Chapter XLII (1)

BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALE. — FINAL REPULSE OF THE PERSIANS.

Though the defeat at Salamis deprived the Persians of all hope from farther maritime attack of Greece, they still anticipated success by land from the ensuing campaign of Mardonius. Their fleet, after having conveyed the monarch himself with his accompanying land-force across the Hellespont, retired to winter at Kymê and Samos: in the latter of which places large rewards were bestowed upon Theomêstor and Phylakus, two Samian captains who had distinguished themselves in the late engagement. Theomêstor was even nominated despot of Samos under Persian protection.[293] Early in the spring they were reassembled, to the number of four hundred sail, but without the Phenicians, at the naval station of Samos, intending, however, only to maintain a watchful guard over Ionia, and hardly supposing that the Greek fleet would venture to attack them.[294]

[293] Herodot. viii, 85.

[294] Herodot. viii, 130; Diodor xi. 27.

For a long time, the conduct of that fleet was such as to justify such a belief in its enemies. Assembled at Ægina in the spring, to the number of one hundred and ten ships, under the Spartan king Leotychidês, it advanced as far as Delos, but not farther eastward: nor could all the persuasions of Chian and other Ionian envoys, despatched both to the Spartan authorities and to the fleet, and promising to revolt from Persia as soon as the Grecian fleet should appear, prevail upon Leotychidês to hazard any aggressive enterprise. Ionia and the western waters of the Ægean had now been for fifteen years completely under the Persians, and so little visited by the Greeks, that a voyage thither appeared, especially to the maritime inexperience of a Spartan king, like going to the Pillars of Hêraklês,[295]—not less venturesome than the same voyage appeared fifty-two years afterwards to the Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas, when he first hazarded his fleet amidst the preserved waters of the Athenian empire.

[295] Herodot. viii, 131, 132: compare Thucyd. iii, 29-32.

Herodotus says, that the Chian envoys had great difficulty in
inducing Leotychidês to proceed even as far as Delos,—τὸ γὰρ
προσωτέρω πᾶν δεινὸν ἦν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι, οὔτε τῶν χώρων ἐοῦσι
ἐμπείροισι, στρατιῆς τε πάντα πλέα ἐδόκεε εἶναι· τὴν δὲ Σάμον
ἐπιστέατο δόξῃ καὶ Ἡρακλέας στήλας ἴσον ἀπέχειν.

This last expression of Herodotus has been erroneously
interpreted by some of the commentators, as if it were a measure
of the geographical ignorance, either of Herodotus himself, or
of those whom he is describing. In my judgment, no inferences
of this kind ought to be founded upon it: it marks fear of an
enemy’s country which they had not been accustomed to visit, and
where they could not calculate the risk beforehand,—rather than
any serious comparison between one distance and another. Speaking
of our forefathers, such of them as were little used to the sea,
we might say,—“A voyage to Bordeaux or Lisbon seemed to them as
distant as a voyage to the Indies,”—by which we should merely
affirm something as to their state of feeling, not as to their
geographical knowledge.

Meanwhile the hurried and disastrous retreat of Xerxes had produced less disaffection among his subjects and allies than might have been anticipated. Alexander, king of Macedon, the Thessalian Aleuadæ,[296] and the Bœotian leaders, still remained in hearty coöperation with Mardonius: nor were there any, except the Phocians, whose fidelity to him appeared questionable, among all the Greeks northwest of the boundaries of Attica and Megaris. It was only in the Chalkidic peninsula, that any actual revolt occurred. Potidæa, situated on the isthmus of Pallênê, together with the other towns in the long tongue of Pallênê, declared themselves independent: and the neighboring town of Olynthus, occupied by the semi-Grecian tribe of Bottiæans, was on the point of following their example. The Persian general, Artabazus, on his return from escorting Xerxes to the Hellespont, undertook the reduction of these towns, and succeeded perfectly with Olynthus. He took the town, slew all the inhabitants, and handed it over to a fresh population, consisting of Chalkidic Greeks, under Kritobulus of Torônê. It was in this manner that Olynthus, afterwards a city of so much consequence and interest, first became Grecian and Chalkidic. But Artabazus was not equally successful in the siege of Potidæa, the defence of which was aided by citizens from the other towns in Pallênê. A plot which he concerted with Timoxenus, commander of the Skiônæan auxiliaries in the town, became accidentally disclosed: a considerable body of his troops perished while attempting to pass at low tide under the walls of the city, which were built across the entire breadth of the narrow isthmus joining the Pallenæan peninsula to the mainland: and after three months of blockade, he was forced to renounce the enterprise, withdrawing his troops to rejoin Mardonius, in Thessaly.[297]

[296] Herodot. ix, 1, 2, 67; viii, 136.

[297] Herodot. viii, 128, 129.

The latter, before he put himself in motion for the spring campaign, thought it advisable to consult the Grecian oracles, especially those within the limits of Bœotia and Phocis. He sent a Karian, named Mys, familiar with the Greek as well as the Karian language, to consult Trophônius at Lebadeia, Amphiaraus, and the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes, Apollo at mount Ptôon near Akræphiæ, and Apollo at the Phocian Abæ. This step was probably intended as a sort of ostentatious respect towards the religious feelings of allies upon whom he was now very much dependent: but neither the questions put, nor the answers given, were made public: and the only remarkable fact which Herodotus had heard was, that the priest of the Ptôian Apollo delivered his answer in Karian, or at least in a language intelligible to no person present except the Karian Mys himself.[298] It appears, however, that at this period, when Mardonius was seeking to strengthen himself by oracles, and laying his plans for establishing a separate peace and alliance with Athens against the Peloponnesians, some persons in his interest circulated predictions, that the day was approaching when the Persians and the Athenians jointly would expel the Dorians from Peloponnesus.[299] The way was thus paved for him to send an envoy to Athens,—Alexander, king of Macedon; who was instructed to make the most seductive offers, to promise reparation of all the damage done in Attica, as well as the active future friendship of the Great King, and to hold out to the Athenians a large acquisition of new territory as the price of their consent to form with him an equal and independent alliance.[300] The Macedonian prince added warm expressions of his own interest in the welfare of the Athenians, recommending them, as a sincere friend, to embrace propositions so advantageous as well as so honorable: especially as the Persian power must in the end prove too much for them, and Attica lay exposed to Mardonius and his Grecian allies, without being covered by any common defence as Peloponnesus was protected by its isthmus.[301]

[298] Herodot. viii, 134, 135; Pausanias, ix, 24, 3.

