Chapter VI: Part 6

Then it was necessary to reassure Poland; so an assurance to Poland is given by Hitler on the 20th of February 1938, and repeated up to the 26th of September 1938. The falsity of that assurance was shown over and over again in Colonel Griffith-Jones’ speech on Poland, which the Tribunal will find in the transcript at Pages 966 to 1060 (Volume II, Pages 195 to 261).

Then finally, when they want the action as directed against Poland in the next year for its conquest, assurance must be given to Russia, and so a non-aggression pact is entered into on the 23rd of August 1939, as shown by Mr. Alderman, at Pages 1160 to 1216 (Volume III, Pages 328 to 366).

With regard to that tabular presentation, one might say, in the Latin tag, _res ipsa oquitur_. But quite a frank statement from this defendant with regard to the earlier part of that can be found in the account of his conversation with the United States Ambassador, Mr. Bullitt, on the 18th of May 1936, which is on Page 74 of the document book, Document L-150, Exhibit USA-65; and if I might read the first paragraph after the introduction which says that he called on this defendant, Mr. Bullitt remarks:

“Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German
Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until ‘the
Rhineland had been digested.’ He explained that he meant that,
until the German fortifications had been constructed on the
French and Belgian frontiers, the German Government would do
everything possible to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak
by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with
regard to Czechoslovakia. ‘As soon as our fortifications are
constructed and the countries of Central Europe realize that
France cannot enter German territory at will, all those
countries will begin to feel very differently about their
foreign policies and a new constellation will develop,’ he
said.”

I remind the Tribunal, without citing it, of the conversation referred to by my friend, Major Barrington, a short time ago, between the Defendant Von Papen, as Ambassador, and Mr. Messersmith, which is very much to the same effect.

Then I come to the actual aggression against Austria, and I remind the Tribunal that this defendant was Foreign Minister:

First, during the early Nazi plottings against Austria in 1934. The Tribunal will find these in the transcript at Pages 475 to 489 (Volume II, Pages 352-364), and I remind them generally that that was the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss and the ancillary acts which were afterwards so strongly approved.

Secondly, when the false assurance was given to Austria on the 21st of May 1935, and the fraudulent treaty made on the 11th of July 1936. References to these are Document TC-26, which is Exhibit GB-19, and Document TC-22, which is Exhibit GB-20. The reference in the transcript is at Pages 544 and 545 (Volume II, Page 383).

Third, when the Defendant Von Papen was carrying on his subterranean intrigues in the period from 1935 to 1937. I again give the references so the Tribunal will have it in mind: Document 2247-PS, Exhibit USA-64, letter dated 17 May 1935; and Exhibit USA-67, Document 2246-PS, 1 September 1936. The references in the transcript are Pages 492 (Volume II, Pages 363, 364), 516-518 (Volume II, Pages 372-374), 526-545 (Volume II, Pages 378 to 391), and 553-554 (Volume II, Pages 394, 395).

This Defendant Von Neurath was present when Hitler declared, at the Hossbach interview on the 5th of November 1937, that the German question could only be solved by force and that his plans were to conquer Austria and Czechoslovakia. That is Document 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25, which the Tribunal will find at Page 82. If you will look at the sixth line of Page 82, after the heading, you will see that one of the persons in attendance at this highly confidential meeting was the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, Freiherr von Neurath.

Without reading a document which the Tribunal have had referred to them more than once, may I remind the Tribunal that it is on Page 86 that the passage about the conquest of Austria occurs, and if the Tribunal will look after “2:” and “3:” the next sentence is:

“For the improvement of our military-political position, it must
be our first aim in every case of warlike entanglement to
conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously, in order to
remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance
westwards.”

That is developed on the succeeding page. The important point is that this defendant was present at that meeting; and it is impossible for him after that meeting to say that he was not acting except with his eyes completely open and with complete comprehension as to what was intended.

Then the next point. During the actual Anschluss he received a note from the British Ambassador dated the 11th of March 1938. That is Document 3045-PS, Exhibit USA-127. He sent the reply contained in Document 3287-PS, Exhibit USA-128. If I might very briefly remind the Tribunal of the reply, I think all that is necessary—and of course the Tribunal have had this document referred to them before—is at the top of Page 93. I wish to call attention to two obvious untruths.

The Defendant Von Neurath states in the sixth line:

“It is untrue that the Reich used forceful pressure to bring
about this development, especially the assertion, which was
spread later by the former Federal Chancellor, that the German
Government had presented the Federal President with a
conditional ultimatum. It is a pure invention.”

According to the ultimatum, he had to appoint a proposed candidate as Chancellor to form a Cabinet conforming to the proposals of the German Government. Otherwise the invasion of Austria by German troops was held in prospect.

“The truth of the matter is that the question of sending
military or police forces from the Reich was only brought up
when the newly formed Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram,
already published by the press, to the German Government,
urgently asking for the dispatch of German troops as soon as
possible, in order to restore peace and order and to avoid
bloodshed. Faced with the imminent danger of a bloody Civil war
in Austria, the German Government then decided to comply with
the appeal addressed to it.”

