Chapter XX: Part III: , European Nations; of which only 1 volume, Greeks, has (12)

The primitive history of Rome is as difficult to reduce to pure
historic truth as that of Athens, or any other city of antiquity; this
proceeds from its being principally founded on traditions, handled by
poets and rhetoricians, and likewise differing from one another; as
may be seen in Plutarch's Romulus. As the knowledge of those
traditions, such as they are found in Dionysius and Livy, attaches to
so many other subjects, it would be improper to pass them over in
silence; and that they contained truths as well as poetic fictions is
proved most evidently by the political institutions of which they
narrate the origin, and which certainly reached back to those times.
To attempt to draw a line of demarcation between mythical and historic
times would be to mistake the real nature of mythology.

L. DE BEAUFORT, _Sur l'incertitude des cinq premiers siecles de
l'histoire Romaine_, nouv. ed. a la Haye, 1750, 2 vols. 8vo. Every
thing that can be said against the credibility of the primitive Roman
history has been developed by Beaufort with abundant, and often with
laboured, acuteness.

3. During the first two hundred and forty-five years subsequent to its foundation this city was under the rule of governors, denominated kings; these, however, were not hereditary, still less were they invested with unlimited power, although they exerted themselves to become both perpetual and absolute. On the contrary, in this period was framed a municipal constitution, demonstrative of the existence, even at this early date, of a considerable degree of political civilization; in its principal parts this constitution was, no doubt,--as in every colony,--copied from that of the mother city. Its principal features were: _a._ Establishment and internal organization of the senate. _b._ Establishment and progress of the patrician or hereditary nobility, which, supported by the privilege of administering the sacred affairs, and by the introduction of family names, quickly formed, in opposition to the plebeians, a political party ever growing in power, although not, therefore, a mere sacerdotal caste. _c._ Organization of the people (_populus_), and modes of popular assembly (_comitia_), founded thereupon; besides the original division according to heads into _tribus_ and _curiae_, another was subsequently introduced according to property into _classes_ and _centuriae_, out of which, besides the more ancient _comitia curiata_, arose the very artificially constructed _comitia centuriata_. _d._ Religious institutions, (_religiones_,) which being most closely connected with the political constitution, formed a state religion, by means of which everything in the state was attached to determined forms, and received a higher sanction. Nor must we omit _e._ the relations in private life established by law, the clientship, marriage, and especially paternal authority. In consequence of those domestic relations, a spirit of subordination and discipline, from the earliest times, pervaded the people; and to that spirit the Romans were indebted for the glory to which they attained.

4. Notwithstanding many little wars with their immediate neighbours the Sabines, Aequi, and Volsci, together with various cities of the Etrusci, and even with the Latins themselves, Rome added but little to her territory: nevertheless she took the first step towards her aggrandizement; from the time of the destruction of Alba Longa, she aimed at being the head of the collected cities of the Latins, and finally attained the object of her ambition.

Line of kings. Romulus, 754-717. First establishment of the colony;
augmentation in the number of the citizens, produced by the
establishment of an asylum, and an union with part of the Sabines.
Numa Pompilius, _d._ 679. By representing this prince as the founder
of the religion of the Roman state, that religion received the high
sanction of antiquity. Tullus Hostilius, _d._ 640. The conquest and
destruction of Alba lays the foundation of Roman supremacy in Latium.
Ancus Martius, _d._ 618. He extends the territory of Rome to the sea;
the foundation of the port of Ostia proves that Rome already applied
to navigation, the object of which was perhaps as yet rather piracy
than trade. Tarquinius Priscus, _d._ 578. A Grecian by descent. Under
his conduct Rome was already able to enter the field against the
confederate Etrusci. Servius Tullius, _d._ 534. The most remarkable in
the line of Roman kings. He placed Rome at the head of the confederacy
of the Latins, which he confirmed by _communia sacra_. On his new
division of the people according to property were raised the highly
important institutions of the _census_ and _comitia centuriata_. The
necessity of this measure is demonstrative of the great and increasing
prosperity of the Roman citizens; there can be no doubt, however,
that by its adoption the frame of the republic was already completed.
Tarquinius Superbus, (the tyrant,)--509. This individual, having taken
forcible possession of the throne as nephew to Priscus, endeavoured to
confirm his power by a close connection with the Latins and Volsci; by
this, as well as by his tyranny, he offended both the patrician and
plebeian parties. His deposition, and the consequent reformation of
the government, were however, properly speaking, brought about by the
ambition of the patricians.

ALGAROTTI, _Saggio sopra la durata de' regni de' re di Roma_. (Op. t.
iii.) Chronological doubts. Can the raising of difficulties deserve
the name of criticism?

5. The only direct consequence to the internal constitution of Rome, proceeding from the abolition of royalty was, that that power, undetermined as it had been while in the hands of the kings, was transferred to two consuls, annually elected. Meanwhile the struggle for liberty, in which the new republic was engaged with the Etrusci and Latins, contributed much to arouse the republican spirit which henceforward was the main feature of the Roman character--the evils of popular rule being in times of need remedied by the establishment of the dictatorship. The party, however, which had deposed the ruling family, took wholly into their own hands the helm of state; and the oppression of these aristocrats, shown principally towards their debtors, who had become their slaves, (_nexi_,)--notwithstanding the _lex de provocatione_ established by Valerius Poplicola, ensuring to the people the highest judicial power--was so galling, that after the lapse of a few years it gave rise to a sedition of the commons, (_plebis_,) the consequence of which was the establishment of annually elected presidents of the people (_tribuni plebis_).

