Chapter XV: Part III: , European Nations; of which only 1 volume, Greeks, has (7)

1. From a multitude of small states, never united but continually distracted by civil broils--and such at the beginning of this period were the states of Greece--any thing important could hardly be expected without the occurrence of some external event, which, by rallying the divided forces round one point, and directing them toward one object, should hinder them from mutually exhausting one another. It was the hostile attempt of Persia that first laid the foundation of the future splendour of Greece; certain states then grew so rapidly in power, that upon their particular history hinges the general history of all the rest.

Causes which led to the Persian war. Share taken by Athens in the
Ionian insurrection and firing of Sardes, B. C. 500. (see above,
p. 98.) Intrigues of Hippias, first with the satraps, and afterwards
at the Persian court itself.--First expedition, that of Mardonius,
thwarted by a storm, 493.

2. Not even the summons to acknowledge the Persian authority was sufficient to rouse the national energy of the Greeks. All the islands, and most of the states on the main land, submitted to the yoke; Sparta and Athens alone boldly rejected it. The Athenians, unassisted, under their leader Miltiades, acquainted from his youth with the Persians and their mode of warfare, and with the superiority of the arms of his countrymen, became the saviours of Greece.

Quarrel of Athens and Sparta with Aegina, which sides with the
Persians, 491; and consequent deposition of Demaratus, king of
Sparta, by his colleague Cleomenes.

Persian expedition of Datis and Artaphernes under the guidance of
Hippias: frustrated by the battle of Marathon, B. C. Sept. 29,
490, and the failure of an attempt upon Athens.

3. The immediate consequence of this victory was a naval expedition against the islands, more particularly Paros, to which Miltiades, out of a private grudge, persuaded the Athenians. It was undertaken for the purpose of levying contributions; and seems to have given the Athenians the first idea of their subsequent dominion of the sea. The Athenians punished Miltiades for the failure of this expedition, although the effect of their own folly; yet was this act of injustice a source of happiness to Athens; as the fall of Miltiades made room for the men who laid the solid foundation of her glory and greatness.

4. As usual in every democratic state rising to power, the history of Athens now becomes that of eminent individuals, standing at the head of affairs, as generals or demagogues. Themistocles, who united to an astonishing degree in his own person the most splendid talents of statesman and general, with a spirit of intrigue, and even of egotism; and Aristides, whose disinterestedness, even in those days, was singular at Athens, were the real founders of the power of this commonwealth. Athens, however, was more indebted to the first than to the latter.

Rivalry of these two men, 490-486. While Themistocles at the head
of the Athenian fleet prosecutes the design of Miltiades against
the islands, the management of state affairs is confided to
Aristides. On the return, however, of Themistocles as conqueror,
Aristides is by ostracism banished Athens, 486. Themistocles
alone, at the head of affairs, pursues his plan for making Athens
a maritime power. In consequence of a war against the object of
popular hatred, Aegina, B. C. 484, he prevails on the Athenians to
devote the income from the mines to the formation of a navy. While
Athens is thus rising to power, Sparta suffers from the insanity
of one of her kings, Cleomenes, (succeeded in 482 by his half
brother Leonidas,) and the arrogance of the other, Leotychides.

5. The glory of frustrating the second mighty Persian invasion of Greece under Xerxes I. belongs to Themistocles alone. Not only his great naval victory off Salamis, but still more the manner in which he contrived to work upon his countrymen, proves him to have been the greatest man of the age, and the deliverer of Greece, now united by one common bond of interest.--All national leagues are weak in themselves: yet how strong may even the weakest be made when held together by one great man, who knows how to animate it with his own spirit!

Themistocles' plan for the conduct of the war; first, a common
union of all the Hellenic states; a measure which succeeds to a
certain degree, the honour of the command being left to the
Spartans; secondly, the sea made the theatre of war.--Gallant
death of Leonidas with his three hundred Spartans and seven
hundred Thespians, July 6, 480. An example of heroism which
contributes as much to the greatness of Greece as the victory of
Salamis. About the same time naval engagements off Artemisium in
Euboea, with two hundred and seventy-one sail. The leaders of the
Greeks are kept to their posts merely by bribery; the means of
purchasing their services being for the most part furnished by
Themistocles himself.--Athens, deserted by its inhabitants, is
taken and burnt by Xerxes, July 20. Retreat of the Grecian fleet
into the bay of Salamis: revocation of all exiles, Aristides among
the rest.--Politic measures adopted by Themistocles to hinder the
dispirited Greeks from taking flight, and at the same time to
secure to himself, in case of need, an asylum with the Persian
monarch.--Naval engagement and victory off Salamis, Sept. 23, 480,
with three hundred and eighty sail, (one hundred and eighty of
which were Athenian,) against the Persian fleet, already much
weakened: retreat of Xerxes.--Poets and historians have disfigured
these events by fanciful exaggerations: still, however, they may
show us how commonly human weakness is attended with human
greatness!

6. The victory of Salamis did not conclude the war; but the negotiations entered into during the winter months with the Persian general, Mardonius, left in Thessaly, and with the Asiatic Greeks, to excite them to throw off the yoke, show how far the confidence of the nation in its own strength had increased. But by the battle fought on land at Plataeae, under the command of the Spartan, Pausanias, (guardian to Plistarchus, son of Leonidas,) and the Athenian, Aristides; together with the naval battle at Mycale on the same day, and the destruction of the Persian fleet, the Persians are for ever driven from the territory of Greece, though the war continues for some time longer.

7. The expulsion of the Persians wrought an entire change in the internal and external relations of Greece. From being the aggressed the Greeks became the aggressors; to free their Asiatic countrymen is now the chief object or pretext for the continuation of a war so profitable; the chief command of which abides with Sparta until B. C. 470.

Athens rebuilt and fortified by Themistocles despite of Spartan
jealousy, 478: formation of the Piraeus, an event of still greater
importance, 477.--Naval expedition under Pausanias, accompanied by
Aristides and Cimon, undertaken against Cyprus and Byzantium, for
the purpose of expelling the Persians, 470. Treachery and fall of
Pausanias, 469. In consequence of the Spartans' haughtiness, the
supreme command devolves upon the Athenians.

