Chapter XLI: Battle of Salamis. — Retreat of Xerxes (1)

The sentiment, alike durable and unanimous, with which the Greeks of after-times looked back on the battle of Thermopylæ, and which they have communicated to all subsequent readers, was that of just admiration for the courage and patriotism of Leonidas and his band. But among the contemporary Greeks that sentiment, though doubtless sincerely felt, was by no means predominant: it was overpowered by the more pressing emotions of disappointment and terror. So confident were the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the defensibility of Thermopylæ and Artemisium, that when the news of the disaster reached them, not a single soldier had yet been put in motion: the season of the festival games had passed, but no active step had yet been taken.[202] Meanwhile the invading force, army and fleet, was in its progress towards Attica and Peloponnesus, without the least preparations,—and, what was still worse, without any combined and concerted plan,—for defending the heart of Greece. The loss sustained by Xerxes at Thermopylæ, insignificant in proportion to his vast total, was more than compensated by the fresh Grecian auxiliaries which he now acquired. Not merely the Malians, Lokrians, and Dorians, but also the great mass of the Bœotians, with their chief town Thebes, all except Thespiæ and Platæa, now joined him.[203] Demaratus, his Spartan companion, moved forward to Thebes to renew an ancient tie of hospitality with the Theban oligarchical leader, Attagînus, while small garrisons were sent by Alexander of Macedon to most of the Bœotian towns,[204] as well to protect them from plunder as to insure their fidelity. The Thespians, on the other hand, abandoned their city, and fled into Peloponnesus; while the Platæans, who had been serving aboard the Athenian ships at Artemisium,[205] were disembarked at Chalkis as the fleet retreated, for the purpose of marching by land to their city, and removing their families. Nor was it only the land-force of Xerxes which had been thus strengthened; his fleet also had received some accessions from Karystus in Eubœa, and from several of the Cyclades,—so that the losses sustained by the storm at Sêpias and the fights at Artemisium, if not wholly made up, were at least in part repaired, while the fleet remained still prodigiously superior in number to that of the Greeks.[206]

[202] Herodot. viii, 40, 71, 73.

[203] Herodot. viii, 66. Diodorus calls the battle of Thermopylæ
a _Kadmeian victory_ for Xerxes,—which is true only in the
letter, but not in the spirit: he doubtless lost a greater number
of men in the pass than the Greeks, but the advantage which he
gained was prodigious (Diodor. xi, 12); and Diodorus himself sets
forth the terror of the Greeks after the event (xi, 13-15).

[204] Plutarch, De Herodot. Malignit. p. 864; Herodot. viii, 34.

[205] Herodot. viii, 44, 50.

[206] Herodot. viii, 66.

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, near fifty years after these events, the Corinthian envoys reminded Sparta that she had allowed Xerxes time to arrive from the extremity of the earth at the threshold of Peloponnesus, before she took any adequate precautions against him: a reproach true almost to the letter.[207] It was only when roused and terrified by the news of the death of Leonidas, that the Lacedæmonians and the other Peloponnesians began to put forth their full strength. But it was then too late to perform the promise made to Athens, of taking up a position in Bœotia so as to protect Attica. To defend the isthmus of Corinth was all that they now thought of, and seemingly all that was now open to them: thither they rushed with all their available population under the conduct of Kleombrotus, king of Sparta (brother of Leonidas), and began to draw fortifications across it, as well as to break up the Skironian road from Megara to Corinth, with every mark of anxious energy. The Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, Eleians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Trœzenians, and Hermionians, were all present here in full numbers; many myriads of men (bodies of ten thousand each) working and bringing materials night and day.[208] As a defence to themselves against attack by land, this was an excellent position: they considered it as their last chance,[209] abandoning all hope of successful resistance at sea. But they forgot that a fortified isthmus was no protection even to themselves against the navy of Xerxes,[210] while it professedly threw out not only Attica, but also Megara and Ægina. And thus rose a new peril to Greece from the loss of Thermopylæ: no other position could be found which, like that memorable strait, comprehended and protected at once all the separate cities. The disunion thus produced brought them within a hair’s breadth of ruin.

[207] Thucyd. i, 69. τόν τε γὰρ Μῆδον αὐτοὶ ἴσμεν ἀπὸ περάτων
γῆς πρότερον ἐπὶ Πελοπόννησον ἐλθόντα, πρὶν τὰ παρ’ ὑμῶν ἀξίως
προαπαντῆσαι.

[208] Herodot. viii, 71. συνδραμόντες ἐκ τῶν πολίων.

[209] Herodot. viii, 74.

[210] Herodot. vii, 139.

If the causes of alarm were great for the Peloponnesians, yet more desperate did the position of the Athenians appear. Expecting, according to agreement, to find a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia ready to sustain Leonidas, or at any rate to coöperate in the defence of Attica, they had taken no measures to remove their families or property: but they saw with indignant disappointment as well as dismay, on retreating from Artemisium, that the conqueror was in full march from Thermopylæ, that the road to Attica was open to him, and that the Peloponnesians were absorbed exclusively in the defence of their own isthmus and their own separate existence.[211] The fleet from Artemisium had been directed to muster at the harbor of Trœzen, there to await such reinforcements as could be got together: but the Athenians entreated Eurybiadês to halt at Salamis, so as to allow them a short time for consultation in the critical state of their affairs, and to aid them in the transport of their families. While Eurybiadês was thus staying at Salamis, several new ships which had reached Trœzen came over to join him; and in this way Salamis became for a time the naval station of the Greeks, without any deliberate intention beforehand.[212]

[211] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 9. ἅμα μὲν ὀργὴ τῆς προδοσίας
εἶχε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἅμα δὲ δυσθυμία καὶ κατήφεια μεμονωμένους.

