Chapter VII: Part 7

“In case of an incident which necessitates the shooting of
hostages, within the meaning of my announcement of 22 August
1941, the district chief in whose territory the incident
happened is to select from the list of hostages persons whose
execution he wishes to propose to me. In making the selection he
must, from the personal as well as local point of view, draw
from persons belonging to a circle which presumably includes the
guilty.”

I skip a paragraph.

“For execution, only those persons who were already under arrest
at the time of the crime may be proposed.

“The proposal must contain the names and number of the persons
proposed for execution, that is, in the order in which the
choice is recommended.”

And, at the very end of Paragraph VIII, we read:

“When the bodies are buried, the burial of a large number in a
common grave in the same cemetery is to be avoided, in order not
to create places of pilgrimage which, now or later, might form
centers for anti-German propaganda. Therefore, if necessary,
burials must be carried out in various places.”

Parallel to this document, concerning France, there exists in Belgium an order of Falkenhausen of 19 September 1941, which you will find on Page 6 of the official report on Belgium, Document Number F-683, which I shall submit as Exhibit Number RF-275.

THE PRESIDENT: Is the Belgian document worded in substantially the same terms as the document you have just read?

M. DUBOST: Exactly.

THE PRESIDENT: Then I do not think you need to read that.

M. DUBOST: As you wish. Then it will not be necessary either to read in entirety the warning of Seyss-Inquart concerning Holland.

I think that by referring to these exhibits in your document book, you will be able to obtain items of evidence which will only confirm what I read to you of Stülpnagel’s order.

For Norway and Denmark there is a teletyped letter from Keitel to the Supreme Command of the Navy, dated 30 November 1944, which you will find in the document book, as Document C-48 (Exhibit Number RF-280). I read the end of Paragraph 1:

“Every ship-yard worker must know that any act of sabotage
occurring within his sphere of activity entails for him
personally or for his relatives, if he disappears, the most
serious consequences.”

Page 2 of Document Number 870-PS (Exhibit Number RF-281):

“4. I have just received a teletype from Field Marshal Keitel
requesting the publication of an order according to which the
personnel or, if need be, their near relatives (liability of
next of kin) will be held collectively responsible for the acts
of sabotage occurring in their factories.”

And Terboven, who wrote this sentence, added (and it is he who condemns Marshal Keitel):

“This request only makes sense and will only be successful if I
am actually allowed to have executions carried out by shooting.”

All these documents will be submitted.

THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, do I understand that in Belgium, Holland, in Norway, and in Denmark, there were similar orders or decrees with reference to hostages?

M. DUBOST: Yes, Your Honor, I mean to read those concerning Belgium, Holland, and Norway. For Belgium, for instance, you will find at Page 6, Document Number F-683, which is the official document of the Belgian Ministry of Justice:

“Brussels, 29 November 1945, 1, rue de Turin. Decree of
Falkenhausen of 19 September 1941.

“In the future, the population must expect that if attacks are
made on members of the German Army or the German Police and the
culprits cannot be arrested, a number of hostages proportionate
to the gravity of the offense, five at a minimum, will be shot
if the attack causes death. All political prisoners in Belgium
are, with immediate effect, to be considered as hostages.”

THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, I did not want you to read these documents if they are substantially in the same form as the document you have already read.

M. DUBOST: They are more or less in the same form, Your Honor. I shall submit them because they constitute the proof of the systematic repetition of the same methods to obtain the same results, that is, to cause terror to reign in all the occupied countries of the West. But, if the Tribunal considers it constant and established that these methods were systematically used in all the western regions, naturally I shall spare you the reading of documents which are monotonous and which repeat in substance what was said in the document relating to France.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you had better give us references to the documents which concern Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark.

M. DUBOST: Yes, Your Honor, for Belgium, Document F-683, Page 6, decree of Falkenhausen of 19 September 1941, submitted as Exhibit Number RF-275, as constituting the official report of the Kingdom of Belgium against the principal war criminals.

The second document is C-46, corresponding to UK-42 (24 November 1942), submitted as Exhibit Number RF-276.

For Holland, a warning by Seyss-Inquart, Document Number F-224, which you may feel it necessary for me to read, since Seyss-Inquart is one of the defendants. I submit this document under Exhibit Number RF-279, and I quote:

“For the destruction or the damaging of railway installations,
telephone cables, and post offices I shall make responsible all
the inhabitants of the community on whose territory the act is
committed.

“The population of these communities must expect that reprisals
will be taken against private property and that houses or whole
blocks will be destroyed.”

THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid I don’t know where you are reading. Which paragraph are you reading?

M. DUBOST: I am told, Mr. President, that this document has not been bound with the Dutch report; I shall file it at the end of the hearing, if I may.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

M. DUBOST: I quote now another document, the warning of Seyss-Inquart to Holland.

THE PRESIDENT: And that is what number?

M. DUBOST: Number 152 in your document book, concerning German justice, which will be submitted at the hearing tomorrow.

For Norway and Denmark we have several documents which establish that the same policy of execution of hostages was followed. We have, in particular, Document C-48 (Exhibit Number RF-280) from which I read a short time ago.

All those special orders for each of the occupied regions of the West are the result of the general order of Keitel, which my American colleagues have already read and on which I merely gave a comment this morning. The responsibility of Keitel in the development of the policy of execution of hostages is total. He was given warning; German generals even told him that this policy went beyond the aim pursued and might become dangerous.

