Chapter XXIII: Section 3: The Objects Of Merit (1)

After defining the existence of merit the Tridentine Council enumerates its objects as follows: “If anyone saith that the justified, by the good works which he performs, ... does not truly merit increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of that eternal life,—if it be so, however, that he depart in grace,—and also an increase of glory: let him be anathema.”(1320) Hence merit calls for a threefold reward: (1) an increase of sanctifying grace; (2) heavenly glory; and (3) an increase of that glory. The expression “_vere mereri_” shows that all three of these objects can be merited in the true and strict sense of the term (_de condigno_). This is, however, no more than a theologically certain conclusion.

1. INCREASE OF SANCTIFYING GRACE.—The first grace of justification (_gratia prima_) can never be merited;(1321) hence the meaning of the above-quoted conciliar definition is that it can be increased by good works. This increase is technically called _gratia secunda_. All Scriptural texts which assert that sanctifying grace is unequal in different individuals, also prove that it can be increased or augmented by the performance of meritorious works.(1322)

a) No adult person can merit the first grace of assistance (_gratia prima actualis_), nor any one of the series of actual graces which follow it, and by which justification ultimately comes to pass. They are all purely gratuitous. Similarly, too, the first grace of justification (_gratia prima habitualis_) cannot be strictly merited by the sinner preparing for justification. This is the express teaching of Trent: “But we are therefore said to be justified freely, because that none of those things which precede justification—whether faith or works—merit the grace itself of justification; for, if it be a grace, it is not now by works; otherwise, as the same Apostle says, grace is no more grace.”(1323) To deny this would not only imperil the dogma of the gratuity of grace (because if the first grace given before active justification could be strictly merited, this would necessarily involve the _gratia prima actualis_), but it would also start a vicious circle (because the _gratia prima habitualis_ is an indispensable condition of merit). This explains why St. Paul and St. Augustine again and again insist on the gratuity both of the first grace of assistance and the grace of justification proper.(1324) “This grace of Christ,” says St. Augustine, “without which neither infants nor adults can be saved, is not bestowed for any merits, but is given freely, on account of which it is also called grace. ‘Being justified,’ says the Apostle, ‘freely through His blood.’ ”(1325)

In the light of this teaching it is easy to decide the question, raised by Vasquez, whether perfect contrition justifies the sinner merely _per modum dispositionis_ or _per modum causae formalis_. Both contrition and charity, be they perfect or imperfect, are essentially acts that dispose the soul for justification.(1326) Hence, no matter how perfect, neither is capable of effecting justification itself by way of merit (_merendo_), nay, of entering even partially, as Vasquez would have it, into the formal cause of justification, because, according to the Tridentine Council, sanctifying grace and not perfect contrition is the _unica causa formalis_ of justification.(1327)

b) In connection with the dogma just explained theologians discuss the question whether a just man may strictly (_de condigno_) merit the actual graces which God bestows on him. We must carefully distinguish between merely sufficient and efficacious graces. Theologians commonly hold(1328) that merely sufficient graces may be merited _de condigno_, not so efficacious graces, because the right to efficacious graces would necessarily include a strict right to final perseverance (_donum perseverantiae_), which lies outside the sphere of condign merit. Assuming that the justified could by good works strictly merit the _prima gratia efficax_ (an impossible hypothesis, because merit presupposes efficacious grace), this would involve a similar claim to a second, third, fourth grace—and ultimately to the final grace of perseverance, which, in matter of fact, no man can merit. Not even heroic acts of virtue give a strict right to infallibly efficacious graces, or to final perseverance. Even the greatest saint is obliged to watch, pray, and tremble, lest he lapse from righteousness.(1329) For this reason the Tridentine Council mentions neither final perseverance nor efficacious graces among the objects of merit.(1330)

2. ETERNAL LIFE OR HEAVENLY GLORY.—The second object of merit is eternal life. The dogmatic proof for this assertion has been given above.(1331) Eternal life is described by the Tridentine Council(1332) both as a grace and as a reward.

a) In the canon quoted in the introduction of this Section the same Council(1333) enumerates four apparently separate and distinct objects of merit, _viz._: increase of grace, eternal life, the attainment of eternal life, and increase of glory. Why the distinction between “eternal life” and the “attainment of eternal life”? Does this imply a twofold reward, and consequently a twofold object of merit? Theologians deny that such was the intention of the Council, because the right to a reward evidently coincides with the right to the payment of the same. An unattainable eternal life would be a chimera.(1334) Nevertheless, the distinction is not superfluous, since the attainment of eternal life does not coincide with the gaining of merit but must be put off until death, and even then depends upon the condition of the soul: “_si tamen in gratia decesserit_” (provided he depart in grace). With this last condition the holy Synod also wished to inculcate the salutary truth that the loss of sanctifying grace _ipso facto_ entails the forfeiture of all previously acquired merits. Even the greatest saint, were he to die in the state of mortal sin, would enter eternity with empty hands and as an enemy of God. All his former merits would be cancelled. To revive them would require a new justification.(1335)

b) A close analysis of the Tridentine canon under review gives rise to another difficulty. Can the _gloria prima_ be merited? In defining the _gratia secunda_ as an object of strict merit, the Council expressly excludes the _gratia prima_. It makes no such distinction in regard to glory, but names both “eternal life” (_gloria prima_) and “increase of glory” (_gloria secunda_) as objects of merit. This naturally suggests the query: Why and to what extent can the just man merit the _gloria prima_, seeing that he is unable to merit the _gratia prima_? Some theologians(1336) contend that the justified are entitled to the _gloria prima_ only as a heritage (_titulo haereditatis_), never as a reward (_titulo mercedis_). Because of its intimate causal connection with the _gratia prima_, which is beyond the reach of merit, the _gloria prima_, they argue, cannot be regarded as an object of merit except on the assumption that the merits which precede justification confer a claim to the _gloria prima_. This assumption is false, because without sanctifying grace no condign merits can be acquired.(1337) In spite of this difficulty, however, most theologians(1338) hold that, unlike the _gratia prima_, the _gloria prima_ may under certain conditions be an object of strict merit. The main reason is that, as the state of glory is not a necessary requisite of the meritoriousness of good works, while the state of grace is, the former may _positis ponendis_ be an effect of the _meritum de congruo_, though the latter may not. A mere statement of the problem shows that it cannot be satisfactorily solved unless we distinguish between and enter into a detailed examination of two distinct hypotheses. It is generally agreed that infants dying in the state of baptismal grace owe that grace, and the state of glory which they enjoy in Heaven, solely to God’s mercy and have no claim to beatitude other than that of heredity (_titulus hereditatis_). Adults who preserve their baptismal innocence until death, manifestly cannot merit the _gloria prima_ by their good works, because they already possess a legal title to it through Baptism.(1339) It follows that their good works increase, but do not merit, the _gloria prima_, to which these souls are already entitled _titulo haereditatis_. The case is quite different with catechumens and Christians guilty of mortal sin, who are justified by an act of perfect contrition before the reception of Baptism or the Sacrament of Penance. Of them it may be said, without fear of contradiction, that they merit for themselves _de condigno_, not indeed the first grace of justification, but the _gloria prima_, because perfect contrition, being an _opus operans_, at the very moment of its infusion becomes an _opus meritorium_ entitled to eternal glory.(1340) As regards the great majority of adult Catholics who, because of defective preparation, never get beyond imperfect contrition (_attritio_), and therefore are not justified until they actually receive the Sacrament, it is certain that they owe whatever grace they possess and whatever glory they have a claim to, entirely to the _opus operatum_ of the Sacrament.(1341)

3. INCREASE OF HEAVENLY GLORY.—The third object of merit, according to the Tridentine Council, is “increase of glory.” This must evidently correspond to an increase of grace, which in its turn is conditioned upon the performance of additional good works. That there is a causal connection between meritorious works performed on earth and the glory enjoyed in Heaven is clearly taught by Holy Scripture. Cfr. Matth. XVI, 27: “For the Son of man shall ... render to every man according to his works.”(1342) 1 Cor. III, 8: “And every man shall receive his own reward, according to his own labor.”(1343) A further argument may be derived from the unequal apportionment of glory to the elect in Heaven.(1344) This inequality is based on inequality of grace, which in turn is owing to the fact that grace can be augmented by good works. Consequently, the inequality of glory depends ultimately on good works.(1345)

4. NOTE ON THE MERITUM DE CONGRUO.—Congruous, as distinguished from condign merit, gives no real claim to a reward, but only a quasi-claim based on equity (_ex quadam aequitate_, _congruentia_, _decentia_).

