Chapter VI: Section 1: The Necessity Of Actual Grace (2)

Equally convincing is the argument that Adam in Paradise was unable to perform any salutary acts without divine grace. “Just as it is in man’s power to die whenever he will,” says St. Augustine, “... but the mere will cannot preserve life in the absence of food and the other means of life; so man in Paradise was able of his mere will, simply by abandoning righteousness, to destroy himself; but to have led a life of righteousness would have been too much for his will, unless it had been sustained by the power of Him who made him.”(282)

This is also the teaching of the Second Council of Orange (A. D. 529): “Even if human nature remained in the state of integrity, in which it was constituted, it would in no wise save itself without the help of its Creator. If it was unable, without the grace of God, to keep what it had received, how should it be able without the grace of God to regain what it has lost?”(283)

c) The theological argument for the metaphysical necessity of grace is based on the essentially supernatural character of all salutary acts.

α) St. Thomas formulates it as follows: “Eternal life is an end transcending the proportion of human nature, ... and therefore man, by nature, can perform no meritorious works proportioned to eternal life, but requires for this purpose a higher power,—the power of grace. Consequently, man cannot merit eternal life without grace. He is, however, able to perform acts productive of some good connatural to man, such as tilling the soil, drinking, eating, acts of friendship, etc.”(284) For the reason here indicated it is as impossible for man to perform salutary acts without grace as it would be to work miracles without that divine assistance which transcends the powers of nature.(285)

β) Catholic theologians are unanimous in admitting that all salutary acts are and must needs be supernatural; but they differ in their conception of this supernatural quality (_supernaturalitas_). The problem underlying this difference of opinion may be stated thus: A thing may be supernatural either entitatively, _quoad substantiam_, or merely as to the manner of its existence, _quoad modum_. The _supernaturale quoad substantiam_ is divided into the strictly supernatural and the merely preternatural.(286) The question is: To what category of the supernatural belong the salutary acts which man performs by the aid of grace? Undoubtedly there are actual graces which are entitatively natural, _e.g._ the purely mediate grace of illumination,(287) the natural graces conferred in the pure state of nature, the actual graces of the sensitive sphere,(288) and the so-called _cogitatio congrua_ of Vasquez.(289) The problem therefore narrows itself down to the _immediate_ graces of intellect and will. Before the Tridentine Council theologians contented themselves with acknowledging the divinely revealed fact that these graces are supernatural; it was only after the Council that they began to speculate on the precise character of this _supernaturalitas_.

Some, following the teaching of the Scotist school, ascribed the supernatural character of salutary acts to their free acceptation on the part of God, holding them to be purely natural in their essence and raised to the supernatural sphere merely _per denominationem extrinsecam_.(290) This view is untenable. For if nature, as such, possessed the intrinsic power to perform salutary acts, irrespective of their acceptation by God, the Fathers and councils would err in teaching that this power is derived from the immediate graces of illumination and strengthening.(291)

Others hold that the salutary acts which grace enables man to perform, are supernatural only _quoad modum_; because while it is the Holy Ghost Himself who incites the natural faculties to salutary thoughts and good resolves, He does not _eo ipso_ raise these thoughts and resolves to the supernatural plane. This theory, besides being open to the same objection which we have urged against the first, involves another difficulty. If all salutary acts were supernatural only _quoad modum_, sanctifying grace, which is as certainly supernatural in its essence as the beatific vision of God,(292) would cease to have an adequate purpose; for the intrinsic reason for its existence is precisely that it raises the nature of the justified into a permanent supernatural state of being.

A third school of theologians tries to solve the difficulty by adding to the natural operation of the intellect and the will some accidental supernatural _modus_. There are several such _modi_, which, though inhering in nature and really distinct therefrom, depend solely on the Holy Ghost, and consequently transcend the natural powers of man, _e.g._ the duration or intensity of a salutary act. This theory at first blush appears more plausible than the other two, but it cannot be squared with the teaching of Tradition. In the first place, the duration or intensity of a salutary act cannot affect its essence or nature. Then again, every such accidental supernatural _modus_ is produced either by grace alone, or by grace working conjointly with free-will. In the former hypothesis it would be useless, because it would not render the free salutary act, as such, supernatural; in the latter case it could do no more than aid the will to do what is morally impossible, whereas every salutary act is in matter of fact a physical impossibility, that is, impossible to unaided nature.(293)

There remains a fourth explanation, which ascribes to every salutary act an ontological, substantial, intrinsic _supernaturalitas_, whereby it is elevated to a higher and essentially different plane of being and operation. This theory is convincingly set forth by Suarez in his treatise on the Necessity of Grace.(294)

It may be asked: If the salutary acts which we perform are supernatural in substance, why are we not conscious of the fact? The answer is not far to seek. Philosophical analysis shows that the intrinsic nature of our psychic operations is no more a subject of immediate consciousness than the substance of the soul itself. Consequently, sanctifying grace cannot reveal its presence through our inner consciousness. Having no intuitive knowledge of our own Ego, we are compelled to specify the different acts of the soul by means of their respective objects and their various tendencies (cognition, volition). To our consciousness the supernatural love of God does not present itself as essentially different from the natural.(295)

Article 3. The Necessity Of Actual Grace For The States Of Unbelief, Mortal Sin, And Justification

Every adult man, viewed in his relation to actual grace, is in one of three distinct states:

(1) The state of unbelief (_status infidelitatis_), which may be either negative, as in the case of heathens, or positive, as in the case of apostates and formal heretics;

(2) The state of mortal sin (_status peccati mortalis_), when the sinner has already received, or not yet lost, the grace of faith, which is the beginning of justification;

(3) The state of justification itself (_status iustitiae sive gratiae sanctificantis_), in which much remains yet to be done to attain eternal happiness.

