Chapter M: HERZOG: The Prosecution, Mr. President, does not wish to read any (9)

JODL: We said then that this had always been our idea, but that we had doubts whether it was not already too late.

DR. THOMA: What was the success of this memorandum?

JODL: As Rosenberg told me after the conference, the Führer, as he often did, pigeonholed the matter; that is, he did not reject it, but he said, “Put it aside.”

DR. THOMA: Did you have the impression that Rosenberg’s suggestions arose from concern about the dangers caused by Koch’s methods?

JODL: Undoubtedly it was an attempt to counteract these methods which were gradually used by Himmler and particularly by Koch.

DR. THOMA: Thank you, I have no more questions.

DR. CARL HAENSEL (Counsel for SS): Was the strategic assignment of the divisions of the Waffen-SS under you?

JODL: The divisions of the Waffen-SS, in regard to assignment, were generally treated like the divisions of the Army.

DR. HAENSEL: How many Waffen-SS divisions were there, according to your recollection? Please mention the number of Wehrmacht divisions also so that we have a means of comparison.

JODL: At the beginning of the war, I believe, we began with three SS divisions. The number increased until the end of the war to an estimated 35 to 37 divisions, as against a number of Army divisions which varied, but which one can give approximately as about 280, 290, 300.

DR. HAENSEL: What was the procedure in setting up new divisions? Who decided whether such a new division would be a Waffen-SS division or a Wehrmacht division?

JODL: As soon as the Führer had ordered the establishment of a new series of divisions he said, after consulting Himmler, that so-and-so many divisions were to be set up and so-and-so many Waffen-SS divisions. He determined the number.

DR. HAENSEL: Was there a certain standard, or was that done arbitrarily?

JODL: I had the impression that in setting up the SS divisions, the Führer wanted to go as far as he absolutely could.

DR. HAENSEL: And what do you consider—when you say “could,” what do you consider the limit?

JODL: The limit was in the fact that the soldiers of these Waffen-SS divisions were to be volunteers; and the time came very soon when Himmler had to report, “I do not get any more replacements for the divisions;” and from that time on the situation arose that, when the men came for military duty, the cream of the crop was taken by the SS, and these people, even if they were strict Catholic peasants’ sons, were drafted into the SS divisions. I myself received bitter letters from peasants’ wives about this.

DR. HAENSEL: In connection with this drafting into the Waffen-SS that you have just described, were political viewpoints taken into account? Was a recruit first questioned politically in some way before he was turned over to the Waffen-SS, or was no consideration taken of this?

JODL: No, the decisive thing was that the fellow was big, looked healthy, and promised to become a good soldier. That was the decisive thing.

DR. HAENSEL: You said yesterday that in the drafting of recruits no consideration was given to whether a man belonged to the SA or not. Is the same thing true of membership in the General SS? I mean in this sense, was no consideration given to whether the recruit belonged to the General SS, either in drafting, in training, or in promotion?

JODL: Not to such a pronounced extent as in the case of the SA. I believe that the majority of the men in the General SS came to the Waffen-SS and volunteered. But I also know that very many did not do that and were drafted in the normal way by the Army, so that they were treated in the Army just like any other German.

DR. HAENSEL: If I understand you correctly then, there were many members of the General SS on the one hand who served in the Army; and on the other hand, there were many who belonged neither to the Party nor to the SS but served in the Waffen-SS?

JODL: That is true; it does not apply to the very beginning of the war, but it is absolutely true for the second half of the war.

DR. HAENSEL: And this second half of the war contained the greater number?

JODL: Undoubtedly, that—the second half—I always call that part after the big losses in the first Russian campaign of 1941.

DR. HAENSEL: How strong was the total Waffen-SS at the end of the war, approximately?

JODL: About 480,000 men.

DR. HAENSEL: And the losses, that is the dead and captured, would be added to this number?

JODL: Yes, they would be added.

DR. HAENSEL: And do you have any figures in mind about that?

JODL: It is hard to give an estimate in regard to the SS.

MR. ROBERTS: Witness, you told the Tribunal 2 days ago that you had soldiering in the blood, is that right?

JODL: Yes, this is true.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. And you said yesterday that you were here to represent the honor of the German soldier, is that right?

JODL: Yes, I do that to a high degree.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good, yes. And you put yourself forward as an honorable soldier.

JODL: With full consciousness, yes.

MR. ROBERTS: And you put yourself forward as a truthful man.

JODL: I represented myself as such a man, and I am.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Because of the things you say you have been made to do in the last 6 or 7 years, do you think your honor has become at all soiled?

JODL: My honor was certainly not soiled, for I guarded it personally.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good, you say your honor is not soiled.

Have you—during the last 6 or 7 years, when causing to be said the things which you say you had to circulate—has your truthfulness remained at the same high standard?

[_There was no response._]

Can’t you answer that question?

JODL: I believe I am too dull for that question.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good, then if you are too dull, I won’t persist in it; I will go on. I will leave the question and I will go on.

In 1935 you were lieutenant colonel at the head of the Home Defense Department of the Wehrmacht, is that right?

JODL: Absolutely right.

MR. ROBERTS: That is Department L, Landesverteidigung, is that right?

