Chapter VII: The "trent" (2)

In England the knowledge of America's decision caused a great national sigh of relief, coupled with a determination to turn the cold shoulder to the released envoys. On January 11, the _Times_ recounted the earlier careers of Mason and Slidell, and stated that these two "more than any other men," were responsible for the traditional American "insane prejudice against England," an assertion for which no facts were offered in proof, and one much overestimating the influence of Mason and Slidell on American politics before secession. They were "about the most worthless booty it would be possible to extract from the jaws of the American lion ... So we do sincerely hope that our countrymen will not give these fellows anything in the shape of an ovation." Continuing, the _Times_ argued:

"What they and their secretaries are to do here passes our
conjecture. They are personally nothing to us. They must not
suppose, because we have gone to the very verge of a great
war to rescue them, that therefore they are precious in our
eyes. We should have done just as much to rescue two of their
own Negroes, and, had that been the object of the rescue, the
swarthy Pompey and Caesar would have had just the same right
to triumphal arches and municipal addresses as Messrs. Mason
and Slidell. So, please, British public, let's have none of
these things. Let the Commissioners come up quietly to town,
and have their say with anybody who may have time to listen
to them. For our part, we cannot see how anything they have
to tell can turn the scale of British duty and deliberation."

This complete reversal, not to say somersault, by the leading British newspaper, was in line with public expressions from all sections save the extreme pro-Southern. Adams was astonished, writing privately: "The first effect of the surrender ... has been extraordinary. The current which ran against us with such extreme violence six weeks ago now seems to be going with equal fury in our favour[489]." Officially on the same day he explained this to Seward as caused by a late development in the crisis of a full understanding, especially "among the quiet and religious citizens of the middle classes," that if Great Britain did engage in war with the United States she would be forced to become the ally of a "slave-holding oligarchy[490]."

Here, in truth, lay the greatest cause of British anxiety during the period of waiting for an answer and of relief when that answer was received. If England and America became enemies, wrote Argyll, "we necessarily became virtually the _Allies_ of the _Scoundrelism_ of the South[491]." Robert Browning, attempting to explain to his friend Story the British attitude, declared that early in the war Britain was with the North, expecting "that the pure and simple rights [of anti-slavery] in the case would be declared and vigorously carried out without one let or stop," but that Lincoln's denial of emancipation as an object had largely destroyed this sympathy. Browning thought this an excusable though a mistaken judgment since at least: "The _spirit_ of all of Mr. Lincoln's acts is altogether against Slavery in the end[492]." He assured Story that the latter was in error "as to men's 'fury' here": "I have not heard one man, woman or child express anything but dismay at the prospect of being obliged to go to war on any grounds with America[493]." And after the affair was over he affirmed: "The purpose of the North is also understood at last; ... there is no longer the notion that 'Slavery has nothing to do with it[494].'"

A few extreme pro-Northern enthusiasts held public meetings and passed resolutions commending the "statesmanlike ability and moderation of Seward," and rejoicing that Great Britain had not taken sides with a slave power[495]. In general, however, such sentiments were not _publicly_ expressed. That they were keenly felt, nevertheless, is certain. During the height of the crisis, Anthony Trollope, then touring America, even while sharing fully in the intense British indignation against Captain Wilkes, wrote:

"These people speak our language, use our prayers, read our
books, are ruled by our laws, dress themselves in our image,
are warm with our blood. They have all our virtues; and their
vices are our own too, loudly as we call out against them.
They are our sons and our daughters, the source of our
greatest pride, and as we grow old they should be the staff
of our age. Such a war as we should now wage with the States
would be an unloosing of hell upon all that is best upon the
world's surface[496]."

