Chapter V: Part 5

“With the draft of the law for the co-ordination of the states
with the Reich, passed today by the Reich Chancellor,
legislative work has begun which will be of historical
significance for the political development of the German State.
The step taken on 20 July 1932 by the Reich Government, which I
headed at the time, with the aim of abolishing the dualism
between the Reich and Prussia is now crowned by this new
interlocking of the interests of the state of Prussia with those
of the Reich. You, Herr Reich Chancellor, will now be, as once
was Bismarck, in a position to co-ordinate in all points the
policy of the greatest of German states with that of the Reich.
Now that the new law affords you the possibility of appointing a
Prussian Prime Minister, I beg you to inform the Reich President
that I dutifully return to his hands my post of Reich
Commissioner for Prussia.”

I would like to read also the letter which Hitler wrote to Hindenburg in transmitting this resignation. Hitler wrote:

“Vice Chancellor Von Papen has addressed a letter to me which I
enclose for your information. Herr Von Papen has already
informed me within the last few days that he has come to an
agreement with Minister Göring to resign on his own volition, as
soon as the unified conduct of the governmental affairs in the
Reich and in Prussia would be assured by the new law on the
co-ordination of policy in the Reich and the States.

“On the eve of the day when the new law on the institution of
Reichsstatthalter was adopted, Herr Von Papen considered this
aim as having been attained, and requested me to undertake the
appointment of the Prussian Prime Minister, at the same time
offering further collaboration in the Reich Government, by now
lending full service.

“Herr Von Papen, in accepting the post of Commissioner for the
Government of Prussia in these difficult times since 30 January,
has rendered a very meritorious service to the realization of
the idea of coordinating the policy in Reich and states. His
collaboration in the Reich Cabinet, to which he is now lending
all his energy, is infinitely valuable; my relationship to him
is such a heartily friendly one, that I sincerely rejoice at the
great help I shall thus receive.”

Yet it was only 5 weeks before this that on the 3rd of March 1933, Von Papen had warned the electorate at Stuttgart against abolishing federalism. I will now read from Document 3313-PS, which is on Page 48 of the English document book, and which I now introduce as Exhibit GB-240—about the middle of the third paragraph. This is an extract from Von Papen’s speech at Stuttgart. He said:

“Federalism will protect us from centralism, that organizational
form which focuses all the living strength of a nation on one
point. No nation is less fitted to be governed centrally than
the German.”

Earlier, at the time of the elections in the autumn of 1932, Von Papen as Chancellor had visited Munich. The _Frankfurter Zeitung_ of the 12th of October 1932 commented on his policy. I refer to Document 3318-PS on Page 51 of the English document book, which I introduce as Exhibit GB-241. The _Frankfurter Zeitung_ commented:

“Von Papen claimed that it had been his great aim from the very
beginning of his tenure in office to build a new Reich for, and
with, the various states. The Reich Government is taking a
definite federalist attitude. Its slogan is not a dreary
centralism or uniformity.”

That was in October 1932. All that was now thrown overboard in deference to his new master.

I now come to the Jews. In March 1933 the entire Cabinet approved a systematic state policy of persecution of the Jews. This has already been described to the Tribunal. The reference to the transcript is Pages 1442 (Volume III, Page 525) and 2490 (Volume V, Page 93).

Only 4 days before the boycott was timed to begin “with all ferocity”—to borrow the words of Dr. Goebbels—Von Papen wrote a radiogram of reassurance to the Board of Trade for German-American Commerce in New York which had expressed its anxiety to the German Government about the situation. His assurance—which I now put in as Document D-635, and it will be Exhibit GB-242 on Page 73 of the English document book—his assurance was published in the _New York Times_ on the 28th of March 1933, and it contained the following sentence which I read from about the middle of the page. This document is the last but one in the German document book:

“Reports circulated in America and received here with
indignation about alleged tortures of political prisoners and
mistreatment of Jews deserve strongest repudiation. Hundreds of
thousands of Jews, irrespective of nationality, who have not
taken part in political activities, are living here entirely
unmolested.”

This is a characteristic . . .

DR. KUBUSCHOK: The article in the _New York Times_ goes back to a telegram of the Defendant Von Papen, which is contained in the document book one page ahead. The English translation has a date of the 27th of March. This date is an error. The German text which I received shows that it is a question of a weekend letter, which, according to the figures on the German document, was sent on the 25th of March. This difference in time is of particular importance for the following reason:

In effect, on the 25th of March nothing was yet known concerning the Jewish boycott, which Goebbels then announced for the 1st of April. The Defendant Von Papen could, therefore, on the 25th of March, point to these then comparatively few smaller incidents as he does in the telegram. In any case, the conclusion of the indictment that the contents of the telegram were a lie thereby falls.

THE PRESIDENT: Major Barrington, have you the original of that?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: The original is here, My Lord; yes. It is quite correct that there are some figures at the top, which, though I had not recognized it, might indicate that it was dispatched on the 25th.

