Chapter XLV (1)

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS AS HEAD. — FIRST FORMATION AND RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

I have already recounted, in the preceding chapter, how the Asiatic Greeks, breaking loose from the Spartan Pausanias, entreated Athens to organize a new confederacy, and to act as presiding city (Vorort),—and how this confederacy, framed not only for common and pressing objects, but also on principles of equal rights and constant control on the part of the members, attracted soon the spontaneous adhesion of a large proportion of Greeks, insular or maritime, near the Ægean sea. I also noticed this event as giving commencement to a new era in Grecian politics. For whereas there had been before a tendency, not very powerful, yet on the whole steady and increasing, towards something like one Pan-Hellenic league under Sparta as president,—from henceforward that tendency disappears and a bifurcation begins: Athens and Sparta divide the Grecian world between them, and bring a much larger number of its members into coöperation, either with one or the other, than had ever been so arranged before.

Thucydidês marks precisely, as far as general words can go, the character of the new confederacy during the first years after its commencement: but unhappily he gives us scarcely any particular facts,—and in the absence of such controlling evidence, a habit has grown up of describing loosely the entire period between 477 B. C., and 405 B. C. (the latter date is that of the battle of Ægos Potamos), as constituting “the Athenian empire.” This word denotes correctly enough the last part, perhaps the last forty years, of the seventy-two years indicated; but it is misleading when applied to the first part: nor, indeed, can any single word be found which faithfully characterizes as well the one part as the other. A great and serious change had taken place, and we disguise the fact of that change, if we talk of the Athenian hegemony, or headship, as a portion of the Athenian empire. Thucydidês carefully distinguishes the two, speaking of the Spartans as having lost, and of the Athenians as having acquired, not empire, but headship, or hegemony.[575] The transition from the Athenian hegemony to the Athenian empire was doubtless gradual, so that no one could determine precisely where the former ends and the latter begins: but it had been consummated before the thirty years’ truce, which was concluded fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war,—and it was in fact the substantial cause of that war. Empire then came to be held by Athens,—partly as a fact established, resting on acquiescence rather than attachment or consent on the minds of the subjects,—partly as a corollary from necessity of union combined with her superior force: while this latter point, superiority of force as a legitimate title, stood more and more forward, both in the language of her speakers and in the conceptions of her citizens. Nay, the Athenian orators of the middle of the Peloponnesian war venture to affirm that their empire had been of this same character ever since the repulse of the Persians: an inaccuracy so manifest, that if we could suppose the speech made by the Athenian Euphêmus at Kamarina in 415 B. C. to have been heard by Themistoklês or Aristeidês fifty years before, it would have been alike offensive to the prudence of the one and to the justice of the other. The imperial state of Athens, that which she held at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when her allies, except Chios and Lesbos, were tributary subjects, and when the Ægean sea was an Athenian lake,—was of course the period of her greatest splendor and greatest action upon the Grecian world. It was also the period most impressive to historians, orators, and philosophers,—suggesting the idea of some one state exercising dominion over the Ægean, as the natural condition of Greece, so that if Athens lost such dominion, it would be transferred to Sparta,—holding out the dispersed maritime Greeks as a tempting prize for the aggressive schemes of some new conqueror,—and even bringing up by association into men’s fancies the mythical Minos of Krete, and others, as having been rulers of the Ægean in times anterior to Athens.

[575] Thucyd. i, 94. ἐξεπολιόρκησαν (Βυζἁντιον) ἐν ~τῇδε τῇ
ἡγεμονίᾳ~, i.e. under the Spartan hegemony, before the Athenians
were invited to assume the hegemony: compare ἡγησάμενοι, i, 77,
and Herodot. viii, 2, 3. Next, we have (i, 95) φοιτῶντές τε (the
Ionians, etc.) πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἠξίουν αὐτοὺς ~ἡγεμόνας~ σφῶν
γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές. Again, When the Spartans send out
Dorkis in place of Pausanias, the allies οὐκέτι ἐφίεσαν ~τὴν
ἡγεμονίαν~. Then, as to the ensuing proceedings of the Athenians
(i, 96)—παραλαβόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ~τὴν ἡγεμονίαν~ τούτῳ τῷ
τρόπῳ ἑκόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ τὸ Παυσανίου μῖσος, etc.: compare
i. 75,—ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων
~ἡγεμόνας~ καταστῆναι, and vi, 76.

Then the transition from the ἡγεμονία to the ἀρχή (i,
97)—ἡγούμενοι δὲ αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν
ξυνόδων βουλευόντων, ~τόσαδε ἐπῆλθον~ πολέμῳ τε καὶ διαχειρίσει
πραγμάτων μεταξὺ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ.

Thucydidês then goes on to say, that he shall notice these
“many strides in advance” which Athens made, starting from her
original hegemony, so as to show in what manner the Athenian
empire, or ἀρχὴ, was originally formed,—ἅμα δὲ καὶ ~τῆς ἀρχῆς~
ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἐν οἵῳ τρόπῳ ~κατέστη~. The
same transition from the ἡγεμονία to the ἀρχὴ is described in
the oration of the Athenian envoy at Sparta, shortly before the
Peloponnesian war (i, 75): but as it was rather the interest
of the Athenian orator to confound the difference between
ἡγεμονία and ἀρχὴ, so, after he has clearly stated what the
relation of Athens to her allies had been at first, and how it
afterwards became totally changed, Thucydidês makes him slur
over the distinction, and say,—οὕτως οὐδ’ ἡμεῖς θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν
πεποιήκαμεν ... ~εἰ ἀρχήν τε διδομένην ἐδεξάμεθα~ καὶ ταύτην μὴ
ἀνεῖμεν, etc.; and he then proceeds to defend the title of Athens
to command on the ground of superior force and worth: which last
plea is advanced a few years afterwards, still more nakedly and
offensively, by the Athenian speakers. Read also the language
of the Athenian Euphêmus at Kamarina (vi, 82), where a similar
confusion appears, as being suitable to the argument.

