Chapter XXXI: Book 2: , Keitel-13). The latter affidavit has also been signed by the (2)

The true nature of the Reich Defense Committee’s activities is set out quite simply and clearly in the _Manual of Mobilization for the Civilian Administration_; Documents 1639-PS and 1639a-PS. It refers to the result of discussions between all the experts of the Reich Defense Committee, and is an appendix to the mobilization plan of the Armed Forces as well as to that of armaments.

These three mobilization plans all taken together form the basis of your decision. You may see from them whether the Prosecution is right in its assumption of a total planning for aggressive war, or whether the Defendant Keitel was right when he stated during his hearing:

“What has been discussed and planned here is what every country
is entitled to do and what the responsible agencies are bound to
do, if they do not wish to violate their most sacred duty,
namely the safeguarding of the security of their country.”

The decision of 4 February 1938 was fateful for General Keitel as well as for the German Wehrmacht: for Keitel who could not yet form an opinion on the newly-created office of the “High Command of the Armed Forces” (OKW) for the Armed Forces which on that day lost its relative independence.

Hitler broke down the last barriers between himself and the Armed Forces—the nation in arms—by removing both the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the constitutionally responsible Reich War Minister. This truly portentous decision was fatal for Keitel and the German nation, though at the time of its occurrence this was not realized by the participants. That they must be blamed for not realizing it is easy to say now, in retrospect.

At the time everybody who was not an inveterate skeptic or pessimist had to base his judgment on the development of things in general and on the strength of the personalities involved. Neither the one nor the other could be clearly appreciated on 4 February 1938.

It was not a personal decision of the Defendant Keitel who did not know Hitler personally in these days and who met him for the first time man to man in the preliminary discussions. Hitler assigned him to the newly-created office of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Keitel accepted it. Even if we disregard entirely the human emotions connected with such a brilliant promotion there was no reasonable ground for the then Chief of the Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry to decline the offer, since Von Blomberg himself had recommended him. Hitler’s ideas about this office could not be discerned by Keitel. I shall pass to the next page...

The decree gave Keitel a wonderfully impressive office name as “Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.” The historical foundation is the elimination of the commanding authority over the entire Armed Forces, which up to 4 February 1938 was in the hands of Field Marshal Von Blomberg, and on that day was taken over by Hitler himself. Hitler created at the same time the responsible Ministry of War, which up to that time had also been administrated by Field Marshal Von Blomberg. Dr. Lammers says the following about the origin of the Führer’s Decree of 4 February 1938: (Morning Session of 8 April 1946; Volume XI, Page 29.)

“The Führer informed me that the Reich Minister of War, Von
Blomberg, is resigning his office and that he avails himself of
this opportunity to make some other changes in the Reich
Government, particularly since the Foreign Minister, Von
Neurath, is going to retire, which will make a change; there is
also a change in the High Command of the Army. In this
connection the Führer gave orders for a decree to be worked out
regarding the Command of the Armed Forces. It was to be merged
with the Ministry of War. As a directive the Führer gave me the
following instruction:

“In the future I shall not have any War Minister; neither will I
have in the future a Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to
stand between me, as the Supreme Commander, and the other
commanders-in-chief within the Armed Forces.

“In accordance with this instruction the decree was formulated,
by which the High Command of the Armed Forces was established as
an Army Staff directly subordinate to the command of the Führer.
The Führer did not want any independent office in this function,
inserted between himself and the commanders-in-chief of the
Armed Forces branches. In consequence, General Keitel, now
appointed Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, had no
independent commanding authority over the different branches of
the Armed Forces. Such authority would not have been considered
for other reasons as well.”

Field Marshal Von Blomberg declares in the affidavit I have submitted: To Question 24:

“At our last discussion Hitler pointed out that he presumably
would not fill my position again, and that he would thereby
become himself the real Supreme Commander of the German Army...

“He asked for a suggestion for the assignment of a _Chef du
Bureau_ who would direct and carry out current tasks under him
and thus under Hitler’s responsibility.

“I named Keitel, who, under me, had administered this office
very capably.”

In answer to Question 27:

“I proposed Keitel as _Chef du Bureau_, believing that I had put
him in the right job.”

In such a position he would not be a military adviser to Hitler. Whether and in how far Hitler ever asked for his advice, I do not know. Even so, Keitel’s responsibility, in my opinion, would not thereby be established.

Question 29:

“Was it not Hitler’s intention to create a tool for himself in
the person of Keitel, whose capacity for organization and hard
work seemed to him valuable, as an executive organ for his
decisions and orders?

“Answer: This question is emphatically confirmed by me. Hitler’s
original intention at that time was most certainly to have at
his disposal a trustworthy subordinate organ, and in no way an
adviser endowed with any responsibility.”

The decree of 4 February 1938 regarding leadership in the Armed Forces is known to the Tribunal. Therefore, I do not need to read it to you. One sees from this and from the hearing of witnesses regarding the position of the Defendant Keitel and questions of his competence and responsibility, that:

(1) Hitler did not want either a responsible War Ministry or any other person but himself to exercise the commanding authority over the entire Armed Forces. He united in his own person both these institutions by declaring that, in regard to the commanding authority, he would from now on exercise this directly and personally, as well as the functions of the Reich War Ministry which were to be administered by Keitel under his instructions.

