Chapter VI: Front Matter (6)

57. _Territorial System._--The feudal system was of course a territorial system in principle. Indeed, as has been shown above, a feudal army was chiefly at fault owing to the dislocation of the various levies. Concentration was equally the characteristic of the professional armies which succeeded those of feudalism, and only such militia forces as remained in existence preserved a local character. The origin of territorial recruiting for first-line troops is to be found in the "cantonal" system, said to have been introduced by Louis XIV., but brought to the greatest perfection in Prussia under Frederick William I. But long service and the absence of a reserve vitiated the system in practice, since losses had to be made good by general recruiting, and even the French Revolution may hardly be said to have produced the territorial system as we understand it to-day. It was only in the deliberate preparation of the Prussian army on short-service lines that we find the beginning of the "territorial system of dislocation and command." This is so intimately connected with the general system of organization that it cannot be considered merely as a method of recruiting by districts. It may be defined as a system whereby, for purposes of command in peace, recruiting, and of organization generally, the country is divided into districts, which are again divided and subdivided as may be required. In a country in which universal service prevails, an army corps district is divided into divisional districts, these being made up of brigade and of regimental districts. Each of these units recruits, and is in peace usually stationed, in its own area; the artillery, cavalry and special arms are recruited for the corps throughout the whole allotted area, and stationed at various points within the same. Thus in the German army the III. army corps is composed entirely of Brandenburgers. The infantry of the corps is stationed in ten towns, the cavalry in four and the artillery in five. In countries which adhere to voluntary recruiting, the system, depending as it does on the calculable certainty of recruiting, is not so fully developed, but in Great Britain the auxiliary forces have been reorganized in divisions of all arms on a strictly territorial basis. The advantage of the system as carried into effect in Germany is obvious. Training is carried out with a minimum of friction and expense, as each unit has an ample area for training. Whilst the brigadiers can exercise general control over the colonels, and the divisional generals over the brigadiers, there is little undue interference of superior authority in the work of each grade, and the men, if soldiers by compulsion, at any rate are serving close to their own homes. Most of the reservists required on mobilization reside within a few miles of their barracks. Living in the midst of the civil population, the troops do not tend to become a class apart. Small garrisons are not, as formerly, allowed to stagnate, since modern communications make supervision easy. Further, it must be borne in mind that the essence of the system is the organization and training for war of the whole military population. Now so great a mass of men could not be administered except through this decentralization of authority, and the corollary of short service universally applied is the full territorial system, in which the whole enrolled strength of the district is subjected to the authority of the district commander. Practice, however, falls short of theory, and the dangers of drawing whole units from disaffected or unmilitary districts are often foreseen and discounted by distributing the recruits, non-regionally, amongst more or less distant regiments.

58. _Army Administration._--The existing systems of command and organization, being usually based upon purely military considerations, have thus much, indeed almost all, in common. _Administration_ differs from them in one important respect. While the methods of command and organization are the result of the accumulated experience of many armies through many hundred years, the central administration in each case is the product of the historical evolution of the particular country, and is dependent upon forms of government, constitutions and political parties. Thus France, after 1870, remodelled the organization of her forces in accordance with the methods which were presumed to have given Germany the victory, but the headquarters staff at Paris is very different in all branches from that of Berlin. Great Britain adopted German tactics, and to some extent even uniform, but the Army Council has no counterpart in the administration of the German emperor's forces.

The first point for consideration, therefore, is, what is the ultimate, and what is the proximate, authority supervising the administration? The former is, in most countries, the people or its representatives in parliament, for it is in their power to stop supplies, and without money the whole military fabric must crumble. The constitutional chief of the army is the sovereign, or, in republics, the president, but in most countries the direct control of army matters by the representatives of the people extends over all affairs into which the well-being of the civil population, the expenditure of money, alleged miscarriages of military justice, &c., enter, and it is not unusual to find grand strategy, and even the technical deficiencies of a field-gun or rifle, the subject of interpellation and debate. The peculiar influence of the sovereign is in what may be termed patronage (that is, the selection of officers to fill important positions and the general supervision of the officer-corps), and in the fact that loyalty is the foundation of the discipline and soldierly honour which it is the task of the officers to inculcate into their men. In all cases the head of the state is _ipso facto_ the head of the army. The difference between various systems may then be held to depend on the degree of power allowed to or held by him. This reacts upon the central administration of the army, and is the cause of the differences of system alluded to. For the civil chief of the executive is not necessarily a soldier, much less an expert and capable soldier; he must, therefore, be provided with technical advisers. The chief of the general staff is often the principal of these, though in some cases a special commander-in-chief, or the minister for war, or, as in France and England, a committee or council, has the duty of advising the executive on technical matters.

59. _Branches of Administration._--In these circumstances the only general principle of army administration common to all systems is the division of the labour between two great branches. Military administration, in respect of the troops and material which it has to control, is divided between the departments of the _War Office_ and the _General Staff_. In the staff work of subordinate units, e.g. army corps and divisions, the same classification of duties is adopted, "general staff" duties being performed by one set of officers, "routine staff" duties by another.

