Chapter II (2)

While Lyons was thus keeping in close touch with Seward, the relations between England and America at London were exceedingly meagre. All that the American Minister Dallas knew of Russell's intentions is summed up in his despatches to Seward of March 22 and April 9, 1861[102]. On the former date, he gave an account of an interview with Russell in which the latter simply refused to pledge himself against a recognition of the Confederacy; in the latter, presenting a long memorial written by Seward to all of the larger European Governments arguing in friendly spirit the cause of the North, Dallas reported that he drew from Russell merely a general expression of England's kindly feeling towards the United States and her hope that there might still be a peaceful solution. Russell again refused to make any pledge in regard to English policy. In this interview it was tacitly agreed that it would be better for Great Britain to await Adams' arrival before taking any definite action, or so at least Dallas understood Russell--though the latter later denied that any pledge of delay was given. There is no doubt, however, that in Russell's mind, whatever he might say to Dallas, the separation in America was an accomplished fact and the hope of Great Britain was centred upon the idea of a peaceful separation.

Up to and including April 1, indeed, Lyons had been reporting that no definite stand was yet being taken by the American Government. At the same time Russell was continuing his instructions to Lyons to recommend conciliation "but never to obtrude advice unasked[103]." Yet Russell was not wholly undisturbed by the reports of Seward's quarrelsome attitude, for in a private letter of the same date as the preceding, he wrote to Lyons, "I rely upon your wisdom, patience, and prudence, to steer us through the dangers of this crisis. If it can possibly be helped Mr. Seward must not be allowed to get us into a quarrel. I shall see the Southerners when they come, but not officially, and keep them at a proper distance[104]." It is an interesting query, whether this fear thus expressed of Seward's temper was not of distinct benefit to the United States at the moment when the Southern Commissioners arrived in England. The inference would seem to be clear, that in spite of Lyons' advice to treat them well, the effect upon Russell of Seward's attitude was to treat them coolly. Russell was indeed distinctly worried by Seward's unfriendly attitude.

In the meantime the British press and public, while still uncertain and divided as to the merits of the conflict were now substantially a unit in accepting separation as final. The _Times_, with judicial ponderosity declared: "The new nationality has been brought forth after a very short period of gestation.... and the Seceding States have now constituted themselves a nation[105] ..." At the other end of the scale in newspaper "tone," the _London Press_ jeered at the Northern American eagle as having "had his tail pulled out and his wings clipped--yet the meek bird now holds out his claws to be pared, with a resignation that would be degrading in the most henpecked of domestic fowls[106]." Having now veered about to expressions of confidence in the permanency of the Southern Confederacy the _Times_ was also compelled to alter its opinion of Southern Statesmen. An editorial gave high praise to the Confederate Congress sitting at Montgomery, stated its personnel to be far superior to that of the Congress at Washington, yet was unable to resist making the customary reference to manners traditionally American;

"With regard to the Congress itself, we cannot refrain from
quoting the _naïve_ testimony of a visitor in its favour.
'Gentlemen here [Montgomery] who have spent much time in
Washington city declare that they have never witnessed such
industry, care, propriety, courtesy, and pleasant
Congressional action. _Not one member has appeared in his
seat under the influence of liquors or wines_, not a harsh
word has been uttered in debate, and all exhibit the most
unflagging energy and determination[107].'"

The most of the British press quickly followed the lead of the _Times_, forgot its previous dictum that the South was in the control of "ignorant ruffians," and dilated upon the statemanlike directness and sagacity of Southern leaders as contrasted with the stupidity of the North, displayed in its tariff policy[108]. A few journals thought that the North might eventually win in a prolonged struggle but that such a victory would be disastrous to the principles of federalism[109], and, in any case, that this civil war was one without "a noble cause to sustain either side[110]." By May nearly all the older journals were aligned on the right of the South to secede, and on the fact of a successful secession, though still differing as to the basic causes and essential justice involved. In this same month, however, there emerged a few vigorous champions of the Northern cause and prospects. In April the _Spectator_ agreed that the Great Republic was at an end[111]; in May it urged the North to fight it out with hope, asserting a chance of ultimate victory because of superior resources and the sympathy of all European nations[112]. A small newspaper of limited circulation, the _Morning Star_, organ of John Bright, had from the first championed the Northern cause. Now, as the armed conflict broke in America, it was joined by a more important paper, the _Daily News_, which set itself the task of controverting the _Times_. Moreover the _Daily News_ was all the more influential in that it was not uncritical of the North, yet consistently, throughout the war, expressed sympathy for the cause and principles behind the efforts of the Northern Government. Selling for a low price, twopence-halfpenny, the _Daily News_, like the _Westminster_ among the Reviews, appealed to a broader and more popular constituency than the older publications, especially to a constituency not yet vocal, since still unrepresented, in Parliament[113].