JODL: Yes, that is correct.

MR. ROBERTS: And was Field Marshal Von Blomberg your superior?

JODL: Field Marshal Von Blomberg was not my direct superior, but one of my superiors.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you work a good deal with Field Marshal Von Blomberg?

JODL: On various occasions I reported to him personally, of course not nearly so much as the Chief of the Armed Forces Department.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you attend staff talks with him?

JODL: I did not attend large conferences with Blomberg. I believe that there were seldom more persons than General Keitel and I and perhaps one other chief of a department.

MR. ROBERTS: And would they be called staff talks?

JODL: No, those conferences took place in the Office of the Chief of the Armed Forces Department.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you go to staff talks?

JODL: Of course, since I belonged to the staff.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good; I thought that.

Now, will you please look at the Document C-139, Exhibit USA-53. First look at the signature, will you. That is signed by Blomberg, is it not?

JODL: That is signed by Blomberg, yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Now, that is dealing with “Operation Schulung.” Do you remember what Operation Schulung was?

[_There was no response._]

That is the reoccupation of the Rhineland, isn’t it?

[_There was no response._]

Can’t you answer me?

JODL: I can answer you as soon as I have read that.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the question was whether you remember what Operation Schulung was. It isn’t necessary to read the document in order to answer that question.

JODL: According to my recollection—I do not know whether it comes from studying the documents here in Nuremberg—the term Schulung meant preparations for the occupation of the Rhineland after evacuation of the West Rhine territories in the case of French sanctions...

MR. ROBERTS: Very good, I agree.

JODL: But—there is more to be said in that connection.

MR. ROBERTS: Now, wait a moment. That is then dealing with the reoccupation of the Rhineland; do you agree with that?

JODL: No, that does not deal with the reoccupation of the Rhineland. That is absolutely false, but it...

MR. ROBERTS: Now, just let us look at this document together and see what it says. Now, first of all, it is dated the 2d of May 1935.

“For the operation...” I am reading it to you if you will follow it, and might I make this point first: It is apparently so secret that it couldn’t be entrusted to a stenographer, isn’t it? The whole document is written in manuscript, handwriting, isn’t it?

[_There was no response._]

MR. ROBERTS: You can answer that question surely. Can’t you see whether it is in handwriting or not?

JODL: It is in handwriting, yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, why not say so?

Now then, let’s just look at the document. It is from the Reich Minister of Defense; that is Von Blomberg, isn’t it? It is the second copy, “By hand only.” It is, to the Chief of the High Command, Chief of the Naval High Command, and the Reich Minister for Air.

“For the operation suggested in the last staff talks”—that is
why I asked you whether you went to staff talks, you see—“of
the Armed Forces, I lay down the code name, ‘Schulung.’”

Then, may I just refer briefly to the contents:

“This is a joint undertaking of the three branches of the
Wehrmacht... The operation must be executed”—and this is a
phrase we have become familiar with later—“by a surprise blow
at lightning speed.

“Strictest secrecy is necessary ... only peacetime strength....”

And Number 3:

“Every improvement of our armaments will make possible a greater
measure of preparedness....”

And then:

“The High Command of the Army is asked: How many divisions ready
for action?”

Not one token battalion as you said yesterday.

“Reinforcement of the necessarily inadequate forces there”—that
is in the West—“by the East Prussian divisions which will be
brought here at once by rail or sea transport... High Command of
the Navy to look after the safe transport of the East Prussian
troops by sea, in case the overland route is closed.”

What could that refer to, that secret instruction—so secret it had to be in manuscript—if it wasn’t the reoccupation of the Rhineland?

JODL: If you will permit me to make quite a brief explanation, then the Tribunal will be saved a tremendous lot of time.

MR. ROBERTS: Please, Witness, answer my question first and then make an explanation after, if it is brief. The question is, what could it refer to except the reoccupation of the Rhineland?

JODL: I am not here as a clairvoyant; I do not know the document; I have never read it; at this time I was not in the Armed Forces Department—that has entirely different signatures—I was in the operations section of the Army. I neither saw nor ever heard of this paper. If you look at the date, 2 May 1935, it is proven there in writing, for I entered the Armed Forces Department only in the middle of June 1935. Thus, only on the basis of my general staff training can I give you some assumptions; but the Court do not want assumptions.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good, if that is your answer. And are you saying that you, who heard General Field Marshal Von Blomberg’s staff talk, cannot help the Court at all as to what that secret operation order is about?

JODL: It was before my time. I was not with Von Blomberg then.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, will you look, please at EC-405. Now—let him see the German book, Page 277.

My Lord, that is Page 26. Hasn’t he a German book?

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you did say, did you not, that you remember that the Operation Schulung was the preparation for the occupation of the Rhineland?

JODL: No, I said the contrary. I said that I heard the word, Schulung, for the first time here in the Court; and then I wondered what that could have been.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Court will be able to judge as to what you said by the shorthand notes. You say, do you, that you did not say Schulung meant the preparation for the occupation of the Rhineland? Is that right?

JODL: I mean, that as General Staff officer of the operations section at that time I had to know what military preparations were made.