Hence congruous merit and condign merit are not species of the same genus, but merely analogous terms. Because of the ambiguity of the word “equity” Dominicus Soto, Becanus, and a few other Scholastics rejected the use of the term _meritum de congruo_ in theology. But this was a mistake. The Fathers engaged in the Semipelagian controversy, notably St. Augustine,(1346) did not assert that the justifying faith of the sinner is entirely without merit. The requisites of congruous merit are identical with those of condign merit(1347) in all respects except one,—the _meritum de congruo_ does not require the state of grace.

a) According to the common opinion, from which but few theologians dissent,(1348) a Christian in the state of mortal sin can, from the moment he begins to coöperate with supernatural grace, merit _de congruo_ by good works, and obtain by prayer the dispositions necessary for justification, and ultimately justification itself.

“Prayer relies on mercy,” says St. Thomas, “condign merit on justice. And therefore man obtains from the divine mercy many things by prayer which he does not merit in strict justice.”(1349) This teaching is based partly on Holy Scripture and partly on the writings of St. Augustine, and is confirmed by certain utterances of the Council of Trent. By conscientiously preparing himself with the aid of actual grace, the sinner probably merits an additional claim (in equity) to justification. Cfr. Ps. L, 19: “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit: a contrite and humbled heart, O God, thou wilt not despise.”(1350) Dan. IV, 24: “Redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to the poor: perhaps he [God] will forgive thy offences.”(1351) St. Augustine says: “The remission of sins itself is not without some merit, if faith asks for it. Nor is that faith entirely unmeritorious by which the publican was moved to say: ‘God, be merciful to me, a sinner,’ and then went away justified through the merit of faithful humility.”(1352)

b) By good works the just may merit for themselves, not in strict justice (_de condigno_), but as a matter of equity (_de congruo_), final perseverance, conversion from mortal sin, spiritual favors for others, and also such temporal blessings as may be conducive to eternal salvation.

α) It is a theologically certain conclusion, accepted by all theologians without exception, that the grace of final perseverance (_donum perseverantiae_) cannot be merited in the strict sense (_de condigno_). Most authors hold, however, that it can be merited de congruo. This _meritum_ is technically called _meritum de congruo fallibili_. Those who deny that it can be merited at all, admit that it can be infallibly obtained by fervent and unremitting prayer.(1353)

β) It is impossible to answer with anything like certainty the question whether the just man is able to merit for himself in advance the grace of conversion against the eventuality of a future lapse into mortal sin. Following the lead of Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas takes a negative view,(1354) on the ground that mortal sin interrupts the state of grace and annihilates all former merits. In another passage of his writings, however, the Angelic Doctor says: “There are two kinds of merit, one based on justice, and this is called condign; and another based solely upon mercy, and this is called congruous. Of the latter St. Paul says that it is just, _i.e._ congruous, that a man who has performed many good works should merit.... And in this wise God does not forget our work and love.”(1355) Scotus,(1356) Bonaventure,(1357) and Suarez(1358) regard this as “a pious and probable opinion,” well supported by Holy Scripture. The prophet Jehu said to Josaphat, King of Juda: “Thou helpest the ungodly, and thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord, and therefore thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the Lord; but good works are found in thee.”(1359) To this argument add the following consideration: If previous mortal sin does not prevent those acts whereby man is disposed for justification from being at least to a limited extent meritorious, there is no reason to assume that merits cancelled by subsequent mortal sin will not be imputed to the sinner, with due regard, of course, to a certain proportion between past merits and future sins.(1360) To pray for the grace of conversion against the eventuality of future mortal sin, is always good and useful,(1361) because it cannot but please God to know that we sincerely desire to be restored to His friendship if we should ever have the misfortune of losing it.(1362)

γ) The just man may congruously merit for others whatever he is able to merit for himself, _e.g._ the grace of conversion, final perseverance, and also the first prevenient grace (_gratia prima praeveniens_), which no man in the state of original sin is able to merit for himself.(1363) The reason for this, according to St. Thomas, is the intimate relation of friendship which sanctifying grace establishes between the just man and God.(1364) However, as Sylvius rightly observes, it is not in the power of the just to obtain by this friendship favors which would involve the abrogation of the divinely established order of salvation. Such a favor would be, for example, the justification of a sinner without the medium of grace, or of a child without the agency of Baptism. An unreasonable petition deserves no consideration, even if made by a friend. What may be obtained by the merit of good works may be even more effectively obtained by prayer for others. The Apostle St. James teaches: “Pray for one another that you may be saved; for the continual prayer of a just man availeth much.”(1365) This consoling truth is confirmed by the dogma of the Communion of Saints, by many illustrious examples from the Bible(1366) and ecclesiastical history,(1367) and by the traditional practice of the Church in praying God to give strength and perseverance to the faithful and the grace of conversion to the heathen and the sinner.(1368)

δ) A final question remains to be answered: Can the just congruously merit such temporal blessings as good health, a comfortable living, and success in business? They can, but only in so far as these favors are conducive to eternal salvation; for otherwise they would not be graces. St. Thomas seems to go even further than this by describing temporal favors as objects of condign merit when they are conducive to salvation, and of congruous merit when they bear no relation to that end.(1369) We have no space left to enter into an argument on this point, but in conclusion wish to call attention to two important facts: first, that prayer is more effective than good works in obtaining temporal as well as spiritual favors; and secondly, that we should not strive with too much anxiety for earthly goods, but direct our thoughts, desires, prayers, and actions to God, the Infinite Good, who has promised to be our “exceeding great reward.”(1370)

READINGS:—St. Thomas, _Summa Theologica_, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 1
sqq.—Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 8, art. 1-5.—*Bellarmine, _De
Iustificatione_, V, 1-22.—*Suarez, _Opusc. de Divina
Iustitia_.—IDEM, _De Gratia_, l. XII, cap. 1 sqq.—Oswald, _Lehre
von der Heiligung, d. i. Gnade, Rechtfertigung, Gnodenwahl_, § 7,
3rd ed., Paderborn 1885.—Tepe, _Institutiones Theologicae_, Vol.
III, pp. 223 sqq., Paris 1896.—*Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische
Theologie_, Vol. VIII, § 473 sqq., Mainz 1897.—Chr. Pesch,
_Praelectiones Dogmaticae_, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 215 sqq.,
Freiburg 1908.—*S. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 594 sqq.,
Freiburg 1901.—Kneib, _Die Lohnsucht der christlichen Moral_,
Vienna 1904.—I. J. Remler, C. M., _Supernatural Merit_, St. Louis
1914.—A. Devine, C. P., _The Sacraments Explained_, 3rd ed.,
London 1905, pp. 74-89.—L. Labauche, S. S., _God and Man_, pp.
254-270, N. Y. 1916. (On merit in general see M. Cronin, _The
Science of Ethics_, Vol. I, Dublin 1909, pp. 544 sqq.)—B. J.
Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. II, St.
Louis 1918, pp. 249 sqq.

On the Protestant idea of the fruits of justification see Möhler,
_Symbolik_, § 21 sqq. (English edition, pp. 157 sqq.).

INDEX

A

Acceptance of good works by God, 419 sqq.