The question we have now to consider is: Does man need actual grace in every one of these three states, and if so, to what extent?

1. SEMIPELAGIANISM.—Semipelagianism is an attempt to effect a compromise between Pelagianism and Augustinism by attributing to mere nature a somewhat greater importance in matters of salvation than St. Augustine was willing to admit.

a) After Augustine had for more than twenty years vigorously combatted and finally defeated Pelagianism, some pious monks of Marseilles, under the leadership of John Cassian, Abbot of St. Victor,(296) tried to find middle ground between his teaching and that of the Pelagians. Cassian’s treatise _Collationes Patrum_,(297) and the reports sent to St. Augustine by his disciples Prosper and Hilary, enable us to form a pretty fair idea of the Semipelagian system. Its principal tenets were the following:

α) There is a distinction between the “beginning of faith” (_initium fidei_, _affectus credulitatis_) and “increase in faith” (_augmentum fidei_). The former depends entirely on the will, while the latter, like faith itself, requires the grace of Christ.

β) Nature can merit grace by its own efforts, though this natural merit (_meritum naturae_) is founded on equity only (_meritum de congruo_), and does not confer a right in strict justice, as Pelagius contended.

γ) Free-will, after justification, can of its own power secure the gift of final perseverance (_donum perseverantiae_); which consequently is not a special grace, but a purely natural achievement.

δ) The bestowal or denial of baptismal grace in the case of infants, who can have no previous _merita de congruo_, depends on their hypothetical future merits or demerits as foreseen by God from all eternity.(298)

b) Informed of these errors by his disciples, St. Augustine energetically set to work, and in spite of his advanced age wrote two books against the Semipelagians, entitled respectively, _De Praedestinatione Sanctorum_ and _De Dono Perseverantiae_. The new teaching was not yet, however, regarded as formally heretical, and Augustine treated his opponents with great consideration, in fact he humbly acknowledged that he himself had professed similar errors before his consecration (A. D. 394).(299)

After Augustine’s death, Prosper and Hilary went to Rome and interested Pope Celestine in their cause. In a dogmatic letter addressed to the Bishops of Gaul, the Pontiff formally approved the teaching of St. Augustine on grace and original sin, but left open such other “more profound and difficult incidental questions” as predestination and the manner in which grace operates in the soul.(300) But as this papal letter (called “_Indiculus_”) was an instruction rather than an ex-cathedra definition, the controversy continued until, nearly a century later (A. D. 529), the Second Council of Orange, convoked by St. Caesarius of Arles, formally condemned the Semipelagian heresy. This council, or at least its first eight canons,(301) received the solemn approbation of Pope Boniface II (A. D. 530) and thus became vested with ecumenical authority.(302)

2. THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.—The Catholic Church teaches the absolute necessity of actual grace for all stages on the way to salvation. We shall demonstrate this in five separate theses.

*Thesis I: Prevenient grace is absolutely necessary, not only for faith, but for the very beginning of faith.*

This is _de fide_.

Proof. The Second Council of Orange defined against the Semipelagians: “If any one say that increase in faith, as well as the beginning of faith, and the very impulse by which we are led to believe in Him who justifies the sinner, and by which we obtain the regeneration of holy Baptism, is in us not as a gift of grace, that is to say, through the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, but by nature, ... is an adversary of the dogmatic teaching of the Apostles....”(303)

a) This is thoroughly Scriptural doctrine, as St. Augustine(304) and Prosper(305) proved. St. Paul’s first epistle to the Corinthians had opened the eyes of Augustine, as he himself admits. 1 Cor. IV, 7: “For who distinguisheth(306) thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?” The Apostle means to say: In matters pertaining to salvation no man has any advantage over his fellow men, because all receive of the grace of God without any merits of their own. This statement would be false if any man were able to perform even the smallest salutary act without the aid of grace.

With a special view to faith the same Apostle teaches: “For by grace you are saved through faith,(307) and that not of yourselves,(308) for it is the gift of God;(309) not of works,(310) that no man may glory.”(311) This, too, would be false if faith could be traced to a purely natural instinct or to some _meritum de congruo_ in the Semipelagian sense.(312) Our Lord Himself, in his famous discourse on the Holy Eucharist, unmistakably describes faith and man’s preparation for it as an effect of prevenient grace. “No man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him.”(313) The metaphorical expression “come to me,” according to the context, means “believe in me;” whereas the Father’s “drawing” plainly refers to the operation of prevenient grace. Cfr. John VI, 65 sq.: “But there are some of you that believe not.... Therefore did I say to you, that no man can come to me, unless it be given him by the Father.” John VI, 29: “This is the work of God,(314) that you believe in him whom he hath sent.” According to our Saviour’s own averment, therefore, preaching is of no avail unless grace gives the first impulse leading to faith.

b) As regards the argument from Tradition, it will suffice to show that the Fathers who wrote before Augustine, ascribed the beginning of faith to prevenient grace.