The _Daily News_ was fortunate in having, after 1862, the best-informed New York correspondent writing to the London press. This was an Irishman, E.L. Godkin, who, both at home and in America, was the intimate friend of literary men, and himself, later, a great moulder of public opinion[114]. Harriet Martineau further aided the _Daily News_ by contributing pro-Northern articles, and was a power in Radical circles[115]. But literary England in general, was slow to express itself with conviction, though Robert Browning, by April, 1861, was firmly determined in his pro-Northern sentiment. In August he was writing in letters of the "good cause[116]." But Browning was a rare exception and it was not until the Civil War had been under way for many months that men of talent in the non-political world were drawn to make comment or to take sides. Their influence at the outset was negligible[117].

In spite of press utterances, or literary silence, alike indicative of a widespread conviction that Southern independence was assured, there still remained both in those circles where anti-slavery sentiment was strong, and in others more neutral in sympathy, a distaste for the newly-born State as the embodiment of a degrading institution. Lincoln's inaugural address denying an intention to interfere with slavery was a weapon for the friends of the South, but it could not wholly still that issue. Even in the _Times_, through the medium of W.H. Russell's descriptive letters, there appeared caustic criticisms. He wrote in his "Diary," "I declare that to me the more orderly, methodical, and perfect the arrangements for economizing slave labour ... are, the more hateful and odious does slavery become[118]," and in his letter of May 8, from Montgomery, having witnessed an auction sale of slaves he stated:

"I am neither sentimentalist nor Black Republican, nor negro
worshipper, but I confess the sight caused a strange thrill
through my heart. I tried in vain to make myself familiar
with the fact that I could, for the sum of $975, become as
absolutely the owner of that mass of blood, bones, sinew,
flesh and brains as of the horse which stood by my side.
There was no sophistry which could persuade me the man was
not a man--he was, indeed, by no means my brother, but
assuredly he was a fellow creature[119]."

This was hard printing for the _Times_, in its new advocacy of the South, and Russell's description was made much of by the _Westminster Review_ and other publications that soon began to sound again the "issue" of slavery[120]. Yet the _Westminster_ itself in the same article decried the folly of the Northern attempt at reconquest. So also thought even John Bright at the moment, when expressing himself privately to friends in America[121].

Slavery, then, still remained an issue before the British public, but of what use was it to upbraid the South, if a new world State were in fact born? And if a State in power, why not give it prompt recognition? The extreme British anti-slavery opponents feared that this was just what the Government was inclined to do, and with promptness. Here and there meetings were hurriedly called to protest against recognition[122]. This fear was unfounded. Neither in London nor at Washington was there any official inclination to hasten recognition. Lyons had held up to Seward the logic of such action, if British trade were illegally interfered with. By April 9 Lyons was aware that the so-called Radical Party in the Cabinet would probably have its way, that conciliation would no longer be attempted, and that a coercive policy toward the South was soon to follow. On that date he wrote to Russell stating that people in Washington seemed so convinced that Europe would _not_ interfere to protect its trade that they were willing to venture any act embarrassing to that trade. He himself was still insisting, but with dwindling confidence, that the trade must not be interfered with under any circumstances. And in a second letter of this same date, he repeated to Russell his advice of treating the Southern Commissioners with deference. Any rebuff to them, he asserts again, will but increase the Northern confidence that they may do anything without provoking the resistance of England[123].

