Chapter VII: Front Matter (7)

71. _Madras._--The first armed force in the Madras presidency was the
little garrison of Armegon on the Coromandel coast, consisting of 28
soldiers. In 1644 Fort St George was built and garrisoned, and in 1653
Madras became a presidency. In 1745 the garrison of Fort St George
consisted of 200 Europeans, while a similar number, with the addition
of 200 "Topasses" (descendants of the Portuguese), garrisoned Fort St
David. In 1748 the various independent companies on the Coromandel
coast and other places were consolidated into the Madras European
regiment. From this time the military history of the Madras army was
full of incident, and it bore the principal part in Clive's victories
of Arcot, Kavaripak and Plassey. In 1754 the 39th regiment of the
Royal army was sent to Madras. In 1758 three others followed. In 1772
the Madras army numbered 3000 European infantry and 16,000 natives,
and in 1784 the number of native troops had risen to 34,000.

72. _Bombay._--The island of Bombay formed part of the marriage
portion received by Charles II. with the infanta of Portugal, and in
1662 the Bombay regiment of Europeans was raised to defend it. In 1668
the island was granted to the Company, and the regiment at the same
time transferred to them. In 1708 Bombay became a presidency, but it
did not play so important a part as the others in the early extension
of British power, and its forces were not so rapidly developed. It is
said, however, to have been the first to discipline native troops, and
Bombay sepoys were sent to Madras in 1747, and took part in the battle
of Plassey in 1757. In 1772 the Bombay army consisted of 2500
Europeans and 3500 sepoys, but in 1794, in consequence of the
struggles with the Mahratta power, the native troops had been
increased to 24,000.

73. _Consolidation of the Army._--In 1796 a general reorganization
took place. Hitherto the officers in each presidency had been borne on
general "lists," according to branches of the service. These lists
were now broken up and cadres of regiments formed. The colonels and
lieutenant-colonels remained on separate lists, and an establishment
of general officers was created, while the divisional commands were
distributed between the royal and Company's officers. Further
augmentations took place, consequent on the great extension of British
supremacy. In 1798 the native infantry in India numbered 122
battalions. In 1808 the total force in India amounted to 24,500
Europeans and 154,500 natives.

The first half of the 19th century was filled with wars and
annexations and the army was steadily increased. Horse artillery was
formed, and the artillery in general greatly augmented. "Irregular
cavalry" was raised in Bengal and Bombay, and recruited from a better
class of troopers, who received high pay and found their own horses
and equipment. "Local forces" were raised in various parts from time
to time, the most important being the Punjab irregular force (raised
after the annexation of the Punjab in 1849), consisting of 3 field
batteries, 5 regiments of cavalry, and 5 of infantry, and the Nagpur
and Oudh irregular forces. Another kind of force, which had been
gradually formed, was that called "contingents"--troops raised by the
protected native states. The strongest of these was that of Hyderabad,
originally known as the nizam's army. Changes were also made in the
organization of the army. Sanitary improvements were effected,
manufacturing establishments instituted or increased, and the
administration generally improved.

74. _The Army before the Mutiny._--The officering and recruiting of
the three armies were in all essentials similar. The officers were
mainly supplied by the Company's military college at Addiscombe in
Surrey (established in 1809), and by direct appointments. The Bengal
army was recruited from Hindustan, the infantry being mostly drawn
from Oudh and the great Gangetic plains. The soldiers were chiefly
high-caste Hindus, a sixth being Mahommedans. The cavalry was composed
mainly of Mahommedans, recruited from Rohilkhand and the Gangetic
Doab. The only other elements in the army were four Gurkha regiments,
enlisted from Nepal, and the local Punjab irregular force. The Madras
army was chiefly recruited from that presidency, or the native states
connected with it, and consisted of Mahommedans, Brahmans, and of the
Mahratta, Tamil and Telugu peoples. The Bombay army was recruited from
its own presidency, with some Hindustanis, but chiefly formed of
Mahrattas and Mahommedans; the Bombay light cavalry mainly from
Hindustan proper.

Including the local and irregular troops (about 100,000 strong), the
total strength amounted to 38,000 Europeans of all arms, with 276
field guns, and 348,000 native troops, with 248 field guns,--truly a
magnificent establishment, and, outwardly, worthy of the great empire
which England had created for herself in the East, but inwardly
unsound, and on the very verge of the great mutiny of 1857.

In 1856 the establishment in the several presidencies was a follows:--

+-------------------------------+---------+---------+---------+-------+
| | Bengal. | Madras. | Bombay. | Total.|
+-------------------------------+---------+---------+---------+-------+
| British Cavalry Regiments | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| British Infantry Battalions | 15 | 3 | 4 | 22 |
| Company's European Battalions | 3 | 3 | 3 | 9 |
| European and Native Artillery | | | | |
| Battalions | 12 | 7 | 5 | 24 |
| Native Infantry Battalions | 74 | 52 | 29 | 155 |
| Native Cavalry Regiments | 28 | 8 | 3 | 39 |
+-------------------------------+---------+---------+---------+-------+

An account of the events of 1857-58 will be found under INDIAN MUTINY.
After the catastrophe the reorganization of the military forces on
different lines was of course unavoidable. Fortunately, the armies of
Madras and Bombay had been almost wholly untouched by the spirit of
disaffection, and in the darkest days the Sikhs, though formerly
enemies of the British, had not only remained faithful to them, but
had rendered them powerful assistance.