Well, as I said, My Lord, these are the two most obvious untruths, and all one can say is that it must have, at any rate, given this defendant a certain macabre sort of humor to write that, when the truth was, as the Tribunal know it from the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Bürckel, which has been put in before the Tribunal as Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61, and when they have heard, as they have at length, the transcripts of the Defendant Göring’s telephone conversation with Austria on that day, which is Document 2949-PS, Exhibit USA-76, and the entries of the Defendant Jodl’s diary for the 11th, 13th, and 14th of February, which is Document 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72.

In this abundance of proof of the untruthfulness of these statements the Tribunal may probably think that the most clear and obvious correction is in the transcription of the Defendant Göring’s telephone conversations, which are so amply corroborated by the other documents.

The Prosecution submits that it is inconceivable that this defendant who, according to the Defendant Jodl’s diary—may I ask the Tribunal just to look at Page 116 of the document book, the entry in the Defendant Jodl’s diary for the 10th of March, so that they have this point quite clear? It is the third paragraph, and it says:

“At 1300 hours General Keitel informs Chief of Operational
Staff, Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London.
Neurath takes over the Foreign Office.”

I submit that it is inconceivable when this defendant had taken over the Foreign Office, was dealing with the matter, and as I shall show the Tribunal in a moment, co-operating with the Defendant Göring to suit the susceptibilities of the Czechs, that he should have been so ignorant of the truth of events and what really was happening as to write that letter in honor and good faith.

His position can be shown equally clearly by the account which is given of him in the affidavit of Mr. Messersmith, Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68. If the Tribunal will look at Page 107 of the document book, I remind them of that entry which exactly describes the action and style of activity of this defendant at this crisis. Two-thirds of the way down the page the paragraph begins:

“I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made
these promises were not only the dyed-in-the-wool Nazis, but
more conservative Germans who already had begun willingly to
lend themselves to the Nazi program.

“In an official dispatch to the Department of State from Vienna,
dated 10 October 1935, I wrote as follows:

“‘Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen,
and Mackensen are not dangerous people, and that they are
“diplomats of the old school.” They are in fact servile
instruments of the regime, and just because the outside world
looks upon them as harmless they are able to work more
effectively. They are able to sow discord just because they
propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the
regime.’”

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned, until 24 January 1946 at 1000 hours._]

FORTY-SECOND DAY
Thursday, 24 January 1946

_Morning Session_

MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): If it please Your Honor, the Defendant Streicher and the Defendant Kaltenbrunner are absent this morning due to illness.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please the Tribunal, before the Tribunal adjourned, I was dealing with the share of the Defendant Neurath in the aggression against Austria. Before I proceed to the next stage, I should like the Tribunal, if it be so kind, to look at the original exhibit to which I am referred, Document 3287-PS, Exhibit USA-128, which is the letter from this defendant to Sir Nevile Henderson, who was then the British Ambassador. The only point in which I would be grateful is if the Tribunal would note Page 92 of the document book. When I say original, that is a certified copy certified by the British Foreign Office, but the Tribunal will see that the heading is from the President of the Secret Cabinet Council. That is the point that the Tribunal will remember. The question was raised as to the existence or activity of that body and the letterhead is from the defendant in that capacity.

The next stage in the Austrian aggression is that at the time of the occupation of Austria, this defendant gave the assurance to M. Mastny, the Ambassador of Czechoslovakia to Berlin, regarding the continued independence of Czechoslovakia. That is one document at Page 123, TC-27, which I have already put in as Exhibit GB-21. It was to Lord Halifax, who was then Foreign Secretary; and if I may read the second paragraph just to remind the Tribunal of the circumstances in which it was written, M. Masaryk says:

“I have in consequence been instructed by my Government to bring
to the official knowledge of His Majesty’s Government the
following facts: Yesterday evening (the 11th of March) Field
Marshal Göring made two separate statements to M. Mastny, the
Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, assuring him that the
developments in Austria will in no way have any detrimental
influence on the relations between the German Reich and
Czechoslovakia, and emphasizing the continued earnest endeavor
on the part of Germany to improve those mutual relations.”

And then there are the particulars of the way it was put to Defendant Göring, which have been brought to the Tribunal’s attention several times, and I shall not do it again. The 6th paragraph begins: “M. Mastny was in a position to give him definite and binding assurances on this subject”—that is, to give the Defendant Göring on the Czech mobilization—and then it goes on:

“. . . and today spoke with Baron Von Neurath, who, among other
things, assured him on behalf of Herr Hitler that Germany still
considers herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration
Convention concluded at Locarno in October 1925.”

In view of the fact that the Defendant Von Neurath had been present at the meeting on the 5th of November, 4 months previously, when he had heard Hitler’s views on Czechoslovakia—and that it was only 6 months before that really negotiated treaty was disregarded at once—that paragraph, in my submission, is an excellent example on the technique of which this defendant was the first professor.

I now come to the aggression against Czechoslovakia. On 28 May 1938 Hitler held a conference of important leaders including Beck, Von Brauchitsch, Raeder, Keitel, Göring, and Ribbentrop at which Hitler affirmed that preparations should be made for military action against Czechoslovakia by October; and it is believed, though not—I say frankly—confirmed, that the Defendant Von Neurath attended. The reference of that meeting is in the transcript of Pages 742 and 743 (Volume III, Page 42).