8. This transfer of the command to Athens had a decided effect on all the subsequent relations of Greece, not only because it augmented the jealousy between Sparta and Athens, but because Athens exercised her predominance for a purpose entirely different from that of Sparta.--Establishment of a permanent confederacy, comprising most of the Grecian states without Peloponnesus, especially the islands, and an adjustment of the contributions to be annually furnished by each, with the view of prosecuting the Persian war, and liberating the Asiatic Greeks from the Persian yoke. Although the common treasury was first established at Delos, the superintendence of it was confided to Athens; and such a manager as Aristides was not always to be found.--Natural consequence of this new establishment: 1. What had hitherto been mere military precedence, becomes in the hands of Athens a right of political prescription, and that, as usual, is soon converted into a sovereignty. Hence her idea of the supremacy of Greece, ([Greek: arche tes Hellados],) as connected with that of the sea, ([Greek: thalassokratia].) 2. The oppression of the Athenians, sometimes real, at other times presumed, after a short time, rouses the spirit of discontent and contumacy among several of the confederates: hence, 3. The gradual formation of a counter league, headed by Sparta, who maintains her supremacy over the greatest part of the Peloponnesus.

9. The changes introduced into the internal organization are not to be determined solely by the palpable alterations made in any of Lycurgus's or Solon's institutions. In Sparta, the general frame-work of Lycurgus's constitution subsisted; nevertheless the power was virtually in the hands of the ephori, whose dictatorial sway placed Sparta in the formidable posture she now assumed.--At Athens, in proportion as the importance of foreign relations increased, and amid the protracted struggles between the heads of the democratic and aristocratic parties, the real power, under the outward appearance of a democracy, gradually centered in the hands of the ten annually elected generals, ([Greek: strategoi],) who with more or less effect played the parts of demagogues.

Abrogation of the law that excluded the poorer citizens from
official situations, B. C. 478.

Expulsion of Themistocles, implicated in the fall of Pausanias,
principally through the intrigues of Sparta: he is first banished
by ostracism, 469, but in consequence of further persecution he
flies over to the Persians, 466.

10. The following forty years, from 470-430, constitute the flourishing period of Athens. A concurrence of fortunate circumstances happening among a people of the highest abilities and promoted by great men, produced here phenomena, such as have never since been witnessed. Political greatness was the fundamental principle of the commonwealth; Athens had been the guardian, and the champion of Greece, and she wished to appear worthy of herself. Hence in Athens alone were men acquainted with public splendour, exhibited in buildings, in spectacles, and festivals, the acquisition of which was facilitated by private frugality. This public spirit animating every citizen, expanded the blossoms of genius; no broad line of distinction was anxiously drawn between private and public life; whatever great, whatever noble was produced by Athens, sprung up verdant and robust out of this harmony, this buxom vigour of the state. Far different was the case with Sparta; there rude customs and laws arrested the development of genius: there men were taught to die for the land of their forefathers: while at Athens they learnt to live for it.

11. Agriculture continued the principal occupation of the citizens of Attica; other employments were left to the care of slaves. Commerce and navigation were mainly directed towards the Thracian coast and the Black sea; the spirit of trade, however, was never the prevailing one. As affairs of state became more attractive, and men desired to participate in them, the want of intellectual education began to be felt, and sophists and rhetoricians soon offered their instruction. Mental expertness was more coveted than mental knowledge; men wished to learn how to think and to speak. A poetical education had long preceded the rise of this national desire; poesy now lost nothing of its value: as heretofore Homer remained the cornerstone of intellectual improvement. Could it be that such blossoms would produce other fruits than those which ripened in the school of Socrates, in the masterpieces of the tragedians and orators, and in the immortal works of Plato?

12. These flowers of national genius burst forth in spite of many evils, inseparable from such a constitution established among such a people. Great men were pushed aside; others took their places. The loss of Themistocles was supplied by Miltiades's son Cimon; who to purer politics united equal talents. He protracted the war against the Persians in order to maintain the union of the Greeks; and favoured the aristocratic party at the same time that he affected popularity. Even his enemies learnt by experience, that the state could not dispense with a leader who seemed to have entered into a compact for life with victory.

Another expedition under Cimon; and victory by sea and land near
the Eurymedon, B. C. 469. He takes possession of the Hellespontine
Chersonesus, 468. Some of the Athenian confederates already
endeavour to secede. Hence, 467, the conquest of Caristus in
Euboea; subjection of Naxos, 466, and from 465-463, siege and
capture of Thasos, under Cimon. The Athenians endeavour to obtain
a firmer footing on the shore of Macedonia; and for that purpose
send out a colony to Amphipolis, 465.

Great earthquake at Sparta; gives rise to a ten years' war, viz.
the third Messenian war or revolt of the Helots, who fortify
themselves in Ithome, 465-455: in this war the Athenians, at the
instigation of Cimon, send assistance to the Spartans, 461, who
refuse the proffered aid. The democratic party seize the
opportunity of casting on Cimon the suspicion of being in the
interest of Sparta; he is banished by ostracism, 461.

13. The death of Aristides, and the banishment of Cimon, concur in elevating Pericles to the head of affairs; a statesman whose influence had begun to operate as early as 469. Less a general than a demagogue, he supported himself in authority during forty years, until the day of his death, and swayed Athens without being either archon or member of the areopagus. That under him the constitution must have assumed a more democratic character, is demonstrated by the fact of his exaltation as leader of the democratic party. The aristocrats, however, contrive until 444 to set up rivals against him in the persons of the military leaders, Myronides, Tolmidas, and more particularly the elder Thucydides.

Change in the spirit of administration under Pericles, both in
reference to internal and external relations. A brilliant
management succeeds to the parsimonious economy of Aristides; and
yet, after the lapse of thirty years, the state treasury was
full.--Limitation of the power of the areopagus by Ephialtes, B.
C. 461. The withdrawal of various causes which formerly came under
the jurisdiction of that tribunal must have diminished its right
of moral censorship.--Introduction of the practice of paying
persons who attended the courts of justice.