(2) Hitler thus created a military staff for a military-technical program. He designated it the High Command of the Armed Forces. This “Oberkommando der Wehrmacht” was therefore nothing more—and, I may add, no less—than the military chancellery of the Führer and Supreme Commander. Such chancelleries already existed as Reich Chancellery, Presidential Chancellery, and Party Chancellery. The Defendant Keitel was assigned to the post of chief of the military chancellery with the title of Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces (for short, Chief OKW).

(3) Hence it follows that the OKW was not intended to be an intermediary agency between the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and the three Armed Forces’ sections. The assumption to the contrary held by the Prosecution, which is based on a graphic representation, is founded upon an erroneous opinion.

An independent intermediary level between the Supreme Commander and the three Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, Navy, and Air Force such as existed before 4 February 1938 no longer existed. The OKW, in which the Defendant Keitel was the Chief of Staff, was no independent military agency or authority, but exclusively Hitler’s military-technical staff and his War Ministry office. The OKW had no independent authority whatsoever, neither the power to issue orders nor the command authority. Therefore, the OKW could not issue its own orders. On the contrary, all instructions, decrees, general directions, or orders issued by the OKW were the expression of the desires of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The Commanders-in-Chief of the three Armed Forces’ branches were always aware of the fact that no intermediary level existed between them and the Supreme Commander, and they never considered or recognized the OKW as such. This is confirmed by the affidavits of the Codefendants Admiral Dönitz and Admiral Raeder, as well as by the testimony of Reich Marshal Göring and Dr. Lammers.

The idea that the OKW, or the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW, would have had authority to issue instructions or orders independently is therefore erroneous. All official business, oral or in writing, which went beyond an exchange of ideas with other military agencies or authorities, was subject to the exclusive decision of the Supreme Commander himself. The OKW was merely the executive staff of the Supreme Commander.

(4) Therefore, when documents issued by the Supreme Commander or by the OKW show signatures or initials of the Defendant Keitel, or of a chief of office or section chief, one must not draw the conclusion that the persons concerned had authority to issue orders independently. In each instance it was merely a case of noting, forwarding, or transmitting the orders of the Supreme Commander himself. Because of the demands made on Hitler’s time in his positions as head of State, Reich Chancellor, Party Leader, and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, it was not always possible to obtain his personal signature, unless it concerned fundamental matters of unusual significance. It must be noted that in all cases Hitler’s personal decision or approval had to be obtained.

Such being the state of affairs, we cannot accept the Prosecution’s argument that because the Defendant Keitel signed or initialed documents he is co-responsible for their actual contents. It would be arbitrary to infer the responsibility of the Defendant Keitel as chief of the military chancellery because he forwarded or signed orders, instructions, and so on, a responsibility which in my opinion can be charged only to the person who promulgates the order by virtue of his authority.

A real responsibility for this could be laid upon the Defendant Keitel only in case it were proved that he willfully participated in drawing up these orders, instructions, et cetera.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, would that be a convenient time to break off?

[_A recess was taken._]

M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): Gentlemen, Counsel for the Defense have presented a request to the French Prosecution to have certain documents communicated to them. This request is divided into two parts.

The first part concerns the Scapini incident, which arose from the publication of a document in the course of my own statement. I am able to communicate to the Defense the answer which the French Government has made to its request.

The French Government has found in the archives left behind by the German authorities the answer which was made to the protest raised at the time of the massacre of French prisoners. It is, by the way, a purely dilatory answer. The German authorities replied that the Armistice Commission was not competent; that the request must be made by the Scapini Embassy. I have handed this document to the Defense and I think that the incident is closed.

The second part of defense counsel’s request concerns a statement made by my colleague, M. Edgar Faure, who at the beginning of his speech announced to the Tribunal that he had examined approximately 2,500 documents, of which he had retained only 200. I can, of course, not answer on behalf of M. Edgar Faure. I only know that the French Delegation has only a total of 800 documents in its archives, and has submitted them all to the Tribunal and to the Defense. I therefore think that it is merely oratorical hyperbole and that my colleague wished to allude to covering letters which were of no importance. In any case, I had previously informed defense counsel Dr. Nelte that all the documents of our delegation were open for him to see and that he would be able to verify that we had no other documents than those which we had published.

On the other hand, the requests which we forwarded to Paris to have complementary documents which might have been forgotten sent to us have all been in vain. We therefore conclude that we have here all the documents which we could make use of in this Trial.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I am grateful to the French Delegation for the explanation given now regarding the complaint I made this morning. If I had had that explanation a few days earlier, what happened this morning would not have occurred. I regret it very much indeed.