[299] Herodot. viii. 141. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ... ἀναμνησθέντες τῶν
λογίων, ὥς σφεας χρεόν ἐστι ἅμα τοῖσι ἄλλοισι Δωριεῦσι ἐκπίπτειν
ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ὑπὸ Μήδων τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων, κάρτα τε ἔδεισαν μὴ
ὁμολογήσωσι τῷ Πέρσῃ Ἀθηναῖοι, etc.

Such oracles must have been generated by the hopes of the
_medizing_ party in Greece at this particular moment: there is
no other point of time to which they could be at all adapted,—no
other, in which expulsion of all the Dorians from Peloponnesus,
by united Persians and Athenians, could be even dreamed of.
The Lacedæmonians are indeed said here, “to call to mind the
prophecies,”—as if these latter were old, and not now produced
for the first time. But we must recollect that a fabricator of
prophecies, such as Onomakritus, would in all probability at
once circulate them as old; that is, as forming part of some old
collection like that of Bakis or Musæus. And Herodotus doubtless,
himself, believed them to be old, so that he would naturally give
credit to the Lacedæmonians for the same knowledge, and suppose
them to be alarmed by “calling these prophecies to mind.”

[300] Herodot. ix, 7.

[301] Herodot. viii, 142.

This offer, despatched in the spring, found the Athenians reëstablished wholly or partially in their half-ruined city. A simple tender of mercy and tolerable treatment, if despatched by Xerxes from Thermopylæ the year before, might perhaps have been sufficient to detach them from the cause of Hellas: and even at the present moment, though the pressure of overwhelming terror had disappeared, there were many inducements for them to accede to the proposition of Mardonius. The alliance of Athens would insure to the Persian general unquestionable predominance in Greece, and to Athens herself protection from farther ravage as well as the advantage of playing the winning game: while his force, his position, and his alliances, even as they then stood, threatened a desolating and doubtful war, of which Attica would bear the chief brunt. Moreover, the Athenians were at this time suffering privations of the severest character; for not only did their ruined houses and temples require to be restored, but they had lost the harvest of the past summer, together with the seed of the past autumn.[302] The prudential view of the case being thus favorable to Mardonius rather than otherwise, and especially strengthened by the distress which reigned at Athens, the Lacedæmonians were so much afraid lest Alexander should carry his point, that they sent envoys to dissuade the Athenians from listening to him, as well as to tender succor during the existing poverty of the city. After having heard both parties, the Athenians delivered their reply in terms of solemn and dignified resolution, which their descendants delighted in repeating. To Alexander they said: “Cast not in our teeth that the power of the Persian is many times greater than ours: we too know _that_, as well as thou: but we, nevertheless, love freedom well enough to resist him in the best manner we can. Attempt not the vain task of talking us over into alliance with him. Tell Mardonius that as long as the sun shall continue in his present path, we will never contract alliance with Xerxes: we will encounter him in our own defence, putting our trust in the aid of those gods and heroes to whom he has shown no reverence, and whose houses and statues he has burned. Come thou not to us again with similar propositions, nor persuade us, even in the spirit of good-will, into unholy proceedings: thou art the guest and friend of Athens, and we would not that thou shouldst suffer injury at our hands.”[303]

[302] Herodot. viii, 142. Πιεζευμένοισι μέντοι ὑμῖν συναχθόμεθα
(say the Spartan envoys to the Athenians), καὶ ὅτι καρπῶν
ἐστερήθητε διξῶν ἤδη, καὶ ὅτι οἰκοφθόρησθε χρόνον ἤδη πολλόν.
Seeing that this is spoken before the invasion of Mardonius,
the loss of _two crops_ must include the seed of the preceding
autumn; and the advice of Themistoklês to his countrymen,—καί τις
οἰκίην τε ἀναπλασάσθω, καὶ σπόρου ἀνακῶς ἐχέτω (viii, 109)—must
have been found impracticable in most cases to carry into effect.

[303] Lykurgus the Athenian orator, in alluding to this incident
a century and a half afterwards, represents the Athenians as
having been “on the point of stoning Alexander,”—μικροῦ δεῖν
κατέλευσαν (Lykurg. cont. Leokrat. c. 17. p. 186)—one among many
specimens of the careless manner in which these orators deal with
past history.

To the Spartans, the reply of the Athenians was of a similar decisive tenor: protesting their unconquerable devotion to the common cause and liberties of Hellas, and promising that no conceivable temptations, either of money or territory, should induce them to desert the ties of brotherhood, common language, and religion. So long as a single Athenian survived, no alliance should ever be made with Xerxes. They then thanked the Spartans for offering them aid during the present privations: but while declining such offers, they reminded them that Mardonius, when apprized that his propositions were refused, would probably advance immediately, and they therefore earnestly desired the presence of a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia to assist in the defence of Attica.[304] The Spartan envoys, promising fulfilment of this request,[305] and satisfied to have ascertained the sentiments of Athens, departed.

[304] Herodot. viii, 143, 144; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 10.
According to Plutarch, it was Aristeidês who proposed and
prepared the reply to be delivered. But here as elsewhere, the
loose, exaggerating style of Plutarch contrasts unfavorably with
the simplicity and directness of Herodotus.

