Chapter VIII: Front Matter (8)

89. The _Saxon Army_ formerly played a prominent part in all the wars of northern Europe, chiefly in connexion with Poland. In the War of the Austrian Succession the Saxon army played a prominent part, but in the end it suffered a heavy defeat in the battle of Kesselsdorf (1745). In the Seven Years' War Saxony was overrun by the Prussians almost without resistance, and the military forces of the country under Field Marshal Rutowski were forced to surrender _en masse_ at Pirna (1756); the men were compelled by Frederick the Great to join the Prussian army, and fought, though most unwillingly, through the remainder of the war as Prussian soldiers. A few outlying regiments which had not been involved in the catastrophe served with the Austrians, and on one occasion at least, at Kolin, inflicted a severe blow on the Prussians. At the outbreak of the wars of the French Revolution the Saxon army was over 30,000 strong. It took part in the campaign of Jena on the side of the Prussians, and during the Napoleonic domination in Germany Saxony furnished strong contingents to the armies of Napoleon, who in return recognized her elector as king, and largely increased his territories. The newly made king remained faithful to Napoleon even in his reverses; but the army was too German in feeling to fight willingly under the French flag. Their defection at Leipzig contributed not a little to the results of that bloody day. After the peace the king was shorn of a great part of his dominions, and the army was reconstituted on a smaller scale. In 1866 Saxony sided with Austria, and her army shared in the disasters of the brief campaign and the crowning defeat at Koniggratz. Under the crown prince's leadership, however, the Saxons distinguished themselves by their courage and steadiness wherever they were engaged. After the war Saxony became part of the North German Confederation, and in 1870-1871 her troops, under the command of the crown prince, formed the XII. corps of the great German army. They were assigned to the II. army of Prince Frederick Charles, and delivered the decisive attack on the French right at Gravelotte. Subsequently a IV. army was formed under the command of the crown prince, in which the XII. corps, now under Prince George of Saxony, served with unvarying credit in the campaign of Sedan and the siege of Paris. The Saxon army is now organized in every respect on Prussian lines, and forms two army corps (XII. at Dresden and XIX. at Leipzig) of the German army. The German emperor, in concert with the king of Saxony, names the officers for the higher commands. Saxony retains, however, her separate war ministry, budget, &c.; and appointments and promotion to all but the highest commands are made by the king. The colours of the older Saxon forces, and especially the green of the tunics, are retained in many of the uniforms of the present day.

90. The _Bavarian Army_ has perhaps the most continuous record of good
service in the field of any of the minor German armies. The oldest
regiments date from the Thirty Years' War, in which the veteran army
of the Catholic league, commanded by Count Tilly and formed on the
nucleus of the Bavarian army, played a conspicuous part. Later in the
war the Bavarian general, Count Mercy, proved himself a worthy
opponent of Turenne and Conde. Henceforward the Bavarians were engaged
in almost every war between France and Austria, taking part
successively in the wars of the Grand Alliance, the Spanish Succession
(in which they came into conflict with the English), and the Polish
and Austrian Succession wars. In pursuance of the traditional
anti-Austrian policy, the troops of Bavaria, led by a distinguished
Bavarian, Marshal (Prince) Wrede, served in the campaigns of 1805 to
1813 side by side with the French, and Napoleon made the electorate
into a kingdom. But in 1813 Bavaria joined the Alliance, and Wrede
tried to intercept the French on their retreat from Leipzig. Napoleon,
however, inflicted a severe defeat on his old general at Hanau, and
opened his road to France. In 1866 the Bavarians took part against
Prussia, but owing to their dilatoriness in taking the field, the
Prussians were able to beat them in detail. In 1870, reorganized to
some extent on Prussian lines, they joined their former enemy in the
war against France, and bore their full share in the glories and
losses of the campaign, the II. Bavarian corps having suffered more
heavily than any but the III. Prussian corps. The I. Bavarian corps
distinguished itself very greatly at Sedan and on the Loire. Bavaria
still retains her separate war office and special organization, and
the troops have been less affected by the Prussian influence than
those of the other states. The Bavarian corps are numbered separately
(I. Bav., Munich; II. Bav., Wurzburg; III. Bav., Nuremberg), and the
old light blue uniforms and other distinctive peculiarities of detail
are still maintained.

91. _Wurttemberg_ furnishes one army corps (XIII.; headquarters,
Stuttgart), organized, clothed and equipped in all respects like the
Prussian army. Like the Bavarians, the Wurttembergers fought against
the Prussians in 1866, but in 1870 made common cause with them against
the French, and by the convention entered into the following year
placed their army permanently under the command of the Prussian king
as emperor. The emperor nominates to the highest commands, but the
king of Wurttemberg retains the nomination and appointment of officers
in the lower grades.

92. The old _Hanoverian Army_ disappeared, of course, with the
annexation of Hanover to Prussia in 1866, but it is still represented
officially by certain regiments of the X. army corps, and, in one case
at least, battle honours won by the King's German Legion in the
British service are borne on German colours of to-day. The _Hessian
Army_ is now represented by the XXV. (Grand-ducal Hessian) division,
which forms part of the XVIII. army corps.

ITALIAN ARMY

93. The old conscription law of the kingdom of Sardinia is the basis of the military organization of Italy, as its constitution is of that of the modern Italian kingdom. The Piedmontese have long borne a high reputation for their military qualities, a reputation shared by the rulers of the house of Savoy (q.v.), many of whom showed special ability in preserving the independence of their small kingdom between two such powerful neighbours as France and Austria. During the wars of the French Revolution Piedmont was temporarily absorbed into the French republic and empire. The Italian troops who fought under Napoleon proved themselves, in many if not most cases, the best of the French allies, and Italy contributed large numbers of excellent general officers to the _Grande Armee_.