Actual Grace, 3 sqq.;
Its nature, 5 sqq.;
Its relation to habitual Grace, 14 sqq.;
Definition of, 15;
Its two-fold causality, 15 sqq.;
Division of, 19 sqq.;
Properties of, 49 sqq.;
Necessity of, 50 sqq.;
Gratuity of, 131 sqq.;
Universality of, 152 sqq.;
Its relation to free-will, 222 sqq.;
As a requisite of supernatural merit, 413 sqq.

_Actus humanus_, 412.

Adoption, 357.

Adoptive sonship, 155, 356 sqq.

Adults, all receive sufficient grace, 167 sqq.

_Affectus credulitatis_, 105.

Albertus Magnus, 206, 432.

Alexander VIII, 179 sq.

Alexander of Hales, 206.

Aloysius, St., 211.

Alphonsus, St., 415.

Alvarez, 30, 216, 242, 243.

Ambrose, St., 69, 102, 158, 209, 319, 349, 404.

_Amor affectivus et effectivus_, 68.

Amsdorf, 291.

Anabaptists, 322.

Aquaviva, 260, 262.

Aristotle, 26, 31, 333, 353.

Arnauld, 180.

Athanasius, St., 341 sq., 373, 374.

Attributes, Divine, 344 sq.

“_Auctorem Fidei_,” Bull, 74 sq.

Augustine, St., 7, 8, 9, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24 sq., 27, 29, 31, 33, 34, 36,
37, 39, 42, 43, 47, 56, 59 sqq., 66, 70, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81,
83, 84, 85, 89, 91, 92, 97, 98, 100, 102, 103, 105, 107, 108
sq., 112, 118 sq., 126, 127, 138, 140, 141, 144, 146, 159
sqq., 171, 174, 177, 188, 189 sq., 191 sq., 194, 197, 203 sq.,
210, 215, 228 sqq., 249, 252, 253, 254, 259, 262, 264, 289,
308, 319 sq., 337 sq., 339, 342, 343, 350, 368, 373 sq., 375,
383, 387, 394, 404, 421, 424 sq., 430, 431.

Augustinianism, 147, 200, 232 sqq.

B

Baius and Bajanism, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62, 67, 70, 74 sqq., 147, 417.

Ballerini, 415.

Bañez, 232 sqq., 246, 255.

Baptism, 163 sqq., 279, 306, 308 sq., 314, 315, 318, 319, 330 sq., 394,
428, 434.

Barnabas, Epistle of, 318.

Basil, St., 346, 349, 373.

Beatitudes, 402, 416.

Beauty, Supernatural, an effect of sanctifying grace, 349 sqq.

Becanus, 206.

Beghards, 399.

Beguins, 399.

Bellarmine, 163, 203, 210, 260, 263, 319, 330, 334, 337, 414.

Benedict XIV, 249.

Bernard, St., 37, 230.

Berti, 249.

Beza, 214.

Biel, Gabriel, 63, 211.

Billuart, 31, 211, 216, 238, 242.

Bonaventure, St., 210, 365, 433.

Boniface II, 99.

Book of Life, The, 192 sq.

Book of Torgau, 292.

Butzer, 292, 322.

C

Cæsarius of Arles, St., 99.

Cajetan, 165.

Calvin and Calvinism, 44, 153, 156, 206, 212, 213, 214, 218, 221, 223 sq.,
228, 285, 302, 310, 392, 399.

Camerarius, 204.

Cano, Melchior, 363.

Capacity for grace, 133 sqq., 145 sqq.

Capacity of nature, 50 sqq.

Carthage, Councils of, 25, 28, 85, 116.

Cassian, John, 97, 142.

Castelein, 195.

Catharinus, 204, 211, 382.

Causality of Grace, 15 sqq.

Celestine I, St., 89, 90, 99, 104.

Celestius, 83, 85, 86.

Cercià, 203.

Certainty regarding justification, 379 sqq.

Charismata, 13.

Charity, 29, 56, 60, 67 sqq., 78, 336 sqq., 352, 363 sqq., 390, 395, 413
sqq., 417.

Children, see Infants.

Christ, The Grace of, 10, 70, 226.

Chrysostom, St., 91, 102 sqq., 141, 171, 178, 181, 209, 318, 349, 380.

Clement of Alexandria, 308.

Clement of Rome, 181.

Clement V, 331.

Clement VIII, 255, 261.

Clement XI, 74, 180.

_Cogitatio congrua_, 69 sqq., 94.

Concupiscence, 64, 120.

_Condignitas_ (equality) between merit and reward, 417 sqq.

Condign Merit, 132 sq., 397 sq., 407 sqq.

_Congregatio de Auxiliis_, 255, 261.

Congruism, 261 sqq.

Congruous Grace, 262 sqq.

Congruous Merit, 132, 397, 407 sqq., 430 sqq.

Conversion, 174 sqq., 297, 432 sq.

Coöperating Grace, 32 sqq.

Cyprian, St., 102, 126.

Cyril of Alexandria, St., 349, 360, 373.

D

D’Argentré, 198.

Definition of Grace, 5 sqq.

Deharbe, 328.

Deification of man, 341 sq., 405.

_Delectatio victrix_, 27, 225, 249 sqq.

De Lemos, 216, 236.

De Lugo, 72, 363, 415, 420.

Despair, 179.

“_De Vocatione Omnium Gentium_,” 170, 182.

Diospolis, Council of, 8, 85, 136, 141.

Dordrecht, Synod of, 213.

Dorner, 293.

Durandus, 63.

E

Eck, Johann, 132.

Efficacious Grace, 41 sqq.

Efficacy, Threefold, 265 sq.

Elect, Number of the, 194 sq.

Ephesus, Ecumenical Council of, 86.

Ephrem, St., 109.

Estius, 216.

Eternal life, 426 sqq.

Eucharist, The Holy, 360.

External and Internal Grace, 11 sqq.

F

_Facienti quod est in se Deus non denegat gratiam_, 147 sqq.

Faith, 62, 73, 100 sqq., 272, 274 sqq., 298 sqq., 363 sq., 390 sq., 395.

_Fides explicita—implicita_, 184 sqq., 279.

Fiduciary faith, 274 sqq., 310 sq.

_Filiatio adoptiva_, 110.

Final perseverance, see Perseverance.

Flacius, 291.

Florence, Council of, 164.

Fonseca, 257.

Francis de Sales, St., 207, 256.

Franzelin, 203.

Frassen, 206.

Freedom a requisite of merit, 411 sqq.

Free-will, 32 sqq.;
How Grace coöperates with, 40 sq.;
Its relation to Grace, 222 sqq.

Friendship, 353.

Friendship of God, an effect of sanctifying grace, 351 sqq.

Fulgentius, St., 23, 182, 215, 278.

G

Gazzaniga, 216, 236.

Gelasius, Pope, 170.

Gifts of the Holy Ghost, 369 sq.

Glory, 426 sqq.

Glossner, 149.

God, The Grace of, 10.

Godts, 195.

Gomarus, 213.

Gonet, 204 sq., 216, 218, 219 sq., 345.

Good intention, 411, 414.

Good works, Merit of, 397 sqq.

Gotti, 30, 185, 216.

Gottschalk, 212.

Goudin, 216.

Grace of justification, 313.

Granderath, 361.

_Gratia antecedens—concomitans_, 35.

_Gratia congrua—incongrua_, 262 sqq.

_Gratia efficax ab extrinseco sive per accidens_, 255 sqq., 268.

_Gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se_, 232 sqq., 267, 268.

_Gratia est in nobis, sed sine nobis_, 37.

_Gratia gratis data_, 12 sqq.

_Gratia gratum faciens_, 12 sqq.

_Gratia inspirationis_, 23.

_Gratia magna_, 252 sq.

_Gratia orationis_, 43.

_Gratia parva_ (of Jansenius) 44, 252 sq.

_Gratia prima_, 136 sqq., 388 sqq., 424, 427 sqq.

