evening. I think, therefore, that the lawyer for Seyss-Inquart might cross-examine him today. In any case I should like to notify him of the modification of the request which I made yesterday.

THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t it be possible, if the counsel for Seyss-Inquart wants to cross-examine the witness, for the witness to be brought back at some other date?

M. FAURE: My witness can of course be brought back at another date, if it should be necessary.

THE PRESIDENT: That is what I meant. Let him go this evening in accordance with arrangements that he has made, and then at some date convenient to him he could be brought back if the defendant’s counsel wants to cross-examine him.

[_A recess was taken._]

M. FAURE: Mr. President, may I ask the permission of the Tribunal to call the witness, Jacobus Vorrink.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, have him called.

M. FAURE: This witness speaks Dutch as his native tongue. Since the interpreting system does not include this language, I propose that he speak in the German language, which he knows well.

[_The witness, Jacobus Vorrink, took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

JACOBUS VORRINK (Witness): Vorrink.

THE PRESIDENT: Your Christian name, your first name?

VORRINK: Jacobus.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you swear to speak without hate or fear, to say the truth, all the truth, and only the truth? Will you raise your right hand and say, “I swear”?

VORRINK: I swear.

M. FAURE: Sit down, Mr. Vorrink. You are a Dutch Senator?

VORRINK: Yes, Sir.

M. FAURE: You are President of the Socialist Party of the Netherlands?

VORRINK: Yes, Sir.

M. FAURE: You exercised these functions in 1940 at the time of the invasion of the Netherlands, by the Germans?

VORRINK: Yes.

M. FAURE: I should like to ask you to give a few explanations on the following situation: There existed in the Netherlands, before the invasion, a National Socialist Party. I should like you to state what the situation was, after the invasion by the Germans and during the occupation, with regard to the various political parties in the Netherlands, and more particularly the National Socialist Party, and what were the activities of this Party in liaison with the German occupation?

VORRINK: I should prefer to speak in the Dutch language. I am sorry I do not know French and English well enough to use these languages—but in order not to delay the proceedings, I shall make my declarations in German. This is the only reason why I am using the German language.

The political situation in Holland after the invasion by the Germans was that first and foremost the German Army wanted to maintain public order in Holland. But the real Nazis immediately came with the Wehrmacht and tried to direct and organize public life in Holland according to their concepts. There were among the Germans three main categories. In the first place, there were those who believed in the “blood and soil” (Blut und Boden) theory. They wanted to win over the whole of the Dutch people to their National Socialist concepts. I must say that, in certain respects, this was our misfortune because these people, on the basis of their “blood and soil” theory, loved us too much and when that love was not reciprocated it turned to hate.

The second category consisted of the politically informed; and these people knew perfectly well that the Dutch National Socialists in Holland were only a very small and much hated group. At the elections of 1935 they received only 8 percent of the votes, and 2 years later this percentage had been reduced by one-half. These people were tactlessness itself. For instance, when the ruins of Rotterdam were still smoking, they saw fit to make a demonstration at which the leader of the Dutch National Socialists, Mussert, dedicated to Göring a new bell as a thank offering for what he had done for Holland. Fortunately, it did not prevent him from being defeated.

In the third place there were the so-called intriguers, those who wanted to destroy the national unity of Holland and who, first of all, tried through Seyss-Inquart to gain the favor of the Dutch people by flattery. In the same way as Seyss-Inquart, they always stressed that the two peoples were kindred races and should therefore work together, while behind the scenes they played off one Nazi group against the other.

In Holland at that time there existed the Dutch National Socialist Workers’ Party, the Dutch National Socialist Front, and the so-called National Front. All these three movements had their contacts with certain German organizations. The Germans first tried to find out whether it was possible to use these groups for their purposes. Slowly, however, they recognized that it was not possible to work with these groups; and so they decided to adopt the National Socialist movement only. These National Socialists gradually occupied the key positions in the Dutch administration. They were appointed general secretaries for internal administration, they became commissioners of the provinces, mayors, _et cetera_.

