Chapter XLI: Battle of Salamis. — Retreat of Xerxes (2)

But the Peloponnesians, though not venturing to disobey the orders of the Spartan admiral, still retained unabated their former fears and reluctance, which began again after a short interval to prevail over the formidable menace of Themistoklês, and were further strengthened by the advices from the Isthmus. The messengers from that quarter depicted the trepidation and affright of their absent brethren while constructing their cross wall at that point, to resist the impending land invasion. Why were _they_ not there also, to join hands and to help in the defence,—even if worsted at sea,—at least on land, instead of wasting their efforts in defence of Attica, already in the hands of the enemy? Such were the complaints which passed from man to man, with many a bitter exclamation against the insanity of Eurybiadês: at length the common feeling broke out in public and mutinous manifestation, and a fresh synod of the chiefs was demanded and convoked.[247] Here the same angry debate, and the same irreconcilable difference, was again renewed; the Peloponnesian chiefs clamoring for immediate departure, while the Athenians, Æginetans,[248] and Megarians, were equally urgent in favor of staying to fight. It was evident to Themistoklês that the majority of votes among the chiefs would be against him, in spite of the orders of Eurybiadês; and the disastrous crisis, destined to deprive Greece of all united maritime defence, appeared imminent,—when he resorted to one last stratagem to meet the desperate emergency, by rendering flight impossible. Contriving a pretext for stealing away from the synod, he despatched a trusty messenger across the strait with a secret communication to the Persian generals. Sikinnus his slave,—seemingly an Asiatic Greek,[249] who understood Persian, and had perhaps been sold during the late Ionic revolt, but whose superior qualities are marked by the fact that he had the care and teaching of the children of his master,—was instructed to acquaint them privately, in the name of Themistoklês, who was represented as wishing success at heart to the Persians, that the Greek fleet was not only in the utmost alarm, meditating immediate flight, but that the various portions of it were in such violent dissension, that they were more likely to fight against each other than against any common enemy. A splendid opportunity, it was added, was thus opened to the Persians, if they chose to avail themselves of it without delay, first, to inclose and prevent their flight, and then to attack a disunited body, many of whom would, when the combat began, openly espouse the Persian cause.[250]

[247] Herodot. viii, 74. ἕως μὲν δὴ αὐτῶν ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὶ παρίστατο,
θώυμα ποιεύμενοι τὴν Εὐρυβιάδεω ἀβουλίην· τέλος δὲ, ἐξεῤῥάγη ἐς
τὸ μέσον, σύλλογός τε δὴ ἐγίνετο, καὶ πολλὰ ἐλέγετο περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν, etc. Compare Plutarch, Themist. c. 12.

[248] Lykurgus (cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 185) numbers the
Æginetans among those who were anxious to escape from Salamis
during the night, and were only prevented from doing so by the
stratagem of Themistoklês. This is a great mistake, as indeed
these orators are perpetually misconceiving the facts of their
past history. The Æginetans had an interest not less strong than
the Athenians in keeping the fleet together and fighting at
Salamis.

[249] Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 12) calls Sikinnus a _Persian by
birth_, which cannot be true.

[250] Herodot. viii, 75.

Such was the important communication despatched by Themistoklês across the narrow strait, only a quarter of a mile in breadth at the narrowest part, which divides Salamis from the neighboring continent on which the enemy were posted. It was delivered with so much address as to produce the exact impression which he intended, and the glorious success which followed caused it to pass for a splendid stratagem: had defeat ensued, his name would have been covered with infamy. What surprises us the most is, that after having reaped signal honor from it in the eyes of the Greeks, as a stratagem, he lived to take credit for it, during the exile of his latter days,[251] as a capital service rendered to the Persian monarch: nor is it improbable, when we reflect upon the desperate condition of Grecian affairs at the moment, that such facility of double interpretation was in part his inducement for sending the message.

[251] Thucydid. i, 137. It is curious to contrast this with
Æschylus, Persæ, 351, _seq._ See also Herodot. viii, 109, 110.

Isokratês might well remark about the ultimate rewards given by
the Persians to Themistoklês,—Θεμιστοκλέα δ’, ὃς ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος
αὐτοὺς κατεναυμάχησε, τῶν μεγίστων δωρέων ἠξίωσαν (Panegyric, Or.
iv, p. 74),—though that orator speaks as if he knew nothing about
the stratagem by which Themistoklês compelled the Greeks to fight
at Salamis against their will. See the same Oration, c. 27, p. 61.

It appears to have been delivered to Xerxes shortly after he had issued his orders for fighting on the next morning: and he entered so greedily into the scheme, as to direct his generals to close up the strait of Salamis on both sides during the night,[252] to the north as well as to the south of the town of Salamis, at the risk of their heads if any opening were left for the Greeks to escape. The station of the numerous Persian fleet was along the coast of Attica,—its head-quarters were in the bay of Phalêrum, but doubtless parts of it would occupy those three natural harbors, as yet unimproved by art, which belonged to the deme of Peiræus,—and would perhaps extend besides to other portions of the western coast southward of Phalêrum: while the Greek fleet was in the harbor of the town called Salamis, in the portion of the island facing mount Ægaleos, in Attica. During the night,[253] a portion of the Persian fleet, sailing from Peiræus northward along the western coast of Attica, closed round to the north of the town and harbor of Salamis, so as to shut up the northern issue from the strait on the side of Eleusis: while another portion blocked up the other issue between Peiræus and the southeastern corner of the island, landing a detachment of troops on the desert island of Psyttaleia, near to that corner.[254] These measures were all taken during the night, to prevent the anticipated flight of the Greeks, and then to attack them in the narrow strait close on their own harbor the next morning.

[252] Æschylus, Persæ, 370.