The work of a _General Staff_ may be taken as consisting in preparation for war, and this again, both in Great Britain and abroad, consists of military policy in all its branches, staff duties in war, the collection of intelligence, mobilization, plans of operations and concentration, training, military history and geography, and the preparation of war regulations. These subjects are usually subdivided into four or five groups, each of which is dealt with by a separate section of the general staff, the actual division of the work, of course, varying in different countries. Thus, the second section of the French staff deals with "the organization and tactics of foreign armies, study of foreign theatres of war, and military missions abroad." A _War Office_ is concerned with peace administration and with the provision of men and material in war. Under the former category fall such matters as "routine" administration, finance, justice, recruiting, promotion of officers (though not always), barracks and buildings generally, armament, equipment and clothing, &c., in fact all matters not directly relevant to the training of the troops for and the employment of the troops in war. In war, some of the functions of a war office are suspended, but on the other hand the work necessary for the provision of men and material to augment the army and to make good its losses is vastly increased. In 1870 the minister of war, von Roon, accompanied the headquarters in the field, but this arrangement did not work well, and will not be employed again. The chief duties other than those of the general staff fall into two classes, the "routine staff," administration or adjutant-general's branch, which deals with all matters affecting _personnel_, and the quartermaster-general's branch, which supervises the provision and issue of supplies, stores and _materiel_ of all kinds. Over and above these, provision has to be made for control of all the technical parts of administration, such as artillery and engineer services (in Great Britain, this, with a portion of the quartermaster-general's department, is under the master-general of the ordnance), and for military legislation, preparation of estimates, &c. These are, of course, special subjects, not directly belonging to the general administrative system. It is only requisite that the latter should be sufficiently elastic to admit of these departments being formed as required. However these subordinate offices may be multiplied, the main work of the war office is in the two departments of the adjutant-general (_personnel_) and the quartermaster-general (_materiel_). Beyond and wholly distinct from these is the general staff, the creation of which is perhaps the most important contribution of the past century to the pure science of military organization.

COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF VARIOUS ARMIES

(a) _Compulsory Service_ (1906).

+-------------------------------+------------+------------+------------+------------+------------+
| | | | | Austria- | |
| | France. | Germany. | Russia. | Hungary. | Italy. |
+-------------------------------+------------+------------+------------+------------+------------+
| Annual Contingent for the | | | | | |
| Colours | 230,000 | 222,000 | 254,000 | 128,000 | 83,000 |
| Medically unfit and exempt | 90,000 | 127,000 | 120,000 | 57,000 | 110,000 |
| Excused from Service in | | | | | |
| Peace, able-bodied | . . | 291,000 | 606,000 | 285,000 | 122,000 |
| +------------+------------+------------+------------+------------+
| Total of Men becoming liable | | | | | |
| for service in 1907 | 320,000 | 540,000 | 980,000 | 470,000 | 315,000 |
+-------------------------------+------------+------------+------------+------------+------------+
| Total Permanent Armed Force | 610,000 | 610,000 | 1,226,000 | 356,000 | 269,000 |
| in Peace |(not includ-| | | | |
| |ing colonial| | | | |
| | troops | | | | |
+-------------------------------+------------+------------+------------+------------+------------+
| First-Line Troops, war- | | | | | |
| strength (estimated) | 1,350,000 | 1,675,000 | 2,187,000 | 950,000 | 800,000 |
| Second-Line Troops, war- | | | | | |
| strength (estimated) | 3,000,000 | 2,275,000 | 1,429,000 | 1,450,000 | 1,150,000 |
| Numbers available in excess | | | | | |
| of these (estimated) | 450,000 | 3,950,000 | 9,384,000 | 5,000,000 | 1,200,000 |
| +------------+------------+------------+------------+------------+
| Total War Resources of all | | | | | |
| kinds | 4,800,000 | 7,900,000 | 13,000,000 | 7,400,000 | 3,150,000 |
+-------------------------------+------------+------------+------------+------------+------------+
| Annual Military Expenditure-- | | | | | |
| total |L27,720,000 |L32,228,000 |L36,080,000 |L15,840,000 |L11,280,000 |
| Annual Military Expenditure-- | | | | | |
| per head of population | | | | | |
| (approximate) | 13s. 9d. | 10s. 9d. | 5s. 3d. | 6s. 8d. | 6s. 5d. |
+-------------------------------+------------+------------+------------+------------+------------+

(b) _Authorized Establishments and Approximate Military Resources of
the British Empire_ (1906-1907).

+-------------------------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+----------+-----------+
| | | | | Native | | |
| | British |Reserves |Auxiliary| Troops | Colonial | |
| | Regular | for | Forces. |(Regular,| Forces | Total. |
| | Army. | Regular | | Reserve,|(various).| |
| | | Army. | | &c.). | | |
+-------------------------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+----------+-----------+
| Great Britain | 117,000 | 120,000 | 500,000 | . . | . . | 737,000 |
| Channel Islands, Malta, | | | | | | |
| Bermuda, Colonies and | | | | | | |
| Dependencies | 65,000 | . . | 6,000 | . . | 30,000 | 101,000 |
| India | 75,000 | . . | 30,000 | 202,000 | . . | 307,000 |
| Canadian Forces | . . | . . | 46,000 | . . | 59,000 | 105,000 |
| | | | | |(reserves)| |
| Australian Forces (including | . . | . . | 70,000 | . . | . . | 70,000 |
| New Zealand) | | | (appr.) | | | |
| South African Forces | . . | . . | 20,000 | . . | . . | 20,000 |
| | | | (appr.) | | | |
| +---------+---------+---------+---------+----------+-----------+
| Totals | 257,000 | 120,000 | 672,000 | 202,000 | 89,000 | 1,340,000 |
+-------------------------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+----------+-----------+

_Note._--Ex-soldiers of regular and auxiliary forces, still fit for
service, and estimated _levees en masse_, are not counted. Enlistment
chiefly voluntary.