With regard to external relations, the precedence of the Athenians
gradually advanced toward supremacy; although their relations with
all the confederates were not precisely the same. Some were mere
confederates; others were subjects.--Augmentation in the imposts
on the confederates, and transfer of the treasury from Delos to
Athens, 461. The jealousy of Sparta and the discontent of the
confederates keep pace with the greatness of Athens.

Unsuccessful attempt to support by the help of an Athenian fleet
and troops, Inarus of Egypt in his insurrection against the
Persians, 462-458.

Wars in Greece: the Spartans instigate Corinth and Epidaurus
against Athens. The Athenians, at first defeated near Haliae, in
their turn rout the enemy, 458, and then carry the war against
Aegina, which is subdued, 457. In the new quarrel between Corinth
and Megara respecting their boundaries, the Athenians side with
Megara; Myronides conquers at Cimolia, 457. Expedition of the
Spartans to the support of the Dorians against Phocis; and hence
arises the first rupture between Athens, Sparta, and Boeotia.
First battle of Tanagra, in which the Spartans are victorious in
the same year, 457. The Boeotians, incited by the Spartans, are
in the second battle of Tanagra worsted by Myronides, 456. The
recall of Cimon, at the suggestion of Pericles himself, in
consequence of the first defeat.

14. Cimon recalled from exile, endeavours to reestablish the domestic tranquillity of Greece, and at the same time to renew the war against the Persians. He succeeds in his attempt after the lapse of five years; and the consequence is a victorious expedition against the Persians. He defeats their fleet off Cyprus, and routs their army on the Asiatic coast. The fruit of this victory is the celebrated peace with Artaxerxes I. (see above, p. 104.) Ere that peace is concluded Cimon dies, too soon for his country, while occupied with the siege of Citium.

Termination of the third Messenian war in favour of Sparta, by the
cession of Ithome, B. C. 455. Meantime Athens continues the war
with Peloponnesus; Tolmidas and Pericles making an incursion by
sea on the enemy's territory, 455-454. At the same time Pericles,
by sending out colonies to the Hellespont, endeavours to secure
more firmly the Athenian power in that quarter: a colony is
likewise sent out to Naxos, 453.--Cimon negotiates a truce, which
is adopted first (451) tacitly, afterwards formally, (450,) for
five years. The result of this truce is his victorious expedition
against the Persians, and the consequent peace with that nation.
Although the conditions of the peace prescribed by Cimon were
sometimes infringed, they appear to have been ratified by all
parties.

15. The conclusion of peace with Persia, glorious as it was, and the death of the man whose grand political object was to preserve union among the Greeks, again aroused the spirit of internal strife. For notwithstanding nearly twenty years intervened before the tempest burst with all its fury, this period was so turbulent during its course, that Greece seldom enjoyed universal peace. While Athens by her naval strength was maintaining her ascendancy over the confederates, and while some of those confederates were raising the standard of rebellion and passing over to Sparta, every thing was gradually combining towards the formation of a counter league, the necessary consequence of which must have been a war, such as the Peloponnesian. Up to this time Athens was at the height of her power; she was governed by Pericles, who, in every thing but the name, was sole ruler during this period, and for that reason she experienced few of the evils resulting from a democratic constitution. Who, indeed, could overthrow a demagogue whose presence of mind, even in the greatest good fortune, never once deserted him; who knew how to keep alive among his fellow-citizens the conviction that, however exalted they might be, it was to him alone they were indebted for it?

During the five years' truce the sacred war for the possession of
the Delphian oracle took place, and it is given by the Spartans to
the city of Delphi; but after their return is given back again by
the Athenians to the Phocians, B. C. 448. The Athenians commanded
by Tolmidas, are defeated by the Boeotians, 447. This expedition,
undertaken in opposition to the advice of Pericles, contributes to
increase his influence; particularly as he reduces to obedience
the revolted Euboea and Megara, 446. End of the five years' truce
with Sparta; and renewal of hostilities, 445; further warlike
proceedings are repressed by a new thirty years' peace, which
lasts, however, only fourteen years.--Complete suppression of the
aristocratic party, by the banishment of the elder Thucydides,
444; the whole administration of the state consequently centres in
the hands of Pericles.--Democracy in the confederate states
favoured; forcibly introduced in Samos, which, after a nine
months' siege, is obliged to submit to Pericles, 440.--Commencement
of the war between Corinth and Corcyra, on the subject of Epidamnus,
436, which the Corcyraeans take possession of after winning a naval
victory, 435. The Athenians take part in the quarrel, and side with
the Corcyraeans, 432. The rupture with Corinth, and the policy of
Perdiccas II. king of Macedonia, lead to the secession of the
Corinthian colony of Potidaea, which previously belonged to the
Athenian confederacy: the war thereby is extended to the Macedonian
coast. Engagement near Potidaea, and siege of that town, 432. The
Corinthians direct their steps to Sparta, and excite the Spartans
to war; which is further accelerated by the attack of the Thebans
upon Plataeae, the confederate of Athens, 431.

16. The history of the twenty-seven years' war, known by the name of the Peloponnesian, or great Grecian war, which swept away the fairest flowers of Greece, is the more deserving attention from its being not merely a struggle between nations, but likewise against certain forms of government. The policy of Athens, which to establish or preserve her influence in foreign states, excited the multitude against the higher orders, had on all sides given rise to two factions, the democrat or Athenian, and the aristocrat or Spartan; and the mutual bitterness of party spirit produced the most violent disorders.

17. The respective relations of the two head states of Greece to their confederates, were at this time of a very opposite nature. Athens, as a naval power, was mistress of most of the islands and maritime cities, which, as tributary confederates, rendered for the most part a forced obedience. Sparta, as a land power, was allied with most of the states on the continent, which had joined her side of their own accord, and were not subject to tribute. Sparta therefore presented herself as the deliverer of Greece from the Athenian yoke.