On 16 September 1942, General Falkenhausen addressed a letter to him, from which I extract the following passage—it is Document Number 1594-PS, which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-283:

“Enclosed is a list of the shootings of hostages which have
taken place until now in my area and the incidents on account of
which these shootings took place.

“In a great number of cases, particularly in the most serious,
the perpetrators were later apprehended and sentenced.

“This result is undoubtedly very unsatisfactory. The effect is
not so much deterrent as destructive of the feeling of the
population for right and security; the cleft between the people
influenced by communism and the remainder of the population is
being bridged; all circles are becoming filled with a feeling of
hatred toward the occupying forces and effective inciting
material is given to enemy propaganda. Thereby military danger
and general political reaction of an entirely unwanted
nature. . . .”—Signed—“Von Falkenhausen.”

I shall now present Document Number 1587-PS from the same German general and he seems to be lucid:

“In addition I wish once more to point out the following:

“In several cases the authors of aggression or acts of sabotage
were discovered when the hostages had already been shot, shortly
after the criminal acts had been committed, according to the
instructions received. Moreover, the real culprits often did not
belong to the same circles as the executed hostages. Undoubtedly
in such cases the execution of hostages does not inspire terror
in the population but indifference to repressive measures and
even resentment on the part of some sections of the population
who until then had displayed a passive attitude. The result for
the occupying power is therefore negative as planned and
intended by the English agents, who were often the instigators
of these acts. It will therefore be necessary to prolong the
delay in cases where the arrest of the culprits may yet be
expected. I therefore request that you leave to me the
responsibility for fixing such delays, in order that the
greatest possible success in the fight against terrorist acts
may be obtained.”

THE PRESIDENT: Is it known what the date of that document was?

M. DUBOST: It is after the 16th of September 1941. We do not have the exact date. The document is appended to another document, the date of which is illegible; but it is after Keitel’s order since it gives an account of the executions of hostages, carried out in compliance with that order. It points out that after the execution of the hostages the culprits were found; that the effect was deplorable and aroused the resentment of some of the population.

You will find also in this Document Number 1587-PS—but this time an extract from the monthly report of the Commander of the Wehrmacht in the Netherlands—the report for the month of August 1942, a new warning to Keitel:

“B. Special events and the political situation:

“On the occasion of an attempt against a train of soldiers on
furlough due to arrive in Rotterdam, a Dutch railway guard was
seriously wounded by touching a wire connected with an explosive
charge, thus causing an explosion. The following repressive
measures were announced in the Dutch press:

“The deadline for the arrest of the perpetrators, with
collaboration of the population, is fixed at 14 August,
midnight. A reward of 100,000 florins will be made for a
denunciation, which will be treated confidentially. If the
culprits are not arrested within the time appointed, arrests of
hostages are threatened; railway lines will be guarded by
Dutchmen.

“Since, despite this summons, the perpetrator did not report and
was not otherwise discovered, the following hostages, among whom
some had already been in custody for several weeks as hostages,
were shot on the order of the Higher SS and Police Führer.”

I will pass over the enumeration of the names. I omit the next paragraph.

THE PRESIDENT: Could you read the names and the titles?

M. DUBOST: “Ruys, Willem, Director General, Rotterdam; Count E.O.G. Van Limburg-Stirum, Arnhem; M. Baelde, Robert, Doctor of Law, Rotterdam; Bennenkers, Christoffel, former Inspector General of the Police at Rotterdam; Baron Alexander Schimmelpennink Van der Oye, Noordgouwe (Seeland).” One paragraph further on:

“Public opinion was particularly affected by the execution of
these hostages. Reports at hand express the opinion that, from
the beginning of the occupation, no stroke inflicted by the
Germans was more deeply felt. Many anonymous letters, and even
some signed ones, sent to the Commander of the Wehrmacht, who
was considered as responsible for this ‘unheard of event,’ show
the varied reactions of the mass of the Dutch people. From the
bitterest insults to apparently pious petitions and prayers not
to resort to extremes, no nuance was lacking which did not in
one way or another indicate, to say the least, complete
disapproval and misunderstanding, first of the threat, and
secondly of the actual execution of the hostages. Reproaches for
this most severe infraction of law (which were based on serious
argument and often gave rise to thought), and also cries of
despair from idealists who, in spite of all that had occurred in
the political sphere, had still believed in German-Dutch
understanding but now saw all was at an end—all this was found
in the correspondence. In addition, the objection was raised
that such methods were only doing the work of the Communists,
who as the real instigators of active sabotage must be very glad
to couple with their achievements the pleasure of the
elimination of ‘such hostages.’

“In short, such disapproval even in the ranks of the very few
really pro-German Dutch had never before been noticed, so much
hatred at one time had never been felt.”—signed—“Schneider,
Captain.”

Despite these warnings proffered by conscientious subordinates, neither the General Staff nor Keitel ever gave any order to the contrary. The order of 16 September 1941 always remained in force. When I have shown you examples of executions of hostages in France, you will see that a number of facts which I shall utilize are dated 1942, 1943 and even 1944.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

MARSHAL: If Your Honor please, the Defendants Kaltenbrunner and Streicher will continue to be absent during this afternoon’s session.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dubost, the Tribunal had some difficulty this morning in following the documents that you were citing; and also, the Tribunal understands the interpreters had some difficulty because the document books, except the one that is before me, have no indications of the “PS” or other numbers; and the documents themselves are not numbered in order. Therefore it is extremely difficult for members of the Tribunal to find documents, and it is also extremely difficult for the interpreters to find any document which may be before them.