Herodot. viii, 40. δοκέοντες γὰρ εὑρήσειν Πελοποννησίους πανδημεὶ
ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίῃ ὑποκατημένους τὸν βάρβαρον, τῶν μὲν εὗρον οὐδὲν
ἐὸν, οἱ δὲ ἐπυνθάνοντο τὸν Ἰσθμὸν αὐτοὺς τειχέοντας ἐς τὴν
Πελοπόννησον, περὶ πλείστου δὲ ποιουμένους περιεῖναι, καὶ ταύτην
ἔχοντας ἐν φυλακῇ, τὰ τε ἄλλα ἀπιέναι.

Thucyd. i, 74. ὅτε γοῦν ἦμεν (we Athenians) ἔτι σῶοι, οὐ
παρεγένεσθε (Spartans).

Both Lysias (Oratio Funebr. c. 8) and Isokratês take pride in
the fact that the Athenians, in spite of being thus betrayed,
never thought of making separate terms for themselves with
Xerxes (Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 60). But there is no reason to
believe that Xerxes would have granted them separate terms: his
particular vengeance was directed against them. Isokratês has
confounded in his mind the conduct of the Athenians when they
refused the offers of Mardonius in the year following the battle
of Salamis, with their conduct before the battle of Salamis
against Xerxes.

[212] Herodot. viii, 40-42.

Meanwhile Themistoklês and the Athenian seamen landed at Phalêrum, and made their mournful entry into Athens. Gloomy as the prospect appeared, there was little room for difference of opinion,[213] and still less room for delay. The authorities and the public assembly at once issued a proclamation, enjoining every Athenian to remove his family out of the country in the best way he could. We may conceive the state of tumult and terror which followed on this unexpected proclamation, when we reflect that it had to be circulated and acted upon throughout all Attica, from Sunium to Orôpus, within the narrow space of less than six days; for no longer interval elapsed before Xerxes actually arrived at Athens, where indeed he might have arrived even sooner.[214] The whole Grecian fleet was doubtless employed in carrying out the helpless exiles; mostly to Trœzen, where a kind reception and generous support were provided for them (the Trœzenian population being seemingly semi-Ionic, and having ancient relations of religion as well as of traffic with Athens),—but in part also to Ægina: there were, however, many who could not, or would not, go father than Salamis. Themistoklês impressed upon the sufferers that they were only obeying the oracle, which had directed them to abandon the city and to take refuge behind the wooden walls; and either his policy, or the mental depression of the time, gave circulation to other stories, intimating that even the divine inmates of the acropolis were for a while deserting it. In the ancient temple of Athênê Polias on that rock, there dwelt, or was believed to dwell, as guardian to the sanctuary and familiar attendant of the goddess, a sacred serpent, for whose nourishment a honey-cake was placed once in the month. The honey-cake had been hitherto regularly consumed; but at this fatal moment the priestess announced that it remained untouched: the sacred guardian had thus set the example of quitting the acropolis, and it behooved the citizens to follow the example, confiding in the goddess herself for future return and restitution. The migration of so many ancient men, women, and children, was a scene of tears and misery inferior only to that which would have ensued on the actual capture of the city.[215] Some few individuals, too poor to hope for maintenance, or too old to care for life, elsewhere,—confiding, moreover, in their own interpretation[216] of the wooden wall which the Pythian priestess had pronounced to be inexpugnable,—shut themselves up in the acropolis along with the administrators of the temple, obstructing the entrance or western front with wooden doors and palisades.[217] When we read how great were the sufferings of the population of Attica near half a century afterwards, compressed for refuge within the spacious fortifications of Athens at the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war,[218] we may form some faint idea of the incalculably greater misery which overwhelmed an emigrant population, hurrying, they knew not whither, to escape the long arm of Xerxes. Little chance did there seem that they would ever revisit their homes except as his slaves.

[213] Plato, Legg. iii, p. 699.

[214] Herodot. viii, 66, 67. There was, therefore, but little
time for the breaking up and carrying away of furniture, alluded
to by Thucydides, i, 18—διανοηθέντες ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ
~ἀνασκευασάμενοι~, etc.

[215] Herodot. viii, 41; Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. x.

In the years 1821 and 1822, during the struggle which preceded
the liberation of Greece, the Athenians were forced to leave
their country and seek refuge in Salamis three several times.
These incidents are sketched in a manner alike interesting and
instructive by Dr. Waddington, in his Visit to Greece (London,
1825), Letters, vi, vii, x. He states, p. 92, “Three times
have the Athenians emigrated in a body, and sought refuge from
the sabre among the houseless rocks of Salamis. Upon these
occasions, I am assured, that many have dwelt in caverns, and
many in miserable huts, constructed on the mountain-side by their
own feeble hands. Many have perished too, from exposure to an
intemperate climate; many, from diseases contracted through the
loathsomeness of their habitations; many from hunger and misery.
On the retreat of the Turks, the survivors returned to their
country. But to what a country did they return? To a land of
desolation and famine; and in fact, on the first reoccupation of
Athens, after the departure of Omer Brioni, several persons are
known to have subsisted for some time on grass, till a supply of
corn reached the Piræus from Syra and Hydra.”

A century and a half ago, also in the war between the Turks and
Venetians, the population of Attica was forced to emigrate to
Salamis, Ægina, and Corinth. M. Buchon observes, “Les troupes
Albanaises, envoyées en 1688 par les Turcs (in the war against
the Venetians) se jetèrent sur l’Attique, mettant tout à feu
et à sang. En 1688, les chroniques d’Athènes racontent que ses
malheureux habitants furent obligés de se refugier à Salamine, à
Egine, et à Corinthe, et que ce ne fut qu’après trois ans qu’ils
purent rentrer en partie dans leur ville et dans leurs champs.
Beaucoup des villages de l’Attique sont encore habités par les
déscendans de ces derniers envahisseurs, et avant la dernière
révolution, on n’y parloit que la langue albanaise: mais leur
physionomie diffère autant que leur langue de la physionomie de
la race Grecque.” (Buchon, La Grèce Continentale et la Morée.
Paris, 1843, ch. ii, p. 82.)

