Chapter XX: Act 1861: s. 31, any person may arrest any one whom he shall find (7)

ARTHUR, CHESTER ALAN (1830-1886), twenty-first president of the United States, was born in Fairfield, Vermont, on the 5th of October 1830. His father, William Arthur (1796-1875), when eighteen years of age, emigrated from Co. Antrim, Ireland, and, after teaching in various places in Vermont and Lower Canada, became a Baptist minister. William Arthur had married Malvina Stone, an American girl who lived at the time of the marriage in Canada, and the numerous changes of the family residence afforded a basis for allegations in 1880 that the son Chester was born not in Vermont, but in Canada, and was therefore ineligible for the presidency. Chester entered Union College as a sophomore, and graduated with honour in 1848. He then became a schoolmaster, at the same time studying law. In 1853 he entered a law office in New York city, and in the following year was admitted to the bar. His reputation as a lawyer began with his connexion with the famous "Lemmon slave case," in which, as one of the special counsel for the state, he secured a decision from the highest state courts that slaves brought into New York while in transit between two slave states were _ipso facto_ free. In another noted case, in 1855, he obtained a decision that negroes were entitled to the same accommodations as whites on the street railways of New York city. In politics he was actively associated from the outset with the Republican party. When the Civil War began he held the position of engineer-in-chief on Governor Edwin D. Morgan's staff, and afterwards became successively acting quartermaster-general, inspector-general, and quartermaster-general of the state troops, in which capacities he showed much administrative efficiency. At the close of Governor Morgan's term, on the 31st of December 1862, General Arthur resumed the practice of his profession, remaining active, however, in party politics in New York city. In November 1871 he was appointed by President U.S. Grant collector of customs for the port of New York. The custom-house had long been conspicuous for the most flagrant abuses of the "spoils system"; and though General Arthur admitted that the evils existed and that they rendered efficient administration impossible, he made no extensive reforms. In 1877 President Rutherford B. Hayes began the reform of the civil service with the New York custom-house. A non-partisan commission, appointed by Secretary John Sherman, recommended sweeping changes. The president demanded the resignation of Arthur and his two principal subordinates, George H. Sharpe, the surveyor, and Alonzo B. Cornell, the naval officer, of the Port. General Arthur refused to resign on the ground that to retire "under fire" would be to acknowledge wrong-doing, and claimed that as the abuses were inherent in a widespread system he should not be made to bear the responsibility alone. His cause was espoused by Senator Roscoe Conkling, for a time successfully; but on the 11th of July 1878, during a recess of the Senate, the collector was removed, and in January 1879, after another severe struggle, this action received the approval of the Senate. In 1880 General Arthur was a delegate at large from New York to the Republican national convention. In common with the rest of the "Stalwarts," he worked hard for the nomination of Gen. U.S. Grant for a third term. Upon the triumph of James A. Garfield, the necessity of conciliating the defeated faction led to the hasty acceptance of Arthur for the second place on the ticket. His nomination was coldly received by the public; and when, after his election and accession, he actively engaged on behalf of Conkling in the great conflict with Garfield over the New York patronage, the impression was widespread that he was unworthy of his position. Upon the death of President Garfield, on the 19th of September 1881, Arthur took the oath as his successor. Contrary to the general expectation, his appointments were as a rule unexceptionable, and he earnestly promoted the Pendleton law for the reform of the civil service. His use of the veto in 1882 in the cases of a Chinese Immigration Bill (prohibiting immigration of Chinese for twenty years) and a River and Harbour Bill (appropriating over $18,000,000, to be expended on many insignificant as well as important streams) confirmed the favourable impression which had been made. The most important events of his administration were the passage of the Tariff Act of 1883 and of the "Edmunds Law" prohibiting polygamy in the territories, and the completion of three great trans-continental railways--the Southern Pacific, the Northern Pacific, and the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe. His administration was lacking in political situations of a dramatic character, but on all questions that arose his policy was sane and dignified. In 1884 he allowed his name to be presented for renomination in the Republican convention, but he was easily defeated by the friends of James G. Blaine. At the expiration of his term he resumed his residence in New York city, where he died on the 18th of November 1886.

For an account of his administration see UNITED STATES: _History_.

ARTHURIAN LEGEND. By the "Arthurian legend," or _Matiere de Brelagne_, we mean the subject-matter of that important body of medieval literature known as the Arthurian cycle (see ARTHUR). The period covered by the texts in their present form represents, roughly speaking, the century 1150-1250. The _History_ of Nennius is, of course, considerably earlier, and that of Geoffrey of Monmouth somewhat antedates 1150 (1136), but with these exceptions the dates above given will be found to cover the composition of all our extant texts.