So, this afternoon, it will be appreciated if you will be so kind as to indicate what the document is, and then give both the interpreters and the Tribunal enough time in which they may find the document, and then indicate exactly which part of the document you are going to read, that is to say, whether it is the beginning of the document, or the first paragraph, or the second, and so on. But you must bear with us if we find some difficulty in following you in the documents.

M. DUBOST: Very well, Your Honor.

I had finished this morning presenting the general rules which prevailed during the five years of occupation in the matter of the execution of numerous hostages in the occupied countries of the West. I brought you the evidence, by reading a series of official German documents, that the highest authorities of the Army, of the Party, and of the Nazi Government had deliberately chosen to practice a terroristic policy through the seizure of hostages.

Before passing to the examination of a few particular cases, it seems to me to be necessary to say exactly wherein this policy consisted, in the light of the texts which I have quoted.

According to the circumstances, people belonging by choice or ethnically to the vanquished nations were apprehended and held as a guarantee for the maintenance of order in a given sector; or after a given incident of which the enemy army had been the victim. They were apprehended and held with a view to obtaining the execution by the vanquished population of acts determined by the occupying authority, such as denunciation, payment of collective fines, the handing over of perpetrators of assaults committed against the German Army, and the handing over of political adversaries; and these persons thus arrested were often massacred subsequently by way of reprisal.

An idea emerges from methods of this kind, namely, that the hostage, who is a human being, becomes a special security subjected to seizure as determined by the enemy. How contrary this is to the rule of individual liberty and human dignity. All the members of the German Government are jointly responsible for this iniquitous concept and for its application in our vanquished countries. No member of the German Government can throw this responsibility on to subordinates by claiming that they merely executed clearly stated orders with an excess of zeal.

I have shown you that upon many occasions, on the contrary, the persons who carried out the orders reported to the chiefs the moral consequences resulting from the application of the terroristic policy of hostages. And we know that in no case were contrary orders given. We know that the original orders were always maintained.

I shall not endeavor to enumerate in their totality all the cases of executions of hostages. For our country, France, alone, there were 29,660 executed. This is proved in Document Number F-420, dated Paris, 21 December 1945, the original of which will be submitted under Exhibit Number RF-266 to your Tribunal. It is at the beginning of the document book, the second document. There in detail, region by region, the number is given of the hostages who were executed.

“Region of: Lille, 1,143; Laon, 222; Rouen, 658; Angers, 863;
Orléans, 501; Reims, 353; Dijon, 1,691; Poitiers, 82;
Strasbourg, 211; Rennes, 974; Limoges, 2,863; Clermont-Ferrand,
441; Lyons, 3,674; Marseilles, 1,513; Montpellier, 785;
Toulouse, 765; Bordeaux, 806; Nancy, 571; Metz, 220; Paris,
11,000; Nice, 324; total, 29,660.”

I shall limit my presentation to a few typical cases of executions which unveil the political plan of the General Staff which prescribed these executions—plans of terror, plans that were intended to create and accentuate the division between Frenchmen, or, more generally, between citizens of the occupied countries. You will find in your document book a file quoted as F-133, which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-288. This is called “Posters Concerning Paris.” At the head of the page you will read, _Pariser Zeitung_ supplement. This document reproduces a few of the very numerous posters and bills, some of the numerous notices inserted in the press from 1940 to 1945 announcing the arrest of hostages in Paris, in the Paris district, and in France. I shall read only one of these documents, which you will find on the second page, entitled Number 6, 19 September 1941. You will see in it an appeal to informers, an appeal to traitors; you will see in it a means of corruption, which systematically applied to all the countries of the West for years; all tended to demoralize them to an equal extent:

“Appeal to the population of occupied territories.

“On 21 August a German soldier was fired on and killed by
cowardly murderers. In consequence I ordered on 23 August that
hostages be taken, and threatened to have a certain number of
them shot in case such an assault should be repeated.

“New crimes have obliged me to put this threat into execution.
In spite of this, new assaults have taken place.

“I recognize that the great majority of the population is
conscious of its duty, which is to help the authorities in their
unremitting effort to maintain calm and order in the country in
the interest of this population.”

And here is the appeal to informers:

“But among you there are agents paid by powers hostile to
Germany, Communist criminal elements who have only one aim,
which is to sow discord between the occupying power and the
French population. These elements are completely indifferent to
the consequences, affecting the entire population, which result
from their activity.

“I will no longer allow the lives of German soldiers to be
threatened by these murderers. I shall stop at no measure,
however rigorous, in order to fulfill my duty.

“But it is likewise my duty to make the whole population
responsible for the fact that, up to the present, it has not yet
been possible to lay hands on the cowardly murderers and to
impose upon them the penalty which they deserve.

“That is why I have found it necessary, first of all for Paris,
to take measures which, unfortunately, will hinder the everyday
life of the entire population. Frenchmen, it depends on you
whether I am obliged to render these measures more severe or
whether they can be suspended again.

“I appeal to you all, to your administration and to your police,
to co-operate by your extreme vigilance and your active personal
intervention in the arrest of the guilty. It is necessary, by
anticipating and denouncing these criminal activities, to avoid
the creation of a critical situation which would plunge the
country into misfortune.

“He who fires in ambush on German soldiers, who are doing only
their duty here and who are safeguarding the maintenance of a
normal life, is not a patriot but a cowardly assassin and the
enemy of all decent people.

“Frenchmen! I count on you to understand these measures which I
am taking in your own interests also.”—Signed—“Von
Stülpnagel.”