(c) The Regular Army of the United States has a maximum authorized
establishment (1906) of 60,000 enlisted men; the Organized Militia was
at the same date 110,000 strong. Voluntary enlistment throughout. (See
UNITED STATES.) In 1906-1907 the total numbers available for a _levee
en masse_ were estimated at 13,000,000.

BRITISH ARMY

60. Prior to the Norman Conquest the armed force of England was essentially a national militia. Every freeman was bound to bear arms for the defence of the country, or for the maintenance of order. To give some organization and training to the levy, the several sheriffs had authority to call out the contingents of their shires for exercise. The "fyrd," as the levy was named, was available for home service only, and could not be moved even from its county except in the case of emergency; and it was principally to repel oversea invasions that its services were required. Yet even in those days the necessity of some more permanent force was felt, and bodies of paid troops were maintained by the kings at their own cost. Thus Canute and his successors, and even some of the great earls kept up a household force (_huscarles_). The English army at Hastings consisted of the _fyrd_ and the corps of _huscarles_.

The English had fought on foot; but the mailed horseman had now become the chief factor in war, and the Conqueror introduced into England the system of tenure by knight-service familiar in Normandy. This was based on the unit of the feudal host, the _constabularia_ of ten knights, the Conqueror granting lands in return for finding one or more of these units (in the case of great barons) or some fraction of them (in the case of lesser tenants). The obligation was to provide knights to serve, with horse and arms, for forty days in each year at their own charges. This obligation could be handed on by sub-enfeoffment through a whole series of under-tenants. The system being based, not on the duty of personal service, but on the obligation to supply one or more knights (or it might be only the fraction of a knight), it was early found convenient to commute this for a money payment known as "scutage" (see KNIGHT SERVICE and SCUTAGE). This money enabled the king to hire mercenaries, or pay such of the feudal troops as were willing to serve beyond the usual time. From time to time proclamations and statutes were issued reminding the holders of knights' fees of their duties; but the immediate object was generally to raise money rather than to enforce personal service, which became more and more rare. The feudal system had not, however, abrogated the old Saxon levies, and from these arose two national institutions--the _posse comitatus_, liable to be called out by the sheriff to maintain the king's peace, and later the _militia_ (q.v.). The _posse comitatus_, or power of the county, included all males able to bear arms, peers and spiritual men excepted; and though primarily a police force it was also bound to assist in the defence of the country. This levy was organized by the Assize of Arms under Henry II. (1181), and subsequently under Edward I. (1285) by the so-called "Statute of Winchester," which determined the numbers and description of weapons to be kept by each man according to his property, and also provided for their periodical inspection. The early Plantagenets made free use of mercenaries. But the weakness of the feudal system in England was preparing, through the 12th and 13th centuries, a nation in arms absolutely unique in the middle ages. The Scottish and Welsh wars were, of course, fought by the feudal levy, but this levy was far from being the mob of unwilling peasants usual abroad, and from the _fyrd_ came the English archers, whose fame was established by Edward I.'s wars, and carried to the continent by Edward III. Edward III. realized that there was better material to be had in his own country than abroad, and the army with which he invaded France was an army of national mercenaries, or, more simply, of English soldiers. The army at Crecy was composed exclusively of English, Welsh and Irish. From the pay list of the army at the siege of Calais (1346) it appears that all ranks, from the prince of Wales downward, were paid, no attempt being made to force even the feudal nobles to serve abroad at their own expense. These armies were raised mainly by contracts entered into "with some knight or gentleman expert in war, and of great revenue and livelihood in the country, to serve the king in war with a number of men." Copies of the indentures executed when Henry V. raised his army for the invasion of France in 1415 are in existence. Under these the contracting party agreed to serve the king abroad for one year, with a given number of men equipped according to agreement, and at a stipulated rate of pay. A certain sum was usually paid in advance, and in many cases the crown jewels and plate were given in pledge for the rest. The profession of arms seems to have been profitable. The pay of the soldier was high as compared with that of the ordinary labourer, and he had the prospect of a share of plunder in addition, so that it was not difficult to raise men where the commander had a good military reputation. Edward III. is said to have declined the services of numbers of foreign mercenaries who wished to enrol under him in his wars against France.

The funds for the payment of these armies were provided partly from the royal revenues, partly from the fines paid in lieu of military service, and other fines arbitrarily imposed, and partly by grants from parliament. As the soldier's contract usually ended with the war, and the king had seldom funds to renew it even if he so wished, the armies disbanded of themselves at the close of each war. To secure the services of the soldier during his contract, acts were passed (18 Henry VI. c. 19; and 7 Henry VII. c. 1) inflicting penalties for desertion; and in Edward VI.'s reign an act "touching the true service of captains and soldiers" was passed, somewhat of the nature of a Mutiny Act.