After 1815 various causes combined to place Piedmont (Sardinia) at the
head of the national movement which agitated Italy during the ensuing
thirty years, and bring her in direct antagonism to Austria. Charles
Albert, her then ruler, had paid great attention to the army, and when
Italy rose against Austria in 1848 he took the field with an excellent
force of nearly 70,000 men. At the outset fortune favoured the arms of
Italy; but the genius and energy of Radetzky, the veteran Austrian
commander, turned the tide, and in the summer of 1849 after many
battles the Piedmontese army was decisively defeated at Novara, and
her king compelled to sue for peace. Charles Albert abdicated in
favour of his son Victor Emanuel, a prince who had already
distinguished himself by his personal gallantry in the field. Under
his care the army soon recovered its efficiency, and the force which
joined the allied armies in the Crimea attracted general admiration
from the excellence of its organization, equipment and discipline. In
1859 Piedmont again took up arms against Austria for the liberation of
Italy; but this time she had the powerful assistance of France, and
played but a subordinate part herself. In this campaign the Sardinian
army was composed of one cavalry and five infantry divisions, and
numbered about 60,000 combatants. By the peace of Villafranca, Italy,
with the exception of Venetia, was freed from the Austrians, and
Lombardy was added to Piedmont. The revolutionary campaign of
Garibaldi in the following year united the whole peninsula under the
rule of Victor Emanuel, and in 1866, when Italy for the third time
took up arms against Austria--this time as the ally of Prussia--her
forces had risen to nearly 450,000, of whom about 270,000 actually
took the field. But in quality these were far from being equal to the
old Piedmontese army; and the northern army, under the personal
command of the king, was decisively defeated at Custozza by the
archduke Albert of Austria.

The existing organization of the Italian army is determined by the
laws of 1873, which made universal liability to service the basis of
recruiting. The territorial system has not, however, been adopted at
the same time, the materials of which the Italian army is composed
varying so much that it was decided to blend the different types of
soldiers so far as possible by causing them to serve together. The
colonial wars in which Italian troops have taken part have been marked
with great disasters, but relieved by the gallantry of the officers
and the rank and file.

RUSSIAN ARMY

94. The history of the Russian army begins with the abolition of the Strelitz (q.v.) by Peter the Great in 1698, the nucleus of the new forces being four regiments of foot, two of which are well known to-day under their old titles of Preobrazhenski and Semenovski. Throughout the 18th century Russian military progress obeyed successive dynasties of western European models--first those of Prussia, then those of France. In the earlier part of the 19th century the army, used chiefly in wars against the revolutionary spirit, became, like others of that time, a dynastic force; subsequently the "nation in arms" principle reasserted itself, and on this basis has been carried out the reorganization of Russia's military power. The enormous development of this since 1874 is one of the most striking phenomena in recent military history. In 1892, in expectation of a general European war, whole armies were massed in the districts of Warsaw and Vilna, three-fifths of the entire forces being in position on the German and Austrian frontiers.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 is generally held to have proved that
the fighting power of the Russian has in no way diminished in
intrinsic value from that of the days of Zorndorf, Borodino and
Sevastopol. The proverbial stubbornness of the rank and file is the
distinctive quality of the armies of the tsar, and in view of the
general adoption of two-years' service in other countries it is a
matter for grave consideration whether, against European forces and in
defence of their own homes, the Russians would not prove more than
formidable antagonists to the men of more highly individualized races
who are their probable opponents. Equally remarkable is the new power
of redistribution possessed by Russia. Formerly it was usual to count
upon one campaign at least elapsing before Russia could intervene
effectively in European wars; much, in fact the greater part, of her
losses in the Crimean War was due to the enormous distances which had
to be traversed on foot. Nowadays the original equal distribution of
the army over the country has been modified in accordance with the
political needs of each moment. In 1892 the centre of gravity was
shifted to Poland and Kiev, in 1904 the performances of the
trans-Siberian railway in transporting troops to the seat of war in
Manchuria excited the admiration of military Europe. The attitude of
the army in the troubles which followed upon the Japanese War belongs
to the history of Russia, not to that of military organization, and it
will be sufficient to say that the conduct of the "nation in arms" at
times of political unrest may vary between the extremes of
unquestioning obedience to authority and the most dangerous form of
licence, examples of both being frequent in the history of nearly all
national armies. A remarkable innovation in the modern history of this
army is the conversion of the whole of the cavalry, except a few
_elite_ regiments, into dragoons of the old type. After the war of
1904-5, however, this policy was reversed and the cavalry reformed on
the usual model. The Cossacks still retain to a large extent the
peculiarities of the light troops of the 18th century.

SPANISH ARMY

95. The feudal sovereignties of medieval Spain differed but little, in their military organization, from other feudal states. As usual, mercenaries were the only forces on which reliance was placed for foreign wars. These troops called _almugavares_ (Arabic = scouts) won a great reputation on Italian and Greek battlefields of the 13th century, and with many transformations in name and character appeared from time to time up to the Peninsular War. Castile, however, had a military system very different from the rest. The forces of the kingdom were composed of local contingents similar to the English _fyrd_, professional soldiers who were paid followers of the great lords, and the heavy cavalry of the military orders. The groups of cities called _Hermandades_, while they existed, also had permanent forces in their pay. At the union of Castile and Aragon the Castilian methods received a more general application. The new _Hermandad_ was partly a light cavalry, partly a police, and was organized in the ratio of one soldier to every hundred families. In the conquest of Grenada (1482-92) _mesnadas_ or contingents were furnished by the crown, the nobles and the cities, and permanently kept in the field. The _Hermandad_ served throughout the war as a matter of course. From the veterans of this war was drawn the army which in the Italian wars won its reputation as the first army in Europe.

In 1596 the home defence of Spain was reorganized and the _ordenanza_, or militia, which was then formed of all men not belonging to the still extant feudal contingents, was generally analogous to the system of "assizes at arms" in England. This _ordenanza_ served in the Peninsular War.

96. With the Italian wars of the early 16th century came the
development of the regular army; a brief account of its place in the
evolution of armies has been given above. Discipline, the feeling of
comradeship and soldierly honour were the qualities which marked out
the Spanish army as the model for others to follow, and for more than
a century the Spanish army maintained its prestige as the first in
Europe. The oldest regiments of the present Spanish army claiming
descent from the _tercios_ date from 1535. An officer whose regiment
was reduced commonly took a pike in some other corps (e.g. Tilly), the
_senor soldado_ was counted as a gentleman, and his wife and family
received state allowances. Nor was this army open only to Spaniards.
Walloons, Italians, Burgundians and other nationalities ruled over by
the Habsburgs all contributed their quotas. But the career of the old
army came to an end at Rocroi (1643), and after this the forces of the
monarchy began more and more to conform to the French model.