Numerous notices follow which all have to do with executions.

Under Number 8 on the following page you will find a list of twelve names among which are three of the best known lawyers of the Paris Bar, who are characterized as militant Communists, Messrs. Pitard, Hajje and Rolnikas.

In file 21 submitted by my colleague, M. Gerthoffer, in the course of his economic presentation, you will find a few notices which are similar, published in the German official journal VOBIF.

You will observe, in connection with this notice of 16 September announcing the execution or rather, the murder, of M. Pitard and his companions, that the murderers had neither the courage nor the honesty to say that they were all Parisian lawyers. Was it by mistake? I think that it was a calculated lie, for at this time it was necessary to handle the elite gently. The occupying power still hoped to separate them from the people of France.

I shall describe to you in detail two cases which spread grief in the hearts of the French in the course of the month of October 1941 and which have remained present in the memory of all my compatriots. They are known as the “executions of Châteaubriant and of Bordeaux.” They are related in Document Number F-415 in your document book, which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-285.

After the attack on two German officers at Nantes on 20 October 1941 and in Bordeaux a few days later, the German Army decided to make an example. You will find, on Page 22 of Document Number F-415, a copy of the notice in the newspaper _Le Phare_ of 21 October 1941.

“Notice. Cowardly criminals in the pay of England and of Moscow
killed, with shots in the back, the Feldkommandant of Nantes on
the morning of 20 October 1941. Up to now the assassins have not
been arrested.

“As expiation for this crime I have ordered that 50 hostages be
shot to begin with. Because of the gravity of the crime, 50 more
hostages will be shot in case the guilty should not be arrested
between now and 23 October 1941 by midnight.”

The conditions under which these reprisals were exercised are worth describing in detail. Stülpnagel, who was commanding the German troops in France, ordered the Minister of the Interior to designate prisoners. These prisoners were to be selected among the Communists who were considered the most dangerous (these are the terms of Stülpnagel’s order). A list of 60 Frenchmen was furnished by the Minister of the Interior. This was Pucheu. He has since been tried by my compatriots, sentenced to death, and executed.

The Subprefect of Châteaubriant sent a letter to the Kommandantur of Châteaubriant, in reply to the order which he received from the Minister of the Interior:

“Following our conversation of today, I have the honor of
confirming to you that the Minister of the Interior has
communicated today with General Von Stülpnagel in order to
designate to him the most dangerous Communist prisoners among
those who are now held at Châteaubriant. You will find enclosed
herewith the list of 60 individuals who have been handed over
this day.”

On the following page is the German order:

“Because of the assassination of the Feldkommandant of Nantes,
Lieutenant Colonel Hotz, on 20 October 1941, the following
Frenchmen, who were already imprisoned as hostages in accordance
with my publication of 22 August 1941 and of my ordinance to the
Plenipotentiary General of the French Government of 19 September
1941, are to be shot.”

In the following pages you will find a list of all the men who were shot on that day. I leave out the reading of the list in order not to lengthen the proceedings unduly.

On Page 16 you will find a list of 48 names. On Page 13 you will find the list of those who were shot in Nantes. On Page 12 you will find the list of those who were shot in Châteaubriant. Their bodies were distributed for burial to all the surrounding communes.

I shall read to you the testimony of eyewitnesses as to how they were buried after having been shot. On Page 3 of this document you will find the note of M. Dumenil concerning the executions of 21 October 1941, which was written the day after these executions. The second paragraph reads:

“The priest was called at 11:30 to the prison of La Fayette. An
officer, probably of the GFP, told him that he was to announce
to certain prisoners that they were going to be shot. The priest
was then locked up in a room with the 13 hostages who were at
the prison. The other three, who were at les Rochettes, were
ministered to by Abbé Théon, professor at the College Stanislas.

“The Abbé Fontaine said to the condemned, ‘Gentlemen, you must
understand, alas, what my presence means.’ He then spoke with
the prisoners collectively and individually for the two hours
which the officers had said would be granted to arrange the
personal affairs of the condemned and to write their last
messages to their families.

“The execution had been fixed for 2 o’clock in the afternoon,
half an hour having been allowed for the journey. But the two
hours went by, another hour passed, and still another hour
before the condemned were sent for. Certain of them, optimists
by nature, like M. Fourny, already hoped that a countermanding
order would be given, in which the priest himself did not at all
believe.

“The condemned were all very brave. It was two of the youngest,
Gloux and Grolleau, who were students, who constantly encouraged
the others, saying that it was better to die in this way than to
perish uselessly in an accident.

“At the moment of leaving, the priest, for reasons which were
not explained to him, was not authorized to accompany the
hostages to the place of execution. He went down the stairs of
the prison with them as far as the car. They were chained
together in twos. The thirteenth had on handcuffs. Once they
were in the truck, Gloux and Grolleau made another gesture of
farewell to him, smiling and waving their hands that were
chained together.

“Signed: Dumenil, Counsellor attached to the Cabinet.”

Sixteen were shot in Nantes. Twenty-seven were shot in Châteaubriant. Five were shot outside the department. For those who were shot in Châteaubriant, we know what their last moments were like. The Abbé Moyon, who was present, wrote on 22 October 1941 the account of this execution. This is the third paragraph, Page 17 of your document:

“It was on a beautiful autumn day. The temperature was
particularly mild. There had been lovely sunshine since morning.
Everyone in town was going about his usual business. There was
great animation in the town for it was Wednesday, which was
market day. The population knew from the newspapers and from the
information it had received from Nantes that a superior officer
had been killed in a street in Nantes but refused to believe
that such savage and extensive reprisals would be applied. At
Choisel Camp the German authorities had, for some days, put into
special quarters a certain number of men who were to serve as
hostages in case of special difficulties. It was from among
these men that those who were to be shot on this evening of 22
October 1941 were chosen.