The expressions of men like Browning and Trollope may not indeed, be regarded as typical of either governmental or general public reactions. Much more exactly and with more authority as representing that thoughtful opinion of which Adams wrote were the conclusions of John Stuart Mill. In an article in _Fraser's Magazine_, February, 1862, making a strong plea for the North, he summarized British feeling about the _Trent_:

"We had indeed, been wronged. We had suffered an indignity,
and something more than an indignity, which, not to have
resented, would have been to invite a constant succession of
insults and injuries from the same and from every other
quarter. We could have acted no otherwise than we have done;
yet it is impossible to think, without something like a
shudder, from what we have escaped. We, the emancipators of
the slave--who have wearied every Court and Government in
Europe and America with our protests and remonstrances, until
we goaded them into at least ostensibly co-operating with us
to prevent the enslaving of the negro ... _we_ should have
lent a hand to setting up, in one of the most commanding
positions of the world, a powerful republic, devoted not only
to slavery, but to pro-slavery propagandism...."

No such protestations of relief over escape from a possible alliance with the South were made officially by the Government, or in a debate upon the _Trent_, February 6, when Parliament reassembled. In the Lords the Earl of Shelburne thought that America should have made a frank and open apology. The Earl of Derby twitted the United States with having yielded to force alone, but said the time "had not yet come" for recognizing the Confederacy. Lord Dufferin expressed great friendship for America and declared that Englishmen ought to make themselves better informed of the real merits of the Civil War. Earl Granville, speaking for the Government, laid stress upon the difficulties at home of the Washington administration in pacifying public opinion and asserted a personal belief that strict neutrality was England's best policy, "although circumstances may arise which may call for a different course." On the same day in the Commons the debate was of a like general tenor to that in the Lords, but Disraeli differed from his chief (Derby) in that he thought America had been placed in a very difficult position in which she had acted very honourably. Palmerston took much credit for the energetic military preparations, but stated "from that position of strict neutrality, it is not our intention to depart "--an important declaration if taken, as apparently it was not, as fixing a policy. In substance all speakers, whether Whig or Tory, praised the Government's stand, and expressed gratification with the peaceful outcome[497].

A further debate on the _Trent_ was precipitated by Bright on February 17, in connection with the estimates to cover the cost of the military contingents sent to Canada. He asserted that England by generously trusting to American honour, might have won her lasting friendship, and it is worthy of note that for the first time in any speech made by him _in Parliament_, Bright declared that the war was one for the abolition of slavery. Palmerston in reply made no comment on the matter of slavery, but energetically defended the military preparations as a necessary precaution. Bright's speech was probably intended for American consumption with the purpose of easing American ill-will, by showing that even in Parliament there were those who disapproved of that show of force to which America so much objected. He foresaw that this would long be the basis of American bitterness. But Palmerston was undoubtedly correct in characterizing Bright's opinion as a "solitary one." And looked at from a distance of time it would seem that a British Government, impressed as it was with a sense of Seward's unfriendliness, which had not prepared for war when making so strong a demand for reparation, would have merited the heaviest condemnation. If Mill was right in stating that the demand for reparation was a necessity, then so also were the military preparations.

Upon the Government the _Trent_ acted to bring to a head and make more clear the British relation to the Civil War in America. By November, 1861, the policy of strict neutrality adopted in May, had begun to be weakened for various reasons already recited--weakened not to the point of any Cabinet member's advocacy of change, but in a restlessness at the slow development of a solution in America. Russell was beginning to _think_, at least, of recognition of the Confederacy. This was clear to Lyons who, though against such recognition, had understood the drift, if Schleiden is to be trusted, of Ministerial opinion. Schleiden reported on December 31 that Lyons had expressed to him much pleasure at the peaceful conclusion of the _Trent_ affair, and had added, "England will be too generous not to postpone the recognition of the independence of the South as long as possible after this experience[498]." But the _Trent_ operated like a thunder-storm to clear the atmosphere. It brought out plainly the practical difficulties and dangers, at least as regards Canada, of a war with America; it resulted in a weakening of the conviction that Seward was unfriendly; it produced from the British public an even greater expression of relief, when the incident was closed, than of anger when it occurred; and it created in a section of that public a fixed belief, shared by at least one member of the Cabinet, that the issue in America was that of slavery, in support of which England could not possibly take a stand.