75. _The Reorganization._--By the autumn of 1858 the mutiny was
virtually crushed, and the task of reorganization commenced. On the
1st of September 1858 the East India Company ceased to rule, and Her
Majesty's government took up the reins of power. On the important
question of the army, the opinions and advice of the most
distinguished soldiers and civilians were invited. Masses of reports
and evidence were collected in India, and by a royal commission in
England. On the report of this commission the new system was based.
The local European army was abolished, and its personnel amalgamated
with the royal army. The artillery became wholly British, with the
exception of a few native mountain batteries. The total strength of
the British troops, all of the royal army, was largely increased,
while that of the native troops was largely diminished. Three distinct
native armies--those of Bengal, Madras and Bombay--were still
maintained. The reduced Indian armies consisted of cavalry and
infantry only, with a very few artillery, distributed as follows:--

Battalions Regiments
Infantry. Cavalry.
Bengal 49 19
Madras 40 4
Bombay 30 7
Punjab Force 12 6
--- ---
Total 131 36

There were also three sapper battalions, one to each army.

The Punjab force, which had 5 batteries of native artillery attached
to it, continued under the Punjab government. In addition, the
Hyderabad contingent of 4 cavalry, 6 infantry regiments and 4
batteries, and a local force in central India of 2 regiments cavalry
and 6 infantry, were retained under the government of India. After all
the arrangements had been completed the army of India consisted of
62,000 British and 125,000 native troops.

76. _The Modern Army._--The college at Addiscombe was closed in 1860,
and the direct appointment of British officers to the Indian local
forces ceased in 1861. In that year a staff corps was formed by royal
warrant in each presidency "to supply a body of officers for service
in India, by whom various offices and appointments hitherto held by
officers borne on the strength of the several corps in the Indian
forces shall in future be held." Special roles were laid down. The
corps was at first recruited partly from officers of the Company's
service and partly from the royal army, holding staff appointments
(the new regimental employment being considered as staff duty) and all
kinds of political and civil posts; for the system established later
see INDIA: _Army_. The native artillery and sappers and miners were to
be officered from the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers. The only
English warrant and non-commissioned officers now to be employed in
the native army were to be those of the Royal Engineers with the
sappers and miners.

A radical change in the regimental organization of all the native
armies was effected in 1863. The Punjab Frontier Force was from the
first organized on the irregular system, which was there seen at its
best, as also were the new regiments raised during the Mutiny. This
system was now applied to the whole army, each regiment and battalion
having seven British officers attached to it for command and
administrative duties, the immediate command of troops and companies
being left to the native officers. Thus was the system reverted to,
which was initiated by Clive, of a few British officers only being
attached to each corps for the higher regimental duties of command and
control. Time had shown that this was more effective than the regular
system instituted in 1796 of British officers commanding troops and
companies.

A new spirit was breathed into the army. The supremacy of the
commandant was the main principle. He was less hampered by the
unbending regulations enjoined upon the old regular regiments, had
greater powers of reward and punishment, was in a position to assume
larger responsibility and greater freedom of action, and was supported
in the full exercise of his authority. The system made the officers.

Up to 1881 the native army underwent little change, but in that year
18 regiments of infantry and 4 of cavalry were broken up, almost the
same total number of men being maintained in fewer and stronger
regiments. The only reduction made in the British troops was in the
Royal Artillery, which was diminished by 11 batteries. The events of
1885, however, on the Russo-Afghan frontier, led to augmentations. The
11 batteries Royal Artillery were brought back from England; each of
the 9 British cavalry regiments in India received a fourth squadron;
each of the British infantry battalions was increased by 100 men, and
3 battalions were added. The native cavalry had a fourth squadron
added to each regiment; three of the four regiments broken up in 1881
were re-raised, while the native infantry was increased in regimental
strength, and 9 new battalions raised composed of Gurkhas, Sikhs and
Punjabis. The addition in all amounted to 10,600 British and 21,200
native troops. In 1890 the strength of the army of India was 73,000
British and, including irregulars, 147,500 native troops. For the
Indian volunteers, see VOLUNTEERS.

Many important changes took place between 1885 and 1904. Seven Madras
infantry regiments were converted into regiments for service in Burma,
composed of Gurkhas and hardy races from northern India; six Bengal
and Bombay regiments were similarly converted into regiments of
Punjabis, Pathans and Gurkhas; the native mountain batteries have been
increased to ten; a system of linked battalions has been introduced
with the formation of regimental centres for mobilization; and
reserves for infantry and mountain artillery have been formed. The
number of British officers with each regiment has been increased to
nine, and the two wing commands in battalions have been converted into
4 double-company commands of 250 men each, under a British commander,
who is responsible to the commandant for their training and
efficiency, the command of the companies being left to the native
officers. This system, which is analogous to the squadron command in
the cavalry, admits of closer individual attention to training, and
distributes among the senior British regimental officers effective
responsibility of a personal kind.

An addition (at the imperial expense) of five battalions of Sikhs,
Punjabi Mahommedans, Jats and hillmen in northern India was made in
1900, as the result of India being called upon to furnish garrisons
for Mauritius and other stations overseas.