It is to be recollected that the word _hegemony_, or headship, is
extremely general, denoting any case of following a leader, and
of obedience, however temporary, qualified, or indeed little more
than honorary. Thus it is used by the Thebans to express their
relation towards the Bœotian confederated towns (ἡγεμονεύεσθαι
ὑφ’ ἡμῶν, Thuc. iii, 61, where Dr. Arnold draws attention to the
distinction between that verb and ἄρχειν, and holds language
respecting the Athenian ἀρχὴ, more precise than his language in
the note ad Thucyd. i, 94), and by the Corinthians to express
their claims as metropolis of Korkyra, which were really little
more than honorary,—ἐπὶ τῷ ~ἡγεμόνες~ τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα
θαυμάζεσθαι (Thucyd. i, 38): compare vii, 55. Indeed, it
sometimes means simply a guide (iii, 98; vii, 50).

But the words ἀρχὴ, ἄρχειν, ἄρχεσθαι, voc. pass., are much
less extensive in meaning, and imply both superior dignity and
coercive authority to a greater or less extent: compare Thucyd.
v, 69; ii, 8, etc. The πόλις ἀχὴν ἔχουσα is analogous to ἀνὴρ
τύραννος (vi, 85).

Herodotus is less careful in distinguishing the meanings of these
words than Thucydidês: see the discussion of the Lacedæmonian
and Athenian envoys with Gelo (vii. 155-162). But it is to be
observed that he makes Gelo ask for the ἡγεμονία and not for the
ἀρχὴ,—putting the claim in the least offensive form: compare also
the claim of the Argeians for ἡγεμονία (vii, 148).

Even those who lived under the full-grown Athenian empire had before them no good accounts of the incidents between 479-450 B. C.; for we may gather from the intimation of Thucydidês, as well as from his barrenness of facts, that while there were chroniclers both for the Persian invasion and for the times before, no one cared for the times immediately succeeding.[576] Hence, the little light which has fallen upon this blank has all been borrowed—if we except the careful Thucydidês—from a subsequent age; and the Athenian hegemony has been treated as a mere commencement of the Athenian empire: credit has been given to Athens for a long-sighted ambition, aiming from the Persian war downwards at results which perhaps Themistoklês[577] may have partially divined, but which only time and successive accidents opened even to distant view. But such systematic anticipation of subsequent results is fatal to any correct understanding, either of the real agents or of the real period; both of which are to be explained from the circumstances preceding and actually present, with some help, though cautious and sparing, from our acquaintance with that which was then an unknown future. When Aristeidês and Kimon dismissed the Lacedæmonian admiral Dorkis, and drove Pausanias away from Byzantium on his second coming out, they had to deal with the problem immediately before them; they had to complete the defeat of the Persian power, still formidable,—and to create and organize a confederacy as yet only inchoate. This was quite enough to occupy their attention, without ascribing to them distant views of Athenian maritime empire.

[576] Thucyd. i, 97. τοῖς πρὸ ἐμοῦ ἅπασιν ἐκλιπὲς ἦν τοῦτο τὸ
χωρίον, καὶ ἢ τὰ πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ξυνετίθεσαν ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ Μηδικά·
τούτων δὲ ὅσπερ ~καὶ ἥψατο~ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ξυγγραφῇ Ἑλλάνικος,
βραχέως τε καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ἐπεμνήσθη.

Hellanikus, therefore, had done no more than _touch_ upon the
events of this period: and he found so little good information
within his reach as to fall into chronological blunders.

[577] Thucyd. i, 93. τῆς γὰρ δὴ θαλάσσης πρῶτος ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν
ὡς ἀνθεκτέα ἐστὶ, καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς ξυγκατεσκεύαζεν.

Dr. Arnold says in his note, “εὐθὺς signifies probably
immediately after the retreat of the Persians.” I think it refers
to an earlier period,—that point of time when Themistoklês
first counselled the building of the fleet, or at least when
he counselled them to abandon their city and repose all their
hopes in their fleet. It is only by this supposition that we
get a reasonable meaning for the words ἐτόλμησε εἰπεῖν, “he
was the _first who dared to say_,”—which implies a counsel of
extraordinary boldness. “For he was the first who dared to advise
them to grasp at the sea, and from that moment forward he helped
to establish their empire.” The word ~ξυγκατεσκεύαζε~ seems to
denote a collateral consequence, not directly contemplated,
though perhaps divined, by Themistoklês.

In that brief sketch of incidents preceding the Peloponnesian war, which Thucydidês introduces as “the throwing off of his narrative,”[578] he neither gives, nor professes to give, a complete enumeration of all which actually occurred. During the interval between the first desertion of the Asiatic allies from Pausanias to Athens, in 477 B. C.,—and the revolt of Naxos in 466 B. C.,—he recites three incidents only: first, the siege and capture of Eion, on the Strymon, with its Persian garrison,—next, the capture of Skyros, and appropriation of the island to Athenian kleruchs, or out-citizens,—thirdly, the war with Karystus in Eubœa, and reduction of the place by capitulation. It has been too much the practice to reason as if these three events were the full history of ten or eleven years. Considering what Thucydidês states respecting the darkness of this period, we might perhaps suspect that they were all which he could learn about it on good authority: and they are all, in truth, events having a near and special bearing on the subsequent history of Athens herself,—for Eion was the first stepping-stone to the important settlement of Amphipolis, and Skyros in the time of Thucydidês was the property of outlying Athenian citizens, or kleruchs. Still, we are left in almost entire ignorance of the proceedings of Athens, as conducting the newly-established confederate force: for it is certain that the first ten years of the Athenian hegemony must have been years of most active warfare against the Persians. One positive testimony to this effect has been accidentally preserved to us by Herodotus, who mentions, that “before the invasion of Xerxes, there were Persian commanders and garrisons everywhere in Thrace and the Hellespont,[579] all of whom were conquered by the Greeks after that invasion, with the single exception of Maskamês, governor of Doriskus, who could never be taken, though many different Grecian attempts were made upon the fortress. Of those who were captured by the Greeks, not one made any defence sufficient to attract the admiration of Xerxes, except Bogês, governor of Eion.” Bogês, after bravely defending himself, and refusing offers of capitulation, found his provisions exhausted, and farther resistance impracticable. He then kindled a vast funeral pile,—slew his wives, children, concubines, and family, and cast them into it,—threw his precious effects over the wall into the Strymon,—and lastly, precipitated himself into the flames.[580] His brave despair was the theme of warm encomium among the Persians, and his relatives in Persia were liberally rewarded by Xerxes. This capture of Eion, effected by Kimon, has been mentioned, as already stated, by Thucydidês; but Herodotus here gives us to understand that it was only one of a string of enterprises, all unnoticed by Thucydidês, against the Persians. Nay, it would seem from his language, that Maskamês maintained himself in Doriskus during the whole reign of Xerxes, and perhaps longer, repelling successive Grecian assaults.