97. The military history of Spain from 1650 to 1700 is full of
incident, and in the long war of the Spanish Succession both the army
and the _ordenanza_ found almost continuous employment. They were now
organized, as were most other armies of Europe, on the lines of the
French army, and in 1714 the old _tercios_, which had served in the
Spanish Netherlands under Marlborough, were brought to Spain. The
king's regiment "Zamora" of the present army descends from one of
these which, as the _tercio_ of Bovadilla, had been raised in 1580.
The army underwent few changes of importance during the 18th century,
and it is interesting to note that there were never less than three
Irish regiments in the service. In 1808 the _Irlanda, Ultonia_ (=
Ulster) and _Hibernia_ regiments had come to consist (as had similar
corps in the French service before the Revolution) largely of native
soldiers. At that time the Spanish army consisted of 119 Spanish and
foreign (Swiss, Walloon and Irish) battalions, with 24 cavalry
regiments and about 8000 artillery and engineers. There were further
51 battalions of militia, and the total forces numbered actually
137,000. The part played by the Spanish standing army in the
Peninsular War was certainly wholly insignificant relatively to these
figures. It must be borne in mind, however, that only continued wars
can give real value to long-service troops of the old style, and this
advantage the Spanish regulars did not possess. Further, the general
decadence of administration reacted in the usual way, the appointment
of court favourites to high command was a flagrant evil, and all that
can be urged is that the best elements of the army behaved as well as
did the Prussians of 1806, that the higher leading and the
administration of the army in the field were both sufficiently weak to
have ruined most armies, and that the men were drawn from the same
country and the same classes which furnished the _guerrilleros_ whom
it became fashionable to exalt at the expense of the soldiers. In the
later campaigns of Wellington, Spanish divisions did good service, and
the corps of La Romana (a picked contingent of troops which had been
sent before the war to Denmark at Napoleon's instance), though often
defeated, always retained some cohesion and discipline. But the result
of this war, the second French invasion, and the continued civil wars
of the 19th century was the destruction of the old army, and the
present army of Spain still bears traces of the confusion out of which
it arose.

The most important changes were in 1870, when conscription was
introduced, and in 1872, when universal service was proposed in its
place. The military virtues of the rank and file and the devotion of
the officers were conspicuously displayed in the Spanish-American War
of 1898, and it cannot be claimed even for the Germans of 1870 that
they fired so coolly and accurately as did the defenders of S. Juan
and El Caney.

TURKISH ARMY

98. The writers who have left the most complete and trustworthy contemporary accounts of the Turkish army in the 14th and 15th centuries, when it reached the height of its most characteristic development, are Bertrandon de la Brocquiere, equerry to Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy, and Francesco Filelfo of Tolentino. Bertrandon, a professional soldier, visited Palestine in 1432, and returned overland in 1433, traversing the Balkan Peninsula by the main trade-route from Constantinople to Belgrade. He wrote an account of his journey for Philip: see _Early Travels in Palestine_, translated and edited by T. Wright (London, 1848). Filelfo served as secretary to the Venetian _baylo_ at Constantinople, and recorded his observations in a series of letters (see FILELFO). Both ascribe the military superiority of the Turks over the nations of western Europe to two facts--firstly to their possession of a well-organized standing army, an institution unknown elsewhere, and secondly to their far stricter discipline, itself a result of their military organization and of the moral training afforded by Islam.

The regular troops comprised the Janissaries (q.v.), a corps of
infantry recruited from captured sons of Christians, and trained to
form a privileged caste of scientific soldiers and religious fanatics;
and the Spahis, a body of cavalry similarly recruited, and armed with
scimitar, mace and bow. Celibacy was one of the rules of this standing
army, which, in its semi-monastic ideals and constitution, resembled
the knightly orders of the West in their prime. The Janissaries
numbered about 12,000, the Spahis about 8000. A second army of some
40,000 men, mostly mounted and armed like the Spahis, was feudal in
character, and consisted chiefly of the personal followers of the
Moslem nobility; more than half its numbers were recruited in Europe.
This force of 60,000 trained soldiers was accompanied by a horde of
irregulars, levied chiefly among the barbarous mountaineers of the
Balkans and Asia Minor, and very ill-armed and ill-disciplined. Their
numbers may be estimated at 140,000, for Bertrandon gives 200,000 as
the total of the Turkish forces. Many 15th and 16th century writers
give a smaller total, but refer only to the standing and feudal
armies. Others place the total higher. Laonicus Chalcocondylas in his
_Turcica Historia_ states that at the siege of Constantinople in 1453
the sultan commanded 400,000 troops, but most other eye-witnesses of
the siege give a total varying from 150,000 to 300,000. Many Christian
soldiers of fortune enlisted with the Turks as artillerists or
engineers, and supplied them at Constantinople with the most powerful
cannon of the age. Other Christians were compelled to serve as
engineers or in the ranks. As late as 1683 a corps of Wallachians was
forced to join the Turkish army before Vienna, and entrusted with the
task of bridging the Danube. But in the 18th and early 19th centuries
the introduction of Christians tended to weaken the _moral_ of the
army already sapped by defeat; it was found impossible to maintain the
discipline of the Janissaries, whose privileges had become a source of
danger; and the feudal nobility became more and more independent of
the sultan's authority. These three causes contributed to make
reorganization inevitable.

The destruction of the Janissaries in 1826 marked the close of the
history of the old Turkish army; already the re-creation of the
service on the accepted models of western Europe had been commenced.
This was still incomplete when the new force was called upon to meet
the Russians in 1828, and though the army displayed its accustomed
bravery, its defective organization and other causes led to its
defeat. Since then the army has been almost as constantly on active
service as the British; the Crimean War, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877
and the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 witnessed the employment of a large
proportion of the sultan's available forces, while innumerable local
revolts in different parts of the empire called for great exertions,
and often for fierce fighting on the part of the troops locally in
garrison and those sent up from the nearest provinces.