61. It is difficult to summarize the history of the army between the Hundred Years' War and 1642. The final failure of the English arms in France was soon followed by the Wars of the Roses, and in the long period of civil strife the only national force remaining to England was the Calais garrison. Henry VIII. was a soldier-king, but he shared the public feeling for the old bow and bill, and English armies which served abroad did not, it seems, win the respect of the advanced professional soldiers of the continent. In 1519 the Venetian ambassador described the English forces as consisting of 150,000 men whose peculiar, though not exclusive, weapon was the long bow (Fortescue i. 117). The national levy made in 1588 to resist the Armada and the threat of invasion produced about 750 lancers (heavy-armed cavalry), 2000 light horse and 56,000 foot, beside 20,000 men employed in watching the coasts. The small proportion of mounted men is very remarkable in a country in which Cromwell was before long to illustrate the full power of cavalry on the battlefield. It is indeed not unfair to regard this army as a miscellaneous levy of inferior quality.

It was in cavalry that England was weakest, and by three different acts it was sought to improve the breed of horses, though the light horse of the northern counties had a good reputation, and even won the admiration of the emperor Charles V. Perhaps the best organized force in England at this time was the London volunteer association which ultimately became the Honourable Artillery Company. At Floddon the spirit of the old English yeomanry triumphed over the outward form of continental battalions which the Scots had adopted, and doubtless the great victory did much to retard military progress in England. The chief service of Henry VIII. to the British army was the formation of an artillery train, in which he took a special interest. Before he died the forces came to consist of a few permanent troops (the bodyguard and the fortress artillery service), the militia or general levy, which was for home, and indeed for county, service only, and the paid armies which were collected for a foreign war and disbanded at the conclusion of peace, and were recruited on the same principle of indents which had served in the Hundred Years' War. In the reign of Mary, the old Statute of Winchester was revised (1553), and the new act provided for a readjustment of the county contingents and in some degree for the rearmament of the militia. But, from the fall of Calais and the expedition to Havre up to the battle of the Dunes a century later, the intervention of British forces in foreign wars was always futile and generally disastrous. During this time, however, the numerous British regiments in the service of Holland learned, in the long war of Dutch independence, the art of war as it had developed on the continent since 1450, and assimilated the regimental system and the drill and armament of the best models. Thus it was that in 1642 there were many hundreds of trained and war-experienced officers and sergeants available for the armies of the king and the parliament. By this time bows and bills had long disappeared even from the militia, and the Thirty Years' War, which, even more than the Low Countries, offered a career for the adventurous man, contributed yet more trained officers and soldiers to the English and Scottish forces. So closely indeed was war now studied by Englishmen that the respective adherents of the Dutch and the Swedish systems quarrelled on the eve of the battle of Edgehill. Francis and Horace Vere, Sir John Norris, and other Englishmen had become generals of European reputation. Skippon, Astley, Goring, Rupert, and many others soon to be famous were distinguished as company and regimental officers in the battles and sieges of Germany and the Low Countries.

The home forces of England had, as has been said, little or nothing to revive their ancient renown. Instead, they had come to be regarded as a menace to the constitution. In Queen Elizabeth's time the demands of the Irish wars had led to frequent forced levies, and the occasional billeting of the troops in England also gave rise to murmurs, but the brilliancy and energy of her reign covered a great deal, and the peaceful policy of her successor removed all immediate cause of complaint. But after the accession of Charles I. we find the army a constant and principal source of dispute between the king and parliament, until under William III. it is finally established on a constitutional footing. Charles, wishing to support the Elector Palatine in the Thirty Years' War, raised an army of 10,000 men. He was already encumbered with debts, and the parliament refused all grants, on which he had recourse to forced loans. The army was sent to Spain, but returned without effecting anything, and was not disbanded, as usual, but billeted on the inhabitants. The billeting was the more deeply resented as it appeared that the troops were purposely billeted on those who had resisted the loan. Forced loans, billeting and martial law--all directly connected with the maintenance of the army--formed the main substance of the grievances set forth in the Petition of Right. In accepting this petition, Charles gave up the right to maintain an army without consent of parliament; and when in 1639 he wished to raise one to act against the rebellious Scots, parliament was called together, and its sanction obtained, on the plea that the army was necessary for the defence of England. This army again became the source of dispute between the king and parliament, and finally both sides appealed to arms.

62. The first years of the Great Rebellion (q.v.) showed primarily the abundance of good officers produced by the wars on the continent, and in the second place the absolute inadequacy of the military system of the country; the commissions of array, militia ordinances, &c., had at last to give way to regular methods of enlistment and a central army administration. It was clear, at the same time, that when the struggle was one of principles and not of dynastic politics, excellent recruits, far different from the wretched levies who had been gathered together for the Spanish war, were to be had in any reasonable number. These causes combined to produce the "New Model" which, originating in Cromwell's own cavalry and the London trained bands of foot, formed of picked men and officers, severely disciplined, and organized and administered in the right way, quickly proved its superiority over all other armies in the field, and in a few years raised its general to supreme civil power. The 15th of February 1645 was the birthday of the British standing army, and from its first concentration at Windsor Park dates the scarlet uniform. The men were for the most part voluntarily enlisted from existing corps, though deficiencies had immediately to be made good by impressment.