[216] Pausanias seems to consider these poor men somewhat
presumptuous for pretending to understand the oracle better than
Themistoklês,—Ἀθηναίων τοὺς πλέον τι ἐς τὸν χρησμὸν ἢ Θεμιστοκλῆς
εἰδέναι νομίζοντας (i, 18, 2).

[217] Herodot. viii, 50.

[218] Thucyd. ii, 16, 17.

In the midst of circumstances thus calamitous and threatening, neither the warriors nor the leaders of Athens lost their energy,—arm as well as mind was strung to the loftiest pitch of human resolution. Political dissensions were suspended: Themistoklês proposed to the people a decree, and obtained their sanction, inviting home all who were under sentence of temporary banishment: moreover, he not only included but even specially designated among them his own great opponent Aristeidês, now in the third year of ostracism. Xanthippus the accuser, and Kimon the son, of Miltiadês, were partners in the same emigration: the latter, enrolled by his scale of fortune among the horsemen of the state, was seen with his companions cheerfully marching through the Kerameikus to dedicate their bridles in the acropolis, and to bring away in exchange some of the sacred arms there suspended, thus setting an example of ready service on shipboard, instead of on horseback.[219] It was absolutely essential to obtain supplies of money, partly for the aid of the poorer exiles, but still more for the equipment of the fleet; there were no funds in the public treasury,—but the Senate of Areopagus, then composed in large proportion of men from the wealthier classes, put forth all its public authority as well as its private contributions and example to others,[220] and thus succeeded in raising the sum of eight drachms for every soldier serving.

[219] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 10, 11; and Kimon, c. 5.

[220] Whether this be the incident which Aristotle (Politic. v,
3, 5) had in his mind, we cannot determine.

This timely help was indeed partly obtained by the inexhaustible resource of Themistoklês, who, in the hurry of embarkation, either discovered or pretended that the Gorgon’s head from the statue of Athênê was lost, and directing upon this ground every man’s baggage to be searched, rendered any treasures, which private citizens might be carrying out, available to the public service.[221] By the most strenuous efforts, these few important days were made to suffice for removing the whole population of Attica,—those of military competence to the fleet at Salamis,—the rest to some place of refuge,—together with as much property as the case admitted. So complete was the desertion of the country, that the host of Xerxes, when it became master, could not seize and carry off more than five hundred prisoners.[222] Moreover, the fleet itself, which had been brought home from Artemisium partially disabled, was quickly repaired, so that, by the time the Persian fleet arrived, it was again in something like fighting condition.

[221] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. x.

[222] Herodot. ix, 99.

The combined fleet which had now got together at Salamis consisted of three hundred and sixty-six ships,—a force far greater than at Artemisium. Of these, no less than two hundred were Athenian; twenty among which, however, were lent to the Chalkidians, and manned by them. Forty Corinthian ships, thirty Æginetan, twenty Megarian, sixteen Lacedæmonian, fifteen Sikyonian, ten Epidaurian, seven from Ambrakia, and as many from Eretria, five from Trœzen, three from Hermionê, and the same number from Leukas; two from Keos, two from Styra, and one from Kythnos; four from Naxos, despatched as a contingent to the Persian fleet, but brought by the choice of their captains and seamen to Salamis;—all these triremes, together with a small squadron of the inferior vessels called pentekonters, made up the total. From the great Grecian cities in Italy there appeared only one trireme, a volunteer, equipped and commanded by an eminent citizen named Phayllus, thrice victor at the Pythian games.[223] The entire fleet was thus a trifle larger than the combined force, three hundred and fifty-eight ships, collected by the Asiatic Greeks at Ladê, fifteen years earlier, during the Ionic revolt. We may doubt, however, whether this total, borrowed from Herodotus, be not larger than that which actually fought a little afterwards at the battle of Salamis, and which Æschylus gives decidedly as consisting of three hundred sail, in addition to ten prime and chosen ships. That great poet, himself one of the combatants, and speaking in a drama represented only seven years after the battle, is better authority on the point even than Herodotus.[224]

[223] Herodot. viii, 43-48.

[224] Æschylus, Persæ, 347; Herodot. viii, 48; vi, 9; Pausanias,
i, 14, 4. The total which Herodotus announces is three hundred
and seventy-eight; but the items which he gives amount, when
summed up, only to three hundred and sixty-six. There seems
no way of reconciling this discrepancy except by some violent
change, which we are not warranted in making.

Ktesias represents that the numbers of the Persian war-ships
at Salamis were above one thousand, those of the Greeks seven
hundred (Persica, c. 26).

The Athenian orator in Thucydides (i, 74) calls the total of the
Grecian fleet at Salamis “nearly four hundred ships, and the
Athenian contingent somewhat less than _two parts_ of this total
(ναῦς μέν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν).”

The Scholiast, with Poppo and most of the commentators on
this passage, treat τῶν δύο μοιρῶν as meaning unquestionably
_two parts out of three_: and if this be the sense, I should
agree with Dr. Arnold in considering the assertion as a mere
exaggeration of the orator, not at all carrying the authority of
Thucydides himself. But I cannot think that we are here driven
to such a necessity; for the construction of Didot and Göller,
though Dr. Arnold pronounces it “a most undoubted error,” appears
to me perfectly admissible. They maintain that αἱ δύο μοιραὶ does
not of necessity mean two parts _out of three_: in Thucydid.
i, 10, we find καίτοι Πελοποννήσου τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοιρὰς
νέμονται, where the words mean _two parts out of five_. Now in
the passage before us, we have ναῦς μέν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας
ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν: and Didot and Göller contend, that
in the word τετρακοσίας is implied a quaternary division of the
whole number,—_four hundreds_ or _hundredth parts_: so that the
whole meaning would be—“To the aggregate _four hundreds_ of ships
we contributed something less than _two_.” The word τετρακοσίας,
equivalent to τέσσαρας ἑκατοντάδας, naturally includes the
general idea of τέσσαρας μοιράς: and this would bring the passage
into exact analogy with the one cited above,—τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο
μοιράς. With every respect to the judgment of Dr. Arnold on an
author whom he had so long studied, I cannot enter into the
grounds on which he has pronounced this interpretation of Didot
and Göller to be “an undoubted error.” It has the advantage of
bringing the assertion of the orator in Thucydides into harmony
with Herodotus, who states the Athenians to have furnished one
hundred and eighty ships at Salamis.