UNITED STATES ARMY

99. The regular army of the United States has always been small. From the first it has been a voluntary force, and until 1898 its chief work in peace was to furnish numerous small posts on the frontier and amongst the Indians, and to act as a reserve to the civil power in the great cities. In war-time the regular army, if, as was usually the case, it was insufficient in numbers for the task of subduing the enemy, formed the nucleus of large armies raised "for the war." In 1790 the rank and file of the army, as fixed by act of Congress, amounted to 1216 men; and in 1814 an English expedition of only 3500 men was able to seize and burn Washington, the capital of a country which even then numbered eight millions of inhabitants. In 1861, at the beginning of the Civil War, the whole regular force amounted to about 15,300 men. In April of that year the president called out 75,000 volunteers for three months; and in May a further call for 42,000 was made. In July a call for 500,000 men was authorized by Congress, and as even this vast force proved insufficient it was found necessary to use a system of drafts. In October 1863 a levy of 300,000 men was ordered, and in February 1864 a further call of 500,000 was made. Finally, in the beginning of 1865 two further levies, amounting in all to 500,000 men, were ordered, but were only partially carried out in consequence of the cessation of hostilities. The total number of men called under arms by the government of the United States, between April 1861 and April 1865, amounted to 2,759,049, of whom 2,656,053 were actually embodied in the armies. If to these be added the 1,100,000 men embodied by the South during the same time, the total armed forces reach the enormous amount of nearly four millions, drawn from a population of only 32 millions--figures before which the celebrated uprising of the French nation in 1793, or the efforts of France and Germany in the Franco-German War, sink into insignificance. These 2,700,000 Federals were organized into volunteer regiments bearing state designations. The officers, except general and staff officers, were appointed by the governors of the respective states. The maximum authorized strength of the regular army never, during the war, exceeded 40,000 men; and the number in the field, especially towards the close of the war, was very much less. The states, in order to obtain men to fill their quotas, offered liberal bounties to induce men to enlist, and it therefore became very difficult to obtain recruits for the regular army, for which no bounties were given. The regular regiments accordingly dwindled away to skeletons. The number of officers present was also much reduced, since many of them, while retaining their regular commissions, held higher rank in the volunteer army. After the close of the Civil War the volunteers were mustered out; and by the act of Congress of the 28th of July 1866 the line of the army was made to consist of 10 regiments of cavalry of 12 troops each, 5 regiments of artillery of 12 batteries each and 45 regiments of infantry of 10 companies. The actual strength in August 1867 was 53,962. The act of the 3rd of March 1869 reduced the number of infantry regiments to 25 and the enlisted strength of the army to 35,036. The numbers were further reduced, without change in organization, to 32,788 in 1870 and to 25,000 in 1874. The latter number remained the maximum for twenty-four years.

In March 1898, in view of hostilities with Spain, the artillery was increased by 2 regiments, and, in April, 2 companies were added to each infantry regiment, giving it 3 battalions of 4 companies each. The strength of batteries, troops and companies was increased, the maximum enlisted strength reached during 1898 being over 63,000. A volunteer army was also organized. Of this army, 3 regiments of engineer troops, 3 of cavalry and 10 of infantry were United States volunteers, all the officers being commissioned by the president. The other organizations came from the states, the officers being appointed by the respective governors. As fast as they were organized and filled up, they were mustered into the service of the United States. The total number furnished for the war with Spain was 10,017 officers and 213,218 enlisted men. All general and staff officers were appointed by the president. Three hundred and eighty-seven officers of the regular army received volunteer commissions. After the conclusion of hostilities with Spain, the mustering out of the volunteers was begun, and by June 1899 all the volunteers, except those in the Philippines, were out of the service. The latter, as well as those serving elsewhere, having enlisted only for the war, were brought home and mustered out as soon as practicable.

The act of the 2nd of March 1899 added 2 batteries to each regiment of artillery. On the 2nd of February 1901 Congress passed an important bill providing for the reorganization and augmentation (max. 100,000) of the regular army, and other measures followed in the next years. (See UNITED STATES.)

MINOR ARMIES

100. _Dutch and Belgian Armies._--The military power of the "United
Provinces" dates its rise from the middle of the 16th century, when,
after a long and sanguinary struggle, they succeeded in emancipating
themselves from the yoke of Spain; and in the following century it
received considerable development in consequence of the wars they had
to maintain against Louis XIV. In 1702 they had in their pay upwards
of 100,000 men, including many English and Scottish regiments, besides
30,000 in the service of the Dutch East India Company. But the
slaughter of Malplaquet deprived the republic of the flower of the
army. Its part in the War of the Austrian Succession was far from
being as creditable as its earlier deeds, a Prussian army overran
Holland in 1787 almost without opposition, and at the beginning of the
wars of the French Revolution the army had fallen to 36,000 men. In
1795 Holland was conquered by the French under Pichegru, and in the
course of the changes which ensued the army was entirely reorganized,
and under French direction bore its share in the great wars of the
empire.

With the fall of Napoleon and the reconstitution of the Netherlands,
the Dutch-Belgian army, formed of the troops of the now united
countries, came into existence. The army fought at Waterloo, but was
not destined to a long career, for the revolution of 1830 brought
about the separation of Belgium. A Dutch garrison under Baron Chasse,
a distinguished veteran of the Napoleonic wars, defended Antwerp
against the French under Marshal Gerard, and the Netherlands have been
engaged in many arduous colonial wars in the East Indies. The Belgian
army similarly has contributed officers and non-commissioned officers
to the service of the Congo Free State.

101. _Swiss Army._--The inhabitants of Switzerland were always a hardy
and independent race, but their high military reputation dates from
the middle of the 15th century, when the comparatively ill-armed and
untrained mountaineers signally defeated Charles the Bold of Burgundy
and the flower of the chivalry of Europe in the battles of Granson,
Morat and Nancy. The Swabian war, towards the end of that century, and
the Milanese war, at the beginning of the following one, added to the
fame of the Swiss infantry, and made it the model on which that arm
was formed all over Europe. The wealthier countries vied with each
other in hiring them as mercenaries, and the poor but warlike Swiss
found the profession of arms a lucrative one.

A brief account of the Swiss mercenaries will be found earlier in this
article. Their fall was due in the end to their own indiscipline in
the first place, and the rise of the Spanish standing army and its
musketeers in the second. Yet it does not seem that the military
reputation of the Swiss was discredited, even by reverses such as
Marignan. On the contrary, they continued all through the 17th and
18th centuries to furnish whole regiments for the service of other
countries, notably of France, and individuals, like Jomini in a later
age, followed the career of the soldier of fortune everywhere. The
most notable incident in the later military history of the Swiss, the
heroic faithfulness of Louis XVI.'s Swiss guard, is proverbial, and
has been commemorated with just pride by their countrymen. The French
Revolutionary armies overran Switzerland, as they did all the small
neighbouring states, and during Napoleon's career she had to submit to
his rule, and furnish her contingent to his armies. On the fall of
Napoleon she regained her independence, and returned to her old trade
of furnishing soldiers to the sovereigns and powers of Europe. Charles
X. of France had at one time as many as 17,000 Swiss in his pay;
Naples and Rome had each four regiments. The recruiting for these
foreign services was openly acknowledged and encouraged by the
government. The young Swiss engaged usually for a period of four or
six years; they were formed in separate regiments, officered by
countrymen of their own, and received a higher rate of pay than the
national regiments; and at the close of their engagement returned with
their earnings to settle down on their paternal holdings. A series of
revolutions, however, expelled them from France and Italy, and
recently the advance of liberal ideas, and the creation of great
national armies based on the principle of personal service, has
destroyed their occupation. Switzerland is now remarkable in a
military sense as being the only country that maintains no standing
army (see Militia).