Four months later the New Model decided the quarrel of king and parliament at Naseby. When Cromwell, the first lieutenant-general and the second captain-general of the army, sent his veterans to take part in the wars of the continent they proved themselves a match for the best soldiers in Europe. On the restoration of the monarchy in 1660 the army, now some 80,000 strong, was disbanded. It had enforced the execution of Charles I., it had dissolved parliament, and England had been for years governed under a military regime. Thus the most popular measure of the Restoration was the dissolution of the army. Only Monk's regiment of foot (now the Coldstream Guards) survived to represent the New Model in the army of to-day. At the same time the troops (now regiments) of household cavalry, and the regiment of foot which afterwards became the Grenadier Guards, were formed, chiefly from Royalists, though the disbanded New Model contributed many experienced recruits. The permanent forces of the crown came to consist once more of the "garrisons and guards," maintained by the king from the revenue allotted to him for carrying on the government of the country. The "garrisons" were commissioned to special fortresses--the Tower of London, Portsmouth, &c. The "guards" comprised the sovereign's bodyguards ("the yeomen of the guard" and "gentlemen-at-arms," who had existed since the times of Henry VII. and VIII.), and the regiments mentioned above. Even this small force, at first not exceeding 3000 men, was looked on with jealousy by parliament, and every attempt to increase it was opposed. The acquisition of Tangier and Bombay, as part of the dower of the infanta of Portugal, led to the formation of a troop of horse (now the 1st Royal Dragoons) and a regiment of infantry (the 2nd, now Queen's R.W. Surrey, regiment) for the protection of the former; and a regiment of infantry (afterwards transferred to the East India Company) to hold the latter (1661). These troops, not being stationed in the kingdom, created no distrust; but whenever, as on several occasions during Charles's reign, considerable armies were raised, they were mostly disbanded when the occasion ceased. Several regiments, however, were added to the permanent force, including Dumbarton's regiment (the 1st or Royal Scots, nicknamed Pontius Pilate's Bodyguard)--which had a long record of service in the armies of the continent, and represented the Scots brigade of Gustavus Adolphus's army--and the 3rd Buffs, representing the English regiments of the Dutch army and through them the volunteers of 1572, and on Charles's death in 1685 the total force of "guards and garrisons" had risen to 16,500, of whom about one-half formed what we should now call the standing army.

63. James II., an experienced soldier and sailor, was more obstinate than his predecessor in his efforts to increase the army, and Monmouth's rebellion afforded him the opportunity. A force of about 20,000 men was maintained in England, and a large camp formed at Hounslow. Eight cavalry and twelve infantry regiments (the senior of which was the 7th "Royal" Fusiliers, formed on a new French model) were raised, and given the numbers which, with few exceptions, they still bear. James even proposed to disband the militia, which had not distinguished itself in the late rebellion, and further augment the standing army; and although the proposal was instantly rejected, he continued to add to the army till the Revolution deprived him of his throne. The army which he had raised was to a great extent disbanded, the Irish soldiers especially, whom he had introduced in large numbers on account of their religion, being all sent home.

The condition of the army immediately engaged the attention of parliament. The Bill of Rights had definitely established that "the raising or keeping of a standing army within the kingdom, unless it be by the consent of parliament, is against the law," and past experience made them very jealous of such a force. But civil war was imminent, foreign war certain; and William had only a few Dutch troops, and the remains of James's army, with which to meet the storm. Parliament therefore sanctioned a standing army, trusting to the checks established by the Bill of Rights and Act of Settlement, and by placing the pay of the army under the control of the Commons. An event soon showed the altered position of the army. A regiment mutinied and declared for James. It was surrounded and compelled to lay down its arms; but William found himself without legal power to deal with the mutineers. He therefore applied to parliament, and in 1689 was passed the first Mutiny Act, which, after repeating the provisions regarding the army inserted in the Bill of Rights, and declaring the illegality of martial law, gave power to the crown to deal with the offences of mutiny and desertion by courts-martial. From this event is often dated the history of the standing army as a constitutional force (but see Fortescue, _British Army_, i. 335).

64. Under William the army was considerably augmented. The old regiments of James's army were reorganized, retaining, however, their original numbers, and three of cavalry and eleven of infantry (numbered to the 28th) were added. In 1690 parliament sanctioned a force of 62,000 men, further increased to 65,000 in 1691; but on peace being made in 1697 the Commons immediately passed resolutions to the effect that the land forces be reduced to 7000 men in England and 12,000 in Ireland. The War of the Spanish Succession quickly obliged Great Britain again to raise a large army, at one time exceeding 200,000 men; but of these the greater number were foreign troops engaged for the continental war. Fortescue (_op. cit._ i. 555) estimates the British forces at home and abroad as 70,000 men at the highest figure. After the peace of Utrecht the force was again reduced to 8000 men in Great Britain and 11,000 in the plantations (i.e. colonies) and abroad. From that time to the present the strength of the army has been determined by the annual votes of parliament, and though frequently the subject of warm debates in both houses, it has ceased to be a matter of dispute between the crown and parliament. The following table shows the fluctuations from that time onward--the peace years showing the average peace strength, the war years the maximum to which the forces were raised:--

PEACE. | WAR.
Year. Number. | Year. Number.
1750 18,857 | 1745 74,187
1793 17,013 | 1761 67,776
1822 71,790 | 1777 90,734
1845 100,011 | 1812 245,996
1857 156,995 | 1856 275,079
1866 203,404 | 1858 222,784

_Note._--Prior to 1856 the British forces serving in India are not
included.