α) In the light of the Augustinian dictum that “prayer is the surest proof of grace,”(315) it is safe to assume that St. Justin Martyr voiced our dogma when he put into the mouth of a venerable old man the words: “But thou pray above all that the gates of light may be opened unto thee; for no man is able to understand the words of the prophets [as _praeambula fidei_] unless God and His Christ have revealed their meaning.”(316) Augustine himself appeals to SS. Cyprian, Ambrose, and Gregory of Nazianzus, and then continues: “Such doctors, and so great as these, saying that there is nothing of which we may boast as of our own, which God has not given us; and that our very heart and our thoughts are not in our own power, ... attribute these things to the grace of God, acknowledge them as God’s gifts, testify that they come to us from Him and are not from ourselves.”(317)

β) Like the Pelagians in their teaching on original sin,(318) the Semipelagians in their teaching on grace relied mainly on the authority of St. John Chrysostom, from whose writings they loved to quote such perplexing passages as this: “We must first select the good, and then God adds what is of His; He does not forestall our will because He does not wish to destroy our liberty. But once we have made our choice, He gives us much help. For while it rests with us to choose and to will antecedently, it lies with him to perfect and bring to an issue.”(319)

To understand St. Chrysostom’s attitude, and that of the Oriental Fathers generally, we must remember that the Eastern Church considered it one of its chief duties to safeguard the dogma of free-will against the Manichaeans, who regarded man as an abject slave of Fate. In such an environment it was of supreme importance to champion the freedom of the will(320) and to insist on the maxim: “Help yourself and God will help you.” If the necessity of prevenient grace was not sufficiently emphasized, the circumstances of the time explain, and to some extent excuse, the mistake. St. Augustine himself remarks in his treatise on the Predestination of the Saints: “What need is there for us to look into the writings of those who, before this heresy sprang up, had no necessity of dwelling on a question so difficult of solution as this, which beyond a doubt they would do if they were compelled to answer such [errors as these]? Whence it came about that they touched upon what they thought of God’s grace briefly and cursorily in some passages of their writings.”(321) Palmieri remarks(322) that it would be easy to cite a number of similar passages from the writings of the early Latin Fathers before Pelagius, who certainly cannot be suspected of Semipelagian leanings.(323)

The orthodoxy of St. Chrysostom can be positively established by a twofold argument. (1) Pope Celestine the First recommended him as a reliable defender of the Catholic faith against Nestorianism and Pelagianism.(324) (2) Chrysostom rejected Semipelagianism as it were in advance when he taught: “Not even faith is of ourselves; for if He [God] had not come, if He had not called, how should we have been able to believe?”(325) and again when he says in his explanation of the Pauline phrase ἀρχηγὸς τῆς πίστεως:(326) “He Himself hath implanted the faith in us, He Himself hath given the beginning.”(327) These utterances are diametrically opposed to the heretical teaching of the Semipelagians.(328)

c) The theological argument for our thesis is effectively formulated by Oswald(329) as follows: “It is faith which first leads man from the sphere of nature into a higher domain,—faith is the beginning of salutary action. That this beginning must come wholly from God, and that it cannot come from man, goes without saying. By beginning we mean the very first beginning. Whether we call this first beginning itself faith, or speak, as the Semipelagians did, of certain preambles of faith,—aspirations, impulses, desires leading to faith (_praeambula fidei: conatus, desideria, credulitatis affectus_), makes no difference. Wherever the supernatural domain of salutary action begins—and it is divided off from the natural by a very sharp line—there it is God who begins and not man, there it is grace which precedes,—_gratia praeveniens_, as it has come to be known by a famous term.”

Indeed, if man were able by his own power to merit for himself the first beginnings of grace, then faith itself, and justification which is based on faith, and the beatific vision, would not be strictly graces.

As for the precise moment when prevenient grace begins its work in the soul, the common opinion is that the very first judgment which a man forms as to the credibility of divine revelation (_iudicium credibilitatis_) is determined by the immediate grace of the intellect,(330) and that the subsequent _affectus credulitatis_ springs from the strengthening grace of the will. St. Augustine, commenting on 2 Cor. III, 5, demonstrates this as follows:

“Let them give attention to this, and well weigh these words, who think that the beginning of faith is of ourselves, and the increase of faith is of God. For who cannot see that thinking is prior to believing? For no one believes anything unless he has first thought that it is to be believed.... Therefore, in what pertains to religion and piety [of which the Apostle was speaking], if we are not capable of thinking anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God, we are certainly not capable of believing anything as of ourselves, since we cannot do this without thinking, but our sufficiency, by which we begin to believe, is of God.”(331)

*Thesis II: The sinner, even after he has received the faith, stands in absolute need of prevenient and co-operating grace for every single salutary act required in the process of justification.*

This proposition also embodies an article of faith.

Proof. The Semipelagians ascribed the dispositions necessary for justification to the natural efforts of the will, thereby denying the necessity of prevenient grace. This teaching was condemned as heretical by the Second Council of Orange (A. D. 529),(332) and again by the Council of Trent, which defined: “If any one saith that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Ghost, and without His help, man can believe, hope, love, or be penitent as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be bestowed upon him; let him be anathema.”(333)

a) The Scriptural texts which we have quoted against Pelagianism(334) also apply to the Semipelagian heresy.

