Chapter XLII (2)

Diodorus (xi, 30) affirms that the Greek position was so well
defended by the nature of the ground, and so difficult of
attack, that Mardonius was prevented from making use of his
superior numbers. It is evident from the account of Herodotus
that this is quite incorrect. The position seems to have had no
protection except what it derived from the river Asôpus, and the
Greeks were ultimately forced to abandon it by the incessant
attacks of the Persian cavalry. The whole account, at once
diffuse and uninstructive, given by Diodorus of this battle (xi,
30-36), forms a strong contrast with the clear, impressive, and
circumstantial narrative of Herodotus.

[338] Herodot. ix, 38, 39.

[339] Herodot. ix, 40, 41.

[340] Herodot. ix, 42.

But while he overruled, by virtue of superior authority, the objections of all around him, Persian as well as Greek, he could not but feel daunted by their reluctant obedience, which he suspected might arise from their having heard oracles or prophecies of unfavorable augury. He therefore summoned the chief officers, Greek as well as Persian, and put the question to them, whether they knew any prophecy announcing that the Persians were doomed to destruction in Greece. All were silent: some did not know the prophecies, but others, Herodotus intimates, knew them full well, though they did not dare to speak. Receiving no answer, Mardonius said, “Since ye either do not know or will not tell, I, who know well, will myself speak out. There is an oracle to the effect, that Persian invaders of Greece shall plunder the temple of Delphi, and shall afterwards all be destroyed. Now we, being aware of this, shall neither go against that temple, nor try to plunder it: on that ground, therefore, we shall not be destroyed. Rejoice ye, therefore, ye who are well-affected to the Persians,—we shall get the better of the Greeks.” With that he gave orders to prepare everything for a general attack and battle on the morrow.[341]

[341] Herodot. ix, 42.

It is not improbable that the Orchomenian Thersander was present at this interview, and may have reported it to Herodotus. But the reflection of the historian himself is not the least curious part of the whole, as illustrating the manner in which these prophecies sunk into men’s minds, and determined their judgments. Herodotus knew, though he does not cite it, the particular prophecy to which Mardonius made allusion; and he pronounces, in the most affirmative tone,[342] that it had no reference to the Persians: it referred to an ancient invasion of Greece by the Illyrians and the Encheleis. But both Bakis, from whom he quotes four lines, and Musæus had prophesied, in the plainest manner, the destruction of the Persian army on the banks of the Thermôdon and Asôpus. And these are the prophecies which we must suppose the officers convoked by Mardonius to have known also, though they did not dare to speak out: it was the fault of Mardonius himself that he did not take warning.

[342] Herodot. ix, 43. Τοῦτον δ’ ἔγωγε τὸν χρησμὸν τὸν Μαρδόνιος
εἶπε ἐς Πέρσας ἔχειν, ἐς Ἰλλυρίους τε καὶ τὸν Ἐγχελέων ~στρατὸν
οἶδα πεποιημένον~, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐς Πέρσας. Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν Βάκιδι ἐς
ταύτην τὴν μάχην ἔστι πεποιημένα, etc.

The attack of a multitude like that of Mardonius was not likely under any circumstances to be made so rapidly as to take the Greeks by surprise: but the latter were forewarned of it by a secret visit from Alexander, king of Macedon; who, riding up to the Athenian advanced posts in the middle of the night, desired to speak with Aristeidês and the other generals. Announcing to them alone his name, and proclaiming his earnest sympathy for the Grecian cause, as well as the hazard which he incurred by this nightly visit,—he apprized them that Mardonius, though eager for a battle long ago, could not by any effort obtain favorable sacrifices, but was, nevertheless, even in spite of this obstacle, determined on an attack the next morning. “Be ye prepared accordingly; and if ye succeed in this war (said he) remember to liberate me also from the Persian yoke: I too am a Greek by descent, and thus risk my head because I cannot endure to see Greece enslaved.”[343]

[343] Herodot. ix, 44-45. The language about the sacrifices is
remarkable,—λέγω δὲ ὦν ὅτι Μαρδονίῳ τε καὶ τῇ στρατιῇ οὐ ~δύναται
τὰ σφάγια καταθύμια γενέσθαι~· πάλαι γὰρ ἂν ἐμάχεσθε, etc.

Mardonius had tried many unavailing efforts to procure better
sacrifices: it _could_ not be done.

The communication of this important message, made by Aristeidês to Pausanias, elicited from him a proposal not a little surprising as coming from a Spartan general. He requested the Athenians to change places with the Lacedæmonians in the line. “We Lacedæmonians (said he) now stand opposed to the Persians and Medes, against whom we have never yet contended, while ye Athenians have fought and conquered them at Marathon. March ye then over to the right wing and take our places, while we will take yours in the left wing, against the Bœotians and Thessalians, with whose arms and attack we are familiar.” The Athenians readily acceded, and the reciprocal change of order was accordingly directed: nor was it yet quite completed when day broke, and the Theban allies of Mardonius immediately took notice of what had been done. That general commanded a corresponding change in his own line, so as to place the native Persians once more over against the Lacedæmonians: upon which Pausanias, seeing that his manœuvre had failed, led back his Lacedæmonians to the right wing, while a second movement on the part of Mardonius replaced both armies in the order originally observed.[344]

[344] Herodot. ix, 47; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 16. Here, as on
many other occasions, Plutarch rather spoils than assists the
narrative of Herodotus.