I continue on Page 64 to the effect that Keitel co-operated in drawing up orders. In order to clarify this as much as possible I would like furthermore to point out the following:

The “instructions,” which were of fundamental significance for the planning of military operations, are operational orders issued to the Commanders-in-Chief of the three Armed Forces’ branches by the Supreme Commander in this capacity. Before these instructions were drawn up Hitler discussed the military-technical aspect of each order with the competent OKW experts and also with the Defendant Keitel. The instructions, aside from opinions manifested by the individual experts, were exclusively the expression of the Supreme Commander’s wishes, and they were not directed to the OKW but to the Commanders-in-Chief of the three Armed Forces’ branches, to whom they were forwarded through the OKW. The three Armed Forces’ branches on their part ordered, on the basis of the general instructions, the details incident to their execution. Therefore, I shall not refer in this connection to the statement of the Charter according to which the carrying-out of orders is not accepted as a ground for exemption from punishment. For the transmission of the order was not an order issued by the OKW to the Armed Forces’ branches, but the forwarding of the expression of the wishes of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The order directed to the OKW, if you will, referred in all cases to the elaboration of some desire expressed by the Supreme Commander and to the purely external act of transmitting the finished idea without having authority of expressing an opinion thereon. It must be assumed that the Prosecution, perhaps influenced by the defendant’s rank of Field Marshal, did not appreciate correctly this position of the Defendant Keitel. This rank had no relationship to the real authority of the defendant to issue military orders. One is inclined to imagine that a Field Marshal is a military commander. However, as we have seen, the Defendant Keitel had no command authority whatsoever.

Field Marshal Von Blomberg, whose testimony has been submitted to the Tribunal by the Prosecution, defines the position of the Defendant Keitel as _Chef du Bureau_. This definition is materially correct. A _Chef du Bureau_ has to see to it that the bureau which he directs operates properly; that the affairs are correctly and promptly attended to by the competent officials. But he does not participate in the final decisions deemed correct by his superior, in this case the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. If this principle holds true in general, it is especially true here. It is known that Hitler did not accept any advice from Keitel concerning military decisions. This has been proved by the evidence, particularly by the testimony of General Jodl.

The Defendant Keitel has clearly outlined in Affidavit Number 8, called “Coordination in the State and in the Armed Forces,” his activity and that of the OKW. The affidavit gives an idea of the difficult and thankless work of the Defendant Keitel. It consisted mainly of a co-ordination of the desires and needs of the Armed Forces’ branches. It consisted, furthermore, in reconciling, divergencies as they arose and in the struggle against Hitler’s negative attitude toward any proper procedure, that is to say, through the competent departments.

In every branch of the Armed Forces there exist interests which differ from the interests of other branches and which cannot be entirely satisfied; sometimes they even oppose each other. This is true especially for the replacement of personnel, but also for the supply of everything that is required for special warfare.

The point of intersection of all these factual and personal differences of opinion was the OKW.

If one desires to estimate properly the incontestable fact that the Defendant Keitel was shown hostility and was personally judged unfavorably by nearly all sides, one must note that this fact occurred as a necessary result of the overlapping of factually opposing interests and personal differences of opinion, which Keitel tried to settle by means of co-ordination or mediation, that is, in nearly all cases by means of compromise. No particular personal experience is needed in order to know that the objective mediator will always incur the ingratitude of both parties. The same picture becomes evident in the relationship to the numerous offices which were endowed with special official authorities or which had Hitler’s favor and special confidence for personal, mostly Party political, reasons. One must realize these differences and overlapping interests to appreciate the heavy burden involved in Keitel’s position and, I might add, in order to judge correctly the significance of his position.

It is difficult to realize the special relationship between the leadership of the Armed Forces and the political sector because the functions of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, of Reich War Minister and of head of State were from 4 February 1938 all embodied in the person of Hitler.

Therefore, since 4 February 1938, complete accord existed between the political leadership and the highest leadership of the Armed Forces since both powers resided in one and the same person.

The assumption of the Prosecution that the chief of Hitler’s military staff was closely connected with his superior Hitler and must therefore also be held responsible for political questions, if not as the perpetrator, then in some form as provided in Article 6 of the Charter, is erroneous.

In this connection there is no need to enter into the hierarchy of the Führer State and the binding character of the Führer order. The military hierarchy is older than the National Socialist ideology; moreover it must be stated and taken into consideration that the introduction of the absolute Leadership Principle into the Armed Forces signifies the final elimination of all efforts which could perhaps be regarded as democratic in a certain sense, or in any case as a restraint on the dictatorial appetite of Hitler. In this connection I refer to the affidavit of Keitel, Document Book 2, Number 9, “The OKW and the General Staff.” The rigid application of the Leadership Principle, judged retrospectively, gradually adulterated the healthy military principle of obedience into immoderate militarism. This found its expression, among other things, in the prohibition of all criticism, from the highest authorities to the lowest. I refer you to the speech made, by Hitler in the Kroll Opera House in 1937 or 1936, also to the critical marginal note—statement of General Winter—in the decree prohibiting applications for release on the part of the generals in 1938, and finally to the removal of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and the War Minister.

It cannot and shall not be denied that the Defendant Keitel was absolutely in favor of the Leadership Principle in the leadership of the Armed Forces and that the essay “Foundations of the Organization of the German Armed Forces” (L-211) can be regarded as a contribution to the conduct of a future war—not, however, that an actual war was anticipated at that time or that it was the reason for this essay.

What does this mean in regard to the Defendant Keitel? Anyone recognizing the Leadership Principle as being militarily correct must act accordingly. Professor Jahrreiss has stated that the Leadership Principle, like every other political system, is not absolutely good or bad, but that everything depends on the manner and methods used in applying it.