Our Lord’s dictum: “Without me you can do nothing,”(335) proves the necessity of prevenient and co-operating grace, not only at the beginning of every salutary act, but also for its continuation and completion. St. Augustine clearly perceived this. “That he might furnish a reply to the future Pelagius,” he observes, “our Lord does not say: Without me you can with difficulty do anything; but He says: Without me you can do _nothing_.... He does not say: Without me you can _perfect_ nothing, but _do_ nothing. For if He had said _perfect_, they might say that God’s aid is necessary, not for beginning good, which is of ourselves, but for perfecting it.... For when the Lord says, Without me you can do nothing, in this one word He comprehends both the beginning and the end.”(336)

St. Paul expressly ascribes the salvation of man to grace when he says: “... with fear and trembling work out your salvation; for it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish.”(337)

The Tridentine Council, as we have seen, designates the four salutary acts of faith, hope, love, and penitence as a preparation for justification. Now St. Paul teaches: “The God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing, that you may abound in hope and in the power of the Holy Ghost;”(338) and St. John: “Charity is of God.”(339)

b) The argument from Tradition is chiefly based on St. Augustine, who in his two treatises against the Semipelagians, and likewise in his earlier writings, inculcates the necessity of grace for all stages on the way to salvation.

Thus he writes in his _Enchiridion_: “Surely, if no Christian will dare to say this: It is not of God that showeth mercy, but of man that willeth, lest he should openly contradict the Apostle, it follows that the true interpretation of the saying (Rom. IX, 16): ‘It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy,’ is that the whole work belongs to God, who both prepares the good will that is to be helped, and assists it when it is prepared. For the good will of man precedes many of God’s gifts, but not all; and it must itself be included among those which it does not precede. We read in Holy Scripture, both ‘God’s mercy shall prevent me’ (Ps. LVIII, 11), and ‘Thy mercy will follow me’ (Ps. XXII, 6). It precedes the unwilling to make him willing; it follows the willing to render his will effectual. Why are we taught to pray for our enemies, who are plainly unwilling to lead a holy life, unless it be that God may work willingness in them? And why are we admonished to ask that we may receive, unless it be that He who has created in us the wish, may Himself satisfy the same? We pray, then, for our enemies, that the mercy of God may precede them, as it has preceded us; we pray for ourselves, that His mercy may follow us.”(340)

That grace accompanies us uninterruptedly on the way to Heaven is also the teaching of St. Jerome: “To will and to run is my own act; but without the constant aid of God, even my own act will not be mine; for the Apostle says (Phil. II, 13): ‘It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish.’... It is not sufficient for me that He gave it once, unless He gives it always.”(341)

St. Ephraem Syrus prays in the name of the Oriental Church: “I possess nothing, and if I possess anything, Thou [O God] hast given it to me.... I ask only for grace and acknowledge that I shall be saved through Thee.”(342)

The Second Council of Orange summarizes the teaching of Tradition on the subject under consideration.(343)

c) The theological argument for our thesis is based on the character of the adoptive sonship resulting from the process of justification.(344) This sonship (_filiatio adoptiva_) is essentially supernatural, and hence can be attained only by strictly supernatural acts, which unaided nature is both morally and physically incapable of performing.(345)

*Thesis III: Even in the state of sanctifying grace man is not able to perform salutary acts, unless aided by actual graces.*

This is likewise _de fide_.

Proof. The faculties of the just man are permanently kept in the supernatural sphere by sanctifying grace and by the habits of faith, hope, and charity. Hence the just man in the performance of salutary acts does not require the same measure of prevenient grace as the unregenerate sinner, who lacks all, or at least some, of the habits mentioned.

The question here at issue, therefore, can only be: Is actual grace (as _gratia excitans s. vocans_, not _elevans_) absolutely necessary to enable a man in the state of sanctifying grace to perform salutary acts? The answer is—Yes, and this teaching is so firmly grounded on Sacred Scripture and Tradition, and so emphatically sanctioned by the Church, that we do not hesitate to follow Perrone in qualifying it as _de fide_.(346) The councils in their teaching on the necessity of grace, assert that necessity alike for the justified and the unjustified. That of Trent expressly declares: “Whereas Jesus Christ Himself continually infuses His virtue into the justified,—as the head into the members, and the vine into the branches,—and this virtue always precedes and accompanies and follows their good works, which without it could not in any wise be pleasing and meritorious before God, we must believe that nothing further is wanting to the justified....”(347)

a) Our thesis can be easily proved from Holy Scripture. We have already shown that the Bible and Tradition make no distinction between the different stages on the way to salvation, or between different salutary acts, but indiscriminately postulate for all the illuminating grace of the intellect and the strengthening grace of the will. It follows that to perform salutary acts the justified no less than the unjustified need actual grace. Our Saviour’s pithy saying: “Without me you can do nothing,”(348) was not addressed to unbelievers or sinners, but to His Apostles, who were in the state of sanctifying grace.(349)

This interpretation is fully borne out by Tradition. St. Augustine, after laying it down as a general principle that “We can of ourselves do nothing to effect good works of piety without God either working that we may will, or co-operating when we will,”(350) says of justified man in particular: “The Heavenly Physician cures our maladies, not only that they may cease to exist, but in order that we may ever afterwards be able to walk aright,—a task to which we should be unequal, even after our healing, were it not for His continued help.... For just as the eye of the body, even when completely sound, is unable to see, unless aided by the brightness of light, so also man, even when fully justified, is unable to lead a holy life, unless he be divinely assisted by the eternal light of righteousness.”(351)

This agrees with the practice of the Church in exhorting all men without exception, saints as well as sinners, to pray: “Precede, we beseech Thee, O Lord, our actions by Thy holy inspiration, and carry them on by Thy gracious assistance, that every prayer and work of ours may begin always from Thee, and through Thee be happily ended.”(352)

b) Some theologians have been led by certain speculative difficulties to deny the necessity of actual grace in the state of justification.