_Gratia sanans s. medicinalis_, 16, 91, 114.

_Gratia secunda_, 388 sqq.

_Gratia vocans_, 32, 35, 111.

Gratuity of Grace, 131 sqq.

Graveson, 216.

Gregory of Nazianzus, 102, 159, 308.

Gregory the Great, St., 38, 290, 308, 368, 380, 394.

Grotius, Hugo, 294.

Gutberlet, 165, 205.

H

Habits, 333 sqq.

“Half-Melanchthonians,” 292.

Harnack, 295, 296, 319, 381.

Heathens, The, receive sufficient grace for salvation, 179 sqq.

Henno, 324.

Henry of Ghent, 210.

Hilary, St., 97, 99, 209.

Holy Ghost, 331 sq., 335, 346, 361 sq., 368, 369 sq.

Hope, 363 sqq., 390, 396.

Hurter, 375.

Hus, 212.

Hypostatic Union, 12, 150, 345.

I

Ignatius of Antioch, St., 404.

Illuminating grace of the intellect, 19 sqq.

Imputation, Lutheran theory of, 313 sqq.

Incarnation, Dogma of the, 282 sqq.

Incompatibility of Grace and sin, 323 sqq.

Increase of glory, 429 sq.

Increase of sanctifying grace, 384 sqq., 423 sqq., 429.

“Indiculus,” 99.

Infants, Unbaptized, 163 sqq.,
Baptized, 406.

Infralapsarians, 156, 213.

_Inhabitatio Spiritus Sancti_, 361 sq., 370 sqq.

Innocent I, 8, 9, 85, 154.

Innocent X, 168, 226.

Innocent XI, 73, 183, 281, 402.

_Intensio gratiae_, 389.

Irenæus, St., 47, 90, 404.

Isaias, 178.

J

Jacob and Esau, 201 sq.

James, St., 286, 287, 288, 289, 294, 403, 434.

Jansenius and Jansenism, 44, 52, 55, 62, 74, 77, 79, 80, 153 sq., 168,
171, 180, 212, 218, 221, 222, 223, 224 sqq., 249, 252, 281,
411, 417.

Jehu, 433.

Jerome, St., 58, 109, 354, 380, 387, 394, 412.

Jews, 137, 155, 195, 282, 367.

John a S. Thoma, 216.

John the Baptist, St., 116.

Joseph, St., 116, 211.

Jovinian, 387, 394.

Julian of Eclanum, 83, 85.

Justification, 36, 73, 97, 113 sq., 136 sqq.;
Process of, 272 sqq.;
Necessity of faith for, 274 sqq.;
Necessity of other preparatory acts, 285 sqq.;
The state of, 300 sqq.;
The nature of, 301 sqq.;
Negative element, 302 sqq.;
Positive element, 310 sqq.;
Sanctifying Grace the sole formal cause of, 322 sqq.;
Qualities of, 378 sqq.;
Increase of Grace, 388;
Fruits of, 397 sqq.

Justin Martyr, St., 102, 308.

K

Klee, 164.

Κοινωνία θείας φύσεως, 345.

Krogh-Tonning, 293.

L

Lateran, Fourth Council of the, 179, 400.

Law of grace, 405.

Lessius, 150, 206, 211, 221, 262, 337, 420.

Liberty, see Freedom.

Liebermann, 89.

Logos, The Divine, 358, 359 sq.

Log-stick-and-stone theory, 291, 292.

Lucidus, 212.

_Lumen gloriae_, 345.

Luther, 52, 74, 132, 223, 285, 288, 291, 293, 295, 302, 310, 322, 384,
389, 392, 399, 407.

M

Maldonatus, 203, 204.

Mary, B. V., 64, 116, 211, 384, 389, 391.

Massillon, 194.

Melanchthon, 292, 310.

Mennonites, 322.

Mercy, Works of, 416.

Merely sufficient Grace, 41 sqq.

Merit, 128, 131 sqq., 397 sqq., 430.

_Meritum de congruo_, 430 sqq.

_Meritum naturae_, 138.

Mezzofanti, Cardinal, 54.

Mileve, Council of, 85, 114, 116.

Modernism, 54.

Molina and Molinism, 65, 148, 200, 217, 255 sqq., 337.

Molinos, M. de, 401.

Moral virtues, Infused, 366 sqq.

Mortal sin, 97, 106 sqq., 392 sqq.

N

Nabuchodonosor, 58.

Natural and Supernatural Grace, 7 sqq.

Nature, Capacity of, 50 sqq.

_Necessitas antecedens peccati_, 120 sqq.

_Necessitas medii—praecepti_, 279 sqq.

O

Obduracy, 175 sq.

Objects of merit, 423 sqq.

Obstinacy, 178 sq.

Occasionalists, 406.

Ockam, 211.

_Opera steriliter bona_, 57, 81 sq.

Orange, Second Council of, 20, 44, 86, 92, 99, 100, 106, 110, 123, 136,
139, 143, 213, 400.

Origen, 77.

Original sin, 303, 434.

Orosius, 182.

Osiander, 292.

Osorius, 204.

Oswald, 104, 203.

P

Palmieri, 61, 72, 103, 116.

Pantheism, 343.

Passaglia, 158, 375.

Passions, The, 28.

Paul, St., 12, 13, 16, 21, 22, 27, 57, 64, 65, 68, 88, 100 sq., 105, 107,
125, 137, 146, 157 sq., 166, 169 sq., 180, 189, 191, 201 sq.,
207, 227 sq., 259, 269, 276, 277, 281 sq., 283, 288 sq., 314,
316, 317, 318, 319 sq., 351, 383, 393, 402, 407, 420, 424.

Paul V, 256, 261.

Pelagius and Pelagianism, 56, 64, 66, 71, 79, 82 sqq., 89, 97, 103, 114,
119, 136, 141, 170, 190, 197, 228, 308.

Penance, Sacrament of, 395, 428.

Perrone, 18.

Perseverance, Final, 123 sqq., 425 sq., 432 sqq.

Pesch, Chr., 68, 72, 248.

Petavius, 203, 204, 361, 375.

Peter Lombard, 331.

Peter, St., 171, 184.

Pfeffinger, 292.

Piccolomini, 262.

Pighius, 204.

Πίστις, 277 sq., 290.

Pistoia, Council of, 71, 74.

Pius V, 165.

Pius VI, 71, 73.

Platel, 72.

Plato, 350.

Pneumatomachians, 373.

Polycarp, St., 290.

Pomponazzi, 52.

Postlapsarians, 213.

_Potentia obedientialis_, 19, 30, 40.

_Praeambula fidei_, 52, 102, 105.

_Praemotio moralis_, 249, 253.

_Praemotio physica_, 233 sqq., 248.

Prayer, 43, 91, 127 sqq., 133, 142 sqq., 266 sqq., 431, 433, 435.

Predestinarianism, Heretical, 212.

Predestination, 152, 187 sqq.;
_ante praevisa nierita_, 199 sqq.;
_post praevisa merita_, 206 sqq.

Predestinationism, Orthodox, 199 sqq.

Prevenient Grace, 32 sqq.

Priesthood, 13.

Properties of sanctifying Grace, 378 sqq.

Prosper, St., 25, 37, 59, 77, 97, 99, 100, 159, 182, 192, 215.

Protagoras, 350.

Q

Qualitates Fluentes, 29 sqq.

Qualities, 333 sq.

Quasi-Merit, 134.

Quesnel, 53, 72, 74 sqq., 180.

Quietists, 343, 401.

R

Re-Creation, 315, 339.

Regeneration, 314 sq., 329, 339, 341, 346.

Repentance, 176.

Reprobation, 152, 178, 212 sqq.

Requisites of supernatural merit, 410 sqq.

Ripalda, 65, 69, 71 sqq., 128, 145, 149, 330, 342, 345, 363.