No incident similar to this will be found throughout the whole course of Lacedæmonian history. To evade encountering the best troops in the enemy’s line, and to depart for this purpose from their privileged post on the right wing, was a step well calculated to lower them in the eyes of Greece, and could hardly have failed to produce that effect, if the intention had been realized: it is at the same time the highest compliment to the formidable reputation of the native Persian troops,—a reputation recognized by Herodotus, and well sustained at least by their personal bravery.[345] Nor can we wonder that this publicly manifested reluctance on the part of the leading troops in the Grecian army contributed much to exalt the rash confidence of Mardonius: a feeling which Herodotus, in Homeric style,[346] casts into the speech of a Persian herald sent to upbraid the Lacedæmonians, and challenge them to a “single combat with champions of equal numbers, Lacedæmonians against Persians.” This herald, whom no one heard or cared for, and who serves but as a mouthpiece for bringing out the feelings belonging to the moment, was followed by something very real and terrible,—a vigorous attack on the Greek line by the Persian cavalry; whose rapid motions, and showers of arrows and javelins, annoyed the Greeks on this day more than ever. The latter, as has been before stated, had no cavalry whatever; nor do their light troops, though sufficiently numerous, appear to have rendered any service, with the exception of the Athenian bowmen. How great was the advantage gained by the Persian cavalry, is shown by the fact that they for a time drove away the Lacedæmonians from the fountain of Gargaphia, so as to choke it up and render it unfit for use. As the army had been prevented by the cavalry from resorting to the river Asôpus, this fountain had been of late the only watering-place: and without it the position which they then occupied became untenable,—while their provisions also were exhausted, inasmuch as the convoys, from fear of the Persian cavalry, could not descend from Kithæron to join them.[347]

[345] Herodot. ix, 71.

[346] Compare the reproaches of Hektor to Diomêdês (Iliad, viii,
161).

[347] Herodot. ix, 49, 50. Pausanias mentions that the Platæans
restored the fountain of Gargaphia after the victory (τὸ ὕδωρ
ἀνεσώσαντο); but he hardly seems to speak as if he had himself
seen it (ix, 4, 2).

In this dilemma, Pausanias summoned the Grecian chiefs to his tent, and after an anxious debate the resolution was taken, in case Mardonius should not bring on a general action in the course of the day, to change their position during the night, when there would be no interruption from the cavalry; and to occupy the ground called the island, distant about ten furlongs in a direction nearly west, and seemingly north of the town of Platæa, which was itself about twenty furlongs distant: this island, improperly so denominated, included the ground comprised between two branches of the river Oeroê,[348] both of which flow from Kithæron, and, after flowing for a certain time in channels about three furlongs apart, form a junction and run in a northwesterly direction towards one of the recesses of the gulf of Corinth,—quite distinct from the Asôpus, which, though also rising near at hand in the lowest declivities under Kithæron, takes an easterly direction and discharges itself into the sea opposite Eubœa. When in this so-called island, the army would be secure of water from the stream in their rear; nor would they, as now, expose an extended breadth of front to a numerous hostile cavalry separated from them only by the Asôpus.[349] It was farther resolved, that so soon as the army should once be in occupation of the island, half of the troops should forthwith march onward to disengage the convoys blocked up on Kithæron and conduct them to the camp. Such was the plan settled in council among the different Grecian chiefs; the march to be commenced at the beginning of the second night-watch, when the enemy’s cavalry would have completely withdrawn.

[348] See a good description of the ground in Colonel Leake,
Travels in Northern Greece, ch. xvi, vol. ii, p. 358.

[349] Herodot. ix, 51. Ἐς τοῦτον δὴ τὸν χῶρον ἐβουλεύσαντο
μεταστῆναι, ἵνα καὶ ὕδατι ἔχωσι χρᾶσθαι ἀφθόνῳ, καὶ οἱ ἱππέες
σφέας μὴ σινοίατο, ὥσπερ κατ’ ἰθὺ ἐόντων.

The last words have reference to the position of the two hostile
armies, extended front to front along the course of the Asôpus.

In spite of what Mardonius is said to have determined, he passed the whole day without any general attack: but his cavalry, probably elated by the recent demonstration of the Lacedæmonians, were on that day more daring and indefatigable than ever, and inflicted much loss as well as severe suffering;[350] insomuch that the centre of the Greek force (Corinthians, Megarians, etc., between the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans on the right, and the Athenians on the left), when the hour arrived for retiring to the island, commenced their march indeed, but forgot or disregarded the preconcerted plan and the orders of Pausanias, in their impatience to obtain a complete shelter against the attacks of the cavalry. Instead of proceeding to the island, they marched a distance of twenty furlongs directly to the town of Platæa, and took up a position in front of the Heræum, or temple of Hêrê, where they were protected partly by the buildings, partly by the comparatively high ground on which the town with its temple stood. Between the position which the Greeks were about to leave and that which they had resolved to occupy (_i. e._ between the course of the Asôpus and that of the Oeroê), there appear to have been a range of low hills: the Lacedæmonians, starting from the right wing, had to march directly over these hills, while the Athenians, from the left, were to turn them and get into the plain on the other side.[351] Pausanias, apprized that the divisions of the centre had commenced their night-march, and concluding of course that they would proceed to the island according to orders, allowed a certain interval of time in order to prevent confusion, and then directed that the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans should also begin their movement towards that same position. But here he found himself embarrassed by an unexpected obstacle. The movement was retrograde, receding from the enemy, and not consistent with the military honor of a Spartan; nevertheless, most of the taxiarchs, or leaders of companies, obeyed without murmuring; but Amompharetus, lochage or captain of that band which Herodotus calls the lochus of Pitana,[352] obstinately refused. Not having been present at the meeting in which the resolution had been taken, he now heard it for the first time with astonishment and disdain, declaring “that he for one would never so far disgrace Sparta as to run away from the foreigner.”[353] Pausanias, with the second in command, Euryanax, exhausted every effort to overcome his reluctance: but they could by no means induce him to retreat; nor did they dare to move without him, leaving his entire lochus exposed alone to the enemy.[354]

[350] Herodot. ix, 52. κείνην μὲν τὴν ἡμέρην πᾶσαν, προσκειμένης
τῆς ἵππου, εἶχον πόνον ἄτρυτον.

[351] Herodot. ix, 56. Παυσανίης—σημῄνας ἀπῆγε διὰ τῶν κολωνῶν
τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας· εἵποντο δὲ καὶ Τεγεῆται. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ
ταχθέντες ἤϊσαν τὰ ἔμπαλιν ἢ Λακεδαιμόνιοι. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε
ὄχθων ἀντείχοντο καὶ τῆς ὑπωρείης τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ,
κάτω τραφθέντες ἐς τὸ πεδίον.