Man in the state of justification, they argue, is endowed with sanctifying grace, the supernatural habits of faith, hope, and charity, and the infused moral virtues, and consequently possesses all those qualifications which are necessary to enable him to perform salutary acts with the supernatural concurrence of God. Why should the will, thus supernaturally equipped, require the aid of additional actual graces to enable it to perform strictly supernatural, and therefore salutary, actions?(353)

We reply: The necessity of actual grace in the state of justification is so clearly taught by divine Revelation that no theological theory is tenable which denies it. Besides, the objection we have briefly summarized disregards some very essential considerations, _e.g._ that there remains in man, even after justification, concupiscence, which is accompanied by a certain weakness that requires at least the _gratia sanans sive medicinalis_ to heal it.(354) Furthermore, a quiescent _habitus_ cannot set itself in motion, but must be determined from without; that is to say, in our case, it must be moved by the _gratia excitans_ to elicit supernatural thoughts and to will supernatural acts. Just as a seed cannot sprout without the aid of appropriate stimuli, so sanctifying grace is incapable of bearing fruit unless stimulated by the sunshine and moisture of actual graces. Man may perform purely natural acts even though he be in the supernatural state of grace; hence if any particular act of his is to be truly supernatural and conducive to eternal salvation, God must lend His special aid.(355)

*Thesis IV: Except by a special privilege of divine grace, man, even though he be in the state of sanctifying grace, is unable to avoid venial sin throughout life.*

This is likewise _de fide_.

Proof. The Pelagians held that man is able to avoid sin, nay to attain to absolute impeccability,(356) without supernatural assistance. Against this error the Second Council of Mileve (A. D. 416) defined: “It likewise hath pleased [the holy Synod] that whoever holds that the words of the Our Father: ‘Forgive us our trespasses,’ when pronounced by saintly men, are pronounced in token of humility, but not truthfully, should be anathema.”(357) Still more to the point is the following declaration of the Council of Trent: “If any one saith that a man once justified ... is able, during his whole life, to avoid all sins, even those that are venial, except by a special grace from God, as the Church holds in regard of the Blessed Virgin; let him be anathema.”(358)

To obtain a better understanding of this Tridentine definition it will be well to ponder the following considerations:

The Council declares that it is impossible for man, even in the state of sanctifying grace, to avoid all sins during his whole life, except by virtue of a special privilege such as that enjoyed by the Blessed Virgin Mary.(359) A venial sin is one which, because of the unimportance of the precept involved, or in consequence of incomplete consent, does not destroy the state of grace. Such a sin may be either deliberate or semi-deliberate. A semi-deliberate venial sin is one committed in haste or surprise. It is chiefly sins of this kind that the Tridentine Council had in view. For no one would seriously assert that with the aid of divine grace a saint could not avoid at least all deliberate venial sins for a considerable length of time. The phrase “_in tota vita_” indicates a period of some length, though its limits are rather difficult to determine. Were a man to die immediately after justification, the Tridentine canon would _per accidens_ not apply to him. As the Council says in another place that “men, how holy and just soever, at times fall into at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial,”(360) it is safe practically to limit the period of possible freedom from venial sin to one day. Theoretically, of course, it may be extended much farther. The phrase “_omnia peccata_” must be interpreted collectively, not distributively, for a sin that could not be avoided would cease to be a sin. For the same reason the term “_non posse_” must be understood of (moral, not physical) disability; in other words, the difficulty of avoiding sin with the aid of ordinary graces for any considerable length of time, is insuperable even for the just. This moral impossibility of avoiding sin can be removed only by a special privilege, such as that enjoyed by the Blessed Virgin Mary. It may incidentally be asked whether this privilege was also granted to other saints, notably St. Joseph and St. John the Baptist. Suarez lays it down as a theological conclusion that no human being has ever been or ever will be able entirely to avoid venial sin except by a special privilege, which must in each case be proved. Palmieri maintains that the moral impossibility of leading an absolutely sinless life without the special assistance of grace is taught by indirection in the canons of Mileve (416) and Carthage (418), which declare that no such life has ever been led by mortal man without that assistance.(361)

a) The Scriptural argument for our thesis was fully developed by the councils just mentioned. The careful student will note, however, that those texts only are strictly conclusive which positively and exclusively refer to venial sins. Thus when St. James says: “In many things we all offend,”(362) he cannot mean that all Christians now and then necessarily commit mortal sin. For St. John expressly declares that “Whosoever abideth in him [Christ], sinneth not.”(363)

It follows that not even the just can wholly avoid venial sin. Hence the most devout and pious Christian may truthfully repeat the petition of the Lord’s Prayer which says: “Forgive us our trespasses,(364) as we forgive those who trespass against us.”(365) Profoundly conscious of the sinfulness of the entire human race, the author of the Book of Proverbs exclaims: “Who can say, My heart is clean, I am pure from sin?”(366)