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, is there any evidence?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No. Your Lordship will remember the documents, a long series of them, and it does not state who was present; therefore, I express that and put it with reserve.

On the 4th of September 1938 the government of which Von Neurath was a member enacted a new Secret Reich Defense Law which defined various official responsibilities in clear anticipation of war. This law provided, as did the previous Secret Reich Defense Law, for a Reich Defense Council as a supreme policy board for war preparations. The Tribunal will remember that I have already referred them to Document 2194-PS, Exhibit USA-36, showing these facts. Then there came the Munich Agreement of 29 September 1938, but in spite of that, on the 14th of March 1939 German troops marched into Czechoslovakia; and the proclamation to the German people and the order to the Wehrmacht is Document TC-50, Exhibit GB-7, which the Tribunal will find at Page 124, which has already been referred to and I shall not read it again.

On the 16th of March 1939 the German Government, of which Von Neurath was still a member, promulgated the “Decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor on the Establishment of the Protectorate ‘Bohemia and Moravia.’” That date is the 16th of March. That is at Page 126 of the document book, TC-51, Exhibit GB-8.

If I may leave that for the moment, I will come back to it in dealing with the setting up of the Protectorate. I will come back in a moment and read Article 5. But taking the events in the order of time, the following week the Defendant Von Ribbentrop signed a treaty with Slovakia, which is at Page 129 (Document 1439-PS, Exhibit GB-135); and the Tribunal may remember Article 2 of that treaty, which is:

“For the purpose of making effective the protection undertaken
by the German Reich, the German Armed Forces shall have the
right at all times to construct military installations and to
keep them garrisoned in the strength they deem necessary in an
area delimited on its western side by the frontiers of the State
of Slovakia, and on its eastern side by a line formed by the
eastern rims of the Lower Carpathians, the White Carpathians,
and the Javornik Mountains.

“The Government of Slovakia will take the necessary steps to
assure that the land required for these installations shall be
conveyed to the German Armed Forces. Furthermore, the Government
of Slovakia will agree to grant exemption from custom duties for
imports from the Reich for the maintenance of the German troops
and the supply of military installations.”

The Tribunal will appreciate that the ultimate objective of Hitler’s policy disclosed at the meeting at which this defendant was present on the 5th of November 1937, that is the resumption of the “Drang nach Osten” and the acquisition of Lebensraum in the East, was obvious from the terms of this treaty as it has been explicit in Hitler’s statement.

Then we come to the pith of this criminality. By accepting and occupying the position of Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, the Defendant Von Neurath personally adhered to the aggression against Czechoslovakia and the world. He further actively participated in the conspiracy of world aggression and he assumed a position of leadership in the execution of policies involving violating the laws of war and the commission of crimes against humanity.

The Tribunal will appreciate that I am not going to trespass on the ground covered by my colleagues and go into the crimes. I want to show quite clearly to the Tribunal the basis for these crimes which was laid by the legal position which this defendant assumed.

The first point. The Defendant Von Neurath assumed the position of Protector under a sweeping grant of powers. The act creating the Protectorate provided—if the Tribunal would be good enough to turn back on Page 126 in the document book (TC-51, Exhibit GB-8) and look at Article V of the Act, it reads as follows:

“1. As trustee of Reich interests, the Führer and Chancellor of
the Reich nominates a ‘Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia’
with Prague as his seat of office.

“2. The Reich Protector, as representative of the Führer and
Chancellor of the Reich and as Commissioner of the Reich
Government, is charged with the duty of seeing to the observance
of the political principles laid down by the Führer and
Chancellor of the Reich.

“3. The members of the Government of the Protectorate shall be
confirmed by the Reich Protector. The confirmation may be
withdrawn.

“4. The Reich Protector is entitled to inform himself of all
measures taken by the Government of the Protectorate and to give
advice. He can object to measures calculated to harm the Reich
and, in case of danger in delay, issue ordinances required for
the common interest.

“5. The promulgation of laws, ordinances, and other legal
provisions and the execution of administrative measures and
legal judgments shall be deferred if the Reich Protector enters
an objection.”

At the very outset of the Protectorate the Defendant Von Neurath’s supreme authority was implemented by a series of basic decrees of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice. They established the alleged legal foundation for the policy and program which resulted, all aimed towards the systematic destruction of the national integrity of the Czechs:

1. By granting the “racial Germans” in Czechoslovakia a supreme order of citizenship—and I give the official reference to the Decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor concerning the Protectorate to which I just referred—and then;

2. An act concerning the representation in the Reichstag of Greater Germany by German nationals resident in the Protectorate, 13 April 1939;

3. An order concerning the acquisition of German citizenship by former Czechoslovakian citizens of German stock, 20 April 1939.

Then there was a series of decrees that granted “racial Germans” in Czechoslovakia a preferred status at law and in the courts:

1. An order concerning the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, 14 April 1939;

2. An order concerning the Exercise of Jurisdiction in Civil Proceedings, 14 April 1939;

3. An order concerning the Exercise of Military Jurisdiction, on 8 May 1939.

Then the orders also granted to the Protector broad powers to change by decree the autonomous law of the Protectorate. That is contained in the Ordinance on Legislation in the Protectorate, 7 June 1939.