THE PRESIDENT: And when was the meeting of the Cabinet which approved the policy of persecution of the Jews?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, My Lord, I can’t say. It was some time within the last few days of March, but it might have been on the 26th. I can have that checked up.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I clarify that matter by saying that the Cabinet meeting in which the Jewish question was discussed took place at a much later date and that in this Cabinet meeting Cabinet members, among others the Defendant Von Papen, condemned the Jewish boycott. I shall submit the minutes of the meeting as soon as my motion has been granted.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t know what you mean by your motion being granted. Does Counsel for the Prosecution say whether he persists in his allegation or whether he withdraws it?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I will say this. Subject to checking the date when the Cabinet meeting took place . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can do that at the adjournment and let us know in the morning.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: If Your Lordship pleases. At this point I will just say this: That it was, as the Tribunal has already heard, common knowledge at the time that the Nazi policy was anti-Jewish, and Jews were already in concentration camps, so I will leave it to the Tribunal to infer that at the time when that radiogram was sent, which I am prepared to accept as being the 25th of March, that Von Papen did know of this policy of boycotting.

I will go further now that I am on this point, and I will say that Von Papen was indeed himself a supporter of the anti-Jewish policy, and as evidence of this I will put in Document 2830-PS, which is on Page 37A of the document book, and which I now introduce as Exhibit GB-243.

This is a letter, My Lord, written by Von Papen from Vienna on the 12th of May 1936 to Hitler on the subject of the Freiheitsbund. Paragraph 4 of the English text is as follows:

“The following incident is interesting. The Czech Legation
secretary Dohalsky has made to Mr. Staud, (leader of the
Freiheitsbund) the offer to make available to the Freiheitsbund
any desired amount from the Czech Government which he would need
for the strengthening of his struggle against the Heimwehr. Sole
condition is that the Freiheitsbund must guarantee to adopt an
anti-German attitude. Mr. Staud has flatly refused this offer.
This demonstrates how even in the enemy’s camp the new grouping
of forces is already taken into account. From this the further
necessity results for us to support this movement financially as
heretofore, and mostly in reference to the continuation of its
fight against Jewry.”

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I must point out here a difficulty which has apparently been caused by the translation. In the original German text the word “mit Bezug” is used in regard to the transmittal in the following way: “. . . referring to the continuation of its fight against Jewry.” This word “mit Bezug” means here that under this heading the money must be transmitted, although this was not the real purpose, for the Austrian Freiheitsbund (Freedom Union) was not an anti-Semitic movement but a legal trade union to which Chancellor Dollfuss also belonged. This expression “mit Bezug” means only that the transmittal of the money demanded a covering designation because it was not permissible to transmit money from abroad to a party recognized by the state for any party purposes, as is shown by the rejected offer of the Czechoslovaks. I only wanted to point out here that the words “in reference” perhaps give a wrong impression and should rather be translated “referring.” In any case, I should like to point out that this “in reference” was a kind of camouflage for the transmittal of the money.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t know to which word you are referring, but as I understand it the only purpose of referring to this letter was to prove that in it Von Papen was suggesting that a certain organization should be financially assisted in its fight against Jewry. That is the only purpose of referring to the letter. I don’t know what you mean about some word being wrongly translated.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: That is exactly how the error originated. The money was not transmitted to fight Jewry for that was not at all the purpose of this Christian Trade Union in Austria, but a certain designation for the transmittal of the money had to be devised. So this continuation of its fight against Jewry was used. The purpose therefore was not the fight against Jewry but the elimination through financial support of another foreign influence, namely that of Czechoslovakia.

THE PRESIDENT: I should have thought myself that the point which might have been taken against the Prosecution was that the letter was dated nearly 3 years after the time with which you were then dealing.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is so, My Lord; it was not at the time of the previous one.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the previous one was marked 1933, and this was 1936.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Oh yes. I put it in, My Lord, only to show what Von Papen’s position was by then, at any rate. If Your Lordship has any doubt as to the translation I would suggest that it might now be translated by the interpreter. We have the German text, a photostat.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you can have it translated again tomorrow; if necessary, you can have it gone into again then.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes, My Lord.

I come now to the Catholic Church. The Nazi treatment of the Church has been fully dealt with by the United States Prosecution. In this particular field Von Papen, a prominent lay Catholic, helped to consolidate the Nazi position both at home and abroad as perhaps no one else could have done.

In dealing with the persecution of the Church, Colonel Wheeler read to the Tribunal Hitler’s assurance given to the Church on the 23rd of March 1933 in Hitler’s speech on the Enabling Act, an assurance which resulted in the well-known Fulda Declaration of the German bishops, also quoted by Colonel Wheeler. That was Document 3387-PS, which was Exhibit USA-566. This deceitful assurance of Hitler’s appears to have been made at the suggestion of Von Papen 8 days earlier at the Reich Cabinet meeting at which the Enabling Act was discussed, on the 15th of March 1933. I refer to Document 2962-PS, which is Exhibit USA-578, and it is on Page 40 of the English document book. I read from Page 44, that is at the bottom of Page 6 of the German text. The minutes say:

“The Deputy of the Reich Chancellor and Reich Commissioner for
Prussia stated that it is of decisive importance to coordinate
into the new state the masses standing behind the parties. The
question of the incorporation of political Catholicism into the
new state is of particular importance.”

That was a statement made by Von Papen at the meeting at which the Enabling Act was discussed prior to Hitler’s speech on the Enabling Act in which he gave his assurance to the Church.