I should like to mention in this connection that at that time there were not enough people qualified to become mayors, so that short courses of instruction were arranged which performed the record feat of turning out Dutch mayors in 3 weeks. You can imagine what kind of mayors they were.

Furthermore, they became administrators in nazified organizations and commercial undertakings, which gave them certain power in Holland; and they behaved like cowardly Nazi lackeys.

Mr. Rost von Tonningen, for instance, used millions of Dutch guilders to finance the war against Russia in order to fight against Bolshevism as he called it. Finally, in December 1942, Seyss-Inquart declared the Nazi Party to be the representative of the political life of Holland. If it had not been so tragic, one might have laughed at it. Mussert was then appointed as the Leader of Holland. I must add that the Nazi Party had only a shadow existence from the political point of view, with the single but important exception that these people had occasionally the opportunity to deal with matters of personnel. I should also add that sometimes they turned the heads of young Dutchmen and persuaded several thousands of them to enter the SS formations; and during the last years it became even worse. Then they even went so far as to put young boys into the SS without their parents’ consent. They even forced minors from correctional institutions into the SS. Sometimes—I know of cases myself—young boys who for certain reasons were at loggerheads with their parents, were taken into the SS. To realize the harm done you must, as I have sometimes done, go and speak to these children who are now in camps in Holland. You will then see what a monstrous crime has been committed against these young people.

M. FAURE: Am I to understand that all these methods employed by the Germans were intended to achieve the nazification of Holland and that if there were, as you have indicated, several varying tendencies among the Germans, these tendencies differed only as to the means to be employed and not in regard to the purpose of Germanization?

VORRINK: The actual nazification of Holland extended to practically all spheres of our national life. They tried in every domain to introduce the Leadership Principle. I would like to point out, for instance, that contrary to our expectations, they did not ban the Socialist Trade Unions but just tried to employ them. They merely sent a Nazi commissioner who told the people, “The era of democracy is past, just go on working under the leadership of the commissioner and you can still help the workers. It is not necessary to change anything.” They even tried that with the Dutch political parties.

As President of the Socialist Democratic Workers’ Party of Holland, I had a long conversation with Rost von Tonningen, who personally told me that it was a pity that the good cultural work done to educate the workers should cease. We both wanted socialism and all we had to do was to work together calmly. I denied that at the time of that conversation. I told him that for us democracy was not a question of opportunism but a part of our ideology and that we were not prepared to betray our convictions and our principles.

They tried to keep the workers in their organizations; but slowly the workers, thousands and tens of thousands of them, left their organizations. When finally the National Labor Front was created, with the Catholic and Christian Trade Unions, there certainly was an organization but no longer any members.

M. FAURE: Can you state with accuracy whether in your country persecutions against the Jews were started?

VORRINK: One of the worst chapters of our sufferings in Holland was the persecution of the Jews. You may know that we in Holland, and especially in Amsterdam, had a strong Jewish minority. These Jews took a very active part in the public and cultural life of Holland, and one can say there was no anti-Semitism in Holland.

When the Germans first came to Holland, they promised us that they would not harm the Jews at all. Nevertheless, even in the first weeks there was a wave of suicides. In the following months the measures against the Jews started. The professors in the universities were forced to resign. The president of the highest court in Holland was dismissed. Then the Jews had to present themselves for registration, and then came the time when the Jews were deported in great numbers.

I am proud to say that the Dutch population did not suffer this without protesting. The Dutch students went on strike when their Jewish professors were driven out, and the workers of Amsterdam went on strike for several days when the persecution of the Jews started. But one has to have seen this with one’s own eyes, as I have, to know what a barbaric system this National Socialism was.