THE PRESIDENT: But, that is not what I asked you. What I want to know is what you said just now when you were asked if you remembered what Operation Schulung meant. What did you say? It is suggested that it may have come through wrongly to us in the translation. What did you say?

JODL: I said, “I believe I recall, but I am not certain whether
this recollection did not result from studying the documents
here or earlier, that the word, Schulung, meant the preparations
for the evacuation of the western Rhine territory and occupation
of the Rhine boundary in case of French sanctions, for that was
the only thing with which we were concerned at that time.”

All the evacuation measures which I later mentioned anyway in Document EC-405 were part of that.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, you remember the date of that first document, 2d of May 1935. Now I refer to EC-405 which is in the big Document Book 7, Page 261, and it is on Page 277 of the German book, 277. Now this, Witness, is a meeting—I want you to look, please, at Pages 43 and 44 of the original which you have. Have you got 43 and 44?

JODL: 43 and 44, yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Well, now, you see there—it is a meeting of the working committee of the Reich Defense Council. It is dated the 26th of June 1935 and at letter “F:” “Lieutenant Colonel Jodl ... about ‘participation in Mobilization Preparations,’” and the first three paragraphs deal with general mobilization; and I do not want to read them, but the fourth paragraph reads:

“Demilitarized zone requires special treatment. In his speech of
21 May 1935 and other utterances the Führer has stated that the
stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pact
regarding the demilitarized zone are being observed. To the
_aide-mémoire_ of the French Chargé d’Affaires of 17 June 1935
on ‘Recruiting Offices in the Demilitarized Zone,’ the German
Reich Government has replied that neither civilian recruiting
authorities nor other offices in the demilitarized zone have
been entrusted with mobilization tasks such as the raising,
equipping, and arming of any kind of formations for the event of
war or in preparation thereof.”

Now, if Von Blomberg’s handwritten letter of the 2d of May 1935 did refer to preparations for reoccupying the Rhineland by surprise, it was highly dishonest of the Führer, 19 days later on the 21st of May, to say that the Locarno and Versailles treaties were being observed, wasn’t it?

JODL: No, it wasn’t dishonest, for if it is true at all that the term, Schulung...

THE PRESIDENT: I think that is a matter of comment, if you please.

MR. ROBERTS: I shall, of course, My Lord, have to make certain comments on the witness as I proceed. No doubt Your Lordship will realize that I am not endeavoring to depart from this particular ruling which is only for this particular question, presumably.

THE PRESIDENT: I think—the Tribunal think that you ought not to make comments but you ought to confine yourself as far as possible to cross-examination about the facts.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, My Lord I—about your Lordship’s ruling—I have had, of course, a very extensive experience in cross-examination in many courts, and I bow entirely to Your Lordship’s ruling; but it is very difficult for a cross-examiner to confine himself entirely to the facts. But I shall do the very best I can.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Then I shall read on:

“Since political entanglements abroad must be avoided at present
under all circumstances, only those preparatory measures that
are urgently necessary may be carried out in the demilitarized
zone. The existence of such preparations or the intention of
making them must be kept strictly secret in the zone itself as
well as in the rest of the Reich....

“Weapons, equipment, insignia, field-gray uniforms, and other
items stored for mobilization purposes must be kept from sight.”

And now I want to refer to the last paragraph:

“Commitment to writing of directives for mobilization purposes
is permissible only insofar as it is absolutely necessary to the
smooth execution of the measures provided for the demilitarized
zone. Without exception such material must be kept in safes.”

You were collecting weapons and uniforms in the demilitarized zone, were you?

JODL: They were weapons and items of equipment of the Landespolizei, the Order Police, and the Gendarmerie. There were no troops there. Consequently, there were no weapons there for them.

MR. ROBERTS: Did the Police wear field-gray uniforms?

JODL: To my knowledge the Police wore a gray-green uniform or a green uniform.

MR. ROBERTS: Then what was the need of this great secrecy if this was only police equipment?

JODL: It was the equipment in addition for the reinforced border guards—the customs inspectors—about which I have already said that it was intended...

MR. ROBERTS: My question, Witness, was what was the need for secrecy? What was the need for secrecy if you were not breaking the Treaty of Versailles? Can’t you answer that?

JODL: I have already testified to the reasons for keeping all these measures secret in detail during my direct examination, and I confirm that in all these preparations it was a question—in case of an occupation of the western Rhenish territory by France—of setting up a blockade along the line with the aid of the Police, the Gendarmerie, and the reinforced border guards. That was the intention at that time, only for this eventuality. I have already testified under oath that I learned about the occupation of the Rhineland only 6 or 8 days beforehand.

MR. ROBERTS: I know you have, you see, and I am suggesting to you that your evidence was quite untrue on that point; and I am going to suggest it is quite untrue on many points. Now then, will you please go back to the first paragraph that I read. You say:

“To the _aide-mémoire_ of the French Chargé d’Affaires ... the
German Reich Government has replied that neither civilian
recruiting authorities nor other offices ... have been entrusted
with mobilization tasks such as the raising, equipping, and
arming of any kind of formations for the event of war....”

Doesn’t that subsequent paragraph about the weapons, equipment, insignia, and field-gray uniforms show that the truth was not told to the French Chargé d’Affaires?