This did not mean that the British Government, nor any large section of the public, believed the North could conquer the South. But it did indicate a renewed vigour for the policy of neutrality and a determination not to get into war with America. Adams wrote to Seward, "I am inclined to believe that the happening of the affair of the _Trent_ just when it did, with just the issue that it had, was rather opportune than otherwise[499]." Hotze, the confidential agent of the Confederacy in London, stated, "the _Trent_ affair has done us incalculable injury," Russell is now "an avowed enemy of our nationality[500]." Hotze was over-gloomy, but Russell himself declared to Lyons: "At all events I am heart and soul a neutral ... what a fuss we have had about these two men[501]."

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 399: The _Trent_ was the cause of the outpouring of more contemporary articles and pamphlets and has been the subject of more historical writing later, than any other incident of diplomatic relations between the United States and Great Britain during the Civil War--possibly more than all other incidents combined. The account given in this chapter, therefore, is mainly limited to a brief statement of the facts together with such new sidelights as are brought out by hitherto unknown letters of British statesman; to a summary of British public attitude as shown in the press; and to an estimate of the _after effect_ of the _Trent_ on British policy. It would be of no service to list all of the writings. The incident is thoroughly discussed in all histories, whether British or American and in works devoted to international law. The contemporary American view is well stated, though from a strongly anti-British point of view, in Harris, T.L., _The Trent Affair_, but this monograph is lacking in exact reference for its many citations and can not be accepted as authoritative. The latest review is that of C.F. Adams in the _Proceedings_ of the Massachusetts Historical Society for November, 1911, which called out a reply from R.H. Dana, and a rejoinder by Mr. Adams in the _Proceedings_ for March, 1912.]

[Footnote 400: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, pp. 41-2.)]

[Footnote 401: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 1. Inclosure. Williams to Patey, Nov. 9, 1861.]

[Footnote 402: Harris, _The Trent Affair_, pp. 103-109, describes the exact _force_ used.]

[Footnote 403: Dana, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, pp. 509-22.)]

[Footnote 404: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, pp. 39-40.)]

[Footnote 405: F.O., America, Vol. 805. Copy, E. Hammond to Advocate-General, Nov. 9, 1861.]

[Footnote 406: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 54.)]

[Footnote 407: _Ibid._, pp. 53-4. Adams' Diary MS. Nov. 12, 1861.]

[Footnote 408: _Ibid._, p. 55.]

[Footnote 409: A full year later, after the publication of the American volume of despatches for the year 1862, Russell took up this matter with Adams and as a result of an interview wrote to Lyons, November 28, 1862:

"Lord Palmerston stated to Mr. Adams on the occasion in question that Her Majesty's Government could not permit any interference with any vessel, British or Foreign, within British waters; that with regard to vessels met with at sea, Her Majesty's Government did not mean to dispute the Belligerent right of the United States Ships of War to search them; but that the exercise of that right and the right of detention in certain conditions must in each case be dealt with according to the circumstances of the case, and that it was not necessary for him to discuss such matters then because they were not in point; but that it would not do for the United States Ships of War to harass British Commerce on the High Seas under the pretence of preventing the Confederates from receiving things that are Contraband of War.

"I took an opportunity of mentioning to Mr. Adams, the account which Lord Palmerston had given me of the language which he had thus held, and Mr. Adams agreed in its accuracy.

"Nothing must be said on this Subject unless the false statements as to Lord Palmerston's language should be renewed, when you will state the real facts to Mr. Seward." (F.O., Am., Vol. 822. No. 295. _Draft_.)

This résumé by Russell contained still other variations from the original reports of both Palmerston and Adams, but the latter did not think it worth while to call attention to them.]

[Footnote 410: Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 357, is evidently in error in stating that the law officers, while admitting the right of an American war vessel to carry the British Packet into an American port for adjudication, added, "she would have no right to remove Messrs. Mason and Slidell and carry them off as prisoners, leaving the ship to pursue her voyage." Certainly Palmerston did not so understand the advice given.]