Herodotus does not mention this threat to the generals, nor does
he even notice the personal interference of Xerxes in any way,
so far as regards the night-movement of the Persian fleet. He
treats the communication of Sikinnus as having been made to the
Persian generals, and the night-movement as undertaken by them.
The statement of the contemporary poet seems the more probable of
the two: but he omits, as might be expected, all notice of the
perilous dissensions in the Greek camp.

[253] Diodorus (xi, 17) states that the Egyptian squadron in
the fleet of Xerxes was detached to block up the outlet between
Salamis and the Megarid; that is, to sail round the southwestern
corner of the island to the northwestern strait. Where the
northwestern corner of the island is separated by a narrow
strait from Megara, near the spot where the fort of Budorum was
afterwards situated, during the Peloponnesian war.

Herodotus mentions nothing of this movement, and his account
evidently implies that the Greek fleet was inclosed to the north
of the town of Salamis, the Persian right wing having got between
that town and Eleusis. The movement announced by Diodorus appears
to me unnecessary and improbable. If the Egyptian squadron had
been placed there, they would have been far indeed removed from
the scene of the action, but we may see that Herodotus believed
them to have taken actual part in the battle along with the rest
(viii, 100).

[254] Herodot. viii, 76. Τοῖσι δὲ ὡς πιστὰ ἐγίνετο τὰ ἀγγελθέντα,
τοῦτο μὲν, ἐς τὴν νησίδα τὴν Ψυττάλειαν, μεταξὺ Σαλαμῖνός τε
κειμένην καὶ τῆς ἠπείρου, πολλοὺς τῶν Περσέων ἀπεβίβασαν· τοῦτο
δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ἐγίνοντο μέσαι νύκτες, ἀνῆγον μὲν τὸ ἀπ’ ἑσπέρης κέρας
κυκλούμενοι πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμῖνα· ἀνῆγον δὲ οἱ ἀμφὶ τὴν Κέον τε καὶ
τὴν Κυνόσουραν τεταγμένοι, κατεῖχόν τε μέχρι Μουνυχίης πάντα τὸν
πορθμὸν τῇσι νηϋσί.

He had previously stated Phalêrum as the main station of the
Persian fleet; not necessarily meaning that the whole of it was
there. The passage which I have just transcribed intimated what
the Persians did to accomplish their purpose of surrounding
the Greeks in the harbor of Salamis and the first part of it,
wherein he speaks of the western (more properly northwestern)
wing, presents no extraordinary difficulty, though we do not
know how far the western wing extended before the movement was
commenced. Probably it extended to the harbor of Peiræus, and
began from thence its night-movement along the Attic coast to get
beyond the town of Salamis. But the second part of the passage
is not easy to comprehend, where he states that, “those who were
stationed about Keos and Kynosura also moved, and beset with
their ships the whole strait as far as Munychia.” What places
are Keos and Kynosura, and where were they situated? The only
known places of those names, are the island of Keos, not far
south of cape Sunium in Attica,—and the promontory Kynosura, on
the northeastern coast of Attica, immediately north of the bay
of Marathon. It seems hardly possible to suppose that Herodotus
meant this latter promontory, which would be too distant to
render the movement which he describes at all practicable: even
the island of Keos is somewhat open to the same objection, though
not in so great a degree, of being too distant. Hence Barthélemy,
Kruse, Bähr, and Dr. Thirlwall, apply the names Keos and Kynosura
to two promontories (the southernmost and the southeasternmost)
of the island of Salamis, and Kiepert has realized their idea in
his newly published maps. But in the first place, no authority
is produced for giving these names to two promontories in the
island, and the critics only do it because they say it is
necessary to secure a reasonable meaning to this passage of
Herodotus. In the next place, if we admit their supposition, we
must suppose that, _before this night-movement commenced_, the
Persian fleet was already stationed in part of _the island of
Salamis_: which appears to me highly improbable. Whatever station
that fleet occupied before the night-movement, we may be very
sure that it was not upon an island then possessed by the enemy:
it was somewhere on the coast of Attica: and the names Keos and
Kynosura must belong to some unknown points in _Attica_, not
in Salamis. I cannot therefore adopt the supposition of these
critics, though on the other hand Larcher is not satisfactory
in his attempt to remove the objections which apply to the
supposition of Keos and Kynosura as commonly understood. It is
difficult in this case to reconcile the statement of Herodotus
with geographical considerations, and I rather suspect that on
this occasion the historian has been himself misled by too great
a desire to find the oracle of Bakis truly fulfilled. It is from
Bakis that he copies the name Kynosura (viii, 77).

Meanwhile, that angry controversy among the Grecian chiefs, in the midst of which Themistoklês had sent over his secret envoy, continued without abatement and without decision. It was the interest of the Athenian general to prolong the debate, and to prevent any concluding vote until the effect of his stratagem should have rendered retreat impossible: nor was prolongation difficult in a case so critical, where the majority of chiefs was on one side and that of naval force on the other,—especially as Eurybiadês himself was favorable to the view of Themistoklês. Accordingly, the debate was still unfinished at nightfall, and either continued all night, or was adjourned to an hour before daybreak on the following morning, when an incident, interesting as well as important, gave to it a new turn. The ostracized Aristeidês arrived at Salamis from Ægina. Since the revocation of his sentence, proposed by Themistoklês himself, he had had no opportunity of revisiting Athens, and he now for the first time rejoined his countrymen in their exile at Salamis; not uninformed of the dissensions raging, and of the impatience of the Peloponnesians to retire to the Isthmus. He was the first to bring the news that such retirement had become impracticable from the position of the Persian fleet, which his own vessel, in coming from Ægina, had only eluded under favor of night. He caused Themistoklês to be invited out from the assembled synod of chiefs, and after a generous exordium, wherein he expressed his hope that their rivalry would for the future be only a competition in doing good to their common country, apprized him that the new movement of the Persians excluded all hope of now reaching the Isthmus and rendered farther debate useless. Themistoklês expressed his joy at the intelligence, and communicated his own secret message whereby he had himself brought the movement about, in order that the Peloponnesian chiefs might be forced to fight at Salamis, even against their own consent. He moreover desired Aristeidês to go himself into the synod, and communicate the news: for if it came from the lips of Themistoklês, the Peloponnesians would treat it as a fabrication. So obstinate indeed was their incredulity, that they refused to accept it as truth even on the assertion of Aristeidês: nor was it until the arrival of a Tenian vessel, deserting from the Persian fleet, that they at last brought themselves to credit the actual posture of affairs and the entire impossibility of retreat. Once satisfied of this fact, they prepared themselves at dawn for the impending battle.[255]

[255] Herodot. viii, 79, 80.