The Green Police sealed off whole sections of cities, went into houses, even went on the roofs, and drove out young and old and took them off in their trucks. No difference was made between young and old. We have seen old women of over 70, who were lying ill at home and had no other desire than to be allowed to die quietly in their own home, put on stretchers and carried out of their home, to be sent to Westernborg and from there to Germany, where they died.

I myself remember very well how a mother, when she was dragged from her home, gave her baby to a stranger, who was not a Jewess, and asked her to look after her child. At this moment there are still hundreds of families in Holland where these small Jewish children are being looked after and brought up as their own.

M. FAURE: Can you state whether, apart from these measures against the Jews, the Germans concerned themselves with other confessions?

VORRINK: From the beginning the Germans always tried to get the churches into their power. All the churches, the Catholic as well as the Protestant, protested whenever the Germans violated human rights. The churches protested against the arbitrary arrest of persons, against the mass deportation of our workers, and the church never failed to testify for the Jews.

Of course, the church dignitaries, the priests and pastors, had to suffer for that; and hundreds of our pastors and priests were taken to concentration camps, and of the 20 parsons and priests whom I knew in the concentration camp in Sachsenhausen, only one has returned to Holland.

M. FAURE: Can you state what measures were adopted with regard, for example, to culture, propaganda, and teaching?

VORRINK: What incensed us most in Holland was not so much our military defeat. We were a small people, and I can say that during those 5 days we fought as well as we could. Perhaps it would have been possible to maintain a correct attitude with the occupation forces, if it hadn’t been for the Nazis’ determination to dominate us, not only in a military sense, but also to break our spirit and to crush us morally. Therefore, they never lost an opportunity of encroaching on our cultural life in their efforts to nazify us.

In regard to the press, for instance, they forced us to publish in our press editorials which were written by Germans and to print them on the front page in order to create the impression that the editor in chief of the paper had written them. One can even say that these measures were the starting point for the very extensive underground press in Holland, because we wouldn’t allow the Germans to lie to us systematically. We had to have a press which told us the truth.

Also in regard to the radio, it was soon forbidden to listen to foreign stations; and they dealt out exceedingly harsh punishment to people who defied this ban; and there were a great many people in Holland who listened to the foreign radio, especially the BBC. And we in Holland were always glad to hear the British radio which never hesitated to give the people, _in extenso_, all the affecting speeches of Hitler and Göring, while we were not allowed to listen to Churchill’s speeches. In those moments we were deeply conscious of the reasons why we had built up our resistance, and we also knew why our Allied friends strove with all their might to deliver the world from the Nazi tyranny.

It was the same in the field of the arts. Quite a number of guilds for painters, musicians, and writers were forced to organize themselves. An author could not even publish a book without submitting it to some Nazi illiterate.

They also encroached on school life and tried to influence elementary education; for instance, in the text books for children of 6 to 12 years they ordered that whole sentences should be struck out. A sentence like the following, “When the Queen visited them the people cheered.” In the schools and public buildings they organized real hunts for pictures of our Royal Family.

M. FAURE: I thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: You have finished your examination, have you?

M. FAURE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko?

GENERAL RUDENKO: No questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Have the British or American prosecutors any questions? [_There was no response._] Does any member of the defendants’ counsel wish now to cross-examine?

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, in order to avoid the witness having to make the long trip from Holland a second time, I should like to cross-examine him today, although my client is absent.

Witness, when Seyss-Inquart took over the government in Holland under the decree of 18 May 1940, was the Queen or were members of the Dutch Government still on Dutch territory?

VORRINK: No, they were no longer on Dutch territory.

DR. STEINBAUER: Did the government of Seyss-Inquart, the Reich Commissioner, leave in office the functionaries of the former government?

VORRINK: Yes.

DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that of the nine General Secretaries appointed by the former Royal Government and still in office only one was dismissed?

VORRINK: Well, it is possible.

DR. STEINBAUER: Do you further know that of the 11 Commissioners of the Provinces only four were dismissed from the government for political reasons?