JODL: I only repeat the answer that was given to the French Chargé d’Affaires. I believe that that was essentially true: No mobilization tasks, such as disposition, equipment, and arming of formations for the event of war. There was no thought of war, no one mentioned it with even one word.

MR. ROBERTS: I will not repeat the point, I submitted—may I just remind you—and I think there are copies for the Tribunal too—of Article 43 of the Versailles Treaty.

Article 42 defines the area, the left bank of the Rhine and the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to the east. Article 43:

“In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of
armed forces, either permanently of temporarily, and military
maneuvers of any kind; as well as the upkeep of all permanent
works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.”

I suggest to you the step you were taking—mentioning at that meeting—was a clear breach of Versailles. Do you agree, or don’t you?

JODL: No, I do not agree to that. They were taken in the event that the enemy should not abide by the treaty and should attack us again, as that time in the Ruhr district.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now I propose to refer to you a document which has been described as your speech, L-172, from time to time—and I want to make it quite clear first as to what you say the document is, because you wouldn’t say one thing one day and the opposite the next, would you, Witness? That document has your writing in places, has it not? I can refer you to the pages if you like. If you look at page...

JODL: That is unnecessary. It contains many handwritten corrections and notations by me. But I have...

MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Witness, for saving me that trouble then. And is that a speech—the notes of a speech—which you delivered at Munich to the Gauleiter in 1943?

JODL: I have already clearly said that this was the rough draft, not the speech that I made but parts of the first draft and most of the contents consist of notes by my staff, which they sent me for the preparation of this speech. I crossed out whole pages and sent the whole rough draft back again and only then did I make my speech.

MR. ROBERTS: Well now, I want to examine that, because you said quite differently, did you not, when you were interrogated by one American officer on two separate occasions? You said quite differently, did you not?

[_There was no response._]

Were you interrogated on this matter on the 8th of October last year by Colonel Thomas Hinkel? Do you remember that? Perhaps you would not remember the date.

JODL: No. Oh, we spoke about this matter a few times.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, and you were sworn when you gave your answers to the interrogators?

JODL: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Well now, may I read, to refresh your memory, a copy from the shorthand notes of the interrogation?

“I show you a photostatic reproduction of a number of pages of a
lecture, which was purported to have been given by you on the
7th of November 1943, and ask you if those pages represent the
lecture that was delivered. For the record, that is identified
as L-172.”

Then you answer:

“Yes. A number of things are not contained therein, which I
explained with the map.

“Question: ‘You interpolated the remarks that do not appear in
the written part; is that correct?’

“Answer: ‘Yes, many particulars I set forth just with the map at
hand.’

“Question: ‘Is that your handwriting appearing on the cover
page?’

“Answer: ‘No, it is not mine.’

“But the remaining sheets you identify as the written version of
a lecture at Munich?

“Answer: ‘I cannot say whether it was actually my lecture as it
was, because I see the signature of Buttlar. It isn’t the
lecture itself. That is the materials of the brochures which had
been furnished to me.’”

Then:

“Do you identify...”

Just follow this, will you, Witness?

“Do you identify the first 29 pages as constituting the lecture
that you delivered?

“Answer (after examining the document): ‘Yes, that is my
lecture.’”

Do you want to alter that sworn answer now? Do you?

JODL: I have not read the transcript of the notes which were taken here. I do not know the translation. I made several other statements in that regard. I observed in the second interrogation that that was not actually my speech, and that...

MR. ROBERTS: I will read the second one, Witness. I have that for you. This was on the 16th...

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, had you finished what you wanted to say?

JODL: No, I had not finished. I was interrupted.

THE PRESIDENT: Then finish what you want to say.

JODL: I wanted to say that before I had looked over the whole document, at the first moment, of course, I had the impression that that was the copy from which I delivered my speech. However, when I looked at it more carefully in the course of the interrogations, I noticed that it was only the material collected for this speech, and I said clearly and distinctly:

“It contains the first draft, the outline and the conclusion by
me. The whole middle part is only material furnished by my
staff, and the whole thing is not at all the speech which I
gave.”

That is word for word what I told Colonel Hinkel.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes. Let me read now what I was going to read, the second interrogation. This is the 16th of November 1945, 4 days before the Trial:

“This document is identified for the record as L-172. I show you
the photostatic reproduction in order to refresh your
recollection concerning it.

“As I remember your previous testimony, it was to the effect
that the first part of the document is the speech that you wrote
for delivery to that meeting. The second part consists of
various thoughts on the basis of which this speech was prepared;
is that right?

“Answer: ‘One moment, please. This is not my real lecture. This
is a conglomeration of the pieces of writings which are partly
drafts of my own, that is, the introduction; but all the
appendices are the basis of my lecture furnished me by my staff.

“‘The photostats appended to the original lecture—it was a
photographed copy—and also a number of maps which were drawn up
were included.

“‘This is not my lecture as such; and the annotations made here,
in this calligraphic manner, were not mine. I made them in my
own handwriting.

“‘I do not know the origin of this copy. Most likely it was
furnished me by the OKW for the purpose of my giving this
lecture. It is altogether a conglomeration of various pieces of
writing, and it is usable only with limitations. However...’”