First commercial treaty with Carthage, 508, in which Rome appears
certainly as a free state, but not yet as sovereign of all Latium; the
most important monument of the authenticity of the earlier Roman
history.

HEYNE, _Foedera Carthaginiensium cum Romanis super navigatione et
mercatura facta_: contained in his Opusc. t. iii. Cf. # A. H. L.
HEEREN, _Ideas_, etc. Appendix to the second vol.

6. The further development of the Roman constitution in this period, hinges almost wholly on the struggle between the new presidents of the commons and the hereditary nobility; the tribunes, instead of confining themselves to defend the people from the oppression of the nobles, soon began to act as aggressors, and in a short time so widely overstepped their power, that there remained no chance of putting an end to the struggle but by a complete equalization of rights. A long time elapsed ere this took place; the aristocracy finding a very powerful support both in the clientship and in the religion of the state, operating under the shape of auspices.

Main facts of the contest: 1. In the trial of Coriolanus the tribunes
usurp the right of summoning some patricians before the tribunal of
the people.--Hence arise the _comitia tributa_; that is to say, either
mere assemblies of the commons, or assemblies so organized that the
commons had the preponderance. This institution gave the tribunes a
share in the legislation, subsequently of such high importance, those
officers being allowed to lay proposals before the commons. 2. More
equitable distribution among the poorer classes of the lands conquered
from the neighbouring nations, (the most ancient _leges agrariae_,)
suggested by the ambitious attempts of Cassius, 486. 3. Extension of
the prerogatives of the _comitia tributa_, more especially in the
election of the tribunes, brought about by Volero, 472. 4. Attempts at
a legal limitation of the consular power by Terentillus, (_lex
Terentilla_,) 460, which, after a long struggle, at last leads to the
idea of one common written code, 452, which is likewise realized in
spite of the opposition at first made by the patricians.

# CHR. F. SCHULZE, _Struggle between the Democracy and Aristocracy
of Rome, or History of the Romans from the Expulsion of Tarquin to
the Election of the first Plebeian Consul_. Altenburgh, 1802, 8vo.
A most satisfactory development of this portion of Roman history.

7. The code of the twelve tables confirmed the ancient institutions, and was in part completed by the adoption of the laws of the Greek republics, among which Athens in particular is mentioned, whose counsels were requested by a special deputation. In this, however, two faults were committed; not only were the commissioners charged with drawing up the laws elected from the patricians _alone_, but they were likewise constituted sole magistrates, with _dictatorial_ power, (_sine provocatione_;) whereby a path was opened to them for an usurpation, which could be frustrated only by a sedition of the people.

Duration of the power of the Decemviri, 451-447. The doubts raised as
to the deputation sent to Athens are not sufficient to invalidate the
authenticity of an event so circumstantially detailed. Athens, under
Pericles, was then at the head of Greece; and, admitting the proposed
design of consulting the Greek laws, it was impossible that Athens
should have been passed over. And indeed, why should it be supposed,
that a state which fifty years before had signed a commercial treaty
with Carthage, and could not be unacquainted with the Grecian colonies
in Lower Italy, might not have sent an embassy into Greece?

The yet remaining fragments of the code of the twelve tables are
collected and illustrated in BACHII _Hist. Jurisprudentiae Romanae_; and
in several other works.

8. By the laws of the twelve tables the legal relations of the citizens were the same for all; but as that code seems to have contained very little in reference to any peculiar constitution of the state, the government not only remained in the hands of the aristocrats, who were in possession of all offices, but the prohibition, according to the new laws of marriage between patricians and plebeians, appeared to have raised an insurmountable barrier between the two classes. No wonder, then, that the tribunes of the people should have immediately renewed their attacks on the patricians; particularly as the power of those popular leaders was not only renewed, but even augmented, as the only limit to their authority was the necessity of their being unanimous in their acts, while each had the right of a negative.

Besides the other laws made in favour of the people at the renewal of
the _tribunicia potestas_, 446, that which imported _ut quod tributim
plebes jussisset, populum teneret_, frequently renewed in subsequent
times, and meaning, in modern language, that the citizens constituted
themselves, must, it would appear, have thrown the supreme power into
the hands of the people; did not the Roman history, like that of other
free states, afford examples enough of the little authority there is
to infer from the enactment of a law that it will be practically
enforced.

9. The main subjects of the new dissensions between patricians and plebeians, excited by the tribune Canuleius, were now the _connubia patrum cum plebe_, and the exclusive participation of the patricians in the consulship, of which the tribunes demanded the abolition. The repeal of the former law was obtained as early as 445, (_lex Canuleia_;) the right of admission to the consulship was not extended to the Plebeians, till after a struggle annually renewed for eighty years; during which, when, as usually was the case, the tribunes forbade the military enrolment, recourse was had to a transfer of the consular power to the yearly elected commanders of the legions; a place to which plebeians were entitled to aspire, (_tribuni militum consulari potestate._)--Establishment of the office of CENSORS, designed at first for nothing more than to regulate the taking of the census, and invested with no higher authority than what that required, but who soon after, by assuming to themselves the _censura morum_, took rank among the most important dignitaries of the state.

10. Meanwhile Rome was engaged in wars, insignificant but almost uninterrupted, arising out of the oppression, either real or imaginary, which she exercised as head of the neighbouring federate cities, (_socii_,) comprising not only those of the Latins, but likewise, after the victory of lake Regillus, those of the other nations: the cities embraced every opportunity of asserting their independence, and the consequent struggles must have depopulated Rome, had not that evil been diverted by the maxim of increasing the complement of citizens by admitting the freedmen, and not unfrequently even the conquered, to the enjoyment of civic privileges. Little as these feuds, abstractedly considered, deserve our attention, they become of high interest, inasmuch as they were not only the means by which the nation was trained to war, but also led to the foundation of that senatorial power, whose important consequences will be exhibited hereafter.