During William's reign the small English army bore an honourable part in the wars against Louis XIV., and especially distinguished itself under the king at Steinkirk, Neerwinden and Namur. Twenty English regiments took part in the campaign of 1694. In the great wars of Queen Anne's reign the British army under Marlborough acquired a European reputation. The cavalry, which had called forth the admiration of Prince Eugene when passed in review before him after its long march across Germany (1704), especially distinguished itself in the battle of Blenheim, and Ramillies, Oudenarde and Malplaquet were added to the list of English victories. But the army as usual was reduced at once, and even the cadres of old regiments were disbanded, though the alarm of Jacobite insurrections soon brought about the re-creation of many of these. During the reign of the first and second Georges an artillery corps was organized, and the army further increased by five regiments of cavalry and thirty-five of infantry. Fresh laurels were won at Dettingen (1743), in which battle twenty English regiments took part; and though Fontenoy (q.v.) was a day of disaster for the English arms, it did not lower their reputation, but rather added to it. Six regiments of infantry won the chief glory of Prince Ferdinand's victory of Minden (q.v.) in 1759, and throughout the latter part of the Seven Years' War the British contingent of Ferdinand's army served with almost unvarying distinction in numerous actions. About this time the first English regiments were sent to India, and the 39th shared in Clive's victory at Plassey. During the first half of George III.'s reign the army was principally occupied in America; and though the conquest of Canada may be counted with pride among its exploits, this page in its history is certainly the darkest. English armies capitulated at Saratoga and at Yorktown, and the war ended by the evacuation of the revolted states of America and the acknowledgment of their independence.

65. Before passing to the great French Revolutionary wars, from which a fresh period in the history of the army may be dated, it will be well to review the general condition of the army in the preceding century, injured as it was by the distrust of parliament and departmental weakness and corruption which went far to neutralize the good work of the duke of Cumberland as commander-in-chief and of Pitt as war administrator. Regiments were raised almost as in the days of the Edwards. The crown contracted with a distinguished soldier, or gentleman of high position, who undertook to raise the men, receiving a certain sum as bounty-money for each recruit. In some cases, in lieu of money, the contractor received the nomination of all or some of the officers, and recouped himself by selling the commissions. This system--termed "raising men for rank"--was retained for many years, and originally helped to create the "purchase system" of promotion. For the maintenance of the regiment the colonel received an annual sum sufficient to cover the pay of the men, and the expenses of clothing and of recruiting. The colonel was given a "beating order," without which no enlistment was legal, and was responsible for maintaining his regiment at full strength. "Muster masters" were appointed to muster the regiments, and to see that the men for whom pay was drawn were really effective. Sometimes, when casualties were numerous, the allowance was insufficient to meet the cost of recruiting, and special grants were made. In war time the ranks were also filled by released debtors, pardoned criminals, and impressed paupers and vagrants. Where the men were raised by voluntary enlistment, the period of service was a matter of contract between the colonel and the soldier, and the engagement was usually for life; but exceptional levies were enlisted for the duration of war, or for periods of three or five years. As for the officers, the low rate of pay and the purchase system combined to exclude all but men of independent incomes. Appointments (except when in the gift of the colonel) were made by the king at home, and by the commander-in-chief abroad; even in Ireland the power of appointment rested with the local commander of the forces until the Union. The soldier was clothed by his colonel, the charge being defrayed from the "stock fund." The army lived in barracks, camps or billets. The barrack accommodation in Great Britain at the beginning of the 18th century only sufficed for five thousand men; and though it had gradually risen to twenty thousand in 1792, a large part of the army was constantly in camps and billets--the latter causing endless complaints and difficulties.

66. The first efforts of the army in the long war with France did not tend to raise its reputation amongst the armies of Europe. The campaigns of allied armies under the duke of York in the Netherlands, in which British contingents figured largely, were uniformly unsuccessful (1793-94 and 1799), though in this respect they resembled those of almost all soldiers who commanded against the "New French" army. The policy of the younger Pitt sent thousands of the best soldiers to unprofitable employment, and indeed to death, in the West Indies. At home the administration was corrupt and ineffective, and the people generally shared the contemptuous feeling towards the regular army which was then prevalent in Europe. But a better era began with the appointment of Frederick Augustus, duke of York, as commander-in-chief of the army. He did much to improve its organization, discipline and training, and was ably seconded by commanders of distinguished ability. Under Abercromby in Egypt, under Stuart at Maida, and under Lake, Wellesley and others in India, the British armies again attached victory to their standards, and made themselves feared and respected. Later, Napoleon's threat of invading England excited her martial spirit to the highest pitch to which it had ever attained. Finally, her military glory was raised by the series of successful campaigns in the Peninsula, until it culminated in the great victory of Waterloo; and the army emerged from the war with the most solidly founded reputation of any in Europe.

The events of this period belong to the history of Europe, and fall outside the province of an article dealing only with the army. The great augmentations required during the war were effected partly by raising additional regiments, but principally by increasing the number of battalions, some regiments being given as many as four. On the conclusion of peace these battalions were reduced, but the regiments were retained, and the army was permanently increased from about twenty thousand, the usual peace establishment before the war, to an average of eighty thousand. The duke of York, on first appointment to the command, had introduced a uniform drill throughout the army, which was further modified according to Sir David Dundas's system in 1800; and, under the direction of Sir John Moore and others, a high perfection of drill was attained. At the beginning of the war, the infantry, like that of the continental powers, was formed in three ranks; but a two-rank formation had been introduced in America and in India and gradually became general, and in 1809 was finally approved. In the Peninsula the army was permanently organized in divisions, usually consisting of two brigades of three or four battalions each, and one or two batteries of artillery. The duke of Wellington had also brought the commissariat and the army transport to a high pitch of perfection, but in the long peace which followed these establishments were reduced or broken up.