[305] Herodot. ix, 7. συνθέμενοι δὲ ἡμῖν τὸν Πέρσην ἀντιώσεσθαι
ἐς τὴν Βοιωτίην, etc.

Diodorus gives the account of this embassy to Athens
substantially in the same manner, coupling it however with some
erroneous motives (xi, 28).

Such unshaken fidelity on the part of the Athenians to the general cause of Greece, in spite of present suffering, combined with seductive offers for the future, was the just admiration of their descendants, and the frequent theme of applause by their orators.[306] But among the contemporary Greeks it was hailed only as a relief from danger, and repaid by a selfish and ungenerous neglect. The same feeling of indifference towards all Greeks outside of their own Isthmus, which had so deeply endangered the march of affairs before the battle of Salamis, now manifested itself a second time among the Spartans and Peloponnesians. The wall across the Isthmus, which they had been so busy in constructing, and on which they had relied for protection against the land-force of Xerxes, had been intermitted and left unfinished when he retired: but it was resumed as soon as the forward march of Mardonius was anticipated. It was, however, still unfinished at the time of the embassy of the Macedonian prince to Athens, and this incomplete condition of their special defence was one reason of their alarm lest the Athenians should accept the terms proposed. That danger being for the time averted, they redoubled their exertions at the Isthmus, so that the wall was speedily brought into an adequate state of defence, and the battlements along the summit were in course of being constructed. Thus safe behind their own bulwark, they thought nothing more of their promise to join the Athenians in Bœotia, and to assist in defending Attica against Mardonius: indeed, their king Kleombrotus, who commanded the force at the Isthmus, was so terrified by an obscuration of the sun at the moment when he was sacrificing to ascertain the inclinations of the gods in reference to the coming war, that he even thought it necessary to retreat with the main force to Sparta, where he soon after died.[307] Besides these two reasons,—indifference and unfavorable omens,—which restrained the Spartans from aiding Attica, there was also a third: they were engaged in celebrating the festival of the Hyakinthia, and it was their paramount object, says the historian,[308] to fulfil “the exigences of the god.” As the Olympia and the Karneia in the preceding year, so now did the Hyakinthia, prevail over the necessities of defence, putting out of sight both the duties of fidelity towards an exposed ally, and the bond of an express promise.

[306] Herodot. ix, 7. ἐπιστάμενοί τε ὅτι κερδαλεώτερόν ἐστι
ὁμολογέειν τῷ Πέρσῃ μᾶλλον ἢ πολεμέειν, etc.

The orators are not always satisfied with giving to Athens the
credit which she really deserved: they venture to represent the
Athenians as having refused these brilliant offers from Xerxes
on his first invasion, instead of from Mardonius in the ensuing
summer. Xerxes never made any offers to them. See Isokratês, Or.
iv, Panegyric, c. 27, p. 61.

[307] Herodot. ix, 10.

[308] Herodot. ix, 7. Οἱ γὰρ δὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὅρταζόν τε τοῦτον
τὸν χρόνον καί σφι ἦν Ὑακίνθια· περὶ πλείστου δ’ ἦγον τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ
πορσύνειν· ἅμα δὲ τὸ τεῖχός σφι τὸ ἐν τῷ Ἰσθμῷ ἐτείχεον, καὶ ἤδη
ἐπάλξεις ἐλάμβανε.

Nearly a century after this, we are told that it was always the
practice for the Amyklæan hoplites to go home for the celebration
of the Hyakinthia, on whatever expedition they might happen to be
employed (Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 5, 11).

Meanwhile, Mardonius, informed of the unfavorable reception which his proposals had received at Athens, put his army in motion forthwith from Thessaly, joined by all his Grecian auxiliaries, and by fresh troops from Thrace and Macedonia. As he marched through Bœotia, the Thebans, who heartily espoused his cause, endeavored to dissuade him from farther military operations against the united force of his enemies,—urging him to try the efficacy of bribes, presented to the leading men in the different cities, for the purpose of disuniting them. But Mardonius, eager to repossess himself of Attica, heeded not their advice: about ten months after the retreat of Xerxes, he entered the country without resistance, and again established the Persian head-quarters in Athens, May or June, 479 B. C.[309]

[309] Diodor. xi, 28; Herodot. ix, 2, 3, 17. οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες
παρεῖχον στρατιὴν καὶ συνεσέβαλον ἐς Ἀθήνας ὅσοι περ ἐμήδιζον
Ἑλλήνων τῶν ταύτῃ οἰκημένων, etc.

Before he arrived, the Athenians had again removed to Salamis, under feelings of bitter disappointment and indignation. They had in vain awaited the fulfilment of the Spartan promise, that a Peloponnesian army should join them in Bœotia for the defence of their frontier; at length, being unable to make head against the enemy alone, they found themselves compelled to transport their families across to Salamis.[310] The migration was far less terrible than that of the preceding summer, since Mardonius had no fleet to harass them; but it was more gratuitous, and might have been obviated had the Spartans executed their covenant, which would have brought about the battle of Platæa two months earlier than it actually was fought.

[310] Herodot. ix, 4.

Mardonius, though master of Athens, was so anxious to conciliate the Athenians, that he at first abstained from damaging either the city or the country, and despatched a second envoy to Salamis to repeat the offers made through Alexander of Macedon: he thought that they might now be listened to, since he could offer the exemption of Attica from ravage, as an additional temptation. Murychidês, a Hellespontine Greek, was sent to renew these propositions to the Athenian senate at Salamis; but he experienced a refusal not less resolute than that of Alexander of Macedon when sent to Athens, and all but unanimous. One unfortunate senator, Lykidas, made an exception to this unanimity, and ventured to recommend acceptance of the propositions of Murychidês. So furious was the wrath, or so strong the suspicion of corruption, which his single-voiced negative provoked, that senators and people both combined to stone him to death: while the Athenian women in Salamis, hearing what had passed, went of their own accord to the house of Lykidas, and stoned to death his wife and children. In the desperate pitch of resolution to which the Athenians were now wound up, an opponent passed for a traitor: unanimity, even though extorted by terror, was essential to their feelings.[311] Murychidês, though his propositions were refused, was dismissed without injury.