And finally the Protector was authorized to go with the Reich Leader SS and the Chief of the German Police to take, if necessary, such police measures which go beyond the limits usually valid for police measures.

In view of the form of the order itself the Tribunal, if it cares to listen and to take judicial notice of this, in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ we have found inserted that one in the document book at Page 131, which rather staggers the imagination to know what can be police measures even beyond the limits usually valid for police measures when one has seen police measures in Germany between 1933 and 1939. But if such increase was possible, and presumably it was believed to be possible, then an increase was given by the Defendant Von Neurath and used by him for coercion of the Czechs.

The declared basic policy of the Protectorate was concentrated upon the central objective of destroying the identity of the Czechs as a nation and absorbing their territory into the Reich; and if the Tribunal will be good enough to turn to Page 132, they will find Document Number 862-PS, Exhibit USA-313, and I think that has been read to the Tribunal. Still, the Tribunal might bear with me so that I might indicate the nature of the document to them.

This memorandum is signed by Lieutenant General of Infantry Friderici. It is headed “The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia.” It is marked “Top Secret,” dated 15 October 1940. That is practically a year before this Defendant Von Neurath went on leave, as he puts it, on 27 September 1941; and it is called the “Basic Political Principles in the Protectorate,” and there are four copies. It also had gone to the Defendant Keitel and the Defendant Jodl, and it begins: “On 9 October of this year”—that is 1940:

“On 9 October of this year the Office of the Reich Protector
held an official conference in which State Secretary SS
Gruppenführer K. H. Frank”—that is not the Defendant Frank, it
is the other K. H. Frank—“spoke about the following:

“Since creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,
party agencies, industrial circles, as well as agencies of the
central authorities of Berlin have been considering the solution
of the Czech problem.

“After careful deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his
view about the various plans in a memorandum. In this, three
possibilities of solution were indicated:

“a. German infiltration of Moravia and withdrawal of the Czech
part of the people to a remainder of Bohemia. This solution is
considered as unsatisfactory, because the Czech problem, even if
in a diminished form, will continue to exist.

“b. Many arguments can be brought up against the most radical
solution, namely, the deportation of all Czechs. Therefore the
memorandum comes to the conclusion that it cannot be carried out
within a reasonable space of time.

“c. Assimilation of the Czechs, that is, absorption of about
half of the Czech people by the Germans, to the extent that it
is of importance from a racial or other standpoint. This will be
brought about, among other things, also by increasing the
Arbeitseinsatz of the Czechs in the Reich territory, with the
exception of the Sudeten German border districts—in other
words, by dispersing the block of Czech people. The other half
of the Czech nationality must by all possible ways be deprived
of its power, eliminated, and shipped out of the country. This
applies particularly to the racially mongoloid parts and to the
major part of the intellectual class. The latter can scarcely be
converted ideologically and would represent a burden by
constantly making claims for the leadership over the other Czech
classes and thus interfering with a rapid assimilation.

“Elements which counteract the planned Germanization are to be
handled roughly and should be eliminated.

“The above development naturally presupposes an increased influx
of Germans from the Reich territory into the Protectorate.

“After a report, the Führer has chosen solution c (assimilation)
as a directive for the solution of the Czech problem and decided
that, while keeping up the autonomy of the Protectorate
outwardly, Germanization will have to be carried out uniformly
by the Office of the Reich Protector for years to come.

“From the above no specific conclusions are drawn by the Armed
Forces. It is the way that has always been followed. In this
connection, I refer to my memorandum which was sent to the Chief
of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, dated 12 July 1939,
entitled ‘The Czech Problem.’”

And that is signed, as I said, by the Deputy Lieutenant General of the Armed Forces.

That view of the Reich Protector was accepted and formed a basis of his policy. The result was a program of consolidating German control over Bohemia and Moravia by the systematic oppression of the Czechs through the abolition of civil liberties and the systematic undermining of the native political, economic, and cultural structure by a regime of terror, which will be dealt with by my Soviet Union colleagues. They will show clearly, I submit, that the only protection given by this defendant was a protection to the perpetrators of innumerable crimes.

I have already drawn the attention of the Tribunal to the many honors and rewards which this defendant received as his worth, and it might well be said that Hitler showered more honors on Von Neurath than on some of the leading Nazis who had been with the Party since the very beginning. His appointment as President of the newly created Secret Cabinet Council in 1938 was in itself a new and singular distinction. On 22 September 1940 Hitler awarded him the War Merit Cross 1st Class as Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. That is in the Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, 22 September 1940.

He was also awarded the Golden Badge of the Party and was promoted by Hitler, personally, from the rank of Gruppenführer to Obergruppenführer in the SS on 21 June 1943. And I also inform the Tribunal that he and Ribbentrop were the only two Germans to be awarded the Adlerorden, a distinction normally reserved for foreigners. On his seventieth birthday, 2 February 1943, it was made the occasion for most of the German newspapers to praise his many years of service to the Nazi regime. This service, as submitted by the Prosecution, may be summed up in two ways:

1) He was an internal Fifth Columnist among the Conservative political circles in Germany. They had been anti-Nazi but were converted in part by seeing one of themselves, in the person of this defendant, wholeheartedly with the Nazis;

2) His previous reputation as a diplomat made public opinion abroad slow to believe that he would be a member of a cabinet which did not stand by its words and assurances. It was most important for Hitler that his own readiness to break every treaty or commitment should be concealed as long as possible, and for this purpose he found in the Defendant Von Neurath his handiest tool.