Confederates of the Athenians: the islands Chios, Samos, Lesbos, all
those of the Archipelago, (Thera and Melos excepted, which stood
neutral,) Corcyra, Zacynthus; the Grecian colonies in Asia Minor, and
on the coast of Thrace and Macedonia; in Greece itself, the cities
of Naupactus, Plataeae, and those of Acarnania.--Confederates of the
Spartans: all the Peloponnesians, (Argos and Achaia excepted, which
stood neutral,) Megara, Locris, Phocis, Boeotia, the cities of
Ambracia and Anactorium, and the island of Leucas.

18. Sketch of the internal state of Athens and Sparta at this period. The power of Athens depended mainly on the state of her finances; without which she could not support a fleet, and without a fleet her ascendancy over the confederates would of course fall to ground. And although Pericles, notwithstanding his lavish public expenditure, was able to enter upon the war with 6,000 talents in the treasury, experience could not fail to show that, in such a democratic state as Athens was now become under Pericles, the squandering of the public money was an unavoidable evil. This evil was produced, however, at Athens much less by the peculations of individual state officers than by the demands of the multitude, who for the most part lived at the expense of the state treasury. On the other hand, Sparta as yet had no finance; and only began to feel the want of it as she began to acquire a naval power, and entered upon undertakings more vast than mere incursions.

Financial system of the Athenians. Revenue: 1. The tribute paid by
the confederates ([Greek: phoroi]) increased by Pericles from four
hundred and sixty to six hundred talents. 2. Income from the
customs, (which were farmed,) and from the mines at Laurium. 3.
The caution money of the non-citizens: ([Greek: metoikoi].) 4. The
taxes on the citizens, ([Greek: eisphorai],) which fell almost
entirely on the rich, more particularly on the first class, the
members of which were not only to bear the burthen of fitting out
the fleet, ([Greek: trierarchiai],) but were likewise to furnish
means for the public festivals and spectacles, ([Greek:
choregiai].) The whole income of the republic at this time was
estimated at 2,000 talents. But the disbursements made to the
numerous assistants at the courts of justice (the principal means
of existence with the poorer citizens, and which, more than any
thing else, contributed to the licentiousness of the democracy and
the oppression of the confederates, whose causes were all brought
to Athens for adjudication,) together with the expenditure for
festivals and spectacles, even at this time, absorbed the greatest
part of the revenue.

# F. BOEKH, _Public Economy of the Athenians_, 2 parts, Berlin,
1816. The chief work on the subject. [Ably translated by J. C.
LEWIS, esq. of Christ Church in this university.]

_Athenian Letters, or the Epistolary Correspondence of an Agent of
the King of Persia, residing at Athens during the Peloponnesian
war._ London, 1798, 2 vols. 4to. The production of several young
authors; first printed, but not published, in 1741. This sketch
comprises, not only Greece, but likewise Persia and Egypt.

19. First period of the war until the fifty years' peace. Beginning of the war unsuccessful to Athens during the first three years, under the conduct of Pericles, in whose defensive plan we may perhaps discern the infirmities of age. The Athenians, however, suffered less from the annual inroads of the Spartans than from the plague, to which Pericles himself at last fell a victim. The alliance of the Athenians with the kings of Thrace and Macedonia extended the theatre of war; on the other hand, Sparta had already conceived the idea of an alliance with Persia.

20. The death of Pericles was, for the next seven years, during which the place of that great man was supplied by Cleon a currier, followed by all the evils of an uncurbed democracy. The atrocious decrees with respect to Mitylene, which after seceding, had been recaptured, and the insurrection of the Corcyraean populace against the rich, characterized the party spirit then dominant in Greece better than the few insignificant events of a war conducted without any plan. Sparta, however, found in young Brasidas a general, such as are wont to arise in revolutionary times. His prosecution of the war on the Macedonian coast might have brought great danger to Athens, had he so early not fallen a victim to his own gallantry.

Capture of Amphipolis by Brasidas, and exile of Thucydides, 424.
Engagement near Amphipolis between Brasidas and Cleon; and death
of those two generals, 422.

21. The peace now concluded for fifty years could not be of long duration, as many of the confederates on either side were discontented with its terms. All hope of tranquillity must have been at an end when the management of Athenian affairs fell into the hands of a youth like Alcibiades, in whom vanity and artifice held the place of patriotism and talent, and who thought war the only field in which he could gain credit. Against him what availed the prudence of Nicias?--Happy was it for Athens that during the whole of this period Sparta never produced one man who could match even with Alcibiades!

Attempt of some states, Corinth especially, to set Argos at the
head of a new confederacy; this measure Athens likewise favours,
421.--Violation of the peace, 419; the war indirect until 415, and
limited to assisting the confederates on either side.--Alcibiades's
plan of giving Athens the preponderance in Peloponnesus, by an
alliance with Argos, is defeated by the battle of Mantinea,
417.--Exterminating war of the Athenians waged against the Melians,
who wish to preserve their neutrality, whereas neutrality in the
weaker party now becomes a crime, 416.

22. Alcibiades's party brings forward at Athens the project of conquering Sicily, under the pretence of succouring the Segestani against the Syracusans. This rash expedition, in which the hopes both of the Athenians and of its instigator Alcibiades were blighted, gave to Athens the first great blow, from which she never after, even with the utmost exertion of her strength, recovered; especially as Sparta also was now become a naval power.

Early interference of the Athenians with the concerns of the
Sicilian Greeks.--A fleet and army under the command of Nicias,
Lamachus, and Alcibiades, sent against Sicily, 415.--Accusation,
recall, and flight of Alcibiades to Sparta: formal rupture of the
peace by an inroad of the Spartans into Attica, where they fortify
Decelea, 414. Unsuccessful siege of Syracuse, 414; and total
annihilation of the Athenian fleet and army by the assistance of
the Spartans under Gylippus, 413.