Other Scripture texts commonly cited in confirmation of our thesis lack cogency, because they either deal exclusively with mortal sin or do not refer to sin at all. Thus Prov. XXIV, 16: “A just man shall fall seven times and shall rise again,” is meant of temporal adversities.(367) Eccles. VII, 21: “There is no just man upon earth, that doth good and sinneth not,”(368) can scarcely be understood of venial sin, because the sacred writer continues: “For thy conscience knoweth that thou also hast often spoken evil of others.”(369) 1 John I, 8: “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us,”(370) would be a splendid argument for our thesis, could it be shown that the Apostle had in mind only the venial sins committed in the state of justification. This is, however, unlikely, as the term _peccatum_ throughout St. John’s first Epistle(371) is obviously employed in the sense of mortal sin.(372)

b) Tradition is again most effectively voiced by St. Augustine, who writes: “There are three points, as you know, which the Catholic Church chiefly maintains against them [the Pelagians]. One is, that the grace of God is not given according to our merits.... The second, that no one lives in this corruptible body in righteousness of any degree without sins of any kind. The third, that man is born obnoxious to the first man’s sin....”(373) To Pelagius’ objection: “If all men sin, then the just must die in their sins,” the holy Doctor replies: “With all his acuteness he [Pelagius] overlooks the circumstance that even righteous persons pray with good reason: ‘Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors.’... Even if we cannot live without sin, we may yet die without sin, whilst the sin committed in ignorance or infirmity is blotted out in merciful forgiveness.”(374) In another chapter of the same treatise he says: “If ... we could assemble all the afore-mentioned holy men and women, and ask them whether they lived without sin, ... would they not all exclaim with one voice: ‘If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us’?”(375)

c) We come to the theological argument. The moral impossibility of avoiding venial sin for any considerable length of time results partly from the infirmity of human nature (_infirmitas naturae_), partly from God’s pre-established plan of salvation (_ordo divinae providentiae_).

α) The infirmity of human nature flows from four separate and distinct sources: (1) concupiscence (_fomes peccati_); (2) imperfection of the ethical judgment (_imperfectio iudicii_); (3) inconstancy of the will (_inconstantia voluntatis_); and (4) the weariness caused by continued resistance to temptation. In view of these agencies and their combined attack upon the will, theologians speak of a _necessitas antecedens peccandi_;—not as if the will were predestined to succumb to any one temptation in particular, but in the sense that it is morally unable to resist the whole series (_suppositione disiunctâ_). The will simply grows weaker and weaker, and in course of time fails to resist sin with sufficient energy.

Let us exemplify. The proofsheets of a book are scrutinized by several trained readers, yet in spite of the greatest care and many ingenious devices for the elimination of error, a perfect book, _i.e._ one entirely free from mistakes, is a practical impossibility. How much harder must it be for man to avoid moral lapses throughout his whole life, considering that he cannot choose his own time for meeting temptations, but must keep his mind and will under constant control and be prepared to resist the enemy at any moment.(376)

St. Thomas Aquinas says: “Man cannot avoid all venial sin, because his sensual appetite is depraved. True, reason is able to suppress the individual stirrings of this appetite. In fact, it is on this account that they are voluntary and partake of the nature of sin. But reason is not able to suppress them all [collectively], because, while it tries to resist one, there perhaps arises another, and, furthermore, reason is not always in a condition to exercise the vigilance necessary to avoid such impulses.”(377)

It follows that the _necessitas peccandi antecedens_ does not destroy the liberty of the will or the moral imputability of those venial sins which a man actually commits; for it is merely a _necessitas indeterminata_, which refers not to certain particular instances, but to the one or other indeterminately. It follows further that God does not command the impossible when He insists that we should avoid venial sin, for He does not in each single case command something which is physically or morally impossible,(378) but merely demands a perfection which in itself is not entirely unattainable _hic et nunc_ with the assistance of ordinary grace.(379)

β) The second theological reason for the impossibility of avoiding venial sin for any considerable time is based on the eternal scheme of salvation decreed by Divine Providence. This scheme of salvation must not, of course, be conceived as a divine precept to commit venial sins. It is merely a wise toleration of sin and a just refusal, on the part of the Almighty, to restore the human race to that entirely unmerited state of freedom from concupiscence with which it was endowed in Paradise, and which alone could guarantee the moral possibility of unspotted innocence. Both factors in their last analysis are based upon the will of God to exercise those whom He has justified in humility and to safeguard us against pride, which is the deadliest enemy of our salvation.(380) In making this wise decree God, of course, infallibly foresaw that no man (with the sole exception of those to whom He might grant a special privilege) would _de facto_ be able to pass through life without committing venial sins. This infallible foreknowledge is based not alone on the _scientia media_, but also on the infirmity of human nature.

Hence Suarez was entirely justified in rejecting the singular opinion of de Vega,(381) that the Tridentine definition does not exclude the possibility of exceptions.(382)

Nevertheless the faithful are wisely warned against both indifference and despondency. “Let no one say that he is without sin, but let us not for this reason love sin. Let us detest sin, brethren. Though we are not without sins, let us hate them; especially let us avoid grievous sins, and venial sins, too, as much as we can.”(383)

*Thesis V: No man can persevere in righteousness without special help from God.*

This proposition is also _de fide_.