“The Curé of Béré was finishing his lunch when M. Moreau Chief
of Choisel Camp presented himself. In a few words the latter
explained to him the object of his visit. Having been delegated
by M. Lecornu, the subprefect of Châteaubriant, he had come to
inform him that 27 men selected among the political prisoners of
Choisel were going to be executed that afternoon; and he asked
Monsieur Le Curé to go immediately to attend them. The priest
said he was ready to accomplish this mission, and he went to the
prisoners without delay.

“When the priest appeared to carry out his mission, the
subprefect was already among the condemned. He came to announce
the horrible fate which was awaiting them, asking them to write
letters of farewell to their families without delay. It was
under these circumstances that the priest presented himself at
the entrance to the quarters.”

You will find on Page 19 the “departure for the execution,” Paragraph 4:

“Suddenly there was the sound of automobile engines. The door,
which I had shut at the beginning so that we might be more
private, was abruptly opened and French constables carrying
handcuffs appeared. A German officer arrived. He was actually a
chaplain. He said to me, ‘Monsieur le Curé, your mission has
been accomplished and you must withdraw immediately.’”

At the bottom of the page, the last paragraph:

“Access to the quarry where the execution took place was
absolutely forbidden to all Frenchmen. I only know that the
condemned were executed in three groups of nine men, that all
the men who were shot refused to have their eyes bound, that
young Mocquet fainted and fell, and that the last cry which
sprang from the lips of these heroes was an ardent ‘Vive la
France.’”

On Page 21 of the same document you will find the declaration of Police Officer Roussel. It is also worth reading:

“The 22 October 1941 at about 3:30 in the afternoon, I happened
to be in the Rue du 11 Novembre at Châteaubriant, and I saw
coming from Choisel Camp four or five German trucks, I cannot
say exactly how many, preceded by an automobile in which was a
German officer. Several civilians with handcuffs were in the
trucks and were singing patriotic songs, the ‘Marseillaise,’ the
‘Chant du Depart,’ and so forth. One of the trucks was filled
with armed German soldiers.

“I learned subsequently that these were hostages who had just
been fetched from Choisel Camp to be taken to the quarry of
Sablière on the Soudan Road to be shot in reprisal for the
murder at Nantes of the German Colonel Hotz.

“About two hours later these same trucks came back from the
quarry and drove into the court of the Châteaubriant, where the
bodies of the men who had been shot were deposited in a cellar
until coffins could be made.

“Coming back from the quarry the trucks were covered and no
noise was heard, but a trickle of blood escaped from them and
left a trail on the road from the quarry to the castle.

“The following day, on the 23rd of October, the bodies of the
men who had been shot were put into coffins without any French
persons being present, the entrances to the château having been
guarded by German sentinels. The dead were then taken to nine
different cemeteries in the surrounding communes, that is, three
coffins to each commune. The Germans were careful to choose
communes where there was no regular transport service,
presumably to avoid the population going _en masse_ to the
graves of these martyrs.

“I was not present at the departure of the hostages from the
camp nor at the shooting in the quarry of Sablière, as the
approaches to it were guarded by German soldiers armed with
machine guns.”

Almost at the same time, in addition to these 48 hostages who were shot, there were others—those of Bordeaux. You will find in your document book, under Document Number F-400, documents which have been sent to us by the Prefecture of the Gironde, which we submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-286.

One of them comes from the Bordeaux Section of Political Affairs, and is dated 22 October 1941, Document F-400(b).

“In the course of the conference, which took place last night at
the Feldkommandantur of Bordeaux, the German authorities asked
me to proceed immediately to arrest 100 individuals known for
their sympathy with the Communist Party or the Gaullist
movement, who will be considered as hostages, and to make a
great number of house searches.

“These operations have been in process since this morning. So
far no interesting result has been called to my attention. In
addition, this morning at 11 o’clock the German authorities
informed me of the reprisal measures which they had decided to
take against the population.”

These reprisal measures you will find set forth on Page “A” of the same document in a letter addressed by General Von Faber Du Faur, Chief of the Regional Administration of Bordeaux, to the Prefect of the Gironde. I quote:

“Bordeaux, 23 October 1941.

“To the Prefect of the Gironde, Bordeaux.

“As expiation for the cowardly murder of the Councillor of War,
Reimers, the Military Commander in France has ordered 50
hostages to be executed. The execution will take place tomorrow.

“In case the murderers should not be arrested in the very near
future, additional measures will be taken, as in the case of
Nantes.

“I have the honor of making this decision known to you.

“Chief of the Military Regional Administration,”—signed—“Von
Faber Du Faur.”

And in execution of this order, 50 men were shot. There is a famous place in the surburbs of Paris which has become a place of pilgrimage for the French since our liberation. It is the Fort of Romainville. During the occupation the Germans converted this fort into a hostage depot from which they selected victims when they wanted to take revenge after some patriotic demonstration. It is from Romainville that Professors Jacques Solomon, Decourtemanche, Georges Politzer, Dr. Boer and six other Frenchmen departed. They had been arrested in March 1942, tortured by the Gestapo, then executed without trial in the month of May 1942, because they refused to renounce their faith.