23. Fatal as in the present circumstances the blow struck in Sicily must appear to have been to Athens, yet the calamity was surmounted by Athenian enthusiasm, never greater than in times of misfortune. They maintained their supremacy over the confederates; but the part which Alcibiades, in consequence of the new posture his own personal interest had assumed at Sparta, took in their affairs, brought about a twofold domestic revolution, which checked the licentious democracy.

Alliance of the Spartans with the Persians, and indecisive
engagement off Miletus--Flight of Alcibiades from Sparta to
Tissaphernes; his negotiations to gain the satrap over to the
interests of Athens, 411.--Equivocal policy of
Tissaphernes.--Negotiations of Alcibiades with the chiefs of the
Athenian army at Samos, and the consequent revolution at Athens,
and overthrow of the democracy by the appointment of the supreme
council of four hundred in place of the [Greek: boule], and of a
committee of five thousand citizens in place of the popular
assembly, 411.--The army assumes the right of debate; names
Alcibiades to be its leader; but declares again for
democracy.--Great commotions at Athens in consequence of the
discomfiture of the fleet at Eretria, and the secession of Euboea.
Deposition of the college of four hundred, after a despotic rule
of four months;--Reformation of the government;--Transfer of the
highest power to the hands of the five thousand;--Recall of
Alcibiades, and reconciliation with the army.

24. Brilliant period of Alcibiades's command. The reiterated naval victories won by the Athenians over the Spartans under Mindarus, who, mistrusting Tissaphernes, now forms an alliance with Pharnabazus, satrap of the north of Asia Minor, oblige the Spartans to propose peace, which haughty Athens, unluckily for herself, rejects.

Two naval engagements on the Hellespont, 411.--Great victory by
sea and land won near Cyzicus, 410.--Confirmation of the Athenian
dominion over Ionia and Thrace by the capture of Byzantium, 480.
Alcibiades returns covered with glory; but in the same year is
deposed, and submits to a voluntary exile, 407.

25. Arrival of the younger Cyrus in Asia Minor; the shrewdness of Lysander wins him over to the Spartan interest. The republican haughtiness of Lysander's successor, Callicratidas, shown to Cyrus, was a serious error in policy; for, unassisted by Persian money, Sparta was not in a condition to pay her mariners, nor consequently to support her naval establishment. After the defeat and death of Callicratidas, the command is restored to Lysander, who terminates the twenty seven years' war triumphantly for Sparta.

Naval victory of Lysander over the Athenians at Notium, 407; in
consequence of which Alcibiades is deprived of the
command.--Appointment of ten new leaders at Athens; Conon among
the number.--Naval victory of Callicratidas at Mitylene; Conon is
shut up in the harbour of that place, 406.--Great naval victory of
the Athenians; defeat and death of Callicratidas at the Aeginussae
islands, near Lesbos, 406.--Unjust condemnation of the Athenian
generals.--Second command of Lysander, and last _decisive_ victory
by sea over the Athenians at Aegospotamos on the Hellespont, Dec.
406.--The loss of the sovereignty of the sea is accompanied by the
defection of the confederates, who are successively subjected by
Lysander, 406.--Athens is besieged by Lysander in the same year,
405; the city surrenders in May, 404.--Athens is deprived of her
walls; her navy is reduced to twelve sail; and, in obedience to
Lysander's commands, the constitution is commuted into an
oligarchy, under thirty rulers, (tyrants.)

26. Thus ended a war destructive in its moral, still more than in its political, consequences. Party spirit had usurped the place of patriotic feeling; as national prejudice had that of national energy. Athens being subdued, Sparta stood at the head of confederate Greece; but Greece very soon experienced the yoke of her deliverers to be infinitely more galling than that of the people hitherto called her oppressors. What evils must not have ensued from the revolutions Lysander now found it necessary to effect in most of the Grecian states, in order to place the helm of government in the hands of his own party under the superintendence of a Spartan harmost?--How oppressive must not have been the military rule of the numerous Spartan garrisons?--Nor could any alleviation of tribute be hoped for, now that in Sparta it was acknowledged that the "state must possess an exchequer."--The arrogance and rapacity of the new masters were rendered more grievous by their being more uncivilized and destitute.

History of the reign of terror at Athens under the thirty tyrants,
403.--What happened here must likewise have happened more or less
in the other Grecian cities, which Lysander found it necessary to
revolutionize. In all quarters his party consisted of men similar
to Critias and his colleagues, who appear to have been long before
united in clubs ([Greek: hetaireiai]) intimately connected with
each other; from which were now taken the most daring
revolutionists, in order to place them everywhere at the head of
affairs.

27. Happy revolution in Athens, and expulsion of the thirty tyrants by Thrasybulus, favoured by the party at Sparta opposed to Lysander, and headed by king Pausanias. Restoration and reform of Solon's constitution; general amnesty. It was easy to reestablish forms;--to recall the departed spirit of the nation was impossible!

ED. PH. HINRICHS, _De Theramenis, Critiae et Thrasybuli, virorum
tempore belli Peloponnesiaci inter Graecos illustrium, rebus et
ingenio, Commentatio_, Hamburgi, 1820. An inquiry which exhibits
much research and impartiality.

28. The defeat of the younger Cyrus entangles the Spartans in a war with the Persians, the same year that, after the death of king Agis, Agesilaus takes possession of the regal dignity. We willingly forget his usurpation as we follow him in his heroic career. None but a man of genius could have instructed Sparta how to support for so long a time the extravagant character which she had now undertaken to play.

Opening of the war with Persia by Tissaphernes's attack on the
Aeolian cities of Asia Minor, 400.--Command of Thimbron, who, 398,
is succeeded by the more successful and fortunate
Dercyllidas.--Availing himself of the jealousy between
Tissaphernes and Artabazus, he persuades the latter to a separate
truce, 397.--Command of Agesilaus; his expedition into Asia, from
the spring of 396 until 394. The conviction which he obtained of
the domestic weakness of the Persian empire in the successful
invasion of Phrygia, 395, seems to have matured in the mind of
Agesilaus the idea of overturning the Persian throne: this design
he would have accomplished had not the Persians been politic
enough to kindle a war against Sparta in Greece itself.