And just listen to this, will you?

“‘...as to the broad lines of it, this is what I have used as a
lecture.’”

Then the next question was:

“I believe you stated before that the written speech that you
had was not given as set forth in the text because you
interpolated various remarks in the course of the speech,
particularly whenever you referred to one of the maps that you
placed before the audience, in order to follow the campaigns
which you discussed. Isn’t that correct?”

Now listen to this:

“What I have written down I have actually spoken and I followed
this text written down by myself. But in regard to the momentary
situation on the various fronts”—and that is Part 3 and 4,
where you will find a note “delivered extemporaneously”—“I had
that so clearly in mind that I did not need to base my speech on
any written statements. Also, I referred to the maps freely.”

Then the last question on this point:

“Is it not true, however, that the document before you
represents, in general, the speech that you gave at Munich in
November 1943 to this meeting?”

The answer is:

“Yes; much, without doubt, is the same. All the appendices with
regard to these various theaters of war and other appendices I
had not used during my speech. I had returned them.”

Do you agree with your answer to that interrogation?

JODL: On the whole, you have confirmed just what I said. However, I do not know why we have to talk so long about it. The case is completely clear. It is...

MR. ROBERTS: Well, please do not worry yourself. I know I am stopping you; but I apprehend that I am stopping you from saying something quite irrelevant, and in the interest of time I regard it as my duty to stop you. Please do not worry about why I should do something.

I want to know whether that document roughly represents what you said in the speech. It is quite a different thing to being in a wastepaper basket.

JODL: The introduction and the conclusion, as contained here in the first draft were, of course, basically retained in the speech in this form. However, the whole speech was only finally worked out on the basis of this first draft; it was shortened, changed, parts were crossed out, and mistakes were eliminated. And only then came the main part of the speech for which only the material is here. There is no proof, and I am not in a position to say whether I actually spoke even one sentence of those which are here in the form in which it is found in the first draft.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good; I will accept that.

JODL: If you give me a copy of my actual speech I will recognize it.

MR. ROBERTS: That is all we can give you, Witness, because that is all we found.

THE PRESIDENT: I think we might as well adjourn now.

MR. ROBERTS: If Your Lordship please.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I should like to call attention to the following: When my client was interrogated here, he was heard through an interpreter, since he does not understand the English language. On the basis of this testimony the minutes were, as I have just heard, set down in the English language. These minutes he never saw and he did not sign them. And now these minutes, which were compiled in English, are submitted to him in a German translation. In my opinion it is quite impossible under such circumstances to tie the defendant down to specific words which are contained in the minutes. He abides by what he said, but he cannot recognize everything that is in those minutes when...

THE PRESIDENT: That is true. We will keep these facts in mind. The Tribunal will keep these facts in mind, if you will draw them to their attention.

MR. ROBERTS: If it please the Tribunal, I am passing from that point. The witness, I think, said the document was the basis of his speech; and I accept that answer and I pass to another point.

Would you please give the witness his diary, 1780-PS, German C-113. And it is Page 133 in the large document book, Page 133.

Witness, I think you have seen this entry. My Lord, it is the 5th of November 1937 I am dealing with:

“Führer develops his ideas about intentions for future course
and conduct of policy....”

Page 133 of the large book.

THE PRESIDENT: When you say, large book, you mean Number 7?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, Number 7; I am sorry. I should have given it a number.

[_Turning to the defendant._] 5th of November 1937:

“Führer develops his ideas about intentions for future course
and conduct of policy to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces...”—_et cetera_.

There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made by the chief of Armed Forces and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

“...the intention of L...”—does that mean your department, Landesverteidigung—its intention to have these thoughts put on paper?

[_There was no response._]

MR. ROBERTS: Please answer my question, Witness.

JODL: “Intention of L,” that means the intention of the Department of National Defense (Landesverteidigung) to have these thoughts put down on paper and transmitted to the branches of the Wehrmacht.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, the meeting that you were talking about was what we have called the Hossbach Conference, was it not, which is 386-PS? The Tribunal is very familiar with it. You remember the conference, do you not? You have read it many times here?

JODL: Yes, but I was not present at this conference. I do recall the things that were read here.

MR. ROBERTS: I know you were not present. But presumably you, as head of the Home Defense Department, were told of what was said at the conference?

JODL: I have already stated with regard to that that the report which I received was in no way sensational. The directives for the preparations after this time are available to the Court in writing; what we prepared and worked out at the time is proved thereby. We have the orders of 20 May and of 14 June; they are available.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you were only asked whether you were told what happened at the conference. It was not necessary to make a long statement about that.

MR. ROBERTS: You see, I try to put simple questions, and I am asking for simple answers. The last thing I want is to interrupt you.

Were you told that at that conference Hitler said that Germany’s problem was a question of space?

JODL: No, not one word.

MR. ROBERTS: Were you told that Hitler said that the German question could only be solved by force?

JODL: No.

MR. ROBERTS: And were you told that Hitler said that German rearmament was practically complete?

JODL: No.

MR. ROBERTS: And the last question I will ask you: Were you told that Hitler said that the first aim in the event of war would be Austria and Czechoslovakia?