As to the origin of this _Matiere de Bretagne_, and the circumstances under which it became a favourite theme for literary treatment, two diametrically opposite theories are held. One body of scholars, headed by Professor Wendelin Forster of Bonn, while admitting that, so far as any historic basis can be traced, the events recorded must have happened on insular ground, maintain that the knowledge of these events, and their romantic development, are due entirely to the Bretons of the continent. The British who fled before the Teutonic and Scandinavian invasions of the 6th and 8th centuries, had carried with them to Armorica, and fondly cherished, the remembrance of Arthur and his deeds, which in time had become interwoven with traditions of purely Breton origin. On the other side of the Channel, i.e. in Arthur's own land, these memories had died out, or at most survived only as the faint echo of historic tradition. Through the medium of French-speaking Bretons these tales came to the cognizance of Northern French poets, notably Chretien de Troyes, who wove them into romances. According to Professor Forster there were no Arthurian romances previous to Chretien, and equally, of course, no insular romantic tradition. This theory reposes mainly on the supposed absence of pre-Chretien poems, and on the writings of Professor H. Zimmer, who derives the Arthurian names largely from Breton roots. This represents the prevailing standpoint of German scholars, and may be called the "continental" theory. In opposition to this the school of which the late Gaston Paris was the leading, and most brilliant, representative, maintains that the Arthurian tradition, romantic equally with historic, was preserved in Wales through the medium of the bards, was by them communicated to their Norman conquerors, worked up into poems by the Anglo-Normans, and by them transmitted to the continental poets. This, the "insular" theory, in spite of its inherent probability, has hitherto been at a disadvantage through lack of positive evidence, but in a recently acquired MS. of the British Museum, Add. 36614, we find the first continuator of the _Perceval_, Wauchier de Denain, quoting as authority for stories of Gawain a certain Bleheris, whom he states to have been "born and bred in Wales." The identity of this Bleheris with the Bledhericus mentioned by Giraldus Cambrensis as _Famosus ille fabulator_, living at a bygone and unspecified date, and with the Breri quoted by Thomas as authority for the _Tristan_ story, has been fully accepted by leading French scholars. Further, on the evidence of certain MSS. of the _Perceval_, notably the Paris MS. (Bibl. Nat. 1450), it is clear that Chretien was using, and using freely, the work of a predecessor, large fragments of which have been preserved by the copyists who completed his unfinished work. The evidence of recent discoveries is all in favour of the insular, or French, view.

So far as the character, as distinguished from the _provenance_, of this subject-matter is concerned, it is largely of folk-lore origin, representing the working over of traditions, in some cases (as e.g. in the account of Arthur's birth and upbringing) common to all the Aryan peoples, in others specifically Celtic. Thus there are a number of parallels between the Arthurian and the Irish heroic cycles, the precise nature of which has yet to be determined. So far as Arthur himself is concerned these parallels are with the Fenian, or Ossianic, cycle, in the case of Gawain with the Ultonian.

In its literary form the cycle falls into three groups:--pseudo-historic: the _Histories_ of Nennius and Geoffrey, the _Brut_ of Wace and Layamon (see ARTHUR); poetic: the works of Chretien de Troyes, Thomas, Raoul de Houdenc and others (see GAWAIN, PERCEVAL, TRISTAN, and the writers named above); prose: the largest and most important group (see GRAIL, LANCELOT, MERLIN, TRISTAN). Of these three branches the prose romances offer the most insuperable problems; none can be dated with any certainty; all are of enormous length; and all have undergone several redactions. Of not one do we as yet possess a critical and comparative text, and in the absence of such texts the publication of any definite and detailed theory as to the evolution and relative position of the separate branches of the Arthurian cycle is to be deprecated. The material is so vast in extent, and in so chaotic a condition, that the construction of any such theory is only calculated to invite refutation and discredit.

The best general study of the cycle is to be found in Gaston Paris's
manual _La Litterature francaise au moyen age_ (new and revised
edition, 1905). See also the introduction to vol. xxx. of _Histoire
litteraire de la France_. For the theories as to origin, see the
Introductions to Professor Forster's editions of the poems of Chretien
de Troyes, notably that to vol. iv., _Der Karrenritter_, which is a
long and elaborate restating of his position. Also Professor H.
Zimmer's articles in _Gottingische gelehrte Anzeigen_, 12 and 20. For
the Insular view, Ferd. Lot's "Etudes sur la provenance du cycle
arthurien," _Romania_, vols. xxiv.-xxviii., are very valuable. For a
popular treatment of the subject, cf. Nos. i. and iv. of _Popular
Studies in Romance and Folk-lore_ (Nutt). Robert Huntington Fletcher's
"The Arthurian Matter in the Chronicles" (vol. x. of _Harvard Studies
and Notes in Philology and Literature_), is a most useful summary.
(J. L. W.)

ARTICHOKE. The common artichoke, _Cynara, scolymus_, is a plant belonging to the natural order Compositae, having some resemblance to a large thistle. It has long been esteemed as a culinary vegetable; the parts chiefly employed being the immature receptacle or floret disk, with the lower part of the surrounding leaf-scales, which are known as "artichoke bottoms." In Italy the receptacles, dried, are largely used in soups; those of the cultivated plant as _Carciofo domestico_, and of the wild variety as _Carciofo spinoso_.

The Jerusalem artichoke, _Helianthus tuberosus_, is a distinct plant belonging to the same order, cultivated for its tubers. It closely resembles the sunflower, and its popular name is a corruption of the Italian _Girasole Articiocco_, the sunflower artichoke. It is a native of Canada and the north-eastern United States, and was cultivated by the aborigines. The tubers are rich in the carbohydrate inulin and in sugar.

The name is derived from the northern Italian _articiocco_, or _arciciocco_, modern _carciofo_; these words come, through the Spanish, from the Arabic _al-kharshuf_. False etymology has corrupted the word in many languages: it has been derived in English from "choke," and "heart," or the Latin _hortus_, a garden; and in French, the form _artichaut_ has been connected with _chaud_, hot, and _chou_, a cabbage.

ARTICLE (from Lat. _articulus_, a joint), a term primarily for that which connects two parts together, and so transferred to the parts thus joined; thus the word is used of the separate clauses or heads in contracts, treaties or statutes and the like; of a literary composition on some specific subject in a periodical; or of particular commodities, as in "articles of trade and commerce." It appears also in the phrase "in the article of death" to translate _in articulo mortis_, at the moment of death. In grammar the term is used of the adjectives which state the extension of a substantive, i.e. the number of individuals to which a name applies; the indefinite article denoting one or any of a particular class, the definite denoting a particular member of a class.

ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, in English company law, the regulations for the internal management of a joint stock company registered under the Companies Acts. They are, in fact, the terms of the partnership agreed upon by the shareholders among themselves. They regulate such matters as the transfer and forfeiture of shares, calls upon shares, the appointment and qualification of directors, their powers and proceedings, general meetings of the shareholders, votes, dividends, the keeping and audit of accounts, and other such matters. In regard to these internal regulations the legislature has left the company free to adopt whatever terms of association it chooses. It has furnished in the schedule to the Companies Act 1862 (Table A), a model or specimen set of regulations, but their adoption, wholly or in part, is optional; only if a company does not register articles of its own these statutory regulations are to apply. When, as is commonly the case, a company decides to have articles of its own framing, such articles must be expressed in separate paragraphs, numbered arithmetically, and signed by the subscribers of the memorandum of association. They must also be printed, stamped like a deed, and attested. When so perfected, they are to be delivered, with the memorandum of association, to the registrar of joint stock companies, who is to retain and register them. The articles of association thereupon become a public document, which any person may inspect on payment of a fee of one shilling. This has important consequences, because every person dealing with the company is presumed to be acquainted with its constitution, and to have read its articles. The articles, also, upon registration, bind the company and its members to the same extent as if each member had subscribed his name and affixed his seal to them. (See also MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION; COMPANY; INCORPORATION.)

In the United States, articles of association are any instrument in writing which sets forth the purposes, the terms and conditions upon which a body of persons have united for the prosecution of a joint enterprise. When this instrument is duly executed and filed, the law gives it the force and effects of a charter of incorporation.

ARTICULATA, a zoological name now obsolete, applied by Cuvier to animals, such as insects and worms, in which the body displays a jointed structure. (See ARTHROPODA.)

ARTICULATION (from Lat. _articulare_, to divide into joints), the act of joining together; in anatomy the junction of the bones (see JOINTS); in botany the point of attachment and separation of the deciduous parts of a plant, such as a leaf. The word is also used for division into distinct parts, as of human speech by words or syllables.

ARTILLERY (the O. Fr. _artiller_, to equip with engines of war, probably comes from Late Lat. _articulum_, dim. of _ars_, art, cf. "engine" from _ingenium_, or of _artus_, joint), a term originally applied to all engines for discharging missiles, and in this sense used in English in the early 17th century. In a more restricted sense, artillery has come to mean all firearms not carried and used by hand, and also the _personnel_ and organization by which the power of such weapons is wielded. It is, however, not usual to class _machine guns_ (q.v.) as artillery. The present article deals with the development and contemporary state of the artillery arm in land warfare, in respect of its organization, personnel and special or "formal" employment. For the _materiel_--the guns, their carriages and their ammunition--see ORDNANCE and AMMUNITION. For _ballistics_, see that heading, and for the work of artillery in combination with the other arms, see TACTICS.

Artillery, as distinct from ordnance, is usually classified in accordance with the functions it has to perform. The simplest division is that into _mobile_ and _immobile_ artillery, the former being concerned with the handling of all weapons so mounted as to be capable of more or less easy movement from place to place, the latter with that of weapons which are installed in fixed positions. Mobile artillery is subdivided, again chiefly in respect of its employment, into _horse_ and _field_ batteries, _heavy field_ or _position_ artillery, _field howitzers, mountain artillery_ and _siege trains_, adapted to every kind of terrain in which field troops may be employed, and work they may have to do. Immobile artillery is used in fixed positions of all kinds, and above all in permanent fortifications; it cannot, therefore, be classified as above, inasmuch as the _raison d'etre_, and consequently the armament of one fort or battery may be totally distinct from that of another. "Fortress," "Garrison" and "Foot" artillery are the usual names for this branch. The dividing line, indeed, in the case of the heavier weapons, varies with circumstances; guns of position may remain on their ground while elaborate fortifications grow up around them, or the deficiencies of a field army in artillery may be made good from the _materiel_, more frequently still from the _personnel_, of the fortress artillery. Thus it may happen that mobile artillery becomes immobile and vice versa. But under normal circumstances the principle of classification indicated is maintained in all organized military forces.

HISTORICAL SKETCH

1. _Early Artillery._--Mechanical appliances for throwing projectiles were produced early in the history of organized warfare, and "engines invented by cunning men to shoot arrows and great stones" are mentioned in the Old Testament. These were continually improved, and, under the various names of _catapulta, balista, onager, trebuchet_, &c., were employed throughout the ancient and medieval periods of warfare. The machines finally produced were very powerful, and, even when a propelling agent so strong as gunpowder was discovered and applied, the supersession of the older weapons was not effected suddenly nor without considerable opposition. The date of the first employment of cannon cannot be established with any certainty, but there is good evidence to show that the Germans used guns at the siege of Cividale in Italy (1331). The terms of a commission given (1414) by Henry V. to his _magister operationum, ingeniarum, et gunnarum ac aliarum ordinationum_, one Nicholas Merbury, show that the organization of artillery establishments was grafted upon that which was already in existence for the service of the old-fashioned machines. Previously to this it is recorded that of some 340 men forming the ordnance establishment of Edward III. in 1344 only 12 were artillerymen and gunners. Two years later, at Crecy, it is said, the English brought guns into the open field for the first time. At the siege of Harfleur (1415) the ordnance establishment included 25 "master gunners" and 50 "servitour gunners." The "gunner" appears to have been the captain of the gun, with general charge of the guns and stores, and the special duty of laying and firing the piece in action.