[311] Herodot. ix, 5. I dare not reject this story about Lykidas
(see Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 30, p. 222), though other authors
recount the same incident as having happened to a person named
Kyrsilus, during the preceding year, when the Athenians quitted
Athens: see Demosthen. de Coronâ, p. 296, c. 59; and Cicero de
Officiis, iii, 11. That two such acts were perpetrated by the
Athenians, is noway probable: and if we are to choose between
the two, the story of Herodotus is far the more probable. In the
migration of the preceding year, we know that a certain number of
Athenians actually did stay behind in the acropolis, and Kyrsilus
might have been among them, if he had chosen. Moreover, Xerxes
held out no offers, and gave occasion to no deliberation; while
the offers of Mardonius might really appear to a well-minded
citizen deserving of attention.

Isokrates (Or. iv, Panegyric. p. 74, c. 42) states that the
Athenians condemned many persons to death for _medism_ (in
allusion doubtless to Themistoklês as one), but he adds,—“even
now they imprecate curses on any citizen who enters into amicable
negotiation with the Persians,”—ἐν δὲ τοῖς συλλόγοις ἔτι καὶ νῦν
ἀρὰς ποιοῦνται, εἴτις ἐπικηρυκεύεται Πέρσαις τῶν πολιτῶν. It
is difficult to believe that in his time any such imprecation
can have been included in the solemnities whereby the Athenian
meetings were opened.

While the Athenians thus gave renewed proofs of their steadfast attachment to the cause of Hellas, they at the same time sent envoys, conjointly with Megara and Platæa, to remonstrate with the Spartans on their backwardness and breach of faith, and to invoke them even thus late to come forth at once and meet Mardonius in Attica: not omitting to intimate, that if they were thus deserted, it would become imperatively necessary for them, against their will, to make terms with the enemy. So careless, however, were the Spartan ephors respecting Attica and the Megarid, that they postponed giving an answer to these envoys for ten successive days, while in the mean time they pressed with all their efforts the completion of the isthmic fortifications. And after having thus amused the envoys as long as they could, they would have dismissed them at last with a negative answer,—such was their fear of adventuring beyond the Isthmus,—had not a Tegean, named Chileos, whom they much esteemed, and to whom they communicated the application, reminded them that no fortifications at the Isthmus would suffice for the defence of Peloponnesus, if the Athenians became allied with Mardonius, and thus laid the peninsula open by sea. The strong opinion of this respected Tegean, proved to the ephors that their selfish policy would not be seconded by their chief Peloponnesian allies, and brought to their attention, probably for the first time, that danger by sea might again be renewed, though the Persian fleet had been beaten in the preceding year, and was now at a distance from Greece. It changed their resolution, not less completely than suddenly; and they despatched forthwith in the night five thousand Spartan citizens to the Isthmus,—each man with seven Helots attached to him. And when the Athenian envoys, ignorant of this sudden change of policy, came on the next day to give peremptory notice that Athens would no longer endure such treacherous betrayal, but would forthwith take measures for her own security and separate pacification,—the ephors affirmed on their oath that the troops were already on their march, and were probably by this time out of the Spartan territory.[312] Considering that this step was an expiation, imperfect, tardy, and reluctant, for foregoing desertion and breach of promise,—the ephors may probably have thought that the mystery of the night-march, and the sudden communication of it as an actual fact to the envoys, in the way of reply, would impress more emphatically the minds of the latter,—who returned with the welcome tidings to Salamis, and prepared their countrymen for speedy action. Five thousand Spartan citizens, each with seven light-armed Helots as attendants, were thus on their march to the theatre of war. Throughout the whole course of Grecian history, we never hear of any number of Spartan citizens at all approaching to five thousand being put on foreign service at the same time. But this was not all: five thousand Lacedæmonian Periœki, each with one light-armed Helot to attend him, were also despatched to the Isthmus, to take part in the same struggle. Such unparalleled efforts afford sufficient measure of the alarm which, though late yet real, now reigned at Sparta. Other Peloponnesian cities followed the example, and a large army was now collected under the Spartan Pausanias.

[312] Herodot. ix, 10, 11; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 10. Plutarch
had read a decree ascribed to Aristeidês, in which Kimon,
Xanthippus, and Myrônidês, were named envoys to Sparta. But it is
impossible that Xanthippus could have taken part in the embassy,
seeing that he was now in command of the fleet.

Probably the Helots must have followed: one hardly sees how
so great a number could have been all suddenly collected, and
marched off in one night, no preparations having been made
beforehand.

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xvi, p. 366) suspects the
correctness of the narrative of Herodotus, on grounds which do
not appear to me convincing. It seems to me that, after all,
the literal narrative is more probable than anything which we
can substitute in its place. The Spartan foreign policy all
depended on the five ephors; there was no public discussion or
criticism. Now the conduct of these ephors is consistent and
intelligible,—though selfish, narrow-minded, and insensible to
any dangers except what are present and obvious. Nor can I think,
with Dr. Thirlwall, that the manner of communication ultimately
adopted is of the nature of a jest.