Among these wars attention must be directed to the last, that against
Veii, the richest city in Etruria; the siege of that place, which
lasted very nearly ten years, 404-395, gave rise to the introduction
among the Roman military of winter campaigning, and of pay; thus, on
the one hand, the prosecution of wars more distant and protracted
became possible, while on the other the consequences must have been
the levy of higher taxes, (_tributa_).

11. Not long after, however, a tempest from the north had nearly destroyed Rome. The Sennonian Gauls, pressed out of northern Italy through Etruria, possessed themselves of the city, the capitol excepted, and reduced it to ashes; an event which made so deep an impression on the minds of the Romans, that few other occurrences in their history have been more frequently the object of traditional detail. Camillus, then the deliverer of Rome, and in every respect one of the chief heroes of that period, laid a double claim to the gratitude of his native city, by overruling, after his victory, the proposal of a general migration to Veii.

12. Scarcely was Rome rebuilt ere the ancient feuds revived, springing out of the poverty of the citizens, produced by an increase of taxation consequent on the establishment of military pay, and by the introduction of gross usury. The tribunes, Sextius and Licinius, by prolonging their term of office to five years, had established their power; while Licinius, by an agrarian law, decreeing that no individual should hold more than five hundred _jugera_ of the national lands, had ensured the popular favour; so that at last they succeeded in obtaining, that one of the consuls should be chosen from the commons; and although the nobility, by the nomination of a praetor from their own body, and of _aediles curules_, endeavoured to compensate for the sacrifice they were obliged to make, yet the plebeians having once made good a claim to the consulship, their participation in the other magisterial offices, (the dictatorship, 353, the censorship, 348, the praetorship, 334,) and even the priesthood, (300,) quickly followed as a matter of course. Thus at Rome the object of political equality between commons and nobles was attained; and although the difference between the patrician and plebeian families still subsisted, they soon ceased to form political parties.

A second commercial treaty entered into with Carthage, 345,
demonstrates that even at this time the navy of the Romans was
anything but contemptible; although its principal object as yet was
mere piracy. Roman squadrons of war however appear more than once
within the next forty years.

13. Far more important than any wars in which Rome had hitherto been engaged, were those soon about to commence with the Samnites. In former contests the object of Rome had been to establish her supremacy over her immediate neighbours; but in these, during a protracted contest of fifty years, she opened a way to the subjugation of Italy, and laid the foundation of her future greatness.

Commencement of the wars against the Samnites, the Campanians having
called the Romans to their assistance against that nation, 343. These
wars, carried on with vigorous exertion and various success, lasted,
with but short intermissions, till 290. This is the true heroic age of
Rome, ennobled by the patriotic valour of Decius Mus, (father and son,
both voluntary victims,) Papirius Cursor, Q. Fabius Maximus, etc. The
consequences of this struggle were: _a._ The Romans learnt the art of
mountain warfare, and thereby for the first time acquired a peculiar
system of military tactics; not, however, till they had been, 321,
obliged to pass under the _furcas Caudinas_. _b._ Their relations
were more firmly established with their neighbours the Latins and
Etrurians, by the complete conquest of the former, 340, and by
repeated victories over the latter, more especially in 308. _c._ Great
national federations having arisen in Italy, particularly during the
last period of the Samnite wars, the Romans entered into connection
with the more distant nations of the country; with the Lucanians and
Apulians, by the first league, 323, with the Umbri, from the year 308;
and although the nature of this connection frequently varied, the
different nations were perpetually struggling for independence, and
were consequently at enmity with Rome. In this period, moreover,
commenced the practical illustration of the leading ideas of Rome upon
the political relations in which she placed the conquered with regard
to herself.

14. After the subjection of the Samnites, Rome, wishing to confirm her dominion in Lower Italy, was thereby, for the first time, entangled in war with a foreign prince; the Tarentines, too feeble to maintain alone their footing against the Romans, called Pyrrhus of Epirus to their assistance. He came, indeed, but not so much to further the views of the Tarentines as to advance his own; but even in victory, he learnt by experience that the Macedonian tactics gave him but a slight preponderance, which the Romans soon transferred to their own side, exhibiting the truth of the principle, that a good civic militia, sooner or later, will always get the upper hand of mercenary troops.

The idea of calling upon Pyrrhus for assistance was the more natural,
as the predecessor of that prince, Alexander I. (see above p. 275.)
had endeavoured, but without success, to effect conquests in Lower
Italy. In the first war with Pyrrhus, 280-278, two battles were
fought, the first at Pandosia, 280, the other at Asculum, 279; in both
of which Rome was unsuccessful. But Pyrrhus, after crossing over into
Sicily, 278, (see above, p. 173, 174.) once more returned into Italy,
275, when he was defeated by the Romans at Beneventum, and compelled
to evacuate Italy, leaving a garrison at Tarentum. That city, however,
soon afterwards, 272, fell into the hands of the Romans, whose
dominion was consequently extended to the extremity of Lower Italy.

15. The chief means to which, even from the earliest times, the Romans had recourse for the foundation of their dominion over the conquered, and at the same time for the prevention of the too great increase of the needy classes at Rome, was the establishment of colonies of their own citizens, which, being settled in the captured cities, served likewise as garrisons. Each colony had its own distinct internal constitution, modelled, for the most part, upon that of the mother city itself; hence to keep the colonies in perfect dependence naturally became an object of Roman policy. This colonial system of the Romans, necessarily and spontaneously arising out of the rude custom of bereaving the conquered of their lands and liberty, assumed its main features in the Samnite war, and gradually embraced the whole of Italy. Closely connected with this system was the construction of military highways, (_viae militares_,) one of which, the Appian Way, was constructed so early as 312, and to this day remains a lasting monument of the greatness of Rome at that period.