2. _The Beginnings of Field Artillery._--It is clear, from such evidence as we possess, that the chief and almost the only use of guns at this time was to batter the walls of fortifications, and it is not until later in the 15th century that their employment in the field became general (see also CAVALRY). The introduction of field artillery may be attributed to John Zizka, and it was in his Hussite wars (1419-1424) that the _Wagenburg_, a term of more general application, but taken here as denoting a cart or vehicle armed with several small guns, came into prominence. This device allowed a relatively high manoeuvring power to be attained, and it is found occasionally in European wars two centuries later, as for instance at Wimpfen in 1622 and Cropredy Bridge in 1644. In an act of attainder passed by the Lancastrian party against the Yorkists (1459), it is stated that the latter were "traiterously ranged in bataill ... their cartes with gonnes set before their batailles" (Rot. Parl. 38 Henry VI., v. 348). In the London fighting of 1460, small guns were used to clear the streets, heavy ordnance to batter the walls of the Tower. The battle of Lose Coat Field (1469) was decided almost entirely by Edward IV.'s field guns, while at Blackheath (1497) "some cornets of horse, and bandes of foot, and good store of artillery wheeling about" were sent to "put themselves beyond" the rebel camp (Bacon, _Henry VII._). The greatest example of artillery work in the 15th century was the siege of Constantinople in 1453, at which the Turks used a large force of artillery, and in particular some monster pieces, some of which survived to engage a British squadron in 1807, when a stone shot weighing some 700 lb. cut the mainmast of Admiral (Sir) J.T. Duckworth's flagship in two, and another killed and wounded sixty men. For siege purposes the new weapon was indeed highly effective, and the castles of rebellious barons were easily knocked to pieces by the prince who owned, or succeeded in borrowing, a few pieces of ordnance (cf. Carlyle, _Frederick the Great_, book iii. chap. i.).

3. _The 16th Century._--In the Italian wars waged by Charles VIII., Louis XII. and Francis I. of France, artillery played a most conspicuous part, both in siege and field warfare. Indeed, cannon did excellent service in the field before hand firearms attained any considerable importance. At Ravenna (1512) and Marignan (1515) field artillery did great execution, and at the latter battle "the French artillery played a new and distinguished part, not only by protecting the centre of the army from the charges of the Swiss phalanxes, and causing them excessive loss, but also by rapidly taking up such positions from time to time ... as enabled the guns to play upon the flanks of the attacking columns" (Chesney, _Observations on Firearms_, 1852). In this connexion it must, however, be observed that, when the arquebus and other small arms became really efficient (about 1525), less is heard of this small and handy field artillery, which had hitherto been the only means of breaking up the heavy masses of the hostile pikemen. We have seen that artillery was not ignored in England; but, in view of the splendid and unique efficiency of the archers, there was no great opportunity of developing the new arm. In the time of Henry VIII., the ordnance in use in the field consisted in the main of heavy _culverins_ and other guns of position, and of lighter field pieces, termed _sakers, falcons_, &c. It is to be noticed that already the lightest pieces had disappeared, the smallest of the above being a 2-pounder. In the earlier days of field artillery, the artillery train was a miscellaneous congeries of pontoon, supply, baggage and tool wagons, heavy ordnance and light guns in carts. With the development of infantry fire the use of the last-named weapons died out, and it is largely due to this fact that "artillery" came to imply cumbrous and immobile guns of position. Little is, therefore, heard of smart manoeuvring, such as that at Marignan, during the latter part of the 16th century. The guns now usually come into action in advance of the troops, but, from their want of mobility, could neither accompany a farther advance nor protect a retreat, and they were generally captured and recaptured with every changing phase of the fight. Great progress was in the meanwhile made in the adaptation of ordnance to the attack and defence of fortresses and, in particular, vertical fire came into vogue. A great Turkish gun, carrying a 600-lb. stone shot, was used in the siege of Constantinople, apparently in this way, since Gibbon records that at the range of a mile the shot buried itself a fathom deep in earth, a fact which implies that a high angle of elevation was given. In the celebrated siege of Malta in 1565 artillery played a conspicuous part.

4. _The Thirty Years' War._--Such, in its broadest outlines, is the history of artillery work during the first three centuries of its existence. Whilst the material had undergone a very considerable improvement, the organization remained almost unchanged, and the tactical employment of guns had become restricted, owing to their slowness and difficulty of movement on the march and immobility in action. In wars of the type of the War of Dutch Independence and the earlier part of the Thirty Years' War, this heavy artillery naturally remained useful enough, and the _Wagenburg_ had given place to the musketry initiated by the Spaniards at Bicocca and Pavia, which since 1525 had steadily improved and developed. It is not, therefore, until the appearance of a captain whose secret of success was vigour and mobility that the first serious attempt was made to produce field artillery in the proper sense of the word, that is, a gun of good power, and at the same time so mounted as to be capable of rapid movement. The "carte with gonnes" had been, as is the modern machine gun, a mechanical concentration of musketry rather than a piece of artillery. Maurice of Nassau, indeed, helped to develop the field gun, and the French had invented the limber, but Gustavus Adolphus was the first to give artillery its true position on the battlefield. At the first battle of Breitenfeld (1631) Gustavus had twelve heavy and forty-two light guns engaged, as against Tilly's heavy 24-pounders, which were naturally far too cumbrous for field work. At the Lech (1632) Gustavus seems to have obtained a local superiority over his opponent owing to the handiness of his field artillery even more than by its fire-power. At Lutzen (1632) he had sixty guns to Wallenstein's twenty-one. His field pieces were not the celebrated "leather" guns (which were indeed a mere makeshift used in Gustavus' Polish wars) but iron 4-pounders. These were distributed amongst the infantry units, and thus began the system of "battalion guns" which survived in the armies of Europe long after the conditions requiring it had vanished. The object of thus dispersing the guns was doubtless to ensure in the first place more certain co-operation between the two arms, and in the second to exercise a military supervision over the lighter and more useful field pieces which it was as yet impossible to exercise over the _personnel_ of the heavy artillery.