67. The period which elapsed between Waterloo and the Crimean War is marked by a number of Indian and colonial wars, but by no organic changes in the army, with perhaps the single exception of the Limited Service Act of 1847, by which enlistment for ten or twelve years, with power to re-engage to complete twenty-one, was substituted for the life enlistments hitherto in force. The army went to sleep on the laurels and recollections of the Peninsula. The duke of Wellington, for many years commander-in-chief, was too anxious to hide it away in the colonies in order to save it from further reductions or utter extinction, to attempt any great administrative reforms. The force which was sent to the Crimea in 1854 was an agglomeration of battalions, individually of the finest quality, but unused to work together, without trained staff, administrative departments or army organization of any kind. The lesson of the winter before Sevastopol was dearly bought, but was not thrown away. From that time successive war ministers and commanders-in-chief have laboured perseveringly at the difficult task of army organization and administration. Foremost in the work was Sidney Herbert (Lord Herbert of Lea), the soldier's friend, who fell a sacrifice to his labours (1861), but not before he had done much for the army. The whole system of administration was revised. In 1854 it was inconceivably complicated and cumbersome. The "secretary of state for war and colonies," sitting at the Colonial Office, had a general but vague control, practically limited to times of war. The "secretary at war" was the parliamentary representative of the army, and exercised a certain financial control, not extending, however, to the ordnance corps. The commander-in-chief was responsible to the sovereign alone in all matters connected with the discipline, command or patronage of the army, but to the secretary at war in financial matters. The master-general and board of ordnance were responsible for the supply of material on requisition, but were otherwise independent, and had the artillery and engineers under them. The commissariat department had its headquarters at the treasury, and until 1852 the militia were under the home secretary. A number of minor subdepartments, more or less independent, also existed, causing endless confusion, correspondence and frequent collision. In 1854 the business of the colonies was separated from that of war, and the then secretary of state, the duke of Newcastle, assumed control over all the other administrative officers. In the following year the secretary of state was appointed secretary at war also, and the duties of the two offices amalgamated. The same year the commissariat office was transferred to the war department, and the Board of Ordnance abolished, its functions being divided between the commander-in-chief and the secretary of state. The minor departments were gradually absorbed, and the whole administration divided under two great chiefs, sitting at the war office and Horse Guards respectively. In 1870 these two were welded into one, and the war office now existing was constituted.

Corresponding improvements were effected in every branch. The system of clothing the soldiers was altered, the contracts being taken from the colonels of regiments, who received a money allowance instead, and the clothing supplied from government manufactories. The pay, food and general condition of the soldier were improved; reading and recreation rooms, libraries, gymnasia and facilities for games of all kinds being provided. Barracks (q.v.) were built on improved principles, and a large permanent camp was formed at Aldershot, where considerable forces were collected and manoeuvred together. Various educational establishments were opened, a staff college was established for the instruction of officers wishing to qualify for the staff, and regimental schools were improved.

68. The Indian Mutiny of 1857, followed by the transference of the government of India, led to important changes. The East India Company's white troops were amalgamated with the Queen's army, and the whole reorganized (see _Indian Army_ below).

The fact that such difficulties as those of 1854 and 1857, not to speak of the disorders of 1848, had been surmounted by the weak army which remained over from the reductions of forty years, coupled with the instantaneous and effective rejoinder to the threats of the French colonels in 1859--the creation of the Volunteer Force--certainly lulled the nation and its representatives into a false sense of security. Thus the two obvious lessons of the German successes of 1866 and 1870--the power of a national army for offensive invasion, and the rapidity with which such an army when thoroughly organized could be moved--created the greatest sensation in England. The year 1870 is, therefore, of prime importance in the history of the regular forces of the crown. The strength of the home forces at different times between 1815 and 1870 is given as follows (Biddulph, _Lord Cardwell at the War Office_):--

+------+-----------------+--------------+-------------+
| | Regulars. | Auxiliaries. | Field Guns. |
+------+-----------------+--------------+-------------+
| 1820 | 64,426 | 60,740 | 22 |
| 1830 | 50,876 | 34,614 | 30 |
| 1840 | 53,379 | 20,791 | 30 |
| 1850 | 68,538 | 29,868 | 70 |
| 1860 | 100,701 | 229,301 | 180 |
| 1870 | 89,051 | 281,692 | 180 |
| | (later 109,000) | | |
+------+-----------------+--------------+-------------+