[Footnote 411: Lyons Papers. Hammond to Lyons. F. O., Private. Nov. 16, 1861. This statement about explicit orders to Captain Marchand "not to endeavour, etc.," is in line with Palmerston's understanding of the conversation with Adams. But that there was carelessness in reporting Adams is evident from Hammond's own language for "no instructions to meddle," which Adams did state, is not the same thing as "instructions not to meddle." Adams had no intent to deceive, but was misunderstood. He was himself very anxious over the presence of the _James Adger_ at Southampton, and hurried her Captain away. Adams informed Russell that Palmerston had not understood him correctly. He had told Palmerston, "I had seen the Captain's [Marchand's] instructions, which directed him to intercept the _Nashville_ if he could, and in case of inability to do so, to return at once to New York, keeping his eye on such British ships as might be going to the United States with contraband of war. Lord Palmerston's recollections and mine differed mainly in this last particular. Lord Russell then remarked that this statement was exactly that which he had recollected my making to him. Nothing had been said in the instructions about other British ships." (State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 80. Adams to Seward. Nov. 29. 1861.) Hammond's letter mentions also the excitement of "the Southerners" in England and that they had "sent out Pilot Boats to intercept and warn the Packet...."]

[Footnote 412: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Milne, Dec. 1, 1861.]

[Footnote 413: _Ibid._, Russell to Lyons, Nov. 16, 1861.]

[Footnote 414: Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, Nov. 29, 1861.]

[Footnote 415: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 58.)]

[Footnote 416: Moore, _Int. Law Digest_, VII, p. 772. The much argued international law points in the case of the _Trent_ are given _in extenso_ by Moore.]

[Footnote 417: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 2.]

[Footnote 418: _Ibid._, No. 4.]

[Footnote 419: _Ibid._, No. 29. Inclosure.]

[Footnote 420: Troops were in fact shipped for Canada. This resulted, after the _Trent_ affair had blown over, in a circumstance which permitted Seward, with keen delight, to extend a courtesy to Great Britain. Bancroft (II, 245) states that these troops "finding the St. Lawrence river full of ice, had entered Portland harbour. When permission was asked for them to cross Maine, Seward promptly ordered that all facilities should be granted for 'landing and transporting to Canada or elsewhere troops, stores, and munitions of war of every kind without exception or reservation.'" It is true that the American press made much of this, and in tones of derision. The facts, as reported by Lyons, were that the request was merely "a superfluous application from a private firm at Montreal for permission to land some Officers' Baggage at Portland." (Russell Papers, Lyons to Russell, Jan. 20, 1862.) Lyons was much vexed with this "trick" of Seward's. He wrote to the Governor-General of Canada and the Lieutenant-Governors of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, protesting against an acceptance of Seward's permission, and finally informed Russell that no English troops were marched across the State of Maine. (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 14, 1862. Also Lyons Papers. Lyons to Monck, Feb. 1, 1862.)]

[Footnote 421: Martin, _Life of the Prince Consort_, V, pp. 418-26.]

[Footnote 422: Still another letter from Russell to Lyons on November 30, but not intended for Seward, outlined the points of complaint and argument, (1) The _San Jacinto_ did not happen to fall in with the _Trent_, but laid in wait for her. (2) "Unnecessary and dangerous Acts of violence" were used. (3) The _Trent_, when stopped was not "searched" in the "ordinary way," but "certain Passengers" were demanded and taken by force. (4) No charge was made that the _Trent_ was violating neutrality, and no authority for his act was offered by Captain Wilkes. (5) No force ought to be used against an "_unresisting_ Neutral Ship" except just so much as is necessary to bring her before a prize court. (6) In the present case the British vessel had done nothing, and intended nothing, warranting even an inquiry by a prize court. (7) "It is essential for British Interests, that consistently with the obligations of neutrality, and of observing any _legal_ and _effective_ blockade, there should be communication between the Dominions of Her Majesty and the Countries forming the Confederate States." These seven points were for Lyons' eye alone. They certainly add no strength to the British position and reflect the uncertainty and confusion of the Cabinet. The fifth and sixth points contain the essence of what, on more mature reflection, was to be the British argument. (F.O., Am., Vol. 758. No. 447. Draft. Russell to Lyons Nov. 30, 1861).]