Even at the time of Hannibal's invasion, the number of Roman colonies
amounted to 53: but several which had been settled returned to the
mother city.

HEYNE, _De Romanorum prudentia in coloniis regendis_: inserted in
_Opusc._ vol. iii. Cf. _Prolusiones de veterum coloniarum jure ejusque
causis_, in his _Opusc._ vol. i.

16. But the relations existing between Rome and the Italian nations were extremely various in kind. 1. A few cities and nations enjoyed the full privileges of Roman citizenship; in some instances, however, without the right of voting in the _comitia_ (_municipia_). 2. The privileges of the colonies (_jus coloniarum_) were of a more restricted nature; the colonists were indeed in possession of their own civic government, but had no further share whatever either in the _comitia_ or magistracies of Rome. The other inhabitants of Italy were either federates (_socii, foedere juncti_) or subjects (_dedititii_). The first (_a_) preserved their internal form of government; but on the other hand (_b_) were obliged to furnish tribute and auxiliary troops (_tributis et armis juvare rempublicam_). Their further relation with Rome depended upon the terms of the league. The most advantageous of these terms were 3. in favour of the Latins, although each of their cities had its own separate league (_jus Latii_;) as 4. the rest of the Italian nations had their _jus Italicum_. On the other hand, 5. the subjects, _dedititii_, were deprived of their internal constitutions, and were governed by Roman magistrates, (_praefecti_,) annually renewed.

C. SIGONIUS, _De antiquo jure civium Romanorum_; and his treatise _De
antiquo jure Italiae_, inserted both in his _Opera_ and in GRAEVII
_Thes. Ant. Rom._ t. ii. contain the most learned researches on the
details of these relations.

17. The internal constitution of Rome itself, now completed, bore the character of a democracy, inasmuch as equality of rights existed both for nobles and commons. Yet this democracy was modified by expedients so various and wonderful--the rights of the people, of the senate, of the magistrates, fitted so nicely into each other, and were so firmly supported by the national religion, connecting every thing with determinate forms--that there was no reason, at that time, to fear the evils either of anarchy, or, what is much more astonishing when we consider the warlike character of the people, those of military despotism.

The rights of the people consisted in the legislative power, so far as
fundamental national principles were concerned, and in the election of
the magistrates. The distinction between the _comitia tributa_ (as
independent of the senate) and the _comitia centuriata_ (as dependent
on the senate) still existed as to form, but had lost all its
importance, the difference between patricians and plebeians being now
merely nominal, and the establishment of the _tribus urbanae_, 303,
excluding the too great influence of the people (_forensis factio_)
upon the _comitia tributa_. The rights of the senate consisted in
administering and debating all transitory national affairs, whether
foreign relations, (war and peace only excepted, in which the consent
of the people was requisite,) financial concerns, or matters regarding
domestic peace and security. But the manner in which the senate was
supplied must have made it the first political body at that time in
the world. The rights and rank of magistrates were founded on their
greater or lesser _auspicia_, no public affair being entered upon
except _auspicato_. Consequently he only who was in possession of the
former could hold the highest civic and military power; (_imperium
civile et militare; suis auspiciis rem gerere_;) as dictator, consul,
praetor; such was not the case with those who had only the lesser
_auspicia_. The union of civil and military power in the person of the
same individual was not without its inconveniences, but military
despotism was in some measure guarded against by the prohibition of
any magistrate possessing military command within Rome itself. We must
not dismiss this subject without observing, that as the Roman
constitution arose merely out of practice, there never having been any
completely written charter, we cannot expect that all the details
should be clearly ascertained; to attempt, therefore, in default of
such authority, to describe all the minutiae would be the surest way to
fall into error.

Of the numerous works on the Roman constitution and on Roman
antiquities, we shall mention:

DE BEAUFORT, _La Republique Romaine, ou plan general de l'ancien
gouvernement de Rome_. La Haye, 1766, 2 vols. 4to. A most copious
work, and one of the most solid in regard to the matters discussed;
although it does not embrace the whole of the subject.

_Histoire critique du gouvernement Romain_; Paris, 1765. Containing
some acute observations.

_Du Gouvernement de la republique Romaine_, _par_ A. AD. DE TEXIER, 3
vols. 8vo. Hamburg, 1796. This contains many enquiries peculiar to the
writer.

Some learned researches respecting the principal points of the Roman
constitution, as SIGONIUS and GRUCHIUS _de comitiis Romanorum_,
ZAMOCIUS _de Senatu Romano_, etc. will be found collected in the first
two vols, of GRAEVIUS, _Antiq. Roman._

For the popular assemblies of the Romans, an antiquarian essay by Chr.
Ferd. Schulze, Gotha, 1815, chiefly according to Niebuhr, may be
consulted.

Among the numerous manuals of Roman antiquities, NIEUPORT, _explicatio
rituum Romanorum, ed. Gesner_. Berol. 1743, promises at least as much
as it performs. Of those which profess to treat of Roman antiquities
in general, none have yet risen above mediocrity. Jurisprudence,
however, has been much more successfully handled. We cite the two
following excellent compendiums:

BACHII, _Historia Jurisprudentiae Romanae_. Lips. 1754. 1796.

# C. HUGO, _Elements of the Roman Law_; 7th edit. Berlin, 1820.

SECOND PERIOD.