69. The period of reform commences therefore with 1870, and is connected indissolubly with the name of Edward, Lord Cardwell, secretary of state for war 1869-1874. In the matter of organization the result of his labours was seen in the perfectly arranged expedition to Ashanti (1874); as for recruiting, the introduction of short service and reserve enlistment together with many rearrangements of pay, &c., proved so far popular that the number of men annually enlisted was more than trebled (11,742 in 1869; 39,971 in 1885; 40,729 in 1898), and so far efficient that "Lord Cardwell's ... system, with but small modification, gave us during the Boer War 80,000 reservists, of whom 96 or 97% were found efficient, and has enabled us to keep an army of 150,000 regulars in the field for 15 months" (Rt. Hon. St John Brodrick, House of Commons, 8th of March 1901). The localization of the army, subsequently completed by the territorial system of 1882, was commenced under Cardwell's regime, and a measure which encountered much powerful opposition at the time, the abolition of the purchase of commissions, was also effected by him (1871). The machinery of administration was improved, and autumn manoeuvres were practised on a scale hitherto unknown in England. In 1871 certain powers over the militia, formerly held by lords-lieutenant, were transferred to the crown, and the auxiliary forces were placed directly under the generals commanding districts. In 1881 came an important change in the infantry of the line, which was entirely remodelled in two-battalion regiments bearing territorial titles. This measure (the "linked battalion" system) aroused great opposition; it was dictated chiefly by the necessity of maintaining the Indian and colonial garrisons at full strength, and was begun during Lord Cardwell's tenure of office, the principle being that each regiment should have one battalion at home and one abroad, the latter being fed by the former, which in its turn drew upon the reserve to complete it for war. The working of the system is to be considered as belonging to present practice rather than to history, and the reader is therefore referred to the article UNITED KINGDOM. On these general lines the army progressed up to 1899, when the Boer War called into the field on a distant theatre of war all the resources of the regular army, and in addition drew largely upon the existing auxiliary forces, and even upon wholly untrained civilians, for the numbers required to make war in an area which comprised nearly all Africa south of the Zambezi. As the result of this war (see TRANSVAAL) successive schemes of reform were undertaken by the various war ministers, leading up to Mr Haldane's "territorial" scheme (1908), which put the organization of the forces in the United Kingdom (q.v.) on a new basis.

Innovations had not been unknown in the period immediately preceding the war; as a single example we may take the development of the mounted infantry (q.v.). It was natural that the war itself, and especially a war of so peculiar a character, should intensify the spirit of innovation. The corresponding period in the German army lasted from 1871 to 1888, and such a period of unsettlement is indeed the common, practically the universal, result of a war on a large scale. Much that was of value in the Prussian methods, faithfully and even slavishly copied by Great Britain as by others after 1870, was temporarily forgotten, but the pendulum swung back again, and the Russo-Japanese War led to the disappearance, so far as Europe was concerned, of many products of the period of doubt and controversy which followed the struggle in South Africa. Side by side with continuous discussions of the greater questions of military policy, amongst these being many well-reasoned proposals for universal service, the technical and administrative efficiency of the service has undergone great improvement, and this appears to be of more real and permanent value than the greater part of the solutions given for the larger problems. The changes in the organization of the artillery afford the best evidence of this spirit of practical and technical reform. In the first place the old "royal regiment" was divided into two branches. The officers for the field and horse artillery stand now on one seniority list for promotion, the garrison, heavy and mountain batteries on another. In each branch important changes of organization have been also made. In the field branch, both for Royal Field and Royal Horse Artillery, the battery is no longer the one unit for all purposes. A lieutenant-colonel's command, the "brigade," has been created. It consists of a group, in the horse artillery of two, in the field artillery of three batteries. For the practical training of the horse and field artillery a large area of ground on the wild open country of Dartmoor, near Okehampton, has for some years been utilized. A similar school has been started at Glen Imaal in Ireland, and a new training ground has been opened on Salisbury Plain. Similarly, with the Royal Garrison Artillery a more perfect system has been devised for the regulation and practice of the fire of each fortress, in accordance with the varying circumstances of its position, &c. A practice school for the garrison artillery has been established at Lydd, but the various coast fortresses themselves carry out regular practice with service ammunition.

INDIAN ARMY

70. Historically, the Indian army grew up in three distinct divisions, the Bengal, Madras and Bombay armies. This separation was the natural result of the original foundation of separate settlements and factories in India; and each retains to the present day much of its old identity.

_Bengal._--The English traders in Bengal were long restricted by the
native princes to a military establishment of an ensign and 30 men;
and this force may be taken as the germ of the Indian army. In 1681
Bengal received the first reinforcement from Madras, and two years
later a company was sent from Madras, raising the little Bengal army
to a strength of 250 Europeans. In 1695 native soldiers were first
enlisted. In 1701-1702 the garrison of Calcutta consisted of 120
soldiers and seamen gunners. In 1756 occurred the defence of Calcutta
against Suraj-ud-Dowlah, and the terrible tragedy of the Black Hole.
The work of reconquest and punishment was carried out by an expedition
from Madras, and in the little force with which Clive gained the great
victory of Plassey the Bengal army was represented by a few hundred
men only (the British 39th, now Dorsetshire regiment, which was also
present, was the first King's regiment sent to India, and bears the
motto _Primus in Indis_); but from this date the military power of the
Company rapidly increased. A company of artillery had been organized
in 1748; and in 1757, shortly before Plassey, the 1st regiment of
Bengal native infantry was raised. Next, in 1759 the native infantry
was augmented, in 1760 dragoons were raised, and in 1763 the total
forces amounted to 1500 Europeans and 12 battalions of native infantry
(11,500 men). In 1765 the European infantry was divided into 3
regiments, and the whole force was organized in 3 brigades, each
consisting of 1 company of artillery, 1 regiment European infantry, 1
troop of native cavalry, and 7 battalions of sepoys. In 1766, on the
reduction of some money allowances, a number of officers of the Bengal
army agreed to resign their commissions simultaneously. This dangerous
combination was promptly put down by Clive, to whom the Bengal army
may be said to owe its existence.

The constant wars and extensions of dominion of the next thirty years
led to further augmentations; the number of brigades and of European
regiments was increased to 6; and in 1794 the Bengal army numbered
about 3500 Europeans and 24,000 natives.