Herodotus states, doubtless correctly, that Aristeidês,
immediately after he had made the communication to the synod,
went away, not pretending to take part in the debate: Plutarch
represents him as present, and as taking part in it (Aristeidês,
c. 9). According to Plutarch, Themistoklês desires Aristeidês
to assist him in persuading Eurybiadês: according to Herodotus,
Eurybiadês was already persuaded: it was the Peloponnesian chiefs
who stood out.

The details of Herodotus will be found throughout both more
credible and more consistent than those of Plutarch and the later
writers.

Having caused his land-force to be drawn up along the shore opposite to Salamis, Xerxes had erected for himself a lofty seat, or throne, upon one of the projecting declivities of mount Ægaleos, near the Herakleion and immediately overhanging the sea,[256]—from whence he could plainly review all the phases of the combat and the conduct of his subject troops. He was persuaded himself that they had not done their best at Artemisium, in consequence of his absence, and that his presence would inspire them with fresh valor: moreover, his royal scribes stood ready by his side to take the names both of the brave and of the backward combatants. On the right wing of his fleet, which approached Salamis on the side of Eleusis, and was opposed to the Athenians on the Grecian left,—were placed the Phenicians and Egyptians; on his left wing the Ionians,[257]—approaching from the side of Peiræus, and opposed to the Lacedæmonians, Æginetans, and Megarians. The seamen of the Persian fleet, however, had been on shipboard all night, in making that movement which had brought them into their actual position: while the Greek seamen now began without previous fatigue, fresh from the animated harangues of Themistoklês and the other leaders: moreover, just as they were getting on board, they were joined by the triremes which had been sent to Ægina to bring to their aid Æakus, with the other Æakid heroes. Honored with this precious heroic aid, which tended so much to raise the spirits of the Greeks, the Æginetan trireme now arrived just in time to take her post in the line, having eluded pursuit from the intervening enemy.[258]

[256] Æschylus, Pers. 473; Herodot. viii, 90. The throne with
silver feet, upon which Xerxes had sat, was long preserved
in the acropolis of Athens,—having been left at his retreat.
Harpokration, Ἀργυρόπους δίφρος.

A writer, to whom Plutarch refers,—Akestodôrus,—affirmed that
the seat of Xerxes was erected, not under mount Ægaleos, but
much further to the northwest, on the borders of Attica and
the Megarid, under the mountains called Kerata (Plutarch,
Themistoklês, 13). If this writer was acquainted with the
topography of Attica, we must suppose him to have ascribed an
astonishingly long sight to Xerxes: but we may probably take the
assertion as a sample of that carelessness in geography which
marks so many ancient writers. Ktesias recognizes the Ἡρακλεῖον
(Persica, c. 26)

[257] Herodot. viii, 85; Diodor. xi, 16.

[258] Herodot. viii, 83; Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 13;
Aristeidês, c. 9; Pelopidas, c. 21). Plutarch tells a story
out of Phanias respecting an incident in the moment before
the action, which it is pleasing to find sufficient ground
for rejecting. Themistoklês, with the prophet Euphrantidês,
was offering sacrifice by the side of the admiral’s galley,
when three beautiful youths, nephews of Xerxes, were brought
in prisoners. As the fire was just then blazing brilliantly,
and sneezing was heard from the right, the prophet enjoined
Themistoklês to offer these three prisoners as a propitiatory
offering to Dionysus Omêstês: which the clamor of the bystanders
compelled him to do against his will. This is what Plutarch
states in his life of Themistoklês; in his life of Aristeidês, he
affirms that these youths were brought prisoners from Psyttaleia,
when Aristeidês attacked _it at the beginning of the action_.
Now Aristeidês did not attack Psyttaleia until the naval combat
was nearly over, so that no prisoners can have been brought from
thence at the commencement of the action: there could therefore
have been no Persian prisoners to sacrifice, and the story may be
dismissed as a fiction.