_From the commencement of the war with Carthage to the rise of the civil broils under the Gracchi, B. C. 264-134. Year of Rome, 490-620._

SOURCES. The principal writer for this highly interesting period,
in which was laid the foundation of the universal dominion of Rome,
is Polybius as far as the year 146, not only in the complete books
preserved to us, which come down to 216, but also in the fragments.
He is frequently followed by Livy, lib. xxi-xlv. 218-166. Appian,
who comes next, does not confine himself merely to the history of
the war; Florus gives us only an abridgement. The lives of Plutarch
which relate to this portion of history, are FABIUS MAXIMUS, P.
AEMILIUS, MARCELLUS, M. CATO, and FLAMINIUS.

Of modern writers we dare only mention one:--and who is worthy to
be ranked beside him?

MONTESQUIEU, _Considerations sur les causes de la grandeur et de la
decadence des Romains_.

1. The political division of Italy laid the foundation for the dominion of Rome in that country; the want of union and political relations in the world paved the way to her universal empire. The first step cost her much, the succeeding followed easily and rapidly; and the history of the struggle between Rome and Carthage only shows on a larger scale what the history of Greece exhibits on a smaller. The whole of the following history confirms the fact, that two republics cannot exist near each other, without one being destroyed or subjected: but the vast extent of this struggle, the important consequences which followed, together with the wonderful exertions made, and the great men engaged on both sides, gave it an interest which cannot be found in that of any other nations. Though the power and resources of both states were nearly equal in appearance, they were widely different in quality and circumstances. Carthage, besides her dominion over the seas, had also a better furnished treasury, by which she was enabled to enlist into her service as many _mercenaries_ as she pleased: Rome, on the contrary, _strong in herself_, had all the advantages possessed by a nation of warriors over one partly commercial, partly military.

2. The first war of twenty-three years between the two republics, arose from very slight causes: it soon, however, became a struggle for the possession of Sicily, which in the end naturally extended itself to the dominion of the sea. Rome, by the aid of her newly-built fleet, having obtained for some time this power, was enabled to attack Africa, and succeeded in driving the Carthaginians from Sicily.

The occupation of Messina by the Romans, 264, gave rise to this
war. The defection of Hiero king of Syracuse from the side of
Carthage, and his joining the Romans, first gave the latter the
idea of expelling the Carthaginians from the island. The victory
near Agrigentum, and capture of that city in 262, seemed to
facilitate the execution of this project: it also convinced the
Romans of the necessity of their having a naval power. We shall the
less wonder at their forming a fleet in Italy, where wood was then
plentiful, if we remember their previous experience in naval
affairs; these were not the first vessels of war which they
constructed, but only the first large ones which they built upon a
Carthaginian model. The first naval victory of the Romans under
Duilius, by the aid of grappling machines, 260. The project then
conceived of carrying the war into Africa was one of the great
ideas of the Romans, and from that time it became a ruling maxim of
the state, to attack the enemy in his own territory. The second and
very remarkable naval victory of the Romans, 257, opened the way
for them to Africa, and shows their naval tactics in a very
brilliant light: but the unfortunate issue of their expedition to
Africa, restored the equilibrium; and the struggle for the dominion
of the sea became the more obstinate, as success did not altogether
favour one party. The result of the contest appears to have turned
upon the possession of the eastern promontories of Sicily,
Drepanum, and Lilybaeum, which were in a manner the bulwarks of the
Carthaginians, and seemed impregnable since Hamilcar Barca had
taken the command of them, 247. The last naval victory of the
Romans, however, under the consul Lutatius, 241, having cut off the
communication between Sicily and Carthage, and the finances of both
parties being completely exhausted, a peace was concluded upon the
conditions: 1. That the Carthaginians should evacuate Sicily and
the small islands adjacent. 2. That they should pay to Rome, by
instalments in ten years, for the expenses she had been at in
carrying on the war, the sum of 2,200 talents. 3. That they should
not make war against Hiero king of Syracuse.

3. The issue of this war placed the political connections of Rome in a new situation, and necessarily extended her influence abroad. The length of the war and the manner of its conclusion had, moreover, inspired a national hatred, such as is only found in republics; the conviction also that they could not remain independent of one another, must have become much more striking, as the points of contact had greatly increased since the beginning of the war. Who does not know the arrogance of a republic after the first essay of her power has been crowned with success! Rome gave a striking example of this by her invasion of Sardinia in the midst of peace. These successes had also a sensible effect on the Roman constitution. For although in appearance its form was not in the least changed, yet the power of the senate now acquired that preponderance which the ruling authority of a republic never fails to do after long and successful wars.

Origin and nature of the governments of the first Roman provinces,
in part of Sicily and in Sardinia.

4. An opportunity was soon afforded the Romans, in the Adriatic sea, of making use of their superior naval power, in chastising the pirates of Illyria under their queen Teuta. By effecting this, they not only secured their authority over that sea, but at the same time formed their first political relations with the Grecian states; relations which soon afterwards became of great importance.

Commencement of the first Illyrian war, 230, which ended with the
subjugation of Teuta, 226. The war, however, again broke out, 222,
against Demetrius of Pharus, who conceived himself inadequately
rewarded by Rome for the services he had rendered her in the
preceding war. The Romans found him a much more dangerous
adversary than had been expected, even after his expulsion and
flight to Philip, 220, (see above, p. 282.) Throughout this war,
Rome appeared as the deliverer of the Grecian states, which had
suffered extremely from the plunder of these freebooters; Corcyra,
Apollonia, and other cities placed themselves formally under her
protection, while the Achaeans, Aetolians, and Athenians vied with
each other in showing their gratitude.