The unification of the triplicate army departments in the different
presidential armies was completed in 1891, all being brought directly
under the supreme government; and the three separate staff corps of
Bengal, Madras and Bombay were fused into one in 1891 as the Indian
Staff Corps. The term "Indian Staff Corps" was in turn replaced by
that of "Indian Army" in 1903. These measures prepared the way for the
new system of army organization which, by authority of parliament,
abolished divided control and placed the whole army of India under the
governor-general and the commander-in-chief in India.

CANADIAN FORCES

77. In the earliest European settlements in Canada, the necessity of
protection against Indians caused the formation of a militia, and in
1665 companies were raised in every parish. The military history of
the Canadian forces under French rule is full of incident, and they
served not only against Indian raiders but also against the troops of
Great Britain and of her North American colonies. Six militia
battalions took part in the defence of Quebec in 1759, and even the
transfer of Canada from the French to the British crown did not cause
the disbandment of the existing forces. The French Canadians
distinguished themselves not less than the British settlers in the War
of American Independence, and in particular in the defence of Quebec
against Montgomery and Arnold. In 1787 an ordinance was made whereby
three battalions of the militia were permanently embodied, each
contingent serving for two years, at the end of which time a fresh
contingent relieved it, and after this a succession of laws and
regulations were made with a view to complete organization of the
force. The brunt of the fighting on the American frontier in the war
of 1812 was borne very largely by the permanent force of three
battalions and the fresh units called out, all these being militia
corps. Up to 1828 a distinction had been made between the British and
the French regiments: this was then abolished. The militia was again
employed on active service during the disturbances of 1837, and the
"Active Militia" in 1863 had grown to a strength of 25,000 men. The
Fenian troubles of 1864 and 1866 caused the embodiment of the Canadian
forces once more. In 1867 took place the unification of Canada, after
which the whole force was completely organized on the basis of a
militia act (1868). A department of Militia and Defence with a
responsible minister was established, and the strength of the active
militia of all arms was fixed at 40,000 rank and file. Two years later
the militia furnished 6000 men to deal with the Fenian Raid of 1870,
and took part in Colonel (Lord) Wolseley's Red River expedition. In
1871 a permanent force, serving the double purpose of a regular
nucleus and an instructional cadre, was organized in two troops of
cavalry, two batteries of artillery and one regiment of infantry, and
in 1876 the Royal Military College of Canada was founded at Kingston.
In 1885 the Riel rebellion was dealt with, and the important action of
Batoche won, by the militia, without assistance from regular troops.
In the same year Canada contributed a force of _voyageurs_ to the Nile
expedition of Lord Wolseley; the experience of these men was
admittedly of great assistance in navigating the Rapids. The militia
sent contingents of all arms to serve in the South African War,
1899-1902, including "Strathcona's Horse," a special corps, recruited
almost entirely from the Active Militia and the North-west Mounted
Police. The latter, a permanent constabulary of mounted riflemen, was
formed in 1873.

After the South African War an extensive scheme of reorganization was
taken in hand, the command being exercised for two years (1902-1904)
by Major-General Lord Dundonald, and subsequently by a militia council
(Militia Act 1904), similar in constitution to the home Army Council.
For details of the present military strength of Canada, see the
article CANADA.

AUSTRIAN ARMY

78. The _Landsknecht_ infantry constituted the mainstay of the imperial armies in the 16th century. Maximilian I. and Charles V. are recorded to have marched and carried the "long pike" in their ranks. Maximilian also formed a corps of _Kyrisser_, who were the origin of the modern cuirassiers. It was not, however, until much later that the Austrian army came into existence as a permanent force. Rudolph II. formed a small standing force about 1600, but relied upon the "enlistment" system, like other sovereigns of the time, for the bulk of his armies. The Thirty Years' War produced the permanence of service which led in all the states of Europe to the rise of standing armies. In the Empire it was Wallenstein who first raised a distinctly imperial army of soldiers owing no duty but to the sovereign; and it was the suspicion that he intended to use this army, which was raised largely at his own expense, to further his own ends, that led to his assassination. From that time the regiments belonged no longer to their colonels, but to the emperor; and the oldest regiments in the present Austrian army date from the Thirty Years' War, at the close of which Austria had 19 infantry, 6 cuirassier and 1 dragoon regiments. The almost continuous wars of Austria against France and the Turks (from 1495 to 1895 Austrian troops took part in 7000 actions of all sorts) led to a continuous increase in her establishments. The wars of the time of Montecucculi and of Eugene were followed by that of the Polish Succession, the two Turkish wars, and the three great struggles against Frederick the Great. Thus in 1763 the army had been almost continuously on active service for more than 100 years, in the course of which its organization had been modified in accordance with the lessons of each war. This, in conjunction with the fact that Austria took part in other Turkish campaigns subsequently, rendered this army the most formidable opponent of the forces of the French Revolution (1792). But the superior leading, organization and numbers of the emperor's forces were totally inadequate to the magnitude of the task of suppressing the Revolutionary forces, and though such victories as Neerwinden were sufficient proof of the efficiency and valour of the Austrians, they made no headway. In later campaigns, in which the enemy had acquired war experience, and the best of their officers had come to the front, the tide turned against the Imperialists even on the field of battle. The archduke Charles's victories of 1796 were more than counterbalanced by Bonaparte's Italian campaign, and the temporary success of 1799 ended at Marengo and Hohenlinden.