With which we must combine another passage, c. 59, intimating
that the track of the Athenians led them to turn and get behind
the hills, which prevented Mardonius from seeing them, though
they were marching along the plain: Μαρδόνιος—ἐπεῖχε ἐπὶ
Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Τεγεήτας μούνους· Ἀθηναίους γὰρ τραπομένους ἐς
τὸ πεδίον ὑπὸ τῶν ὄχθων οὐ κατεώρα.

[352] There is on this point a difference between Thucydides and
Herodotus: the former affirms that there never was any Spartan
lochus so called (Thucyd. i, 21).

We have no means of reconciling the difference, nor can we be
certain that Thucydides is right in his negative comprehending
all past time—ὃς οὐδ’ ἐγένετο πώποτε.

[353] Herodot. ix, 53, 54.

[354] Herodot. ix, 52, 53.

Amidst the darkness of night, and in this scene of indecision and dispute, an Athenian messenger on horseback reached Pausanias, instructed to ascertain what was passing, and to ask for the last directions: for in spite of the resolution taken after formal debate, the Athenian generals still mistrusted the Lacedæmonians, and doubted whether, after all, they would act as they had promised: the movement of the central division having become known to them, they sent at the last moment before they commenced their own march, to assure themselves that the Spartans were about to move also. A profound, and even an exaggerated mistrust, but too well justified by the previous behavior of the Spartans towards Athens, is visible in this proceeding:[355] yet it proved fortunate in its results,—for if the Athenians, satisfied with executing their part in the preconcerted plan, had marched at once to the island, the Grecian army would have been severed without the possibility of reuniting, and the issue of the battle might have proved altogether different. The Athenian herald found the Lacedæmonians still stationary in their position, and the generals in hot dispute with Amompharetus; who despised the threat of being left alone to make head against the Persians, and when reminded that the resolution had been taken by general vote of the officers, took up with both hands a vast rock, fit for the hands of Ajax or Hektor, and cast it at the feet of Pausanias, saying—“This is _my_ pebble, wherewith I give my vote not to run away from the strangers.” Pausanias denounced him as a madman,—desiring the herald to report the scene of embarrassment which he had just come to witness, and to entreat the Athenian generals not to commence their retreat until the Lacedæmonians should also be in march. In the mean time the dispute continued, and was even prolonged by the perverseness of Amompharetus until the morning began to dawn; when Pausanias, afraid to remain longer, gave the signal for retreat,—calculating that the refractory captain, when he saw his lochus really left alone, would probably make up his mind to follow. Having marched about ten furlongs, across the hilly ground which divided him from the island, he commanded a halt,—either to await Amompharetus, if he chose to follow, or to be near enough to render aid and save him, if he were rash enough to stand his ground single-handed. Happily the latter, seeing that his general had really departed, overcame his scruples, and followed him; overtaking and joining the main body in its first halt near the river Moloeis and the temple of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr.[356] The Athenians, commencing their movement at the same time with Pausanias, got round the hills to the plain on the other side and proceeded on their march towards the island.

[355] Herodot. ix, 54, Ἀθηναῖοι—εἶχον ἀτρέμας σφέας αὐτοὺς ἵνα
ἐτάχθησαν, ἐπιστάμενοι τὰ Λακεδαιμονίων φρονήματα, ὡς ἄλλα
φρονεόντων καὶ ἄλλα λεγόντων.

[356] Herodot. xi. 56, 57.

When the day broke, the Persian cavalry were astonished to find the Grecian position deserted. They immediately set themselves to the pursuit of the Spartans, whose march lay along the higher and more conspicuous ground, and whose progress had moreover been retarded by the long delay of Amompharetus: the Athenians on the contrary, marching without halt and being already behind the hills, were not open to view. To Mardonius, this retreat of his enemy inspired an extravagant and contemptuous confidence, which he vented in full measure to the Thessalian Aleuadæ: “These are your boasted Spartans, who changed their place just now in the line, rather than fight the Persians, and have here shown by a barefaced flight what they are really worth!” With that, he immediately directed his whole army to pursue and attack, with the utmost expedition. The Persians crossed the Asôpus, and ran after the Greeks at their best speed, pell-mell, without any thought of order or preparations for overcoming resistance: the army already rang with shouts of victory, in full confidence of swallowing up the fugitives as soon as they were overtaken.

The Asiatic allies all followed the example of this disorderly rush forward:[357] but the Thebans and the other Grecian allies on the right wing of Mardonius, appear to have maintained somewhat better order.

[357] Herodot. ix, 59. ἐδίωκον ὡς ποδῶν ἕκαστος εἶχον, οὔτε κόσμῳ
οὐδενὶ κοσμηθέντες, οὔτε τάξι. Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν βοῇ τε καὶ ὁμίλῳ
ἐπήϊσαν, ὡς ἀναρπασόμενοι τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

Herodotus dwells especially on the reckless and disorderly manner
in which the Persians advanced: Plutarch, on the contrary, says
of Mardonius,—ἔχων ~συντεταγμένην~ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπεφέρετο τοῖς
Λακεδαιμονίοις, etc. (Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 17.)

Plutarch also says that Pausanias ἦγε τὴν ἄλλην δύναμιν ~πρὸς τὰς
Πλαταιὰς~, etc., which is quite contrary to the real narrative
of Herodotus. Pausanias intended to march to the island, not to
Platæa: he did not reach either the one or the other.