5. In the mean time, while Carthage endeavoured to make up for the loss of Sicily and Sardinia by extending her Spanish dominions, which the jealousy of Rome restrained her from carrying beyond the Ebro (p. 84.), Rome herself had a new war to maintain against her northern neighbours the Gauls, which ended after a violent contest with the establishment of her authority over the north of Italy.

From the first Gallic war to the burning of Rome, 390, the Gauls
had repeated their attacks in 360 and 348, even to the conclusion
of the peace in 336. But in the latter part of the Samnite war, a
formidable confederacy having taken place among the Italian
tribes, some of the Gauls enlisted as mercenaries in the service
of the Etruscans, while others allied themselves to the Samnites.
This led them to take part in these wars in 306, 302, and 292,
until they were obliged, together with the Etruscans, to sue for
peace in 284, before which time the Romans had sent a colony into
their country, near Sena. This peace lasted till 238, when it was
disturbed by the incursion of the transalpine Gauls; without,
however, their coming to any war with Rome. But in 232, the
proposition of Flaminius the tribune, (_lex Flaminia_), to divide
the lands conquered from the Senones, became the cause of new
disturbances. Upon this occasion, the Gauls entered into an
alliance with their transalpine countrymen, the Gaesates on the
Rhone, who had been accustomed to engage as mercenaries. These
having crossed the Alps, the dreadful war of six years (226-220)
began, in which, after defeating the Gauls near Clusium, 225, the
Romans pursued them into their own territory, and encamped upon
the Po, 223. The Gauls having been again completely overthrown by
Marcellus, were obliged to sue for peace; when the Roman colonies
of Placentia and Cremona were established. The number of men
capable of bearing arms in all Italy subject to the Romans during
this war amounted to 800,000.

6. Before this storm was totally appeased, in which it is probable that Carthaginian policy was not altogether inactive, Hannibal had obtained the chief command in Spain. From the reproach of having first begun the war, he and his party cannot be cleared; Rome, in the situation she then was, could hardly desire it; he however who strikes the first blow is not always the real aggressor. The plan of Hannibal was the destruction of Rome; and by making Italy the principal seat of the war, he necessarily turned the scale in his favour; because Rome, obliged to defend herself, left to him all the advantages of attack. The preparations she made for defence, show that it was not believed possible he could execute his enterprise by the route which he took.

The history of this war, 218-201, of which no later transaction
has been able to destroy the interest, is divided into three
parts: the history of the war in Italy; the contemporary war in
Spain; and from 203, the war in Africa. Hannibal's invasion of
Italy in the autumn, 218--engagement near the river Ticinus and
the battle of Trebia, in the same year. Battle near the lake
Thrasymenus in the spring, 217. Seat of the war transferred to
Lower Italy, and the defensive system of the dictator Fabius until
the end of the year. Battle of Cannae, 216, followed by the
conquest of Capua and the subjection of the greater part of Lower
Italy. The defensive mode of warfare afterwards adopted by the
Carthaginian, arose partly from his desire to form a junction with
his brother Asdrubal and the Spanish army, and partly from his
expectation of foreign support by means of alliances, with
Syracuse, after the death of Hiero, 215, and with Philip of
Macedon, 216. These hopes, however, were frustrated by the
Romans.--Syracuse was besieged and taken, 214-212, (see above, p.
174.) and Philip kept employed in Greece, (see above, p. 282.) In
addition to this, the Romans retook Capua, notwithstanding the
audacious march of Hannibal towards Rome, 211, and he had now no
succour left except the reinforcement which Asdrubal was bringing
from Spain. The latter, however, was attacked immediately upon his
arrival in Italy, near Sena, by the consuls Nero and Livius, and
left dead on the field, 207. From this time the war in Italy
became only of secondary importance, as Hannibal was obliged to
act on the defensive in Bruttium.

_The Course of Hannibal over the Alps ascertained_, by J.
WHITTAKER. London, 1794, 2 vols. 8vo. The author endeavours to
prove that the passage of Hannibal was over the great St. Bernard,
and criticises the opinions of other writers.

[We may likewise mention the learned treatise:--

_A Dissertation on the Passage of Hannibal over the Alps._ By H.
L. WICKHAM, M. A. and the Rev. J. A. CRAMER, M. A. second edition,
Oxon.]

The war in Spain began nearly about the same time between Asdrubal
and the two brothers, Cn. and P. Cornelius Scipio, and was
continued, with various success, till the year 216, the issue
depending much upon the disposition of the Spaniards themselves.
The plan of Carthage after the year 216, was to send Asdrubal with
the Spanish army into Italy, and to supply its place by an army
from Africa; two victories, however, gained by the Scipios near
the Ebro, 216, and the Illiberis, 215, prevented this from being
effected, till at last both fell under the superior power and
cunning of the Carthaginians, 212. But the arrival of the youthful
P. Cornelius Scipio, who did not appear merely to his own nation
as an extraordinary genius, entirely changed the face of affairs,
and the fortunes of Rome soon became attached to his name, which
alone seemed to promise victory. During his command in Spain,
210-206, he won over the inhabitants while he defeated the
Carthaginians, and for the furtherance of his great design,
contracted an alliance with Syphax in Africa, 206. He was unable,
however, to prevent the march of Asdrubal into Italy, 208, which
nevertheless rendered it an easy task for him to subdue all
Carthaginian Spain as far as Gades, 206, and thus procured him the
consular dignity at his return, 205.