Keitel has a military background and favors the Leadership Principle for the field he knows. According to this principle the responsibility lies completely with the one who has authority to command. While the Leadership Principle in fact hardly underwent any change in the civilian areas where it was also applied, though superficially, this principle necessarily made itself felt much more strongly in the military sphere, particularly in the relationship between the commanders-in-chief and their chiefs of the General Staff.

Formerly the chiefs of the General Staff had been the really responsible commanders, now they became the operational assistants to the commanders-in-chief. In the formulation of orders they were “collaborating advisers” in the field of strategic operations, for which these officers had been especially trained. Keitel was neither a commander-in-chief nor a chief of the General Staff; he was the chief of the military chancellery under Hitler, a soldier and an administrator of war-ministerial duties, therefore a “minister,” claims the Prosecution.

One should not refer in this Trial to formal distinctions when the real functions give another picture. This is particularly important in the case of Keitel. It should be determined what he actually was and how he acted in reality.

The dual position created by the decree of 4 February 1938 has led to an erroneous conception of Keitel’s functions. We assume that Hitler dissolved the Reich War Ministry because he no longer wished to have a War Minister; in spite of the fact that on 4 February 1938 a considerable number of functions up to then handled by the Reich War Ministry had been assigned to the individual Armed Forces’ branches, there were a number of functions which had to be retained and administered in the OKW.

But taking into account the idea of an intended strict concentration of functions pertaining to the conduct of the war, Keitel was unable to deal even with those on the basis of complete authority and according to his own judgment, but had to present the demands of the Armed Forces and co-ordinate the Armed Forces’ affairs with the tasks of the other ministries.

It cannot and will not be denied that this concentration of duties in the person of Hitler was impracticable. Thus, a huge amount of preparatory and executive work rested with Hitler’s military staff, whose Chief of Staff was Keitel. Hence, it was also responsible, although not with reference to important questions, especially those of a fundamental nature. It was, of course, a matter of judgment to what extent the Defendant Keitel considered matters essential and fundamental and submitted them. But the evidence showed that when in doubt about matters, after conscientious examination, Keitel was inclined to present them rather than to make his own decision about them.

The sources from which Hitler obtained his news, through Himmler, Bormann or some other way, were so intricate that Keitel had no way of knowing whether Hitler had the information that seemed to him to be important. To avoid the unavoidable discussions afterward with Hitler who, being distrustful of everyone, always took it for granted that people would intentionally conceal things from him, Keitel was anxious not to leave himself open to the reproach of having omitted anything. A characteristic example is the case of the mass escape of 80 R. A. F. officers from the POW Camp Sagan.

Here the point is simply to show that Keitel in his capacity as guardian of the actual war functions which still remained in the OKW, held no position as a minister. Here, too, he was the _Chef du Bureau_, the head of the military chancellery, a position which is also held by the chief of a ministerial office, or even a state secretary. I wish to refer again in this connection to Dr. Lammers’ statement, and to the affidavits of Admirals Raeder and Dönitz, which I have already mentioned repeatedly.

The text of the Führer decree of 4 February 1938 shows that Hitler also wished to make this clear. If Hitler had not had the definite desire to exclude everyone else from a responsible, and perhaps for him uncomfortable function in the highest military sector, he might have given Keitel at least the authority to take part in Cabinet meetings. In the Führer decree in which the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army and Navy as well as Keitel had been given the “rank” of a Reich minister, it was explicitly ordered that both commanders-in-chief should be entitled to take part in Cabinet meetings. The fact that this was decreed simultaneously is a convincing _argumentum e contrario_. It proves that Hitler did not wish to give his Chief of Staff of the OKW an opportunity to present his own opinions and possible doubts before the Cabinet. Hitler gave the Defendant Keitel the “rank” of a Reich minister for the purpose of enabling him to carry on direct negotiations with the departmental ministers. Had Keitel not had the rank of a Reich minister, he would have been limited to conferences with state secretaries and the like, and thus be very much handicapped in carrying out the Führer’s orders and his tasks.

It is in error, therefore, that the Prosecution has classified Keitel as a Reich minister “without portfolio.” He was not a minister, nor a member of the Reich Government. State Secretary Stuckart in a document submitted to the Prosecution has listed all members of the Reichsregierung. Keitel is not among them; he is mentioned in this document only as the holder of one of the highest offices.

Now, the Prosecution has not limited the term Reichsregierung to membership in the Reich Cabinet, but considered other committees as part of the Reichsregierung, too. It would seem, therefore, as if the Prosecution looked upon the legal structure based on German law as irrelevant. Pursuant to Appendix B to the general bill of Indictment, the Reichsregierung in the sense of the Indictment is composed of:

1. Members of the regular Cabinet after 30 January 1933, the day Hitler became Chancellor of the German Republic. The expression “regular Cabinet” used here includes: Reich ministers, that is, heads of departments of the Central Government; Reich ministers without portfolio, ministers of State with the function of Reich ministers, and other officials entitled to participate in the Cabinet meetings.

2. Members of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich.

3. Members of the Secret Cabinet Council.

Regardless of the individual responsibility of every defendant the Tribunal must examine whether the concept of a “Reich Government” as defined by the Prosecution is correct, that is, practical; whether, as to the composition of this group, the Prosecution’s concept of a “Reich Government” appears justified. In any case it is not sufficient to accept as correct the assertion of the Prosecution in this respect.