That concludes the presentation against the Defendant Von Neurath.

THE PRESIDENT: In view of the motion which was made yesterday by Counsel for the Defendant Hess, the Tribunal will postpone the presentation of the individual case against Hess, and will proceed with the presentation of the case by counsel for France.

M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): When stating the charges which now weigh upon the defendants, my British and American colleagues showed evidence that these men conceived and executed a plan and plot for the domination of Europe. They have shown you of what crimes against peace these men became guilty by launching unjust wars. They have shown you that, as leaders of Nazi Germany, they had all premeditated unjust wars, and had participated in the conspiracy against peace.

Then my friends and colleagues of the French Delegation, M. Herzog, M. Faure and M. Gerthoffer, submitted documents establishing that the defendants, who all in various positions counted among the leaders of Nazi Germany, are responsible for the repeated violations of the laws and customs of war committed by men of the Reich in the course of military operations. However, it still remains for us to expose the atrocities of which men, women, and children of the occupied countries of the west were victims.

We intend at this point to prove that the defendants, in their capacity as leaders of Hitlerite Germany, systematically pursued a policy of extermination, the cruelty of which increased from day to day until the final defeat of Germany; that the defendants planned, conceived, willed, and prescribed these atrocities as part of a system which was to enable them to accomplish a political aim. It is this political aim which closely binds all the facts we intend to present to you. The crimes perpetrated against people and property, as presented so far by my colleagues of the French Prosecution, were in close connection with the war. They had the distinct character of war crimes _stricto sensu_. Those which I shall present to you surpass them both in meaning and extent. They form part of the plans of a policy of domination, of expansion, beyond war itself.

It is Hitler himself who gave the best definition of this policy in one of his speeches in Munich on 16 May 1927. He was deceiving his listeners about the danger that France, an agricultural country of only 40 million inhabitants, might represent for Germany, which was already a highly-industrialized country with a population of nearly 70 million. That day Hitler said:

“There is only one way for Germany to escape encirclement; and
it is the destruction of the state which, by the natural order
of things, will always be her mortal enemy: that is France. When
a nation is aware that its whole existence is endangered by an
enemy, it must aim at one thing only: the annihilation of that
enemy.”

During the first months that followed their victory, the Germans seemed to have abandoned their plan of annihilation; but this was only a tactical pretense. They hoped to draw into their war against England and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics the western nations they had enslaved. By doses of treachery and violence, they attempted to make these western nations take the road of collaboration. The latter resisted; and the defendants then abandoned their tactics and came back to their big scheme, the annihilation of conquered peoples in order to secure in Europe the space necessary for the 250 million Germans whom they hoped to settle there in generations to come.

This destruction, this annihilation—I repeat the very words used by Hitler in his speech—was undertaken under various pretenses; the elimination of inferior, or negroid races; the extermination of bolshevism; the destruction of Jewish-Masonic influences hostile to the founding of the pseudo “New European Order.”

In fact, this destruction, this elimination, conduced to the assassination of the elite and vital forces opposed to the Nazis; it also led to the reduction of the means of livelihood of the enslaved nations.

All of this was done, as I shall prove to you, in execution of a deliberate plan, the existence of which is confirmed, among other things, by the repetition and the immutability of the same facts in all the occupied countries.

Faced with this repetition and this immutability, it is no longer possible to claim that only the one who performed the crime was guilty. This repetition and this immutability prove that the same criminal will united all the members of the German Government, all the leaders of the German Reich.

It is from this common will that the official policy of terrorism and extermination, which directed the strokes of the executioners, was born; and it is for having participated in the creation of this common will that each of the defendants here present has been placed in the ranks of major war criminals.

I shall come back to this point when, having finished my presentation of the facts, I shall have to qualify the crime, in accordance with the legal tradition of my country.

Allow me to give you some indications as to how, with your kind permission, I intend to make my presentation.

The facts I am to prove here are the results of many testimonies. We could have called innumerable witnesses to this stand. Their statements have been collected by the French Office for Inquiry into War Crimes. It seemed to us that it would simplify and shorten the procedure if we were to give you extracts only from the testimony that we have received in writing.

With your authorization, therefore, I shall limit myself to reading excerpts from the written testimonies collected in France by official organizations qualified to investigate War Crimes. However, if in the course of this presentation it appears necessary to call certain witnesses, we shall proceed to do so but with constant care not to slow down the sessions in any way and to bring them with all speed to the only possible conclusion, the one our peoples expect.

The whole question of atrocities is dominated by the German terrorist policy. Under this aspect it is not without precedent in the Germanic practice of war. We all remember the execution of hostages at Dinant during the war of 1914, the execution of hostages in the citadel of Laon, or the hostages of Senlis. But Nazism perfected this terrorist policy; for Nazism, terror is a means of subjugation. We all remember the propaganda picture about the war in Poland, shown in Oslo in particular on the eve of the invasion of Norway. For Nazism, terror is a means of subjugating all enslaved people in order to submit them to the aims of its policy.