The Greeks rowed forward from the shore to attack with the usual pæan, or war-shout, which was confidently returned by the Persians; and the latter were the most forward of the two to begin the fight: for the Greek seamen, on gradually nearing the enemy, became at first disposed to hesitate,—and even backed water for a space, so that some of them touched ground on their own shore: until the retrograde movement was arrested by a supernatural feminine figure hovering over them, who exclaimed with a voice that rang through the whole fleet,—“Ye worthies, how much farther are ye going to back water?” The very circulation of this fable attests the dubious courage of the Greeks at the commencement of the battle.[259] The brave Athenian captains Ameinias and Lykomêdês (the former, brother of the poet Æschylus) were the first to obey either the feminine voice or the inspirations of their own ardor: though according to the version current at Ægina, it was the Æginetan ship, the carrier of the Æakid heroes, which first set this honorable example.[260] The Naxian Demokritus was celebrated by Simonides as the third ship in action. Ameinias, darting forth from the line, charged with the beak of his ship full against a Phenician, and the two became entangled so that he could not again get clear: other ships came in aid on both sides, and the action thus became general. Herodotus, with his usual candor, tells us that he could procure few details about the action, except as to what concerned Artemisia, the queen of his own city: so that we know hardly anything beyond the general facts. But it appears that, with the exception of the Ionic Greeks, many of whom—apparently a greater number than Herodotus likes to acknowledge—were lukewarm, and some even averse;[261] the subjects of Xerxes conducted themselves generally with great bravery: Phenicians, Cyprians, Kilikians, Egyptians, vied with the Persians and Medes serving as soldiers on shipboard, in trying to satisfy the exigent monarch who sat on shore watching their behavior. Their signal defeat was not owing to any want of courage,—but, first, to the narrow space which rendered their superior number a hindrance rather than a benefit: next, to their want of orderly line and discipline as compared with the Greeks: thirdly, to the fact that, when once fortune seemed to turn against them, they had no fidelity or reciprocal attachment, and each ally was willing to sacrifice or even to run down others, in order to effect his own escape. Their numbers and absence of concert threw them into confusion, and caused them to run foul of each other: those in the front could not recede, nor could those in the rear advance:[262] the oar-blades were broken by collision,—the steersmen lost control of their ships, and could no longer adjust the ship’s course so as to strike that direct blow with the beak which was essential in ancient warfare. After some time of combat, the whole Persian fleet was driven back and became thoroughly unmanageable, so that the issue was no longer doubtful, and nothing remained except the efforts of individual bravery to protract the struggle. While the Athenian squadron on the left, which had the greatest resistance to surmount, broke up and drove before them the Persian right, the Æginetans on the right intercepted the flight of the fugitives to Phalêrum:[263] Demokritus, the Naxian captain, was said to have captured five ships of the Persians with his own single trireme. The chief admiral, Ariabignês, brother of Xerxes, attacked at once by two Athenian triremes, fell, gallantly trying to board one of them, and the number of distinguished Persians and Medes who shared his fate was great:[264] the more so, as few of them knew how to swim, while among the Greek seamen who were cast into the sea, the greater number were swimmers, and had the friendly shore of Salamis near at hand. It appears that the Phenician seamen of the fleet threw the blame of defeat upon the Ionic Greeks; and some of them, driven ashore during the heat of the battle under the immediate throne of Xerxes, excused themselves by denouncing the others as traitors. The heads of the Ionic leaders might have been endangered if the monarch had not seen with his own eyes an act of surprising gallantry by one of their number. An Ionic trireme from Samothrace charged and disabled an Attic trireme, but was herself almost immediately run down by an Æginetan. The Samothracian crew, as their vessel lay disabled on the water, made such excellent use of their missile weapons, that they cleared the decks of the Æginetan, sprung on board, and became masters of her. This exploit, passing under the eyes of Xerxes himself, induced him to treat the Phenicians as dastardly calumniators, and to direct their heads to be cut off: his wrath and vexation, Herodotus tells us, were boundless, and he scarcely knew on whom to vent it.[265]

[259] Herodot. viii, 84. φανεῖσαν δὲ διακελεύσασθαι, ὥστε καὶ
ἅπαν ἀκοῦσαι τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατόπεδον, ὀνειδίσασαν πρότερον
τάδε· Ὦ δαιμόνιοι, μέχρι κόσου ἔτι πρύμναν ἀνακρούεσθε;

Æschylus (Pers. 396-415) describes finely the war-shout of the
Greeks and the response of the Persians: for very good reasons,
he does not notice the incipient backwardness of the Greeks,
which Herodotus brings before us.

The war-shout, here described by Æschylus, a warrior actually
engaged, shows us the difference between a naval combat of
that day and the improved tactics of the Athenians fifty years
afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Phormio
especially enjoins on his men the necessity of silence (Thucyd.
ii, 89).

[260] Simonides, Epigram 138, Bergk; Plutarch, De Herodot.
Malignitate, c. 36.

According to Plutarch (Themist. 12) and Diodorus (xi, 17), it was
the Persian admiral’s ship which was first charged and captured:
if the fact had been so, Æschylus would probably have specified
it.

[261] Herodot. viii, 85; Diodor. xi, 16. Æschylus, in the Persæ,
though he gives a long list of the names of those who fought
against Athens, does not make any allusion to the Ionic or to
any other Greeks as having formed part of the catalogue. See
Blomfield ad Æschyl. Pers. 42. Such silence easily admits of
explanation: yet it affords an additional reason for believing
that the persons so admitted did not fight very heartily.

[262] Herodot. viii, 86; Diodor. xi, 17. The testimony of the
former, both to the courage manifested by the Persian fleet, and
to their entire want of order and system, is decisive, as well as
to the effect of the personal overlooking of Xerxes.

[263] Simonides, Epigr. 138, Bergk.

[264] The many names of Persian chiefs whom Æschylus reports as
having been slain, are probably for the most part inventions
of his own, to please the ears of his audience. See Blomfield,
Præfat. ad Æschyl. Pers. p. xii.

[265] Herodot. viii, 90.

In this disastrous battle itself, as in the debate before the battle, the conduct of Artemisia of Halikarnassus was such as to give him full satisfaction. It appears that this queen maintained her full part in the battle until the disorder had become irretrievable; she then sought to escape, pursued by the Athenian trierarch, Ameinias, but found her progress obstructed by the number of fugitive or embarrassed comrades before her. In this dilemma, she preserved herself from pursuit by attacking one of her own comrades; she charged the trireme of the Karian prince, Damasithymus, of Kalyndus, ran it down and sunk it, so that the prince with all his crew perished. Had Ameinias been aware that the vessel which he was following was that of Artemisia, nothing would have induced him to relax in the pursuit,—for the Athenian captains were all indignant at the idea of a female invader assailing their city;[266] but knowing her ship only as one among the enemy, and seeing her thus charge and destroy another enemy’s ship, he concluded her to be a deserter, turned his pursuit elsewhere, and suffered her to escape. At the same time, it so happened that the destruction of the ship of Damasithymus happened under the eyes of Xerxes and of the persons around him on shore, who recognized the ship of Artemisia, but supposed the ship destroyed to be a Greek. Accordingly they remarked to him, “Master, seest thou not how well Artemisia fights, and how she has just sunk an enemy’s ship?” Assured that it was really her deed, Xerxes is said to have replied, “My men have become women; my women, men.” Thus was Artemisia not only preserved, but exalted to a higher place in the esteem of Xerxes by the destruction of one of his own ships,—among the crew of which not a man survived to tell the true story.[267]