Pausanias had not been able to retreat farther than the neighborhood of the Demetrion, or temple of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, where he had halted to take up Amompharetus. Overtaken first by the Persian horse, and next by Mardonius with the main body, he sent a horseman forthwith to apprize the Athenians, and to entreat their aid. Nor were the Athenians slack in complying with his request: but they speedily found themselves engaged in conflict against the Theban allies of the enemy, and therefore unable to reach him.[358] Accordingly, the Lacedæmonians and Tegeates had to encounter the Persians single-handed, without any assistance from the other Greeks. The Persians, on arriving within bowshot of their enemies, planted in the ground the spiked extremities of their gerrha, or long wicker shields, forming a continuous breastwork, from behind which they poured upon the Greeks a shower of arrows:[359] their bows were of the largest size, and drawn with no less power than skill. In spite of the wounds and distress thus inflicted, Pausanias persisted in the indispensable duty of offering the battle sacrifice, and the victims were for some time unfavorable, so that he did not venture to give orders for advance and close combat. Many were here wounded or slain in the ranks,[360] among them the brave Kallikratês, the handsomest and strongest man in the army: until Pausanias, wearied out with this compulsory and painful delay, at length raised his eyes to the conspicuous Heræum of the Platæans, and invoked the merciful intervention of Hêrê to remove that obstacle which confined him to the spot. Hardly had he pronounced the words, when the victims changed and became favorable:[361] but the Tegeans, while he was yet praying, anticipated the effect and hastened forward against the enemy, followed by the Lacedæmonians as soon as Pausanias gave the word. The wicker breastwork before the Persians was soon overthrown by the Grecian charge: nevertheless the Persians, though thus deprived of their tutelary hedge, and having no defensive armor, maintained the fight with individual courage, the more remarkable because it was totally unassisted by discipline or trained collective movement, against the drilled array, the regulated step, the well-defended persons, and the long spears, of the Greeks.[362] They threw themselves upon the Lacedæmonians, seizing hold of their spears, and breaking them: many of them devoted themselves in small parties of ten to force by their bodies a way into the lines, and to get to individual close combat with the short spear and the dagger.[363] Mardonius himself, conspicuous upon a white horse, was among the foremost warriors, and the thousand select troops who formed his body-guard distinguished themselves beyond all the rest. At length he was slain by the hand of a distinguished Spartan named Aeimnêstus; his thousand guards mostly perished around him, and the courage of the remaining Persians, already worn out by the superior troops against which they had been long contending, was at last thoroughly broken by the death of their general. They turned their backs and fled, not resting until they got into the wooden fortified camp constructed by Mardonius behind the Asôpus. The Asiatic allies also, as soon as they saw the Persians defeated, took to flight without striking a blow.[364]

[358] Herodot. ix, 60, 61.

[359] About the Persian bow, see Xenoph. Anabas. iii, 4, 17.

[360] Herod. ix, 72.

[361] Herodot. ix, 62. Καὶ τοῖσι Λακεδαιμονίοισι ~αὐτίκα~ μετὰ
τὴν εὐχὴν τὴν Παυσανίεω ἐγίνετο θυομένοισι τὰ σφάγια χρηστά.
Plutarch exaggerates the long-suffering of Pausanias (Aristeid.
c. 17, ad finem).

The lofty and conspicuous site of the Heræon, visible to
Pausanias at the distance where he was, is plainly marked in
Herodotus (ix, 61).

For incidents illustrating the hardships which a Grecian army
endured from its reluctance to move without favorable sacrifices,
see Xenophon, Anabasis, vi, 4, 10-25; Hellenic. iii, 2, 17.

[362] Herodot. ix, 62, 63. His words about the courage of the
Persians are remarkable: λήματι μέν νυν καὶ ῥώμῃ οὐκ ἕσσονες
ἦσαν οἱ Πέρσαι· ἄνοπλοι δὲ ἐόντες, καὶ πρὸς, ἀνεπιστήμονες ἦσαν,
καὶ οὐκ ὁμοῖοι τοῖσι ἐναντίοισι σοφίην ... πλεῖστον γάρ σφεας
ἐδηλέετο ἡ ἐσθὴς ἐρῆμος ἐοῦσα ὅπλων· πρὸς γὰρ ὁπλίτας ἐόντες
γυμνῆτες ἀγῶνα ἐποιεῦντο. Compare the striking conversation
between Xerxes and Demaratus (Herodot. vii, 104).

The description given by Herodotus of the gallant rush made by
these badly-armed Persians, upon the presented line of spears in
the Lacedæmonian ranks, may be compared with Livy (xxxii, 17),
a description of the Romans attacking the Macedonian phalanx,
and with the battle of Sempach (June, 1386), in which fourteen
hundred half-armed Swiss overcame a large body of fully-armed
Austrians, with an impenetrable front of projecting spears; which
for some time they were unable to break in upon, until at length
one of their warriors, Arnold von Winkelried, grasped an armful
of spears, and precipitated himself upon them, making a way for
his countrymen over his dead body. See Vogelin, Geschichte der
Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, ch. vi, p. 240, or indeed
any history of Switzerland, for a description of this memorable
incident.

[363] For the arms of the Persians, see Herodot. vii, 61.

Herodotus states in another place that the Persian troops adopted
the Egyptian breastplates (θώρηκας): probably this may have been
after the battle of Platæa. Even at this battle, the Persian
leaders on horseback had strong defensive armor, as we may see by
the case of Masistius, above narrated: by the time of the battle
of Kunaxa, the habit had become more widely diffused (Xenoph.
Anabas. i, 8, 6; Brisson, De Regno Persarum, lib. iii, p. 361),
for the cavalry at least.

[364] Herodot. ix, 64, 65.

The Athenians on the left, meanwhile, had been engaged in a serious conflict with the Bœotians; especially the Theban leaders with the hoplites immediately around them, who fought with great bravery, but were at length driven back, after the loss of three hundred of their best troops. The Theban cavalry, however, still maintained a good front, protecting the retreat of the infantry and checking the Athenian pursuit, so that the fugitives were enabled to reach Thebes in safety; a better refuge than the Persian fortified camp.[365] With the exception of the Thebans and Bœotians, none of the other _medizing_ Greeks rendered any real service: instead of sustaining or reinforcing the Thebans, they never once advanced to the charge, but merely followed in the first movement of flight. So that, in point of fact, the only troops in this numerous Perso-Grecian army who really fought, were the native Persians and Sakæ on the left, and the Bœotians on the right: the former against the Lacedæmonians, the latter against the Athenians.[366]

[365] Herodot. ix, 67, 68.

[366] Herodot. ix, 67, 68. Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων τῶν μετὰ βασιλέος
ἐθελοκακεόντων ... καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων ὁ πᾶς ὅμιλος οὔτε
διαμαχεσάμενος οὐδενὶ οὔτε τι ἀποδεξάμενος ἔφυγεν.