The first signs of this terrorist policy during the occupation are fresh in the memory of all Frenchmen. Only a few months after the signing of the armistice they saw red posters edged with black appear on the walls of Paris, as well as in the smallest villages of France, proclaiming the first execution of hostages. We know mothers who were informed of the execution of their sons in this way. These executions were carried out by the occupiers after anti-German incidents. These incidents were the answer of the French people to the official policy of collaboration. Resistance to this policy stiffened, became organized, and with it the repressive measures increased in intensity until 1944—the climax of German terrorism in France and in the countries of the West. At that time the Army and the SS Police no longer spoke of the execution of hostages; they organized real reprisal expeditions during which whole villages were set on fire, and thousands of civilians killed, or arrested and deported. But before reaching this stage, the Germans attempted to justify their criminal exactions in the eyes of a susceptible public opinion. They promulgated, as we shall prove, a real code of hostages, and pretended they were merely complying with law every time they proceeded to carry out reprisal executions.

The taking of hostages, as you know, is prohibited by Article 50 of the Hague Convention. I shall read this text to you. It is to be found in the Fourth Convention, Article 50:

“No collective penalty, pecuniary or other, can be decreed
against populations for individual acts for which they cannot be
held jointly responsible.” (Document Number RF-265).

And yet, supreme perfidy! The German General Staff, the German Government, will endeavor to turn this regulation into a dead letter and to set up as law the systematic violation of the Hague Convention.

I shall describe to you how the General Staff formed its pseudo-law on hostages, a pseudo-law which in France found its final expression in what Stülpnagel and the German administration called the “hostages code.” I shall show you, in passing, which of these defendants are the most guilty of this crime.

On the 15th of February 1940 in a secret report addressed to the Defendant Göring, the OKW justifies the taking of hostages, as proved by the excerpt from Document Number 1585-PS which I propose to read to you. This document is dated Berlin, 15 February 1940. It bears the heading: “Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Secret. To the Reich Minister for Aviation and Supreme Commander of the Air Force.”

“Subject: Arrest of Hostages.

“According to the opinion of the OKW, the arrest of hostages is
justified in all cases in which the security of the troops and
the carrying out of their orders demand it. In most cases it
will be necessary to have recourse to it in case of resistance
or an untrustworthy attitude on the part of the population of an
occupied territory, provided that the troops are in combat or
that a situation exists which renders other means of restoring
security insufficient . . . .

“In selecting hostages it must be borne in mind that their
arrest shall take place only if the refractory sections of the
population are anxious for the hostages to remain alive. The
hostages shall therefore be chosen from sections of the
population from which a hostile attitude may be expected. The
arrest of hostages shall be carried out among persons whose
fate, we may suppose, will influence the insurgents.”

This document is filed by the French Delegation as Exhibit Number RF-267.

To my knowledge, Göring never raised any objection to this thesis. Here is one more paragraph from an order, Document Number F-508 (Exhibit Number RF-268), from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in France, administrative section, signed “Stroccius,” 12 September 1940. Three months after the beginning of the occupation, the hostages are defined therein as follows:

“Hostages are inhabitants of a country who guarantee with their
lives the impeccable attitude of the population. The
responsibility for their fate is thus placed in the hands of
their compatriots. Therefore, the population must be publicly
threatened that the hostages will be held responsible for
hostile acts of individuals. Only French citizens may be taken
as hostages. The hostages can be held responsible only for
actions committed after their arrest and after the public
proclamation.”

This ordinance cancels 5 directives prior to 12 September 1940. This question was the subject of numerous texts, and two General Staff ordinances, dated, as indicated at the head of the Document Number F-510 (Exhibit Number RF-269), 2 November 1940 and 13 February 1941:

“If acts of violence are committed by the inhabitants of the
country against members of the occupation forces, if offices and
installations of the Armed Forces are damaged or destroyed, or
if any other attacks are directed against the security of German
units and service establishments, and if, under the
circumstances, the population of the place of the crime or of
the immediate neighborhood can be considered as jointly
responsible for those acts of sabotage, measures of prevention
and expiation may be ordered by which the civil population is to
be deterred in future from committing, encouraging, or
tolerating acts of that kind. The population is to be treated as
jointly responsible for individual acts of sabotage, if by its
attitude in general towards the German Armed Forces, it has
favored hostile or unfriendly acts of individuals, or if by its
passive resistance against the investigation of previous acts of
sabotage, it has encouraged hostile elements to similar acts, or
otherwise created a favorable atmosphere for opposition to the
German occupation. All measures must be taken in a way that it
is possible to carry out. Threats that cannot be realized give
the impression of weakness.”

I submit these two documents as Exhibit Number RF-268 and 269 (Documents Number F-508 and F-510).