It appears that Mardonius was at this moment in secret correspondence with the Argeians, who, though professing neutrality, are said to have promised him that they would arrest the march of the Spartans beyond their own borders.[313] We may reasonably doubt whether they ever made such a promise: but at any rate, the suddenness of the march as well as the greatness of the force prevented them from fulfilling it; and they were forced to content themselves with apprizing Mardonius instantly of the fact, through their swiftest courier. It determined that general to evacuate Attica, and to carry on the war in Bœotia,—a country in every way more favorable to him. He had for some time refrained from committing devastations in or round Athens, hoping that the Athenians might be induced to listen to his propositions; but the last days of his stay were employed in burning and destroying whatever had been spared by the host of Xerxes during the preceding summer. After a fruitless attempt to surprise a body of one thousand Lacedæmonians which had been detached for the protection of Megara,[314] he withdrew all his army into Bœotia, not taking either the straight road to Platæa through Eleutheræ, or to Thebes through Phylê, both which roads were mountainous and inconvenient for cavalry, but marching in the northeasterly direction to Dekeleia, where he was met by some guides from the adjoining regions near the river Asôpus, and conducted through the deme of Sphendaleis to Tanagra. He thus found himself, by a route longer but easier, in Bœotia, on the plain of the Asôpus: along which river he next day marched westward to Skôlus, a town in the territory of Thebes, seemingly near to that of Platæa.[315] He then took up a position not far off, in the plain on the left bank of the Asôpus: his left wing over against Erythræ, his centre over against Hysiæ, and his right in the territory of Platæa: and he employed his army in constructing forthwith a fortified camp[316] of ten furlongs square, defended by wooden walls and towers, cut from trees in the Theban territory.

[313] Herodot. ix, 12.

[314] There were stories current at Megara, even in the time of
Pausanias, respecting some of these Persians, who were said to
have been brought to destruction by the intervention of Artemis
(Pausan. i, 40, 2).

[315] Herodot. ix, 15. The situation of the Attic deme Sphendalê,
or Sphendaleis, seems not certainly known (Ross, Über die Demen
von Attika, p. 138); but Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay think that
it stood “near Aio Merkurio, which now gives name to the pass
leading from Dekeleia through the ridges of Parnes into the
extremity of the Tanagrian plain, at a place called Malakasa.”
(Leake, Athens and the Demi of Attica, vol. ii, sect. iv, p. 123.)

Mr. Finlay (Oropus and the Diakria, p. 38) says that “Malakasa is
the only place on this road where a considerable body of cavalry
could conveniently halt.”

It appears that the Bœotians from the neighborhood of the
Asôpus were necessary as guides for this road. Perhaps even the
territory of Orôpus was at this time still a part of Bœotia: we
do not certainly know at what period it was first conquered by
the Athenians.

The combats between Athenians and Bœotians will be found to
take place most frequently in this southeastern region of
Bœotia,—Tanagra, Œnophyta, Delium, etc.

[316] Herodot. ix, 15.

Mardonius found himself thus with his numerous army, in a plain favorable for cavalry; with a camp more or less defensible,—the fortified city of Thebes[317] in his rear,—and a considerable stock of provisions as well as a friendly region behind him from whence to draw more. Few among his army, however, were either hearty in the cause or confident of success:[318] even the native Persians had been disheartened by the flight of the monarch the year before, and were full of melancholy auguries. A splendid banquet to which the Theban leader Attagînus invited Mardonius, along with fifty Persians and fifty Theban or Bœotian guests, exhibited proofs of this depressed feeling, which were afterwards recounted to Herodotus himself by one of the guests present,—an Orchomenian citizen of note named Thersander. The banquet being so arranged as that each couch was occupied by one Persian and one Theban, this man was accosted by his Persian neighbor in Greek, who inquired to what city he belonged, and, upon learning that he was an Orchomenian,[319] continued thus: “Since thou hast now partaken with me in the same table and cup, I desire to leave with thee some memorial of my convictions: the rather, in order that thou mayst be thyself forewarned so as to take the best counsel for thine own safety. Seest thou these Persians here feasting, and the army which we left yonder encamped near the river? Yet a little while, and out of all these thou shalt behold but few surviving.” Thersander listened to these words with astonishment, spoken as they were with strong emotion and a flood of tears, and replied: “Surely, thou art bound to reveal this to Mardonius, and to his confidential advisers:” but the Persian rejoined: “My friend, man cannot avert that which God hath decreed to come: no one will believe the revelation, sure though it be. Many of us Persians know this well, and are here serving only under the bond of necessity. And truly this is the most hateful of all human sufferings,—to be full of knowledge, and at the same time to have no power over any result.”[320] “This (observes Herodotus) I heard myself from the Orchomenian Thersander, who told me farther that he mentioned the fact to several persons about him, even before the battle of Platæa.” It is certainly one of the most curious revelations in the whole history; not merely as it brings forward the historian in his own personality, communicating with a personal friend of the Theban leaders, and thus provided with good means of information as to the general events of the campaign,—but also as it discloses to us, on testimony not to be suspected, the real temper of the native Persians, and even of the chief men among them. If so many of these chiefs were not merely apathetic, but despondent, in the cause, much more decided would be the same absence of will and hope in their followers and the subject allies. To follow the monarch in his overwhelming march of the preceding year, was gratifying in many ways to the native Persians: but every man was sick of the enterprise as now cut down under Mardonius: and Artabazus, the second in command, was not merely slack but jealous of his superior.[321] Under such circumstances we shall presently not be surprised to find the whole army disappearing forthwith, the moment Mardonius is slain.

[317] The strong town of Thebes was of much service to him
(Thucyd. i, 90).

[318] Herodot. ix, 40, 45, 67; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 18.

[319] Herodot. ix, 16. Thersander, though an Orchomenian, passes
as a Theban—Πέρσην τε καὶ Θηβαῖον ἐν κλίνῃ ἑκάστῃ—a proof of the
intimate connection between Thebes and Orchomenus at this time,
which is farther illustrated by Pindar, Isthm. i, 51 (compare the
Scholia ad loc. and at the beginning of the Ode), respecting the
Theban family of Herodotus and Asôpodôrus. The ancient mythical
feud appears to have gone to sleep, but a deadly hatred will be
found to grow up in later times between these two towns.