I assume that my colleague Dr. Kubuschok will enlarge on this during his case.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal feels that you are taking a very long time over this question of whether Keitel was—what his exact position was.

DR. NELTE: I believe, Mr. President, that the Prosecution also took a great deal of time to make clear what position Field Marshal Keitel occupied in their opinion. He is not here as Field Marshal, but as the Chief of the OKW.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, if they have, I must confess that I have forgotten. It seems to me and the Tribunal generally that you are taking up far too long on this topic. You have got many other topics which are of very great importance to the defendant, and you have already been speaking for several hours, and you occupied a large number of pages in order to try and define what Keitel’s position was. I thought you might be able to cut it down.

DR. NELTE: I shall try.

I have explained that Defendant Keitel did not belong to Group 1; that is to say, that he was not a minister.

He was neither chief of a Government department, nor a Reich minister without portfolio, nor a state minister having the functions of a Reich minister, nor an official who was entitled to attend Cabinet sessions.

In the hearing of evidence it was proved that despite the Führer Decree of 4 February 1938 there never existed a Secret Cabinet Council; that such council was never set up; that it never held a session; and that no persons involved ever received a commission. Thus, it is proved that the defendant was also never a member of the Secret Cabinet Council.

It is true that Keitel was a member of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich. Witness Dr. Lammers has confirmed that the fact of his becoming a member of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich did not change Keitel’s official position, and especially did not make him a minister. In his affidavit of 25 November 1945, Codefendant Dr. Frick says that Keitel worked in the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich as “liaison man.”

Although he is not listed among the members of the Reich Cabinet, Keitel’s capacities as a member of the so-called “Dreimänner-Kollegium” (Three Man College) and as a member of the Reich Defense Council have been mentioned by the Prosecution. I believe I may refer to the result of the hearing of evidence. It was shown that a Three Man College as a Government committee never existed, and that the Reich Defense Council, after the unpublished Reich Defense Law of 1938, never held sessions, or in any case that it never held conferences, or passed resolutions.

In order to clarify the Defendant Keitel’s responsibility and competence it is necessary to analyze the concept of OKW. I ask that this statement be not considered a theoretical and therefore superfluous discussion. The very fact that the Prosecution makes a sweeping and fundamental assertion...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, may I ask what you have been doing if you have not been analyzing the concept of the OKW?

DR. NELTE: Up to now I have explained Keitel’s position as Chief of the OKW. In statements on Page 74 and the following pages I wanted to explain to you that the Prosecution, and others as well, have talked about the OKW: and “OKW” is a word which has three different types of significance.

Mr. President, if you will be good enough to permit me to submit this in its written form, and if you would consider it as having been presented in Court, then I am willing to leave out the pages up to 77 and submit them to you. In any case, it appears to me to be an important part of the explanation regarding the interpretation of the word “OKW,” and the fact that this is not identical with Keitel is particularly important.

May I do that?

[_The President nodded his assent._]

In that case, then, I shall continue at Page 77.

In order to clarify the Defendant Keitel’s responsibility and competence it is necessary to analyze the concept of OKW. I ask that this statement be not considered a theoretical and therefore superfluous discussion. The very fact that the Prosecution makes a sweeping and fundamental assertion, and that the French Prosecution undertakes a pointedly legal examination of the question as to the office in which each defendant was active with regard to the counts he is charged with, makes it my duty to clear up a mistake made by the Prosecution. However, this mistake is all the more excusable, because not only foreign countries but large groups at home, even within the Armed Forces, did not know what OKW meant. It became a popular collective term for the supreme command of the Armed Forces without anybody taking the trouble to find out who and what was behind the three words “Oberkommando der Wehrmacht.” This corresponds to the law of inertia governing the association of human beings, to the almost pathological mania to abbreviate titles of military commands. Since, furthermore, the communiqués of the High Command of the Armed Forces were published daily, and all announcements referring to war events began with the words: “The High Command of the Armed Forces announces,” not only did these words become impressed upon the public’s mind, but also the conception that the “High Command of the Armed Forces” was the supreme military command. The conception would be correct had the words OKW not been translated with Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (High Command of the Armed Forces) but rather as Supreme Commander (Oberkommandierender) of the Armed Forces. It was Hitler alone, as “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,” who was the incarnation of what everybody imagined the OKW to be, namely, the central military planning and command headquarters and thus the supreme command and executive headquarters for all military matters. In this respect the OKW was synonymous with Hitler as “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,” which was his official title.

If, in naming the headquarters of the supreme commander, it was desired to avoid the title “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces” which was in accordance with the prevalent Leadership Principle, the title “Oberkommando der Wehrmacht” was bound to be used. This headquarters comprises the supreme commander himself, that is, Hitler, and his assistants, his staff.