79. The Austrians, during the short peace which preceded the war of 1805, suffered, in consequence of all this, from a feeling of distrust, not merely in their leaders, but also in the whole system upon which the army was raised, organized and trained. This was substantially the same as that of the Seven Years' War time. Enlistment being voluntary and for long service, the numbers necessary to cope with the output of the French conscription could not be raised, and the inner history of the Austrian headquarters in the Ulm campaign shows that the dissensions and mutual distrust of the general officers had gone far towards the disintegration of an army which at that time had the most _esprit de corps_ and the highest military qualities of any army in Europe. But the disasters of 1805 swept away good and bad alike in the abolition of the old system. Already the archduke Charles had designed a "nation in arms" after the French model, and on this basis the reconstruction was begun. The conscription was put in force and the necessary numbers thus obtained; the administration was at the same time reformed and the organization and supply services brought into line with modern requirements. The war of 1809 surprised Austria in the midst of her reorganization, yet the new army fought with the greatest spirit. The invasion of Bavaria was by no means so leisurely as it had been in 1805, and the archduke Charles obtained one signal victory over Napoleon in person. Aspern and Wagram were most desperately contested, and though the archduke ceased to take part in the administration after 1809 the work went on steadily until, in 1813, the Austrian armies worthily represented the combination of discipline with the "nation in arms" principle. Their intervention in the War of Liberation was decisive, and Austria, in spite of her territorial losses of the past years, put into the field well-drilled armies far exceeding in numbers those which had appeared in the wars of the Revolution. After the fall of Napoleon, Austria's hold on Italy necessitated the maintenance of a large army of occupation. This army, and in particular its cavalry, was admittedly the best in Europe, and, having to be ready to march at a few days' notice, it was saved from the deadening influence of undisturbed peace which affected every other service in Europe from 1815 to 1850.

80. The Austrian system has conserved much of the peculiar tone of the army of 1848, of which English readers may obtain a good idea from George Meredith's _Vittoria_. It was, however, a natural result of this that the army lost to some considerable extent the spirit of the "nation in arms" of 1809 and 1813. It was employed in dynastic wars, and the conscription was of course modified by substitution; thus, when the war of 1859 resulted unfavourably to the Austrians, the army began to lose confidence, precisely as had been the case in 1805. Once more, in 1866, an army animated by the purely professional spirit, which was itself weakened by distrust, met a "nation in arms," and in this case a nation well trained in peace and armed with a breechloader. Bad staff work, and tactics which can only be described as those of pique, precipitated the disaster, and in seven weeks the victorious Prussians were almost at the gates of Vienna.

The result of the war, and of the constitutional changes about this time, was the re-adoption of the principles of 1806-1813, the abolition of conscription and long service in favour of universal service for a short term, and a thorough reform in the methods of command and staff work. It has been said of the Prussian army that "discipline is--the officers." This is more true of the "K.K." army[1] than of any other in Europe; the great bond of union between the heterogeneous levies of recruits of many races is the spirit of the corps of officers, which retains the personal and professional characteristics of the old army of Italy.

FRENCH ARMY

81. The French army (see for further details FRANCE: _Law and Institutions_) dates from the middle of the 15th century, at which time Charles VII. formed, from mercenaries who had served him in the Hundred Years' War, the _compagnies d'ordonnance_, and thus laid the foundation of a national standing army. But the armies that followed the kings in their wars still consisted mainly of mercenaries, hired for the occasion; and the work of Charles and his successors was completely undone in the confusion of the religious wars. Louvois, who was minister of Louis XIV., was the true creator of the French royal army. The organization of the first standing army is here given in some detail, as it served as a model for all armies for more than a century, and is also followed to some extent in our own times. Before the advent of Louvois, the forces were royal only in name. The army was a fortuitous concourse of regiments of horse and foot, each of which was the property of its colonel. The companies similarly belonged to their captains, and, the state being then in no condition to buy out these vested interests, superior control was almost illusory. Indeed, all the well-known devices for eluding such control, for instance, showing imaginary men on the pay lists, can be traced to the French army of the 16th century. A further difficulty lay in the existence of the offices called Colonel-General, Marshal-General and Grand Master of Artillery, between whom no common administration was possible. The grand master survived until 1743, but Louvois managed to suppress the other offices, and even to put one of his own subordinates into the office of grand master. Thus was assured direct royal control, exercised through the war minister. Louvois was unable indeed to overthrow the proprietary system, but he made stringent regulations against abuses, and confined it to the colonels (_mestre de camp_ in the cavalry) and the captains. Henceforward the colonel was a wealthy noble, with few duties beyond that of spending money freely and of exercising his court influence on behalf of his regiment. The real work of the service was done by the lieutenant-colonels and lieutenants, and the king and the minister recognized this on all occasions. Thus Vauban was given, as a reward for good service, a company in the "Picardie" regiment without purchase. Promotions from the ranks were very rare but not unknown, and all promotions were awarded according to merit except those to captain or colonel. One of the captains in a regiment was styled major, and acted as adjutant. This post was of course filled by selection and not by purchase. The grades of general officers were newly fixed by Louvois--the _brigadier, marechal de camp_, lieutenant-general and marshal of France. The general principle was to give command, but not promotion, according to merit. The rank and file were recruited by voluntary enlistment for four years' service. The infantry company was maintained in peace at an effective of 60, except in the guards and the numerous foreign corps, in which the company was always at the war strength of 100 to 200 men. This arm was composed, in 1678, of the _Gardes francaises_, the Swiss guards, the old (_vieux_ and _petits vieux_) regiments of the line, of which the senior, "Picardie," claimed to be the oldest regiment in Europe, and the regiments raised under the new system. The _regiment du roi_, which was deliberately made the model of all others and was commanded by the celebrated Martinet, was the senior of these latter. The whole infantry arm in 1678 numbered 320,000 field and garrison troops. The cavalry consisted of the _Maison du Roi_ (which Louvois converted from a "show" corps to one of the highest discipline and valour), divided into the _Gardes du Corps_ and the _Mousquetaires_, the _Gendarmerie_ (descended from the old feudal cavalry and the _ordonnance_ companies) and the line cavalry, the whole being about 55,000 strong. There were also 10,000 dragoons. In addition to the regular army, the king could call out, in case of need, the ancient _arriere-ban_ or levy, as was in fact done in 1674. On that occasion, however, it behaved badly, and it was not again employed. In 1688 Louvois organized a militia raised by ballot. This numbered 25,000 men and proved to be better, at any rate, than the _arriere-ban_. Many infantry regiments of the line were, as has been said, foreign, and in 1678 the foreigners numbered 30,000, the greater part of these being Swiss.