[578] Thucyd. i, 97 ἔγραψα δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ ~τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ λόγου~
ἐποιησάμην διὰ τόδε, etc.

[579] Herodot. vii, 106, 107. Κατέστασαν γὰρ ἔτι πρότερον ταύτης
τῆς ἐλάσιος ὕπαρχοι ἐν τῇ Θρηΐκῃ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πανταχῇ.
Οὗτοι ὦν πάντες, οἵ τε ἐκ Θρηΐκης καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, πλὴν
τοῦ ἐν Δορίσκῳ, ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων ὕστερον ταύτης τῆς στρατηλασίης
ἐξῃρέθησαν· τὸν δὲ ἐν Δορίσκῳ Μασκάμην οὐδαμοί κω ἐδυνάσθησαν
ἐξελεῖν, ~πολλῶν πειρησαμένων~.

The loose chronology of Plutarch is little to be trusted; but
he, too, acknowledges the continuance of Persian occupations in
Thrace, by aid of the natives, until a period later than the
battle of the Eurymedon (Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14).

It is a mistake to suppose, with Dr. Arnold, in his note on
Thucyd. viii, 62, “that Sestus was almost the last place held by
the Persians in Europe.”

Weissenborn (Hellen oder Beiträge zur genaueren Erforschung der
altgriechischen Geschichte, Jena, 1844, p. 144, note 31) has
taken notice of this important passage of Herodotus, as well as
of that in Plutarch; but he does not see how much it embarrasses
all attempts to frame a certain chronology for those two or three
events which Thucydidês gives us between 476-466 B. C.

[580] Kutzen (De Atheniensium Imperio Cimonis atque Periclis
tempore constituto. Grimæ, 1837. Commentatio, i, p. 8) has good
reason to call in question the stratagem ascribed to Kimon by
Pausanias (viii, 8, 2) for the capture of Eion.

The valuable indication here cited from Herodotus would be of itself a sufficient proof that the first years of the Athenian hegemony were full of busy and successful hostility against the Persians. And in truth this is what we should expect: the battles of Salamis, Platæa, and Mykalê, drove the Persians out of Greece, and overpowered their main armaments, but did not remove them at once from all the various posts which they occupied throughout the Ægean and Thrace. Without doubt, the Athenians had to clear the coasts and the islands of a great number of different Persian detachments: an operation never short nor easy, with the then imperfect means of siege, as we may see by the cases of Sestus and Eion; nor, indeed, always practicable, as the case of Doriskus teaches us. The fear of these Persians, yet remaining in the neighborhood,[581] and even the chance of a renewed Persian invading armament, formed one pressing motive for Grecian cities to join the new confederacy: while the expulsion of the enemy added to it those places which he had occupied. It was by these years of active operations at sea against the common enemy, that the Athenians first established[582] that constant, systematic, and laborious training, among their own ships’ crews, which transmitted itself with continual improvements down to the Peloponnesian war: it was by these, combined with the present fear, that they were enabled to organize the largest and most efficient confederacy ever known among Greeks,—to bring together deliberative deputies,—to plant their own ascendency as enforcers of the collective resolutions,—and to raise a prodigious tax from universal contribution. Lastly, it was by these same operations, prosecuted so successfully as to remove present alarm, that they at length fatigued the more lukewarm and passive members of the confederacy, and created in them a wish either to commute personal service for pecuniary contribution, or to escape from the obligation of service in any way. The Athenian nautical training would never have been acquired,—the confederacy would never have become a working reality,—the fatigue and discontents among its members would never have arisen,—unless there had been a real fear of the Persians, and a pressing necessity for vigorous and organized operations against them, during the ten years between 477 and 466 B. C.

[581] To these “remaining operations against the Persians” the
Athenian envoy at Lacedæmon alludes, in his speech prior to
the Peloponnesian war—ὑμῶν μὲν (you Spartans) οὐκ ἐθελησάντων
παραμεῖναι ~πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου~, ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων
τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστῆναι, etc.
(Thucyd. i, 75:) and again, iii, 11. τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τῶν ἔργων.

Compare also Plato, Menexen. c. 11. αὐτὸς δὲ ἠγγέλλετο βασιλεὺς
διανοεῖσθαι ὡς ἐπιχειρήσων πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας, etc.

[582] The Athenian nautical training begins directly after
the repulse of the Persians. Τὸ δὲ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐπιστήμονας
γενέσθαι (says Periklês respecting the Peloponnesians, just at
the commencement of the Peloponnesian war) οὐ ῥᾳδίως αὐτοῖς
προσγενήσεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς, μελετῶντες αὐτὸ ~εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῶν
Μηδικῶν~, ἐξείργασθέ πω (Thucyd. i, 142).