On the 20th of July 1933 Papen signed the Reich Concordat negotiated by him with the Vatican. The Tribunal has already taken judicial notice of this as Document 3280(a)-PS. The signing of the Concordat, like Hitler’s Papen-inspired speech on the Enabling Act, was only an interlude in the church policy of the Nazi conspirators. Their policy of assurances was followed by a long series of violations which eventually resulted in Papal denunciation in the Encyclical “Mit brennender Sorge,” which is 3476-PS, Exhibit USA-567.

Papen maintains that his actions regarding the Church were sincere, and he has asserted during interrogations that it was Hitler who sabotaged the Concordat. If Von Papen really believed in the very solemn undertakings given by him on behalf of the Reich to the Vatican, I submit it is strange that he, himself a Catholic, should have continued to serve Hitler after all those violations and even after the Papal Encyclical itself. I will go further. I will say that Papen was himself involved in what was virtually, if not technically, a violation of the Concordat. The Tribunal will recollect the allocution of the Pope, dated the 2d of June 1945, which is Document 3268-PS, Exhibit USA-356, from which on Page 1647 (Volume IV, Page 64) of the transcript Colonel Storey read the Pope’s own summary of the Nazis’ bitter struggle against the Church. The very first item the Pope mentioned is the dissolution of Catholic organizations and if the Tribunal will look at Document 3376-PS on Page 56 of the English document book, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-244 and which is an extract from _Das Archiv_, they will see that in September 1934 Von Papen ordered—and I say “ordered” advisedly—the dissolution of the Union of Catholic Germans, of which he was at the time the leader. The text of _Das Archiv_ reads as follows:

“The Reich Directorate of the Party announced the
self-dissolution of the Union of Catholic Germans.

“Since the Reich Directorate of the Party, through its
Department for Cultural Peace, administers directly and to an
increasing extent all cultural problems including those
concerning the relations of State and churches, the tasks at
first delegated to the Union of Catholic Germans are now
included in those of the Reich Directorate of the Party in the
interest of a still closer co-ordination.

“Former Vice Chancellor Von Papen, up to now the leader of the
Union of Catholic Germans, declared about the dissolution of
this organization that it was done upon his suggestion, since
the attitude of the National Socialist State toward the
Christian and Catholic Church had been explained often and
unequivocally by the Führer and Chancellor himself.”

I said that Von Papen “ordered” the dissolutions, although the announcement said it was self-dissolution on his suggestion; but I submit that such a suggestion from one in Papen’s position was equivalent to an order, since by that date it was common knowledge that the Nazis were dropping all pretense that rival organizations might be permitted to exist.

After 9 months’ service under Hitler, spent in consolidating the Nazi control, Von Papen was evidently well content with his choice. I refer to Document 3375-PS, Page 54 of the English document book, which I put in as Exhibit GB-245. On the 2d of November 1933, speaking at Essen from the same platform as Hitler and Gauleiter Terboven, in the course of the campaign for the Reichstag election and the referendum concerning Germany’s leaving the League of Nations, Von Papen declared:

“Ever since Providence called upon me to become the pioneer of
national resurrection and the rebirth of our homeland, I have
tried to support with all my strength the work of the National
Socialist movement and its Führer; and just as I at the time of
taking over the Chancellorship”—that was in 1932—“advocated
paving the way to power for the young fighting liberation
movement, just as I on January 30 was destined by a gracious
fate to put the hands of our Chancellor and Führer into the hand
of our beloved Field Marshal, so do I today again feel the
obligation to say to the German people and all those who have
kept confidence in me:

“The good Lord has blessed Germany by giving her in times of
deep distress a leader who will lead her through all distresses
and weaknesses, through all crises and moments of danger, with
the sure instinct of the statesman into a happy future.”

And then the last sentence of the whole text on Page 55:

“Let us, in this hour, say to the Führer of the new Germany that
we believe in him and his work.”

By this time the Cabinet, of which Von Papen was a member and to which he had given all his strength, had abolished the civil liberties, had sanctioned political murder committed in aid of Nazism’s seizure of power, had destroyed all rival political parties, had enacted the basic laws for abolition of the political influence of the federal states, had provided the legislative basis for purging the civil service and judiciary of anti-Nazi elements, and had embarked upon a State policy of persecution of the Jews.

Papen’s words are words of hollow mockery: “The good Lord has blessed Germany . . . .”

The third allegation against the Defendant Papen is that he promoted preparations for war. Knowing as he did the basic program of the Nazi Party, it is inconceivable that as Vice Chancellor for a year and a half he could have been dissociated from the conspirators’ warlike preparations; he, of whom Hitler wrote to Hindenburg on the 10th of April 1933 that, “His collaboration in the Reich Cabinet, to which he is now lending all his energy, is infinitely valuable.”

The fourth allegation against Papen is that he participated in the political planning and preparations for wars of aggression and wars in violation of international treaties. In Papen’s case this allegation is really the story of the Anschluss. His part in that was a preparation for wars of aggression in two senses: First, that the Anschluss was the necessary preliminary step to all the subsequent armed aggressions; second, that, even if it can be contended that the Anschluss was in fact achieved without aggression, it was planned in such a way that it would have been achieved by aggression if that had been necessary.