The Führer Decree of 4 February 1938 bearing the heading: “Decree concerning the Command of the Armed Forces” resulted, through the unfortunate and vague nature of its wording, in an interpretation that the “Chief OKW” mentioned therein was the chief in the sense of director, of the High Command of the Armed Forces. It is true that it follows from the decree that “Chief OKW” is to mean “Chief of Staff OKW,” that is chief of Hitler’s bureau in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. But since then, every time that people have spoken and speak of the OKW, everybody thinks of Keitel without examining whether the expression means: OKW-Oberkommandierender (Supreme Commander) of the Armed Forces, OKW-Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, or OKW-Staff of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

The Prosecution makes no distinction in this respect, just as the German agencies were unaware of the exact difference, or at any rate paid no attention to it. They, just like the Prosecution now, thought it right to claim the OKW’s jurisdiction and responsibility for anything having a connection with the Armed Forces or members of the Armed Forces. From this viewpoint to claiming Keitel’s personal jurisdiction by virtue of the title “Chief OKW” there is only a short step. For Germans and foreigners the recollection of the first World War was a contributing factor in forming this opinion, which was not based on an examination according to constitutional law. The relationship between Hitler and Keitel prompted the comparison with the relationship between the Kaiser and Von Hindenburg. This comparison had results for the Defendant Keitel which are shown at this Trial. Without thinking of the fundamental differences between Von Hindenburg as Chief of the Great General Staff which existed until 1918, and Keitel as the chief of Hitler’s military executive staff, and without knowing the field of Keitel’s jurisdiction and what possibilities Keitel had as regards Hitler’s plans and measures by virtue of the functions assigned to him, comparisons were made which gave rise to doubts about him. When furthermore—after the catastrophe had set in—Keitel once again came to play an outwardly similar part as representative of the Armed Forces when he had to execute the signature for unconditional surrender, this comparison also turned out to his disadvantage. People do not ask about jurisdiction when things go badly, but look for a guilty person and the guilty person is judged by external appearances. Quite naturally the great attention paid to Keitel’s person at this Trial can largely be traced to the fact that after Hitler’s death Keitel came into the public eye.

In order to see clearly what part Keitel really played, and what share he had in what happened, I now wish—after investigating his legal competencies—to examine what actual influence he had upon the development and carrying-out of the measures, the effects of which constitute the subject of this Trial. From everyday experience we know that it does not matter so much what a person is supposed to be in a particular position, but what he has made of that position by virtue of his personality. I believe I may say that in the course of this Trial the personality of no other defendant has been judged in such varying and contradictory ways as that of the Defendant Keitel.

Decisive for Keitel’s material responsibility is his actual position in the tug-of-war with and around Hitler, his effective influence upon that group, and thus on those circumstances as a whole which could have influenced the operations of Hitler’s headquarters in the military field.

I shall deal with this fundamental topic when taking up the charges made by the Prosecution against Keitel and other defendants on the strength of the cross-examination of Dr. Gisevius, in other words, after the presentation of evidence for Keitel has been completed.

In view of the comprehensive scope of Justice Jackson’s questions and the answers given thereto by Dr. Gisevius, the testimony of Dr. Gisevius has become of tremendous importance in the case of the Defendant Keitel. Had Dr. Gisevius’ statements about Keitel been true—that is, statements made by him on the basis of information, in most instances in terms of conclusive findings—the Defendant Keitel could not have told the truth during the presentation of evidence. The importance of that fact becomes evident when it is considered that a negative opinion on truthfulness would of necessity destroy Keitel’s defense, which in its essence draws on the subjective aspect of facts as a whole. In view of this fact and the importance of the testimony of Dr. Gisevius also for other defendants, it becomes my duty to explain the contrast between Keitel’s answers and the testimony of the witness Gisevius.

Experience teaches us that dead witnesses are the best witnesses, because their purported utterances cannot be directly refuted. Evidence on the strength of information belongs to another group of statements which almost defy refutation. The testimony of Gisevius combines both possibilities, in that he bases his testimony primarily on information obtained from witnesses who are dead. Justice Jackson used Dr. Gisevius as star witness in his comprehensive attack on the Defendant Keitel. After the completion of the presentation of evidence against Keitel, he did not bring forward one individual circumstance, but an Indictment on all Counts and a general judgment, on Keitel’s answers.

The counterevidence is concerned with proving the objective incorrectness of facts based upon information obtained from certain individuals and further, with establishing proof of the unreliability of the information. I call to mind the words which the Defendant Keitel said under oath upon completion of his direct examination by me while in the witness box:

“One may hold it against me that I was wrong and made mistakes,
that my attitude toward the Führer Adolf Hitler was wrong and
weak, but it should not be said of me that I was a coward, that
I was untruthful, and that I was disloyal.”

I sum up in condensed form the charges made against the Defendant Keitel during interrogation by the Prosecution, as follows:

(1) Keitel built an impenetrable ring round Hitler so that the latter could be told nothing.

(2) Keitel failed to pass on to Hitler reports he had received from Canaris whenever they concerned atrocities, crimes, and the like, or he gave orders to modify them.

(3) Keitel had a tremendous influence on the OKW and the Army.

(4) Keitel threatened his subordinates, when they made political statements, that he would not protect them; he even said that he would turn them over to the Gestapo.

Dr. Gisevius says in one part of his statement that Keitel had no influence over Hitler. He exonerates Hitler by explaining that Keitel had formed a ring round Hitler, in order that the latter should be told nothing. The British and American Prosecution in their Indictment called Keitel a powerful staff officer who had exerted great influence over Hitler; the French Prosecution described Keitel as a willing tool of Hitler; the German generals called him a “yes man” who could not carry anything through; and now Keitel grows, according to the statement of Dr. Gisevius, into a real handyman and buffer for Hitler, who hid from the latter anything bad, who submitted to him only what he saw fit, and permitted no one to approach Hitler.