Wherever such harmony can be secured by an admissible
construction of existing words, it is an unquestionable
advantage, and ought to count as a reason in the case, if there
be a doubt between two admissible constructions. But on the
other hand, I protest against altering numerical statements in
one author, simply in order to bring him into accordance with
another, and without some substantive ground in the text itself.
Thus, for example, in this very passage of Thucydides, Bloomfield
and Poppo propose to alter τετρακοσίας into τριακοσίας, in
order that Thucydides may be in harmony with Æschylus and other
authors, though not with Herodotus; while Didot and Göller would
alter τριακοσίων into τετρακοσίων in Demosthenes de Coronâ (c.
70), in order that Demosthenes may be in harmony with Thucydides.
Such emendations appear to me inadmissible in principle: we are
not to force different witnesses into harmony by retouching their
statements.

Hardly was the fleet mustered at Salamis, and the Athenian population removed, when Xerxes and his host overran the deserted country, his fleet occupying the roadstead of Phalêrum with the coast adjoining. His land-force had been put in motion under the guidance of the Thessalians, two or three days after the battle of Thermopylæ, and he was assured by some Arcadians who came to seek service, that the Peloponnesians were, even at that moment, occupied with the celebration of the Olympic games. “What prize does the victor receive?” he asked. Upon the reply made, that the prize was a wreath of the wild olive, Tritantæchmês, son of the monarch’s uncle Artabanus, is said to have burst forth, notwithstanding the displeasure both of the monarch himself and of the bystanders: “Heavens, Mardonius, what manner of men are these against whom thou hast brought us to fight! men who contend not for money, but for honor!”[225] Whether this be a remark really delivered, or a dramatic illustration imagined by some contemporary of Herodotus, it is not the less interesting as bringing to view a characteristic of Hellenic life, which contrasts not merely with the manners of contemporary Orientals, but even with those of the earlier Greeks themselves during the Homeric times.

[225] Herodot. viii, 26. Παπαὶ, Μαρδόνιε, κοίους ἐπ’ ἄνδρας
ἤγαγες μαχησομένους ἡμέας, οἳ οὐ περὶ χρημάτων τὸν ἀγῶνα
ποιεῦνται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἀρετῆς.

Among all the various Greeks between Thermopylæ and the borders of Attica, there were none except the Phocians disposed to refuse submission: and they refused only because the paramount influence of their bitter enemies the Thessalians made them despair of obtaining favorable terms.[226] Nor would they even listen to a proposition of the Thessalians, who, boasting that it was in their power to guide as they pleased the terrors of the Persian host, offered to insure lenient treatment to the territory of Phocis, provided a sum of fifty talents were paid to them.[227] The proposition being indignantly refused, they conducted Xerxes through the little territory of Doris, which _medized_ and escaped plunder, into the upper valley of the Kephisus, among the towns of the inflexible Phocians. All of them were found deserted; the inhabitants having previously escaped either to the wide-spreading summit of Parnassus, called Tithorea, or even still farther, across that mountain into the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians. Ten or a dozen small Phocian towns, the most considerable of which were Elateia and Hyampolis, were sacked and destroyed by the invaders, nor was the holy temple and oracle of Apollo at Abæ better treated than the rest: all its treasures were pillaged, and it was then burnt. From Panopeus Xerxes detached a body of men to plunder Delphi, marching with his main army through Bœotia, in which country he found all the towns submissive and willing, except Thespiæ and Platæa: both were deserted by their citizens, and both were now burnt. From hence he conducted his army into the abandoned territory of Attica, reaching without resistance the foot of the acropolis at Athens.[228]

[226] Herodot. viii, 30.

[227] Herodot. viii, 28, 29.

[228] Herodot. viii, 32-34.

Very different was the fate of that division which he had detached from Panopeus against Delphi: Apollo defended his temple here more vigorously than at Abæ. The cupidity of the Persian king was stimulated by accounts of the boundless wealth accumulated at Delphi, especially the profuse donations of Crœsus. The Delphians, in the extreme of alarm, while they sought safety for themselves on the heights of Parnassus, and for their families by transport across the gulf into Achaia, consulted the oracle whether they should carry away or bury the sacred treasures. Apollo directed them to leave the treasures untouched, saying that he was competent himself to take care of his own property. Sixty Delphians alone ventured to remain, together with Akêratus, the religious superior: but evidences of superhuman aid soon appeared to encourage them. The sacred arms suspended in the interior cell, which no mortal hand was ever permitted to touch, were seen lying before the door of the temple; and when the Persians, marching along the road called Schistê, up that rugged path under the steep cliffs of Parnassus which conducts to Delphi, had reached the temple of Athênê Pronœa,—on a sudden, dreadful thunder was heard,—two vast mountain crags detached themselves and rushed down with deafening noise among them, crushing many to death,—the war-shout was also heard from the interior of the temple of Athênê. Seized with a panic terror, the invaders turned round and fled; pursued not only by the Delphians, but also, as they themselves affirmed, by two armed warriors of superhuman stature and destructive arm. The triumphant Delphians confirmed this report, adding that the two auxiliaries were the heroes Phylakus and Autonoüs, whose sacred precincts were close adjoining: and Herodotus himself when he visited Delphi, saw in the sacred ground of Athênê the identical masses of rock which had overwhelmed the Persians.[229] Thus did the god repel these invaders from his Delphian sanctuary and treasures, which remained inviolate until one hundred and thirty years afterwards, when they were rifled by the sacrilegious hands of the Phocian Philomêlus. On this occasion, as will be seen presently, the real protectors of the treasures were the conquerors at Salamis and Platæa.