82. The artillery had been an industrial concern rather than an arm of the service. In sieges a sum of money was paid for each piece put in battery, and the grand master was not subordinated to the war office. A nominee of Louvois, as has been said, filled the post at this time, and eventually Louvois formed companies of artillerymen, and finally the regiment of "Fusiliers" which Vauban described as the "finest regiment in the world." The engineer service, as organized by Vauban, was composed of engineers "in ordinary," and of line officers especially employed in war. Louvois further introduced the system of magazines. To ensure the regular working of supply and transport, he instituted direct control by the central executive, and stored great quantities of food in the fortresses, thereby securing for the French armies a precision and certainty in military operations which had hitherto been wanting. The higher administration of the army, under the minister of war, fell into two branches, that of the commissaries and that of the inspecting officers. The duties of the former resembled those of a modern "routine" staff--issue of equipment, checking of returns, &c. The latter exercised functions analogous to those of a general staff, supervising the training and general efficiency of the troops. Louvois also created an excellent hospital service, mobile and stationary, founded the Hotel des Invalides in Paris for the maintenance of old soldiers, established cadet schools for the training of young officers, and stimulated bravery and good conduct by reviving and creating military orders of merit.

83. The last half of the 17th century is a brilliant period in the annals of the French armies. Thoroughly organized, animated by the presence of the king, and led by such generals as Conde, Turenne, Luxembourg, Catinat and Vendome, they made head against coalitions which embraced nearly all the powers of Europe, and made France the first military nation of Europe. The reverses of the later part of Louis XIV.'s reign were not of course without result upon the tone of the French army, and the campaigns of Marlborough and Eugene for a time diminished the repute in which the troops of Louis were held by other powers. Nevertheless the War of the Spanish Succession closed with French victories, and generals of the calibre of Villars and Berwick were not to be found in the service of every prince. The war of the Polish Succession in Germany and Italy reflected no discredit upon the French arms; and the German general staff, in its history of the wars of Frederick the Great, states that "in 1740 the French army was still regarded as the first in Europe." Since the death of Louvois very little had changed. The army was still governed as it had been by the great war minister, and something had been done to reduce evils against which even he had been powerless. A royal regiment of artillery had come into existence, and the engineers were justly regarded as the most skilful in Europe. Certain alterations had been made in the organization of both the guard and the line, and the total strength of the French in peace was somewhat less than 200,000. Relatively to the numbers maintained in other states, it was thus as powerful as before. Indeed, only one feature of importance differentiated the French army from its contemporaries--the proportion of officers to men, which was one to eleven. In view of this, the spirit of the army was necessarily that of its officers, and these were by no means the equals of their predecessors of the time of Turenne or Luxembourg. Louvois' principle of employing professional soldiers for command and wealthy men for colonelcies and captaincies was not deliberately adopted, but inevitably grew out of the circumstances of the time. The system answered fairly whilst continual wars gave the professional soldiers opportunities for distinction and advancement. But in a long peace the captains of eighteen and colonels of twenty-three blocked all promotion, and there was no work save that of routine to be done. Under these conditions the best soldiers sought service in other countries, the remainder lived only for pleasure, whilst the titular chiefs of regiments and companies rarely appeared on parade. Madame de Genlis relates how, when young courtiers departed to join their regiments for a few weeks' duty, the ladies of the court decked them with favours, as if proceeding on a distant and perilous expedition.

On the other hand, the fact that the French armies required large drafts of militia to bring up their regular forces to war strength gave them a vitality which was unusual in armies of the time. Even in the time of Louis XIV. the military spirit of the country had arisen at the threat of invasion, and the French armies of 1709 fought far more desperately, as the casualty lists of the allies at Malplaquet showed, than those of 1703 or 1704. In the time of the Revolution the national spirit of the French army formed a rallying-point for the forces of order, whereas Prussia, whose army was completely independent of the people, lost all power of defending herself after a defeat in the field. It is difficult to summarize the conduct of the royal armies in the wars of 1740-63. With a few exceptions the superior leaders proved themselves incompetent, and in three great battles, at least, the troops suffered ignominious defeat (Dettingen 1743, Rossbach 1757, Minden 1759). On the other hand, Marshal Saxe and others of the younger generals were excellent commanders, and Fontenoy was a victory of the first magnitude. The administration, however, was corrupt and inefficient, and the general reputation of the French armies fell so low that Frederick the Great once refused an important command to one of his generals on the ground that his experience had been gained only against French troops.