Nor did even all the native Persians take part in the combat. A body of forty thousand men under Artabazus, of whom some must doubtless have been native Persians, left the field without fighting and without loss. That general, seemingly the ablest man in the Persian army, had been from the first disgusted with the nomination of Mardonius as commander-in-chief, and had farther incurred his displeasure by deprecating any general action. Apprized that Mardonius was hastening forward to attack the retreating Greeks, he marshalled his division and led them out towards the scene of action, though despairing of success, and perhaps not very anxious that his own prophecies should be contradicted. And such had been the headlong impetuosity of Mardonius in his first forward movement,—so complete his confidence of overwhelming the Greeks when he discovered their retreat,—that he took no pains to insure the concerted action of his whole army: accordingly, before Artabazus arrived at the scene of action, he saw the Persian troops, who had been engaged under the commander-in-chief, already defeated and in flight. Without making the least attempt either to save them or to retrieve the battle, he immediately gave orders to his own division to retreat: not repairing, however, either to the fortified camp, or to Thebes, but abandoning at once the whole campaign, and taking the direct road through Phocis to Thessaly, Macedonia, and the Hellespont.[367]

[367] Herodot. ix, 66.

As the native Persians, the Sakæ, and the Bœotians, were the only real combatants on the one side, so also were the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians, on the other. It has already been mentioned that the central troops of the Grecian army, disobeying the general order of march, had gone during the night to the town of Platæa instead of to the island. They were thus completely severed from Pausanias, and the first thing which they heard about the battle, was, that the Lacedæmonians were gaining the victory. Elate with this news, and anxious to come in for some share of the honor, they rushed to the scene of action, without any heed of military order; the Corinthians taking the direct track across the hills, while the Megarians, Phliasians, and others, marched by the longer route along the plain, so as to turn the hills and arrive at the Athenian position. The Theban horse under Asôpodôrus, employed in checking the pursuit of the victorious Athenian hoplites, seeing these fresh troops coming up in thorough disorder, charged them vigorously, and drove them back to take refuge in the high ground, with the loss of six hundred men.[368] But this partial success had no effect in mitigating the ruin of the general defeat.

[368] Herodot. ix, 69.

Following up their pursuit, the Lacedæmonians proceeded to attack the wooden redoubt wherein the Persians had taken refuge. But though they were here aided by all or most of the central Grecian divisions, who had taken no part in the battle, they were yet so ignorant of the mode of assailing walls, that they made no progress, and were completely baffled, until the Athenians arrived to their assistance. The redoubt was then stormed, not without a gallant and prolonged resistance on the part of its defenders. The Tegeans, being the first to penetrate into the interior, plundered the rich tent of Mardonius, whose manger for his horses, made of brass, remained long afterwards exhibited in their temple of Athênê Alea,—while his silver-footed throne, and cimeter[369] were preserved in the acropolis of Athens, along with the breastplate of Masistius. Once within the wall, effective resistance ceased, and the Greeks slaughtered without mercy as well as without limit; so that if we are to credit Herodotus, there survived only three thousand men out of the three hundred thousand which had composed the army of Mardonius,—save and except the forty thousand men who accompanied Artabazus in his retreat.[370] Respecting these numbers, the historian had probably little to give except some vague reports, without any pretence of computation: about the Grecian loss, his statement deserves more attention, when he tells us that there perished ninety-one Spartans, sixteen Tegeans, and fifty-two Athenians. Herein, however, is not included the loss of the Megarians when attacked by the Theban cavalry, nor is the number of slain Lacedæmonians, not Spartans, specified; while even the other numbers actually stated are decidedly smaller than the probable truth, considering the multitude of Persian arrows and the unshielded right side of the Grecian hoplite. On the whole, the affirmation of Plutarch, that not less than thirteen hundred and sixty Greeks were slain in the action, appears probable: all doubtless hoplites,—for little account was then made of the light-armed, nor indeed are we told that they took any active part in the battle.[371] Whatever may have been the numerical loss of the Persians, this defeat proved the total ruin of their army: but we may fairly presume that many were spared and sold into slavery,[372] while many of the fugitives probably found means to join the retreating division of Artabazus. That general made a rapid march across Thessaly and Macedonia, keeping strict silence about the recent battle, and pretending to be sent on a special enterprise by Mardonius, whom he reported to be himself approaching. If Herodotus is correct (though it may well be doubted whether the change of sentiment in Thessaly and the other _medizing_ Grecian states was so rapid as he implies), Artabazus succeeded in traversing these countries before the news of the battle became generally known, and then retreated by the straightest and shortest route through the interior of Thrace to Byzantium, from whence he passed into Asia: the interior tribes, unconquered and predatory, harassed his retreat considerably; but we shall find long afterwards Persian garrisons in possession of many principal places on the Thracian coast.[373] It will be seen that Artabazus afterwards rose higher than ever in the estimation of Xerxes.

[369] Herodot. ix, 70; Demosthenês cont. Timokrat. p. 741, c. 33.
Pausanias (i, 27, 2) doubts whether this was really the cimeter
of Mardonius, contending that the Lacedæmonians would never have
permitted the Athenians to take it.

[370] Herodot. ix, 70: compare Æschyl. Pers. 805-824. He singles
out “the Dorian spear” as the great weapon of destruction to the
Persians at Platæa,—very justly. Dr. Blomfield is surprised at
this compliment; but it is to be recollected that all the earlier
part of the tragedy had been employed in setting forth the glory
of Athens at Salamis, and he might well afford to give the
Peloponnesians the credit which they derived at Platæa. Pindar
distributes the honor between Sparta and Athens in like manner
(Pyth. i, 76).

[371] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 19. Kleidemus, quoted by Plutarch,
stated that all the fifty-two Athenians who perished belonged
to the tribe Æantis, which distinguished itself in the Athenian
ranks. But it seems impossible to believe that no citizens
belonging to the other nine tribes were killed.

[372] Diodorus, indeed, states that Pausanias was so apprehensive
of the numbers of the Persians, that he forbade his soldiers to
give quarter or take any prisoners (xi, 32); but this is hardly
to be believed, in spite of his assertion. His statement that the
Greeks lost ten thousand men is still less admissible.