To assert that Keitel blocked access to Hitler, can only be maintained by somebody who did not know the conditions prevailing around Hitler. Before the war Keitel worked in Berlin in Bendler Strasse, while Hitler was in Wilhelmstrasse. Keitel came perhaps once a week to report, or on special order. At that time, on account of the distance, it was in fact impossible for Keitel to exert any influence over access to the Führer. It was equally impossible when Hitler was at the Berghof near Berchtesgaden for weeks at a time, while Keitel remained in Berlin.

At the beginning of operations, Keitel was with Jodl and the Armed Forces Operations Staff at the Führer’s headquarters. Here also they were separated. Keitel did not sit in Hitler’s anteroom, but rather in other buildings or barracks. He came from time to time with General Jodl to the conference on the situation, in which, besides Hitler, some 15 or 20 officers of all three branches of the Armed Forces took part. Apart from the conferences on the situation there was no personal contact. When Hitler wanted Keitel for anything he sent for him. Personally and individually there was closer contact in Berlin between Hitler and his adjutants, the Chief of the Party Chancellery, the Chief of the Presidential Chancellery, and the Chief of the Reich Chancellery. Keitel not only could not decide who should see Hitler, he also could not possibly prevent anybody going to Hitler.

Hitler’s sources of information were the responsible heads of each department; it was occasionally not clear whence Hitler obtained his information, as I have already stated. Gisevius did not know these conditions from his own experience; he himself was never near Keitel, who never saw or spoke to him and did not know his name. When he gave his opinion here, he could only base it on information given him by Canaris, Thomas, and Oster.

General Jodl has been heard regarding this question. He certainly is the best witness in this matter, since he, as well as Keitel, lived in direct proximity to Hitler and therefore could form his own judgment. He stated concerning this matter:

“Unfortunately, it was impossible to keep things from Hitler.
Many channels of information led directly to Hitler.”

Upon my interrogation, at the suggestion of the Tribunal, Jodl fully confirmed that what Keitel had testified was quite correct, and that what witness Gisevius stated in this respect was, in general, merely figures of speech.

The Codefendants, Admirals Raeder and Dönitz, have confirmed that the allegation of the witness Gisevius that Keitel was able to keep the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces away from Hitler is false. If, however, this was not the case, it follows that the way from the branches of the Armed Forces to the Führer was open at any time. Through the hearing of witnesses it was also established that apart from Jodl, the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Canaris in particular had direct access to Hitler. Thus, the accusation of the witness Gisevius that Keitel had formed a ring round Hitler is proved false.

The witness Gisevius has declared that reports were submitted to Keitel by Canaris about atrocities in connection with deportations, extermination of Jews, concentration camps, the persecution of the Church, and the killing of insane persons, all of which Keitel withheld from Hitler. The same is alleged about the reports of General Thomas, Chief of the War Economy Office, the purpose of which was to inform Hitler about the war potential of the enemy and make him listen to reason.

Concerning Admiral Canaris’ reports, it must be said that as chief of espionage and counterintelligence he naturally delivered regular reports which concerned the conduct of the war, including the conduct of economic warfare. It is affirmed that reports were submitted on subjects which belonged neither to the jurisdiction of the Counterintelligence Office nor to that of the OKW. It has been proved that Hitler took strict care that every worker confined himself to his own special field, and it was particularly forbidden for military offices to concern themselves with political affairs.

Keitel has declared under oath that he knew nothing about the atrocities, and especially the extermination of the Jews and the concentration camps. This is in absolute contradiction to the assertion of the witness Gisevius that Canaris submitted reports to the Defendant Keitel on the above-mentioned subjects.

One can assert that reports of any kind whatsoever were delivered to Keitel without fear of being contradicted, especially when one has no fear that these reports will be found. For if they are not delivered they cannot be found, because they do not exist. Now Gisevius has declared that he collected documents from the beginning which contained incriminating material. Is it not remarkable, under these circumstances, that up to now none of these reports have been produced? As far as they were available at the OKW, they have been used in the accusation and as evidence. Can it be sufficient under these circumstances for a witness to declare that he knows from third parties that such reports were submitted to Keitel?

Canaris, because of his particular activity, which took him constantly to foreign countries on personal secret errands for Hitler, had access to Hitler at all times. He would thus have had an opportunity to go to Hitler immediately if he had had such serious misgivings of conscience, as Gisevius has declared he had. Why did he not do so?

Now, Gisevius, who in general has pronounced comprehensive and damning accusations, has, luckily for Keitel, at one point of his deposition made a positive declaration that permits of objective verification. I quote:

“...I believe that I have still two examples to mention, which
to me are particularly characteristic: First, the attempt was
made by all possible means to induce Field Marshal Keitel to
warn Hitler against the invasion of Holland and Belgium, that
is, to inform Hitler that the information submitted by Keitel
about alleged violations of neutrality by the Dutch and Belgians
was false. The Counterintelligence Office was to prepare reports
incriminating the Dutch and Belgians. Admiral Canaris at that
time refused to sign these reports. I request that this be
verified. He told Keitel repeatedly that this report which was
ostensibly made by the OKW was false. This is an instance where
Herr Keitel did not transmit to Hitler what he was supposed to
have transmitted...”