Under Louis XVI. things improved somewhat; the American War and the successes of Lafayette and Rochambeau revived a more warlike spirit. Instruction was more carefully attended to, and a good system of drill and tactics was elaborated at the camp of St Omer. Attempts were made to reform the administration. Artillery and engineer schools had come into existence, and the intellectual activity of the best officers was remarkable (see Max Jahns, _Gesch. der Kriegswissenschaften_, vol. iii. passim). But the Revolution soon broke over France, and the history of the royal army was henceforward carried on by that revolutionary army, which, under a new flag, was destined to raise the military fame of France to its greatest height.

84. If Louis was the creator of the royal army, Carnot was so of the revolutionary army. At the outbreak of the Revolution the royal army consisted of 224 infantry battalions, 7 regiments of artillery, and 62 regiments of cavalry, numbering about 173,000 in all, but capable of augmentation on war strength to 210,000. To this might be added about 60,000 militia (see Chuquet, _Premiere invasion prussienne_).

The first step of the Constituent Assembly was the abrogation of an edict of 1781 whereby men of non-noble birth had been denied commissioned rank (1790). Thus, when many of the officers emigrated along with their fellows of the _noblesse_, trained non-commissioned officers, who would already have been officers save for this edict, were available to fill their places. The general scheme of reform (see CONSCRIPTION) was less satisfactory, but the formation of a National Guard, comprising in theory the whole military population, was a step of the highest importance. At this time the titles of regiments were abandoned in favour of numbers, and the costly and dangerous _Maison du Roi_ abolished. But voluntary enlistment soon failed; the old corps, which kept up their discipline, were depleted, and the men went to the volunteers, where work was less exacting and promotion more rapid. _"Aussi fut-on,"_ says a French writer, _"reduit bientot a forcer l'engagement volontaire et a imposer le choix du corps."_ The "first invasion" (July 1792) put an end to half-measures, and the country was declared "in danger." Even these measures, however, were purely designed to meet the emergency, and, after Valmy, enthusiasm waned to such a degree that, of a paper strength of 800,000 men (December 1792), only 112,000 of the line and 290,000 volunteers were actually present. The disasters of the following spring once more called for extreme energy, and 300,000 national guards were sent to the line, a step which was followed by a compulsory _levee en masse_; one million men were thus assembled to deal with the manifold dangers of civil and foreign war. France was saved by mere numbers and the driving energy of the Terrorists, not by discipline and organization. The latter was chaotic, and almost every element of success was wanting to the tumultuary levies of the year 1793 save a ferocious energy born of liberty and the guillotine. But under the Terrorist regime the army became the rallying-point of the nation, and when Lazare Carnot (q.v.) became minister of war a better organization and discipline began to appear. The amalgamation of the old army and the volunteers, which had been commenced but imperfectly carried out, was effected on a different and more thorough principle. The infantry was organized in demi-brigades of three battalions (usually one of the old army to two of volunteers). A permanent organization in divisions of all arms was introduced, and the ablest officers selected for the commands. Arsenals and manufactories of warlike stores were created, schools of instruction were re-established; the republican forces were transformed from hordes to armies, well disciplined, organized and equipped. Later measures followed the same lines, and the artillery and engineers, which in 1790 were admittedly the best in Europe and which owing to the _roturier_ element in their officer cadres had not been disorganized by the emigration, steadily improved. The infantry, and in a less degree the cavalry, became good and trustworthy soldiers, and the glorious campaigns of 1794, 1795 and 1796, which were the direct result of Carnot's administration, bore witness to the potentialities of the essentially modern system. But, great as was the triumph of 1796-97, the exhaustion of years of continuous warfare had made itself felt: the armies were reduced to mere skeletons, and no sufficient means existed of replenishing them, till in 1798 the _conscription_ was introduced. From that time the whole male population of France was practically at her ruler's disposal; and Napoleon had full scope for his genius in organizing these masses. His principal improvements were effected in the interval between the peace of Amiens and the war with the third coalition, while threatening the invasion of England. His armies were collected in large camps on the coasts of the Channel, and there received that organization which, with minor variations, they retained during all his campaigns, and which has since been copied by all European nations. The divisions had already given place to the army corps, and Napoleon completed the work of his predecessors. He withdrew the whole of the cavalry and a portion of the artillery from the divisions, and thus formed "corps troops" and cavalry and artillery reserves for the whole army. The grade of marshal of France was revived at Napoleon's coronation. At the same time, the operation of Jourdan's law, acquiesced in during times of national danger and even during peace, soon found opposition when the conscripts realized that long foreign wars were to be their lot. It was not the actual losses of the field armies, great as these undoubtedly were, which led Napoleon in the full tide of his career to adopt the fatal practice of "anticipating" the conscription, but the steady increase in the number of _refractaires_, men who refused to come up for service. To hunt these men down, no less than forty thousand picked soldiers were engaged within the borders of France, and the actual French element in the armies of Napoleon grew less and less with every extension of the empire. Thus, in the Grand Army of 1809, about one-third of the corps of all arms were purely German, and in 1812 the army which invaded Russia, 467,000 strong, included 280,000 foreigners. In other words, the million of men produced by the original conscription of 1793 had dwindled to about half that number (counting the various subsidiary armies in Spain, &c.), and one hundred thousand of the best and sturdiest Frenchmen were engaged in a sort of civil war in France itself. The conscription was "anticipated" even in 1806, the conscripts for 1807 being called up before their time. As the later wars of the Empire closed one by one the foreign sources of recruiting, the conscription became more terrible every year, with the result that more _refractaires_ and more trusted soldiers to hunt them down were kept in non-effective employment. Finally the capacity for resistance was exhausted, and the army, from the marshals downward, showed that it had had enough.