[Footnote 423: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Dec. 2, 1861.]

[Footnote 424: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 78. Russell to Yancey, Rost and Mann, Aug. 24, 1861.]

[Footnote 425: _Ibid._, No. 124. Russell to Yancey, Rost and Mann, Dec. 7, 1861.]

[Footnote 426: Gladstone Papers. Gladstone to Robertson Gladstone, Dec. 7, 1861.]

[Footnote 427: _Ibid._, Argyll to Gladstone, Mentone. Dec. 10, 1861.]

[Footnote 428: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, p. 255. Lewis to Clarendon, Dec. 18, 1861.]

[Footnote 429: _Ibid._, p. 254. Clarendon to Duchess of Manchester, Dec. 17, 1861.]

[Footnote 430: Palmerston MS.]

[Footnote 431: _Ibid._, Russell to Palmerston, Dec. 20, 1861.]

[Footnote 432: Many citations from the _Times_ are given in Harris, _The Trent Affair_, to show a violent, not to say scurrilous, anti-Americanism. Unfortunately dates are not cited, and an examination of the files of the paper shows that Harris' references are frequently to communications, not to editorials. Also his citations give but one side of these communications even, for as many argued caution and fair treatment as expressed violence. Harris apparently did not consult the _Times_ itself, but used quotations appearing in American papers. Naturally these would print, in the height of American anti-British feeling, the bits exhibiting a peevish and unjust British temper. The British press made exactly similar quotations from the American newspapers.]

[Footnote 433: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc. XLV, p. 43, note.) John Bigelow, at Paris, reported that the London Press, especially the Tory, was eager to make trouble, and that there were but two British papers of importance that did not join the hue and cry--these being controlled by friends of Bright, one in London and one in Manchester (Bigelow, _Retrospections of An Active Life_, I, p. 384.) This is not exactly true, but seems to me more nearly so than the picture presented by Rhodes (III, 526) of England as united in a "calm, sorrowful, astonished determination."]

[Footnote 434: Cowley sent to Russell on December 3, a letter from Percy Doyle recounting an interview with Scott in which these statements were made. (F.O., France, Vol. 1399. No. 1404. Inclosure.)]

[Footnote 435: Dec. 13, 1861. C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair. (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 95.)]

[Footnote 436: _Ibid._, p. 37.]

[Footnote 437: _Ibid._, p. 49. The _New York Times_, November 19, stated, "We do not believe the American heart ever thrilled with more genuine delight than it did yesterday, at the intelligence of the capture of Messrs. Slidell and Mason.... We have not the slightest idea that England will even remonstrate. On the contrary, she will applaud the gallant act of Lieut. Wilkes, so full of spirit and good sense, and such an exact imitation of the policy she has always stoutly defended and invariably pursued ... as for Commodore Wilkes and his command, let the handsome thing be done, consecrate another _Fourth_ of July to him. Load him down with services of plate and swords of the cunningest and costliest art. Let us encourage the happy inspiration that achieved such a victory." Note the "_Fourth_ of July."]

[Footnote 438: Lyons Papers. Lousada to Lyons. Boston, Nov. 17, 1861. "Every other man is walking about with a Law Book under his arm and proving the _right_ of the Ss. Jacintho to stop H.M.'s mail boat."]

[Footnote 439: "Mr. Galt, Canadian Minister, is here. He has frightened me by his account of the defencelessness of the Province at this moment." (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. Dec. 3, 1861.)]

[Footnote 440: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Monck, Dec. 9, 1861.]

[Footnote 441: Rogers, _Speeches by John Bright_, I, p. 189 _seq_.]