I have submitted to General Jodl, here on the witness stand, Document 790-PS, which refers to the case of the _White Paper_ concerning violations of neutrality by Holland and Belgium. Jodl testified literally, and I quote:

“...I understand the question, and would like very briefly to
state the facts how it was possible—if disgust does not choke
me. I was present when Canaris came to the Field Marshal in the
Reich Chancellery with these report notes and laid before him
the draft of the Foreign Office’s _White Paper_. Field Marshal
Keitel then looked it through, above all paying attention to the
comments which Canaris had made at the request of the Foreign
Office, namely, that the reports were perhaps still somewhat in
need of improvement, that he should confirm the fact that a
military operation against Holland and Belgium was absolutely
necessary, and that, as is expressed here, a final really
striking violation of neutrality was still lacking. Before
Canaris had said a word, Field Marshal Keitel threw the book on
the table and said: ‘I refuse to do this, why should I take any
responsibility at all for a political decision? In this _White
Paper_ there appear word for word, true and correct, the very
same reports that you, yourself, Canaris, brought to me.’ To
this Canaris said: I am entirely of the same point of view. It
is, in my opinion too, entirely superfluous to have this
document signed on the part of the Armed Forces, and the reports
that we have here are altogether quite sufficient to prove the
violations of neutrality which have taken place in Holland and
Belgium.’ And he advised Field Marshal Keitel not to sign it at
all. That is the way it happened. The Field Marshal then took
the paper with him and I do not know what happened
subsequently...”

Keitel did not sign the _White Paper_. Therefore in the only verifiable case a clear proof is obtained of the incorrectness of Gisevius’ testimony.

According to the statement of the witness Gisevius, Keitel exerted a tremendous influence on the OKW and the Army. These words, without any presentation of concrete facts, are only a phrase in the mouth of a man who had no contact whatsoever with Keitel. They are refuted by the statements of Reich Marshal Göring, Admiral Dönitz, and Admiral Raeder. Jodl has defined this statement as merely a figure of speech.

Insofar as the witness speaks of his tremendous influence on the OKW, it must appear questionable what he really means. Naturally, Keitel as Chief of Staff had influence in the OKW, influence which resulted from his position, which I have already discussed. His position in relation to his subordinates will be taken up later. The important thing, however, is whether Keitel had a decisive and culpable influence on what happened. That this was not the case has even been confirmed by Gisevius, and also the fact that he had no decisive influence on the branches of the Armed Forces; it has also been established by the results of the testimony.

A particularly damaging charge against the Defendant Keitel was “that instead of placing himself in front of his subordinate officers to protect them, he threatened to hand them over to the Gestapo.”

In contradiction to this it has been established that no chief of office in the OKW was dismissed in the years up to 1944; furthermore, until 20 July 1944, the day of the attempt on Hitler’s life and the transfer of the judicial power in the home Army to Himmler, no officer of the OKW was turned over to the Police. Admiral Dönitz has confirmed that the branches of the Armed Forces and the OKW were very scrupulous in maintaining the privileges of the Armed Forces in relation to the Police.

The Court has also seen here how General Jodl spoke about his relationship to the Defendant Keitel. I think this remark has a special importance, not only because Keitel lived on companionable and friendly terms with his official subordinate, General Jodl, during their long years of co-operation. As natural as that may appear, the less natural it is if one reflects that Jodl, in spite of his officially subordinate position, in reality became more and more Hitler’s sole strategic adviser. What this means, considering the preponderance of the operational tasks in the war, has been convincingly demonstrated here by General Jodl.

If Keitel accepted this without jealousy, freely acknowledging the superiority of his subordinate Jodl in this domain, this proves that Keitel possessed a trait of character which refutes the information derived from obscure sources by the witness Gisevius.

The proven fact that Keitel lived on friendly and companionable terms with his subordinate Chief of Office, Canaris, is also in contrast with the assertion to the contrary by the witness Gisevius.

In this connection it is necessary to refer to the fact, not submitted by Keitel but testified to by Jodl without Keitel’s consent, that the latter supported and helped Canaris’ family after his arrest. I only refer to this to refute the perhaps most serious personal reproach, according to which Keitel did not behave decently toward his subordinates and abused his superior position—which was especially powerful in military life—even to the point of threatening them with violence.

In reality, according to Gisevius’ evidence, Admiral Canaris not only played a double role officially, but also with respect to the Defendant Keitel; in exploiting the friendship shown to him he expressed a similar attitude, whereas among his own group he openly spoke in a spiteful way about Keitel.

Finally, in this connection reference must still be made to the evidence of the witness Von Buttlar-Brandenfels (Session of 8 May 1946) from which it is clear that Keitel always treated the officers of the Armed Forces Operations Staff kindly.

The witness mentions a quarrel between himself and Lieutenant Colonel Ziervogel on the one hand and Himmler on the other, in which Keitel, to whom the incident was reported, immediately and energetically intervened in writing to protect his subordinates against Himmler. The affidavit of the Chief of Office in Canaris’ office, Admiral Bürckner, to which I refer, testifies in the same way to Keitel’s kindly attitude toward his subordinates. At any rate, it must be said in clarification that Keitel many times had occasion to speak energetically to his office and department chiefs.