Until now we have not found any trace in these German texts of an affirmation which might lead one to think that the taking of hostages and their execution constitute a right for the occupying power; but here is a German text which explicitly formulates this idea. It is quoted in your book of documents as Document Number F-507 (Exhibit Number RF-270), dated Brussels, 18 April 1944. It is issued by the Chief Judge to the military Commander-in-Chief in Belgium and the North of France; and it is addressed to the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden. It reads in the margin: “Most Secret. Subject: Execution of 8 terrorists in Lille on 22 December 1943. Reference: Your letter of 16 March 1944 Lille document.” You will read in the middle of Paragraph 2 of the text:

“. . . Moreover, I maintain my point of view that the legal
foundations for the measures taken by the Oberfeldkommandantur
of Lille, by virtue of the letter of my police group of the 2d
of March 1944, are, regardless of the opinion of the Armistice
Commission, sufficiently justified and further explanations are
superfluous. The Armistice Commission is in a position to
declare to the French, if it wishes to go into the question in
detail at all, that the executions have been carried out in
conformity with the general principles of the law concerning
hostages.”

It is, therefore, quite obviously a state doctrine which is involved. Innocent people become forfeit. They answer with their lives for the attitude of their fellow-citizens towards the German Army. If an offense is committed of which they are completely ignorant, they are the object of a collective penalty possibly entailing death. This is the official German thesis imposed by the German High Command, in spite of the protests of the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden. I say: A thesis imposed by the German High Command, and I will produce the evidence. Keitel, on the 16th of September 1941, signed a general order which has already been read and filed by my American colleagues under Document Number 389-PS (Exhibit Number RF-271) and which I shall begin to explain. This order concerns all the occupied territories of the East and the West, as established by the list of addresses which includes all the military commanders of the countries then occupied by Germany: France, Belgium, Norway, Holland, Denmark, eastern territories, Ukraine, Serbia, Salonika, southern Greece, Crete. This order was in effect for the duration of the war. We have a text of 1944 which refers to it. This order of Keitel, Chief of the OKW, is dictated by a violent spirit of anti-Communist repression. It aims at all kinds of repression of the civilian population.

This order, which concerns even the commanders whose troops are stationed in the West, points out to them that in all cases in which attacks are made against the German Army:

“It is necessary to establish that we are dealing with a mass
movement uniformly directed by Moscow to which may also be
imputed the seemingly unimportant sporadic incidents which have
occurred in regions which have hitherto remained quiet.”

Consequently Keitel orders, among other things, that 50 to 100 Communists are to be put to death for each German soldier killed. This is a political conception which we constantly meet in all manifestations of German terrorism. As far as Hitlerite propaganda is concerned, all resistance to Germany is of Communist inspiration, if not in essence Communist. The Germans thereby hoped to eliminate from among the resistance the nationalists whom they thought hostile to Communism. But the Nazis also pursued another aim: They still hoped above all to divide France and the other conquered countries of the West into two hostile factions and to put one of these factions at their service under the pretext of anti-Communism.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off for 10 minutes?

[_A recess was taken._]

M. DUBOST: Keitel confirmed this order concerning hostages on 24 September 1941. We submit it as Exhibit Number RF-272, and you will find it in your document book as F-554. I shall read you the first paragraph:

“Following instructions by the Führer, the Supreme Command of
the Armed Forces issued on 16 September 1941 an order concerning
the Communist revolutionary movements in the occupied
territories. The order was addressed to the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs for the attention of Ambassador Ritter. It also deals
with the question of capital punishment in court-martial
proceedings.

“According to the order, in the future, most stringent measures
must be taken in the occupied territories.”

The choice of hostages is also indicated thus in Document Number 877-PS, which has already been read to you and which is previous to the aggression of Germany against Russia. It is necessary to remind the Tribunal of this document because it shows the premeditation of the German Command and the Nazi Government to divide the occupied countries, to take away from the partisan resistance all its patriotic character, in order to substitute for it a political character which it never had. We submit this document under Exhibit Number RF-273:

“In this connection it must be borne in mind that, apart from
other adversaries with whom our troops have to contend, there is
a particularly dangerous element of the civilian population
which is destructive of all order and propagates
Jewish-Bolshevist philosophy. There is no doubt that, wherever
he possibly can, this enemy uses this weapon of disintegration
cunningly and in ambush against the German forces which are
fighting and liberating the country.”

This document is an official document issued by the headquarters of the High Command of the Army. It expresses the general doctrine of all the German Staff. It is Keitel who presides over the formation of this doctrine. He is therefore not only a soldier under the orders of his government; but at the same time that he is a general, he is also a Nazi politician whose acts are those of a war leader and also those of a politician serving the Hitlerite policy. You have proof of it in the document which I have just read to you: A general who is also a politician, in whom both politics and the conduct of war are combined in one single preoccupation. This is not surprising for those who know the German line of thought, which had never separated war and politics. Was it not Clausewitz who said that war was only the continuation of politics by other means?

This is doubly important. This constitutes a direct and crushing charge against Keitel; but Keitel is the German General Staff. Now this organization is indicted, and we see by this document that this indictment is justified as the German General Staff dabbled in the criminal policy of the German Cabinet.

In the case of France, the general orders of Keitel were adapted by Stülpnagel in his order of 30 September 1941, better known in France under the name of “hostages code,” which repeats and specifies in detail the previous order, namely that of 23 August 1941. This order of 30 September 1941 is of major importance to anyone who wishes to prove under what circumstances French hostages were shot. This is why I shall be obliged to read large extracts. It defines, in Paragraph 3, the categories of Frenchmen who will be considered as hostages. I shall read this document 1588-PS, which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-274. Paragraph I concerns the seizure of hostages. I read:

“1. On 22 August 1941, I issued the following announcement:

“‘On the morning of 21 August 1941, a member of the German Armed
Forces was killed in Paris as a result of a murderous attack. I
therefore order that:

“‘1. All Frenchmen held in custody of whatever kind, by the
German authorities or on behalf of German authorities in France,
are to be considered as hostages as from 23 August.