I need do no more than summarize Papen’s Austrian activities since the whole story of the Anschluss has been described to the Tribunal already, though with the Tribunal’s permission I would like to read again two short passages of a particularly personal nature regarding Papen. But before I deal with Papen’s activities in Austria there is one matter that I feel I ought not to omit to mention to the Tribunal.

On the 18th of June 1934 Papen made his remarkable speech at Marburg University. I do not propose to put it in evidence, nor is it in the document book, because it is a matter of history and in what I say I do not intend to commit myself in regard to the motives and consequences of his speech which are not free from mystery; but I will say this: That as far as concerns the subject matter of Papen’s Marburg speech, it was an outspoken criticism of the Nazis. One must imagine that the Nazis were furiously angry; and although he escaped death in the Blood Purge 12 days later, he was put under arrest for 3 days. Whether this arrest was originally intended to end in execution or whether it was to protect him from the purge as one too valuable to be lost, I do not now inquire. After his release from arrest he not unnaturally resigned the Vice Chancellorship. Now the question that arises—and this is why I mention the matter at this point—is why, after these barbaric events, did he ever go back into the service of the Nazis again? What an opportunity missed! If he had stopped then he might have saved the world much suffering. Suppose that Hitler’s own Vice Chancellor, just released from arrest, had defied the Nazis and told the world the truth. There might never have been a reoccupation of the Rhineland; there might never have been a war. But I must not speculate. The lamentable fact is that he slipped back, he succumbed again to the fascination of Hitler.

After the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss only 3 weeks later, on 25 July 1934, the situation was such as to call for the removal of the German Minister Rieth and for the prompt substitution of a man who was an enthusiast for the Anschluss with Germany, who could be tolerant of Nazi objectives and methods but who could lend an aura of respectability to official German representation in Vienna. This situation is described in the transcript at Pages 478 and 479 (Volume II, Pages 355, 356). Hitler’s reaction to the murder of Dollfuss was immediate. He chose his man as soon as he heard the news. The very next day, the 26th of July, he sent Von Papen a letter of appointment. This is on Page 37 of the English document book; it is document 2799-PS and it has already been judicially noticed by the Tribunal. Mr. Alderman read the letter, and I only wish to refer to the personal remarks toward the end. Hitler in this letter, after reciting his version of the Dollfuss affair and expressing his desire that Austrian-German relations should be brought again into normal and friendly channels, says in the third paragraph:

“For this reason I request you, dear Herr Von Papen, to take
over this important task just because you have possessed and
continue to possess my most complete and unlimited confidence
ever since our collaboration in the Cabinet.”

And the last paragraph of the letter:

“Thanking you again today for all that you once have done for
the co-ordination of the Government of the National Revolution
and since then, together with us, for Germany . . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: This might be a good time to break off for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

MAJOR BARRINGTON: My Lord, I had just read from the letter of appointment as Minister in Vienna which Hitler sent to Von Papen on the 26th of July 1934. This letter, which, of course, was made public, naturally did not disclose the real intention of Von Papen’s appointment. The actual mission of Von Papen was frankly stated shortly after his arrival in Vienna in the course of a private conversation he had with the American Minister, Mr. Messersmith. I quote from Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit, which is Document 1760-PS, Exhibit USA-57, and it is on Page 22 of the document book, just about half way through the second paragraph. Mr. Messersmith said:

“When I did call on Von Papen in the German Legation, he greeted
me with: ‘Now you are in my Legation and I can control the
conversation.’ In the baldest and most cynical manner he then
proceeded to tell me that all of southeastern Europe, to the
borders of Turkey, was Germany’s natural hinterland and that he
had been charged with the mission of facilitating German
economic and political control over all this region for Germany.
He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was
to be the first step. He definitely stated that he was in
Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from
Vienna to work towards the weakening of the governments in the
other states to the south and southeast. He said that he
intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain
influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer,
towards that end.”

Throughout the earlier period of his mission to Austria, Von Papen’s activity was characterized by the assiduous avoidance of any appearance of intervention. His true mission was re-affirmed with clarity several months after its commencement when he was instructed by Berlin that “during the next 2 years nothing can be undertaken which will give Germany external political difficulties,” and that every appearance of German intervention in Austrian affairs must be avoided; and Von Papen himself stated to Berger-Waldenegg, an Austrian Foreign Minister, “Yes, you have your French and English friends now, and you can have your independence a little longer.” All of that was told in detail by Mr. Alderman, again quoting from Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit, which is in the transcript at Pages 492 (Volume II, Page 354), 506, and 507 (Volume II, Pages 362-364).

Throughout this earlier period, the Nazi movement was gaining strength in Austria without openly admitted German intervention; and Germany needed more time to consolidate its diplomatic position. These reasons for German policy were frankly expressed by the German Foreign Minister Von Neurath in conversation with the American Ambassador to France; this was read into the transcript at Page 520 (Volume II, Page 381) by Mr. Alderman from Document L-150, Exhibit USA-65.