Roman Catechism, 333, 340, 349, 363.

S

Saints absolutely predestined, 211;
Favored by God, 419.

Salmeron, 337.

Salutary acts, 82 sqq.

Sanctification, Internal, 323, 347, 348.

Sanctifying Grace, 271 sqq.;
Genesis of, 272 sqq.;
The sole formal cause of justification, 322 sqq.;
Nature of, 328 sqq.;
A permanent quality of the soul, 328 sqq.;
An infused habit, 333 sqq.;
Not identical with charity, 336 sqq.;
A participation of the soul in the divine nature, 340 sqq.;
The effects of, 347 sqq.;
Sanctity, 347 sqq.;
Supernatural beauty, 349 sqq.;
Divine friendship, 351 sqq.;
Adoptive sonship, 356 sqq.;
Supernatural concomitants, 362 sqq.;
Properties of, 378 sqq.;
Admits of degrees and therefore can be increased, 384 sqq.;
Lost by mortal sin, 392 sqq.;
Fruits of, 397 sqq.;
As a requisite of merit, 418 sq.;
Increased by merit, 424 sqq.

Sanctity, an effect of sanctifying Grace, 347 sqq.

Sardagna, 337.

Scheeben, 361, 375.

Schrader, 375.

_Scientia media_, 245, 253, 257 sq., 266.

Scotus and the Scotists, 10, 63, 67, 94, 210, 325, 332, 337, 419, 433.

“Seed of God,” Why grace is called the, 409.

Self-righteousness, 406 sq.

Semipelagianism, 97 sqq., 139 sqq., 146, 148, 170, 190, 197, 226, 228,
239.

Sensitive sphere, Graces of the, 26 sqq.

Sinners, Ordinary and obdurate, 172 sqq.

Sin, Incompatible with Grace, 323 sqq.;
Is sanctifying Grace diminished by venial sin? 388 sq.

Sins of malice, 247.

Society of Jesus, 260 sqq., 325.

Socinianism, 292.

Socrates, 25.

Sola fides theory, 286 sqq.

Soto, Dominicus, 211, 363, 430.

Stapleton, 206.

Stoics, 64, 387.

Strengthening Grace of the will, 23 sqq.

Suarez, 63, 96, 116, 122, 128, 150, 218, 219, 257, 262, 325, 330, 334,
346, 359, 362, 363, 365, 390 sq., 415, 420, 433.

Sufficient Grace, 41 sqq., 167 sqq.

Supererogation, Works of, 411.

Supernatural character of merit, 413 sqq.

Sylvius, 216, 434.

Syncretism, 267 sqq.

Synergist dispute, 292.

T

Temporal blessings, 435.

Temptations, 65 sqq.

Tepe, 68, 72, 81.

Tertullian, 179.

Θείωσις, 341, 376.

Theodoret, 209.

Theological systems devised to harmonize the dogmas of grace and
free-will, 231 sqq.;
Thomism, 232 sqq.;
Augustinianism, 248 sqq.;
Molinism, 255 sqq.;
Congruism, 261 sqq.;
Syncretism, 267 sqq.

Thomas, St., 27, 32, 34, 52, 53, 62, 70, 93, 121, 149, 161, 165, 178, 185,
194, 210, 232, 298, 331, 332, 334, 338, 339, 345, 349, 357,
365, 368 sq., 387, 409, 414, 419, 421, 431, 432, 435.

Thomism and the Thomists, 11, 29, 200, 203, 216, 219, 232 sqq., 325, 332,
389, 413, 414.

Toletus, 204, 206.

Tournely, 207, 337.

Traditionalism, 52.

Trent, Council of, 34, 35, 36, 38, 45, 74, 86, 94, 106, 107, 111, 115 sq.,
122, 123, 124, 125, 136, 153, 165, 168, 182, 188, 213, 224,
227, 243 sq., 247, 265, 272, 275, 285, 295 sqq., 303, 307, 311
sqq., 319, 322 sq., 324, 325, 329 sq., 331, 335, 338, 352,
361, 363, 365, 383, 385, 391, 392, 400, 401, 407 sq., 415, 421
sq., 423, 425, 426, sqq., 431.

Trinity, Dogma of the, 282 sqq.

U

Ultricuria, Nicholas de, 52.

Unbelief, 97.

“Unigenitus,” Constitution, 74.

V

Vasquez, 69 sqq., 72, 94, 133, 149, 262, 337, 363, 415, 418, 420, 425.

Vatican Council, 51, 54, 73, 183, 244 sq., 265.

Vega, 122.

Venial sin, Possibility of avoiding, 117 sqq.;
Is sanctifying Grace diminished by? 388 sq.

Vienne, Council of, 331, 363.

Vital acts of the soul, 27 sqq.

Vitelleschi, 262.

Vocation, The grace of, 190, 196.

_Voluntas salvifica Dei_, 152 sqq.

W

Wiclif, 212.

Will to save, God’s, 152 sqq.

Y

Ysambert, 211.

Z

Zosimus, 85.

Zwingli, 298.

FOOTNOTES

1 The Fathers and the Schoolmen “do not emphasize the difference, and
frequently speak of habitual and actual grace as of one whole.
Controversial reasons account for this discrepancy, which readers of
the older theologians should constantly bear in mind.”
(Wilhelm-Scannell, _Manual of Catholic Theology_, Vol. II, p. 229,
2nd ed., London 1901.)

2 The asterisk before an author’s name indicates that his treatment of
the subject is especially clear and thorough. As St. Thomas is
invariably the best guide, the omission of the asterisk before his
name never means that we consider his work inferior to that of other
writers. There are vast stretches of theology which he scarcely
touched.

3 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 181 sqq., St. Louis 1912.

_ 4 Theologiae Graecorum Patrum Vindicatae circa Universam Materiam
Gratiae Libri III_, I, 4, Paris 1646.

5 “The same name is loosely applied to the act of ‘blessing’ the food
before taking it, which is properly the function of a priest, but
which is suitably performed by every Christian.” (Hunter, _Outlines
of Dogmatic Theology_, Vol. III, p. 6.) Cfr. S. Thomas, _Summa
Theologica_, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 1: “_Secundum communem loquendi
modum tripliciter gratia accipi consuevit: uno modo pro dilectione
alicuius...; secundo sumitur pro aliquo dono gratis dato...; tertio
modo sumitur pro recompensatione beneficii gratis dati, secundum
quod dicimur agere gratias beneficiorum._”

6 Rom. XI, 6: “_Si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus; alioquin gratia
iam non est gratia._”

_ 7 Tract. in Ioannem_, III, n. 9: “_Quid est gratia? Gratis data. Quid
est gratis data? Donata, non reddita._”

_ 8 Debitum naturae._

_ 9 Epistula ad Innocent._, n. 2: “_Nam si intellexissent illi
episcopi, eam illum dicere gratiam, quam etiam cum impiis habemus,
cum quibus homines sumus, negare vero eam quâ Christiani et filii
Dei sumus, quis eum patienter ... ante oculos suos ferret?
Quapropter non culpandi sunt iudices, qui ecclesiasticâ consuetudine
nomen gratiae_ [_i.e._ _christianae] audierunt._”

10 On the difference between these two categories see Pohle-Preuss,
_God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_, pp. 180 sqq.

_ 11 Epist. ad Innocent._, _l.c._: “_Etsi quâdam non improbandâ ratione
dicitur gratia Dei quâ creati sumus [gratia naturalis], ... alia est
tamen, quâ praedestinati vocamur, iustificamur, glorificamur [gratia
supernaturalis]._”

_ 12 Epist. ad Sixt._, 194, n. 8: “_Haec est enim gratia, quam in libris
Dei legere et populis praedicare catholici antistites consueverunt,
et gratia quam commendat Apostolus non est ea quâ creati sumus, ut
homines essemus, sed quâ iustificati sumus, quum mali homines
essemus._”

13 St. Augustine, _Ep._, 217: “_Hoc [scil. credere] opus est gratiae,
non naturae. Opus est, inquam, gratiae quam nobis attulit secundus
Adam, non naturae quam totam perdidit in seipso Adam._”

_ 14 Gratia est donum gratis datum supernaturale._

15 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _Soteriology. A Dogmatic Treatise on the
Redemption_, pp. 24 sqq., St. Louis 1914.