On 19 August 1942, 96 hostages left this fort, among them M. Le Gall, a municipal councillor of Paris. They left the fort of Romainville, were transferred to Mont-Valérien and executed.

In September 1942 an assault had been made against some German soldiers at the Rex cinema in Paris. General Von Stülpnagel issued a proclamation announcing that, because of this assault, he had caused 116 hostages to be shot and that extensive measures of deportation were to be taken. You will find an extract from this newspaper in Document Number F-402(b) (Exhibit Number RF-287).

The notice was worded as follows:

“As a result of assaults committed by Communist agents and
terrorists in the pay of England, German soldiers and French
civilians have been killed or wounded.

“As reprisal for these assaults I have had 116 Communist
terrorists shot, whose participation or implication in
terroristic acts has been proved by confessions.

“In addition, severe measures of repression have been taken. In
order to prevent incidents on the occasion of demonstrations
planned by the Communists for 20 September 1942, I ordered the
following:

“1) From Saturday, 19 September 1942, from 3 o’clock in the
afternoon, until Sunday, 20 September 1942, at midnight, all
theaters, cinemas, cabarets, and other places of amusement
reserved for the French population shall be closed in the
Departments of the Seine, Seine-et-Oise, and Seine-et-Marne. All
public demonstrations, including sports, are forbidden.

“2) On Sunday, 20 September 1942, from 3 o’clock in the
afternoon until midnight, non-German civilians are forbidden to
walk about in the streets and public places in the Departments
of the Seine, Seine-et-Oise, and Seine-et-Marne. The only
exceptions are persons representing official services. . . .”

In actual fact, it was only on the day of 20 September that 46 of these hostages were chosen from the list of 116. The Germans handed newspapers of 20 September to the prisoners of Romainville, announcing the decision of the Military High Command. It was, therefore, through the newspapers that the prisoners of Romainville learned that a certain number of them would be chosen at the end of the afternoon to be led before the firing squad.

All lived through that day awaiting the call that would be made that evening. Those who were called knew their fate beforehand. All died innocent of the crimes for which they were being executed, for those who were responsible for the assault in the Rex cinema were arrested a few days later.

It was in Bordeaux that the 70 other hostages of the total of 116 announced by General Von Stülpnagel were executed. In reprisal for the murder of Ritter, the German official of the Labor Front, 50 other hostages were shot at the end of September 1943 in Paris. Here is a reprint of the newspaper article which announced these executions to the French people—Document Number F-402(c).

“Reprisals against terroristic acts. Assaults and acts of
sabotage have increased in France recently. For this reason 50
terrorists, convicted of having participated in acts of sabotage
and of terrorism, were shot on 2 October 1943 by order of the
German authorities.”

All these facts concerning the hostages of Romainville have been related to us by one of the rare survivors, M. Rabaté, a mechanic living at 69 Rue de la Tombe-Issiore, Paris, whose testimony was taken by one of our collaborators.

In this testimony—Document Number F-402(a), which has already been submitted as Exhibit Number RF-287—we read the following:

“There were 70 of us, including Professor Jacques Solomon,
Decourtemanche and Georges Politzer, Dr. Boer, and Messrs.
Engros, Dudach, Cadras, Dalidet, Golue, Pican who were shot in
the month of May 1942, and an approximately equal number of
women.

“Some of us were transferred to the German quarter of the Santé
(a prison in Paris), but the majority of us were taken to the
military prison of Cherche-Midi (in Paris). We were questioned
in turn by a Gestapo officer in the offices of the Rue des
Saussaies. Some of us, especially Politzer and Solomon, were
tortured to such an extent that their limbs were broken,
according to the testimony of their wives.

“Moreover, while questioning me, the Gestapo officer confirmed
this to me: I repeat his words:

“‘Rabaté, here you will have to speak. Professor Langevin’s
son-in-law, Jacques Solomon, came in here arrogant. He went out
crawling.’

“After a short stay of 5 months in the prison of Cherche-Midi,
in the course of which we learned of the execution as hostages
of the 10 prisoners already mentioned, we were transferred on 24
August 1942 to the Fort of Romainville.

“It is to be noted that from the day of our arrest we were
forbidden to write, or to receive mail, or inform our families
where we were. On the doors of our cells was written, ‘Alles
verboten’ (‘Everything is forbidden’). We received only the
strict food ration of the prison, namely, three-fourths of a
liter of vegetable soup and 200 grams of black bread per day.
The biscuits sent to the prison for political prisoners by the
Red Cross or by the Quakers’ Association were not given to us
because of this prohibition.

“In the Fort of Romainville we were interned as ‘isolated
prisoners,’ an expression corresponding to the ‘NN’ (Nacht und
Nebel), which we knew about in Germany.”

THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, the Tribunal thinks that, unless there is anything very special that you wish to read in any of these documents, they have already heard the number of the hostages who were put to death and they think that it really does not add to it—the actual details of these documents.

M. DUBOST: I thought, Mr. President, that I had not spoken to you of the regime to which men were subjected when they were prisoners of the German Army. I thought that it was my duty to enlighten the Tribunal on the condition of these men in the German prisons.

I thought that it was also my duty to enlighten the Tribunal on the ill-treatment inflicted by the Gestapo, who left the son-in-law of Professor Langevin with his limbs broken. Moreover that is found in a testimony.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, if there are matters of that sort which you think it right to go into, you must do so; but the actual details of individual shooting of hostages we think you might, at any rate, summarize. But if there are particular atrocities which you wish to draw our attention to, by all means do so.