The Defendant Von Papen accordingly restricted his activities to the normal ambassadorial function of cultivating all respectable elements in Austria, and ingratiating himself in these circles. Despite his facade of strict nonintervention, Von Papen remained in contact with subversive elements in Austria. Thus in his report to Hitler, dated 17 May 1935, he advised concerning Austrian-Nazi strategy as proposed by Captain Leopold, leader of the illegal Austrian Nazis, the object of which was to trick Dr. Schuschnigg into establishing an Austrian coalition government with the Nazi Party. This is Document 2247-PS, Exhibit USA-64, and it is in the transcript at Pages 516 to 518 (Volume II, Pages 379, 380). It is on Page 34 of the English document book. I don’t want to read this letter again, but I would like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the first line of what appears as the second paragraph in the English text, where Von Papen, talking about this strategy of Captain Leopold, says, “I suggest that we take an active part in this game.”

I mention also in connection with the illegal organizations in Austria, Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61, which the Tribunal will remember was a report from Rainer to Bürckel, and which is dealt with in the transcript at Pages 498 to 505 (Volume II, Pages 367 to 376).

Eventually the agreement of 11 July 1936 between Germany and Austria was negotiated by Von Papen. This is already in evidence as Document TC-22, Exhibit GB-20. The public form of this agreement provides that while Austria in her policy should regard herself as a German state, yet Germany would recognize the full sovereignty of Austria and would not exercise direct or indirect influence on the inner political order of Austria. More interesting was the secret part of the agreement, revealed by Mr. Messersmith, which ensured the Nazis an influence in the Austrian Cabinet and participation in the political life of Austria. This has already been read into the transcript at Page 522 (Volume II, Page 383) by Mr. Alderman.

After the agreement the Defendant Von Papen continued to pursue his policy by maintaining contact with the illegal Nazis, by trying to influence appointments to strategic Cabinet positions, and by attempting to secure official recognition of Nazi front organizations. Reporting to Hitler on 1 September 1936, he summarized his program for normalizing Austrian-German relations in pursuance of the agreement of 11 July. This is Document 2246-PS, Exhibit USA-67, on Page 33 of the English document book.

The Tribunal will recall that he recommended “as a guiding principle, continued, patient, psychological manipulations with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime.” Then he mentions his discussion with the illegal party and says that he is aiming at “cooperative representation of the movement in the Fatherland Front, but nevertheless is refraining from putting National Socialists in important positions for the time being.”

There is no need to go over again the events that led up to the meeting of Schuschnigg with Hitler in February 1938, which Von Papen arranged and which he attended, and to the final invasion of Austria in March 1938. It is enough if I quote from the biography again on Page 66 of the document book. It is about two-thirds of the way down the page:

“Following the events of March 1938, which caused Austria’s
incorporation into the German Reich, Von Papen had the
satisfaction of being present at the Führer’s side when the
entry into Vienna took place, after the Führer, in recognition
of his valuable collaboration, had on 14 February 1938, admitted
him to the Party and had bestowed upon him the Golden Party
Badge.”

And the biography continues:

“At first Von Papen retired to his estate Wallerfangen in the
Saar district, but soon the Führer required his services again
and on the 18 April 1939 appointed Von Papen German Ambassador
in Ankara.”

Thus the fascination of serving Hitler triumphed once again, and this time it was at a date when the seizure of Czechoslovakia could have left no shadow of doubt in Papen’s mind that Hitler was determined to pursue his program of aggression.

One further quotation from the biography on Page 66, the last sentence of the last paragraph but one:

“After his return to the Reich”—that was in 1944—“Von Papen
was awarded the Knight’s Cross of the War Merit Order with
Swords.”

In conclusion, I draw the Tribunal’s attention again to the fulsome praises which Hitler publicly bestowed upon Von Papen for his services, especially in the earlier days. I have given two instances where Hitler said “His collaboration is infinitely valuable,” and again “You possess my most complete and unlimited confidence.”

Papen, the ex-Chancellor, the soldier, the respected Catholic, Papen the diplomat, Papen the man of breeding and culture—there was the man who could overcome the hostility and antipathy of those respectable elements who barred Hitler’s way. Papen was—to repeat the words of Sir Hartley Shawcross in his opening speech—“one of the men whose co-operation and support made the Nazi Government of Germany possible.”

That concludes my case. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe will now follow with the case of Von Neurath.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please the Tribunal, the presentation against the Defendant Von Neurath falls into five parts, and the first of these is concerned with the following positions and honors which he held.

He was a member of the Nazi Party from 30 January 1937 until 1945, and he was awarded the Golden Party Badge on 30 January 1937. He was general in the SS. He was personally appointed Gruppenführer by Hitler in September 1937 and promoted to Obergruppenführer on 21 June 1943. He was Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Chancellorship of the Defendant Von Papen from 2 June 1932 and under the Chancellorship of Hitler from 30 January 1933 until he was replaced by the Defendant Von Ribbentrop on 4 February 1938. He was Reich Minister from 4 February 1938 until May 1945. He was President of the Secret Cabinet Council, to which he was appointed on 4 February 1938, and he was a member of the Reich Defense Council. He was appointed Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia from 18 March 1939 until he was replaced by the Defendant Frick on 25 August 1943.

He was awarded the Adler Order by Hitler at the time of his appointment as Reich Protector. The Defendant Ribbentrop was the only other German to receive this decoration.

If the Tribunal please, these facts are collected in Document 2973-PS, which is Exhibit USA-19, and in that document, which is signed by the defendant and his counsel, the defendant makes comments on certain of these matters with which I should like to deal.