[320] Herodot. ix, 16, 17. The last observation here quoted is
striking and emphatic—ἐχθίστη δὲ ὀδύνη ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι
αὕτη, πολλὰ φρονέοντα μηδενὸς κρατέειν. It will have to be
more carefully considered at a later period of this history,
when we come to touch upon the scientific life of the Greeks,
and upon the philosophy of happiness and duty as conceived by
Aristotle. If carried fully out, this position is the direct
negative of what Aristotle lays down in his Ethics, as to the
superior happiness of the βίος θεωρητικὸς, or life of scientific
observation and reflection.

[321] Herodot. ix, 66.

Among the Grecian allies of Mardonius, the Thebans and Bœotians were active and zealous, most of the remainder lukewarm, and the Phocians even of doubtful fidelity. Their contingent of one thousand hoplites, under Harmokydês, had been tardy in joining him, having only come up since he retired from Attica into Bœotia: and some of the Phocians even remained behind in the neighborhood of Parnassus, prosecuting manifest hostilities against the Persians. Aware of the feeling among this contingent, which the Thessalians took care to place before him in an unfavorable point of view, Mardonius determined to impress upon them a lesson of intimidation. Causing them to form in a separate body on the plain, he then brought up his numerous cavalry all around them: while the phêmê, or sudden simultaneous impression, ran through the Greek allies as well as the Phocians themselves, that he was about to shoot them down.[322] The general Harmokydês, directing his men to form a square and close their ranks, addressed to them short exhortations to sell their lives dearly, and to behave like brave Greeks against barbarian assassins,—when the cavalry rode up, apparently to the charge, and advanced close to the square, with uplifted javelins and arrows on the string, some few of which were even actually discharged. The Phocians maintained, as enjoined, steady ranks with a firm countenance, and the cavalry wheeled about without any actual attack or damage. After this mysterious demonstration, Mardonius condescended to compliment the Phocians on their courage, and to assure them, by means of a herald, that he had been greatly misinformed respecting them: he at the same time exhorted them to be faithful and forward in service for the future, and promised that all good behavior should be amply recompensed. Herodotus seems uncertain,—difficult as the supposition is to entertain,—whether Mardonius did not really intend at first to massacre the Phocians in the field, and desisted from the intention only on seeing how much blood it would cost to accomplish. However this may be, the scene itself was a remarkable reality, and presented one among many other proofs of the lukewarmness and suspicious fidelity of the army.[323]

[322] Herodot. ix, 17. διεξῆλθε φήμη, ὡς κατακοντιεῖ σφέας.
Respecting φήμη, see a note a little farther on, at the battle of
Mykalê, in this same chapter.

Compare the case of the Delians at Adramyttium, surrounded
and slain with missiles by the Persian satrap, though not his
enemies—περιστήσας τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ κατηκόντισε (Thucyd. viii, 108).

[323] Οὐκ ἔχω δ’ ἀτρεκέως εἰπεῖν, οὔτε εἰ ἦλθον μὲν ἀπολέοντες
τοὺς Φωκέας, δεηθέντων τῶν Θεσσαλῶν, etc. (Herodot. ix, 18.)

This confession of uncertainty as to motives and plans,
distinguishing between them and the visible facts which he is
describing, is not without importance as strengthening our
confidence in the historian.

Conformably to the suggestion of the Thebans, the liberties of Greece were now to be disputed in Bœotia: and not only had the position of Mardonius already been taken, but his camp also fortified, before the united Grecian army approached Kithæron in its forward march from the Isthmus. After the full force of the Lacedæmonians had reached the Isthmus, they had to await the arrival of their Peloponnesian and other confederates. The hoplites who joined them were as follows: from Tegea, fifteen hundred; from Corinth, five thousand,—besides a small body of three hundred from the Corinthian colony of Potidæa; from the Arcadian Orchomenus, six hundred; from Sikyon, three thousand; from Epidaurus, eight hundred; from Trœzen, one thousand; from Lepreon, two hundred; from Mykênæ and Tiryns, four hundred; from Phlius, one thousand; from Hermionê, three hundred; from Eretria and Styra, six hundred; from Chalkis, four hundred; from Ambrakia, five hundred; from Leukas and Anaktorium, eight hundred; from Palê in Kephallenia, two hundred; from Ægina, five hundred. On marching from the Isthmus to Megara, they took up three thousand Megarian hoplites; and as soon as they reached Eleusis in their forward progress, the army was completed by the junction of eight thousand Athenian hoplites, and six hundred Platæan, under Aristeidês, who passed over from Salamis.[324] The total force of hoplites, or heavy-armed troops, was thus thirty-eight thousand seven hundred men: there were no cavalry, and but very few bowmen; but if we add those who are called light-armed, or unarmed generally,—some perhaps with javelins or swords, but none with any defensive armor,—the grand total was not less than one hundred and ten thousand men. Of these light-armed, or unarmed, there were, as computed by Herodotus; thirty-five thousand in attendance on the five thousand Spartan citizens, and thirty-four thousand five hundred in attendance on the other hoplites,—together with eighteen hundred Thespians, who were properly hoplites, yet so badly armed as not to be reckoned in the ranks.[325]

[324] Compare this list of Herodotus with the enumeration which
Pausanias read inscribed on the statue of Zeus, erected at
Olympia by the Greeks who took part in the battle of Platæa
(Pausan. v, 23, 1).

Pausanias found inscribed all the names here indicated by
Herodotus except the Palês of Kephallenia: and he found in
addition the Eleians Keans, Kythnians, Tenians, Naxians, and
Mêlians. The five last names are islanders in the Ægean:
their contingents sent to Platæa must, at all events, have
been very small, and it is surprising to hear that they sent
any,—especially when we recollect that there was a Greek fleet at
this moment on service, to which it would be natural that they
should join themselves in preference to land-service.