102. The _Swedish Army_ can look back with pride to the days of
Gustavus Adolphus and of Charles XII. The contributions made by it to
the military science of the 17th century have been noticed above. The
triumphs of the small and highly disciplined army of Charles were
often such as to recall the similar victories of the Greeks under
Alexander. The then nebulous armies of Russia and Poland resembled
indeed the forces of Darius in the 4th century B.C., but Peter the
Great succeeded at last in producing a true army, and the resistance
of the Swedes collapsed under the weight of the vastly superior
numbers then brought against them.

The _Danish Army_ has a long and meritorious record of good service
dating from the Thirty Years' War.

103. The existing Army of _Portugal_ dates from the Peninsular War,
when a considerable force of Portuguese, at one time exceeding 60,000
men, was organized under Marshal Beresford. Trained and partly
officered by English officers, it proved itself not unworthy of its
allies, and bore its full share in the series of campaigns and battles
by which the French were ultimately expelled from Spain. At the peace
the army numbered about 50,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry, formed on
the English model, and all in the highest state of efficiency. This
force was reduced in 1821, under the new constitutional government, to
about one-half.

104. The _Rumanian, Bulgarian_ and _Servian_ armies are the youngest
in Europe. The conduct of the Rumanians before Plevna in 1877 earned
for them the respect of soldiers of all countries. Servia and Bulgaria
came to war in 1885, and the Bulgarian soldiers, under the most
adverse conditions, achieved splendid victories under the leadership
of their own officers. In the crisis following the Austrian annexation
of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908-9), it seemed likely that the Servian
forces might play an unexpectedly active part in war even with a
strong power.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.--Below are the titles of some of the more important
works on the subject of armies. See also under biographical headings
and articles dealing with the several arms, &c. A large proportion of
the works mentioned below are concerned mainly with the development of
strategy and tactics.