He says that the award of the Golden Party Badge was made on 30 January 1937 against his will and without his being asked.

I point out that this defendant not only refrained from repudiating the allegedly unwanted honor, but after receiving it, attended meetings at which wars of aggression were planned, actively participated in the rape of Austria, and tyrannized Bohemia and Moravia.

The second point is that his appointment as Gruppenführer was also against his will and without his being asked. On that point, the Prosecution submits that the wearing of the uniform, the receipt of the further promotion to Obergruppenführer and the actions against Bohemia and Moravia must be considered when the defendant’s submission is examined.

He then says that his appointment as Foreign Minister was by Reich President Von Hindenburg. We submit we need not do more than draw attention to the personalities of the Defendant Von Papen and Hitler and to the fact that President Von Hindenburg died in 1934. This defendant continued as Foreign Minister until 1938.

He then says that he was an inactive Minister from the 4th of February 1938 until May 1945. At that moment attention is drawn to the activities which will be mentioned below and to the terrible evidence as to Bohemia and Moravia which will be forthcoming from our friend the Soviet prosecutor.

This defendant’s next point is that the Secret Cabinet Council never sat nor conferred.

I point out to the Tribunal that that was described as a select committee of the Cabinet for the deliberation of foreign affairs; and the Tribunal will find that description in Document 1774-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-246. This is an extract from a book by a well-known author, and on Page 2 of the document book, the first page of that document, in about the seventh line from the bottom of the page, they will see that among the bureaus subordinated to the Führer for direct counsel and assistance, number four is the Secret Cabinet Council; President: Reich Minister Baron Von Neurath.

And if the Tribunal will be kind enough to turn over to Page 3, about ten lines from the top, they will see the paragraph beginning:

“A Secret Cabinet Council to advise the Führer in the basic
problems of foreign policy has been created by the decree of 4
February 1938”—and a reference is given.

“This Secret Cabinet Council is under the direction of Reich
Minister Von Neurath, and includes the Foreign Minister, the Air
Minister, the Deputy of the Führer, the Propaganda Minister, the
Chief of the Reich Chancellery, the Commanders-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy and the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces. The Secret Cabinet council constitutes a closer staff of
collaborators of the Führer which consists exclusively of
members of the Government of the Reich; strictly speaking it
represents a select committee of the Reich Government for the
deliberation on foreign affairs.”

In order to have the formal composition of the body, that is shown in Document 2031-PS, which is Exhibit GB-217. I believe that has been put in. I need not read it again.

The next point that the defendant makes as to his offices is that he was not a member of the Reich Defense Council.

If I may very shortly take that point by stages, I remind the Tribunal that the Reich Defense Council was set up soon after Hitler’s accession to power on 4 April 1933; and the Tribunal will find a note of that point in Document 2261-PS, Exhibit USA-24; and they will find that on the top of Page 12 of the document book there is a reference to the date of the establishment of the Reich Defense Council.

The Reich Defense Council is also dealt with in Document 2986-PS, Exhibit USA-409, which is the affidavit of the Defendant Frick, which the Tribunal will find on Page 14. In the middle of that short affidavit, Defendant Frick says:

“We were also members of the Reich Defense Council which was
supposed to plan preparations in case of war which later on were
published by the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the
Reich.”

Now, that the membership of this Council included the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was then the Defendant Von Neurath, is shown by Document EC-177, Exhibit USA-390. If the Tribunal will turn to Page 16 of the document book, they will find that document and, at the foot of the page, the composition of the Reich Defense Council, the permanent members including the Minister for Foreign Affairs. That document is dated “Berlin, 22 May 1933” which was during this defendant’s tenure of that office. That is the first stage.

The functioning of this council, with a representative of this defendant’s department, Von Bülow, present, is shown by the minutes of the 12th meeting on 14 May 1936. That is Document EC-407, which I put in as Exhibit GB-247. The Tribunal will find at Page 21 that the minutes are for the 14th of May 1936, and the actual reference to an intervention of Von Bülow is in the middle of Page 22.

Then, the next period was after the secret law of 4 September 1938. This defendant was, under the terms of that law, a member of the Reich Defense Council by virtue of his office as president of the Secret Cabinet Council. That is shown by the Document 2194-PS, Exhibit USA-36, which the Tribunal will find at Page 24, and if you will look at Page 24, you will see that the actual copy which was put in evidence was enclosed in a letter addressed to the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia on the 4th of September 1939. It is rather curious that the Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia is now denying his membership in the council when the letter enclosing the law is addressed to him.

But if the Tribunal will be good enough to turn on to Page 28, which is still that document, the last words on that page describe the tasks of that council and say:

“The task of the Reich Defense Council consists, during
peacetime, in deciding all measures for the preparation of Reich
defense, and the gathering together of all forces and means of
the nation in compliance with the directions of the Führer and
Reich Chancellor. The tasks of the Reich Defense Council in
wartime will be especially determined by the Führer and Reich
Chancellor.”

If the Tribunal will turn to the next page, they will see that the permanent members of the Council are listed, and that the seventh one is the President of the Secret Cabinet Council, who was, again, this defendant.

I submit that that deals, for every relevant period, with this defendant’s statement that he was not a member of the Reich Defense Council.