_ 16 Gratia est donum gratis datum, supernaturale, ex meritis Christi._

17 Cfr. St. Augustine, _Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum_, IV, 15.

18 Cfr. Rom. III, 21 sqq.; Gal. II, 16.

_ 19 Gratia est donum gratis datum, supernaturale, internum, ex meritis
Christi._

20 St. Matthew X, 8: “_Infirmos curate, mortuos suscitate, leprosos
mundate, daemones eiicite: gratis accepistis, gratis date_ (δωρεὰν
δότε).”—The name “gratuitously given,” as Fr. Hunter observes
(_Outlines_, III, 10), is “tautological and not particularly
expressive,” and “helps in no way to indicate what is the nature of
the graces which it is intended to exclude. These are such as, for
want of a better word, we call ingratiating: the Latin name used by
theologians (_gratum faciens_) denotes that they make a man pleasing
to God, grateful to Him, if we understand _grateful_ of that which
gives pleasure, and not in its commoner sense, which is nearly the
same as thankful.”

21 For a list of the charismata see 1 Cor. XII, 4 sqq. Cfr. Englmann,
_Von den Charismen im allgemeinen und von dem Sprachencharisma im
besonderen_, Ratisbon 1848; Cornely, _Comment. in S. Pauli Priorem
Epistolam ad Corinthios_, pp. 410 sqq., Paris 1890; Chr. Pesch,
_Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 243 sqq., Freiburg 1908.

22 1 Cor. XII, 31: “_Aemulamini autem charismata meliora, et adhuc
excellentiorem viam vobis demonstro._”

_ 23 Caritas_, ἀγάπη.

24 1 Cor. XIII, 1 sqq. Cfr. St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae,
qu. 111, art. 5: “_Unaquaeque virtus tanto excellentior est, quanto
ad altius bonum ordinatur. Semper autem finis potior est his, quae
sunt ad finem [i.e. media]. Gratia autem gratum faciens ordinat
hominem immediate ad coniunctionem ultimi finis; gratiae autem
gratis datae ordinant hominem ad quaedam praeparatoria finis ultimi,
sicut per prophetiam et miracula et huiusmodi homines inducuntur ad
hoc quod ultimo fini coniungantur. Et ideo gratia gratum faciens est
multo excellentior quam gratia gratis data._”

_ 25 Gratia est donum gratis datum, supernaturale, internum, gratum
faciens, ex meritis Christi._

26 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 229 sq.

_ 27 Ibid._, pp. 298 sq.

_ 28 Ep. ad Simplician._, I, 9, 22: “_Voluntas ipsa, nisi aliquid
occurrerit quod delectet et invitet animum, moveri nullo modo
potest; hoc autem, ut occurrat, non est in hominis potestate._”

_ 29 Enchiridion_, c. 98: “_Quis tam impie desipiat, ut dicat, Deum
malas hominum voluntates, quas voluerit, quando voluerit, ubi
voluerit, in bonum non posse convertere?_”

30 “_Domine, ... ad te nostras etiam rebelles compelle propitius
voluntates._” For a full treatment of God’s moral causality the
student is referred to Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 109,
sect. 2 sq.

31 Cfr. D. Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 15.

_ 32 Causa formalis._

_ 33 Causa efficiens._

_ 34 Causa meritoria._

_ 35 Causa materialis._

_ 36 Causalitas moralis._

_ 37 Causalitas physica._

_ 38 Causa finalis inadaequata._

_ 39 Causa finalis adaequata._

40 On the _potentia obedientialis_ see Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of
Nature and the Supernatural_, pp. 188 sqq.

41 Can. 7, quoted by Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 180.

_ 42 Supra_, p. 11.

43 “_Lex Domini immaculata, convertens animas, ... praeceptum Domini
lucidum, illuminans oculos._”

44 “_Christus passus est pro nobis, vobis relinquens exemplum, ut
sequamini vestigia eius._”

_ 45 De Spiritu et Litera_, c. 34: “_Visorum suasionibus agit Deus, ut
velimus et ut credamus, sive extrinsecus per evangelicas
exhortationes sive intrinsecus, ubi nemo habet in potestate, quid ei
veniat in mentem._”

46 2 Cor. III, 4 sq.: “_Fiduciam autem talem habemus per Christum ad
Deum; non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis quasi ex
nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est._”

47 1 Cor. III, 6: “_Ego plantavi, Apollo rigavit; sed Deus incrementum
dedit_ (ἀλλὰ ὁ θεὸς ηὔξανεν). _Itaque neque qui plantat est aliquid
neque qui rigat, sed qui incrementum dat, Deus_ (ὁ αὐξάνων θεός).”

_ 48 De Gratia Christi_, c. 19: “_Ipse in bonis arboribus cooperatur
fructum, qui et forinsecus rigat atque excolit per quemlibet
ministrum et per se dat intrinsecus incrementum._” Cfr. also Eph. I,
17 sq., Acts XXVI, 16 sqq., 2 Cor. IV, 6, 1 John II, 20 and 27.

49 Cfr. Mazzella, _De Gratia_, disp. 1, art. 1, §4, 3rd ed., Rome 1882.

_ 50 Tract. in Ioa._, III, 13: “_Magisteria forinsecus adiutoria quaedam
sunt et admonitiones; cathedram in coelo habet, qui corda tenet._”

_ 51 L.c._: “_Interior magister est, qui docet; Christus docet,
inspiratio ipsius docet._”

_ 52 Ep. 17 de Incarn. et Grat._ n. 67: “_Frustra [divinus sermo]
exterioribus auribus sonat, nisi Deus spiritali munere auditum
hominis interioris aperiat._” Other Patristic texts will be found in
the classic work of Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 101,
sect. 3-4.

53 It is to be noted, however, that the term _gratia inspirationis_,
both in the writings of St. Augustine and in the decrees of Trent
(Sess. VI, can. 3), sometimes also denotes the immediate
illuminating grace of the mind.

_ 54 De Gratia Christi_, c. 12: “_Quâ gratiâ agitur, non solum ut
facienda noverimus, verum etiam ut cognita faciamus, nec ut solum
diligenda credamus, verum etiam ut credita diligamus._”

_ 55 Op. cit._, c. 26: “_Cognitionem et dilectionem, sicut sunt
discernenda, discernat, quia scientia inflat, quando caritas
aedificat.... Et quum sit utrumque donum Dei, sed unum minus,
alterum maius, non sic iustitiam nostram super laudem iustificatoris
extollat, ut horum duorum quod minus est divino tribuat adiutorio,
quod autem maius est humano usurpet arbitrio._”

56 He applies a variety of practically synonymous terms to the
strengthening grace of the will, for instance: _delectatio
coelestis_, _spiritus caritatis_, _inspiratio dilectionis_, _bona
voluntas_, _voluptas_, _sanctum desiderium_, _inspiratio
suavitatis_, _cupiditas boni_, etc.

57 Canon 4: “_Quisquis dixerit, eandem gratiam Dei per Iesum Christum
D. N. propter hoc tantum adiuvare ad non peccandum, quia per ipsam
nobis aperitur el revelatur intelligentia mandatorum, ut sciamus
quid appetere et quid vitare debeamus, non autem per illam nobis
praestari ut quod faciendum cognoverimus, etiam facere diligamus
atque valeamus, a. s.; ... quum sit utrumque donum Dei, et scire
quid facere debeamus et diligere ut faciamus._” (Denzinger-Bannwart,
n. 104.)