JODL: The report about the more active preparations for the march against Czechoslovakia was, I believe, contained in these statements. But I can only say that the details which I received from Field Marshal Keitel are not in my recollection at present. I recall only one thing, that it was no surprise or sensation for me, and only small corrections of the directives which had been given out up to that point were necessary.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Thank you. Now then, you were not present at Obersalzberg when Keitel was there with Schuschnigg the following February, were you?

JODL: No, I was not present.

MR. ROBERTS: But Keitel later told you what had happened?

JODL: He made a few brief remarks about that in narrative form, for after all, I had no further concern in this matter.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you make that entry in your diary; that is, the next entry to the one I was referring to, Page 133, Book 7, the same page, under 11th of February 1938:

“Evening 12 February General Keitel, with General Reichenau, and
Sperrle at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg and Schmidt were again put
under severest political and military pressure.”

Did Keitel tell you that?

JODL: Yes. You have only inserted the word “again.” That is not in my diary. This entry I made personally, because Keitel told me that during lunch Reichenau and Sperrle had carried on warlike conversations, that they had talked about the new rearmament of Germany.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, in March—I think this is common ground—you signed or initialed one or two orders for the “Operation Otto.”

JODL: Yes; but at that time it was not called Otto but “For the March into Austria.”

MR. ROBERTS: Hitler, when he heard that Schuschnigg was going to obtain the opinion of the people by plebiscite, decided to invade at once, did he not?

JODL: Yes, I was told, when he heard that there was to be a grotesque violation of public opinion through the trick of a plebiscite, he said that he would certainly not tolerate this under any circumstances. This is what I was told.

MR. ROBERTS: He would not tolerate public opinion being ascertained?

JODL: No; he would not tolerate public opinion being abused through this trick. That is how it was told to me.

MR. ROBERTS: So the Armed Forces of Germany then marched into Austria? That is right?

JODL: That is right; the Wehrmacht marched in.

MR. ROBERTS: And Austria, from that day, received all the benefits of National Socialism, is that right?

JODL: That is a political question. At any rate it could perhaps have become the happiest country on earth.

MR. ROBERTS: I wasn’t asking what it could have become, but what it received. It received the SS, the Gestapo, the concentration camps, the suppression of opponents, and the persecution of Jews, didn’t it?

JODL: Those are questions with which I did not concern myself. Those questions you have to put to the competent authorities. In addition it received me as artillery commander; and they loved me; I only want to confirm that.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. You say the people appeared pleased to see you?

JODL: The people who were under my jurisdiction were very happy about this officer; I can say that.

MR. ROBERTS: They had to appear to be, whether they were or not, didn’t they?

JODL: No, they did not have to be. At any rate, after I had been away for a long time, they certainly did not have to write enthusiastic letters to me, letters which I received throughout the war from these Austrians to whom my heart belonged.

MR. ROBERTS: There was one man who was not pleased to see you, wasn’t there?

JODL: I know no such person.

MR. ROBERTS: Don’t you?

JODL: No.

MR. ROBERTS: What about Schuschnigg?

JODL: I never saw Schuschnigg. He doesn’t know me and I do not know him. I don’t know...

MR. ROBERTS: He wasn’t pleased to see you come in, was he?

JODL: I cannot say that.

MR. ROBERTS: What happened to him?

THE PRESIDENT: We know that, Mr. Roberts.

MR. ROBERTS: I quite realize that. I can’t imagine my question is not admissible, but if you don’t want me to put it—it is one of a series of questions—I won’t.

Schuschnigg was put in a concentration camp, wasn’t he?

JODL: I was told that the Führer had decided: “I do not want a martyr, under any circumstances, but I cannot liberate him; I must put him in honorary custody.” That was the impression I had during the entire war.

MR. ROBERTS: Honorary custody?

JODL: It was called honorary custody.

MR. ROBERTS: What? Was he an honorary member of Dachau?

JODL: That I do not know. Those are not questions that you can put to me, for I was a soldier and not the commandant of a concentration camp.

MR. ROBERTS: That is an honor that one would be glad to dispense with, isn’t it?

JODL: I would gladly dispense with much that took place during these years.

DR. EXNER: Please, I must protest against questions like that, purely political and based purely on legal questions and on matters which the defendant cannot at all answer through his own knowledge. It is not a fact whether Schuschnigg was happy.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, in my respectful submission, these questions are perfectly proper; they are questions the like of which have been put by every counsel who has cross-examined both for the Prosecution and the Defense.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, the Tribunal thinks that the cross-examination is proper.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I am passing from that point. I am grateful to you.

[_Turning to the defendant._] The only question I ask in conclusion is that Schuschnigg was kept in prison or kept in confinement for several years without any charge and any trial. That is right, isn’t it?

JODL: It may be, I do not know.

MR. ROBERTS: You knew, did you not, when you signed those orders for the march into Austria, that Germany had given an assurance in May 1935 to respect the territorial integrity of the state of Austria and that on the 11th of July 1936 there had been entered into by your Government and the Austrian Government an agreement by Germany to recognize the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria? Did you know of these things?

JODL: At that moment I did not know that; in my position as a colonel in the General Staff that did not concern me in the least. What would that have led to?