As to the ten years from 477-466 B. C., there has been a tendency almost unconscious to assume that the particular incidents mentioned by Thucydidês about Eion, Skyros, Karystus, and Naxos, constitute the sum total of events. To contradict this assumption, I have suggested proof sufficient, though indirect, that they are only part of the stock of a very busy period,—the remaining details of which, indicated in outline by the large general language of Thucydidês, we are condemned not to know. Nor are we admitted to be present at the synod of Delos, which during all this time continued its periodical meetings: though it would have been highly interesting to trace the steps whereby an institution which at first promised to protect not less the separate rights of the members than the security of the whole, so lamentably failed in its object. We must recollect that this confederacy, formed for objects common to all, limited to a certain extent the autonomy of each member; both conferring definite rights and imposing definite obligations. Solemnly sworn to by all, and by Aristeidês on behalf of Athens, it was intended to bind the members in perpetuity,—marked even in the form of the oath, which was performed by casting heavy lumps of iron into the sea never again to be seen.[583] As this confederacy was thus both perpetual and peremptory, binding each member to the rest, and not allowing either retirement or evasion, so it was essential that it should be sustained by some determining authority and enforcing sanction. The determining authority was provided by the synod at Delos: the enforcing sanction was exercised by Athens as president. And there is every reason to presume that Athens, for a long time, performed this duty in a legitimate and honorable manner, acting in execution of the resolves of the synod, or at least in full harmony with its general purposes. She exacted from every member the regulated quota of men or money, employing coercion against recusants, and visiting neglect of military duty with penalties. In all these requirements she only discharged her appropriate functions as chosen leader of the confederacy, and there can be no reasonable doubt that the general synod went cordially along with her[584] in strictness of dealing towards those defaulters who obtained protection without bearing their share of the burden.

[583] Plutarch. Aristeidês. c. 24.

[584] Such concurrence of the general synod is in fact implied
in the speech put by Thucydidês into the mouth of the Mitylenæan
envoys at Olympia, in the third year of the Peloponnesian war:
a speech pronounced by parties altogether hostile to Athens
(Thucyd. iii, 11)—ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μαρτυρίῳ ἐχρῶντο (the Athenians)
μὴ ἂν ~τούς γε ἰσοψήφους ἄκοντας~, εἰ μή τι ἠδίκουν οἷς ἐπῄεσαν,
~ξυστρατεύειν~.

But after a few years, several of the confederates becoming weary of personal military service, prevailed upon the Athenians to provide ships and men in their place, and imposed upon themselves in exchange a money-payment of suitable amount. This commutation, at first probably introduced to meet some special case of inconvenience, was found so suitable to the taste of all parties that it gradually spread through the larger portion of the confederacy. To unwarlike allies, hating labor and privation, it was a welcome relief,—while to the Athenians, full of ardor and patient of labor, as well as discipline, for the aggrandizement of their country, it afforded constant pay for a fleet more numerous than they could otherwise have kept afloat. It is plain from the statement of Thucydidês that this altered practice was introduced from the petition of the confederates themselves, not from any pressure or stratagem, on the part of Athens.[585] But though such was its real source, it did not the less fatally degrade the allies in reference to Athens, and extinguish the original feeling of equal rights and partnership in the confederacy, with communion of danger as well as of glory, which had once bound them together. The Athenians came to consider themselves as military chiefs and soldiers, with a body of tribute-paying subjects, whom they were entitled to hold in dominion, and restrict, both as to foreign policy and internal government, to such extent as they thought expedient,—but whom they were also bound to protect against foreign enemies. The military force of these subject-states was thus in a great degree transferred to Athens, by their own act, just as that of so many of the native princes in India has been made over to the English. But the military efficiency of the confederacy against the Persians was much increased, in proportion as the vigorous resolves of Athens[586] were less and less paralyzed by the contentions and irregularity of a synod; so that the war was prosecuted with greater success than ever, while those motives of alarm, which had served as the first pressing stimulus to the formation of the confederacy, became every year farther and farther removed.

[585] Thucyd. i, 97-99. Αἰτίαι δὲ ἄλλαι ἦσαν τῶν ἀποστάσεων,
καὶ μέγισται, αἱ τῶν φόρων καὶ νεῶν ἐκδεῖαι καὶ λιποστράτιον,
εἴ τῳ ἐγένετο· οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκριβῶς ἔπρασσον, καὶ λυπηροὶ
ἦσαν, οὐκ εἰωθόσιν οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ταλαιπωρεῖν προσάγοντες
τὰς ἀνάγκας. Ἦσαν δέ πως καὶ ἄλλως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ὁμοίως
ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, καὶ οὔτε ξυνεστράτευον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου, ῥᾴδιόν
τε προσάγεσθαι ἦν αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀφισταμένους· ~ὧν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι
ἐγένοντο οἱ ξύμμαχοι~· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόκνησιν ταύτην τῶν
στρατειῶν, οἱ πλείους αὐτῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπ’ οἴκου ὦσι, χρήματα
~ἐτάξαντο~ ἀντὶ τῶν νεῶν τὸ ἱκνούμενον ἀνάλωμα φέρειν, καὶ τοῖς
μὲν Ἀθηναίοις ηὔξετο τὸ ναυτικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς δαπάνης ἣν ἐκεῖνοι
ξυμφέροιεν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ὅποτε ἀποσταῖεν, ἀπαράσκευοι καὶ ἄπειροι ἐς
τὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντο.

[586] See the contemptuous remarks of Periklês upon the debates
of the Lacedæmonian allies at Sparta (Thucyd. i, 141).

Under such circumstances several of the confederate states grew tired even of paying their tribute,—and averse to continuance as members. They made successive attempts to secede, but Athens, acting seemingly in conjunction with the synod, repressed their attempts one after the other,—conquering, fining, and disarming the revolters; which was the more easily done, since in most cases their naval force had been in great part handed over to her. As these events took place, not all at once, but successively in different years,—the number of mere tribute-paying allies as well as of subdued revolters continually increasing,—so there was never any one moment of conspicuous change in the character of the confederacy: the allies slid unconsciously into subjects, while Athens, without any predetermined plan, passed from a chief into a despot. By strictly enforcing the obligations of the pact upon unwilling members, and by employing coercion against revolters, she had become unpopular in the same proportion as she acquired new power,—and that, too, without any guilt of her own. In this position, even if she had been inclined to relax her hold upon the tributary subjects, considerations of her own safety would have deterred her from doing so; for there was reason to apprehend that they might place their strength at the disposal of her enemies. It is very certain that she never was so inclined; it would have required a more self-denying public morality than has ever been practised by any state, either ancient or modern, even to conceive the idea of relinquishing voluntarily an immense ascendency as well as a lucrative revenue: least of all was such an idea likely to be conceived by Athenian citizens, whose ambition increased with their power, and among whom the love of Athenian ascendency was both passion and patriotism. But though the Athenians were both disposed and qualified to push all the advantages offered, and even to look out for new, we must not forget that the foundations of their empire were laid in the most honorable causes: voluntary invitation, efforts both unwearied and successful against a common enemy, unpopularity incurred in discharge of an imperative duty, and inability to break up the confederacy without endangering themselves as well as laying open the Ægean sea to the Persians.[587]