Proof. The Semipelagians asserted that man is able by his own power to persevere in righteousness to the end.(384) Against this teaching the Second Council of Orange defined: “Even those who are reborn and holy must implore the help of God, in order that they may be enabled to attain the good end, or to persevere in the good work.”(385) This definition was repeated in substance by the Council of Trent: “If any one saith that the justified either is able without the special help of God to persevere in the justice received, or that, with that help, he is not able; let him be anathema.”(386)

Perfect perseverance is the preservation of baptismal innocence, or, in a less strict sense, of the state of grace, until death. Imperfect perseverance is a temporary continuance in grace, _e.g._ for a month or a year, until the next mortal sin. Imperfect perseverance, according to the Tridentine Council, requires no special divine assistance (_speciale auxilium_).(387)

Final perseverance is either passive or active, according as the justified dies in the state of grace irrespective of his will (as baptized children and insane adults),(388) or actively coöperates with grace whenever the state of grace is imperilled by grievous temptation. The Council of Trent has especially this latter case in view when it speaks of the necessity of a _speciale auxilium_, because the special help extended by God presupposes coöperation with grace, and man cannot strictly speaking coöperate in a happy death. The Council purposely speaks of an _auxilium_, not a _privilegium_, because a privilege is by its very nature granted to but few, while the special help of grace extends to all the elect. This _auxilium_ is designated as _speciale_, because final perseverance is not conferred with sanctifying grace, nor is it a result of the mere power of perseverance (_posse perseverare_). The state of sanctifying grace simply confers a claim to ordinary graces, while the power of perseverance of itself by no means insures actual perseverance (_actu perseverare_). The power of perseverance is assured by those merely sufficient graces which are constantly at the command of the righteous. Actual perseverance, on the other hand, implies a series of efficacious graces. God is under no obligation to bestow more than sufficient grace on any man; consequently, final perseverance is a special grace, or, more correctly, a continuous series of efficacious graces. The Council of Trent is therefore justified in speaking of it as “a great gift.”(389)

a) Sacred Scripture represents final perseverance as the fruit of prayer and as a special gift not included in the bare notion of justification.

α) Our Divine Saviour Himself says in His prayer for His disciples, John XVII, 11: “Holy Father, keep them in thy name whom thou hast given me, that they may be one, as we also are.”(390) St. Paul teaches in his Epistle to the Colossians: “Epaphras saluteth you ... who is always solicitous for you in prayers, that you may stand perfect and full in all the will of God.”(391) Hence the necessity of constantly watching and praying: “Watch ye and pray that ye enter not into temptation.”(392)

β) That perseverance is not included in the bare notion of justification appears from such passages as these: Phil. I, 6: “Being confident of this very thing, that he who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus.”(393) 1 Pet. I, 5: “Who, by the power of God, are kept by faith unto salvation, ready to be revealed in the last time.”(394)

b) The threads of Tradition run together in the hands of St. Augustine, who has written a special treatise On the Gift of Perseverance.(395)

His main argument is based on the necessity of prayer. “Why,” he asks, “is that perseverance asked for from God, if it is not given by God? Is it a mocking petition inasmuch as that is asked of Him which it is known He does not give, but, although He gives it not, is in man’s power?... Or is not that perseverance, perchance, asked for from Him? He who says this, is not to be rebuked by my arguments, but must be overwhelmed with the prayers of the saints. Is there indeed one among them who do not ask for themselves from God that they may persevere in Him, when in that very prayer which is called the Lord’s—because the Lord taught it—whenever it is prayed by the saints, scarcely anything else is understood to be prayed for but perseverance?”(396) He then proceeds to show, in accordance with St. Cyprian’s little treatise On the Lord’s Prayer, that the seven petitions of the “Our Father” are all prayers for perseverance, and concludes as follows: “Truly in this matter let not the Church look for laborious disputations, but consider her own daily prayers. She prays that the unbelieving may believe; therefore God converts to the faith. She prays that believers may persevere; therefore God gives perseverance to the end.”(397) And again: “For who is there that would groan with a sincere desire to receive what he prays for from the Lord, if he thought that he received it from himself and not from the Lord?”(398)

c) From this teaching flows a corollary of great practical importance, to wit: The grace of final perseverance cannot be merited by good works, but it can be obtained by pious and unremitting prayer.

“This gift of God,” says St. Augustine, speaking of final perseverance, “may be obtained suppliantly [by prayer], but when it has been given, it cannot be lost contumaciously.”(399) And again: “Since it is manifest that God has prepared some things to be given even to those who do not pray for them, such as the beginning of faith, and other things not to be given except to those who pray for them, such as perseverance unto the end, certainly he who thinks that he has this latter from himself, does not pray to obtain it.”(400)

Between merit (_meritum_) and prayer (_oratio, preces_) there is this great difference, that merit appeals to God’s justice, prayer to His mercy. If man were able to merit final perseverance by good works (_meritum de condigno_), God would be in justice bound to give him this precious grace. But this is plainly incompatible with the Catholic conception of final perseverance.