5. _Personnel and Classification._--More than 300 years after the first employment of ordnance, the men working the guns and the transport drivers were still civilians. The actual commander of the artillery was indeed, both in Germany and in England, usually a soldier, and Lennart Torstensson, the commander of Gustavus' artillery, became a brilliant and successful general. But the transport and the drivers were still hired, and even the gunners were chiefly concerned for the safety of their pieces, the latter being often the property, not of the king waging war, but of some "master gunner" whose services he had secured, and the latter's apprentices were usually in entire charge of the material. These civilian "artists," as they were termed, owed no more duty to the prince than any other employes, and even Gustavus, it would appear, made no great improvement in the matter of the reorganization of artillery trains. Soldiers as drivers do not appear until 150 years later, and in the meanwhile companies of "firelocks" and "fusiliers" (q.v.) came into existence, as much to prevent the gunners and drivers from running away as to protect them from the enemy. A further cause of difficulties, in England at any rate, was the age of the "gunners." In the reign of Elizabeth, some of the Tower gunners were over ninety years of age. Complaints as to the inefficiency of these men are frequent in the years preceding the English Civil War. Gustavus, however, has the merit of being the first to make the broad classification of artillery, as mobile or non-mobile, which has since been almost universally in force. In his time the 12-pounder was the heaviest gun classed as mobile, and the "feildpeece" _par excellence_ was the 9-pounder or _demi-culverin_. After the death of Gustavus at Lutzen (1632), his principles came universally into practice, and amongst them were those of the employment of field artillery.

6. _The English Civil War._--Even in the English Civil War (Great Rebellion), in which artillery was hampered by the previous neglect of a century, its field work was not often contemptible, and on occasion the arm did excellent service. But in the campaigns of this war, fought out by men whose most ardent desire was to decide the quarrel swiftly, the marching and manoeuvring were unusually rapid. The consequence of this was that the guns were sometimes either late in arriving, as at Edgehill, or absent altogether, as at Preston. The _role_ of guns was further reduced by the fact that there were few fortresses to be reduced, and country houses, however strong, rarely required to be battered by a siege train. The New Model army usually sent for siege guns only when they were needed for particular service. On such occasions, indeed, the heavy ordnance did its work so quickly and effectually that the assault often took place one or two days after the guns had opened fire. Cromwell in his sieges made great use of shells, 12-inch and even larger mortars being employed. The castle of Devizes, which had successfully resisted the Parliamentary battering guns, succumbed at once to vertical fire. It does not, however, appear certain that there was any separation of field from siege ordnance, although the Swedish system was followed in almost all military matters.

7. _Artillery Progress, 1660-1740._--Cromwell's practice of relegating heavy guns to the rear, except when a serious siege operation was in view, and in very rapid movements leaving even the field pieces far behind, was followed to some extent in the campaigns of the age of Louis XIV. The number of ammunition wagons, and above all of horses, required for each gun was four or five times as great as that required even for a modern quick-firer. In the days of Turenne heavy guns were much employed, as the campaigns of the French were directed as a rule to the methodical conquest of territory and fortified towns. Similarly, Marlborough, working amidst the fortresses of the Netherlands in 1706, had over 100 pieces of artillery (of which 60 were mortars) to a force of some 11,000 men, or about 9 pieces per 1000 men. On the other hand, in his celebrated march to the Danube in 1704, he had but few guns, and the allied armies at Blenheim brought into the field only 1 piece per 1000 men. At Oudenarde "from the _rapidity of the march_ ... the battle was fought with little aid from artillery on either side" (Coxe, _Marlborough_). There was less need now than ever before for rapid manoeuvres of mobile artillery, since the pike finally disappeared from the scene about 1700, and infantry fire-power had become the decisive factor in battles. In the meantime, artillery was gradually ceasing to be the province of the skilled workman, and assuming its position as an arm of the military service. In the 17th century, when armies were as a rule raised only "for the war" and disbanded at the conclusion of hostilities, there had been no very pressing need for the maintenance in peace of an expensive _personnel_ and material. Gunners therefore remained, as civilians, outside the regular administration of the forces, until the general adoption of the "standing army" principle in the last years of the century (see ARMY). From this time steps were taken, in all countries, to organize the artillery as a military force. After various attempts had been made, the "Royal Regiment of Artillery" came into existence in England in 1716. It is, however, stated that the English artillery did not "begin to assume a military appearance until the Flanders campaigns" of the War of the Austrian Succession. Even in the War of American Independence a dispute arose as to whether a general officer, whose regimental service had been in the Royal Artillery, was entitled to command troops of all arms, and the artillery drivers were not actually soldiers until 1793 at the earliest. French artillery officers received military rank only in 1732.