[Footnote 442: Among the communications were several on international law points by "Historicus," answering and belittling American legal argument. W.V. Harcourt, under this pseudonym, frequently contributed very acute and very readable articles to the _Times_ on the American civil war. The _Times_ was berated by English friends of the North. Cobden wrote Sumner, December 12, "The _Times_ and its yelping imitators are still doing their worst." (Morley, _Cobden_, II, 392.) Cobden was himself at one with the _Times_ in suspicion of Seward. "I confess I have not much opinion of Seward. He is a kind of American Thiers or Palmerston or Russell--and talks Bunkum. Fortunately, my friend Mr. Charles Sumner, who is Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and has really a kind of veto on the acts of Seward, is a very peaceable and safe man." _(ibid._, p. 386, to Lieut.-Col. Fitzmayer, Dec. 3, 1861.) It is interesting that Canadian opinion regarded the _Times_ as the great cause of American ill-will toward Britain. A letter to Gait asserted that the "war talk" was all a "farce" (J.H. Pope to Gait, Dec. 26, 1861) and the Toronto _Globe_ attacked the _Times_ for the creation of bad feeling. The general attitude was that if _British_ policy resulted in an American blow at Canada, it was a British, not a Canadian duty, to maintain her defence (Skelton, _Life of Sir Alexander Tilloch Gait_, pp. 340, 348.) Yet the author states that in the beginning Canada went through the same phases of feeling on the _Trent_ as did Great Britain.]

[Footnote 443: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, pp. 81-2.]

[Footnote 444: _Ibid._, I, p. 83. Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Dec. 13, 1861.]

[Footnote 445: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. Nov. 29, 1861.]

[Footnote 446: See the _Times_, Dec. 14, 1861. Here for the first time the _Times_ used the expression "the last card" as applied to emancipation.]

[Footnote 447: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Dec. 11, 1861.]

[Footnote 448: Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, Dec. 13, 1861. On the same day Lady Russell wrote Lady Dumfermline: "There can be no doubt that we have done deeds very like that of Captain Wilkes.... but I wish we had not done them.... It is all terrible and awful, and I hope and pray war may be averted--and whatever may have been the first natural burst of indignation in this country, I believe it would be ready to execrate the Ministry if all right and honourable means were not taken to prevent so fearful a calamity." (Dana, _The Trent Affair. (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 528.))]

[Footnote 449: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 87. Charles Francis Adams to his son, Dec. 20, 1861. ]

[Footnote 450: The _Times_, Dec. 16, 1861.]

[Footnote 451: The _Times_ twice printed the full text of the message, on December 16 and 17.]

[Footnote 452: Gladstone Papers. Milner-Gibson to Gladstone, Dec. 18, 1861.]

[Footnote 453: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, p. 225. Lewis to Clarendon, Dec. 18, 1861.]

[Footnote 454: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No 14. Russell to Lyons, Dec. 19, 1861. The Government did not make public Adams' confirmation of "no authorization of Wilkes." Possibly it saw no reason for doing so, since this had been established already by Wilkes' own statements. The point was later a matter of complaint by Americans, who regarded it as indicating a peevish and unfriendly attitude. (Willard, _Letter to an English Friend on the Rebellion in the United States_, p. 23. Boston, 1862.) Also by English friends; Cobden thought Palmerston had intentionally prolonged British feeling for political purposes. "Seward's despatch to Adams on the 19th December [_communicated to Russell_ on the 19th]... virtually settled the matter. To keep alive the wicked passions in this country as Palmerston and his _Post_ did, was like the man, and that is the worst that can be said of it." (Morley, _Cobden_, II, p. 389. To Mr. Paulton, Jan., 1862.)]

[Footnote 455: Davis to Adams. New York. Dec. 21, 1861. C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair, (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 107.)]