85. One of the first acts of the Restoration was to abolish the conscription, but it had again to be resorted to within three years. In 1818 the annual contingent was fixed at 40,000, and the period of service at six years; in 1824 the contingent was increased to 60,000, and in 1832 to 80,000. Of this, however, a part only, according to the requirements of the service, were enrolled; the remainder were sent home on leave or furlough. Up to 1855 certain exemptions were authorized, and substitution or exchange of lots amongst young men who had drawn was permitted, but the individual drawn was obliged either to serve personally or find a substitute. The long series of Algerian wars produced further changes, and in 1855 the law of "dotation" or exemption by payment was passed, and put an end to personal substitution. The state now undertook to provide substitutes for all who paid a fixed sum, and did so by high bounties to volunteers or to soldiers for re-engaging. Although the price of exemption was fixed as high as L92, on an average 23,000 were claimed annually, and in 1859 as many as 42,000 were granted. Thus gradually the conscription became rather subsidiary to voluntary enlistment, and in 1866, out of a total establishment of 400,000, only 120,000 were conscripts. Changes had also taken place in the constitution of the army. On the Restoration its numbers were reduced to 150,000, the old regiments broken up and recast, and a royal guard created in place of the old imperial one. When the revolution of July 1830 had driven Charles X. from his throne, the royal guard, which had made itself peculiarly obnoxious, was dissolved; and during Louis Philippe's reign the army was augmented to about 240,000 with the colours. Under the Provisional Government of 1848 it was further increased, and in 1854, when France allied herself with England against Russia, the army was raised to 500,000 men. The imperial guard was re-created, and every effort made to revive the old Napoleonic traditions in the army. In 1859 Napoleon III. took the field as the champion and ally of Italy, and the victories of Montebello, Magenta and Solferino raised the reputation of the army to the highest pitch, and for a time made France the arbiter of Europe. But the campaign of 1866 suddenly made the world aware that a rival military power had arisen, which was prepared to dispute that supremacy.

Marshal Niel (q.v.), the then war minister, saw clearly that the organization which had with difficulty maintained 150,000 men in Italy, was no match for that which had within a month thrown 250,000 into the very heart of Austria, while waging a successful war on the Main against Bavaria and her allies. In 1867, therefore, he brought forward a measure for the reorganization of the army. This was to have been a true "nation in arms" based on universal service, and Niel calculated upon producing a first-line army 800,000 strong--half with the colours, half in reserve--with a separate army of the second line. But many years must elapse before the full effect of this principle of recruiting can be produced, as the army is incomplete in some degree until the oldest reservist is a man who has been through the line training. Niel himself died within a year, and 1870 witnessed the complete ruin of the French army. The law of 1868 remained therefore no more than an expression of principle.

86. At the outbreak of the Franco-German War (q.v.) the French field troops consisted of 368 battalions, 252 squadrons, and 984 guns. The strength of the entire army on peace footing was 393,000 men; on war footing, 567,000. Disasters followed one another in rapid succession, and the bulk of this war-trained long-service army was captive in Germany within three months of the opening battle. But the spirit of the nation rose to the occasion as it had done in 1793. The next year's contingent of recruits was called out and hastily trained. Fourth battalions were formed from the depot cadres, and organized into _regiments de marche_. The _gardes mobiles_ (Niel's creation) were mobilized, and by successive decrees and under various names nearly all the manhood of the country called to arms.

The regular troops raised as _regiments de marche_, &c., amounted to 213,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry and 10,000 artillery. The _garde mobile_ exceeded 300,000, and the mobilized national guard exceeded 1,100,000--of whom about 180,000 were actually in the field and 250,000 in Paris; the remainder preparing themselves in camps or depots for active work. Altogether the new formations amounted to nearly 1,700,000. Though, in the face of the now war-experienced well-led and disciplined Germans, their efforts failed, this cannot detract from the admiration which must be felt by every soldier for the patriotism of the people and the creative energy of their leaders, of whom Gambetta and Freycinet were the chief. After the war every Frenchman set himself to solve the army problem not less seriously than had every Prussian after Jena, and the reformed French army (see FRANCE) was the product of the period of national reconstruction. The adoption of the "universal service" principle of active army, reserves and second-line troops, the essential feature of which is the _line_ training of every man, was almost as a matter of course the basis of the reorganization, for the want of a trained reserve was the most obvious cause of the disasters of "the terrible year."