_ 58 Contra Collator._, c. VII, 2: “_Trahit timor; principium enim
sapientiae timor Domini (Prov. I, 7). Trahit laetitia, quoniam
laetatus sum in his, quae dicta sunt mihi: in domum Domini ibimus
(Ps. CXXI, 1). Trahit desiderium, quoniam concupiscit et deficit
anima mea in atria Domini (Ps. LXXXIII, 3). Trahunt delectationes:
quam dulcia enim faucibus meis eloquia tua, super mel et favum ori
meo (Ps. CXVIII, 103). Et quis perspicere aut enarrare possit, per
quos affectus visitatio Dei animum ducat humanum?_” Cfr. Schiffini,
_De Gratia Divina_, thes. 11; Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_,
thes. 8.

_ 59 De Anima_, I, 8: Ἄνευ φαντάσματος οὐκ ἔστι νοεῖν.

_ 60 De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione_, II, 19, 33: “_... ut suave
faciat, quod non delectabat._”

61 2 Cor. XII, 9: “_Sufficit tibi gratia mea._” For further information
on this point the student is referred to Ripalda, _De Ente
Supernaturali_, disp. 44, sect. 9.

_ 62 In Psalmos_, 102, n. 16: “_Vocat [Deus] per intimam
cognitionem._”—_Tract. in Ioa._, 26, n. 7: “_Videte quomodo trahit
Pater, docendo delectat._”

_ 63 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 2.

_ 64 S. Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 25, art. 2.

65 “_... quum sit utrumque donum Dei, et scire quid facere debeamus, et
diligere ut faciamus._” (_V. supra_, p. 25.)

66 “_Amor Dei propter se super omnia._”

_ 67 V. infra_, Part II, Ch. I.

68 Cfr., _e.g._, _De Trinitate_, VIII, 10: “_Quid est dilectio vel
caritas, quam tantopere Scriptura divina laudat et praedicat, nisi
amor boni?_”—_Contra Duas Epistolas Pelag._, II, 9, 21: “_Quid est
boni cupiditas nisi caritas?_”—_De Gratia Christi_, c. 21: “_Quasi
vero aliud sit bona voluntas quam caritas._”

69 It should also be noted that in Augustine’s writings _inspiratio
caritatis_, as an immediate grace of the will, is not necessarily
identical with the infusion of theological love.

_ 70 E.g._ Berti, _De Theol. Discipl._, XIV, 7.

71 Cfr. Alvarez, _De Aux._, disp. 67, n. 6.

72 Alvarez, _op. cit._, disp. 74.—Cfr. John VI, 44: “_Nemo potest
venire ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum._” Apoc. III,
20: “_Ecce sto ad ostium et pulso; si quis audierit vocem meam et
aperuerit mihi ianuam, intrabo ad illum._”

_ 73 Comment. in Summam Theol. S. Thomae Aquinatis_, p. 2, tr. 6, qu. 2,
art. 2, §2.

_ 74 V. supra_, Nos. 1 and 2.

_ 75 Ad Simplic._, I, 2, n. 21: “_Quis potest credere, nisi aliquâ
vocatione, h. e. aliquâ rerum testificatione tangatur? Quis habet in
potestate tali viso attingi mentem suam, quo eius voluntas moveatur
ad fidem?_”

76 Cfr. Suarez, _De Div. Grat._, III, 4: “_In Conciliis et Patribus
nullum vestigium talis gratiae invenimus, quin potius ipsam
inspirationem ponunt ut gratiam primam et praeterea indicant
immediate infundi ab ipso Spiritu Sancto et non mediante aliquâ
qualitate._”

_ 77 De Gratia_, diss. 4, art. 2.

_ 78 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 2: “_In eo, qui dicitur
gratiam Dei habere, significatur esse quidam effectus gratuitae Dei
voluntatis. Dictum est autem supra (qu. 109, art. 1), quod
dupliciter ex gratuita Dei voluntate homo adiuvatur: uno modo
inquantum anima hominis movetur a Deo ad aliquid cognoscendum vel
volendum vel agendum; et hoc modo ipse gratuitus effectus in homine
non est qualitas, sed motus quidam animae; actus enim moventis in
moto est motus, ut dicitur (Phys. 1, 3, text. 18). Alio modo
adiuvatur homo ex gratuita Dei voluntate, secundum quod aliquod
habituale donum a Deo animae infunditur ... et sic donum gratiae
qualitas quaedam est._”—Cfr. Palmieri, _De Gratia Div. Actuali_,
thes. 16; Pesch, _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 23 sqq.;
Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 220 sqq. The Thomistic doctrine
on this point is viewed with favor by several Molinist theologians,
_e.g._, Platel (_De Gratia_, n. 547) and Gutberlet (_Dogmatische
Theologie_, Vol. VIII, pp. 25 sq., Mainz 1897).

_ 79 De Peccat. Merit. et Rem._, II, 18: “_Quoniam quod a Deo nos
avertimus nostrum est, et haec est voluntas mala; quod vero ad Deum
nos convertimus nisi ipso excitante et adiuvante non possumus, et
haec est voluntas bona._”

_ 80 De Grat. et Lib. Arbitr._, c. 17, 33: “_Ipse ut velimus, operatur
incipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens._”—On certain
differences of opinion on this point between Suarez (_De Div.
Motione_, III, 5) and St. Thomas (_Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 111,
art. 2), see Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 252 sqq.

81 Cfr. Ps. LVIII, 11; XXII, 6.

_ 82 Enchiridion_, c. 32: “_Nolentem praevenit, ut velit; volentem
subsequitur, ne frustra velit._”

_ 83 Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 5: “_Declarat praeterea, ipsius
justificationis exordium in adultis a Dei per Iesum Christum
praeveniente gratia sumendum esse, h. e. ab eius vocatione, qua
nullis eorum existentibus meritis vocantur._” (Denzinger-Bannwart,
n. 797.)

_ 84 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 111, art. 3: “_Sicut gratia dividitur in
operantem et cooperantem secundum diversos effectus, ita etiam in
praevenientem et subsequentem, qualitercumque gratia accipiatur
(i.e. sive habitualis sive actualis). Sunt autem quinque effectus
gratiae in nobis, quorum primus est ut anima sanetur; secundus ut
bonum velit; tertius est ut bonum quod vult efficaciter operetur;
quartus est ut in bono perseveret; quintus est ut ad gloriam
perveniat. Et ideo gratia, secundum quod causat in nobis primum
effectum, vocatur praeveniens respectu secundi effectus; et prout
causat in nobis secundum, vocatur subsequens respectu primi
effectus. Et sicut unus effectus est posterior uno effectu et prior
alio, ita gratia potest dici praeveniens et subsequens secundum
eundem effectum respectu diversorum._”

_ 85 Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 16: “_Iesus Christus in ipsos
iustificatos iugiter virtutem influit, quae virtus bona eorum opera
semper antecedit et comitatur et subsequitur._”

86 On the distinction to be drawn between the various members of these
pairs, whether it be real or merely logical, theologians differ.
Cfr. Palmieri, _De Div. Grat._, thes. 18; Chr. Pesch, _Praelect.
Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 17 sqq.; Schiffini, _De Gratia
Divina_, pp. 241 sqq.

_ 87 V. supra_, Nos. 1 and 4.