[587] The speech of the Athenian envoy at Sparta, a little before
the Peloponnesian war, sets forth the growth of the Athenian
empire, in the main, with perfect justice (Thucyd. i, 75, 76).
He admits and even exaggerates its unpopularity, but shows that
such unpopularity was, to a great extent, and certainly as to its
first origin, unavoidable as well as undeserved. He of course, as
might be supposed, omits those other proceedings by which Athens
had herself aggravated it.

Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τήνδε (τὴν ἀρχὴν) ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι ... ἐξ
αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν
ἐς τόδε, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον
καὶ ὠφελείας. Καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ἔτι ἐδόκει εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς
ἀπηχθημένους, καί τινων καὶ ἤδη ἀποστάντων κεχειρωμένων,
ὑμῶν τε ἡμῖν οὐκέτι ὁμοίως φίλων, ἀλλ’ ὑπόπτων καὶ διαφόρων
ὄντων, ἀνέντας κινδυνεύειν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν αἱ ἀποστάσεις πρὸς ὑμᾶς
ἐγίγνοντο· πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὰ ξυμφέροντα τῶν μεγίστων πέρι
κινδύνων εὖ τίθεσθαι.

The whole speech well merits attentive study: compare also
the speech of Periklês at Athens, in the second year of the
Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii, 63).

There were two other causes, besides that which has just been adverted to, for the unpopularity of imperial Athens. First, the existence of the confederacy, imposing permanent obligations, was in conflict with the general instinct of the Greek mind, tending towards separate political autonomy of each city, as well as with the particular turn of the Ionic mind, incapable of that steady personal effort which was requisite for maintaining the synod of Delos, on its first large and equal basis. Next,—and this is the great cause of all,—Athens, having defeated the Persians, and thrust them to a distance, began to employ the force and the tribute of her subject-allies in warfare against Greeks, wherein these allies had nothing to gain from success,—everything to apprehend from defeat,—and a banner to fight for, offensive to Hellenic sympathies. On this head, the subject-allies had great reason to complain, throughout the prolonged wars of Greek against Greek, for the purpose of sustaining Athenian predominance: but on the point of practical grievances or oppressions, they had little ground for discontent, and little feeling of actual discontent, as I shall show more fully hereafter. Among the general body of citizens in the subject-allied cities, the feeling towards Athens was rather indifference than hatred: the movement of revolt against her proceeded from small parties of leading men, acting apart from the citizens, and generally with collateral views of ambition for themselves: and the positive hatred towards her was felt chiefly by those who were not her subjects.

It is probable that the same indisposition to personal effort, which prompted the confederates of Delos to tender money-payment as a substitute for military service, also induced them to neglect attendance at the synod. But we do not know the steps whereby this assembly, at first an effective reality, gradually dwindled into a mere form and vanished. Nothing, however, can more forcibly illustrate the difference of character between the maritime allies of Athens, and the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, than the fact,—that while the former shrank from personal service, and thought it an advantage to tax themselves in place of it,—the latter were “ready enough with their bodies,” but uncomplying and impracticable as to contributions.[588] The contempt felt by these Dorian landsmen for the military efficiency of the Ionians recurs frequently, and appears even to have exceeded what the reality justified: but when we turn to the conduct of the latter twenty years earlier, at the battle of Ladê, in the very crisis of the Ionic revolt from Persia,[589]—we detect the same want of energy, the same incapacity of personal effort and labor, as that which broke up the confederacy of Delos with all its beneficial promise. To appreciate fully the indefatigable activity and daring, together with the patient endurance of laborious maritime training, which characterized the Athenians of that day,—we have only to contrast them with these confederates, so remarkably destitute of both. Amidst such glaring inequalities of merit, capacity, and power, to maintain a confederacy of equal members was impossible: it was in the nature of things that the confederacy should either break up, or be transmuted into an Athenian empire.

[588] Thucyd. i, 141. σώμασι δὲ ἑτοιμότεροι οἱ αὐτουργοὶ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων ἢ χρήμασι πολεμεῖν, etc.

[589] See Herodot. vi, 12, and the preceding volume of this
history, chap. xxxv, vol. iv, p. 301.

It has already been mentioned that the first aggregate assessment of tribute, proposed by Aristeidês, and adopted by the synod at Delos, was four hundred and sixty talents in money. At that time many of the confederates paid their quota, not in money but in ships; but this practice gradually diminished, as the commutations above alluded to, of money in place of ships, were multiplied, while the aggregate tribute, of course, became larger. It was no more than six hundred talents[590] at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, forty-six years after the first formation of the confederacy; from whence we may infer that it was never at all increased upon individual members during the interval. For the difference between four hundred and sixty talents and six hundred admits of being fully explained by the numerous commutations of service for money, as well as by the acquisitions of new members, which doubtless Athens had more or less the opportunity of making. It is not to be imagined that the confederacy had attained its maximum number, at the date of the first assessment of tribute: there must have been various cities, like Sinopê and Ægina, subsequently added.[591]

[590] Thucyd. ii, 13.

[591] Thucyd. i, 108; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 20.