With respect to the name of the Eleians, the suspicion of
Bröndstedt is plausible, that Pausanias may have mistaken the
name of the Palês of Kephallenia for theirs, and may have fancied
that he read FΑΛΕΙΟΙ when it was really written ΠΑΛΕΙΣ, in an
inscription at that time about six hundred years old. The place
in the series wherein Pausanias places the name of the Eleians,
strengthens the suspicion. Unless it be admitted, we shall be
driven, as the most probable alternative, to suppose a fraud
committed by the vanity of the Eleians, which may easily have
led them to alter a name originally belonging to the Palês.
The reader will recollect that the Eleians were themselves the
superintendents and curators at Olympia.

Plutarch seems to have read the same inscription as Pausanias (De
Herodoti Malignit. p. 873).

[325] Herodot. ix, 19, 28, 29.

Such was the number of Greeks present or near at hand in the combat against the Persians at Platæa, which took place some little time afterwards: but it seems that the contingents were not at first completely full, and that new additions[326] continued to arrive until a few days before the battle, along with the convoys of cattle and provisions which came for the subsistence of the army. Pausanias marched first from the Isthmus to Eleusis, where he was joined by the Athenians from Salamis: at Eleusis, as well as at the Isthmus, the sacrifices were found encouraging, and the united army then advanced across the ridge of Kithæron, so as to come within sight of the Persians. When Pausanias saw them occupying the line of the Asôpus in the plain beneath, he kept his own army on the mountain declivity near Erythræ, without choosing to adventure himself in the level ground. Mardonius, finding them not disposed to seek battle in the plain, despatched his numerous and excellent cavalry under Masistius, the most distinguished officer in his army, to attack them. For the most part, the ground was so uneven as to check their approach,—but the Megarian contingent, which happened to be more exposed than the rest, were so hard pressed that they were forced to send to Pausanias for aid. They appear to have had not only no cavalry, but no bowmen or light-armed troops of any sort with missile weapons; while the Persians, excellent archers and darters, using very large bows, and trained in such accomplishments from their earliest childhood, charged in successive squadrons and overwhelmed the Greeks with darts and arrows,—not omitting contemptuous taunts on their cowardice for keeping back from the plain.[327] So general was then the fear of the Persian cavalry, that Pausanias could find none of the Greeks, except the Athenians, willing to volunteer and go to the rescue of the Megarians. A body of Athenians, however, especially three hundred chosen troops under Olympiodorus, strengthened with some bowmen, immediately marched to the spot and took up the combat with the Persian cavalry. For some time the struggle was sharp and doubtful: at length the general, Masistius,—a man renowned for bravery, lofty in stature, clad in conspicuous armor, and mounted on a Nisæan horse with golden trappings,—charging at the head of his troops, had his horse struck by an arrow in the side. The animal immediately reared and threw his master on the ground, close to the ranks of the Athenians, who, rushing forward, seized the horse, and overpowered Masistius before he could rise. So impenetrable were the defences of his helmet and breastplate,[328] however, that they had considerable difficulty in killing him, though he was in their power: at length a spearman pierced him in the eye. The death of the general passed unobserved by the Persian cavalry, but as soon as they missed him and became aware of the loss, they charged furiously and in one mass to recover the dead body. At first the Athenians, too few in number to resist the onset, were compelled for a time to give way, abandoning the body; but reinforcements presently arriving at their call, the Persians were driven back with loss, and it finally remained in their possession.[329]

[326] Herodot. ix, 28. οἱ ἐπιφοιτῶντές τε καὶ οἱ ἀρχὴν ἐλθόντες
Ἑλλήνων.

[327] About the missile weapons and skill of the Persians, see
Herodot. i, 136; Xenophon, Anabas. iii, 4, 17.

Cyrus the younger was eminent in the use both of the bow and the
javelin (Xenoph. Anab. i, 8, 26; i, 9, 5: compare Cyropæd. i, 2,
4).

[328] See Quintus Curtius, iii, 11, 15; and the note of Mützel.

[329] Herodot. ix, 21, 22, 23; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 14.

The death of Masistius, coupled with that final repulse of the cavalry which left his body in possession of the Greeks, produced a strong effect on both armies, encouraging the one as much as it disheartened the other. Throughout the camp of Mardonius, the grief was violent and unbounded, manifested by wailings so loud as to echo over all Bœotia; while the hair of men, horses, and cattle, was abundantly cut in token of mourning. The Greeks, on the other hand, overjoyed at their success, placed the dead body in a cart, and paraded it around the army: even the hoplites ran out of their ranks to look at it; not only hailing it as a valuable trophy, but admiring its stature and proportions.[330] And so much was their confidence increased, that Pausanias now ventured to quit the protection of the mountain-ground, inconvenient from its scanty supply of water, and to take up his position in the plain beneath, interspersed only with low hillocks. Marching from Erythræ in a westerly direction along the declivities of Kithæron, and passing by Hysiæ, the Greeks occupied a line of camp in the Platæan territory along the Asôpus and on its right bank; with their right wing near to the fountain called Gargaphia,[331] and their left wing near to the chapel, surrounded by a shady grove, of the Platæan hero, Androkratês. In this position they were marshalled according to nations, or separate fractions of the Greek name,—the Lacedæmonians on the right wing, with the Tegeans and Corinthians immediately joining them,—and the Athenians on the left wing; a post which, as second in point of dignity, was at first claimed by the Tegeans, chiefly on grounds of mythical exploits, to the exclusion of the Athenians, but ultimately adjudged by the Spartans, after hearing both sides, to Athens.[332] In the field, even Lacedæmonians followed those democratical forms which pervaded so generally Grecian military operations: in this case, it was not the generals, but the Lacedæmonian troops in a body, who heard the argument, and delivered the verdict by unanimous acclamation.

[330] Herodot. ix, 24, 25. οἰμωγῇ τε χρεώμενοι ἀπλέτῳ· ἅπασαν γὰρ
τὴν Βοιωτίην κατεῖχε ἠχώ, etc.