[266] Compare the indignant language of Demosthenês a century and
a quarter afterwards, respecting the second Artemisia, queen of
Karia, as the enemy of Athens,—ὑμεῖς δ’ ὄντες Ἀθηναῖοι βάρβαρον
ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ταῦτα γυναῖκα, φοβηθήσεσθε (Demosthenes, De
Rhodior. Libertat. c. x, p. 197).

[267] Herodot. viii, 87, 88, 93. The story given here by
Herodotus respecting the stratagem whereby Artemisia escaped,
seems sufficiently probable; and he may have heard it from
fellow-citizens of his own who were aboard her vessel. Though
Plutarch accuses him of extravagant disposition to compliment
this queen, it is evident that he does not himself like the
story, nor consider it to be a compliment; for he himself
insinuates a doubt: “I do not know whether she ran down the
Kalyndian ship intentionally, or came accidentally into collision
with it.” Since the shock was so destructive that the Kalyndian
ship was completely run down and sunk, so that every man of her
crew perished, we may be pretty sure that it was intentional; and
the historian merely suggests a possible hypothesis to palliate
an act of great treachery. Though the story of the sinking of the
Kalyndian ship has the air of truth, however, we cannot say the
same about the observation of Xerxes, and the notice which he is
reported to have taken of the act: all this reads like nothing
but romance.

We have to regret (as Plutarch observes, De Malign. Herodot. p.
873) that Herodotus tells us so much less about others than about
Artemisia; but he doubtless _heard_ more about her than about
the rest, and perhaps his own relatives may have been among her
contingent.

Of the total loss of either fleet, Herodotus gives us no estimate; but Diodorus states the number of ships destroyed on the Grecian side as forty, on the Persian side as two hundred; independent of those which were made prisoners with all their crews. To the Persian loss is to be added, the destruction of all those troops whom they had landed before the battle in the island of Psyttaleia: as soon as the Persian fleet was put to flight, Aristeidês carried over some Grecian hoplites to that island, overpowered the enemy, and put them to death to a man. This loss appears to have been much deplored, as they were choice troops; in great proportion, the native Persian guards.[268]

[268] Herodot. viii, 95; Plutarch, Aristid. c. 9; Æschyl. Pers.
454-470; Diodor. xii, 19.

Great and capital as the victory was, there yet remained after it a sufficient portion of the Persian fleet to maintain even maritime war vigorously, not to mention the powerful land-force, as yet unshaken. And the Greeks themselves, immediately after they had collected in their island, as well as could be done, the fragments of shipping and the dead bodies, made themselves ready for a second engagement.[269] But they were relieved from this necessity by the pusillanimity[270] of the invading monarch, in whom the defeat had occasioned a sudden revulsion from contemptuous confidence, not only to rage and disappointment, but to the extreme of alarm for his own personal safety. He was possessed with a feeling of mingled wrath and mistrust against his naval force, which consisted entirely of subject nations,—Phenicians, Egyptians, Kilikians, Cyprians, Pamphylians, Ionic Greeks, etc., with a few Persians and Medes serving on board, in a capacity probably not well suited to them. None of these subjects had any interest in the success of the invasion, or any other motive for service except fear, while the sympathies of the Ionic Greeks were even decidedly against it. Xerxes now came to suspect the fidelity, or undervalue the courage, of all these naval subjects;[271] he fancied that they could make no resistance to the Greek fleet, and dreaded lest the latter should sail forthwith to the Hellespont, so as to break down the bridge and intercept his personal retreat; for, upon the maintenance of that bridge he conceived his own safety to turn, not less than that of his father Darius, when retreating from Scythia, upon the preservation of the bridge over the Danube.[272] Against the Phenicians, from whom he had expected most, his rage broke out in such fierce threats, that they stole away from the fleet in the night, and departed homeward.[273] Such a capital desertion made future naval struggle still more hopeless, and Xerxes, though at first breathing revenge, and talking about a vast mole or bridge to be thrown across the strait to Salamis, speedily ended by giving orders to the whole fleet to leave Phalêrum in the night,—not without disembarking, however, the best soldiers who served on board.[274] They were to make straight for the Hellespont, and there to guard the bridge against his arrival.[275]

[269] Herodot. viii, 96.

[270] The victories of the Greeks over the Persians were
materially aided by the personal timidity of Xerxes, and of
Darius Codomannus at Issus and Arbela (Arrian, ii, 11, 6; iii,
14, 3).

[271] See this feeling especially in the language of Mardonius
to Xerxes (Herodot. viii, 100), as well as in that put into the
mouth of Artemisia by the historian (viii, 68), which indicates
the general conception of the historian himself, derived from the
various information which reached him.

[272] Herodot. vii, 10.

[273] This important fact is not stated by Herodotus: but it is
distinctly given in Diodorus, xi, 19. It seems probable enough.

If the tragedy of Phrynichus, entitled _Phœnissæ_, had been
preserved, we should have known more about the position and
behavior of the Phenician contingent in this invasion. It was
represented at Athens only three years after the battle of
Salamis, in B. C. 477 or 476, with Themistoklês as choregus, four
years earlier than the Persæ of Æschylus, which was affirmed
by Glaukus to have been (παραπεποιῆσθαι) altered from it. The
Chorus in the Phœnissæ consisted of Phenician women, possibly the
widows of those Phenicians whom Xerxes had caused to be beheaded
after the battle (Herodot. viii, 90, as Dr. Blomfield supposes,
Præf. ad Æsch. Pers. p. ix), or only of Phenicians absent on the
expedition. The fragments remaining of this tragedy, which gained
the prize, are too scanty to sustain any conjectures as to its
scheme or details (see Welcker Griechische Tragœd. vol. i, p. 26;
and Droysen, Phrynichos, Æschylos, und die Trilogie, pp. 4-6).