29. The Corinthian war, waged against Sparta by Corinth, Thebes, and Argos, to which Athens and the Thessalians unite, terminated by the peace of Antalcidas. The tyranny of Sparta, and more particularly the recent devastation of Elis, a sacred territory, were the alleged pretexts; but the bribes of Timocrates, the Persian envoy, were the real causes of this war.

Irruption of the Spartans into Boeotia; they engage and are routed
at Haliartus, 394. Lysander falls on the field of battle; and
Agesilaus is recalled out of Asia.--His victory at Coronea ensures
to the Spartans the preponderance by land; but the discomfiture of
their navy near Cnidus at the same time, gives to their enemies
the sovereignty of the sea: Conon, who commanded the combined
Persian and Athenian fleets, avails himself, with consummate
skill, of this success to reestablish the independence of Athens,
393.--Sparta endeavours by apparently great sacrifices to bring
over the Persians to her interests: the peace at last concluded by
the efforts of the skilful Antalcidas, (see above, book ii, parag.
42), was readily agreed to by the Spartans, as they gave up only
what otherwise they could not have retained. The preponderance of
Sparta on the continent of Greece was established by the article
which invested them with the power of seeing the conditions of the
treaty fulfilled: the stipulated freedom of the Grecian cities was
but an apparent disadvantage; and now that the Asiatic colonies
were given up, the contest for power in Greece itself must be
decided by land, and not by sea.

30. The quarrels which, after the peace of Antalcidas, Sparta began to have with Mantinea and Phlius, and still more so her participation in those between the Macedo-Greek cities and the over-powerful Olynthus, prove too plainly the arrogance with which Sparta behaved to the weaker states. But the arbitrary appropriation of the citadel of Thebes by Phoebidas,--an act not indeed commanded, yet approved by Sparta,--was attended with more serious consequences than were at first expected. Would that all authors of similar breaches of good faith and the law of nations were visited with the same vengeance!

31. Period of the rivalry of Sparta and Thebes, Thebes, from the year 378. The greatness of Thebes was the work of two men, who knew how to inspire their fellow-citizens and confederates with their own heroic spirit: with them Thebes rose, with them she fell. Rarely does history exhibit such a _duumvirate_ as that of Epaminondas and Pelopidas. How high must our estimation of Pythagoras be, even had his philosophy formed but one such man as Epaminondas!

Liberation of Thebes from Spartan rule by the successful attempt
of Pelopidas and his fellow-conspirators, 378. Vain attempts
against Thebes, by the Spartans under Cleombrotus, 378, and
Agesilaus, 377 and 376. The defensive war conducted by Pelopidas,
during which he established the Theban supremacy in Boeotia, and
brought over the Athenians, (whose fleet, 376, beat that of the
Spartans,) deserves our admiration more than the winning of a
battle.--The vast plans of Thebes were not unfolded, however, till
Epaminondas was at the head of affairs.

SERAN DE LA TOUR, _Histoire d'Epaminondas_. Paris, 1752.

# MEISSNER, _Life of Epaminondas_. Prague, 1801, 2 parts. In which
the authorities are duly considered.

# J. G. SCHEIBEL, _Essays towards a better understanding of the
Ancient World_, 1809. The second part contains an essay upon the
history of Thebes, as the first does on that of Corinth.

32. A general peace is concluded in Greece through the mediation of the Persians, (who wish to obtain auxiliaries against the Egyptians,) under the condition that all the Grecian cities shall be free: it is acceded to by Sparta and Athens, but rejected by Thebes, because she cannot admit the condition without again falling under the Spartan yoke. In fact, the lofty language used by Epaminondas, as envoy to Sparta, shows that it was problematic whether Sparta or Thebes should now be at the head of Greece. Could the idea, therefore, of a perfect equality between the states of Greece be other than chimerical?

33. The long struggle maintained so gloriously by Epaminondas against Sparta is remarkable both in a political and military point of view. The power of Sparta was abased; Epaminondas invented a new system of tactics, (out of which soon after sprang the Macedonian art of war;) and as soon as he found confederates in Peloponnesus itself, he made his way to the very gates of Sparta.

Victory won by the Thebans at Leuctra, July 8, 371, and
annihilation of what hitherto had been called the supremacy of
Sparta.--First irruption into Peloponnesus preceded by alliances
with Arcadia, Elis, and Argos.--The attack upon Sparta itself is
unsuccessful; but the freedom of Messene is restored, 369.

34. Sparta in distress forms an alliance with Athens, under the stipulation that the command shall alternately be in the hands of the two confederates; conditions, no doubt, humiliating to Spartan pride! It however affords them the means of frustrating Epaminondas's new attempt on Corinth and the Peloponnesus. Even Dionysius I. of Syracuse, thinks himself bound to assist the Spartans as being Dorians.

35. Thebes played a no less brilliant part in the north than she did in the south. And had the attempts to liberate Thessaly from the rule of the tyrant, Alexander of Pherae, been attended with success, Thebes would have received a vast increase of power. Even in Macedonia she acted as arbitress.

First and successful expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly,
368.--After the decision of the disputed succession to the
Macedonian throne, young Philip is brought as hostage to Thebes,
and educated in the house of Epaminondas.--Pelopidas is sent as
ambassador, and taken prisoner by Alexander; hence the second
expedition of the Thebans, in which Epaminondas rescues the army
and delivers his friend, 367.

36. Alliance of Thebes with Persia successfully brought about by Pelopidas. In the intrigues of the opponents at the Persian court, the object of each was to bring that court over to his own interest. Yet the domineering tone in which the Persians wished to dictate peace, had not the consequences that might have been expected; and although Sparta consented to her confederates remaining neutral, she would not forego her claims on Messene. The establishment of a navy would have been of more important consequences to Thebes than this alliance, had not all these plans, together with the greatness of Thebes, been swept away by the premature death of her two leading men.