V. der Goltz, _Das Volk in Waffen_ (1883, new ed., 1898, English
translation, P.A. Ashworth, _Nation in Arms_, London, 1887, new ed.,
1907, French, _Nation armee_, Paris, 1889); Jahns, _Heeresverfassung
und Volkerleben_ (Berlin, 1885); Berndt, _Die Zahl im Kriege_ (Vienna,
1895); F.N. Maude, _Evolution of Modern Strategy_ (1903), _Voluntary
versus Compulsory Service_ (1897), and _War and the World's Life_
(1907); Pierron, _Methodes de guerre_, vol. i.; Jahns, _Geschichte der
Kriegswissenschaften_ (an exhaustive bibliography, with critical
notes); Troschke, _Mil. Litteratur seit den Befreiungskriegen_
(Berlin, 1870); T.A. Dodge, _Great Captains_ (_Alexander, Hannibal,
Caesar, Gustavus, Napoleon_); Bronsart v. Schellendorf (Eng. trans.,
War Office, 1905) _Duties of the General Staff_; Fave, _Histoire et
tactique des trois armes_ (Liege, 1850); Maynert, _Gesch. des
Kriegswesens u. der Heeresverfassungen in Europa_ (Vienna, 1869);
Jahns, _Handbuch fur eine Geschichte des Kriegswesens v. der Urzeit
bis zur Renaissance_ (Leipzig, 1880); de la Barre Duparcq, _Histoire
de l'art de la guerre avant l'usage de poudre_ (Paris, 1860); Rustow
and Kochly, _Geschichte des griechischen Kriegswesens_ (Aarau, 1852);
Kochly and Rustow, _Griechische Kriegsschriftsteller_ (Leipzig, 1855);
Forster, in _Hermes_, xii. (1877); D.G. Hogarth, _Philip and
Alexander_ (London, 1897); Macdougall, _Campaigns of Hannibal_
(London, 1858); Rustow, _Heerwesen, &c., Julius Casars_ (Nordhausen,
1855); _Organ der M. Wissensch. Verein_ of 1877 (Vienna); Polybius
literature of the 17th and 18th centuries; supplement to _M.W.B._,
1883; the works of Xenophon, Aelian, Arrian, Vegetius, Polybius,
Caesar, &c. (see Kochly and Rustow: a collection was made in the 15th
century, under the title _Veteres de re militari scriptores_, 1487);
Oman, _A History of the Art of War: Middle Ages_ (London, 1898);
Delpech, _La Tactique au XIII^e siecle_ (Paris, 1886); Kohler, _Die
Entwickelung des Kriegswesens v. II. Jahrhdt. bis zu den
Hussitenkriegen_ (Breslau, 1886-1893); Ricotti, _Storia delle
Compagnie di Ventura_ (Turin, 1846); Steger, _Gesch. Francesco Sforzas
und d. ital. Condottieri_ (Leipzig, 1865); J.A. Symonds, _The
Renaissance in Italy and The Age of the Despots; A Brandenburg
Mobilization of 1477_ (German General Staff Monograph, No. 3);
Palacky, "Kriegskunst der Bohmen," _Zeitschrift bohmisch. Museums_
(Prague, 1828); George, _Battles of English History_ (London, 1895);
Biottot, _Les Grands inspires devant la science: Jeanne d'Arc_ (Paris,
1907); V. Ellger, _Kriegswesen, &c., der Eidgenossen, 14., 15., 16.
Jahrhdt._ (1873); de la Chauvelays, _Les Armees de Charles le
Temeraire_ (Paris, 1879); Guillaume, _Hist. des bandes d'ordonnance
dans les Pays-Bas_ (Brussels, 1873); the works of Froissart, de
Brantome, Machiavelli, Lienhard Fronsperger (_Kriegsbuch_, 1570), de
la Noue, du Bellay, &c.; Villari, _Life and Times of Machiavelli_
(English version); "Die frommen Landsknechte" (_M. W. B._, supplement,
1880); _Kriegsbilder aus der Zeit der Landsknechte_ (Stuttgart, 1883);
C.H. Firth, _Cromwell's Army_ (London, 1902); Heilmann, _Das
Kriegswesen der Kaiserlichen und Schweden_ (Leipzig, 1850); C. Walton,
_History of the British Standing Army, 1660-1700_ (London, 1894); E.A.
Altnam in _United Service Magazine_, February 1907; Austrian official
history of Prince Eugene's campaigns, &c.; de la Barre Duparcq, _Hist,
milit. de la Prusse avant 1756_ (Paris, 1857); Marsigli, _L'Etat
militaire de l'emp. ottoman_ (1732); Prussian Staff History of the
Silesian wars; C. von B(inder)-K(rieglstein), _Geist und Stoff im
Kriege_ (Vienna, 1895); E. d'Hauterive, _L'Armee sous la Revolution_
(Paris, 1894); C. Rousset, _Les Volontaires de 1791-1794_; Michelet,
_Les Soldats de la Revolution_ (Paris, 1878); publications of the
French general staff on the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars; H.
Bonnal, _Esprit de la guerre moderne_ (a series of studies in military
history, 1805-1870); Paimblant du Rouil, _La Division Durutte, les
Refractaires_, also supplement, _M.W.B._, 1890; "The French
Conscription" (suppl. _M.W.B._, 1892); C. v. der Goltz, _Von Rossbach
bis Jena und Auerstadt_ (a new edition of the original _Rossbach und
Jena_, Berlin, 1883); German General Staff Monograph, No. 10; _M.W.B._
supplements of 1845, 1846, 1847, 1854, 1855, 1856, 1857, 1858, 1862,
1865, 1866, 1867, 1887; v. Duncker, _Preussen wahrend der franz.
Okkupation_ (1872); Archives of Prussian war ministry, publications of
1892 and 1896; histories of the wars of 1866 and 1870; V. Chareton,
_Comme la Prusse a prepare sa revanche, 1806-1813; Reports_ of Col.
Baron Stoffel, French attache at Berlin (translation into English, War
Office, London); Haxthausen, _Les Forces militaires de la Prusse_
(Paris, 1853); de la Barre Duparcq, _Etudes historiques generales et
militaires sur la Prusse_ (Paris, 1854); Paixhans, _Constitution
militaire de la France_ (Paris, 1849); Duc d'Aumale, _Les Institutions
militaires de la France_ (Paris, 1867); C. v. Decker, _Uber die
Personlichkeit des preussischen Soldaten_ (Berlin, 1842); War Office,
_Army Book of the British Empire_ (London, 1893); M. Jahns, _Das
franzosische Heer von der grossen Revolution bis zur Gegenwart_
(Leipzig, 1873); Baron Kaulbars, _The German Army_ (in Russian) [St
Petersburg, 1890]; _Die Schweiz im 19. Jahrhundert_ (Berne and
Lausanne, 1899); Heimann, _L'Armee allemande_ (Paris, 1895); R. de
l'Homme de Courbiere, _Grundzuge der deutschen Militarverwaltung_
(Berlin, 1882); G.F.R. Henderson, _The Science of War_ (London, 1905);
J.W. Fortescue, _History of the British Army_ (London, 1899- ----); R.
de l'Homme de Courbiere, _Gesch. der brandenburg-preussisch.
Heeresverfassung_ (Berlin, 1852); Krippentagel and Kustel, _Die
preuss. Armee von der altesten Zeit bis zur Gegenwart_ (Berlin, 1883);
Gansauge, _Das brandenbg.-preuss. Kriegswesen, 1440, 1640, 1740_
(Berlin, 1839); A. v. Boguslawksi, _Die Landwehr, 1813-1893_ (1893);
A.R. v. Sichart, _Gesch. d. k. hannover. Armee_ (Hanover, 1866); v.
Reitzenstein, _Die k. hannover. Kavallerie, 1631-1866_ (1892); Schlee,
_Zur Gesch. des hessischen Kriegswesens_ (Kassel, 1867); Leichtlen,
_Badens Kriegsverfassung_ (Carlsruhe, 1815); v. Stadlinger, _Gesch.
des wurttembergischen Kriegswesens_ (Stuttgart, 1858); Munich,
_Entwickelung der bayerischen Armee_ (Munich, 1864); official _Gesch.
d. k. bayer. Armee_ (Munich, 1901 onward); Wurdinger,
_Kriegsgeschichte v. Bayern_ (Munich, 1868); H. Meynert, _Gesch. des
osterr. Kriegswesens_ (Vienna, 1852), _Kriegswesen Ungarns_ (Vienna,
1876); Anger, _Gesch. der K.-K. Armee_ (Vienna, 1886); _Beitrage zur
Gesch. des osterr. Heerwesens, 1754-1814_ (Vienna, 1872); R. v.
Ottenfeld and Teuber, _Die osterr. Armee, 1700-1867_ (Vienna, 1895);
v. Wrede, _Gesch. d. K. u. K. Wehrmacht_ (Vienna, 1902); May de
Rainmoter, _Histoire militaire de la Suisse_ (Lausanne, 1788); Cusachs
y Barado, _La Vida Militar en Espana_ (Barcelona, 1888); Guillaume,
_Hist. de l'infanterie wallonne sous la maison d'Espagne_ (Brussels,
1876); A. Vitu, _Histoire civile de l'armee_ (Paris, 1868); A. Pascal,
_Hist. de l'armee_ (Paris, 1847); L. Jablonski, _L'Armee francaise a
travers les ages_; C. Romagny, _Hist. generale de l'armee nationale_
(Paris, 1893); E. Simond, _Hist. mil. de la France_; Susane, _Hist. de
l'infanterie, cavalerie, artillerie francaises_ (Paris, 1874); Pere
Daniel, _Hist. des milices francaises_ (1721); the official
_Historique des corps de troupe_ (Paris, 1900- ----); Cahu, _Le Soldat
francais_ (Paris, 1876); J. Molard, _Cent ans de l'armee francaise,
1780-1889_ (Paris, 1890); v. Stein, _Lehre vom Heerwesen_ (Stuttgart,
1872); du Verger de S. Thomas, _L'Italie et son armee_, 1865 (Paris,
1866); "C. Martel," _Military Italy_ (London, 1884); Sir R. Biddulph,
_Lord Cardwell at the War Office_ (London, 1904); Willoughby Verner,
_Military Life of the Duke of Cambridge_ (London, 1905); W.H. Daniel,
_The Military Forces of the Crown_ (London, 1902); War Office, _Annual
Report of the British Army_; Broome, _Rise and Progress of the Bengal
Army_ (Calcutta, 1850); W.J. Wilson, _Hist. of the Madras Army_
(London, 1882-1885); C.M. Clode, _Military Forces of the Crown_;
Blume, _Die Grundlage unserer Wehrkraft_ (Berlin, 1899); Spenser
Wilkinson, _The Brain of an Army_ (London, 1890 and 1895); v. Olberg,
_Die franzosische Armee im Exerzirplatz und im Felde_ (Berlin, 1861);
_Die Heere und Flotte der Gegenwart_, ed. Zepelin (Berlin, 1896);
Molard, _Puissances militaires de l'Europe_ (Paris, 1895); works of
Montecucculi, Puysegur, Vauban, Feuquieres, Guibert, Folard, Guichard,
Joly de Maizeroy, Frederick the Great, Marshal Saxe, the prince de
Ligne, Napoleon, Carnot, Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, Napoleon III.,
Moltke, Hamley, &c.