The second broad point that the Prosecution makes against this defendant is that in assuming the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs in Hitler’s Cabinet, this defendant assumed charge of a foreign policy committed to breach of treaties.

We say first that the Nazi Party had repeatedly and for many years made known its intention to overthrow Germany’s international commitments, even at the risk of war. We refer to Sections 1 and 2 of the Party program, which, as the Tribunal has heard, was published year after year. That is on Page 32 of the document book. It is Document 1708-PS, Exhibit USA-255.

I just remind the Tribunal of these Points 1 and 2:

“1. We demand the unification of all Germans into Greater
Germany on the basis of the right of self-determination of
peoples.

“2. We demand equality of rights for the German people in
respect to other nations; abrogation of the peace treaties of
Versailles and St. Germain.”

But probably clearer than that is the statement contained in Hitler’s speech at Munich on the 15th of March 1939; and the Tribunal will find one of the references to that on Page 40 at the middle of the page. It begins:

“My foreign policy had identical aims. My program was to abolish
the Treaty of Versailles. It is absolutely nonsense for the rest
of the world to pretend today that I had not announced this
program until 1933 or 1935 or 1937. Instead of listening to the
foolish chatter of emigrees these gentlemen should have read,
merely once, what I have written, that is written a thousand
times.”

It is futile nonsense for foreigners to raise that point. It would be still more futile for Hitler’s Foreign Minister to suggest that he was ignorant of the aggressive designs of the policy. But I remind the Tribunal that the acceptance of force as a means of solving international problems and achieving the objectives of Hitler’s foreign policy must have been known to anyone as closely in touch with Hitler as the Defendant Von Neurath; and I remind the Tribunal simply by reference to the passages from _Mein Kampf_, which were quoted by my friend Major Elwyn Jones, especially those toward the end of the book, Pages 552, 553, and 554.

So that the Prosecution say that by the acceptance of this foreign policy the Defendant Von Neurath assisted and promoted the accession to power of the Nazi Party.

The third broad point is that in his capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs this defendant directed the international aspects of the first phase of the Nazi conspiracy, the consolidation of control in preparation for war.

As I have already indicated, from his close connection with Hitler this defendant must have known the cardinal points of Hitler’s policy leading up to the outbreak of the World War, as outlined in retrospect by Hitler in his speech to his military leaders on the 23rd of November 1939.

This policy had two facets: internally, the establishment of rigid control; externally, the program to release Germany from its international ties. The external program had four points: 1) Secession from the Disarmament Conference; 2) the order to re-arm Germany; 3) the introduction of compulsory military services; and 4) the remilitarization of the Rhineland.

If the Tribunal will look at Page 35 in the document book, at the end of the first paragraph they will find these points very briefly set out, and perhaps I might just read that passage. It is Document 789-PS, Exhibit USA-23—about 10 lines before the break:

“I had to reorganize everything, beginning with the mass of the
people and extending it to the Armed Forces. First,
reorganization of the interior, abolishment of appearances of
decay and defeatist ideas, education to heroism. While
reorganizing the interior, I undertook the second task: To
release Germany from its international ties. Two particular
characteristics are to be pointed out: Secession from the League
of Nations and denunciation of the Disarmament Conference. It
was a hard decision. The number of prophets who predicted that
it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the
number of believers was very small. I was supported by the
nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I carried out my
intentions. After that the order for rearmament. Here again
there were numerous prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only
a few believers. In 1935 the introduction of compulsory armed
service. After that, militarization of the Rhineland, again a
process believed to be impossible at that time. The number of
people who put trust in me was very small. Then, beginning of
the fortification of the whole country, especially in the west.”

Now, these are summarized in four points. The Defendant Von Neurath participated directly and personally in accomplishing each of these four aspects of Hitler’s foreign policy, at the same time officially proclaiming that these measures did not constitute steps toward aggression.

The first is a matter of history. When Germany left the Disarmament Conference this defendant sent telegrams dated the 14th of October 1933, to the President of the conference—and that will be found in _Dokumente Der Deutschen Politik_, on Page 94 of the first volume for that year. Similarly this defendant made the announcement of Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations on the 21st of October 1933. That again will be found in the official documents. These are referred to in the transcript of the proceedings of the Trial, and I remind the Tribunal of the complementary documents of military preparation, which of course were read and which are Documents C-140, Exhibit USA-51, the 25th of October 1933, and C-153, Exhibit USA-43, the 12th of May 1934. These have already been read and I merely collect them for the memory and assistance of the Tribunal.