[373] Herodot. ix, 89. The allusions of Demosthenês to Perdikkas
king of Macedonia, who is said to have attacked the Persians
on their flight from Platæa, and to have rendered their ruin
complete, are too loose to deserve attention; more especially as
Perdikkas was _not then_ king of Macedonia (Demosthenês cont.
Aristokrat. pp. 687, c. 51; and περὶ Συντάξεως, p. 173, c. 9).

Ten days did the Greeks employ after their victory, first in burying the slain, next in collecting and apportioning the booty. The Lacedæmonians, the Athenians, the Tegeans, the Megarians, and the Phliasians, each buried their dead apart, erecting a separate tomb in commemoration: the Lacedæmonians, indeed, distributed their dead into three fractions, in three several burial-places: one for those champions who enjoyed individual renown at Sparta, and among whom were included the most distinguished men slain in the recent battle, such as Poseidonius, Amompharetus, the refractory captain, Philokyon, and Kallikratês,—a second for the other Spartans and Lacedæmonians,[374]—and a third for the Helots. Besides these sepulchral monuments, erected in the neighborhood of Platæa by those cities whose citizens had really fought and fallen, there were several similar monuments to be seen in the days of Herodotus, raised by other cities which falsely pretended to the same honor, with the connivance and aid of the Platæans.[375] The body of Mardonius was discovered among the slain, and treated with respect by Pausanias, who is even said to have indignantly repudiated advice offered to him by an Æginetan, that he should retaliate upon it the ignominious treatment inflicted by Xerxes upon the dead Leonidas.[376] On the morrow, the body was stolen away and buried; by whom, was never certainly known, for there were many different pretenders who obtained reward on this plea from Artyntês, the son of Mardonius: the funereal monument was yet to be seen in the time of the traveller Pausanias.[377]

[374] Herodot. ix, 84. Herodotus indeed assigns this second
burial-place only to the other _Spartans_, apart from the Select.
He takes no notice of the Lacedæmonians not Spartans, either in
the battle or in reference to burial, though he had informed us
that five thousand of them were included in the army. Some of
them must have been slain, and we may fairly presume that they
were buried along with the Spartan citizens generally. As to
the word ἱρέας, or εἴρενας, or ἱππέας (the two last being both
conjectural readings), it seems impossible to arrive at any
certainty: we do not know by what name these select warriors were
called.

[375] Herodot. ix, 85. Τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ὅσοι καὶ φαίνονται ἐν
Πλαταιῇσι ἐόντες τάφοι, τούτους δὲ, ~ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι~,
ἐπαισχυνομένους τῇ ἀπεστοῖ τῆς μάχης, ἑκάστους χώματα χῶσαι
κεινὰ, τῶν ἐπιγινομένων εἵνεκεν ἀνθρώπων· ἐπεὶ καὶ Αἰγινητέων
ἐστὶ αὐτόθι καλεόμενος τάφος, τὸν ἐγὼ ἀκούω καὶ δέκα ἔτεσι
ὕστερον μετὰ ταῦτα, δεηθέντων τῶν Αἰγινητέων, χῶσαι Κλεάδην τὸν
Αὐτοδίκου, ἄνδρα Πλαταιέα, πρόξεινον ἐόντα αὐτῶν.

This is a curious statement, derived by Herodotus doubtless from
personal inquiries made at Platæa.

[376] Herodot. ix, 78, 79. This suggestion, so abhorrent to
Grecian feeling, is put by the historian into the mouth of
the Æginetan Lampôn. In my preceding note, I have alluded to
another statement made by Herodotus, not very creditable to the
Æginetans: there is, moreover, a third (ix, 80), in which he
represents them as having cheated the Helots in their purchases
of the booty. We may presume him to have heard all these
anecdotes at Platæa: at the time when he probably visited that
place, not long before the Peloponnesian war, the inhabitants
were united in the most intimate manner with Athens, and
doubtless sympathized in the hatred of the Athenians against
Ægina. It does not from hence follow that the stories are all
untrue. I disbelieve, indeed, the advice said to have been given
by Lampôn to crucify the body of Mardonius,—which has more the
air of a poetical contrivance for bringing out an honorable
sentiment, than of a real incident. But there seems no reason to
doubt the truth of the other two stories. Herodotus does but too
rarely specify his informants: it is interesting to scent out the
track in which his inquiries have been prosecuted.

After the battle of Kunaxa, and the death of Cyrus the younger,
his dead body had the head and hands cut off, by order of
Artaxerxes, and nailed to a cross (Xenoph. Anab. i, 10, 1; iii,
1, 17).

[377] Herodot. ix, 84; Pausanias, ix, 2, 2.

The spoil was rich and multifarious,—gold and silver in Darics as well as in implements and ornaments, carpets, splendid arms and clothing, horses, camels, etc., even the magnificent tent of Xerxes, left on his retreat with Mardonius, was included.[378] By order of the general Pausanias, the Helots collected all the valuable articles into one spot for division; not without stealing many of the golden ornaments, which, in ignorance of the value, they were persuaded by the Æginetans to sell as brass. After reserving a tithe for the Delphian Apollo, together with ample offerings for the Olympic Zeus and the Isthmian Poseidon, as well as for Pausanias as general,—the remaining booty was distributed among the different contingents of the army in proportion to their respective numbers.[379] The concubines of the Persian chiefs were among the prizes distributed: there were probably however among them many of Grecian birth, restored to their families; and one especially, overtaken in her chariot amidst the flying Persians, with rich jewels and a numerous suite, threw herself at the feet of Pausanias himself, imploring his protection. She proved to be the daughter of his personal friend Hegetoridês, of Kos, carried off by the Persian Pharandatês; and he had the satisfaction of restoring her to her father.[380] Large as the booty collected was, there yet remained many valuable treasures buried in the ground, which the Platæan inhabitants afterwards discovered and appropriated.

[378] Herodot. ix, 80, 81: compare vii, 41-83.

[379] Diodorus (xi, 33) states this proportional distribution.
Herodotus only says—ἔλαβον ἕκαστοι τῶν ἄξιοι ἦσαν (ix, 81).