The carrying of the war into Africa by Scipio, notwithstanding the
opposition of the old Roman generals, and the desertion of Syphax,
who at the persuasion of Sophonisba again went over to the
Carthaginians (whose loss however was well repaid by Masinissa,
whom Scipio had won over to his side in Spain), was followed by an
important consequence; for after he had gained two victories over
Asdrubal and Syphax, 203, and taken the latter prisoner, the
Carthaginians found it necessary to recall Hannibal from Italy,
202; and the battle of Zama terminated the war, 201. The following
were the conditions of peace: 1. That the Carthaginians should
only retain the territory in Africa annexed to their government.
2. That they should give up all their ships of war, except ten
triremes, and all their elephants. 3. That they should pay, at
times specified, 10,000 talents. 4. That they should commence no
war without the consent of Rome. 5. That they should restore to
Masinissa all the houses, cities, and lands that had ever been
possessed by himself or his ancestors.--The reproach usually cast
upon the Carthaginians, of having left Hannibal unsupported in
Italy, in a great measure vanishes, if we remember the plan formed
in 216, to send the Spanish army into Italy, and to replace it by
an African one: a plan formed with much ability, and followed with
as much constancy. We may add to this, that the Barcine faction
maintained its influence in the government even to the end of the
war. But why they, who by the treaty of peace gave up five hundred
vessels of war, suffered Scipio to cross over from Sicily, without
sending one to oppose him, is difficult to explain.

7. Notwithstanding her great loss of men, and the devastation of Italy, Rome felt herself much more powerful at the end of this war than at the beginning. Her dominion was not only established over Italy, but extensive foreign countries had been brought under it; her authority over the seas was rendered secure by the destruction of the naval power of the Carthaginians. The Roman _form_ of government, it is true, underwent no change, but its _spirit_ much, as the power of the senate became almost unlimited; and although the dawn of civilization had broken over Rome, since her intercourse with more civilized foreigners, the state still remained altogether a nation of warriors. And now, for the first time, appears in the page of history the fearful phenomenon of a great military republic; and the history of the next ten years, in which Rome overthrew so many thrones and free states, gives a striking proof, that such a power is the natural enemy to the independence of all the states within the reach of her arms. The causes which led Rome from this time to aspire after the dominion of the world are to be found neither in her geographical situation, which for a conquering power by land seemed rather unfavourable; nor in the inclination of the people, who were opposed to the first war against Philip; but singly and entirely in the spirit of her government. The means, however, whereby she obtained her end, must not be sought for merely in the excellence of her armies and generals, but rather in that uniform, sharp-sighted, and dexterous policy, by which she was enabled to frustrate the powerful alliances formed against her, notwithstanding the many adversaries who at that time sought to form new ones. But where could be found such another council of state, embodying such a mass of practical political wisdom, as the Roman senate must have been from the very nature of its organization? All this, however, would not have been sufficient to have subjugated the world, if the want of good government, the degeneracy of the military art, and an extremely corrupt state of morals among both rulers and people, in foreign states, had not seconded the efforts of Rome.

View of the political state of the world at this period. In the
west, Sicily (the whole island after 212), Sardinia, and Corsica,
from the year 237, and Spain, divided into citerior and ulterior
(the latter rather in name than in fact), had become Roman
provinces 206; the independence of Carthage had been destroyed by
the last peace, and her subordination secured by the alliance of
Rome with Masinissa; Cisalpine Gaul, formed into a province,
served as a barrier against the inroads of the more northern
barbarians. On the other side, in the east, the kingdom of
Macedonia, and the free states of Greece, forming together a very
complicated system, had opened a connection with Rome since the
Illyrian war, 230, and Philip's alliance with Hannibal, 214. Of
the three powers of the first rank, Macedonia, Syria, and Egypt,
the two former were allied against the latter, who, on her part,
maintained a good understanding with Rome. The states of secondary
rank were, those of the Aetolian league, the kings of Pergamus, and
the republic of Rhodes, with some smaller, such as Athens: these
had allied themselves to Rome since the confederacy against
Philip, 211. The Achaean league, on the contrary, was in the
interests of Macedonia, which Rome always endeavoured to attach to
herself, in order to make head against those of the first rank.

8. A declaration of war against Philip, notwithstanding the opposition of the tribunes of the people, and an attack upon Macedonia itself, according to the constant maxim of carrying the war into the enemy's country, immediately followed. They could not, however, drive Philip so soon from the fastnesses of Epirus and Thessaly, which were his bulwarks. But Rome possessed in T. Quintius Flaminius, who marched against Philip as the deliverer of Greece, a statesman and general exactly fitted for a period of great revolutions. By the permanency of his political influence he became indeed the true founder of the Roman power in the east. Who could better cajole men and nations, while they were erecting altars to him, than T. Quintius? So artfully indeed did he assume the character of a great genius, such as had been given by nature to Scipio, that he has almost deceived history itself. The struggle between him and Philip consisted rather in a display of talents in political stratagem and finesse than in feats of arms: even before the battle of Cynoscephalae had given the finishing stroke, the Romans had already turned the balance in their favour, by gaining over the Achaean league.

The negotiations between Rome and Macedonia, from the year 214,
give the first striking examples of the ability and address of the
Romans in foreign policy; and they are the more remarkable, as the
treaty with the Aetolians and others, 211 (see above, p. 283), was
the remote cause of the transactions which afterwards took place
in the east. The peculiar system adopted by the Romans, of taking
the lesser states under their protection as allies, must always
have given them an opportunity of making war on the more powerful
whenever they chose. This in fact happened in the present case,
notwithstanding the peace concluded with Philip, 204. The chief
object of the Romans in this war, both by sea and land, was to
drive Philip completely out of Greece. The allies on both sides,
and the conditions of peace, were similar to those concluded with
Carthage (see above, p. 284). The destruction of the naval power
of her conquered enemies became now a maxim of Roman policy in
making peace; and she thus maintained the dominion of the seas
without any great fleet, and without losing the essential
character of a dominant power by land.