[Footnote 456: There has crept into American historical writing of lesser authenticity a story that just at this juncture there appeared, in the harbours of New York and San Francisco, Russian fleets whose commanders let it be understood that they had come under "sealed orders" not to be opened except in a certain grave event and that their presence was, at least, not an unfriendly indication of Russian sentiment in the _Trent_ crisis. This is asserted to have bolstered American courage and to give warrant for the argument that America finally yielded to Great Britain from no fear of consequences, but merely on a clearer recognition of the justice of the case. In fact the story is wholly a myth. The Russian fleets appeared two years later in the fall of 1863, not in 1861. Harris, _The Trent Affair, _ pp. 208-10, is mainly responsible for this story, quoting the inaccurate memory of Thurlow Weed. (_Autobiography_, II, pp. 346-7.) Reliable historians like Rhodes make no mention of such an incident. The whole story of the Russian fleets with their exact instructions is told by F. A. Colder, "The Russian Fleet and the Civil War," _Am. Hist. Rev_., July, 1915.]

[Footnote 457: Weed, _Autobiography_, II, pp. 354-61.]

[Footnote 458: _Ibid._, p. 365. Peabody to Weed, Jan, 17, 1862.]

[Footnote 459: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 91. Charles Francis Adams to his son, Dec. 27, 1861.]

[Footnote 460: See _ante_. Ch. IV.]

[Footnote 461: The _Times_, Dec. 25, 1861.]

[Footnote 462: James, _William Wetmore Story and his Friends_, II, pp. 108-9. The letters were sent to Robert Browning, who secured their publication through Dicey.]

[Footnote 463: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. Adams to Motley, Dec. 26, 1861. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 109).]

[Footnote 464: _Ibid._, p. 110.]

[Footnote 465: Palmerston had very close relations with Delane, of the _Times_, but that paper carefully maintained its independence of any party or faction.]

[Footnote 466: Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, Dec. 30, 1861.]

[Footnote 467: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 97. Adams to Seward, Jan. 2, 1862.]

[Footnote 468: Palmerston MS.]

[Footnote 469: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 233. Lyons officially reported that he carried no papers with him _(Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 19. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 19, 1861). Newton (_Lyons_, I, pp. 55-78) shows that Seward was, in fact, permitted to read the instructions on the nineteenth.]

[Footnote 470: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 86. C.F. Adams, Jr., to Henry Adams, Dec. 19, 1861.]

[Footnote 471: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 234. Adams' letter of December 3 was received on December 21; Dayton's of December 3, on the 24th.]

[Footnote 472: Much ink has flowed to prove that Lincoln's was the wise view, seeing from the first the necessity of giving up Mason and Slidell, and that he overrode Seward, e.g., Welles, _Lincoln and Seward_, and Harris, _The Trent Affair_. Rhodes, III, pp. 522-24, and Bancroft, _Seward_, II, pp. 232-37, disprove this. Yet the general contemporary suspicion of Seward's "anti-British policy," even in Washington, is shown by a despatch sent by Schleiden to the Senate of Bremen. On December 23 he wrote that letters from Cobden and Lyndhurst had been seen by Lincoln.

"Both letters have been submitted to the President. He returned them with the remark that 'peace will not be broken if England is not bent on war.' At the same time the President has assured my informant that he would examine the answer of his Secretary of State, word for word, in order that no expression should remain which could create bad blood anew, because the strong language which Mr. Seward had used in some of his former despatches seems to have irritated and insulted England" (Schleiden Papers). No doubt Sumner was Schleiden's informant. At first glance Lincoln's reported language would seem to imply that he was putting pressure on Seward to release the prisoners and Schleiden apparently so interpreted them. But the fact was that at the date when this was written Lincoln had not yet committed himself to accepting Seward's view. He told Seward, "You will go on, of course, preparing your answer, which, as I understood it, will state the reasons why they ought to be given up. Now, I have a mind to try my hand at stating the reasons why they ought _not_ to be given up. We will compare the points on each side." Lincoln's idea was, in short, to return an answer to Great Britain, proposing arbitration (Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 234).]

[Footnote 473: Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, XLV, 155. Bright to Sumner, Dec. 14, 1861. The letters to Sumner on the _Trent_ are all printed in this volume of the _Proceedings_. The originals are in the _Sumner Papers_ in the library of Harvard University.]

[Footnote 474: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 24. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 27, 1861.]