[229] Herodot. viii, 38, 39; Diodor. xi, 14; Pausan. x, 8, 4.

Compare the account given in Pausanias (x, 23) of the subsequent
repulse of Brennus and the Gauls from Delphi: in his account, the
repulse is not so exclusively the work of the gods as in that of
Herodotus: there is a larger force of human combatants in defence
of the temple, though greatly assisted by divine intervention:
there is also loss on both sides. A similar descent of crags from
the summit is mentioned.

See for the description of the road by which the Persians
marched, and the extreme term of their progress, Ulrichs, Reisen
und Forschungen in Griechenland, ch. iv, p. 46; ch. x, p. 146.

Many great blocks of stone and cliff are still to be seen near
the spot, which have rolled down from the top, and which remind
the traveller of these passages.

The attack here described to have been made by order of Xerxes
upon the Delphian temple, seems not easy to reconcile with
the words of Mardonius, Herodot. ix, 42: still less can it be
reconciled with the statement of Plutarch (Numa, c. 9), who says
that the Delphian temple was burnt by the Medes.

Four months had elapsed since the departure from Asia when Xerxes reached Athens, the last term of his advance. He brought with him the members of the Peisistratid family, who doubtless thought their restoration already certain,—and a few Athenian exiles attached to their interest. Though the country was altogether deserted, the handful of men collected in the acropolis ventured to defy him: nor could all the persuasions of the Peisistratids, eager to preserve the holy place from pillage, induce them to surrender.[230] The Athenian acropolis,—a craggy rock rising abruptly about one hundred and fifty feet, with a flat summit of about one thousand feet long from east to west, by five hundred feet broad from north to south,—had no practicable access except on the western side:[231] moreover, in all parts where there seemed any possibility of climbing up, it was defended by the ancient fortification called the Pelasgic wall. Obliged to take the place by force, the Persian army was posted around the northern and western sides, and commenced their operations from the eminence immediately adjoining on the northwest, called Areopagus:[232] from whence they bombarded, if we may venture upon the expression, with hot missiles, the woodwork before the gates; that is, they poured upon it multitudes of arrows with burning tow attached to them. The wooden palisades and boarding presently took fire and were consumed: but when the Persians tried to mount to the assault by the western road leading up to the gate, the undaunted little garrison still kept them at bay, having provided vast stones, which they rolled down upon them in the ascent. For a time the Great King seemed likely to be driven to the slow process of blockade; but at length some adventurous men among the besiegers tried to scale the precipitous rock before them on its northern side, hard by the temple or chapel of Aglaurus, which lay nearly in front of the Persian position, but behind the gates and the western ascent. Here the rock was naturally so inaccessible, that it was altogether unguarded, and seemingly even unfortified:[233] moreover, the attention of the little garrison was all concentrated on the host which fronted the gates. Hence the separate escalading party was enabled to accomplish their object unobserved, and to reach the summit in the rear of the garrison; who, deprived of their last hope, either cast themselves headlong from the walls, or fled for safety to the inner temple. The successful escaladers opened the gates to the entire Persian host, and the whole acropolis was presently in their hands. Its defenders were slain, its temples pillaged, and all its dwellings and buildings, sacred as well as profane, consigned to the flames.[234] The citadel of Athens fell into the hands of Xerxes by a surprise, very much the same as that which had placed Sardis in those of Cyrus.[235]

[230] Herodot. viii, 52.

[231] Pausanias, i, 22, 4; Kruse, Hellas, vol. ii, ch. vi, p.
76. Ernst Curtius (Die Akropolis von Athens, p. 5, Berlin,
1844) says that the plateau of the acropolis is rather less
than four hundred feet higher than the town: Fiedler states it
to be one hundred and seventy-eight fathoms, or one thousand
and sixty-eight feet above the level of the sea. (Reise durch
das Königreich Griechenland, i, p. 2); he gives the length and
breadth of the plateau in the same figures as Kruse, whose
statement I have copied in the text. In Colonel Leake’s valuable
Topography of Athens, I do not find any distinct statement
about the height of the acropolis. We must understand Kruse’s
statement, if he and Curtius are both correct, to refer only to
the precipitous impracticable portion of the whole rock.

[232] Athenian legend represented the Amazons as having taken
post on the Areopagus, and fortified it as a means of attacking
the acropolis,—ἀντεπύργωσαν (Æschyl. Eumenid. 638).

[233] Herodot. viii, 52, 53. ... ἔμπροσθε ὦν πρὸ τῆς ἀκροπόλιος,
ὄπισθε δὲ τῶν πύλεων καὶ τῆς ἀνόδου, τῇ δὴ οὔτε τις ἐφύλασσε,
οὔτ’ ἂν ἤλπισε μή κοτέ τις κατὰ ταῦτα ἀναβαίη ἀνθρώπων, ταύτῃ
ἀνέβησάν τινες κατὰ τὸ ἱρὸν τῆς Κέκροπος θυγατρὸς Ἀγλαύρου,
καίτοιπερ ἀποκρήμνου ἐόντος τοῦ χώρου.

That the Aglaurion was on the north side of the acropolis,
appears clearly made out; see Leake, Topography of Athens, ch.
v, p. 261; Kruse, Hellas, vol. ii, ch. vi, p. 119; Forchhammer,
Topographie Athens, pp. 365, 366; in Kieler Philologischen
Studien, 1841. Siebelis (in the Plan of Athens prefixed to his
edition of Pausanias, and in his note on Pausanias, i, 18, 2)
places the Aglaurion erroneously on the eastern side of the
acropolis.