M. DUBOST: Mr. President, I have only given two examples of executions out of the multiple executions which caused 29,660 deaths in my country.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, M. Dubost.

M. DUBOST: In the region of the North of France, which was administratively attached to Belgium and subjected to the authority of General Von Falkenhausen, the same policy of execution was practiced. You will find in Document Number F-133, submitted as Exhibit Number RF-289, copies of a great number of posters announcing either arrests, executions, or deportations. Certain of these posters include, moreover, an appeal to informers, and they are analogous to those which I read to you in connection with France. Perhaps it would be well, nevertheless, to point out the one that you will find on Page 3, which concerns the execution of 20 Frenchmen, ordered as the result of a theft; that on Page 4, which concerns the execution of 15 Frenchmen, ordered as a result of an attack against a railroad installation; and finally, especially the last, the one that you will find on Pages 8 and 9, which announces that executions will be carried out, and invites the civilian population to hand over the guilty ones, if they know them, to the German Army.

As concerns especially the countries of the West other than France, we have a very great number of identical cases. You will find in your document book, under Document Number F-680, Exhibit Number RF-290, a copy of a poster by the Military Commander-in-Chief for Belgium and the North of France, which announces the arrest in Tournai, on 18 September 1941, of 25 inhabitants as hostages, and specifies the condition under which certain of them will be shot if the guilty are not discovered. But you will find especially, under the Number F-680(a) a remarkable document; it comes from the German authorities themselves. It is the secret report of the German Chief of Police in Belgium dated 13 December 1944, that is to say, when Belgium was totally liberated and this German official wished to give an account to his chiefs of his services during the occupation of Belgium.

From the first page of this document we take the following passage:

“The increasing incitement of the population, by enemy radio and
enemy press, to acts of terrorism and sabotage”—this is applied
to Belgium—“the passive attitude of the population,
particularly that of the Belgian administration, the complete
failure of the public prosecutors, the examining judges, and of
the police to disclose and prevent terrorist acts, have finally
led to preventive and repressive measures of the most rigorous
kind, that is to say, to the execution of persons closely
related to the culprits.

“Already on 19 October 1941, on the occasion of the murder of
two police officials in Tournai, the Military Commander-in-Chief
declared through an announcement appearing in the press that all
the political prisoners in Belgium would be considered as
hostages with immediate effect. In the provinces of the north of
France, subject to the jurisdiction of the same Military
Commander-in-Chief, this ordinance was already in force as from
26 August 1941. Through repeated notices appearing in the press
the civilian population has been informed that political
prisoners taken as hostages will be executed if the murders
continue to be committed.

“As a result of the assassination of Teughels, Rexist major of
Charleroi, and other attempts at assassination of public
officials, the Military Commander-in-Chief has been obliged to
order, for the first time in Belgium, the execution of eight
terrorists. The date of the execution is 27 November 1942.”

On the following page of this same document—Number F-680(b)—you will find another order dated 22 April 1944, secret, and issued by the Military Commander in Belgium and the North of France, concerning measures of reprisal for the murder of two Walloon SS, who had fought at Tcherkassy; five hostages were shot on that day.

On the following page nine hostages are added to these five, and still a tenth on the next page. Then five others on the following page.

You will find, finally, on the next to the last page of the document, a proposed list of persons to be shot in reprisal for the murder of SS men. Compare the dates, and judge the ferocity with which the assassination of these two Walloon traitors, SS volunteers, was revenged.

Finally, you will see the names of the 20 Belgian patriots who were thus murdered.

“Nouveau Journal, 25 April 1944.

“Measures of reprisal for the murder of men who fought at
Tcherkassy.

“Announcement by the German authorities:

“The perpetrators of the assassination on 6 April of the members
of the SS Sturmbrigade Wallonie, Hubert Stassen and François
Musch, who fought at Tcherkassy, have so far not been
apprehended. Therefore, in accordance with the communication
dated 10 April 1944, the 20 terrorists whose names follow have
been executed:

“Renatus Dierickx of Louvain; François Boets of Louvain; Antoine
Smets of Louvain; Jacques Van Tilt of Holsbeek; Emiliens Van
Tilt of Holsbeek; Franciskus Aerts of Herent; Jan Van der Elst
of Herent; Gustave Morren of Louvain; Eugene Hupin of
Chapelle-lez-Herlaimont; Pierre Leroy of Boussois; Léon Hermann
of Montignies-sur-Sambre; Felix Trousson of Chaudfontaine;
Joseph Grab of Tirlemont; Octave Wintgens of Baelen-Hontem;
Stanislaw Mrozowski of Grâce-Berleur; Marcel Boeur of Athus;
Marcel Dehon of Ghlin; André Croquelois of Pont des Briques,
near Boulogne; Gustave Hos of Mons; and the stateless Jew,
Walter Kriss of Herent.”

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

M. DUBOST: As far as the other western countries, Holland and Norway, are concerned, we have received documents which we submit as Document Number F-224(b), Exhibits RF-291, 292, and 293.

In the French text you will find a long list of civilians who were executed. Also you will find a report of the Chief of the Criminal Police, Munt, in connection with these executions, and you will observe that Munt tries to prove his own innocence, in my opinion without success. This is in Document Number RF-277, already submitted.