The principal general military periodicals are:--English, _Journal of
the R. United Service Institution_; United States, _Journal of the
Military Service Institution_; French, _Revue d'histoire_ and _Revue
des armees etrangeres_ (general staff); Rau and Lauth, _L'Etat
militaire des puissances_ (about every 4 years); _Revue militaire
generale_, founded in 1907 by General Langlois; _Almanach du drapeau_
(a popular _aide-memoire_ published annually); German, the
_Vierteljahrsheft_ of the general staff; _Militar-Wochenblatt_
(referred to above as _M.W.B._--the supplements are of great value);
von Lobell's _Jahresberichte_ (annual detailed reports on the state,
&c., of all armies--an English _precis_ appears annually in the
_Journal_ of the R.U.S. Institution); Austrian, _Streffleurs ost.
Militar-Zeitschrift_, with which was amalgamated (1907) the _Organ d.
militarwissenschaft. Vereins._ The British War Office issues from time
to time handbooks dealing with foreign armies, and, quarterly since
April 1907, a critical review and bibliography of recent military
literature in the principal languages, under the name of _Recent
Publications of Military Interest_. (C. F. A.)

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The phrase "K. und K." (_Kaiserlich und Koniglich_) is applied to
all services common to the Austrian and Hungarian armies. "K.-K."
(_Kaiserlich-Koniglich_) refers strictly only to the troops of
Austria, the Hungarian army being known as the "K. Ung." (Royal
Hungarian) service.

[2] From _Krumperpferde_ (cast horses attached to batteries, &c., for
odd jobs), applied to the recruits in jest.

ARNAL, ETIENNE (1794-1872), French actor, was born at Meulan, Seine-et-Oise, on the 1st of February 1794. After serving in the army, and working in a button factory, he took to the stage. His first appearance (1815) was in tragedy, and for some time he was unsuccessful; it was not until 1827 that he showed his real ability in comedy parts, especially in plays by Felix August Duvert (1795-1876) and Augustin Theodore Lauzanne (1805-1877), whose _Cabinets particuliers_ (1832), _Le Mari de la dame de choeurs_ (1837), _Passe minuit, L'Homme blase_ (1843), _La Clef dans le dos_ (1848), &c., contained parts written for him. He was twenty years at the Vaudeville, and completed at the various Parisian theatres a stage career of nearly half a century. Arnal was the author of _Epitre a bouffe_ (1840), which is reprinted in his volume of poetry, _Boutades en vers_ (1861).

ARNALDUS DE VILLA NOVA, also called ARNALDUS DE VILLANUEVA, ARNALDUS VILLANOVANUS or ARNAUD DE VILLENEUVE (c. 1235-1313), alchemist, astrologer and physician, appears to have been of Spanish origin, and to have studied chemistry, medicine, physics, and also Arabian philosophy. After having lived at the court of Aragon, he went to Paris, where he gained a considerable reputation; but he incurred the enmity of the ecclesiastics and was forced to flee, finally finding an asylum in Sicily. About 1313 he was summoned to Avignon by Pope Clement V., who was ill, but he died on the voyage. Many alchemical writings, including _Thesaurus Thesaurorum_ or _Rosarius Philosophorum, Novum Lumen, Flos Florum_, and _Speculum Alchimiae_, are ascribed to him, but they are of very doubtful authenticity. Collected editions of them were published at Lyons in 1504 and 1532 (with a biography by Symphorianus Campegius), at Basel in 1585, at Frankfort in 1603, and at Lyons in 1686. He is also the reputed author of various medical works, including _Breviarium Practicae_.

See J.B. Haureau in the _Histoire litteraire de la France_ (1881),
vol. 28; E. Lalande, _Arnaud de Villeneuve, sa vie et ses oeuvres_
(Paris, 1896). A list of writings is given by J. Ferguson in his
_Bibliotheca Chemica_ (1906). See also U. Chevalier, _Repertoire des
sources hist., &c., Bio-bibliographie_ (Paris, 1903).