The expressions ἔμπροσθε πρὸ τῆς ἀκροπόλιος appear to refer to
the position of the Persian army, who would naturally occupy the
northern and western fronts of the acropolis: since they reached
Athens from the north,—and the western side furnished the only
regular access. The hill called Areopagus would thus be nearly
in the centre of their position. Forchhammer explains these
expressions unsatisfactorily.

[234] Herodot. viii, 52, 53.

[235] Herodot. i, 84.

Thus was divine prophecy fulfilled: Attica passed entirely into the hands of the Persians, and the conflagration of Sardis was retaliated upon the home and citadel of its captors, as it also was upon their sacred temple of Eleusis. Xerxes immediately despatched to Susa intelligence of the fact, which is said to have excited unmeasured demonstrations of joy, confuting, seemingly, the gloomy predictions of his uncle Artabanus.[236] On the next day but one, the Athenian exiles in his suite received his orders, or perhaps obtained his permission, to go and offer sacrifice amidst the ruins of the acropolis, and atone, if possible, for the desecration of the ground: they discovered that the sacred olive-tree near the chapel of Erechtheus, the special gift of the goddess Athênê, though burnt to the ground by the recent flames, had already thrown out a fresh shoot of one cubit long,—at least the piety of restored Athens afterwards believed this encouraging portent,[237] as well as that which was said to have been seen by Dikæus, an Athenian companion of the Peisistratids, in the Thriasian plain. It was now the day set apart for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries; and though in this sorrowful year there was no celebration, nor any Athenians in the territory, Dikæus still fancied that he beheld the dust and heard the loud multitudinous chant, which was wont to accompany in ordinary times the processional march from Athens to Eleusis. He would even have revealed the fact to Xerxes himself, had not Demaratus deterred him from doing so: but he as well as Herodotus construed it as an evidence that the goddesses themselves were passing over from Eleusis to help the Athenians at Salamis. But whatever may have been received in after times, on that day certainly no man could believe in the speedy resurrection of conquered Athens as a free city: not even if he had witnessed the portent of the burnt olive-tree suddenly sprouting afresh with preternatural vigor. So hopeless did the circumstances of the Athenians then appear, not less to their confederates assembled at Salamis than to the victorious Persians.

[236] Herodot. v, 102; viii, 53-99; ix, 65. ἔδεε γὰρ κατὰ τὸ
θεοπρόπιον πᾶσαν τὴν Ἀττικὴν τὴν ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ γενέσθαι ὑπὸ
Πέρσῃσι.

[237] Herodot. viii, 55-65.

About the time of the capture of the acropolis, the Persian fleet also arrived safely in the bay of Phalêrum, reinforced by ships from Karystus as well as from various islands of the Cyclades, so that Herodotus reckons it to have been as strong as before the terrible storm at Sêpias Aktê,—an estimate certainly not admissible.[238]

[238] Herodot. viii, 66. Colonel Leake observes upon this
statement (Athens and the Demi of Attica, App. vol. ii, p.
250), “_About one thousand ships_ is the greatest accuracy we
can pretend to, in stating the strength of the Persian fleet at
Salamis: and from these are to be deducted, in estimating the
number of ships engaged in the battle, those which were sent to
occupy the Megaric strait of Salamis, two hundred in number.”

The estimate of Colonel Leake appears somewhat lower than the
probable reality. Nor do I believe the statement of Diodorus,
that ships were detached to occupy the Megaric strait: see a note
shortly following.

Soon after their arrival, Xerxes himself descended to the shore to inspect the fleet, as well as to take counsel with the various naval leaders about the expediency of attacking the hostile fleet, now so near him in the narrow strait between Salamis and the coasts of Attica. He invited them all to take their seats in an assembly, wherein the king of Sidon occupied the first place and the king of Tyre the second. The question was put to each of them separately by Mardonius, and when we learn that all pronounced in favor of immediate fighting, we may be satisfied that the decided opinion of Xerxes himself must have been well known to them beforehand. One exception alone was found to this unanimity,—Artemisia, queen of Halikarnassus in Karia; into whose mouth Herodotus puts a speech of some length, deprecating all idea of fighting in the narrow strait of Salamis,—predicting that if the land-force were moved forward to attack Peloponnesus, the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Salamis would return for the protection of their own homes, and thus the fleet would disperse, the rather as there was little or no food in the island,—and intimating, besides, unmeasured contempt for the efficacy of the Persian fleet and seamen as compared with the Greek, as well as for the subject contingents of Xerxes generally. That queen Artemisia gave this prudent counsel, there is no reason to question; and the historian of Halikarnassus may have had means of hearing the grounds on which her opinion rested: but I find a difficulty in believing that she can have publicly delivered any such estimate of the maritime subjects of Persia,—an estimate not merely insulting to all who heard it, but at the time not just, though it had come to be nearer the truth at the time when Herodotus wrote,[239] and though Artemisia herself may have lived to entertain the conviction afterwards. Whatever may have been her reasons, the historian tells us that friends as well as rivals were astonished at her rashness in dissuading the monarch from a naval battle, and expected that she would be put to death. But Xerxes heard the advice with perfect good temper, and even esteemed the Karian queen the more highly: though he resolved that the opinion of the majority, or his own opinion, should be acted upon: and orders were accordingly issued for attacking the next day,[240] while the land-force should move forward towards Peloponnesus.

[239] The picture drawn in the Cyropædia of Xenophon represents
the subjects of Persia as spiritless and untrained to war
(ἀνάλκιδες καὶ ἀσύντακτοι) and even designedly kept so, forming a
contrast to the native Persians (Xenophon, Cyropæd. viii, 1, 45).

[240] Herodot. viii, 68, 69, 70.