On Page 6 you will find the report of an investigation concerning mass executions carried out by the Germans in Holland. I do not think it is necessary to read this report. It brings no new factual element and simply illustrates the thesis that I have been presenting since this morning: That in all the western countries the German military authorities systematically carried out executions of hostages as reprisals for acts of resistance. You will see that on 7 March 1945 an order was given to shoot 80 prisoners, and the authority who gave this order said, “I don’t care where you get your prisoners”—execution without any designation of age or profession or origin.

The Tribunal will see that a total of 2,080 executions was reached. It will be noted that as a reprisal for the murder of an SS soldier, a house was destroyed and 10 Dutchmen were executed; and in addition, two other houses were destroyed. In another case 10 Dutchmen were executed. Altogether, 3,000 Dutchmen were executed under these conditions, according to the testimony of this document, which was drawn up by the War Crimes Commission, signed by the Chief of the Dutch Delegation to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Colonel Baron Van Tuyll van Serooskerken.

This document gives to the Tribunal the approximate number of victims, region by region.

I do not wish to conclude the statement as to hostages concerning Holland without drawing the attention of the Tribunal to Section (b) of Document Number F-224, which gives a long list of hostages, prisoners or dead, arrested by the Germans in Holland; for the Tribunal will observe that most of the hostages were intellectuals or very highly placed personages in Holland. We note, therein, the names of members of parliament, lawyers, senators, Protestant clergymen, judges, and amongst them we find a former Minister of Justice. The arrests were made systematically among the intellectual elite of the country.

As far as Norway is concerned, the Tribunal will find in Document Number F-240, submitted as Exhibit Number RF-292, a short report of the executions which the Germans carried out in that country:

“On 26 April 1942 two German policemen who tried to arrest two
Norwegian patriots were killed on an island on the west coast of
Norway. In order to avenge them, 4 days later 18 young men were
shot without trial. All these 18 Norwegians had been in prison
since the 22 February of the same year and therefore had nothing
to do with this affair.”

In the first paragraph of the French translation in the French document book, which is Page 22 of the Norwegian original, it states that:

“On 6 October 1942, 10 Norwegian citizens were executed in
reprisal for attempts at sabotage.

“On 20 July 1944 an indeterminate number of Norwegians were shot
without trial. They had all been taken from a concentration
camp. The reason for this arrest and execution is unknown.

“Finally, after the German capitulation, the bodies of 44
Norwegian citizens were found in graves. All had been shot and
we do not know the reason for their execution. It has never been
published, and we do not believe they were tried. The executions
were effected by a shot through the back of the neck or a
revolver bullet through the ear, the hands of the victims being
tied behind their backs.”

This information is given by the Norwegian Government for this Tribunal.

I draw the attention of the Tribunal to a final document, Number R-134 (Exhibit Number RF-293), signed by Terboven, which concerns the execution of 18 Norwegians who were taken prisoners for having made an illegal attempt to reach England.

It is by thousands and tens of thousands that in all the western countries citizens were executed without trial in reprisal for acts in which they never participated. It does not seem necessary to me to multiply these examples. Each of these examples involves individual responsibility which is not within the competency of this Tribunal. The examples are only of interest in so far as they show that the orders of the defendants were carried out and notably the orders of Keitel.

I believe that I have amply proved this. It is incontestable that in every case the German Army was concerned with these executions, which were not solely carried out by the police or the SS.

Moreover, they did not achieve the results expected. Far from reducing the number of attacks, it increased them. Each attempt was followed by an execution of hostages, and every shooting of hostages occasioned more attacks in revenge. Generally the announcement of new executions of hostages plunged the countries into a stupor and forced every citizen to become conscious of the fate of his land, despite the efforts of German propaganda. Faced with the failure of this terroristic policy, one might have thought that the defendants would modify their methods. Far from modifying them, they intensified them. I shall endeavor to show the activity of the police and the law from the time when, the policy of hostages having failed, it was necessary to appeal to the German police in order to keep the occupied countries in a state of servitude. The German authorities made arbitrary arrests at all times and from the very beginning of the occupation; but with the failure of the policy of executing hostages, which was—as you remember—commented upon by General Von Falkenhausen in the case of Belgium, arbitrary arrests increased to the point of becoming a constant practice substituted for that of killing hostages.

We submit to the Tribunal Document Number 715-PS, Exhibit Number RF-294. This document concerns the arrest of high-ranking officers who were to be transferred to Germany in honorable custody:

“Subject: Measures to be taken against French Officers.

“In agreement with the German Embassy in Paris and with the
Chief of the Security Police and the SD, the Supreme Commander
in the West has made the following proposals:

“1. The senior officers enumerated below will be arrested and
transferred to Germany in honorable custody: “Generals of the
Army: Frère”—who died subsequently in Germany after his
deportation—“Gérodias, Cartier, Revers, De Lattre de Tassigny,
Fornel de la Laurencie, Robert de Saint-Vincent, Laure, Doyen,
Pisquendar, Mittelhauser, Paquin;

“Generals of the Air Force: Bouscat, Carayon, De Geffrier,
D’Harcourt, Mouchard, Mendigal, Rozoy;

“Colonels: Loriot and Fonck.

“It is a question of generals whose names have a propaganda
value in France and abroad or whose attitude and abilities
represent a danger.

“2. Moreover, we have chosen from the index of officers kept by
the ‘Arbeitsstab’ in France about 120 officers who have
distinguished themselves by their anti-German attitude during
the last two years. The SD has also given a list of about 130
officers previously accused. After the compilation of these two
lists, the arrest of these officers is to be arranged at a later
date, depending on the situation . . . .