VORRINK: I do not know the exact number but that is possible.

DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know how many mayors were appointed by the Royal Government and in particular is it correct that there were more than one-half still in office in 1944?

VORRINK: Yes, I believe so.

DR. STEINBAUER: You have not answered fully the question which was asked you by the prosecutor. He asked you how many political parties there were in parliament at the time of the invasion. Which were those parties?

VORRINK: The Catholic Party, two Protestant Christian parties, two liberal parties, the Social Democratic Party, the Communist Party, and some minor parties.

DR. STEINBAUER: I shall now talk about two subjects mentioned by you—schools and churches. Is it correct that the Dutch school system, throughout the Seyss-Inquart regime, was under the direction of a Dutchman, Van Hann?

VORRINK: It was under a Dutchman during the whole time, but we do not consider him as a Dutchman. He is today in prison because he betrayed his country.

DR. STEINBAUER: But he was not a German?

VORRINK: He was a Dutch traitor.

DR. STEINBAUER: Is it correct that Seyss-Inquart showed great interest in the Dutch school system?

VORRINK: I cannot remember that.

DR. STEINBAUER: For instance, Seyss-Inquart added an eighth class to the elementary school?

VORRINK: That is not correct.

DR. STEINBAUER: And that in this way adolescents did not have to enter the labor services until later?

VORRINK: Correct.

DR. STEINBAUER: Did he show an interest in a long standing wish of the Dutch concerning the spelling of the Dutch language and did he not appoint a special committee to investigate the matter?

VORRINK: In this connection he did take some interest in a thing about which he knew nothing; he got his information from the wrong people.

DR. STEINBAUER: But he did make an effort.

VORRINK: Yes, but in the wrong direction.

DR. STEINBAUER: Is it correct that he endeavored to increase the number of teachers?

VORRINK: No, certainly not.

DR. STEINBAUER: That, in particular, he employed junior teachers and reduced expenses thereby?

VORRINK: He did that because he wanted to influence the Dutch youth.

DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know, for instance, that as a result of protests, Seyss-Inquart rescinded measures that had been taken against the School of Commerce in Rotterdam?

VORRINK: Will you repeat the question? I did not understand it.

DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that Seyss-Inquart, as a result of protests, took steps to see that the School of Commerce in Rotterdam was not interfered with?

VORRINK: I do not know.

DR. STEINBAUER: As far as the churches are concerned, apart from deportation, as you say for political reasons, were the Catholics and Protestants ever prevented from practicing their religion?

VORRINK: The Germans interfered very much with the right to worship. They put spies in the churches to listen to the sermons with the idea of possibly denouncing the pastors.

DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, but that has happened in other countries too. Please, tell me, could the priest or the parson still continue to preach according to his conscience?

VORRINK: No, certainly not according to his conscience.

DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that during the whole of the occupation the prayer for the Queen was allowed in churches of all denominations?

VORRINK: It was certainly not allowed. Several ministers were arrested for that very reason.

DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that Seyss-Inquart prevented 27 convents from being confiscated for German refugees? Is it correct?

VORRINK: I know nothing about it.

DR. STEINBAUER: But perhaps you may know that he prevented the destruction of the synagogues in Rotterdam and in The Hague. The police wanted to destroy them, and he prevented them from doing it. Do you know anything about that?

VORRINK: I do not know whether he wanted to prevent it; but in any case, the synagogues were destroyed; and those who destroyed them went unpunished and later took part in the worst persecution of the Jews.

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, do you know that out of the Catholic and Protestant Dutch clergymen deported to Germany, Seyss-Inquart succeeded in getting two-thirds sent back to their country?

VORRINK: I do not know.

DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that he prevented the departure of valuable cultural treasures, especially libraries, which were already prepared for transportation from Holland to the Reich?

VORRINK: I do not know whether he used his personal influence in that respect; I only know that enormous quantities of our art treasures and books were taken away by the Germans, and in any case he was then powerless to prevent it.