88 Sess. VI, cap. 5 and can. 4, quoted in Denzinger-Bannwart’s
_Enchiridion_, n. 797 and 814.

_ 89 Ad Simplic._, I, qu. 2, n. 22: “_Voluntas ipsa, nisi aliquid
occurrerit, quod delectet atque invitet animum, moveri nullo modo
potest; hoc autem ut occurrat, non est in hominis potestate._”

_ 90 Contr. Collator._, c. VII, 2: “_Et quis perspicere aut enarrare
possit, per quos affectus visitatio Dei animum ducat humanum, ut
quae fugiebat sequatur, quae oderat diligat, quae fastidiebat
esuriat, ac subitâ commutatione mirabili quae clausa ei fuerant sint
aperta, quae onerosa levia, quae amara sint dulcia, quae obscura
sint lucida?_”

91 Cfr. M. Cronin, _The Science of Ethics_, Vol. I, pp. 30 sqq., Dublin
1909.

_ 92 Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagian._, II, 9, 21: “_Multa Deus facit in
homine bona, quae non facit homo; nulla vero facit homo, quae non
facit Deus, ut faciat homo._”

_ 93 De Gratia et Lib. Arbitr._, c. 17, n. 33: “_Ut ergo velimus, sine
nobis operatur; quum autem volumus et sic volumus ut faciamus,
nobiscum cooperatur; tamen sine illo vel operante ut velimus, vel
cooperante quum volumus, ad bona pietatis opera nihil valemus._”

_ 94 De Gratia et Lib. Arbitr._, c. 14: “_Si ergo Deus tria haec, h. e.
bonum cogitare, velle, perficere, operatur in nobis (2 Cor. III, 5;
Phil. II, 13), primum profecto sine nobis, secundum nobiscum,
tertium per nos facit. Siquidem immittendo bonam cogitationem, nos
praevenit; immutando etiam malam voluntatem sibi per consensum
iungit; ministrando et consensui facultatem foris per apertum opus
nostrum internus opifex innotescit. Sane ipsi nos praevenire
nequaquam possumus. Qui autem bonum neminem invenit, neminem salvat,
quem non praevenit. A Deo ergo sine dubio nostrae fit salutis
exordium, nec per nos utique nec nobiscum. Verum consensus et opus,
etsi non ex nobis, non iam tamen sine nobis._”—On the
misinterpretation of this text by the Jansenists, see Palmieri, _De
Gratia Divina Actuali_, pp. 84 sq.

_ 95 Moral._, XVI, 10: “_Superna pietas prius agit in nobis aliquid sine
nobis [gratia praeveniens], ut subsequente libero arbitrio bonum,
quod appetimus, agat nobiscum [gratia cooperans]._”

_ 96 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, c. 16: “_Tanta est [Dei] erga homines
bonitas, ut eorum velit esse merita quae sunt ipsius dona._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 810.)

_ 97 De Grat. et Lib. Arbitr._, c. 16, 32: “_Certum enim est nos mandata
servare, si volumus; sed quia praeparatur voluntas a Domino, ab illo
petendum est, ut tantum velimus quantum sufficit, ut volendo
faciamus. Certum est nos velle, quum volumus; sed ille facit ut
velimus bonum, de quo dictum est quod paulo ante posui (Prov. VIII,
35): ____Praeparatur voluntas a Domino____; de quo dictum est (Ps.
XXXVI, 32): ____A Domino gressus hominis dirigentur et viam eius
volet____; de quo dictum est (Phil. II, 13): ____Deus est qui
operatur in nobis et velle.____ Certum est nos facere quum facimus;
sed ille facit ut faciamus, praebendo vires efficacissimas
voluntati, qui dixit (Ezech. XXXVI, 27): ____Faciam ut in
iustificationibus meis ambuletis et iudicia mea observetis et
faciatis.____ Quum dicit: ____Faciam ut faciatis,____ quid aliud
dicit nisi (Ezech. XI, 19): ____Auferam a vobis cor lapideum,____
unde non faciebatis, (Ezech. XXXVI, 26), et ____dabo vobis cor
carneum,____ unde facitis._”—On the subject of this paragraph see
Palmieri, _op. cit._, thes. 10, and Chr. Pesch, _op. cit._, pp. 14
sqq.

98 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 67 sqq.

99 Cfr. Palmieri, _De Div. Grat. Actuali_; thes. 17, and Chr. Pesch,
_Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 28 sqq.

_ 100 V. infra_, Ch. III, Sect. 2.

_ 101 De Grat. et Lib. Arbitr._, c. 16, 32: “_Certum est nos facere, quum
facimus; sed ille facit ut faciamus, praebendo vires efficacissimas
voluntati._”

_ 102 De Corrept. et Grat._, c. 11: “_Acceperat posse, si vellet [gratia
sufficiens]; sed non habuit velle [gratia efficax] quod posset, nam
si habuisset, perseverasset._” Cfr. Palmieri, _De Div. Grat.
Actuali_, thes. 11.

_ 103 De Nat. et Grat._, 43: “_Nam Deus impossibilia non iubet, sed
iubendo monet, et facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis, et
adiuvat ut possis._”

_ 104 De Gratia Christi_, IV, 10: “_... ita inefficax, ex qua operatio ne
possit quidem sequi, nisi eius inefficacia per aliam suppleatur._”

105 “_Illud a recentioribus prolatum gratiae sufficientis genus, quo
adiuvante nullum unquam opus factum est aut fiet unquam, videtur
monstrum quoddam singulare gratiae, solummodo peccatis faciendis
maiorique damnationi accersendae serviens._” (_De Grat. Christi_,
III, 3).

106 “_Gratia sufficiens statui nostro non tam utilis quam perniciosa
est, sic ut proinde merito possimus petere: A gratia sufficienti
libera nos, Domine._” This assertion was condemned by Pope Alexander
VIII in 1690. It is convincingly refuted by Schiffini, _De Gratia
Divina_, pp. 354 sqq.

107 “_Hoc etiam secundum fidem catholicam credimus, quod acceptâ per
baptismum gratiâ omnes baptizati Christo auxiliante et cooperante,
quae ad salutem pertinent, possint et debeant, si fideliter laborare
voluerint, adimplere._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 200.)

108 Sess. VI, can. 4: “_Si quis dixerit, liberum hominis arbitrium a Deo
motum et excitatum nihil cooperari Deo, ... neque posse dissentire,
si velit, anathema sit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 814.)

109 Is. V, 4: “_Quid est, quod debui ultra facere vineae meae et non
feci ei? An quod exspectavi, ut faceret uvas et fecit labruscas?_”

110 Prov. I, 24: “_Vocavi et renuistis, extendi manum meam et non fuit
qui adspiceret._”

111 Matth. XI, 21.

112 Cfr. Matth. XXIII, 37; Acts VII, 51; 1 Cor. X, 13; 2 Cor. VI, 1; 1
Thess. V, 19.

_ 113 Contra Haer._, IV, 37, 1: “_Illud autem quod dicit (Matth. XXIII,
37): Quoties volui colligere filios tuos, et noluisti, veterem
libertatem hominis manifestat, quia liberum eum fecit Deus ab
initio.... Vis enim a Deo non fit, sed bona sententia adest illi
semper. Et propter hoc consilium quidem bonum dat omnibus.... Et qui
operantur quidem illud [gratia efficax], gloriam et honorem
percipient, quoniam operati sunt bonum, quum possint non operari
illud; hi autem, qui illud non operantur, indicium iustum excipient
Dei, quoniam non sunt operati bonum [gratia inefficax], quum possint
operari illud [gratia vere et mere sufficiens]._”

114 “_Gratia Dei ... quae hominum adiuvat voluntates: qua ut non
adiuventur, in ipsis itidem causa est, non in Deo._” _De Peccat.
Mer. et Rem._, II, 17.

_ 115 De Lib. Arbitr._, III, 16: “_Ex eo quod non accepit, nullus reus
est; ex eo autem quod non facit quod debet, iuste reus est. Debet
autem [facere], si accepit et voluntatem liberam et
sufficientissimam facultatem._” On the Jansenist distortions of St.
Augustine’s teaching see Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes.
48. The doctrine of the Greek Fathers is thoroughly rehearsed by
Isaac Habert, _Theol. Patr. Graec._, II, 6 sq.

_ 116 Conc. Vat.,_ Sess. III, De Revel., can. 1: “_Si quis dixerit, Deum
unum et verum, Creatorem et Dominum nostrum, per ea, quae facta
sunt, naturali rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci non posse,
anathema sit._”