Without some such preliminary statements as those just given, respecting the new state of Greece between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, beginning with the Athenian hegemony, or headship, and ending with the Athenian empire, the reader would hardly understand the bearing of those particular events which our authorities enable us to recount; events unhappily few in number, though the period must have been full of action, and not well authenticated as to dates. The first known enterprise of the Athenians in their new capacity—whether the first absolutely or not, we cannot determine—between 476 B. C. and 466 B. C., was the conquest of the important post of Eion, on the Strymon, where the Persian governor, Bogês, starved out after a desperate resistance, destroyed himself rather than capitulate, together with his family and precious effects, as has already been stated. The next events named are their enterprises against the Dolopes and Pelasgi in the island of Skyros, seemingly about 470 B. C., and the Dryopes in the town and district of Karystus, in Eubœa. To the latter, who were of a different kindred from the inhabitants of Chalkis and Eretria, and received no aid from them, they granted a capitulation: the former were more rigorously dealt with, and expelled from their island. Skyros was barren, and had little to recommend it, except a good maritime position and an excellent harbor; while its inhabitants, seemingly akin to the Pelasgian residents in Lemnos, prior to the Athenian occupation of that spot, were alike piratical and cruel. Some Thessalian traders, recently plundered and imprisoned by them, had raised a complaint against them before the Amphiktyonic synod, which condemned the island to make restitution: the mass of the islanders threw the burden upon those who had committed the crime; and these men, in order to evade payment, invoked Kimon with the Athenian armament,—who conquered the island, expelled the inhabitants, and peopled it with Athenian settlers.

Such clearance was a beneficial act, suitable to the new character of Athens as guardian of the Ægean sea against piracy: but it seems also connected with Athenian plans. The island lay very convenient for the communication with Lemnos, which the Athenians had doubtless reoccupied after the expulsion of the Persians,[592] and became, as well as Lemnos, a recognized adjunct, or outlying portion, of Attica: moreover, there were old legends which connected the Athenians with it, as the tomb of their hero Theseus, whose name, as the mythical champion of democracy, was in peculiar favor at the period immediately following the return from Salamis. It was in the year 476 B. C., that the oracle had directed them to bring home the bones of Theseus from Skyros, and to prepare for that hero a splendid entombment and edifice in their new city: they had tried to effect this, but the unsocial manners of the Dolopians had prevented a search, and it was only after Kimon had taken the island that he found, or pretended to find, the body. It was brought to Athens in the year 469 B. C.,[593] and after being welcomed by the people in solemn and joyous procession, as if the hero himself had come back, was deposited in the interior of the city,—the monument called the Theseium, with its sacred precinct being built on the spot, and invested with the privilege of a sanctuary for men of poor condition who might feel ground for dreading the oppressions of the powerful, as well as for slaves in case of cruel usage.[594] Such were the protective functions of the mythical hero of democracy, whose installation is interesting as marking the growing intensity of democratical feeling in Athens since the Persian war.

[592] Xenophon, Hellenic, v, 1, 31.

[593] Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellenic. ad ann. 476 B. C.)
places the conquest of Skyros by Kimon in the year 476 B. C.
He says, after citing a passage from Thucyd. i, 98, and from
Plutarch, Theseus, c. 36, as well as a proposed correction of
Bentley, which he justly rejects: “The island was actually
conquered in the year of the archon Phædon, B. C. 476. This
we know from Thucyd. i, 98, and Diodor. xi, 41-48, combined.
Plutarch named the archon Phædon, with reference to the
_conquest_ of the island: then, by a negligence not unusual with
him, connected the oracle with that fact, as a contemporary
transaction: although in truth the oracle was not procured till
six or seven years afterwards.”

Plutarch has many sins to answer for against chronological
exactness; but the charge here made against him is undeserved. He
states that the oracle was given in (476 B. C.) the year of the
archon Phædon; and that the body of Theseus was brought back to
Athens in (469 B. C.) the year of the archon Aphepsion. There is
nothing to contradict either statement; nor do the passages of
Thucydidês and Diodorus, which Mr. Clinton adduces, prove that
which he asserts. The two passages of Diodorus have, indeed, no
bearing upon the event: and in so far as Diodorus is in this
case an authority at all, he goes against Mr. Clinton, for he
states Skyros to have been conquered in 470 B. C. (Diodor. xi,
60). Thucydidês only tells us that the operations against Eion,
Skyros, and Karystus, took place in the order here indicated,
and at some periods between 476 and 466 B. C.; but he does not
enable us to determine positively the date of either. Upon
what authority Mr. Clinton states, that “the oracle was not
procured till six or seven years afterwards,” (_i. e._, after the
conquest,) I do not know: the account of Plutarch goes rather
to show that it was procured six or seven years _before_ the
conquest: and this may stand good until some better testimony
is produced to contradict it. As our information now stands, we
have no testimony as to the year of the conquest except that of
Diodorus, who assigns it to 470 B. C., but as he assigns both the
conquest of Eion and the expeditions of Kimon against Karia and
Pamphylia with the victories of the Eurymedon, all to the same
year, we cannot much trust his authority. Nevertheless, I incline
to believe him as to the date of the conquest of Skyros: because
it seems to me very probable that this conquest took place in
the year immediately before that in which the body of Theseus
was brought to Athens, which latter event may be referred with
great confidence to 469 B. C., in consequence of the interesting
anecdote related by Plutarch about the first prize gained by the
poet Sophoklês.

Mr. Clinton has given in his Appendix (Nos. vi-viii, pp. 248-253)
two Dissertations respecting the chronology of the period from
the Persian war down to the close of the Peloponnesian war. He
has rendered much service by correcting the mistake of Dodwell,
Wesseling, and Mitford (founded upon an inaccurate construction
of a passage in Isokratês) in supposing, after the Persian
invasion of Greece, a Spartan hegemony, lasting ten years,
prior to the commencement of the Athenian hegemony. He has
shown that the latter must be reckoned as commencing in 477, or
476 B. C., immediately after the mutiny of the allies against
Pausanias,—whose command, however, need not be peremptorily
restricted to one year, as Mr. Clinton (p. 252) and Dodwell
maintain: for the words of Thucydidês, ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ, imply
nothing as to annual duration, and designate merely “the hegemony
which preceded that of Athens.”

But the refutation of this mistake does not enable us to
establish any good positive chronology for the period between
477 and 466 B. C. It will not do to construe Πρῶτον μὲν (Thuc.
i, 98) in reference to the Athenian conquest of Eion, as if it
must necessarily mean “_the year after_” 477 B. C. If we could
imagine that Thucydidês had told us all the military operations
between 477-466 B. C., we should be compelled to admit plenty of
that “interval of inaction” against which Mr. Clinton so strongly
protests (p. 252). Unhappily, Thucydidês has told us but a small
portion of the events which really happened.