DR. STEINBAUER: You said also that the radio was prohibited because it stimulated the organization of resistance. As a leader, would you have allowed a radio speaking against you?

VORRINK: I would by all means allow the radio. I am of the opinion that there can be no human dignity if people are not allowed to form their opinions by hearing reasons for and against.

DR. STEINBAUER: Was Mussert given the task of forming a government, or was that not done because Seyss-Inquart objected?

VORRINK: I really do not know what happened behind the scenes, but perhaps you may be right that Seyss-Inquart was no friend of Mussert. While in prison I was taken out of my cell one night and asked to write an article on the National Socialist movement in Holland, and I was requested to give my own personal opinion about Mussert. When I answered, ‘Why should I do this? You know what I think of Mussert and of all the Nazis,’ they said: ‘You cannot make it bad enough.’ I took this to be one of the many machinations of the Nazi cliques which fought against each other.

DR. STEINBAUER: I thank you. I have no further questions.

HERR BABEL: Witness, you spoke of Dutch youngsters who had entered the SS. Could you tell me approximately what the total number was?

VORRINK: I would say a few thousand.

HERR BABEL: In your opinion how many of those entered the ranks voluntarily and how many were forced?

VORRINK: I cannot give you an exact figure; but I am of the opinion that if minors entered such organizations without the consent of their parents, they did not do it voluntarily. They could not judge the consequences of their actions.

HERR BABEL: I did not ask that question. I asked you how many, in your opinion, joined the SS voluntarily and how many were forced. Will you answer this question and no other?

VORRINK: I have already said that I cannot give you the exact number.

HERR BABEL: Well, an approximate figure.

VORRINK: I should say several hundred were forced.

HERR BABEL: Good, and you gave the total number as several thousand.

VORRINK: They were youngsters who for some reason or another left their homes, and they were taken by the Green Police or the Security Police and pressed into the SS. I myself have come across quite a few cases of this in Dutch concentration camps. As an old leader in the Youth Movement I was able to speak to these youngsters and got them to tell me about their life.

HERR BABEL: You say “pressed”? What do you mean by “pressed”?

VORRINK: That means that they were threatened with imprisonment if they were not willing to join the SS.

HERR BABEL: You heard that yourself?

VORRINK: Yes.

HERR BABEL: You further said that thousands of workmen left their organizations. I think you said tens of thousands. Did they do so voluntarily, or what was the reason for this?

VORRINK: The reasons were that the workmen refused to be in a nazified trade union and to submit to the Leadership Principle. They wanted to be in their old trade unions where they could have a say in the running of their organizations.

HERR BABEL: The resignations, therefore, were voluntary?

VORRINK: Yes.

HERR BABEL: In regard to the Jewish question you said that at first nothing happened to the Jews, but that nevertheless there was a wave of suicides. Why? What was the reason for those suicides when it had been said, “nothing will happen to you.”

VORRINK: These Jews were the most sensible ones. We in Holland did not live on an island, and we knew all that had happened between 1933 and 1940 in Germany. We knew that in Germany the Jews had been persecuted to death, and I personally still have in my possession quite a few sworn statements of German Jews who had emigrated, who kept us hourly informed of how they had been tortured and martyred by the SS during the period before the war. That of course was known to the Dutch Jews, and in my opinion in that respect they were more sensible since they knew they would suffer the same fate.

HERR BABEL: You put it in such a way as to make it sound as if there were a large number of suicides. Was that so, or were there a few individual cases?

VORRINK: This happened to about 30 or 50 people, but in Holland; where we value life very highly, that is quite a large number.

HERR BABEL: Now, you used the word “Nazi illiterate.” Quite apart from, I would say, your not very friendly attitude towards us Germans, have you any justification for saying this? Have you met a single German who was illiterate?