MR. ROBERTS: I am passing from Austria with this one last question: Is there an entry in your diary—it is a passage in L-172, the basis for the draft of your speech—that after the Anschluss Czechoslovakia was enclosed by pincers and was bound to fall a victim? My Lord, that is Page 290 of Book 7. Do you remember that passage?

JODL: In the first draft which I made for my Gauleiter speech it was put down exactly what strategic improvements had taken place through the various actions of the Führer, in retrospect, but only these strategic results....

MR. ROBERTS: Well, but—again I do not want to stop you, but did you say that—something to this effect—and I will give you the document if you like—that Czechoslovakia was enclosed by pincers and was bound to fall a victim?

JODL: In the first draft I set down that through the taking over—through the Anschluss of Austria—the strategic situation of Czechoslovakia had become so hopeless that at any time it must fall a victim to a pincers attack; a strategic retrospect about facts, indisputable facts.

MR. ROBERTS: I accept that, Witness. Now I go very shortly to the case of Czechoslovakia. I only want to deal really with a couple of documents. I want to deal with item 17, which the Tribunal will find on Page 29 of Book 7. And it is marked—if you’ll hand it up—and I have flagged that for you, Witness, item 17.

JODL: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: You are familiar with that?

JODL: Yes, I know that.

MR. ROBERTS: And I do not propose to read it again, because it was read very recently; but you agree, do you not, you said yesterday, the problem was this: First of all, you must have a surprise attack; if you were going to attack at all, you must have a surprise attack.

JODL: On the basis of the stipulations made by the Führer; yes.

MR. ROBERTS: You must have a surprise attack first, and your troops would take 4 days to get into their battle position.

JODL: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: And therefore you must know the time, the incident which is going to be the cause of the attack; you must know the time when the incident is going to take place.

JODL: Yes, I said that one would either have to predetermine the time or one must know it in advance; otherwise the demands could not be carried out.

MR. ROBERTS: And, therefore, you must create the incident yourself.

JODL: I testified to that at length yesterday. Either one of the many had to be exploited or perhaps one would have to help the situation along a bit; but, as I said, those are General Staff considerations which, when we capture them from the French, you consider entirely irrelevant.

MR. ROBERTS: It is set down at the end of the document on Page 30 that either the Wehrmacht or the counterintelligence section would be charged with the manufacture of the incident in the last paragraph.

JODL: Yes, I therefore wrote: “In case the counterintelligence service is not charged with the organization of an incident _aside from that_”—“in case.” These are all theoretical deliberations of the General Staff in a situation, which I depicted quite accurately yesterday, where such incidents already occurred every day.

MR. ROBERTS: I know. Then, if this had taken place, the world would have been told that because of that incident Germany had been compelled to go to war?

JODL: I do not believe that this would have been reported to the world. Rather, I believe the true reason would have been told the world, which, furthermore, was made known constantly through the press, that 3½ million Germans cannot be used as slaves by another people permanently. That was the issue.

MR. ROBERTS: If the world is going to be told the truth, what is the earthly good of manufacturing an incident?

JODL: I testified as to that yesterday—I can only repeat what I said yesterday at length: I knew the history of war too well not to know that in every war things like that happen—the question as to who fired the first shot. And Czechoslovakia at that time had already fired thousands of shots which had fallen on this territory.

MR. ROBERTS: Now, I say, Witness, subject to correction, that you are not answering the question at all. The question was a very short one and you make a long speech about something quite different. The question is, if the truth was sufficient to justify your going to war, why should you want to manufacture an incident? If you can’t answer it, say so.

JODL: Well, it isn’t at all confirmed that I wanted to bring about an incident. I wrote, “in case ... not.” We never prepared one and that is surely the essential thing.

MR. ROBERTS: I won’t argue any further with you. I have put my point and will leave it. But now I want, on quite another point, to refer to the last paragraph on Page 29, the same document:

“Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague is
impossible before the first air attack, although the consequence
could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of
such an attack.”

Perhaps you would read this paragraph, known already to the Tribunal.

“...death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral
powers.”

That means an air raid before there has been any declaration of war or any warning to the civilian population, doesn’t it?

JODL: That meant that I called the attention of the Führer, through this document, to the fact that on the basis of his decree that result could or would come about.

MR. ROBERTS: Would you call that a terror attack? A terror attack?

JODL: It cannot be said under what conditions such an action would be launched. These are all theoretical tasks for our General Staff. How and if that was translated into practice, that no one can say, whether with justice or injustice; that depended on the political decision.

MR. ROBERTS: I will show you later how those thoughts were carried into practice in the case of other countries. So we will leave that document altogether now and I will leave the case of Czechoslovakia. Now you were recalled to the OKW on the 23d of August 1939, from your artillery employment. We know that, don’t we?

JODL: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: That was a great compliment to the opinion that the Führer had of you, wasn’t it?

JODL: The Führer was not responsible for my being called back. I do not know whether he knew about it at all. I do not believe so.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. On a very small point, Witness, you told the Court yesterday or the day before that you never had a conference with the Führer, I think, until September 1939; but your diary, on the 10th of August 1938—it is Page 136 of Book 7—your diary said you attended a conference at the Berghof with the Army chiefs and the Air Force groups. Didn’t you meet the Führer then?