9. The expulsion of Philip from Greece brought that country into a state of dependence upon Rome; an event which could not have been better secured than by the present of liberty which T. Quintius conferred upon its inhabitants at the Isthmian games. The system of surveillance, which the Romans had already established in the west over Carthage and Numidia, was now adopted in the east over Greece and Macedonia. Roman commissioners, under the name of ambassadors, were sent into the country of the nations in alliance, and were the principal means by which this system of espionage was carried on. These however did not fail to give umbrage to the Greeks, particularly to the turbulent Aetolians; more especially as the Romans seemed in no hurry to withdraw their troops from a country which they had declared to be free.

Liberty was expressly granted to the state which had taken the
part of Philip, namely, to the Achaeans; to the others it was
naturally understood to belong. It was nevertheless three years,
194, before the Roman army evacuated Greece and withdrew from the
fortified places. The conduct of T. Quintius during this period
fully shows what he was. The Greeks indeed had much want of such a
guardian if they wished to remain quiet: his conduct, however, in
the war against Nabis, 195, shows that he had not really at heart
the tranquillity of Greece.

10. The treaty of peace with Philip contained the seeds of a new and greater war with Syria; but though this seemed inevitable at that time, it did not break out till six years afterwards; and in but few periods of the history of the world is so great a political crisis to be found, as in this short interval. The fall of Carthage and Macedonia had shown the rest of the world what it had to expect from Rome; and there was no lack of great men sufficiently endowed with courage and talents to resist her. The danger of a formidable league between Carthage, Syria, and perhaps Macedonia, was never so much to be feared, as when Hannibal, now at the head of affairs, laboured to effect it with all the zeal which his hatred of Rome could inspire; and they might calculate with certainty beforehand on the accession of many smaller states. Rome, however, by her equally decided and artful policy procured Hannibal's banishment from Carthage, amused Philip by granting him some trifling advantages, and gained over the smaller states by her ambassadors. By these means, and by taking advantage of the intrigues in the court of Syria, she prevented this coalition from being formed. Antiochus was therefore left without assistance in Greece, except from the Aetolians, and a few other unimportant allies; while Rome drew from hers, especially the Rhodians and Eumenes, advantages of the greatest consequence.

The first cause of contention between Rome and Antiochus was the
liberty of Greece, which the former wished to extend to the
Grecian cities of Asia, and to those in particular which had
belonged to Philip, and afterwards to Antiochus; while the latter
contended, that Rome had no right to intermeddle with the affairs
of Asia. The second cause of dispute was the occupation of the
Thracian Chersonesus by Antiochus, 196, in right of some ancient
pretensions; and Rome, on her part, would not tolerate him in
Europe. This quarrel therefore commenced as early as 196, but did
not become serious till the year 105, when in consequence of
Hannibal's flight to Antiochus, together with the turbulence and
excitement of the Aetolians, whose object it was to embroil the
rival powers, the political horizon was completely overcast. What
a fortunate thing it was for Rome that such men as Hannibal and
Antiochus could not understand each other!

HEYNE, _de foederum ad Romanorum opes imminuendas initorum eventis
eorumque causis; in Opusc._ vol. iii.

11. This war was much sooner brought to a termination than the Macedonian, owing to the half-measures adopted by Antiochus. After having been driven from Greece by Glabrio, and after two naval victories had opened to the Romans the way to Asia, he felt inclined to act on the defensive; but in the battle near Magnesia at the foot of Mount Sipylus, L. Scipio gathered the laurels which more properly belonged to Glabrio. The total expulsion of Antiochus from Asia Minor, even before this victory, had been the chief object of the war. The conditions of peace (see above, p. 284.) were such, as not only weakened Antiochus, but reduced him to a state of dependence.

During this contest in the east, a sanguinary war was going on in
the west; from the year 201 in Spain, where the elder Cato
commanded; and from 193 in Italy itself, against the Ligurians.
Whatever may be said upon the means made use of by Rome to
increase the number of her citizens, it will always be difficult
to comprehend, not only how she could support all these wars
without being thereby weakened, but how at the same time she could
found so many colonies!

12. Even after the termination of this war, Rome refrained with astonishing moderation from appearing in the light of a conqueror: it was only for the liberty of Greece, and for her allies, that she had contended! Without keeping a foot of land for herself, she divided, with the exception of the free Grecian cities, the conquered Asia Minor between Eumenes and the Rhodians; the manner, however, in which she dealt with the Aetolians, who after a long supplication for peace were obliged to buy it dearly, shows that she also knew how to treat unfaithful allies. The war against the Gauls in Asia Minor was not less necessary for the preservation of tranquillity in that country, than it was injurious to the morals and military discipline of the Roman army. They here learned to levy contributions.

13. Thus, within the short space of ten years, was laid the foundation of the Roman authority in the east, and the general state of affairs entirely changed. If Rome was not yet the ruler, she was at least the arbitress of the world from the Atlantic to the Euphrates. The power of the three principal states was so completely humbled, that they durst not, without the permission of Rome, begin any new war; the fourth, Egypt, had already, in the year 201, placed herself under the guardianship of Rome; and the lesser powers followed of themselves: esteeming it an honour to be called the _allies of Rome_. With this name the nations were lulled into security, and brought under the Roman yoke; the new political system of Rome was founded and strengthened, partly by exciting and supporting the weaker states against the stronger, however unjust the cause of the former might be, and partly by factions which she found means to raise in every state, even the smallest.