VORRINK: I am rather surprised at this question. By an “illiterate Nazi” I meant a man who talks about things about which he has no knowledge, and the people who judged an author’s work were people who had been set to read through the book to find out whether a Jew appeared in it and was presented as a good and humane character. According to the Nazi concepts, such a book could not be published. I would add that I have used the word “Nazi illiterate” from the days when there were found in the German cities, in the country of Goethe and Schiller, great piles of burned books, books that we had read and admired in Holland.

HERR BABEL: I understand you to mean that you can bring no positive facts which might justify this derogatory word “Nazi illiterate.”

Thank you.

DR. OTTO PANNENBECKER (Counsel for Defendant Frick): I have just one question, Witness. You just said that young people who did not enter the SS were threatened with prison. Do I understand you to say that they would be given prison sentences for an offense committed previously or that they would be imprisoned only because they did not enter the SS?

VORRINK: They would be given a prison sentence, of course, because they had been threatened. Whether they would have put them in prison, I do not know, but it was a threat. It was one of the usual methods of the Nazis to say “We want you to do this or that, and if you do not we will put you in prison.” There were so many instances of this sort that one could have no illusions about it.

DR. PANNENBECKER: But it is correct in this case that these were youngsters who had run away from home because of differences with their parents?

VORRINK: Those are cases which I know of personally.

DR. PANNENBECKER: I thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Defense Counsel wish to ask any questions? [_There was no response._] M. Faure, do you wish to ask any questions?

M. FAURE: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Then, the witness can leave.

[_The witness left the stand._]

M. FAURE: I shall ask the Tribunal to be kind enough to take the brief and the document book, bearing the title “Denmark.”

The Tribunal knows that Denmark was invaded on 9 April 1940 in violation, as in other cases, of treaties, and particularly, of a treaty which was not very old, since it was the Non-Aggression Treaty which had been concluded on 31 May 1939.

Inasmuch as Denmark was not in a position to offer armed resistance to this invasion, the Germans sought to establish and maintain the fiction according to which that country was not an occupied country. Therefore they did not set up a civil administration with powers to issue regulations as they were to do in the case of Belgium and Holland.

On the other hand, there was a military command, inasmuch as troops were garrisoned there. But this military command, contrary to what happened in the other occupied countries, did not exercise any official authority by issuing ordinances or general regulations.

In spite of this fiction, the Germans did commit in this country which they pretended they were not occupying, usurpations of sovereignty. These usurpations were all the more blatant, inasmuch as they had no juridical justification whatsoever, even from the Nazi point of view.

During the first period, which extended to the middle of 1943, German usurpations were discreet and camouflaged. There were two reasons for this. The first was that one had to take into account international public opinion, inasmuch as Denmark was not officially occupied. The second reason was that the Germans had conceived the plan to germanize the country from within by developing National Socialist political propaganda there.

I think it should be noted, very briefly, that this Germanization from within had already begun before the war. It is set forth in detail and in a most interesting manner in a part of the official report of the Danish Government, which I place before the Tribunal as Document Number RF-901.

This Document Number RF-901 comprises the whole of the green dossier which the Tribunal has before it. There are several sections. The subject of which I am now speaking is to be found in the first document of this bundle. This first document starts with the heading “Memorandum.”

This document shows that even before the war the Germans had organized an information service which was supplemented by a clever espionage service. In particular they had established a branch of the National Socialist Party, into which Germans living in Denmark were recruited. The idea was first of all to form a party made up of Germans and we shall shortly see how this National Socialist Party was afterwards called the Danish Party.

This branch of the German Party was called NSDAP, Ausland-Organisation, Landeskreis Danemark (Foreign Section, Regional District Denmark). It acted in co-ordination with other institutions; particularly, the Deutsche Akademie, the Danish-German Chamber of Commerce, and the Nordische Gesellschaft (Nordic Association).

A German organization in Hamburg called the Deutsche Fichtebund, which was directly under the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, undertook a systematic propaganda campaign in order to gain favorable Danish public opinion.