[274] Herodot. ix, 32.

[275] Herodot. viii, 97-107. Such was the terror of these
retreating seamen, that they are said to have mistaken the
projecting cliffs of Cape Zôstêr (about half-way between Peiræus
and Sunium) for ships, and redoubled the haste of their flight
as if an enemy were after them,—a story which we can treat as
nothing better than silly exaggeration in the Athenian informants
of Herodotus.

Ktesias, Pers. c. xxvi; Strabo, ix, p. 395; the two latter
talk about the intention to carry a mole across from Attica to
Salamis, as if it had been conceived _before_ the battle.

This resolution was prompted by Mardonius, who saw the real terror which beset his master, and read therein sufficient evidence of danger to himself. When Xerxes despatched to Susa intelligence of his disastrous overthrow, the feeling at home was not simply that of violent grief for the calamity, and fear for the personal safety of the monarch,—it was farther imbittered by anger against Mardonius, as the instigator of this ruinous enterprise. That general knew full well that there was no safety for him[276] in returning to Persia with the shame of failure on his head: it was better for him to take upon himself the chance of subduing Greece, which he had good hopes of being yet able to do,—and to advise the return of Xerxes himself to a safe and easy residence in Asia. Such counsel was eminently palatable to the present alarm of the monarch, while it opened to Mardonius himself a fresh chance not only of safety, but of increased power and glory. Accordingly, he began to reassure his master, by representing that the recent blow was after all not serious,—that it had only fallen upon the inferior part of his force, and upon worthless foreign slaves, like Phenicians, Egyptians, etc., while the native Persian troops yet remained unconquered and unconquerable, fully adequate to execute the monarch’s revenge upon Hellas;—that Xerxes might now very well retire with the bulk of his army if he were disposed, and that he, Mardonius, would pledge himself to complete the conquest, at the head of three hundred thousand chosen troops. This proposition afforded at the same time consolation for the monarch’s wounded vanity, and safety for his person: his confidential Persians, and Artemisia herself, on being consulted, approved of the step. The latter had acquired his confidence by the dissuasive advice which she had given before the recent deplorable engagement, and she had every motive now to encourage a proposition indicating solicitude for his person, as well as relieving herself from the obligation of farther service. “If Mardonius desires to remain (she remarked, contemptuously[277]), by all means let him have the troops: should he succeed, thou wilt be the gainer: should he even perish, the loss of some of thy slaves is trifling, so long as thou remainest safe, and thy house in power. Thou hast already accomplished the purpose of thy expedition, in burning Athens.” Xerxes, while adopting this counsel, and directing the return of his fleet, showed his satisfaction with the Halikarnassian queen, by intrusting her with some of his children, directing her to transport them to Ephesus.

[276] Compare Herodot. vii, 10.

[277] Herodot. viii, 101, 102.

The Greeks at Salamis learned with surprise and joy the departure of the hostile fleet from the bay of Phalêrum, and immediately put themselves in pursuit; following as far as the island of Andros without success. Themistoklês and the Athenians are even said to have been anxious to push on forthwith to the Hellespont, and there break down the bridge of boats, in order to prevent the escape of Xerxes,—had they not been restrained by the caution of Eurybiadês and the Peloponnesians, who represented that it was dangerous to detain the Persian monarch in the heart of Greece. Themistoklês readily suffered himself to be persuaded, and contributed much to divert his countrymen from the idea; while he at the same time sent the faithful Sikinnus a second time to Xerxes, with the intimation that he, Themistoklês, had restrained the impatience of the Greeks to proceed without delay and burn the Hellespontine bridge,—and that he had thus, from personal friendship to the monarch, secured for him a safe retreat.[278] Though this is the story related by Herodotus, we can hardly believe that, with the great Persian land-force in the heart of Attica, there could have been any serious idea of so distant an operation as that of attacking the bridge at the Hellespont. It seems more probable that Themistoklês fabricated the intention, with a view of frightening Xerxes away, as well as of establishing a personal claim upon his gratitude in reserve for future contingences.

[278] Herodot. viii, 109, 110; Thucyd. i, 137. The words
ἢν ψευδῶς προσεποιήσατο may probably be understood in a
sense somewhat larger than that which they naturally bear
in Thucydidês. In point of fact, not only was it false that
Themistoklês was the person who dissuaded the Greeks from going
to the Hellespont, but it was also false that the Greeks had ever
any serious intention of going there. Compare Cornelius Nepos,
Themistokl. c. 5.

Such crafty manœuvres and long-sighted calculations of possibility, seem extraordinary: but the facts are sufficiently attested,—since Themistoklês lived to claim as well as to receive fulfilment of the obligation thus conferred,—and though extraordinary, they will not appear inexplicable, if we reflect, first, that the Persian game, even now, after the defeat of Salamis, was not only not desperate, but might perfectly well have succeeded, if it had been played with reasonable prudence: next, that there existed in the mind of this eminent man an almost unparalleled combination of splendid patriotism, long-sighted cunning, and selfish rapacity. Themistoklês knew better than any one else that the cause of Greece had appeared utterly desperate, only a few hours before the late battle: moreover, a clever man, tainted with such constant guilt, might naturally calculate on being one day detected and punished, even if the Greeks proved successful.