8. _Artillery in the Wars of Frederick the Great._--By the time of Frederick the Great's first wars, artillery had thus been divided into (a) those guns moving with an army in the field, and (b) those which were either wholly stationary or were called upon only when a siege was expected. The _personnel_ was gradually becoming more efficient and more amenable to discipline; the transport arrangements, however, remained in a backward state. Siege and fortress artillery was now organized and employed in accordance with the system of the "formal attack" as finally developed by Vauban. For details of this, as involving the tactical procedure of artillery in the attack and defence of fortresses, the reader is referred to FORTIFICATION AND SIEGECRAFT. We are concerned here more especially with the progress of field artillery. The part played by this arm began now to vary according to the circumstances of each action, and the "moral" support of guns was calculated as a factor in the dispositions. In the early Silesian wars, heavy or reserve guns protected the deployment of the army and endeavoured to prepare for the subsequent advance by firing upon the hostile troops; the battalion guns remained close to the infantry, accompanied its movements and assisted in the fire fight. Their support was not without value, and the heavy guns often provoked the enemy into a premature advance, as at Mollwitz. But the infantry or the cavalry forced the decision. It has been mentioned that with the final disappearance of the pike, about 1700, infantry fire-power ruled the battlefield. Throughout the 18th century, it will be found, when the infantry is equal to its work the guns have only a subordinate part in the fighting of pitched battles. At Kunersdorf (1759) the first dashing charge of the Prussian grenadiers captured 72 guns from the Russian army. Later the total of captured ordnance reached 180, yet the Russians, then almost wholly in flight, were not cut to pieces, for only a few light guns of the Prussian army could get to the front; their heavy pieces, though twelve horses were harnessed to each, never came into action. This example will serve to illustrate the difference between the artillery of 1760 and that of fifty years later. According to Tempelhof, who was present, Kunersdorf was the finest opportunity for field artillery that he had ever seen. Yet the field artillery of the 18th century was, if anything, more powerful than that of Napoleon's time; it was the want of mobility alone which prevented the Prussians from turning to good account an opportunity fully as favourable as that of the German artillery at Sedan. That Frederick made more use of his guns in the later campaigns of the Seven Years' War is accounted for by the fact that his infantry and cavalry were no longer capable of forcing a decision, and also by changes in the general character of the operations. These were fought in and about broken country and entrenched positions, and the mobility of the other arms sank to that of the artillery. Thus power came to the front again, and the heavier weapons regained their former supremacy. In a _bataille rangee_ in the open field the proportion of guns to men had been, in 1741, 2 per 1000. At Leuthen (1757) heavy fortress guns were brought to the front for a special purpose. At Kunersdorf the proportion was 4 and 5 per 1000 men, with what degree of effectiveness we have seen. In the later campaigns the Austrian artillery, which was, throughout the Seven Years' War, the best in Europe, placed its numerous and powerful ordnance (an "amphitheatre of 400 guns," as Frederick said) in long lines of field works. The combination of guns and obstacles was almost invariably too formidable to offer the slightest chance of a successful assault. It was at this stage that Frederick, in 1759, introduced horse artillery to keep pace with the movements of cavalry, a proof, if proof were needed, of the inability of the field artillery to manoeuvre. The field howitzer, the weapon _par excellence_ for the attack of field works, has never perhaps been more extensively employed than it was by the Prussians at that time. At Burkersdorf (1762) Frederick placed 45 howitzers in one battery. In those days the mobile artillery was always formed in groups or "batteries" of from 10 to 20 pieces. England too was certainly abreast of other countries in the organization of the field artillery arm. About the middle of the 18th century the guns in use consisted of 24-pounders, 12-pounders, 6-pounders and 3-pounders. The guns were divided into "brigades" of four, five and six guns respectively, and began to be separated into "heavy" and "light" brigades. Each field gun was drawn by four horses, the two leaders being ridden by artillerymen, and had 100 rounds of shot and 30 rounds of grape. The British artillery distinguished itself in the latter part of the Seven Years' War. Foreign critics praised its lightness, its elegance and the good quality of its materials. At Marburg (1760) "the English artillery could not have been better served; it followed the enemy with such vivacity, and maintained its fire so well, that it was impossible for the latter to re-form," says Tempelhof, the Prussian artillery officer who records the lost opportunity of Kunersdorf. The merits and the faults of the artillery had been made clear, and nowhere was the lesson taken to heart more than in France, where General Gribeauval, a French officer who had served in the war with the Austrian artillery, initiated reforms which in the end led to the artillery triumphs of the Napoleonic era. While Frederick had endeavoured to employ, as profitably as possible, the existing heavy equipments, Gribeauval sought improvement in other directions.

9. _Gribeauval's Reforms._--At the commencement of the 18th century, French artillery had made but little progress. The carriages and wagons were driven by wagoners on foot, and on the field of battle the guns were dragged about by ropes or remained stationary. Towards the middle of the century some improvements were made. Field guns and carriages were lightened, and the guns separated into brigades. Siege carriages were introduced. From 1765 onwards, however, Gribeauval strove to build up a complete system both of _personnel_ and _materiel_, creating a distinct _materiel_ for field, siege, garrison and coast artillery. Alive to the vital importance of mobility for field artillery, he dismissed to other branches all pieces of greater calibre than 12-pounders, and reduced the weight of those retained. His reforms were resisted, and for a time successfully; but in 1776 he became first inspector-general of artillery, and was able to put his ideas into force. The field artillery of the new system included 4-pounder regimental guns, and for the reserve 8- and 12-pounders, with 6-inch howitzers. For siege and garrison service Gribeauval adopted the 16-pounder and 12-pounder guns, 8-inch howitzer and 10-inch mortar, 12-, 10- and 8-inch mortars being introduced in 1785.