Mr. Clinton compares the various periods of duration assigned
by ancient authors to that which is improperly called the
Athenian “empire,”—between 477-405 B. C. (pp. 248, 249.) I
confess that I rather agree with Dr. Gillies, who admits the
discrepancy between these authors broadly and undisguisedly,
than with Mr. Clinton, who seeks to bring them into comparative
agreement. His explanation is only successful in regard to one
of them,—Demosthenês; whose two statements (forty-five years
in one place and seventy-three years in another) are shown to
be consistent with each other as well as chronologically just.
But surely it is not reasonable to correct the text of the
orator Lykurgus from ἐννενήκοντα to ἑβδομήκοντα, and then to
say, that “Lykurgus may be added to the number of those who
describe the period as seventy years,” (p. 250.) Neither are
we to bring Andokidês into harmony with others, by supposing
that “his calculation ascends to the battle of Marathon, from
the date of which (B. C. 490) to the battle of Ægos Potami,
are just eighty-five years.” (Ibid.) Nor ought we to justify a
computation by Demosthenês, of sixty-five years, by saying, “that
it terminates at the Athenian defeat in Sicily,” (p. 249).

The truth is, that there is more or less chronological inaccuracy
in all these passages, except those of Demosthenês,—and
historical inaccuracy in _all_ of them, not even excepting those.
It is not true that the Athenians ἦρξαν τῆς θαλάσσης—ἦρξαν τῶν
Ἑλλήνων—προστάται ἦσαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων—for seventy-three years. The
historical language of Demosthenês, Plato, Lysias, Isokratês,
Andokidês, Lykurgus, requires to be carefully examined before we
rely upon it.

[594] Plutarch (Kimon, c. 8; Theseus, c. 36). ἐστὶ δὲ φύξιον
οἰκέταις καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ταπεινοτέροις καὶ δεδιόσι κρείττονας, ὡς
καὶ τοῦ Θησέως προστατικοῦ τινος καὶ βοηθητικοῦ γενομένου καὶ
προσδεχομένου φιλανθρώπως τὰς τῶν ταπεινοτέρων δεήσεις.

It was about two years or more after this incident, that the first breach of union in the confederacy of Delos took place. The important island of Naxos, the largest of the Cyclades,—an island which thirty years before had boasted a large marine force and eight thousand hoplites,—revolted; on what special ground we do not know: but probably the greater islands fancied themselves better able to dispense with the protection of the confederacy than the smaller,—at the same time that they were more jealous of Athens. After a siege, of unknown duration, by Athens and the confederate force, it was forced to surrender, and reduced to the condition of a tributary subject;[595] its armed ships being doubtless taken away, and its fortifications razed: whether any fine or ulterior penalty was levied, we have no information.

[595] Thucyd. i, 98. It has already been stated in the preceding
chapter, that Themistoklês, as a fugitive, passed close to Naxos
while it was under siege, and incurred great danger of being
taken.

We cannot doubt that the reduction of this powerful island, however untoward in its effects upon the equal and self-maintaining character of the confederacy, strengthened its military force by placing the whole Naxian fleet with new pecuniary contributions in the hands of the chief: nor is it surprising to hear that Athens sought both to employ this new force, and to obliterate the late act of severity, by increased exertions against the common enemy. Though we know no particulars respecting operations against Persia, since the attack on Eion, such operations must have been going on; but the expedition under Kimon, undertaken not long after the Naxian revolt, was attended with memorable results. That commander, having under him two hundred triremes from Athens, and one hundred from the various confederates, was despatched to attack the Persians on the south-western and southern coast of Asia Minor. He attacked and drove out several of their garrisons from various Grecian settlements, both in Karia and Lykia: among others, the important trading city of Phasêlis, though at first resisting, and even standing a siege, was prevailed upon by the friendly suggestions of the Chians in Kimon’s armament to pay a contribution of ten talents and join in the expedition. From the length of time occupied in these various undertakings, the Persian satraps had been enabled to assemble a powerful force, both fleet and army, near the mouth of the river Eurymedon, in Pamphylia, under the command of Tithraustês and Pherendatês, both of the regal blood. The fleet, chiefly Phenician, seems to have consisted of two hundred ships, but a farther reinforcement of eighty Phenician ships was expected, and was actually near at hand, and the commanders were unwilling to hazard a battle before its arrival. Kimon, anxious for the same reason to hasten on the combat, attacked them vigorously: partly from their inferiority of numbers, partly from discouragement at the absence of the reinforcement, they seem to have made no strenuous resistance. They were put to flight and driven ashore; so speedily, and with so little loss to the Greeks, that Kimon was enabled to disembark his men forthwith, and attack the land-force which was drawn up on shore to protect them. The battle on land was long and gallantly contested, but Kimon at length gained a complete victory, dispersed the army with the capture of many prisoners, and either took or destroyed the entire fleet. As soon as his victory and his prisoners were secured, he sailed to Cyprus for the purpose of intercepting the reinforcement of eighty Phenician ships in their way, and was fortunate enough to attack them while yet they were ignorant of the victories of the Eurymedon. These ships too were all destroyed, though most of the crews appear to have escaped ashore on the island. Two great victories, one at sea and the other on land, gained on the same day by the same armament, counted with reason among the most glorious of all Grecian exploits, and were extolled as such in the inscription on the commemorative offering to Apollo, set up out of the tithe of the spoils.[596] The number of prisoners, as well as the booty taken by the victors, was immense.

[596] For the battles of the Eurymedon, see Thucyd. i, 100;
Diodor. xi, 60-62; Plutarch, Kimon, 12, 13.

The accounts of the two latter appear chiefly borrowed from
Ephorus and Kallisthenês, authors of the following century; and
from Phanodemus, an author later still. I borrow sparingly from
them, and only so far as consists with the brief statement of
Thucydidês. The narrative of Diodorus is exceedingly confused,
indeed hardly intelligible.

Phanodemus stated the number of the Persian fleet at six hundred
ships; Ephorus, at three hundred and fifty. Diodorus, following
the latter, gives three hundred and forty. Plutarch mentions the
expected reinforcement of eighty Phenician ships; which appears
to me a very credible circumstance, explaining the easy nautical
victory of Kimon at the Eurymedon. From Thucydidês, we know that
the vanquished fleet at the Eurymedon consisted of no more than
two hundred ships; for so I venture to construe the words of
Thucydidês, in spite of the authority of Dr. Arnold,—Καὶ εἶλον
(Ἀθηναῖοι) τριήρεις Φοινίκων καὶ διέφθειραν τὰς πάσας ἐς (τὰς)
διακοσίας. Upon which Dr. Arnold observes: “Amounting in all to
two hundred: that is, that the whole number of ships taken or
destroyed was two hundred,—not that the whole fleet consisted
of no more.” Admitting the correctness of this construction
(which may be defended by viii, 21), we may remark that the
defeated Phenician fleet, according to the universal practice of
antiquity, ran ashore to seek protection from its accompanying
land-force. When, therefore, this land-force was itself defeated
and dispersed, the ships would all naturally fall into the
power of the victors; or if any escaped, it would be merely by
accident. Moreover, the smaller number is in this case more
likely to be the truth, as we must suppose an easy naval victory
in order to leave strength for a strenuous land-battle on the
same day.

It is remarkable that the inscription on the commemorative
offering only specifics “one hundred Phenician ships with their
crews” as having been captured (Diodor. xi, 62). The other
hundred ships were probably destroyed. Diodorus represents Kimon
as having captured three hundred and forty ships, though he
himself cites the inscription which mentions only one hundred.

A victory thus remarkable, which thrust back the Persians to the region eastward of Phasêlis, doubtless fortified materially the position of the Athenian confederacy against them; but it tended not less to exalt the reputation of Athens, and even to popularize her with the confederates generally, from the large amount of plunder divisible among them. Probably this increased power and popularity stood her in stead throughout her approaching contest with Thasos, at the same time that it explains the increasing fear and dislike of the Peloponnesians.

Thasos was a member of the confederacy of Delos; but her quarrel with Athens seems to have arisen out of causes quite distinct from confederate relations. It has been already stated that the Athenians had within the last few years expelled the Persians from the important post of Eion, on the Strymon, the most convenient post for the neighboring region of Thrace, which was not less distinguished for its fertility than for its mining wealth. In the occupation of this post, the Athenians had had time to become acquainted with the productive character of the adjoining region, chiefly occupied by the Edonian Thracians; and it is extremely probable that many private settlers arrived from Athens, with the view of procuring grants or making their fortunes by partnership with powerful Thracians in working the gold-mines round Mount Pangæus. In so doing, they speedily found themselves in collision with the Greeks of the opposite island of Mount Thasos, who possessed a considerable strip of land, with various dependent towns on the continent of Thrace, and derived a large revenue from the mines of Skaptê Hylê, as well as from others in the neighborhood.[597] The condition of Thasos at this time, about 465 B. C., indicates to us the progress which the Grecian states in the Ægean had made since their liberation from Persia. It had been deprived both of its fortifications and of its maritime force, by order of Darius, about 491 B. C., and must have remained in this condition until after the repulse of Xerxes; but we now find it well-fortified and possessing a powerful maritime force.

[597] About Thasos, see Herodot. vi, 46-48; vii, 118. The
position of Ragusa in the Adriatic, in reference to the despots
of Servia and Bosnia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,
was very similar to that of Athens and Thasos in regard to the
Thracian princes of the interior. In Engel’s History of Ragusa
we find an account of the large gains made in that city by its
contracts to work the gold and silver mines belonging to these
princes (Engel, Geschichte des Freystaates Ragusa, sect. 36, p.
163. Wien, 1807).

In what precise manner the quarrel between the Thasians and the Athenians of Eion manifested itself, respecting the trade and the mines in Thrace, we are not informed; but it reached such a height that the Athenians were induced to send a powerful armament against the island, under the command of Kimon.[598] Having vanquished the Thasian force at sea, they disembarked, gained various battles, and blocked up the city by land as well as by sea. And at the same time they undertook—what seems to have been part and parcel of the same scheme—the establishment of a larger and more powerful colony on Thracian ground not far from Eion. On the Strymon, about three miles higher up than Eion, near the spot where the river narrows itself again out of a broad expanse of the nature of a lake, was situated the Edonian town or settlement called Ennea Hodoi, (Nine Ways), a little above the bridge, which here served as an important communication for all the people of the interior. Both Histiæus and Aristagoras, the two Milesian despots, had been tempted by the advantages of this place to commence a settlement there: both of them had failed, and a third failure on a still grander scale was now about to be added. The Athenians sent thither a large body of colonists, ten thousand in number, partly from their own citizens, partly collected from their allies: and the temptations of the site probably rendered volunteers numerous. As far as Ennea Hodoi was concerned, they were successful in conquering it and driving away the Edonian possessors: but on trying to extend themselves farther to the eastward, to a spot called Drabêskus, convenient for the mining region, they encountered a more formidable resistance from a powerful alliance of Thracian tribes, who had come to the aid of the Edonians in decisive hostility to the new colony,—probably not without instigation from the inhabitants of Thasos. All or most of the ten thousand colonists were slain in this warfare, and the new colony was for the time completely abandoned: we shall find it resumed hereafter.[599]

[598] Thucyd. i, 100, 101; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14; Diodor xi, 70.

[599] Thucyd. i, 101. Philip of Macedon, in his dispute more than
a century after this period with the Athenians respecting the
possession of Amphipolis, pretended that his ancestor, Alexander,
had been the first to acquire possession of the spot after the
expulsion of the Persians from Thrace, (see Philippi Epistola
ap. Demosthen. p. 164, R.) If this pretence had been true, Ennea
Hodoi would have been in possession of the Macedonians at this
time, when the first Athenian attempt was made upon it: but
the statement of Thucydidês shows that it was then an Edonian
township.