GERMAN ARMY

87. The German army, strictly speaking, dates only from 1871, or at earliest 1866. Before the unification of the German empire or confederation, the several states possessed distinct armies, federal armies when required being formed from the contingents which the members of the union, like those of an ordinary alliance, engaged to furnish. The armies of the Holy Roman Empire were similarly formed from "single," "double," or "treble" contingents under the supreme command of specially appointed field marshals of the Empire. In the troubles of 1848 there was witnessed the curious spectacle of half of a victorious army being unable to pursue the enemy; this, being composed of "Prussian" as distinct from "federal contingent" troops, had to stop at the frontier of another state. The events of 1866 and 1870 put an end to all this, and to a very great extent to the separate armies of the old confederation, all being now remodelled on Prussian lines. The Prussian army therefore is at once the most important and historically the most interesting of the forces of the German empire. Its _debut_ (about 1630) was not satisfactory, and in the Thirty Years' War troops of Sweden, of the Emperor, of the League, &c., plundered Brandenburg unharmed. The elector, when appealed to for protection, could but answer, "Que faire? Ils ont des canons." The humiliations of this time, were, however, avenged by the troops of the next ruler of Brandenburg, called the Great Elector. The supposed invincibility of the Swedes did not prevent him from inflicting upon them a severe defeat at Fehrbellin, and thereafter the Prussian contingents which took part in the many European wars of the time acquitted themselves creditably. One of their generals was the famous Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, and the reckless gallantry of this leader was conspicuous on many fields, from Blenheim to Malplaquet. But Leopold's greatest work was done in the years of peace (1715-40), during which Prussia was preparing the army with which Frederick the Great won his battles. He had introduced (about 1700) iron ramrods into the infantry service, and for over twenty years the Prussian infantry was drilled to a perfection which gave it a superiority of five to three over the best-drilled troops of the Austrian service, and still greater predominance over the French, which was then accounted the best in Europe. Frederick William I., king of Prussia, directed and supervised the creation of the new Prussian army, and Leopold was his principal assistant. In organization and methods of recruiting, as well as in tactical efficiency, the army of 1740 was equally pre-eminent. Then came the wars of Frederick the Great. It is not too much to say that the infantry won his earlier battles; the cavalry had been neglected both by Frederick William and by Leopold, and Frederick wrote that "it was not worth the devil's while to fetch it away." But the predominance of the infantry was so far indisputable that Frederick was able to devote himself to the reorganization of the mounted arm, with results which appeared in the splendid victories of Hohenfriedberg, Rossbach, Leuthen and Zorndorf. But long before the close of the Seven Years' War the incomparable infantry of the old army had disappeared, to be replaced by foreigners, deserters and vagabonds of all kinds, not to mention the unwilling Saxon and other recruits forced into the king's service. The army of 200,000 men which Frederick bequeathed to his successor was indeed superb, and deserved to be the model of Europe. But with Frederick's death the genius which had animated it, and which alone gave value to such heterogeneous materials, was gone. The long peace had the customary effect of sapping the efficiency of the long-service troops. They still retained their imposing appearance and precision of movement, and overweening self-confidence. But in 1806, after two crushing defeats and a series of humiliating surrenders, Prussia found herself at the feet of the conqueror, shorn of half her territory, obliged to receive French troops in all her towns and fortresses, and only existing on sufferance. But in these very disasters were laid the seeds of her future greatness. By the treaty of Tilsit the Prussian army was limited to 43,000 men. This limitation suggested to Scharnhorst "universal service" on the _Krumper_[2] system already described (see S 36 above).

88. The bitter humiliation and suffering endured under the French yoke aroused a national spirit which was capable of any sacrifices. The civilian became eager to be trained to fight against the oppressor of his country; and when Prussia rose in 1813, the armies she poured into the field were no longer professional, but national armies, imperfectly trained and organized, but animated by a spirit which more than compensated for these defects. At the close of the war her rulers, with far-seeing sagacity, at once devoted themselves to organize on a permanent footing the system which had sprung up under the necessities and enthusiasm of the moment. Universal compulsory service, and a three years' term in the ranks, with further periods in the reserve and _Landwehr_, were then introduced; and though variations have subsequently been made in the distribution of time, the principles were substantially the same as those now in force. By the law of 1814 the periods of service were fixed at three years in the army, two in the reserve and fourteen in the _Landwehr_, and the annual contingent at 40,000 men. As the population increased, it was felt that the service was unequally distributed, pressing unnecessarily heavily on some, while others escaped altogether. Further, the experiences of Bronnzell and Olmutz in 1850, and of 1859, when Prussia armed in anticipation of a war with France, aroused great doubts as to the efficiency of the _Landwehr_, which then formed the bulk of Prussia's forces, and of whom many had been as long as ten years away from the colours. At this time the French remark that the Prussian army was "a sort of militia" was by no means untrue. Accordingly, by the law of 1860 the annual contingent was fixed at 63,000, the period in the reserve was increased from two to four years, and that in the _Landwehr_ reduced from fourteen to five. The total armed force thus remained nearly the same (12 contingents of 63,000, in place of 19 of 40,000), but the army and its reserves were more than doubled (increased from 5 X 40,000 to 7 X 63,000) while the _Landwehr_ was proportionately reduced.

This change was not effected without great opposition, and led to a prolonged struggle between the king, guided by Bismarck, and the parliament. It required the victories of 1866 and 1870, and the position thereby won for Prussia, to reconcile the nation to the new law. The military alliance (1866) of Prussia with the other German states gave place in 1871 to the union of all the armies into the German army as it is to-day. Some retained their old peculiarities of uniform, and even more than this was allowed to Bavaria and to Saxony, but the whole army, which has been increased year by year to its present strength, is modelled on the Prussian part of it. The Prussian army corps are the Guard, and the line numbered I. to XI., and XV. to XVIII.