[Footnote 475: F.O., Am., Vol. 777. No. 807. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 31, 1861. But he transmitted a few days later, a "shocking prayer" in the Senate on December 30, by the Rev. Dr. Sutherland, which showed a bitter feeling. "O Thou, just Ruler of the world ... we ask help of Thee for our rulers and our people, that we may patiently, resolutely, and with one heart abide our time; for it is indeed a day of darkness and reproach--a day when the high principle of human equity constrained by the remorseless sweep of physical and armed force, must for the moment, succumb under the plastic forms of soft diplomacy" (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Jan. 3, 1862).]

[Footnote 476: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 249-53.]

[Footnote 477: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair. (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV. p. 75).]

[Footnote 478: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 250.]

[Footnote 479: Mason, Slidell, Eustis and McFarland were delivered to the British ship _Rinaldo_, January 1, 1862. _En route_ to Halifax the ship encountered a storm that drove her south and finally brought her to St. Thomas, where the passengers embarked on a packet for Southampton.]

[Footnote 480: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." Nos. 27 and 35. February 3, Lyons reported that Sumner, in a fireside talk, had revealed that he was in possession of copies of the Law Officers' opinions given on November 12 and 28 respectively. Lyons was astounded and commented that the Law Officers, before giving any more opinions, ought to know this fact (F.O., Am., Vol. 824. No. 76. Lyons to Russell).]

[Footnote 481: F.O., France, Vol. 1399. No. 1397. Cowley to Russell, Dec. 3, 1861. The italics are mine.]

[Footnote 482: Newton, _Lyons_, I, 73.]

[Footnote 483: F.O., Am., Vol. 817. No. 57. Draft. Russell to Lyons, Feb. 11, 1861.]

[Footnote 484: F.O., France, Vol. 1419. No. 73. Draft. Russell to Cowley, Jan. 20, 1862.]

[Footnote 485: Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, Jan. 26, 1862.]

[Footnote 486: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 424. Bowen to Bigelow, Dec. 27, 1861.]

[Footnote 487: _Poems. Bigelow Papers_. "Jonathan to John." After the release of the envoys there was much correspondence between friends across the water as to the merits of the case. British friends attempted to explain and to soothe, usually to their astonished discomfiture on receiving angry American replies. An excellent illustration of this is in a pamphlet published in Boston in the fall of 1862, entitled, Field and Loring, _Correspondence on the Present Relations between Great Britain and the United States of America_. The American, Loring, wrote, "The conviction is nearly if not quite universal that we have foes where we thought we had friends," p. 7.]

[Footnote 488: Dana, _The Trent Affair. (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, pp. 508-22).]

[Footnote 489: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 99. To his son, Jan. 10, 1862.]

[Footnote 490: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 99. Adams to Seward, Jan. 10, 1862.]

[Footnote 491: Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, Dec. 7, 1861, Also expressed again to Gladstone. _Ibid._, Jan. 1, 1862.]

[Footnote 492: James, _William Wetmore Story and His Friends_, II, 105. Browning to Story, Dec. 17, 1861.]

[Footnote 493: _Ibid._, p. 109. To Story, Dec. 31, 1861.]

[Footnote 494: _Ibid._, p. 110. To Story, Jan. 21, 1862.]

[Footnote 495: _Liberator_, Feb. 7, 1862. Giving an account of a meeting at Bromley-by-Bow.]

[Footnote 496: Trollope, _North America_ (Chapman & Hall, London, 1862), I, p. 446. Trollope left England in August, 1861, and returned in the spring of 1862. He toured the North and the West, was a close observer, and his work, published in midsummer 1862, was very serviceable to the North, since he both stated the justice of the Northern cause and prophesied its victory.]

[Footnote 497: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXV, p. 12 _seq_., though not consecutive as the speeches were made in the course of the debate on the Address to the Throne.]

[Footnote 498: Schleiden Papers. Schleiden to the Senate of Bremen.]

[Footnote 499: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 114. Adams to Seward, Feb. 13, 1862.]

[Footnote 500: Pickett Papers. Hotze to Hunter, March 11, 1862.]

[Footnote 501: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Feb. 8, 1862.]