It may be asked: Is God determined by the _meritum de congruo_ inherent in all good works to grant the gift of final perseverance as a reward to the righteous? Theologians are at variance on this point. Ripalda(401) thinks that this is the case at least with the more conspicuous good works performed in the state of grace. Suarez modifies this improbable contention somewhat by saying that prayer alone can infallibly guarantee final perseverance.(402) Our prayers are infallibly heard if we address the Father through Jesus Christ, because Christ has promised: “If you ask the Father anything in my name, he will give it you.”(403) To insure its being infallibly heard, prayer for perseverance must be made in the state of grace and unremittingly. True, Christ did not make sanctifying grace a necessary condition of efficacious prayer. But, as Suarez points out, prayer cannot be infallibly efficacious unless it proceeds from one who is in the state of grace, because the moral conditions that render it efficacious are found only in that state.(404) As to the second point, if we say that prayer for perseverance must be unremitting, we mean, in the words of the same eminent theologian, that it must continue throughout life and must be made with becoming trustfulness and zeal, especially when there is a duty to be fulfilled or a temptation to be overcome.(405)

READINGS:—Suarez, _De Gratia_, 1. I-II.—*Tricassin, O. Cap., _De
Necessaria ad Salutem Gratia_.—Byonius, _De Gratiae Auxiliis_, in
Becanus, _Theologia Scholastica_, Rouen, 1658.—Scheeben _Natur und
Gnade_, Mainz 1861.—IDEM, _Dogmatik_, Vol. III, § 292-298,
Freiburg 1882.—*Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 19-29,
Gulpen 1885.—Oswald, _Lehre von der Heiligung_, § 9-11, 3rd ed.,
Paderborn 1885.—Tepe, _Institutiones Theologicae_, Vol. III, pp.
8-51, Paris 1896.—*Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_,
Vol. VIII, § 396-416, Mainz 1897.—Chr. Pesch, _Praelectiones
Dogmaticae_, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 32 sqq., Freiburg
1908.—Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, disp. 2, Freiburg 1901.

On St. Augustine and his teaching cfr. *J. Ernst, _Werke und
Tugenden der Ungläubigen nach Augustinus_, Freiburg 1871.—F.
Wörter, _Die Geistesentwicklung des hl. Augustinus bis zu seiner
Taufe_, Paderborn 1898.—Wolfsgruber, _Augustinus_, Paderborn
1898.—Boucat, _Theologia Patrum Dogmatico-Scholastico-Positiva_,
disp. 3, Paris 1718.—*Zaccaria, _Dissert. de Adiutorio sine quo
non_, in the _Thesaurus Theol._, Vol. V, Venice 1762.—O.
Rottmanner, O. S. B., _Geistesfrüchte aus der Klosterzelle_,
München 1908.—B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of
Dogmas_, Vol. I, St. Louis 1917, pp. 306 sqq., 374 sq.

On the heresy of Pelagianism cfr. *F. Wörter, _Der Pelagianismus
nach seinem Ursprung und seiner Lehre_, Freiburg 1874.—F. Klasen,
_Die innere Entwicklung des Pelagianismus_, Freiburg
1882.—Schwane, _Dogmengeschichte_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., § 60 sqq.,
Freiburg 1895.—H. Zimmer, _Pelagius in Irland_, Berlin
1901.—Warfield, _Two Studies in the History of Doctrine_, New York
1897.—Tixeront, _Histoire des Dogmes_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Paris
1909 (English tr., St. Louis 1914).—Pohle in the _Catholic
Encyclopedia_, Vol. XI, pp. 604-608.—B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual
of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. I, pp. 357 sqq.

On Semi-Pelagianism cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, Prolegom., V, 5
sqq.—Livinus Meyer, _De Pelag. et Semipelag. Erroribus._—Wiggers,
_Geschichte des Semipelagianismus_, Hamburg 1835.—A. Hoch, _Lehre
des Johannes Cassianus von Natur und Gnade_, Freiburg 1895.—*A.
Koch, _Der hl. Faustus, Bischof von Riez_, Stuttgart 1895.—Fr.
Wörter, _Zur Dogmengeschichte des Semipelagianismus_, Münster
1900.—Sublet, _Le Semipélagianisme_, Namur 1897.—Tixeront,
_Histoire des Dogmes_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Paris 1909 (English tr.,
St. Louis 1914).—Pohle in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. XIII,
pp. 703-706.—B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of
Dogmas_, Vol. I, pp. 379 sqq.

On Jansenism cfr. *Steph. Dechamps, _De Haeresi Ianseniana_, Paris
1645.—Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, Vol. III: “Contra Baium et
Baianos,” Cologne 1648.—Duchesne, _Histoire du Baianisme_, Douai
1731.—*Linsenmann, _Michael Bajus und die Grundlegung des
Jansenismus_, Tübingen 1867.—A. Schill, _Die Konstitution
Unigenitus, ihre Veranlassung und ihre Folgen_, Freiburg
1876.—Ingold, _Rome et France: La Seconde Phase du Jansénisme_,
Paris 1901.—P. Minges, O. F. M., _Die Gnadenlehre des Duns Scotus
auf ihren angeblichen Pelagianismus und Semipelagianismus
geprüft_, Münster 1906.—Lafiteau, _Histoire de la Constitution
Unigenitus_, 2 vols., Liège 1738.—Van den Peereboom, _Cornelius
Jansenius, Septième Évêque d’Ypres_, Bruges 1882.—J. Forget in the
_Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. VIII, pp. 285-294.—B. J. Otten, S.
J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. II, pp. 507 sqq.