He now employed the fleet among the islands of the Cyclades, for the purpose of levying fines upon them as a punishment for adherence to the Persian. He first laid siege to Andros, telling the inhabitants that he came to demand their money, bringing with him two great gods,—Persuasion and Necessity. To which the Andrians replied, that “Athens was a great city, and blest with excellent gods: but that _they_ were miserably poor, and that there were two unkind gods who always stayed with them and would never quit the island,—Poverty and Helplessness.[279] In these gods the Andrians put their trust, refusing to deliver the money required; for the power of Athens could never overcome their inability.” While the fleet was engaged in contending against the Andrians with their sad protecting deities, Themistoklês sent round to various other cities, demanding from them private sums of money on condition of securing them from attack. From Karystus, Paros, and other places, he thus extorted bribes for himself apart from the other generals,[280] but it appears that Andros was found unproductive, and after no very long absence, the fleet was brought back to Salamis.[281]

[279] Herodot. viii, 111. ἐπεὶ Ἀνδρίους γε εἶναι γεωπείνας ἐς τὰ
μέγιστα ἀνήκοντας, καὶ θεοὺς δύο ἀχρήστους οὐκ ἐκλείπειν σφέων
τὴν νῆσον, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ φιλοχωρέειν—Πενίην τε καὶ Ἀμηχανίην.

Compare Alkæus, Fragm. 90, ed. Bergk, and Herodot. vii, 172.

[280] Herodot. viii, 112; Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 21,—who
cites a few bitter lines from the contemporary poet Timokreon.

[281] Herodot. viii, 112-121.

The intimation sent by Themistoklês perhaps had the effect of hastening the departure of Xerxes, who remained in Attica only a few days after the battle of Salamis, and then withdrew his army through Bœotia into Thessaly, where Mardonius made choice of the troops to be retained for his future operations. He retained all the Persians, Medes, Sakæ, Baktrians, and Indians, horse as well as foot, together with select detachments of the remaining contingents: making in all, according to Herodotus, three hundred thousand men. But as it was now the beginning of September, and as sixty thousand out of his forces, under Artabazus, were destined to escort Xerxes himself to the Hellespont, Mardonius proposed to Winter in Thessaly, and to postpone farther military operations until the ensuing spring.[282]

[282] Herodot. viii, 114-126.

Having left most of these troops under the orders of Mardonius in Thessaly, Xerxes marched away with the rest to the Hellespont, by the same road as he had taken in his advance a few months before. Respecting his retreat, a plentiful stock of stories were circulated,[283]—inconsistent with each other, fanciful and even incredible: Grecian imagination, in the contemporary poet Æschylus, as well as in the Latin moralizers Seneca or Juvenal,[284] delighted in handling this invasion with the maximum of light and shadow,—magnifying the destructive misery and humiliation of the retreat so as to form an impressive contrast with the superhuman pride of the advance, and illustrating the antithesis with unbounded license of detail. The sufferings from want of provision were doubtless severe, and are described as frightful and death-dealing: the magazines stored up for the advancing march had been exhausted, so that the retiring army were now forced to seize upon the corn of the country through which they passed,—an insufficient maintenance, eked out by leaves, grass, the bark of trees, and other wretched substitutes for food. Plague and dysentery aggravated their misery, and occasioned many to be left behind among the cities through whose territory the retreat was carried; strict orders being left by Xerxes that these cities should maintain and tend them. After forty-five days’ march from Attica, he at length found himself at the Hellespont, whither his fleet, retreating from Salamis, had arrived long before him.[285] But the short-lived bridge had already been knocked to pieces by a storm, so that the army was transported on shipboard across to Asia, where it first obtained comfort and abundance, and where the change from privation to excess engendered new maladies. In the time of Herodotus, the citizens of Abdêra still showed the gilt cimeter and tiara, which Xerxes had presented to them when he halted there in his retreat, in token of hospitality and satisfaction: and they even went the length of affirming that never, since his departure from Attica, had he loosened his girdle until he reached their city. So fertile was Grecian fancy in magnifying the terror of the repulsed invader! who reëntered Sardis, with a broken army and humbled spirit, only eight months after he had left it, as the presumed conqueror of the western world.[286]

[283] The account given by Æschylus of this retiring march
appears to me exaggerated, and in several points incredible
(Persæ, 482-513). That they suffered greatly during the march
from want of provisions, is doubtless true, and that many of them
died of hunger. But we must consider in deduction: 1. That this
march took place in the months of October and November, therefore
not very long after the harvest. 2. That Mardonius maintained a
large army in Thessaly all the winter, and brought them out in
fighting condition in the spring. 3. That Artabazus also, with
another large division, was in military operation in Thrace all
the winter, after having escorted Xerxes into safety.

When we consider these facts, it will seem that the statements
of Æschylus, even as to the sufferings by famine, must be taken
with great allowance. But his statement about the passage of the
Strymon appears to me incredible, and I regret to find myself
on this point differing from Dr. Thirlwall, who considers it
an undoubted fact. (Hist. Greece, ch. xv, p. 351, 2d ed.) “The
river had been frozen in the night hard enough to bear those who
arrived first. But the ice suddenly gave way under the morning
sun, and numbers perished in the waters,”—so Dr. Thirlwall
states, after Æschylus,—adding, in a note, “It is a little
surprising that Herodotus, when he is describing the miseries
of the retreat, does not notice this disaster, which is so
prominent in the narrative of the Persian messenger in Æschylus.
There can, however, be no doubt as to the fact: and perhaps it
may furnish a useful warning, not to lay too much stress on the
silence of Herodotus, as a ground for rejecting even important
and interesting facts which are only mentioned by later writers,”
etc.