Like a good diplomat Lyons was merely pushing the argument for all it was worth, hoping to prevent an injury to his country, yet if that injury did come (provided it were sanctioned by the law of nations) he did not see in it an injury sufficient to warrant precipitate action by Great Britain. When indeed the Southern capture of Fort Sumter in Charleston harbour finally brought the actual clash of arms, Lyons expressed himself with regard to other elements in the struggle previously neglected in his correspondence. On April 15 describing to Russell the fall of Sumter, he stated that civil war had at last begun. The North he believed to be very much more powerful than the South, the South more "eager" and united as yet, but, he added, "the taint of slavery will render the cause of the South loathsome to the civilized world." It was true that "commercial intercourse with the cotton States is of vital importance to manufacturing nations[124]...." but Lyons was now facing an actual situation rather than a possible one, and as will be seen later, he soon ceased to insist that an interruption of this "commercial intercourse" gave reasonable ground for recognition of the South.

With the fall of Fort Sumter and the European recognition that a civil war was actually under way in America, a large number of new and vexing problems was presented to Russell. His treatment of them furnishes the subject matter of later chapters. For the period previous to April, 1861, British official attitude may be summed up in the statement that the British Minister at Washington hoped against hope that some solution might be found for the preservation of the Union, but that at the same time, looking to future British interests and possibly believing also that his attitude would tend to preserve the Union, he asserted vehemently the impossibility of any Northern interference with British trade to Southern ports. Across the water, Russell also hoped faintly that there might be no separation. Very soon, however, believing that separation inevitable and the disruption of the Union final, he fixed his hope on peaceful rather than warlike secession. Even of this, however, he had little real expectation, but neither he nor anyone else in England, nor even in America, had any idea that the war would be a long and severe one. It is evident that he was already considering the arrival of that day when recognition must be granted to a new, independent and slave-holding State. But this estimate of the future is no proof that the Russian Ambassador's accusation of British governmental pleasure in American disruption was justified[125]. Russell, cautious in refusing to pledge himself to Dallas, was using exactly such caution as a Foreign Secretary was bound to exercise. He would have been a rash man who, in view of the uncertainty and irresolution of Northern statesmen, would have committed Great Britain in March, 1861, to a definite line of policy.

On April 6, Russell was still instructing Lyons to recommend reconciliation. April 8, Dallas communicated to Russell an instruction from Seward dated March 9, arguing on lines of "traditional friendship" against a British recognition of the Confederacy. Russell again refused to pledge his Government, but on April 12 he wrote to Lyons that British Ministers were "in no hurry to recognize the separation as complete and final[126]." In the early morning of that same day the armed conflict in America had begun, and on the day following, April 13, the first Southern victory had been recorded in the capture of Fort Sumter. The important question which the man at the head of the British Foreign Office had now immediately to decide was, what was to be England's attitude, under international law, toward the two combatants in America. In deciding this question, neither sentiment nor ideals of morality, nor humanitarianism need play any part; England's _first_ need and duty were to determine and announce for the benefit of her citizens the correct position, under International law, which must be assumed in the presence of certain definite facts.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 31: Dr. Newton asserts that at the end of the 'fifties Great Britain made a sharp change of policy. (_Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy_, Vol. II, p. 283.)]

[Footnote 32: Thomas Colley Grattan, _Civilized America_, 2 vols. 2nd ed., London, 1859, Vol. I, pp. 284-87. The first edition was printed in 1859 and a third in 1861. In some respects the work is historically untrustworthy since internal evidence makes clear that the greater part of it was written before 1846, in which year Grattan retired from his post in Boston. In general he wrote scathingly of America, and as his son succeeded to the Boston consulship, Grattan probably thought it wiser to postpone publication. I have found no review of the work which treats it otherwise than as an up-to-date description of 1859. This fact and its wide sale in England in 1860-61, give the work importance as influencing British knowledge and opinions.]

[Footnote 33: Charles Mackay, _Life and Liberty in America: or, Sketches of a Tour in the United States and Canada in 1857-8_, one vol., New York, 1859, pp. 316-17. Mackay was at least of sufficient repute as a poet to be thought worthy of a dinner in Boston at which there were present, Longfellow, Holmes, Agassiz, Lowell, Prescott, Governor Banks, and others. He preached "hands across the seas" in his public lectures, occasionally reading his poem "John and Jonathan"--a sort of advance copy of Kipling's idea of the "White Man's Burden." Mackay's concluding verse, "John" speaking, was:

"And I have strength for nobler work
Than e'er my hand has done,
And realms to rule and truths to plant
Beyond the rising sun.
Take you the West and I the East;
We'll spread ourselves abroad,
With trade and spade and wholesome laws,
And faith in man and God."
]

[Footnote 34: Duncan, _Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer_, Vol. I, p. 140.]

[Footnote 35: R.C. Hamilton, Manuscript Chapters and Notes on "The English Press and the Civil War." Mr. Hamilton was at work on this subject, as a graduate student, but left Stanford University before completing his thesis. His notes have been of considerable value, both for suggested citations from the English Press, and for points of interpretation.]

[Footnote 36: _Economist_, November 24, 1860. Six months later, however, the _Economist_ pictured Lincoln as merely an unknown "sectionalist," with no evidence of statesmanship--_Economist_, June 1, 1861.]

[Footnote 37: _Saturday Review_, November 24, 1860.]

[Footnote 38: _Spectator_, November 24, 1860.]

[Footnote 39: The _Times_, November 26, 1860.]

[Footnote 40: _Ibid._, November 29, 1860.]

[Footnote 41: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 42: R.L. Duffus, "Contemporary English Popular Opinion on the American Civil War," p. 2. A thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, Stanford University, 1911. This thesis is in manuscript. It is a valuable study of the Reviews and of the writings of men of letters. Hereafter cited as Duffus "English Opinion."]

[Footnote 43: The _Times_, January 12, 1861.]

[Footnote 44: _Saturday Review_, January 12, 1861.]

[Footnote 45: _Economist_, December 8, 1860. _Spectator_, January 19, 1861.]

[Footnote 46: _Spectator_, December 1, 1860. _Times_, January 29, 1861. _Economist_, May 25, 1861.]

[Footnote 47: _Saturday Review_, January 19, 1861.]

[Footnote 48: _Edinburgh Review_, Vol. 112, p. 545.]

[Footnote 49: Lyons Papers.]

[Footnote 50: Russell, _My Diary North and South_, Boston, 1863, p. 134. "Then cropped out again the expression of regret for the rebellion of 1776, and the desire that if it came to the worst, England would receive back her erring children, or give them a prince under whom they could secure a monarchical form of government. There is no doubt about the earnestness with which these things are said." Russell's _Diary_ is largely a condensation of his letters to the _Times_. In the letter of April 30, 1861 (published May 28), he dilates to the extent of a column on the yearning of South Carolina for a restoration of colonial relations. But Consul Bunch on December 14, 1860, reported a Charleston sentiment very different from that of the Jockey Club in February. He wrote to Lyons:

"The church bells are ringing like mad in celebration of a
newly revived festival, called 'Evacuation Day,' being the
_nefastus ille dies_ in which the bloody Britishers left
Charleston 78 years ago. It has fallen into utter disuse for
about 50 years, but is now suddenly resuscitated apropos _de_
nothing at all."

In this same letter Bunch described a Southern patriotic demonstration. Returning to his home one evening, he met a military company, which from curiosity he followed, and which

"drew up in front of the residence of a young lawyer of my
friends, after performing in whose honour, through the medium
of a very brassy band, a Secession Schottische or Palmetto
Polka, it clamorously demanded his presence. After a very
brief interval he appeared, and altho' he is in private life
an agreeable and moderately sensible young man, he succeeded,
to my mind at any rate, in making most successfully, what Mr.
Anthony Weller calls 'an Egyptian Mummy of his self.' the
amount of balderdash and rubbish which he evacuated (_dia
stomatos_) about mounting the deadly breach, falling back
into the arms of his comrades and going off generally in a
blaze of melodramatic fireworks, really made me so unhappy
that I lost my night's rest. So soon as the speech was over
the company was invited into the house to 'pour a libation to
the holy cause'--in the vernacular, to take a drink and spit
on the floor."

Evidently Southern eloquence was not tolerable to the ears of the British consul. Or was it the din of the church bells rather than the clamour of the orator, that offended him? (_Lyons Papers_.)]

[Footnote 51: _Edinburgh Review_, Vol. 113, p. 555.]

[Footnote 52: The _Times_, January 4, 1861.]

[Footnote 53: Letter to _Dublin News_, dated January 26, 1861. Cited in _The Liberator_, March 1, 1861. Garrison, editor of _The Liberator_, was then earnest in advocating "letting the South go in peace" as a good riddance.]

[Footnote 54: _Saturday Review_, March 2, 1861, p. 216.]

[Footnote 55: _London Chronicle_, March 14, 1861. Cited in _The Liberator_, April 12, 1861.]

[Footnote 56: _London Review_, April 20, 1861. Cited in Littel's _Living Age_, Vol. LXIX, p. 495. The editor of the _Review_ was a Dr. Mackay, but I have been unable to identify him, as might seem natural from his opinions, as the Mackay previously quoted (p. 37) who was later New York correspondent of the _Times_.]

[Footnote 57: Matthew Arnold, _Letters_, Vol. I., p. 150. Letter to Mrs. Forster, January 28, 1861.]

[Footnote 58: Julian Hawthorne, _Nathaniel Hawthorne and his Wife_, Vol. II, pp. 271-78. _Life and Letters of John Greenleaf Whittier_, Vol. II, pp. 439 seq.]

[Footnote 59: _Quarterly Review_, Vol. 110, p. 282. July, 1861.]

[Footnote 60: Duffus, "English Opinion," p. 7.]

[Footnote 61: _Westminster_, Vol. LXXX, p. 587.]

[Footnote 62: Adams' course was bitterly criticized by his former intimate friend, Charles Sumner, but the probable purpose of Adams was, foreseeing the certainty of secession, to exhibit so strongly the arrogance and intolerance of the South as to create greater unity of Northern sentiment. This was a purpose that could not be declared and both at home and abroad his action, and that of other former anti-slavery leaders, for the moment weakened faith that the North was in earnest on the general issue of slavery.]

[Footnote 63: _Services rendered by Russia to the American People during the War of the Rebellion_, Petersburg, 1904, p. 5.]

[Footnote 64: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV, "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States," No. 1.]

[Footnote 65: _Ibid._, No. 6. Russell to Lyons, December 26, 1860.]

[Footnote 66: _Ibid._, Russell to Lyons, No. 9, January 5, 1861, and No. 17, February 20, 1861.]

[Footnote 67: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1861, _Lords_, Vol. XVIII. Correspondence with U.S. Government respecting suspension of Federal Customs House at the Port of Charleston. Nos. 1 and 3.]

[Footnote 68: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Bunch, December 12, 1860.]

[Footnote 69: _Ibid._, The same day official instructions were sent permitting Bunch to remain at Charleston, but directing him, if asked to recognize South Carolina, to refer the matter to England. F.O., Am., Vol. 754, No. 6. Russell to Lyons, January 10, 1861.]

[Footnote 70: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, January 22, 1861.]

[Footnote 71: This view was not shared by Lyons' colleagues at Washington. The Russian Minister, Stoeckl, early declared the Union permanently destroyed, and regretting the fact, yet hoped the North would soon accept the inevitable and seek close co-operation with the South in commerce and in foreign relations. This view was repeated by him many times and most emphatically as late as the first month of 1863. (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., January 29-February 10, 1863. No. 342.) It was not until September, 1863, that Stoeckl ventured to hope for a Northern reconquest of the South. I am indebted to Dr. Frank A. Golder, of Stanford University, for the use of his notes and transcripts covering all of the Russian diplomatic correspondence with the United States, 1860-1865. In the occasional use made of this material the English translation is mine.]

[Footnote 72: Stoeckl reported that at a dinner with Lyons, at which he, Mercier and Seward were the guests, Seward had asserted that if Civil War came all foreign commerce with the South would be interrupted. To this Lyons protested that England could not get along without cotton and that she would secure it in one way or another. Seward made no reply. (_Ibid._, March 25-April 9, 1861, No. 810.)]

[Footnote 73: _Economist_, January 12, 1861.]

[Footnote 74: _Ibid._, February 23, 1861.]

[Footnote 75: _London Press_, March 23, 1861. Cited in Littell's _Living Age_, Vol. LXIX, p. 438.]

[Footnote 76: Before Adams' selection as Minister to England was decided upon, Sumner's Massachusetts friends were urging him for the place. Longfellow was active in this interest. _H.W. Longfellow_, by Samuel Longfellow, Vol. II, pp. 412-13.]

[Footnote 77: John Bright later declared "his conviction that the leading journal had not published one fair, honourable, or friendly article toward the States since Lincoln's accession to office." Dasent, _Life of Delane_, Vol. II, p. 38. The time is approximately correct, but the shift in policy began earlier, when it came to be feared that the North would not submit to peaceable secession.]

[Footnote 78: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, Vol. I, pp. 344-45.]

[Footnote 79: See _ante_, p. 40.]

[Footnote 80: _Economist_, March 2, 1861.]

[Footnote 81: _Spectator_, March 16, 1861.]

[Footnote 82: Lyons Papers.]

[Footnote 83: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXI, p. 814. February 22, 1861. William E. Forster was of Quaker descent and had early taken part in public meetings called to express humanitarian sentiment. From 1850 on he was an acceptable public speaker in all matters liberal, as free trade, social reform, and anti-slavery. Elected to Parliament in 1859 and again in 1861 from Bradford, where he was engaged in business as a woollen manufacturer, he sought, after the fashion of new Members, a cause to represent and found it in championship of the North. Having great native ability, as shown by his later distinguished career, it was the good fortune of the United States thus to enlist so eager a champion. Forster and John Bright were the two leading "friends of the North" in Parliament. The latter already had established reputation, but was more influential out of Parliament than in it. Forster, with a reputation to make, showed skill in debate, and soon achieved prestige for himself and his American cause. Henry Adams, son and private secretary of the American Minister to England, once told the writer that he regarded Forster's services as, on the whole, the most valuable rendered by any Englishman to the North.]

[Footnote 84: F.O., Am., Vol. 780, No. 30.]

[Footnote 85: Newton, _Lord Lyons_, Vol. I, p. 30.]

[Footnote 86: F.O., Am., Vol. 760, No. 40.]

[Footnote 87: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, February 4, 1861.]

[Footnote 88: F.O., Am., Vol. 760, No. 59.]

[Footnote 89: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, February 12, 1861.]

[Footnote 90: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States," No. 17. Russell to Lyons, February 20, 1861.]

[Footnote 91: F.O., Am., Vol. 761, No. 78. Received March 11. It is curious that in the first period of the war Lyons made no extended characterization of Lincoln. Probably his contacts with the new President were insufficient to justify it. The first record of personal impressions was that made by W.H. Russell and later printed in his "Diary" but not reproduced in his letters to the _Times_. Russell was taken to the White House. "Soon afterwards there entered, with a shambling, loose, irregular, almost unsteady gait, a tall, lank, lean man, considerably over six feet in height, with stooping shoulders, long pendulous arms, terminating in hands of extraordinary dimensions, which, however, were far exceeded in proportion by his feet.... The impression produced by the size of his extremities, and by his flapping and wide-projecting ears, may be removed by the appearance of kindliness, sagacity, and awkward bonhomie of his face ... eyes dark, full, and deeply set, are penetrating, but full of an expression which almost amounts to tenderness.... A person who met Mr. Lincoln in the street would not take him to be what--according to usages of European society--is called a 'gentleman' ... but, at the same time, it would not be possible for the most indifferent observer to pass him in the street without notice."--_My Diary_, I, pp. 37-8.]

[Footnote 92: Lyons Papers.]

[Footnote 93: F.O., Am., Vol. 761.]

[Footnote 94: F.O., Am., Vol. 762, No. 122. March 30, 1861. Received April 16.]

[Footnote 95: F.O., Am., Vol. 780, No. 37. March 21, 1861. Received April 9.]

[Footnote 96: F.O., Am., Vol. 778, No. 26. April 24, 1861.]

[Footnote 97: Russell Papers.]

[Footnote 98: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, March 26, 1861. Printed in Newton, _Lord Lyons_, Vol. I., p. 31.]

[Footnote 99: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 100: Russell Papers.]

[Footnote 101: Lyons Papers.]

[Footnote 102: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, pp, 80-81.]

[Footnote 103: F.O., Am., Vol. 754, No. 79. Russell to Lyons, April 6, 1861.]

[Footnote 104: Lyons Papers, Russell to Lyons, April 6, 1861.]

[Footnote 105: The _Times_, February 26, 1861.]

[Footnote 106: _London Press_, March 30, 1861, Cited in Littell's _Living Age_, Vol. 69, p. 379.]

[Footnote 107: The _Times_, March 26, 1861.]

[Footnote 108: _Saturday Review_, May 11, 1861, pp. 465-6.]

[Footnote 109: _Economist_, May 4, 1861.]

[Footnote 110: _Examiner_, January 5 and (as quoted) April 27, 1861. Cited in Littell's _Living Age_, Vol. 68, p. 758 and Vol. 69, p. 570.]

[Footnote 111: _Spectator_, April 27, 1861.]

[Footnote 112: _Ibid._, May 4, 1861.]

[Footnote 113: These four publications, the _Spectator_, the _Westminster_, the _Daily News_, and the _Morning Star_, were the principal British pro-Northern organs. In addition _The Liberator_ names among the lesser and provincial press the following: _Nonconformist, British Standard, Dial, Birmingham Post, Manchester Examiner, Newcastle Chronicle, Caledonian Mercury_ and _Belfast Whig_. Duffus, "English Opinion," p. 40.]

[Footnote 114: Godkin had joined the staff of the _Daily News_ in 1853. During the Crimea War he was special war correspondent. He had travelled extensively in America in the late 'fifties and was thoroughly well informed. From 1862 to 1865 his letters to the _Daily News_ were of great value in encouraging the British friends of the North. In 1865 Godkin became editor of the New York _Nation_.]

[Footnote 115: W.E. Forster said of her, "It was Harriet Martineau alone who was keeping English opinion about America on the right side through the Press." The _Daily News_ Jubilee Edition, p. 46.]

[Footnote 116: James, _William Wetmore Story and His Friends_, Vol. II, p. 92.]

[Footnote 117: Moncure D. Conway's _Autobiography_ asserts that two-thirds of the English authors "espoused the Union cause, some of them actively--Professor Newman, Mill, Tom Hughes, Sir Charles Lyell, Huxley, Tyndall, Swinburne, Lord Houghton, Cairns, Fawcett, Frederic Harrison, Leslie Stephen, Allingham, the Rossettis," Vol. I, p. 406. This is probably true of ultimate, though not of initial, interest and attitude. But for many writers their published works give no clue to their opinions on the Civil War--as for example the works of Dickens, Thackeray, William Morris, or Ruskin. See Duffus, "English Opinion," p. 103.]

[Footnote 118: Russell, _My Diary_, I, p. 398.]

[Footnote 119: The _Times_, May 30, 1861.]

[Footnote 120: _Westminster Review_, Vol. 76, pp. 487-509, October, 1861.]

[Footnote 121: Bright to Sumner, September 6, 1861. Cited in Rhodes, _United States_, Vol. III, p. 509.]

[Footnote 122: A meeting held in Edinburgh, May 9, 1861, declared that anti-slavery England ought never to recognize the South. Reported in _Liberator_, May 31, 1861.]

[Footnote 123: F.O., Am., Vol. 762, Nos. 141 and 142.]

[Footnote 124: _Ibid._, No. 146.]

[Footnote 125: See _ante_, pp. 50-51.]

[Footnote 126: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." Nos. 24, 25 and 26.]