[380] Herodot. ix, 76, 80, 81, 82. The fate of these female
companions of the Persian grandees, on the taking of the camp by
an enemy, forms a melancholy picture here as well as at Issus,
and even at Kunaxa: see Diodor. xvii, 35; Quintus Curtius, iii,
xi, 21; Xenoph. Anab. i, 10, 2.

The real victors in the battle of Platæa were the Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and Tegeans: the Corinthians and others, forming part of the army opposed to Mardonius, did not reach the field until the battle was ended, though they doubtless aided both in the assault of the fortified camp and in the subsequent operations against Thebes, and were universally recognized, in inscriptions and panegyrics, among the champions who had contributed to the liberation of Greece.[381] It was not till after the taking of the Persian camp that the contingents of Elis and Mantineia, who may perhaps have been among the convoys prevented by the Persian cavalry from descending the passes of Kithæron, first reached the scene of action. Mortified at having missed their share in the glorious exploit, the new-comers were at first eager to set off in pursuit of Artabazus: but the Lacedæmonian commander forbade them, and they returned home without any other consolation than that of banishing their generals for not having led them forth more promptly.[382]

[381] Plutarch animadverts severely (De Malign. Herodot. p. 873;
compare Plut. Aristeid. c. 19) upon Herodotus, because he states
that none of the Greeks had any share in the battle of Platæa
except the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians: the orator
Lysias repeats the same statement (Oratio Funebr. c. 9).

If this were the fact (Plutarch asks) how comes it that the
inscriptions and poems of the time recognize the exploit as
performed by the whole Grecian army, Corinthians and others
included? But these inscriptions do not really contradict what is
affirmed by Herodotus. The actual battle happened to be fought
only by a part of the collective Grecian army; but this happened
in a great measure by accident; the rest were little more than a
mile off, and until within a few hours had been occupying part of
the same continuous line of position; moreover, if the battle had
lasted a little longer, they would have come up in time to render
actual help. They would naturally be considered, therefore, as
entitled to partake in the glory of the entire result.

When however in after-times a stranger visited Platæa, and saw
Lacedæmonian, Tegean, and Athenian tombs, but no Corinthian nor
Æginetan, etc., he would naturally inquire how it happened that
none of these latter had fallen in the battle, and would then
be informed that they were not really present at it. Hence the
motive for these cities to erect empty sepulchral monuments on
the spot, as Herodotus informs us that they afterwards did or
caused to be done by individual Platæans.

[382] Herodot. ix, 77.

There yet remained the most efficient ally of Mardonius,—the city of Thebes; which Pausanias summoned on the eleventh day after the battle, requiring that the _medizing_ leaders should be delivered up, especially Timêgenidas and Attagînus. On receiving a refusal, he began to batter their walls, and to adopt the still more effective measure of laying waste their territory,—giving notice that the work of destruction would be continued until these chiefs were given up. After twenty days of endurance, the latter at length proposed, if it should prove that Pausanias peremptorily required their persons and refused to accept a sum of money in commutation, to surrender themselves voluntarily as the price of liberation for their country. A negotiation was accordingly entered into with Pausanias, and the persons demanded were surrendered to him, excepting Attagînus, who found means to escape at the last moment. His sons, whom he left behind, were delivered up as substitutes, but Pausanias refused to touch them, with the just remark, which in those times was even generous,[383] that they were nowise implicated in the _medism_ of their father. Timêgenidas and the remaining prisoners were carried off to Corinth, and immediately put to death, without the smallest discussion or form of trial: Pausanias was apprehensive that if any delay or consultation were granted, their wealth and that of their friends would effectually purchase voices for their acquittal,—indeed, the prisoners themselves had been induced to give themselves up partly in that expectation.[384] It is remarkable that Pausanias himself, only a few years afterwards, when attainted of treason, returned and surrendered himself at Sparta, under similar hopes of being able to buy himself off by money.[385] In this hope, indeed, he found himself deceived, as Timêgenidas had been deceived before: but the fact is not the less to be noted, as indicating the general impression that the leading men in a Grecian city were usually open to bribes in judicial matters, and that individuals superior to this temptation were rare exceptions. I shall have occasion to dwell upon this recognized untrustworthiness of the leading Greeks when I come to explain the extremely popular cast of the Athenian judicature.

[383] See, a little above in this chapter, the treatment of the
wife and children of the Athenian senator Lykidas (Herodot. ix,
5). Compare also Herodot. iii, 116; ix, 120.

[384] Herodot. ix, 87, 88.

[385] Thucyd. i, 131. καὶ πιστεύων χρήμασι διαλύσειν τὴν
διαβολήν. Compare Thucyd. viii, 45, where he states that the
trierarchs and generals of the Lacedæmonian and allied fleet,
all except Hermokratês of Syracuse, received bribes from
Tissaphernes to betray the interests both of their seamen and of
their country: also c. 49 of the same book about the Lacedæmonian
general Astyochus. The bribes received by the Spartan kings
Leotychidês and Pleistoanax are recorded (Herodot. vi, 72;
Thucyd. ii, 21).

Whether there was any positive vote taken among the Greeks respecting the prize of valor at the battle of Platæa, may well be doubted: and the silence of Herodotus goes far to negative an important statement of Plutarch, that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians were on the point of coming to an open rupture, each thinking themselves entitled to the prize,—that Aristeidês appeased the Athenians, and prevailed upon them to submit to the general decision of the allies,—and that Megarian and Corinthian leaders contrived to elude the dangerous rock by bestowing the prize on the Platæans, to which proposition both Aristeidês and Pausanias acceded.[386] But it seems that the general opinion recognized the Lacedæmonians and Pausanias as bravest among the brave, seeing that they had overcome the best troops of the enemy and slain the general. In burying their dead warriors, the Lacedæmonians singled out for peculiar distinction Philokyon, Poseidonius, and Amompharetus the lochage, whose conduct in the fight atoned for his disobedience to orders. There was one Spartan, however, who had surpassed them all,—Aristodêmus, the single survivor of the troop of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. Having ever since experienced nothing but disgrace and insult from his fellow-citizens, this unfortunate man had become reckless of life, and at Platæa he stepped forth single-handed from his place in the ranks, performing deeds of the most heroic valor, and determined to regain by his death the esteem of his countrymen. But the Spartans refused to assign to him the same funereal honors as were paid to the other distinguished warriors, who had manifested exemplary forwardness and skill, yet without any desperate rashness, and without any previous taint such as to render life a burden to them. Subsequent valor might be held to efface this taint, but could not suffice to exalt Aristodêmus to a level with the most honored citizens.[387]

[386] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 20; De Herodot. Malign. p. 873.