That a large river, such as the Strymon, near its mouth (180
yards broad, and in latitude about N. 40° 50′), at a period which
could not have been later than the beginning of November, should
have been frozen over in one night so hardly and firmly as to
admit of a portion of the army marching over it at daybreak,
before the sun became warm,—is a statement which surely requires
a more responsible witness than Æschylus to avouch it. In fact,
he himself describes it as a “frost out of season,” (χειμῶν’
ἄωρον,) brought about by a special interposition of the gods.
If he is to be believed, none of the fugitives were saved,
except such as were fortunate enough to cross the Strymon on
the ice during the interval between break of day and the sun’s
heat. One would imagine that there was a pursuing enemy on
their track, leaving them only a short time for escape: whereas
in fact, they had no enemy to contend with,—nothing but the
difficulty of finding subsistence. During the advancing march
of Xerxes, a bridge of boats had been thrown over the Strymon:
nor can any reason be given why that bridge should not still
have been subsisting: Artabazus must have recrossed it after he
had accompanied the monarch to the Hellespont. I will add, that
the town and fortress of Eion, which commanded the mouth of the
Strymon, remained as an important strong-hold of the Persians
some years after this event, and was only captured, after a
desperate resistance, by the Athenians and their confederates
under Kimon.

The Athenian auditors of the Persæ would not criticize nicely,
the historical credibility of that which Æschylus told them about
the sufferings of their retreating foe, nor his geographical
credibility when he placed Mount Pangæus on the hither side of
the Strymon, to persons marching out of Greece (Persæ, 494).
But I must confess that, to my mind, his whole narrative of the
retreat bears the stamp of the poet and the religious man, not
of the historical witness. And my confidence in Herodotus is
increased when I compare him on this matter with Æschylus,—as
well in what he says as in what he does not say.

[284] Juvenal, Satir. x, 178.

Ille tamen qualis rediit, Salamine relictâ,
In Caurum atque Eurum solitus sævire flagellis, etc.

[285] Herodot. viii, 130.

[286] See the account of the retreat of Xerxes, in Herodotus,
viii, 115-120, with many stories which he mentions only to
reject. The description given in the Persæ of Æschylus (v, 486,
515, 570) is conceived in the same spirit. The strain reaches its
loudest pitch in Justin (ii, 13), who tells us that Xerxes was
obliged to cross the strait in a fishing-boat. “Ipse cum paucis
Abydon contendit. Ubi cum solutum pontem hibernis tempestatibus
offendisset, piscatoriâ scaphâ trepidus trajecit. Erat res
spectaculo digna et, æstimatione sortis humanæ, rerum varietate
miranda—in exiguo latentem videre navigio, quem paulo ante vix
æquor omne capiebat: carentem etiam omni servorum ministerio,
cujus exercitus propter multitudinem terris graves erant.”

Meanwhile the Athenians and Peloponnesians, liberated from the immediate presence of the enemy either on land or sea, and passing from the extreme of terror to sudden ease and security, indulged in the full delight and self-congratulation of unexpected victory. On the day before the battle, Greece had seemed irretrievably lost: she was now saved even against all reasonable hope, and the terrific cloud impending over her was dispersed.[287] In the division of the booty, the Æginetans were adjudged to have distinguished themselves most in the action, and to be entitled to the choice lot; while various tributes of gratitude were also set apart for the gods. Among them were three Phenician triremes, which were offered in dedication to Ajax at Salamis, to Athênê at Sunium, and to Poseidon at the isthmus of Corinth; farther presents were sent to Apollo at Delphi, who, on being asked whether he was satisfied, replied, that all had done their duty to him except the Æginetans: from them he required additional munificence on account of the prize awarded to them, and they were constrained to dedicate in the temple four golden stars upon a staff of brass, which Herodotus himself saw there. Next to the Æginetans, the second place of honor was awarded to the Athenians; the Æginetan Polykritus, and the Athenians Eumenês and Ameinias, being ranked first among the individual combatants.[288] Respecting the behavior of Adeimantus and the Corinthians in the battle, the Athenians of the time of Herodotus drew the most unfavorable picture, representing them to have fled at the commencement, and to have been only brought back by the information that the Greeks were gaining the victory. Considering the character of the debates which had preceded, and the impatient eagerness manifested by the Corinthians to fight at the Isthmus instead of at Salamis, some such backwardness on their part, when forced into a battle at the latter place, would not be in itself improbable: yet in this case it seems that not only the Corinthians themselves, but also the general voice of Greece, contradicted the Athenian story, and defended them as having behaved with bravery and forwardness. We must recollect that, at the time when Herodotus probably collected his information, a bitter feeling of hatred prevailed between Athens and Corinth, and Aristeus, son of Adeimantus, was among the most efficient enemies of the former.[289]

[287] Herodot. viii, 109. ἡμεῖς δὲ, εὕρημα γὰρ εὑρήκαμεν ἡμέας
αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, μὴ διώκωμεν ἄνδρας φεύγοντας.

[288] Herodot. viii, 93-122; Diodor. xi, 27.

[289] Herodot. viii, 94; Thucyd. i, 42, 103. τὸ σφοδρὸν μῖσος
from Corinth towards Athens. About Aristeus, Thucyd. ii, 67.

Plutarch (De Herodot. Malignit. p. 870) employs many angry words
in refuting this Athenian scandal, which the historian himself
does not uphold as truth. The story advanced by Dio Chrysostom
(Or. xxxvii, p. 456), that Herodotus asked for a reward from the
Corinthians, and on being refused, inserted this story into his
history for the purpose of being revenged upon them, deserves
no attention without some reasonable evidence: the statement of
Diyllus, that he received ten talents from the Athenians as a
reward for his history, would be much less improbable, so far
as the fact of pecuniary reward, apart from the magnitude of
the sum: but this also requires proof. Dio Chrysostom is not
satisfied with rejecting this tale of the Athenians, but goes the
length of affirming that the Corinthians carried off the palm
of bravery, and were the cause of the victory. The epigrams of
Simonides, which he cites, prove nothing of the kind (p. 459).
Marcellinus (Vit. Thucyd. p. xvi), insinuates a charge against
Herodotus, something like that of Plutarch and Dio.