Whilst on the shore of Phalêrum, an omnipotent will compelled seeming unanimity and precluded all real deliberation,—great, indeed, was the contrast presented by the neighboring Greek armament at Salamis, among the members of which unmeasured dissension had been reigning. It has already been stated that the Greek fleet had originally got together at that island, not with any view of making it a naval station, but simply in order to cover and assist the emigration of the Athenians. This object being accomplished, and Xerxes being already in Attica, Eurybiadês convoked the chiefs to consider what position was the fittest for a naval engagement. Most of them, especially those from Peloponnesus, were averse to remaining at Salamis, and proposed that the fleet should be transferred to the isthmus of Corinth, where it would be in immediate communication with the Peloponnesian land-force, so that in case of defeat at sea, the ships would find protection on shore, and the men would join in the land service,—while if worsted in a naval action near Salamis, they would be inclosed in an island from whence there were no hopes of escape.[241] In the midst of the debate, a messenger arrived with news of the capture and conflagration of Athens and her acropolis by the Persians: and such was the terror produced by this intelligence, that some of the chiefs, without even awaiting the conclusion of the debate and the final vote, quitted the council forthwith, and began to hoist sail, or prepare their rowers, for departure. The majority came to a vote for removing to the Isthmus, but as night was approaching, actual removal was deferred until the next morning.[242]

[241] Herodot. viii, 70.

[242] Herodot. viii. 49, 50, 56.

Now was felt the want of a position like that of Thermopylæ, which had served as a protection to all the Greeks at once, so as to check the growth of separate fears and interests. We can hardly wonder that the Peloponnesian chiefs,—the Corinthian in particular, who furnished so large a naval contingent, and within whose territory the land-battle at the Isthmus seemed about to take place,—should manifest such an obstinate reluctance to fight at Salamis, and should insist on removing to a position where, in case of naval defeat, they could assist, and be assisted by, their own soldiers on land. On the other hand, Salamis was not only the most favorable position, in consequence of its narrow strait, for the inferior numbers of the Greeks, but could not be abandoned without breaking up the unity of the allied fleet; since Megara and Ægina would thus be left uncovered, and the contingents of each would immediately retire for the defence of their own homes,—while the Athenians also, a large portion of whose expatriated families were in Salamis and Ægina, would be in like manner distracted from combined maritime efforts at the Isthmus. If transferred to the latter place, probably not even the Peloponnesians themselves would have remained in one body; for the squadrons of Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, etc., each fearing that the Persian fleet might make a descent on one or other of these separate ports, would go home to repel such a contingency, in spite of the efforts of Eurybiadês to keep them together. Hence the order for quitting Salamis and repairing to the Isthmus was nothing less than a sentence of extinction for all combined maritime defence; and it thus became doubly abhorrent to all those who, like the Athenians, Æginetans, and Megarians, were also led by their own separate safety to cling to the defence of Salamis. In spite of all such opposition, however, and in spite of the protest of Themistoklês, the obstinate determination of the Peloponnesian leaders carried the vote for retreat, and each of them went to his ship to prepare for it on the following morning.

When Themistoklês returned to his ship, with the gloom of this melancholy resolution full upon his mind, and with the necessity of providing for removal of the expatriated Athenian families in the island as well as for that of the squadron,—he found an Athenian friend named Mnêsiphilus, who asked him what the synod of chiefs had determined. Concerning this Mnêsiphilus, who is mentioned generally as a sagacious practical politician, we unfortunately have no particulars: but it must have been no common man whom fame selected, truly or falsely, as the inspiring genius of Themistoklês. On learning what had been resolved, Mnêsiphilus burst out into remonstrance on the utter ruin which its execution would entail: there would presently be neither any united fleet to fight, nor any aggregate cause and country to fight for.[243] He vehemently urged Themistoklês again to open the question, and to press by every means in his power for a recall of the vote for retreat, as well as for a resolution to stay and fight at Salamis. Themistoklês had already in vain tried to enforce the same view: but disheartened as he was by ill-success, the remonstrances of a respected friend struck him so forcibly as to induce him to renew his efforts. He went instantly to the ship of Eurybiadês, asked permission to speak with him, and being invited aboard, reopened with him alone the whole subject of the past discussion, enforcing his own views as emphatically as he could. In this private communication, all the arguments bearing upon the case were more unsparingly laid open than it had been possible to do in an assembly of the chiefs, who would have been insulted if openly told that they were likely to desert the fleet when once removed from Salamis. Speaking thus freely and confidentially, and speaking to Eurybiadês alone, Themistoklês was enabled to bring him partially round, and even prevailed upon him to convene a fresh synod. So soon as this synod had assembled, even before Eurybiadês had explained the object and formally opened the discussion, Themistoklês addressed himself to each of the chief’s separately, pouring forth at large his fears and anxiety as to the abandonment of Salamis: insomuch that the Corinthian Adeimantus rebuked him by saying: “Themistoklês, those who in the public festival-matches rise up before the proper signal, are scourged.” “True, (rejoined the Athenian), but those who lag behind the signal win no crowns.”[244]

[243] Herodot. viii, 57. Οὖτοι ἄρα ἤν ἀπαίρωσι τὰς νῆας ἀπὸ
Σαλαμῖνος, περὶ οὐδεμίης ἔτι πατρίδος ναυμαχήσεις· κατὰ γὰρ πόλις
ἕκαστοι τρέψονται, etc. Compare vii, 139, and Thucyd. i, 73.