Last expedition of Pelopidas against Alexander of Pherae, in which
he himself falls, 364.--New irruption into Peloponnesus caused by
the commotions in Arcadia.--Battle of Mantinea, and death of
Epaminondas, June 27, 362.--General peace in Greece mediated by
the Persians; Sparta does not assent to it on account of Messene,
but sends Agesilaus to Egypt, there to support the insurrection of
Tachos.

37. The result of this bloody struggle for the supremacy of Greece was, that neither Sparta nor Thebes obtained it; the former of these states being weakened by the loss of Messene, the latter by the loss of its leaders, and both strained by their violent exertions. The situation of Greece after this war seems to have been thus far changed, that no state had the predominance; an independence proceeding from enervation. Even Athens, who by means of her naval power still preserved her influence over the cities on the coast and in the islands, lost the greater part in the war of the allies, together with three of her most celebrated leaders, Chabrias, Timotheus, and Iphicrates, whose places were ill supplied by Chares.

Confederacy of the islands Cos, Rhodes, and Chios, and the city of
Byzantium; their secession from Athens, 358.--Unsuccessful siege
of Chios, before which Chabrias falls, 358; of Byzantium, 357.
Athens suffers a still greater injury from the cabals of Chares
against his colleagues Timotheus and Iphicrates, and from her
imprudent participation in the insurrection of Artabazus, 356. The
threats of Artaxerxes III. force Athens to make a peace, in which
she is obliged to acknowledge the freedom of her confederates.

38. At the very time when the growing power of Macedonia under Philip ought to have united all the Grecian states, had such an union been within the range of possibility, Greece plunged into another civil war of ten years' duration, which is known by the name of the sacred or Phocian war. The Amphictyonic assembly, whose duty it was to maintain peace, and whose influence had been in the present circumstances reinstated, abused its authority by kindling discord. The hatred of the Thebans, who sought for new opportunities of quarrel with Sparta, and the ambition of the Phocian Philomelus, were the real causes which led to the war, which the policy of Philip knew how to prolong till the precise moment favourable to his own particular views arrived. The treasures of Delphi circulating in Greece, were as injurious to the country as the ravages which it underwent. A war springing out of private passions, fostered by bribes and subsidiary troops, and terminated by the interference of foreign powers, was exactly what was requisite for annihilating the scanty remains of morality and patriotism still existing in Greece.

Sentence of the Amphictyons against Sparta on account of the
former surprise of the citadel of Thebes by Phoebidas; and against
Phocis on account of the tillage of the sacred lands of Delphi,
357.--Philomelus is elected general of the Phocians; the rifling
of the treasury of Delphi enables him to take into his pay
Athenian and other auxiliaries, and to carry war against the
Thebans and their confederates, the Locrians, etc. under pretence
of their being the executors of the Amphictyonic decrees.
Philomelus having fallen, 353, is succeeded by his brother
Onomarchus, more skilful than himself in intrigue and war: but
Onomarchus having fallen, 352, in the battle with Philip in
Thessaly, is followed by Phayllus. Philip even thus early
endeavours to push through Thermopylae into Greece, but is repelled
by the Athenians. He executes this plan after his peace with
Athens, 347, and having procured the expulsion of the Phocians
from the Amphictyonic council, gets their place and right of vote
to be transferred to himself.

39. From the very first advance of Philip, the fate of Greece could scarcely afford matter for doubt; although the eloquence of Demosthenes warded it off until the second invasion, caused by the Amphictyonic sentence passed on the Locrians. (See below, book iv. parag. 15.) The battle of Chaeronea laid the foundation of Macedonia's complete ascendancy over the Grecian republics: by the appointment of Philip to be generalissimo of Greece in the Persian war, that ascendancy was, as it were, formally acknowledged; nor did it end with the assassination of that prince.

* * * * *

FOURTH BOOK.

HISTORY OF THE MACEDONIAN MONARCHY.

FIRST PERIOD.

_From its origin to the death of Alexander the Great. B. C. 800-323._

Sources. We have no historian who wrote, particularly, on
Macedonia, before the time of Alexander. The facts relative to the
earlier history previous to Philip are collected from Diodorus,
Justin, Thucydides, and Arrian; from Diodorus more especially. In
consequence of the loss of the other historians, Diodorus is the
chief authority for the history of Philip; the speeches of
Demosthenes and Aeschines must likewise be consulted, but not made
use of without caution and judicious historical criticism. With
respect to Alexander the Great, as so many writers on his reign
have been destroyed by time, Arrian must now be considered as the
chief authority, on account of the care he has shown in the
selection of his authorities, conjointly with the seventeenth book
of Diodorus. Plutarch's biography contains several valuable
additional facts; and even the superficial Curtius might furnish us
with abundance of information, did his accounts offer higher claims
to our credit.

1. An Hellenic colony from Argos, headed by the Temenidae, a branch of the Heraclidae, settled in Emathia, and laid the feeble foundation of the Macedonian empire, which was in time to rise to such power. Not only did the settlers keep their footing in the country, in spite of the aboriginal inhabitants; but their princes gradually extended their territory, by subjecting or expelling several of the neighbouring tribes. Their earlier history, not excepting even the names of their kings, is buried in obscurity till the time of the Persian invasions.

The three first Macedonian kings, Caranus said to have ruled
twenty-eight years, Coenus twenty-three, Tyrmas forty-five, were
unknown to Herodotus, who names as founder of the Macedonian
monarchy, Perdiccas, 729-678. Of this prince and his successors
Argaeus, _d._ 640, Philip I. _d._ 602, Aeropus, _d._ 576, and
Alcetas, _d._ 547, nothing more is known than that they waged war,
with various success against the neighbouring Pierians and
Illyrians, who had their own kings.

2. When the Persians commenced their incursions into Europe, Macedonia, by its situation, must have been one of the first countries they ravaged. Accordingly, as early as the reign of Darius Hystaspis, the Macedonian kings were tributary to the Persians; and were indebted for their deliverance from that yoke, not to their own valour, but to the victories of the Greeks. The battle of Plataeae restored independence to the Macedonian kingdom, although that independence was not formally acknowledged by the Persians.