The carriages were constructed on a uniform model and technically improved. The horses were harnessed in pairs, instead of in file as formerly, but the manner in which the teams were driven remained much the same. The _prolong_ (a sort of tow-rope) was introduced, to unite the trail of the gun and the limber in slow retiring movements. Siege carriages differed from those of field artillery only in details. Gribeauval also introduced new carriages for garrison and coast service. The great step made was in a uniform construction being adopted for all _materiel_, and in making the parts interchangeable so far as possible. In 1765 the _personnel_ of the French artillery was reorganized. The corps or reserve artillery was organized in divisions of eight guns. The battery or division was thus made a unit, with guns, munitions and gunners complete, the horses and drivers being added at a later date. Horse artillery was introduced into the French army in 1791. The last step was made in 1800, when the establishment of a driver corps of soldiers put an end to the old system of horsing by contract.

10. _British Artillery, 1793-1815._--Meanwhile the numbers of the English artillery had increased to nearly 4000 men. For some five centuries the word "artillery" in England meant entirely garrison artillery; the field artillery only existed in time of war. When war broke out, a train of artillery was organized, consisting of a certain number of field (or siege) guns, manned by garrison gunners; and when peace was proclaimed the train was disbanded, the _materiel_ being returned into store, and the gunners reverting to some fort or stronghold. In 1793 the British artillery was anything but efficient. Guns were still dispersed among the infantry, mobility had declined again since the Seven Years' War, and the American war had been fought out by the other arms. The drivers were mere carters on foot with long whips, and the whole field equipment was scarcely able to break from a foot-pace. Prior to the Peninsular War, however, the exertions of an able officer, Major Spearman, had done much to bring about improvement. Horse artillery had been introduced in 1793, and the driver corps established in 1794. Battalion guns were abolished in 1802, and field "brigades of six guns" were formed, horse artillery batteries being styled "troops." Military drivers were introduced, and the horses teamed in pairs. The drivers were mounted on the near horses, the gunners either rode the off horses or were carried on the limbers and wagons. The equipment was lightened, and a new system of manoeuvres introduced. A troop of horse artillery and a field brigade each had five guns and one howitzer. The "driver corps," raised in 1794, was divided into troops, the addition of one of which to a company of foot artillery converted it into a field brigade. The horse artillery possessed both drivers and horses, and required very limited assistance from the driver corps.

11. _French Revolutionary Wars._--During the long wars of the French Revolution and Empire the artillery of the field army by degrees became field artillery as we know it to-day. The development of musketry in the 16th century had taken the work of preparing an assault out of the hands of the gunners. _Per contra_, the decadence of infantry fire-power in the latter part of the Seven Years' War had reinstated the artillery arm. A similar decadence of the infantry arm was destined to produce, in 1807, artillery predominance, but this time with an important difference, viz. _mobility_, and when mobility is thus achieved we have the first modern field artillery. The new tactics of the French in the Revolutionary wars, forced upon them by circumstances, involved an almost complete abandonment of the fire-tactics of Frederick's day, and the need for artillery was, from the first fight at Valmy onwards, so obvious that its moral support was demanded even in the outpost line of the new French armies. St Cyr (_Armies of the Rhine_, p. 112) quotes a case in which "right in the very farthest outpost line" the original 4-pounder guns were replaced by 8-, 16-, and in the end by 24-pounders. The cardinal principle of massing batteries was not, indeed, forgotten, notwithstanding the weakness of raw levies. But though, as we have seen, the _materiel_ had already been greatly improved, and the artillery was less affected by the Revolution than other arms of the service, circumstances were against it, and we rarely find examples of artillery work in the Revolutionary wars which show any great improvement upon older methods. The field guns were however, at last organized in batteries each complete in itself, as mentioned above. The battalion gun disappeared; it was a relic of days in which it was thought advisable, both for other reasons and also because the short range of guns forbade any attempt at concentration of fire from several positions at one target, to have some force of artillery at any point that might be threatened. Though it was officially retained in the regulations of the French army, "officers and men combined to reject it" (Rouquerol, _Q.F. Field Artillery_, p. 121), and its last appearances, in 1809 and in 1813, were due merely to an endeavour on the part of Napoleon to give cohesion thereby to the battalions of raw soldiers which then constituted his army. But, with the development of mobility, it was probably found that sufficient guns could be taken to any threatened point, and no one had ever denied the principle of massed batteries, although, in practice, dispersion had been thought to be unavoidable.

12. _Napoleon's Artillery Tactics._--During the war the French artillery steadily improved in manoeuvring power. But many years elapsed before perfection was attained. Meanwhile, the infantry, handled without regard to losses in every fight, had in consequence deteriorated. The final production of the field artillery battle, usually dated as from the battle of Friedland (June 14, 1807), therefore saved the situation for the French. Henceforward Napoleon's battles depend for their success on an "artillery preparation," the like of which had never been seen. Napoleon's own maxim illustrates the typical tactics of 1807-1815. "When once the _melee_ has begun," he says, "the man who is clever enough to bring up an unexpected force of artillery, without the enemy knowing it, is sure to carry the day." The guns no longer "prepared" the infantry advance by slowly disintegrating the hostile forces. Still less was it their business merely to cover a deployment. On the contrary, they now went in to the closest ranges and, by actually _annihilating_ a portion of the enemy's line with case-shot fire, "covered" the assault so effectively that columns of cavalry and infantry reached the gap thus created without striking a blow. It is unnecessary to give examples. Every one of Napoleon's later battles illustrates the principle. The most famous case is that of the great battery of 100 guns at Wagram (q.v.) which preceded the final attack of the centre. When Napoleon at Leipzig saw the allied guns forming up in long lines to prepare the assault, he exclaimed, "At last they have learned something." This "case-shot preparation," of course, involved a high degree of efficiency in manoeuvre, as the guns had to gallop forward far in front of the infantry. The want of this quality had retarded the development of field artillery for 300 years, during which it had only been important relatively to the occasional inferiority of other troops. After Napoleon's time the art of tactics became the art of _combining the three arms_.