ARNAUD, HENRI (1641-1721), pastor and general of the Vaudois or Waldensians of Piedmont, was born at Embrun. About 1650 his family returned to their native valley of Luserna, where Arnaud was educated at La Tour (the chief village), later visiting the college at Basel (1662 and 1668) and the Academy at Geneva (1666). He then returned home, and seems to have been pastor in several of the Vaudois valleys before attaining that position at La Tour (1685). He was thus the natural leader of his co-religionists after Victor Amadeus expelled them (1686) from their valleys, and most probably visited Holland, the ruler of which, William of Orange, certainly gave him help and money. Arnaud occupied himself with organizing his 3000 countrymen who had taken refuge in Switzerland, and who twice (1687-1688) attempted to regain their homes. The English revolution of 1688, and the election of William to the throne, encouraged the Vaudois to make yet another attempt. Furnished with detailed instructions from the veteran Josue Janavel (prevented by age from taking part in the expedition) Arnaud, with about 1000 followers, started (August 17, 1689) from near Nyon on the Lake of Geneva for the _glorieuse rentree_. On the 27th of August, the valiant band, after many hardships and dangers, reached the Valley of St Martin, having passed by Sallanches and crossed the Col de Very (6506 ft.), the Enclave de la Fenetre (7425 ft.), the Col du Bonhomme (8147 ft.), the Col du Mont Iseran (9085 ft.), the Grand Mont Cenis (6893 ft.), the Petit Mont Cenis (7166 ft.), the Col de Clapier (8173 ft.), the Col de Coteplane (7589 ft.), and the Col du Piz (8550 ft.). They soon took refuge in the lofty and secure rocky citadel of the Balsille, where they were besieged (October 24, 1689 to May 14, 1690) by the troops (about 4000 in number) of the king of France and the duke of Savoy. They maintained this natural fortress against many fierce attacks and during the whole of a winter. In particular, on the 2nd of May, one assault was defeated without the loss of a single man of Arnaud's small band. But another attack (May 14) was not so successful, so that Arnaud withdrew his force, under cover of a thick mist, and led them over the hills to the valley of Angrogna, above La Tour. A month later the Vaudois were received into favour by the duke of Savoy, who had then abandoned his alliance with France for one with Great Britain and Holland. Hence for the next six years the Vaudois helped Savoy against France, though suffering much from the repeated attacks of the French troops. But by a clause in the treaty of peace of 1696, made public in 1698, Victor Amadeus again became hostile to the Vaudois, about 3000 of whom, with Arnaud, found a shelter in Protestant countries, mainly in Wurttemberg, where Arnaud became the pastor of Durrmenz-Schonenberg, N.W. of Stuttgart (1699). Once again (1704-1706) the Vaudois aided the duke against France. Arnaud, however, took no part in the military operations, though he visited England (1707) to obtain pecuniary aid from Queen Anne. He died at Schonenberg (which was the church hamlet of the parish of Durrmenz) in 1721. It was during his retirement that he compiled from various documents by other hands his _Histoire de la glorieuse rentree des Vaudois dans leurs vallees_, which was published (probably at Cassel) in 1710, with a dedication to Queen Anne. It was translated into English (1827) by H. Dyke Acland, and has also appeared in German and Dutch versions. A part of the original MS. is preserved in the Royal Library in Berlin.

See K.H. Klaiber, _Henri Arnaud, ein Lebensbild_ (Stuttgart, 1880); A.
de Rochas d'Aiglun, _Les Vallees vaudoises_ (Paris, 1881); various
chapters in the _Bulletin du bicentenaire de la glorieuse rentree_
(Turin, 1889). (W. A. B. C.)

ARNAULD, the surname of a family of prominent French lawyers, chiefly remembered in connexion with the Jansenist troubles of the 17th century. At their head was ANTOINE ARNAULD (1560-1619), a leader of the Paris bar; in this capacity he delivered a famous philippic against the Jesuits in 1594, accusing them of gross disloyalty to the newly converted Henry IV. This speech was afterwards known as the original sin of the Arnaulds.

Of his twenty children several grew up to fight the Jesuits on more important matters. Five gave themselves up wholly to the church. HENRI ARNAULD (1597-1692), the second son, became bishop of Angers in 1649, and represented Jansenism on the episcopal Bench for as long as forty-three years. The youngest son, ANTOINE (1612-1694), was the most famous of Jansenist theologians (see below). The second daughter, ANGELIQUE (1591-1661), was abbess and reformer of Port Royal; here she was presently joined by her sister AGNES (1593-1671) and two younger sisters, both of whom died early.

Only two of Antoine's children married--ROBERT ARNAULD D'ANDILLY (1588-1674), the eldest son, and CATHERINE LEMAISTRE (1590-1651), the eldest daughter. But both of these ended their lives under the shadow of the abbey. Andilly's five daughters all took the veil there; the second, ANGELIQUE DE ST JEAN ARNAULD D'ANDILLY (1624-1684) rose to be abbess, was a writer of no mean repute, and one of the most remarkable figures of the second generation of Jansenism. One of Andilly's sons became a hermit at Port Royal; the eldest, ANTOINE (1615-1699), was first a soldier, afterwards a priest. As the Abbe Arnauld, he survives as author of some interesting _Memoirs_ of his time. The second son, SIMON ARNAULD DE POMPONNE (1616-1699), early entered public life. After holding various embassies, he rose to be foreign secretary to Louis XIV., and was created marquis de Pomponne. Lastly Madame Lemaistre and two of her sons became identified with Port Royal. On her husband's death she took the veil there. Her eldest son, ANTOINE LEMAISTRE (1608-1658), became the first of the _solitaires_, or hermits of Port Royal. There he was joined by his younger brother, ISAAC LEMAISTRE DE SACI (1613-1684), who presently took holy orders, and became confessor to the hermits.

The Arnaulds' connexion with Port Royal (q.v.)--a convent of Cistercian nuns in the neighbourhood of Versailles--dated back to 1599, when the original Antoine secured the abbess's chair for his daughter Angelique, then a child of eight. About 1608 she started to reform her convent in the direction of its original Rule; but about 1623 she made the acquaintance of du Vergier (q.v.) and thenceforward began to move in a Jansenist direction. Her later history is entirely bound up with the fortunes of that revival. Angelique's strength lay chiefly in her character. Her sister and collaborator, Agnes, was also a graceful writer; and her _Letters_, edited by Prosper Feugere (2 vols., Paris, 1858), throw most valuable light on the inner aims and aspirations of the Jansenist movement. The first relative to join their projects of reform was their nephew, Antoine Lemaistre, who threw up brilliant prospects at the bar to settle down at the Abbey gates (1638). Here he was presently joined by his brother, de Saci, and other hermits, who led an austere semi-monastic existence, though without taking any formal vow. In 1646 they were joined by their uncle, Arnauld d'Andilly, hitherto a personage of some importance at court and in the world; he was a special favourite of the queen regent, Anne of Austria, and had held various offices of dignity in the government. Uncle and nephews passed their time partly in ascetic exercises--though Andilly never pretended to vie in austerity with the younger men--partly in managing the convent estates, and partly in translating religious classics. Andilly put Josephus, St Augustine's _Confessions_, and many other works, into singularly delicate French. Lemaistre attacked the lives of the saints; in 1654 Saci set to work on a translation of the Bible. His labours were interrupted by the outbreak of persecution. In 1661 he was forced to go into hiding; in 1666 he was arrested, thrown into the Bastille, and kept there more than two years. Meanwhile his friends printed his translation of the New Testament--really in Holland, nominally at Mons in the Spanish Netherlands (1667). Hence it is usually known as the _Nouveau Testament de Mons_. It found enthusiastic friends and violent detractors. Bossuet approved its orthodoxy, but not its over-elaborate style; and it was destructively criticized by Richard Simon, the founder of Biblical criticism in France. On the other hand it undoubtedly did much to popularize the Bible, and was bitterly attacked by the Jesuits on that ground.

Le grand Arnauld.