“‘2. If any further incident occurs, a number of these hostages
are to be shot, to be determined according to the gravity of the
attempt.’

“2. On 19 September 1941 by an announcement to the
Plenipotentiary of the French Government attached to the
Military Commander in France, I ordered that, as from 19
September 1941, all French males who are under arrest of any
kind by the French authorities or who are taken into custody
because of Communist or anarchistic agitation are to be kept
under arrest by the French authorities also on behalf of the
Military Commander in France.

“3. On the basis of my notification of the 22d of August 1941
and of my order of the 19th of September 1941 the following
groups of persons are therefore hostages:

“(a) All Frenchmen who are kept in detention of any kind
whatsoever by the German authorities, such as police custody,
imprisonment on remand, or penal detention.

“(b) All Frenchmen who are kept in detention of any kind
whatsoever by the French authority on behalf of the German
authorities. This group includes:

“(aa) All Frenchmen who are kept in detention of any kind
whatsoever by the French authorities because of Communist or
anarchist activities.

“(bb) All Frenchmen on whom the French penal authorities impose
prison terms at the request of the German military courts and
which the latter consider justified.

“(cc) All Frenchmen who are arrested and kept in custody by the
French authorities upon demand of the German authorities or who
are being handed over by the Germans to French authorities with
the order to keep them under arrest.

“(c) Stateless inhabitants who have already been living for some
time in France are to be considered as Frenchmen within the
meaning of my notification of the 22d of August 1941. . . .

“III. Release from detention.

“Persons who were not yet in custody on 22 August 1941 or on 19
September 1941 but who were arrested later or are still being
arrested are hostages as from the date of detention if the other
conditions apply to them.

“The release of arrested persons authorized on account of
expiration of sentences, lifting of the order for arrest, or for
other reasons will not be affected by my announcement of 22
August 1941. Those released are no longer hostages.

“In as far as persons are in custody of any kind with the French
authorities for Communist or anarchist activity, their release
is possible only with my approval as I have informed the French
Government. . . .

“VI. Lists of hostages.

“If an incident occurs which according to my announcement of 22
August 1941 necessitates the shooting of hostages, the execution
must immediately follow the order. The district commanders,
therefore, must select for their own districts from the total
number of prisoners (hostages) those who, from a practical point
of view, may be considered for execution and enter them on a
list of hostages. These lists of hostages serve as a basis for
the proposals to be submitted to me in the case of an execution.

“1. According to the observations made so far, the perpetrators
of outrages originate from Communist or anarchist terror gangs.
The district commanders are, therefore, to select from those in
detention (hostages), those persons who, because of their
Communist or anarchist views in the past or their positions in
such organizations or their former attitude in other ways, are
most suitable for execution. In making the selection it should
be borne in mind that the better known the hostages to be shot,
the greater will be the deterrent effect on the perpetrators,
themselves, and on those persons who, in France or abroad, bear
the moral responsibility—as instigators or by their
propaganda—for acts of terror and sabotage. Experience shows
that the instigators and the political circles interested in
these plots are not concerned about the life of obscure
followers, but are more likely to be concerned about the lives
of their own former officials. Consequently, we must place at
the head of these lists:

“(a) Former deputies and officials of Communist or anarchist
organizations.”

Allow me to make a comment, gentlemen. There never were any anarchist organizations represented in parliament, in either of our Chambers; and this paragraph (a) could only refer to former deputies and officials of the Communist organizations, of whom we know, moreover, that some were executed by the Germans as hostages.

“(b) Persons (intellectuals) who have supported the spreading of
Communist ideas by word of mouth or writing.

“(c) Persons who have proved by their attitude that they are
particularly dangerous.

“(d) Persons who have collaborated in the distribution of
leaflets.”

One idea is dominant in this selection: “We must punish the elite.” In conformity with paragraph (b) of this article, we shall see that the Germans shot a great number of intellectuals, including Solomon and Politzer, in 1941 and 1942, in Paris and in the provincial towns.

I shall come back to these executions later when I give you examples of German atrocities committed in relation to the policy of hostages in France.

“2. Following the same directives, a list of hostages is to be
prepared from the prisoners with De Gaullist sympathies.

“3. Racial Germans of French nationality who are imprisoned for
Communist or anarchist activity may be included in the list.
Special attention must be drawn to their German origin on the
attached form.

“Persons who have been condemned to death but who have been
pardoned, may also be included in the lists. . . .

“5. The lists have to record for each district about 150 persons
and for the Greater Paris Command about 300 to 400 people. The
district chiefs should always record on their lists those
persons who had their last residence or permanent domicile in
their districts, because the persons to be executed should, as
far as possible, be taken from the district where the act was
committed. . . .

“The lists are to be kept up to date. Particular attention is to
be paid to new arrests and releases.

“VII. Proposals for executions: