Chapter XI: Russell's Mediation Plan (1)

The adjournment of Parliament on August 7 without hint of governmental inclination to act in the American Civil War was accepted by most of the British public as evidence that the Ministry had no intentions in that direction. But keen observers were not so confident. Motley, at Vienna, was keeping close touch with the situation in England through private correspondence. In March, 1862, he thought that "France and England have made their minds up to await the issue of the present campaign"--meaning McClellan's advance on Richmond[734]. With the failure of that campaign he wrote: "Thus far the English Government have resisted his [Napoleon's] importunities. But their resistance will not last long[735]." Meanwhile the recently established pro-Southern weekly, _The Index_, from its first issue, steadily insisted on the wisdom and necessity of British action to end the war[736]. France was declared rapidly to be winning the goodwill of the South at the expense of England; the British aristocracy were appealed to on grounds of close sympathy with a "Southern Aristocracy"; mediation, at first objected to, in view of the more reasonable demand for recognition, was in the end the chief object of _The Index_, after mid-July, when simple recognition seemed impossible of attainment[737]. Especially British humiliation because of the timidity of her statesmen, was harped upon and any public manifestation of Southern sympathy was printed in great detail[738].

The speculations of Motley, the persistent agitation of _The Index_ are, however, no indication that either Northern fears or Southern hopes were based on authoritative information as to governmental purpose. The plan now in the minds of Palmerston and Russell and their steps in furthering it have been the subject of much historical study and writing. It is here proposed to review them in the light of all available important materials, both old and new, using a chronological order and with more citation than is customary, in the belief that such citations best tell the story of this, the most critical period in the entire course of British attitude toward the Civil War. Here, and here only, Great Britain voluntarily approached the danger of becoming involved in the American conflict[739].

Among the few who thought the withdrawal of Lindsay's motion, July 18, and the Prime Minister's comments did _not_ indicate safety for the North stood Adams, the American Minister. Of Palmerston's speech he wrote the next day in his diary: "It was cautious and wise, but enough could be gathered from it to show that mischief to us in some shape will only be averted by the favour of Divine Providence or our own efforts. The anxiety attending my responsibility is only postponed[740]." At this very moment Adams was much disturbed by his failure to secure governmental seizure of a war vessel being built at Liverpool for the South--the famous _Alabama_--which was soon completed and put to sea but ten days later, July 29. Russell's delay in enforcing British neutrality, as Adams saw it, in this matter, reinforcing the latter's fears of a change in policy, had led him to explain his alarm to Seward. On August 16 Adams received an instruction, written August 2, outlining the exact steps to be taken in case the feared change in British policy should occur. As printed in the diplomatic documents later presented to Congress this despatch is merely a very interesting if somewhat discursive essay on the inevitability of European ruminations on the possibility of interference to end the war and argues the unwisdom of such interference, especially for Great Britain's own interests. It does not read as if Seward were alarmed or, indeed, as if he had given serious consideration to the supposed danger[741]. But this conveys a very erroneous impression. An unprinted portion of the despatch very specifically and in a very serious tone, instructs Adams that if approached by the British Government with propositions implying a purpose:

"To dictate, or to mediate, or to advise, or even to solicit
or persuade, you will answer that you are forbidden to
debate, to hear, or in any way receive, entertain or
transmit, any communication of the kind.... If you are asked
an opinion what reception the President would give to such a
proposition, if made here, you will reply that you are not
instructed, but you have no reason for supposing that it
would be entertained."

This was to apply either to Great Britain alone or acting in conjunction with other Powers. Further, if the South should be "acknowledged" Adams was immediately to suspend his functions. "You will perceive," wrote Seward, "that we have approached the contemplation of that crisis with the caution which great reluctance has inspired. But I trust that you will also have perceived that the crisis has not appalled us[742]."

This serious and definite determination by the North to resent any intervention by Europe makes evident that Seward and Lincoln were fully committed to forcible resistance of foreign meddling. Briefly, if the need arose, the North would go to war with Europe. Adams at least now knew where he stood and could but await the result. The instruction he held in reserve, nor was it ever officially communicated to Russell. He did, however, state its tenor to Forster who had contacts with the Cabinet through Milner-Gibson and though no proof has been found that the American determination was communicated to the Ministry, the presumption is that this occurred[743]. Such communication could not have taken place before the end of August and possibly was not then made owing to the fact that the Cabinet was scattered in the long vacation and that, apparently, the plan to move _soon_ in the American War was as yet unknown save to Palmerston and to Russell.

Russell's letter to Palmerston of August 6, sets the date of their determination[744]. Meanwhile they were depending much upon advices from Washington for the exact moment. Stuart was suggesting, with Mercier, that October should be selected[745], and continued his urgings even though his immediate chief, Lyons, was writing to him from London strong personal objections to any European intervention whatever and especially any by Great Britain[746]. Lyons explained his objections to Russell as well, but Stuart, having gone to the extent of consulting also with Stoeckl, the Russian Minister at Washington, was now in favour of straight-out recognition of the Confederacy as the better measure. This, thought Stoeckl, was less likely to bring on war with the North than an attempt at mediation[747]. Soon Stuart was able to give notice, a full month in advance of the event, of Lincoln's plan to issue an emancipation proclamation, postponed temporarily on the insistence of Seward[748], but he attached no importance to this, regarding it as at best a measure of pretence intended to frighten the South and to influence foreign governments[749]. Russell was not impressed with Stuart's shift from mediation to recognition. "I think," he wrote, "we must allow the President to spend his second batch of 600,000 men before we can hope that he and his democracy will listen to reason[750]." But this did not imply that Russell was wavering in the idea that October would be a "ripe time." Soon he was journeying to the Continent in attendance on the Queen and using his leisure to perfect his great plan[751].

Russell's first positive step was taken on September 13. On that date he wrote to Cowley in Paris instructing him to sound Thouvenel, _privately_[752], and the day following he wrote to Palmerston commenting on the news just received of the exploits of Stonewall Jackson in Virginia, "it really looks as if he might end the war. In October the hour will be ripe for the Cabinet[753]." Similar reactions were expressed by Palmerston at the same moment and for the same reasons. Palmerston also wrote on September 14:

"The Federals ... got a very complete smashing ... even
Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the
Confederates."

"If this should happen, would it not be time for us to
consider whether in such a state of things England and France
might not address the contending parties and recommend an
arrangement upon the basis of separation[754]?"

Russell replied:

"... I agree with you that the time is come for offering
mediation to the United States Government, with a view to the
recognition of the independence of the Confederates. I agree
further that, in case of failure, we ought ourselves to
recognize the Southern States as an independent State. For
the purpose of taking so important a step, I think we must
have a meeting, of the Cabinet. The 23rd or 30th would suit
me for the meeting[755]."

The two elder statesmen being in such complete accord the result of the unofficial overture to France was now awaited with interest. This, considering the similar unofficial suggestions previously made by Napoleon, was surprisingly lukewarm. Cowley reported that he had held a long and serious conversation with Thouvenel on the subject of mediation as instructed by Russell on the thirteenth and found a disposition "to wait to see the result of the elections" in the North. Mercier apparently had been writing that Southern successes would strengthen the Northern peace party. Thouvenel's idea was that "if the peace party gains the ascendant," Lincoln and Seward, both of whom were too far committed to listen to foreign suggestions, would "probably be set aside." He also emphasized the "serious consequences" England and France might expect if they recognized the South.

"I said that we might propose an armistice without mediation,
and that if the other Powers joined with us in doing so, and
let it be seen that a refusal would be followed by the
recognition of the Southern States, the certainty of such
recognition by all Europe must carry weight with it."

Thouvenel saw some difficulties, especially Russia.

"...the French Government had some time back sounded that of
Russia as to her joining France and England in an offer of
mediation and had been met by an almost scornful refusal...."

"It appears also that there is less public pressure here for
the recognition of the South than there is in England[756]."

Thouvenel's lack of enthusiasm might have operated as a check to Russell had he not been aware of two circumstances causing less weight than formerly to be attached to the opinions of the French Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The first was the well-known difference on American policy between Thouvenel and Napoleon III and the well-grounded conviction that the Emperor was at any moment ready to impose his will, if only England would give the signal. The second circumstance was still more important. It was already known through the French press that a sharp conflict had arisen in the Government as to Italian policy and all signs pointed to a reorganization of the Ministry which would exclude Thouvenel. Under these circumstances Russell could well afford to discount Thouvenel's opinion. The extent to which he was ready to go--much beyond either the offer of mediation, or of armistice evidently in Cowley's mind--is shown by a letter to Gladstone, September 26.

"I am inclined to think that October 16 may be soon enough
for a Cabinet, if I am free to communicate the views which
Palmerston and I entertain to France and Russia in the
interval between this time and the middle of next month.
These views had the offer of mediation to both parties in the
first place, and in the case of refusal by the North, to
recognition of the South. Mediation on the basis of
separation and recognition accompanied by a declaration of
neutrality[757]."

The perfected plan, thus outlined, had resulted from a communication to Palmerston of Cowley's report together with a memorandum, proposed to be sent to Cowley, but again _privately_[758], addressed to France alone. Russell here also stated that he had explained his ideas to the Queen. "She only wishes Austria, Prussia and Russia to be consulted. I said that should be done, but we must consult France first." Also enclosed was a letter from Stuart of September 9, reporting Mercier as just returned from New York and convinced that if advantage were not taken of the present time to do exactly that which was in Russell's mind, Europe would have to wait for the "complete exhaustion" of the North[759]. Russell was now at home again and the next day Palmerston approved the plans as "excellent"; but he asked whether it would not be well to include Russia in the invitation as a compliment, even though "she might probably decline." As to the other European powers the matter could wait for an "after communication." Yet that Palmerston still wished to go slowly is shown by a comment on the military situation in America:

"It is evident that a great conflict is taking place to the
north-west of Washington, and its issue must have a great
effect on the state of affairs. If the Federals sustain a
great defeat, they may be at once ready for mediation, and
the iron should be struck while it is hot. If, on the other
hand, they should have the best of it, we may wait awhile and
see what may follow[760]...."

Thus through Palmerston's caution Russia had been added to France in Russell's proposed memorandum and the communication to Cowley had not been sent off immediately--as the letter to Gladstone of September 26 indicates. But the plan was regarded as so far determined upon that on September 24 Russell requested Lyons not to fix, as yet, upon a date for his departure for America, writing, "M. Mercier is again looking out for an opportunity to offer mediation, and this time he is not so much out in his reckoning[761]." Curiously Mercier had again changed his mind and now thought a proposal of an armistice was the best move, being "particularly anxious that there should be no mention of the word _separation_," but of this Russell had, as yet, no inkling[762]. With full approval of the plan as now outlined, Palmerston wrote to Gladstone, September 24, that he and Russell were in complete agreement that an offer of mediation should be made by the three maritime powers, but that "no actual step would be taken without the sanction of the Cabinet[763]." Two days later Russell explained to Gladstone the exact nature of the proposal[764], but that there was even now no thoroughly worked out agreement on the sequence of steps necessary is shown by Palmerston's letter to Gladstone of the twenty-fourth, in which is outlined a preliminary proposal of an armistice, cessation of blockade, and negotiation on the basis of separation[765].

Other members of the Cabinet were likewise informed of the proposed overture to France and Russia and soon it was clear that there would be opposition. Granville had replaced Russell in attendance upon the Queen at Gotha. He now addressed a long and careful argument to Russell opposing the adventure, as he thought it, summing up his opinion in this wise:

"...I doubt, if the war continues long after our recognition
of the South, whether it will be possible for us to avoid
drifting into it."

"...I have come to the conclusion that it is premature to
depart from the policy which has hitherto been adopted by you
and Lord Palmerston, and which, notwithstanding the strong
antipathy to the North, the strong sympathy with the South,
and the passionate wish to have cotton, has met with such
general approval from Parliament, the press, and the
public[766]."

But Granville had little hope his views would prevail. A few days later he wrote to Lord Stanley of Alderley:

"I have written to Johnny my reasons for thinking it
decidedly premature. I, however, suspect you will settle to
do so! Pam, Johnny, and Gladstone would be in favour of it;
and probably Newcastle. I do not know about the others. It
appears to me a great mistake[767]."

Opportunely giving added effect to Granville's letter there now arrived confused accounts from America of the battles about Washington and of a check to the Southern advance. On September 17 there had been fought the battle of Antietam and two days later Lee, giving up his Maryland campaign, began a retreat through the Shenandoah valley toward the old defensive Southern lines before Richmond. There was no pursuit, for McClellan, again briefly in command, thought his army too shattered for an advance. Palmerston had been counting on a great Southern victory and was now doubtful whether the time had come after all for European overtures to the contestants. October 2 he wrote Russell:

"MY DEAR RUSSELL,

"I return you Granville's letter which contains much
deserving of serious consideration. There is no doubt that
the offer of Mediation upon the basis of Separation would be
accepted by the South. Why should it not be accepted? It
would give the South in principle the points for which they
are fighting. The refusal, if refusal there was, would come
from the North, who would be unwilling to give up the
principle for which they have been fighting so long as they
had a reasonable expectation that by going on fighting they
could carry their point. The condition of things therefore
which would be favourable to an offer of mediation would be
great success of the South against the North. That state of
things seemed ten days ago to be approaching. Its advance has
been lately checked, but we do not yet know the real course
of recent events, and still less can we foresee what is about
to follow. Ten days or a fortnight more may throw a clearer
light upon future prospects.

"As regards possible resentment on the part of the Northerns
following upon an acknowledgment of the Independence of the
South, it is quite true that we should have less to care
about that resentment in the spring when communication with
Canada was open, and when our naval force could more easily
operate upon the American coast, than in winter when we are
cut off from Canada and the American coast is not so safe.

"But if the acknowledgment were made at one and the same time
by England, France and some other Powers, the Yankees would
probably not seek a quarrel with us alone, and would not like
one against a European Confederation. Such a quarrel would
render certain and permanent that Southern Independence the
acknowledgment of which would have caused it.

"The first communication to be made by England and France to
the contending parties might be, not an absolute offer of
mediation but a friendly suggestion whether the time was not
come when it might be well for the two parties to consider
whether the war, however long continued, could lead to any
other result than separation; and whether it might not
therefore be best to avoid the great evils which must
necessarily flow from a prolongation of hostilities by at
once coming to an agreement to treat upon that principle of
separation which must apparently be the inevitable result of
the contest, however long it may last.

"The best thing would be that the two parties should settle
details by direct negotiation with each other, though perhaps
with the rancorous hatred now existing between them this
might be difficult. But their quarrels in negotiation would
do us no harm if they did not lead to a renewal of war. An
armistice, if not accompanied by a cessation of blockades,
would be all in favour of the North, especially if New
Orleans remained in the hands of the North.

"The whole matter is full of difficulty, and can only be
cleared up by some more decided events between the contending
armies...."

PALMERSTON[768]."

Very evidently Palmerston was experiencing doubts and was all in favour of cautious delay. American military events more than Granville's arguments influenced him, but almost immediately there appeared a much more vigorous and determined opponent within the Cabinet. Cornewall Lewis was prompt to express objections. October 2, Russell transmitted to Palmerston a letter of disapproval from Lewis. Russell also, momentarily, was hesitating. He wrote:

"This American question must be well sifted. I send you a
letter of G. Lewis who is against moving ..."

"My only doubt is whether we and France should stir if Russia
holds back. Her separation from our move would ensure the
rejection of our proposals. But we shall know more by the
16th. I have desired a cabinet to be summoned for that day,
but the summons will not go out till Saturday. So if you wish
to stop it, write to Hammond[769]."

From this it would appear that Russia had been approached[770] but that Russell's chief concern was the attitude of France, that his proposed private communication to Cowley had been despatched and that he was waiting an answer which might be expected before the sixteenth. If so his expectations were negatived by that crisis now on in the French Ministry over the Italian question prohibiting consideration of any other matter. On October 15 Thouvenel was dismissed, but his formal retirement from office did not take place until October 24. Several Ministers abroad, among them Flahault, at London, followed him into retirement and foreign affairs were temporarily in confusion[771]. The Emperor was away from Paris and all that Cowley reported was that the last time he had seen Thouvenel the latter had merely remarked that "as soon as the Emperor came back the two Governments ought to enter into a serious consideration of the whole question[772]...." Cowley himself was more concerned that it was now becoming clear France, in spite of previous protestations, was planning "colonizing" Mexico[773].

Up to the end of September, therefore, the British Government, while wholly confident that France would agree in any effort whatsoever that England might wish to make, had no recent assurances, either official or private, to this effect. This did not disturb Russell, who took for granted French approval, and soon he cast aside the hesitation caused by the doubts of Granville, the opposition of Lewis, and the caution of Palmerston. Public opinion was certainly turning toward a demand for Ministerial action[774]. Two days of further consideration caused him to return to the attack; October 4 he wrote Palmerston:

"I think unless some miracle takes place this will be the
very time for offering mediation, or as you suggest,
proposing to North and South to come to terms.

"Two things however must be made clear:

(i) That we propose separation,

(ii) That we shall take no part in the war unless attacked
ourselves[775]."

How Russell proposed to evade a war with an angry North was not made clear, but in this same letter notice was given that he was preparing a memorandum for the Cabinet. Russell was still for a mediation on lines of separation, but his uncertainty, even confusion, of mind became evident but another two days later on receipt of a letter from Stuart, written September 23, in which he and Mercier were now all for a suggestion of armistice, with no mention of separation[776]. Russell now thought:

"If no fresh battles occur, I think the suggestion might be
adopted, tho' I am far from thinking with Mercier that the
North would accept it. But it would be a fair and defensible
course, leaving it open to us to hasten or defer recognition
if the proposal is declined. Lord Lyons might carry it over
on the 25th[777]."

British policy, as represented by the inclinations of the Foreign Secretary, having started out on a course portending positive and vigorous action, was now evidently in danger of veering far to one side, if not turning completely about. But the day after Russell seemed to be considering such an attenuation of the earlier plan as to be content with a mere suggestion of armistice, a bomb was thrown into the already troubled waters further and violently disturbing them. This was Gladstone's speech at Newcastle, October 7, a good third of which was devoted to the Civil War and in which he asserted that Jefferson Davis had made an army, was making a navy, and had created something still greater--a nation[778]. The chronology of shifts in opinion would, at first glance, indicate that Gladstone made this speech with the intention of forcing Palmerston and Russell to continue in the line earlier adopted, thus hoping to bolster up a cause now losing ground. His declaration, coming from a leading member of of the Cabinet, was certain to be accepted by the public as a foreshadowing of governmental action. If Jefferson Davis had in truth created a nation then early recognition must be given it. But this surmise of intentional pressure is not borne out by any discovered evidence. On the contrary, the truth is, seemingly, that Gladstone, in the north and out of touch, was in complete ignorance that the two weeks elapsed since his letters from Palmerston and Russell had produced any alteration of plan or even any hesitation. Himself long convinced of the wisdom of British intervention in some form Gladstone evidently could not resist the temptation to make the good news known. His declaration, foreshadowing a policy that did not pertain to his own department, and, more especially, that had not yet received Cabinet approval was in itself an offence against the traditions of British Cabinet organization. He had spoken without authorization and "off his own bat."

The speculative market, sensitive barometer of governmental policy, immediately underwent such violent fluctuations as to indicate a general belief that Gladstone's speech meant action in the war. The price of raw cotton dropped so abruptly as to alarm Southern friends and cause them to give assurances that even if the blockade were broken there would be no immediate outpouring of cotton from Southern ports[779]. On the other hand, Bright, staunch friend of the North, _hoped_ that Gladstone was merely seeking to overcome a half-hearted reluctance of Palmerston and Russell to move. He was sore at heart over the "vile speech" of "your old acquaintance and friend[780]." The leading newspapers while at first accepting the Newcastle speech as an authoritative statement and generally, though mildly, approving, were quick to feel that there was still uncertainty of policy and became silent until it should be made clear just what was in the wind[781]. Within the Cabinet it is to be supposed that Gladstone had caused no small stir, both by reason of his unusual procedure and by his sentiments. On Russell, however much disliked was the incursion into his own province, the effect was reinvigoration of a desire to carry through at least some portion of the plan and he determined to go on with the proposal of an armistice. Six days after Gladstone's speech Russell circulated, October 13, a memorandum on America[782].

This memorandum asserted that the South had shown, conclusively, its power to resist--had maintained a successful defensive; that the notion of a strong pro-Northern element in the South had been shown to be wholly delusive; that the emancipation proclamation, promising a freeing of the slaves in the sections still in rebellion on January 1, 1863, was no humanitarian or idealistic measure (since it left slavery in the loyal or recognized districts) and was but an incitement to servile war--a most "terrible" plan. For these reasons Russell urged that the Great Powers ought seriously to consider whether it was not their duty to propose a "suspension of arms" for the purpose of "weighing calmly the advantages of peace[783]." This was a far cry from mediation and recognition, nor did Russell indicate either the proposed terms of an armistice or the exact steps to be taken by Europe in bringing it about and making it of value. But the memorandum of October 13 does clearly negative what has been the accepted British political tradition which is to the effect that Palmerston, angered at Gladstone's presumption and now determined against action, had "put up" Cornewall Lewis to reply in a public speech, thereby permitting public information that no Cabinet decision had as yet been reached. Lewis' speech was made at Hereford on October 14. Such were the relations between Palmerston and Russell that it is impossible the former would have so used Lewis without notifying Russell, in which case there would have been no Foreign Office memorandum of the thirteenth[784]. Lewis was, in fact, vigorously maintaining his objections, already made known to Russell, to _any_ plan of departure from the hitherto accepted policy of neutrality and his speech at Hereford was the opening gun of active opposition.

Lewis did not in any sense pose as a friend of the North. Rather he treated the whole matter, in his speech at Hereford and later in the Cabinet as one requiring cool judgment and decision on the sole ground of British interests. This was the line best suited to sustain his arguments, but does not prove, as some have thought, that his Cabinet acknowledgment of the impossibility of Northern complete victory, was his private conviction[785]. At Hereford Lewis argued that everyone must acknowledge a great war was in progress and must admit it "to be undecided. Under such circumstances, the time had not yet arrived when it could be asserted in accordance with the established doctrines of international law that the independence of the Southern States had been established[786]." In effect Lewis gave public notice that no Cabinet decision had yet been reached, a step equally opposed to Cabinet traditions with Gladstone's speech, since equally unauthorized, but excusable in the view that the first offence against tradition had forced a rejoinder[787]. For the public Lewis accomplished his purpose and the press refrained from comment, awaiting results[788]. Meanwhile Palmerston, who must finally determine policy, was remaining in uncertainty and in this situation thought it wise to consult, indirectly, Derby, the leader of the opposition in Parliament. This was done through Clarendon, who wrote to Palmerston on October 16 that Derby was averse to action.

"He said that he had been constantly urged to _go in for_
recognition and mediation, but had always refused on the
ground that recognition would merely irritate the North
without advancing the cause of the South or procuring a
single bale of cotton, and that mediation in the present
temper of the Belligerents _must_ be rejected even if the
mediating Powers themselves knew what to propose as a fair
basis of compromise; for as each party insisted upon having
that which the other declared was vitally essential to its
existence, it was clear that the war had not yet marked out
the stipulations of a treaty of peace.... The recognition of
the South could be of no benefit to England unless we meant
to sweep away the blockade, which would be an act of
hostility towards the North[789]."

More than any other member of the Cabinet Lewis was able to guess, fairly accurately, what was in the Premier's mind for Lewis was Clarendon's brother-in-law, and "the most intimate and esteemed of his male friends[790]." They were in constant communication as the Cabinet crisis developed, and Lewis' next step was taken immediately after Palmerston's consultation of Derby through Clarendon. October 17, Lewis circulated a memorandum in reply to that of Russell's of October 13. He agreed with Russell's statement of the facts of the situation in America, but added with sarcasm:

"A dispassionate bystander might be expected to concur in the
historical view of Lord Russell, and to desire that the war
should be speedily terminated by a pacific agreement between
the contending parties. But, unhappily, the decision upon any
proposal of the English Government will be made, not by
dispassionate bystanders, but by heated and violent
partisans; and we have to consider, not how the proposal
indicated in the Memorandum ought to be received, or how it
would be received by a conclave of philosophers, but how it
is likely to be received by the persons to whom it would be
addressed."

Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, Lewis admitted, presumably was intended to incite servile war, but that very fact was an argument against, not for, British action, since it revealed an intensity of bitterness prohibitory of any "calm consideration" of issues by the belligerents. And suppose the North did acquiesce in an armistice the only peaceful solution would be an independent slave-holding South for the establishment of which Great Britain would have become intermediary and sponsor. Any policy except that of the continuance of strict neutrality was full of dangers, some evident, some but dimly visible as yet. Statesmanship required great caution; "... looking to the probable consequences," Lewis concluded, "of this philanthropic proposition, we may doubt whether the chances of evil do not preponderate over the chances of good, and whether it is not--

'Better to endure the ills we have
Than fly to others which we know not of[791].'"

At the exact time when Lewis thus voiced his objections, basing them on the lack of any sentiment toward peace in America, there were received at the Foreign Office and read with interest the reports of a British special agent sent out from Washington on a tour of the Western States. Anderson's reports emphasized three points:

(1) Emancipation was purely a war measure with no thought of ameliorating the condition of the slaves once freed;

(2) Even if the war should stop there was no likelihood of securing cotton for a long time to come;

(3) The Western States, even more then the Eastern, were in favour of vigorous prosecution of the war and the new call for men was being met with enthusiasm[792].

This was unpromising either for relief to a distressed England or for Northern acceptance of an armistice, yet Russell, commenting on Clarendon's letter to Palmerston, containing Derby's advice, still argued that even if declined a suggestion of armistice could do no harm and might open the way for a later move, but he agreed that recognition "would certainly be premature at present[793]." Russell himself now heard from Clarendon and learned that Derby "had been constantly urged to press for recognition and mediation but he had always refused on the ground that the neutral policy hitherto pursued by the Government was the right one and that if we departed from it we should only meet with an insolent rejection of our offer[794]." A long conference with Lyons gave cause for further thought and Russell committed himself to the extent that he acknowledged "we ought not to move _at present_ without Russia[795]...." Finally, October 22, Palmerston reached a decision for the immediate present, writing to Russell:

"Your description of the state of things between the two
parties is most comprehensive and just. I am, however, much
inclined to agree with Lewis that at present we could take no
step nor make any communication of a distinct proposition
with any advantage."

* * * * *

"All that we could possibly do without injury to our position
would be to ask the two Parties not whether they would agree
to an armistice but whether they might not turn their
thoughts towards an arrangement between themselves. But the
answer of each might be written by us beforehand. The
Northerners would say that the only condition of arrangement
would be the restoration of the Union; the South would say
their only condition would be an acknowledgment by the North
of Southern Independence--we should not be more advanced and
should only have pledged each party more strongly to the
object for which they are fighting. I am therefore inclined
to change the opinion on which I wrote to you when the
Confederates seemed to be carrying all before them, and I am
very much come back to our original view of the matter, that
we must continue merely to be lookers-on till the war shall
have taken a more decided turn[796]."

By previous arrangement the date October 23 had been set for a Cabinet to consider the American question but Russell now postponed it, though a few members appeared and held an informal discussion in which Russell still justified his "armistice" policy and was opposed by Lewis and the majority of those present. Palmerston did not attend, no action was possible and technically no Cabinet was held[797]. It soon appeared that Russell, vexed at the turn matters had taken, was reluctant in yielding and did not regard the question as finally settled. Yet on the afternoon of this same day Adams, much disturbed by the rumours attendant upon the speeches of Gladstone and Lewis, sought an explanation from Russell and was informed that the Government was not inclined at present to change its policy but could make no promises for the future[798]. This appeared to Adams to be an assurance against _any_ effort by Great Britain and has been interpreted as disingenuous on Russell's part. Certainly Adams' confidence was restored by the interview. But Russell was apparently unconvinced as yet that a suggestion of armistice would necessarily lead to the evil consequences prophesied by Lewis, or would, indeed, require any departure from a policy of strict neutrality. On the one side Russell was being berated by pro-Southerners as weakly continuing an outworn policy and as having "made himself the laughing-stock of Europe and of America[799];" on the other he was regarded, for the moment, as insisting, through pique, on a line of action highly dangerous to the preservation of peace with the North. October 23 Palmerston wrote his approval of the Cabinet postponement, but declared Lewis' doctrine of "no recognition of Southern independence until the North had admitted it" was unsound[800]. The next day he again wrote: "... to talk to the belligerents about peace at present would be as useless as asking the winds during the last week to let the waters remain calm[801]."

This expression by Palmerston on the day after the question apparently had come to a conclusion was the result of the unexpected persistence of Russell and Gladstone. Replying to Palmerston's letter of the twenty-third, Russell wrote: "As no good could come of a Cabinet, I put it off. But tho' I am quite ready to agree to your conclusions for the present, I cannot do so for G. Lewis' reasons...."

"G. Lewis besides has made a proposition for me which I never
thought of making. He says I propose that England and France
and perhaps some one Continental power should ask America to
suspend the war. I never thought of making such a proposal.

"I think if Russia agreed Prussia would. And if France and
England agreed Austria would. Less than the whole five would
not do. I thought it right towards the Cabinet to reserve any
specific proposition. I am not at all inclined to adopt G.
Lewis' invention.

"I have sent off Lyons without instructions, at which he is
much pleased[802]."

Russell was shifting ground; first the proposal was to have been made by England and France; then Russia was necessary; now "less than five powers would not do." But whatever the number required he still desired a proposal of armistice. On October 23, presumably subsequent to the informal meeting of Cabinet members, he drew up a brief memorandum in answer to that of Lewis on October 17, denying that Lewis had correctly interpreted his plan, and declaring that he had always had "in contemplation" a step by the five great powers of Europe. The advisability of trying to secure such joint action, Russell asserted, was all he had had in mind. _If_ the Cabinet had approved this advisability, and the powers were acquiescent, _then_ (in answer to Lewis' accusation of "no look ahead") he would be ready with definite plans for the negotiation of peace between North and South[803]. Thus by letter to Palmerston and by circulation of a new memorandum Russell gave notice that all was not yet decided. On October 24, Gladstone also circulated a memorandum in reply to Lewis, urging action by England, France and Russia[804].

Russell's second memorandum was not at first taken seriously by his Cabinet opponents. They believed the issue closed and Russell merely putting out a denial of alleged purposes. Clarendon, though not a member of the Cabinet, was keeping close touch with the situation and on October 24 wrote to Lewis:

"Thanks for sending me your memorandum on the American
question, which I have read with great satisfaction. Johnny
[Russell] always loves to do something when to do nothing is
prudent, and I have no doubt that he hoped to get support in
his meddling proclivities when he called a Cabinet for
yesterday; but its postponement _sine die_ is probably due to
your memorandum. You have made so clear the idiotic position
we should occupy, either in having presented our face
gratuitously to the Yankee slap we should receive, or in
being asked what practical solution we had to propose after
an armistice had been agreed to at our suggestion, that no
discussion on the subject would have been possible, and the
Foreign Secretary probably thought it would be pleasanter to
draw in his horns at Woburn than in Downing Street[805]."

On October 26, having received from Lewis a copy of Russell's newly-circulated paper, Clarendon wrote again:

"The Foreign Secretary's _blatt_ exhibits considerable
soreness, for which you are specially bound to make
allowance, as it was you who procured abortion for him. He
had thought to make a great deal of his colt by Meddler out
of Vanity, and you have shown his backers that the animal was
not fit to start and would not run a yard if he did. He is
therefore taken back to the country, where he must have a
deal more training before he can appear in public again."

* * * * *

"I should say that your speech at Hereford was nearly as
effective in checking the alarm and speculation caused by
Gladstone's speech, as your memorandum was in smashing the
Foreign Secretary's proposed intervention, and that you did
so without in the smallest degree committing either the
Government or yourself with respect to the future[806]."

In effect Clarendon was advising Lewis to pay no attention to Russell's complaining rejoinder since the object desired had been secured, but there was still one element of strength for Russell and Gladstone which, if obtained, might easily cause a re-opening of the whole question. This was the desire of France, still unexpressed in spite of indirect overtures, a silence in part responsible for the expression of an opinion by Palmerston that Napoleon's words could not be depended upon as an indication of what he intended to do[807]. On the day this was written the French ministerial crisis--the real cause of Napoleon's silence--came to an end with the retirement of Thouvenel and the succession of Drouyn de Lhuys. Russell's reply to Palmerston's assertion of the folly of appealing now to the belligerents was that "recognition" was certainly out of the question for the present and that "it should not take place till May Or June next year, when circumstances may show pretty clearly whether Gladstone was right[808]." But this yielding to the Premier's decision was quickly withdrawn when, at last, Napoleon and his new Minister could turn their attention to the American question.

On October 27 Cowley reported a conversation with the Emperor in which American affairs were discussed. Napoleon hoped that England, France and Russia would join in an offer of mediation. Cowley replied that he had no instructions and Napoleon then modified his ideas by suggesting a proposal of armistice for six months "in order to give time for the present excitement to calm down[809]...." The next day Cowley reported that Drouyn de Lhuys stated the Emperor to be very anxious to "put an end to the War," but that he was himself doubtful whether it would not be better to "wait a little longer," and in any case if overtures to America were rejected Russia probably would not join Great Britain and France in going on to a recognition of the South[810]. All this was exactly in line with that plan to which Russell had finally come and if officially notified to the British Government would require a renewed consideration by the Cabinet. Presumably Napoleon knew what had been going on in London and he now hastened to give the needed French push. October 28, Slidell was summoned to an audience and told of the Emperor's purpose, acting with England, to bring about an armistice[811]. Three days later, October 31, Cowley wrote that he had now been officially informed by Drouyn de Lhuys, "by the Emperor's orders" that a despatch was about to be sent to the French Ministers in England and Russia instructing them to request joint action by the three powers in suggesting an armistice of six months _including a suspension of the blockade_, thus throwing open Southern ports to European commerce[812].

Napoleon's proposal evidently took Palmerston by surprise and was not regarded with favour. He wrote to Russell:

"As to the French scheme of proposals to the United States,
we had better keep that question till the Cabinet meets,
which would be either on Monday 11th, or Wednesday 12th, as
would be most convenient to you and our colleagues. But is
it likely that the Federals would consent to an armistice to
be accompanied by a cessation of Blockades, and which would
give the Confederates means of getting all the supplies they
may want?"

* * * * *

"Then comes the difficulty about slavery and the giving up of
runaway slaves, about which we could hardly frame a proposal
which the Southerns would agree to, and people of England
would approve of. The French Government are more free from
the shackles of principle and of right and wrong on these
matters, as on all others than we are. At all events it would
be wiser to wait till the elections in North America are over
before any proposal is made. As the Emperor is so anxious to
put a stop to bloodshed he might try his hand as a beginning
by putting down the stream of ruffians which rolls out from
that never-failing fountain at Rome[813]."

But Russell was more optimistic, or at least in favour of some sort of proposal to America. He replied to Palmerston:

"My notion is that as there is little chance of our good
offices being accepted in America we should make them such as
would be creditable to us in Europe. I should propose to
answer the French proposal therefore by saying,

"That in offering our good offices we ought to require both
parties to consent to examine, first, whether there are any
terms upon which North and South would consent to restore the
Union; and secondly, failing any such terms, whether there
are any terms upon which both would consent to separate.

"We should also say that if the Union is to be restored it
would be essential in our view, that after what has taken
place all the slaves should be emancipated, compensation
being granted by Congress at the rate at which Great Britain
emancipated her slaves in 1833.

"If separation takes place we must be silent on the trend of
slavery, as we are with regard to Spain and Brazil.

"This is a rough sketch, but I will expand it for the
Cabinet.

"It will be an honourable proposal to make, but the North and
probably the South will refuse it[814]."

Here were several ideas quite impossible of acceptance by North and South in their then frame of mind and Russell himself believed them certain to be refused by the North in any case. But he was eager to present the question for Cabinet discussion hoping for a reversal of the previous decision. Whether from pique or from conviction of the wisdom of a change in British policy, he proposed to press for acceptance of the French plan, with modifications. The news of Napoleon's offer and of Russell's attitude, with some uncertainty as to that of Palmerston, again brought Lewis into action and on November 7 he circulated another memorandum, this time a very long one of some fifteen thousand words. This was in the main an historical résumé of past British policy in relation to revolted peoples, stating the international law of such cases, and pointing out that Great Britain had never recognized a revolted people so long as a _bona fide_ struggle was still going on. Peace was no doubt greatly to be desired. "If England could, by legitimate means, and without unduly sacrificing or imperilling her own interests, accelerate this consummation, she would, in my opinion, earn the just gratitude of the civilized world." But the question, as he had previously asserted, was full of grave dangers. The very suggestion of a concert of Powers was itself one to be avoided. "A conference of the five great Powers is an imposing force, but it is a dangerous body to set in motion. A single intervening Power may possibly contrive to satisfy both the adverse parties; but five intervening Powers have first to satisfy one another." Who could tell what divergence might arise on the question of slavery, or on boundaries, or how far England might find her ideals or her vital interests compromised[815]?

Here was vigorous resistance to Russell, especially effective for its appeal to past British policy, and to correct practice in international law. On the same day that Lewis' memorandum was circulated, there appeared a communication in the _Times_ by "Historicus," on "The International Doctrine of Recognition," outlining in briefer form exactly those international law arguments presented by Lewis, and advocating a continuation of the policy of strict neutrality. "Historicus" was William Vernon Harcourt, husband of Lewis' stepdaughter who was also the niece of Clarendon. Evidently the family guns were all trained on Russell[816]. "Historicus" drove home the fact that premature action by a neutral was a "hostile act" and ought to be resented by the "Sovereign State" as a "breach of neutrality and friendship[817]."

Thus on receipt of the news of Napoleon's proposal the Cabinet crisis was renewed and even more sharply than on October 23. The French offer was not actually presented until November 10[818]. On the next two days the answer to be made received long discussion in the Cabinet. Lewis described this to Clarendon, prefacing his account by stating that Russell had heard by telegram from Napier at St. Petersburg to the effect that Russia would not join but would support English-French proposals through her Minister at Washington, "provided it would not cause irritation[819]."

"Having made this statement, Lord John proceeded to explain
his views on the question. These were, briefly, that the
recent successes of the Democrats afforded a most favourable
opportunity of intervention, because we should strengthen
their hands, and that if we refused the invitation of France,
Russia would reconsider her decision, act directly with
France, and thus accomplish her favourite purpose of
separating France and England. He therefore advised that the
proposal of France should be accepted. Palmerston followed
Lord John, and supported him, but did not say a great deal.
His principal argument was the necessity for showing sympathy
with Lancashire, and of not throwing away any chance of
mitigating it [_sic_].

"The proposal was now thrown before the Cabinet, who
proceeded to pick it to pieces. Everybody present threw a
stone at it of greater or less size, except Gladstone, who
supported it, and the Chancellor [Westbury] and Cardwell, who
expressed no opinion. The principal objection was that the
proposed armistice of six months by sea and land, involving a
suspension of the commercial blockade, was so grossly
unequal--so decidedly in favour of the South, that there was
no chance of the North agreeing to it. After a time,
Palmerston saw that the general feeling of the Cabinet was
against being a party to the representation, and he
capitulated. I do not think his support was very sincere: it
certainly was not hearty ... I ought to add that, after the
Cabinet had come to a decision and the outline of a draft had
been discussed, the Chancellor uttered a few oracular
sentences on the danger of refusing the French invitation,
and gave a strong support to Lord John. His support came
rather late ... I proposed that we should _tater le terrain_
at Washington and ascertain whether there was any chance of
the proposal being accepted. Lord John refused this. He
admitted there was no chance of an affirmative answer from
Washington. I think his principal motive was a fear of
displeasing France, and that Palmerston's principal motive
was a wish to seem to support him. There is a useful article
in to-day's _Times_ throwing cold water on the invitation. I
take for granted that Delane was informed of the result of
the Cabinet[820]."

Gladstone, writing to his wife, gave a similar though more brief account:

"Nov. 11. We have had our Cabinet to-day and meet again
to-morrow. I am afraid we shall do little or nothing in the
business of America. But I will send you definite
intelligence. Both Lords Palmerston and Russell are _right._
Nov. 12. The United States affair has ended and not well.
Lord Russell rather turned tail. He gave way without
resolutely fighting out his battle. However, though we
decline for the moment, the answer is put upon grounds and in
terms which leave the matter very open for the future. Nov.
13. I think the French will make our answer about America
public; at least it is very possible. But I hope they may not
take it as a positive refusal, or at any rate that they may
themselves act in the matter. It will be clear that we concur
with them, that the war should cease. Palmerston gave to
Russell's proposal a feeble and half-hearted support[821]."