[244] Herodot. viii, 58, 59. The account given by Herodotus, of
these memorable debates which preceded the battle of Salamis, is
in the main distinct, instructive, and consistent. It is more
probable than the narrative of Diodorus (xi, 15, 16), who states
that Themistoklês succeeded in fully convincing both Eurybiadês
and the Peloponnesian chiefs of the propriety of fighting at
Salamis, but that, in spite of all their efforts, the armament
would not obey them, and insisted on going to the Isthmus. And
it deserves our esteem still more, if we contrast it with the
loose and careless accounts of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos.
Plutarch (Themist. c. 11) describes the scene as if Eurybiadês
was the person who desired to restrain the forwardness and
oratory of Themistoklês, and with that view, first made to
him the observation given in my text out of Herodotus, which
Themistoklês followed up by the same answer,—next, lifted up his
stick to strike Themistoklês, upon which the latter addressed to
him the well-known observation,—“Strike, but hear me,” (Πάταξον
μὲν, ἄκουσον δέ.) Larcher expresses his surprise that Herodotus
_should have suppressed_ so impressive an anecdote as this
latter: but we may see plainly from the tenor of his narrative
that he cannot have heard it. In the narrative of Herodotus,
Themistoklês gives no offence to _Eurybiadês_, nor is the latter
at all displeased with him: nay, Eurybiadês is even brought
over by the persuasion of Themistoklês, and disposed to fall in
with his views. The persons whom Herodotus represents as angry
with Themistoklês, are the Peloponnesian chiefs, especially
Adeimantus the Corinthian. They are angry too, let it be added,
not without plausible reason: a formal vote has just been taken
by the majority, after full discussion; and here is the chief
of the minority, who persuades Eurybiadês to reopen the whole
debate: not an unreasonable cause for displeasure. Moreover, it
is _Adeimantus_, not _Eurybiadês_, who addresses to Themistoklês
the remark, that “persons who rise before the proper signal are
scourged:” and he makes the remark because Themistoklês goes
on speaking to, and trying to persuade, the various chiefs,
_before_ the business of the assembly has been formally opened.
Themistoklês draws upon himself the censure by sinning against
the forms of business, and talking before the proper time. But
Plutarch puts the remark into the mouth of Eurybiadês, without
any previous circumstance to justify it, and without any fitness.
His narrative represents Eurybiadês as the person who was anxious
both to transfer the ships to the Isthmus, and to prevent
Themistoklês from offering any opposition to it: though such an
attempt to check argumentative opposition from the commander of
the Athenian squadron is noway credible.

Dr. Blomfield (ad Æschyl. Pers. 728) imagines that the story
about Eurybiadês threatening Themistoklês with his stick, grew
out of the story as related in Herodotus, though to Herodotus
himself it was unknown. I cannot think that this is correct,
since the story will not fit on to the narrative of that
historian: it does not consist with his conception of the
relations between Eurybiadês and Themistoklês.

Eurybiadês then explained to the synod that doubts had arisen in his mind, and that he called them together to reconsider the previous resolve: upon which Themistoklês began the debate, and vehemently enforced the necessity of fighting in the narrow sea of Salamis and not in the open waters at the Isthmus,—as well as of preserving Megara and Ægina: contending that a naval victory at Salamis would be not less effective for the defence of Peloponnesus than if it took place at the Isthmus, whereas, if the fleet were withdrawn to the latter point, they would only draw the Persians after them. Nor did he omit to add, that the Athenians had a prophecy assuring to them victory in this, their own island. But his speech made little impression on the Peloponnesian chiefs, who were even exasperated at being again summoned to reopen a debate already concluded,—and concluded in a way which they deemed essential to their safety. In the bosom of the Corinthian Adeimantus, especially, this feeling of anger burst all bounds. He sharply denounced the presumption of Themistoklês, and bade him be silent as a man who had now no free Grecian city to represent,—Athens being in the power of the enemy: nay, he went so far as to contend that Eurybiadês had no right to count the vote of Themistoklês, until the latter could produce some free city as accrediting him to the synod. Such an attack, alike ungenerous and insane, upon the leader of more than half of the whole fleet, demonstrates the ungovernable impatience of the Corinthians to carry away the fleet to their Isthmus: it provoked a bitter retort against them from Themistoklês, who reminded them that while he had around him two hundred well-manned ships, he could procure for himself anywhere both city and territory as good or better than Corinth. But he now saw clearly that it was hopeless to think of enforcing his policy by argument, and that nothing would succeed except the direct language of intimidation. Turning to Eurybiadês, and addressing him personally, he said: “If thou wilt stay here, and fight bravely here, all will turn out well: but if thou wilt not stay, thou wilt bring Hellas to ruin.[245] For with us, all our means of war are contained in our ships. Be thou yet persuaded by me. If not, we Athenians shall migrate with our families on board, just as we are, to Siris in Italy, which is ours from of old, and which the prophecies announce that we are one day to colonize. You chiefs then, when bereft of allies like us, will hereafter recollect what I am now saying.”

[245] Herodot. viii, 61, 62. Σὺ εἰ μενέεις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μένων ἔσεαι
ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνατρέψεις τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

All the best commentators treat this as an elliptical
phrase,—some such words as σώσεις τὴν Ἑλλάδα or καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι,
being understood after ἀγαθός. I adopt their construction, not
without doubts whether it be the true one.

Eurybiadês had before been nearly convinced by the impressive pleading of Themistoklês. But this last downright menace clenched his determination, and probably struck dumb even the Corinthian and Peloponnesian opponents: for it was but too plain, that without the Athenians the fleet was powerless. He did not however put the question again to vote, but took upon himself to rescind the previous resolution and to issue orders for staying at Salamis to fight. In this order all acquiesced, willing or unwilling;[246] the succeeding dawn saw them preparing for fight instead of for retreat, and invoking the protection and companionship of the Æakid heroes of Salamis,—Telamon and Ajax: they even sent a trireme to Ægina to implore Æakus himself and the remaining Æakids. It seems to have been on this same day, also, that the resolution of fighting at Salamis was taken by Xerxes, whose fleet was seen in motion, towards the close of the day, preparing for attack the next morning.

[246] Herodot. viii, 64. Οὕτω μὲν οἱ περὶ Σαλαμῖνα, ἔπεσι
ἀκροβολισάμενοι, ἐπεί τε Εὐρυβιάδῃ ἔδοξε, αὐτοῦ παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς
ναυμαχήσοντες.