Immediately after the Scythian campaign, 513, Amyntas (_d._ 498,)
became tributary to the Persians; his son and successor, Alexander,
(_d._ 454,) was in the same state of subjection, and was even
compelled to join the expedition of Xerxes.

3. But the expulsion of the Persians still left Macedonia exposed to the attacks of other formidable neighbours; on one side there was the Thracians, among whom, under Sitalces, and his successor, Seuthes, arose the powerful kingdom of the Odrysae; on the other, the Athenians, who, availing themselves of their extensive navy, reduced to subjection the Grecian settlements on the Macedonian shores. Harassing as these neighbours were to the Macedonian kings, they proved to be the very instruments by which Macedonia became so early and so deeply involved in the affairs of Greece.

Commencement of the differences with Athens, under the reign of
Perdiccas II, 454-413; Athens having supported his brother Philip
against him.--Defection of Potidaea, and fortification of Olynthus,
into which the Greeks from Chalcis and other cities are
transplanted, 432. Potidaea being forced to surrender to Athens,
431, Perdiccas contrives to play so skilful a part in the
Peloponnesian war just now commencing, that he outwits the
Athenians, parrying the attack of Sitalces by a marriage of his
sister with Seuthes, the heir to that prince, 429. His alliance
with Sparta, 424, is very detrimental to the Athenians, Brasidas
wresting Amphipolis from their hands; nevertheless Perdiccas
chooses rather to conclude a peace with Athens, 423, than to throw
himself entirely into the arms of his new allies.

4. Archelaus, the successor of Perdiccas, introduced agriculture and civilization among the Macedonians, who were never, however, recognized by the Hellenes as their legitimate brethren: highways and military roads were constructed; forts were erected; and the court became the seat of literature. In these days the Macedonian kingdom seems to have comprised Emathia, Mygdonia, and Pelagonia, to which may be added some of the neighbouring tribes, who, although governed by their own kings, were tributary. The power of the kings was insignificant when unaided by the nobles, among whom, as was the case with all the hereditary princes of Greece, they merely held the right of precedence. How difficult was it, even in Alexander's time, to erase from the minds of the Macedonian nobility the recollection of their former importance!

5. The murder of Archelaus was followed by a stormy period, wrapped in obscurity: the unsettled state of the succession raised up many pretenders to the throne, each of whom easily found the means of supporting his claims, either in some of the neighbouring tribes, or in one of the Grecian republics.

Aeropus, as guardian to the young king Orestes, usurps the supreme
power, B. C. 400-394. After his death, and the murder of his son
Pausanias, 393, the throne was seized by Amyntas II. son of
Philip, and brother to Perdiccas II. who was nevertheless unable
to maintain his power until he had gained a victory over Argaeus,
the brother of Pausanias, who was backed by the Illyrians,
390-369. The war with Olynthus, 383-380, could not be brought to a
successful conclusion until he had formed an alliance with Sparta.

6. The three sons of Amyntas II, Alexander, Perdiccas, and Philip, successively ascended the throne after the death of their father; but so violent were the commotions during the reigns of the two former, that the future existence of Macedonia as a kingdom might have been regarded as problematical: it is certain that they were obliged to submit to the payment of tribute to the Illyrians.

Alexander, in opposition to his rival, Ptolemy of Alorus, placed
on the throne by Pelopidas, sends his youngest brother Philip as
hostage to Thebes: in the same year he is deposed by Ptolemy, 368.
Reign of Ptolemy, 388-365, with the stipulation imposed, 367, by
Pelopidas, that he shall only hold the sceptre in reserve for the
two younger brothers. Murder of Ptolemy, 365, by Perdiccas III.
who is nearly overwhelmed by Pausanias, another and earlier
pretender to the crown; he is at last firmly seated on the throne
by the Athenians, under Iphicrates, 364. But as early as 360 he
falls in the war against the Illyrians, leaving behind him a son,
Amyntas, still a minor, and a younger brother Philip, who escapes
from Thebes in order to gain possession of the throne.

7. The reign of Philip, which lasted twenty-four years, is one of the most instructive and interesting in the whole range of history, as well on account of the prudence he displayed, as for the manner in which his plans were arranged and executed. Though it may be difficult to trace in his morals the pupil of Epaminondas, yet it is impossible to view without feelings of astonishment the brilliant career of a man, who, under the almost hopeless circumstances in which he commenced his course, never lost his firmness of mind, and who in the highest prosperity preserved his coolness of reflection.

The history of Philip, even in his own days, was distorted to his
disadvantage by orators and historians. Demosthenes could not,
Theopompus would not, be impartial; and the information contained
in Diodorus and Justin is mostly derived from the work of the
latter.

OLIVIER, _Histoire de Philippe, roi de Macedoine_. Paris, 1740, 2
vols. 8vo. A defence of Philip.

DE BURY, _Histoire de Philippe, et d'Alexandre le grand_. Paris,
1760, 4to. A very mean performance.

TH. LELAND, _The History of the Life and Reign of Philip king of
Macedon_. London, 1761, 4to. Dry, but exhibiting much reading and
strict impartiality.

In MITFORD, _History of Greece_, vol. iv, Philip has found his
most zealous panegyrist and defender. It would seem that, even in
the present day, it is impossible to write an impartial history of
this monarch.

8. Melancholy posture of the Macedonian affairs at the beginning of Philip's reign. Besides victorious foes abroad, there were at home two pretenders to the throne, Argaeus, backed by Athens, Pausanias, supported by Thrace; and Philip himself, at first, was merely regent, and not king. In the two first years, however, every thing was changed, and Macedonia recovered her independence. The newly-created phalanx ensured victory over the barbarians; recourse was had to other means than force for success against the suspiciousness of Athens and the neighbouring Greek settlements, particularly against the powerful Olynthus. It is in the conduct of these affairs that the peculiar sagacity of Philip is displayed.