JODL: That which you asserted in your first sentence, I did not say. What I said was, word for word:

“On 3 September I was introduced to the Führer by Field Marshal
Keitel, and on this occasion, at any rate, I spoke with him for
the first time.”

That is what I testified to, word for word, yesterday. I had seen the Führer a dozen times before then and I had heard him when he delivered his big speeches, after he was Reich Chancellor and Supreme Commander.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, I accept that. It is quite likely that I was wrong. Now, with regard to the Polish campaign, did I hear you right when you said that Warsaw was only bombed after leaflets had been dropped?

JODL: That applies to the period of the siege of Warsaw. The terror attack, I might say, which was to hit the entire city through artillery bombardment, that took place after two previous warnings.

MR. ROBERTS: It is a matter of history, is it not, that Warsaw was bombed, with many other Polish towns, in the early hours of the 1st of September 1939 before any declaration of war? Isn’t that a matter of history?

JODL: As far as this historical fact is concerned, Field Marshal Kesselring, who is very well informed about this, testified to that here in detail. He said—and also Reich Marshal Göring—that on this date the militarily important objectives throughout Poland were attacked but not the population of Warsaw.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. You are quite right, now Kesselring—If the Tribunal wants the reference, he gave evidence as to the bombing of Warsaw, the English transcript, Page 5731 (Volume IX, Page 175).

[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I suppose the result of the Polish campaign was naturally a source of satisfaction to all of you?

JODL: The military development of the Polish campaign, from the military point of view, was extremely satisfactory to us. Of course things happen in life that would give more satisfaction than a military action.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, I want you to look at a letter. This is—My Lord, this is a new exhibit, D-885, and it is GB-484.

That letter is in your writing, is it not? Is it in your writing?

JODL: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, it is written to Police President Dr. Karl Schwabe, Brünn, Moravia, Police Presidency, dated October 28, 1939:

“My dear Police President: For your enthusiastic letter of 22
September, I thank you heartily. I was quite particularly
pleased about it. This wonderful campaign in Poland was a grand
opening for this hard and decisive struggle and has brought
about for us an unusually favorable point of departure
politically as well as militarily. The difficult part for the
people as well as the Armed Forces is still ahead.”—I propose
to read it without comments and comment afterward.

“But the Führer and his associates are full of the greatest
confidence; for the sanctimonious British will not succeed in
throttling our economy, and militarily we are without worry.
Decisive is the will of the people to stick it out, and this the
many strong-willed and devoted men who are today at the head of
the districts and in other responsible posts will take care of.
This time we will show that we have better nerves and greater
unity. That you, Police President, will contribute your weighty
share to keeping the Czechs at it and not let them perk up, of
this I am convinced.”

Then he is very pleased about the high recognition granted to the troops:

“Thanking you heartily once more for your words of appreciation
which exceed my modest contribution in the shadow of the
powerful personality of our Führer. I am with a Heil Hitler.”

Why did you call the British sanctimonious? Because they keep treaties and don’t have concentration camps and don’t persecute Jews? Is that why you thought we were sanctimonious, because we don’t break treaties?

JODL: No, that was not the reason. The reason was that the political situation generally was represented that way, and that I was actually of that opinion at the time.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now you deal with:

“Decisive is the will of the people to stick it out, and this
the many strong-willed and devoted men who are at the head of
the districts and in other responsible posts will take care of.”

Who were these strong-willed and devoted men? Is that the SS and the Gestapo?

JODL: No, these are the Gauleiter.

MR. ROBERTS: The Gauleiter?

JODL: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, but I mean we have one or two Gauleiter here, Gauleiter Sauckel, for instance; in a large area like Thuringia, he couldn’t do much by himself, could he? He would have to have some SS or Gestapo, wouldn’t he?

JODL: We are not at all concerned with that here. The fact is that these Gauleiter actually directed the organization of the State and the administration in this war in a noteworthy way. Despite the catastrophe the people were much better taken care of than in the years 1914-18. That is uncontested and it is to the credit of these people.

MR. ROBERTS: They were better taken care of?

JODL: Even in the most terrible conditions at the end every man in Berlin received his normal rations. It was a model of organization, I can only say that.

MR. ROBERTS: And a model of organization because no opposition to the government or the Party was allowed, was it?

JODL: Certainly, it made it easier on one hand, and on the other hand, led to terrible catastrophes about which, of course, I only heard here for the first time.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Well, the letter speaks for itself, and I will go along. May I just ask you about this last sentence:

“That you, Police President, will contribute your weighty share
to keeping the Czechs at it and to not let them perk up...”

What did you mean by that?

JODL: Since he was Police President in Brünn, it was his task to see that quiet and order were maintained in Brünn and not to tolerate a Czech uprising at our backs while we were at war. That is a matter of course. I did not say that he was to murder or germanize the Czechs at all, but he had to keep them in order.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I pass from that now and I want to go to the various campaigns in the West. Now, with regard to Norway, of course you knew that your country had given its solemn word repeatedly to respect the integrity of Norway and Denmark, did you not?