FIGS. 1 and 2.--15th Century Field Artillery (Napoleon III).

FIG. 3.--Field Artillery. 1525 (Napoleon III).

FIG. 4.--French Artillery 1735 (_Journal d'Armee_,1835).

FIG. 5.--French Field Artillery,1835 (_Journal d'Armee_,1835).

FIG. 6.--Artillery in Action, Roveredo, 1796 (C. Vernet).]

BREACH LOADING FIELD BATTERY (15-PR. B.L.).
_Photo, Gale & Polden._

QUICK-FIRING HORSE ARTILLERY (ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY, 13-PR. Q.F.).
_Photo, Gale & Polden._

Q.F. FIELD ARTILLERY (18-PR. Q.F., R.F.A.).
_Photo, Gale & Polden._

FRENCH (75-MM. Q.F.) FIELD ARTILLERY MANOEUVRING.
_Photo, Topical Press._]

13. _Artillery, 1815-1865._--Henceforward, therefore, the history of artillery becomes the history of its technical effectiveness, particularly in relation to infantry fire, and of improvements or modifications in the method of putting well-recognized principles into action. Infantry fire, however, being more variable in its effectiveness than that of artillery, the period 1815-1870 saw many changes in the relations of the two arms. In the time of Napoleon, infantry fire never equalled that of the Seven Years' War, and after the period of the great wars the musket was less and less effectively used. Economy was, however, practised to excess in every army of Europe during the period 1815-1850, and even if there had been great battles at this time, the artillery, which was maintained on a minimum strength of guns, men and horses, would not have repeated the exploits of Senarmont and Drouot in the Napoleonic wars. The principle was well understood, but under such conditions the practice was impossible. It was at this stage that the general introduction of the rifled musket put an end, once for all, to the artillery tactics of the smooth-bore days. Infantry, armed with a far-ranging rifle, as in the American Civil War, kept the guns beyond case-shot range, compelling them to use only round shot or common shell. In that war, therefore, attacking infantry met, on reaching close quarters, not regiments already broken by a _feu d'enfer_, but the full force of the defenders' artillery and infantry, both arms fresh and unshaken, and the full volume of their case shot and musketry. At Fredericksburg the Federal infantry attacked, unsupported by a single field piece; at Gettysburg the Federal artillery general Hunt was able to reserve his ammunition to meet Lee's assault, although the infantry of his own side was meanwhile subjected to the fire of 137 Confederate guns. Thus, in both these cases the assault became one of infantry against unshaken infantry and artillery. On many occasions, indeed, the batteries on either side went into close ranges, as the traditions of the old United States army dictated, but their losses were then totally out of proportion to their effectiveness. Indeed, the increased range at which battles were now fought, and the ineffectiveness of the projectiles necessarily used by the artillery at these ranges, so far neutralized even rifled guns that artillery generals could speak of "idle cannonades" as the "besetting sin" of some commanders.

14. _The Franco-German War, 1870-71._--In the next great war, that of 1866 (Bohemia), guns were present on both sides in great numbers, the average for both sides being three guns per 1000 men. Artillery, however, played but a small part in the Prussian attacks, this being due to the inadequate training then afforded, and also to the mixture of rifled guns and smooth-bores in their armament. In Prussia, however, the exertions of General v. Hindersin, the improvement of the _materiel_, and above all the better tactical training of the batteries, were rewarded four years later by success on the battlefield almost as decisive as Napoleon's. In 1870 the French artillery was invariably defeated by that of the Germans, who were then free to turn their attention to the hostile infantry. At first, indeed, the German infantry was too impatient to wait until the victorious artillery had prepared the way for them by disintegrating the opposing line of riflemen. Thus the attack of the Prussian Guards at St Privat (August 18, 1870) melted away before the unbroken fire-power of the French, as had that of the Federals at Fredericksburg and that of the Confederates at Gettysburg. But such experiences taught the German infantry commanders the necessity of patience, and at Sedan the French army was enveloped by the fire of nearly 600 guns, which did their work so thoroughly that the Germans annihilated the Imperial army at the cost of only 5% of casualties.

15. _Results of the War._--The tactical lessons of the war, so far as field artillery is concerned, may be briefly summarized as (a) employment of great masses of guns; (b) forward position of guns in the order of march, in order to bring them into action as quickly as possible; (c) the so-called "artillery duel," in which the assailant subdues the enemy's artillery fire; and (d) when this is achieved, and not before, the thorough preparation of all infantry attacks by artillery bombardment. This theory of field artillery action has not, even with the almost revolutionary improvements of the present period, entirely lost its value, and it may be studied in detail in the well-known work of von Schell, _Taktik der Feldartillerie_ (1877), later translated into English by Major-General Sir A.E. Turner (_Tactics of Field Artillery_, 1900). In one important matter, however, the precepts of Schell and his contemporaries no longer hold good. "It is absolutely necessary that the object of the infantry's attack should be cannonaded before it advances. To accomplish this, sufficient time should be given to the artillery, and on no account should the infantry be ordered to advance until the fire of the guns has produced the desired effect." This, the direct outcome of the slaughter at St Privat, represents the best possibilities of breech-loading guns with common shell--no more than a slow disintegration of the enemy's power of resistance by a thorough and lengthy "artillery preparation." Against troops sheltered behind works (as in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78) the common shell usually failed to give satisfactory results, if for no other reason, because the "preparation" consumed an inordinate time, and in any case the hostile artillery had first of all to be subdued in the artillery duel.