The second point—the rearmament of Germany: When this defendant was Foreign Minister, on the 9th of March 1935, the German Government officially announced the establishment of the German Air Force. That is Document TC-44, Exhibit GB-11, already referred to. On the 21st of May 1935 Hitler announced a purported unilateral repudiation of the Naval, Military, and Air clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which, of course, involved a similar purported unilateral repudiation of the same clauses of the Treaty for the Restoration of Friendly Relations with the United States, and that will be found in Document 2288-PS, Exhibit USA-38, which again has already been read. On the same day the Reich Cabinet, of which this defendant was a member, enacted the secret Reich Defense Law creating the office of Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, afterwards designated by the Wehrmacht armament expert as “the cornerstone of German rearmament.” The reference to the law is Document 2261-PS, Exhibit USA-24, a letter of Von Blomberg dated the 24th of June 1935, enclosing this law, which is already before the Tribunal; and the reference to the comment on the importance of the law is Document 2353-PS, Exhibit USA-35. Some of that has already been read, but if the Tribunal will be good enough to turn to Page 52 where that appears, they will find an extract and I might just give the Tribunal the last sentence:

“The new regulations were stipulated in the Reich Defense Law of
21 May 1935, supposed to be promulgated only in case of war but
already declared valid for carrying out war preparations. As
this law . . . fixed the duties of the Armed Forces and the
other Reich authorities in case of war, it was also the
fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war
economy organization.”

The third point is the introduction of compulsory military service. On the 16th of March 1935 this defendant signed the law for the organization of the Armed Forces which provided for universal military service and anticipated a vastly expanded German army. This was described by the Defendant Keitel as the real start of the large scale rearmament program which followed. I will give the official reference in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, year 1935, Volume I, Part 1, Page 369; and the references in the transcript are 411 (Volume II, Page 305), 454, and 455 (Volume II, Page 340).

The fourth point was the remilitarization of the Rhineland. The Rhineland was reoccupied on the 7th of March 1936. I remind the Tribunal of the two complementary documents: 2289-PS, Exhibit USA-56, the announcement of this action by Hitler; and C-139, Exhibit USA-53, which is the “Operation Schulung,” giving the military action which was to be given if necessary. Again the reference to the transcript is Page 458 to Page 464 (Volume II, Pages 342 to 347). These were the acts for which the defendant shared responsibility because of his position and because of the steps which he took; but a little later he summed up his views on the actions detailed above in a speech before Germans abroad made on the 29th of August 1937, of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice, as it appears in _Das Archiv_, 1937, at Page 650. But I quote a short portion of it that appears on Page 72 of the document book:

“The unity of the racial and national will created through
Nazism with unprecedented elan has made possible a foreign
policy by which the fetters of the Versailles Treaty were
forced, the freedom to arm regained, and the sovereignty of the
whole nation re-established. We have really again become master
in our own house and we have created the means of power to
remain henceforth that way for all times. . . . The world should
have seen from . . . Hitler’s deeds and words that his aims are
not aggressive.”

The world, of course, had not the advantage of seeing these various complementary documents of military preparation which I have had the opportunity of putting before the Tribunal.

The next section—and the next point against this defendant—is that both as Minister of Foreign Affairs and as one of the inner circle of the Führer’s advisers on foreign political matters, this defendant participated in the political planning and preparation for acts of aggression against Austria, Czechoslovakia, and other nations.

If I might first put the defendant’s policy in a sentence, I would say that it can be summarized as breaking one treaty only at a time. He himself put it—if I may say so—slightly more pompously but to the same effect in a speech before the Academy of German Law on the 30th of October 1937, which appears in _Das Archiv_, October 1937, Page 921, and which the Tribunal will find in the document book on Page 73. The underlining (italics) is mine:

“In recognition of these elementary facts the Reich Cabinet has
always interceded _in favor of treating every concrete
international problem within the scope of methods especially
suited to it; not to complicate it unnecessarily by involvement
with other problems; and, as long as problems between only two
powers are concerned, to choose the direct way for an immediate
understanding between these two powers. We are in a position to
state that this method has fully proved itself good not only in
the German interest, but also in the general interest._”

The only country whose interests are not mentioned are the other parties to the various treaties that were dealt with in that way; and the working out of that policy can readily be shown by looking at the tabulated form of the actions of this defendant when he was Foreign Minister or during the term of his immediate successor when the defendant still was purported to have influence.

In 1935 the action was directed against the Western Powers. That action was the rearmament of Germany. When that was going on another country had to be reassured. At that time it was Austria, with the support of Italy—which Austria still had up to 1935. And so you get the fraudulent assurance, the essence of the technique, in that case given by Hitler, on the 21st of May 1935. And that is shown clearly to be false, by the documents which Mr. Alderman put in—I give the general reference to the transcript on Pages 534 to 545 (Volume II, Pages 388 to 398). Then, in 1936, you still have the action necessary against the Western Powers in the occupation of the Rhineland. You still have a fraudulent assurance to Austria in the treaty of the 11th of July of that year; and that is shown to be fraudulent by the letters from the Defendant Von Papen, Exhibits USA-64 (Document 2247-PS) and 67 (Document 2246-PS), to one of which my friend Major Barrington has just referred.

Then in 1937 and 1938 you move on a step and the action is directed against Austria. We know what that action was. It was absorption, planned, at any rate finally, at the meeting on the 5th of November 1937; and action taken on the 11th of March 1938.

Reassurance had to be given to the Western Powers, so you have the assurance to Belgium on the 13th of October 1937, which was dealt with by my friend Mr. Roberts. The Tribunal will find the references in Pages 1100 to 1126 (Volume III, Pages 289 to 307) of the transcript.

We move forward a year and the object of the aggressive action becomes Czechoslovakia. Or I should say we move forward 6 months to a year. There you have the Sudetenland obtained in September; the absorption of the whole of Bohemia and Moravia on the 15th of March 1939.