[387] Herodot. iv, 71, 72.

But though we cannot believe the statement of Plutarch, that the Platæans received by general vote the prize of valor, it is certain that they were largely honored and recompensed, as the proprietors of that ground on which the liberation of Greece had been achieved. The market-place and centre of their town was selected as the scene for the solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, offered up by Pausanias, after the battle, to Zeus Eleutherius, in the name and presence of all the assembled allies. The local gods and heroes of the Platæan territory, who had been invoked in prayer before the battle, and who had granted their soil as a propitious field for the Greek arms, were made partakers of this ceremony, and witnesses as well as guarantees of the engagements with which it was accompanied.[388] The Platæans, now re-entering their city, which the Persian invasion had compelled them to desert, were invested with the honorable duty of celebrating the periodical sacrifice in commemoration of this great victory, as well as of rendering care and religious service at the tombs of the fallen warriors. As an aid to enable them to discharge this obligation, which probably might have pressed hard upon them at a time when their city was half-ruined and their fields unsown, they received out of the prize-money the large allotment of eighty talents, which was partly employed in building and adorning a handsome temple of Athênê,—the symbol probably of renewed connection with Athens. They undertook to render religious honors every year to the tombs of the warriors, and to celebrate in every fifth year the grand public solemnity of the Eleutheria with gymnastic matches analogous to the other great festival games of Greece.[389] In consideration of the discharge of these duties, together with the sanctity of the ground, Pausanias, and the whole body of allies, bound themselves by oath to guarantee the autonomy of Platæa, and the inviolability of her territory. This was an emancipation of the town from the bond of the Bœotian federation, and from the enforcing supremacy of Thebes as its chief.

[388] Thucyd. ii, 71, 72. So the Roman emperor Vitellius, on
visiting the field of Bebriacum, where his troops had recently
been victorious, “instaurabat sacrum Diis loci.” (Tacitus,
Histor. ii, 70.)

[389] Thucyd. ii, 71; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 19-21; Strabo, ix,
p. 412; Pausanias, ix, 2, 4.

The Eleutheria were celebrated on the fourth of the Attic month
Boedromion, which was the day on which the battle itself was
fought; while the annual decoration of the tombs, and ceremonies
in honor of the deceased, took place on the sixteenth of the
Attic month Mæmaktêrion. K. F. Hermann (Gottesdienstliche
Alterthümer der Griechen, ch. 63, note 9) has treated these two
celebrations as if they were one.

But the engagement of the allies appears to have had other objects also, larger than that of protecting Platæa, or establishing commemorative ceremonies. The defensive league against the Persians was again sworn to by all of them, and rendered permanent: an aggregate force of ten thousand hoplites, one thousand cavalry, and one hundred triremes, for the purpose of carrying on the war, was agreed to and promised, the contingent of each ally being specified: moreover, the town of Platæa was fixed on as the annual place of meeting, where deputies from all of them were annually to assemble.[390] This resolution is said to have been adopted on the proposition of Aristeidês, whose motives it is not difficult to trace. Though the Persian army had sustained a signal defeat, no one knew how soon it might reassemble, or be reinforced; indeed, even later, after the battle of Mykalê had become known, a fresh invasion of the Persians was still regarded as not improbable,[391] nor did any one then anticipate that extraordinary fortune and activity whereby the Athenians afterwards organized an alliance such as to throw Persia on the defensive. Moreover, the northern half of Greece was still _medizing_, either in reality or in appearance, and new efforts on the part of Xerxes might probably keep up his ascendency in those parts. Now assuming the war to be renewed, Aristeidês and the Athenians had the strongest interest in providing a line of defence which should cover Attica as well as Peloponnesus, and in preventing the Peloponnesians from confining themselves to their isthmus, as they had done before. To take advantage for this purpose of the new-born reverence and gratitude which now bound the Lacedæmonians to Platæa, was an idea eminently suitable to the moment, though the unforeseen subsequent start of Athens, combined with other events, prevented both the extensive alliance and the inviolability of Platæa, projected by Aristeidês, from taking effect.[392]

[390] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 21.

[391] Thucyd. i, 90.

[392] It is to this general and solemn meeting, held at Platæa
after the victory, that we might probably refer another vow
noticed by the historians and orators of the subsequent century,
if that vow were not of suspicious authenticity. The Greeks,
while promising faithful attachment, and continued peaceful
dealing among themselves, and engaging at the same time to amerce
in a tithe of their property all who had _medized_,—are said to
have vowed that they would not repair or rebuild the temples
which the Persian invader had burnt; but would leave them in
their half-ruined condition as a monument of his sacrilege.
Some of the injured temples near Athens were seen in their
half-burnt state even by the traveller Pausanias (x, 35, 2),
in his time. Periklês, forty years after the battle, tried to
convoke a Pan-Hellenic assembly at Athens, for the purpose of
deliberating what should be done with these temples (Plutarch,
Periklês, c. 17). Yet Theopompus pronounced this alleged oath to
be a fabrication, though both the orator Lykurgus and Diodorus
profess to report it verbatim. We may safely assert that the
oath, _as they give it_, is not genuine; but perhaps the vow of
tithing those who had voluntarily joined Xerxes, which Herodotus
refers to an earlier period, when success was doubtful, may now
have been renewed in the moment of victory: see Diodor. ix,
29; Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 19, p. 193; Polybius, ix, 33;
Isokrates, Or. iv; Panegyr. c. 41, p. 74; Theopompus, Fragm. 167,
ed. Didot; Suidas, v. Δεκατεύειν, Cicero de Republicâ, iii, 9,
and the beginning of the chapter last but one preceding, of this
history.