The exaggerated demonstrations of grief, ascribed to Xerxes and
Atossa. in the Persæ of Æschylus, have often been blamed by
critics: we may see from this passage how much they are in the
manners of Orientals of that day.

[331] Herodot. ix, 25-30; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 11. τὸ τοῦ
Ἀνδροκράτους ἡρῷον ἐγγὺς ἄλσει πυκνῶν καὶ συσκίων δένδρων
περιεχόμενον.

The expression of Herodotus respecting this position taken by
Pausanias, Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταχθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀσωπῷ ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο,
as well as the words which follow in the next chapter (31)—Οἱ
βάρβαροι, πυθόμενοι εἶναι τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐν Πλαταιῇσι, παρῇσαν καὶ
αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀσωπὸν τὸν ταύτῃ ῥέοντα,—show plainly that the
Grecian troops were encamped along the Asôpus on the Platæan
side, while the Persians in their second position occupied the
ground on the opposite, or Theban side of the river. Whichever
army commenced the attack had to begin by passing the Asôpus (c.
36-59).

For the topography of this region, and of the positions occupied
by the two armies, compare Squire, in Walpole’s Turkey, p. 338;
Kruse, Hellas, vol. ii, ch. vi, p. 9, _seq._, and ch. viii, p.
592. _seq._: and the still more copious and accurate information
of Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, ch. xvi, vol. ii,
pp. 324-360. Both of them have given plans of the region; that
which I annex is borrowed from Kiepert’s maps. I cannot but think
that the fountain Gargaphia is not yet identified, and that both
Kruse and Leake place the Grecian position farther from the river
Asôpus than is consistent with the words of Herodotus; which
words seem to specify points near the two extremities, indicating
that the fountain of Gargaphia was near the river towards the
right of the Grecian position, and the chapel of Androkratês
also _near_ the river towards the left of that position, where
the Athenians were posted. Nor would such a site for a chapel of
Androkratês be inconsistent with Thucydides (iii, 24), who merely
mentions that chapel as being on the right hand of the first mile
of road from Platæa to Thebes.

Considering the length of time which has elapsed since the
battle, it would not be surprising if the spring of Gargaphia
were no longer recognizable. At any rate, neither the fountain
pointed out by Colonel Leake (p. 332) nor that of Vergutiani,
which had been supposed by Colonel Squire and Dr. Clarke, appear
to me suitable for Gargaphia.

The errors of that plan of the battle of Platæa which accompanies
the Voyage d’Anacharsis, are now well understood.

[332] Herodot. ix, 26-29. Judging from the battles of Corinth (B.
C. 396) and Mantineia (B. C. 418), the Tegeans seem afterwards to
have dropped this pretension to occupy the left wing, and to have
preferred the post in the line next to the Lacedæmonians (Xenoph.
Hellen. iv, 2, 19).

Mardonius, apprized of this change of position, marched his army also a little farther to the westward, and posted himself opposite to the Greeks, divided from them by the river Asôpus. At the suggestion of the Thebans, he himself, with his Persians and Medes, the picked men of his army, took post on the left wing, immediately opposite to the Lacedæmonians on the Greek right, and even extending so far as to cover the Tegean ranks on the left of the Lacedæmonians: Baktrians, Indians, Sakæ, with other Asiatics and Egyptians, filled the centre: and the Greeks and Macedonians in the service of Persia, the right,—over against the hoplites of Athens. The numbers of these last-mentioned Greeks Herodotus could not learn, though he estimates them conjecturally at fifty thousand:[333] nor can we place any confidence in the total of three hundred thousand, which he gives as belonging to the other troops of Mardonius, though probably it cannot have been much less.

[333] Herodot. ix, 31, 32.

In this position lay the two armies, separated only by a narrow space including the river Asôpus, and each expecting a battle, whilst the sacrifices on behalf of each were offered up. Pausanias, Mardonius, and the Greeks in the Persian army, had each a separate prophet to offer sacrifice, and to ascertain the dispositions of the gods; the two first had men from the most distinguished prophetic breeds in Elis,—the latter invited one from Leukas.[334] All received large pay, and the prophet of Pausanias had indeed been honored with a recompense above all pay,—the gift of full Spartan citizenship for himself as well as for his brother. It happened that the prophets on both sides delivered the same report of their respective sacrifices,—favorable for resistance if attacked; unfavorable for beginning the battle. At a moment when doubt and indecision was the reigning feeling on both sides, this was the safest answer for the prophet to give, and the most satisfactory for the soldiers to hear. And though the answer from Delphi had been sufficiently encouraging, and the kindness of the patron-heroes of Platæa[335] had been solemnly invoked, yet Pausanias did not venture to cross the Asôpus and begin the attack, in the face of a pronounced declaration from his prophet. Nor did even Hegesistratus, the prophet employed by Mardonius, choose on his side to urge an aggressive movement, though he had a deadly personal hatred against the Lacedæmonians, and would have been delighted to see them worsted. There arose commencements of conspiracy, perhaps encouraged by promises or bribes from the enemy, among the wealthier Athenian hoplites, to establish an oligarchy at Athens under Persian supremacy, like that which now existed at Thebes,—a conspiracy full of danger at such a moment, though fortunately repressed[336] by Aristeidês, with a hand at once gentle and decisive. More over, the annoyance inflicted by the Persian cavalry, under the guidance of the Thebans, was incessant: their constant assaults, and missile weapons from the other side of the Asôpus, prevented the Greeks from using it for supplies of water, so that the whole army was forced to water at the fountain Gargaphia, at the extreme right of the position,[337] near the Lacedæmonian hoplites. Moreover, the Theban leader, Timegenidas, remarking the convoys which arrived over the passes of Kithæron, in the rear of the Grecian camp, and the constant reinforcements of hoplites which accompanied them, prevailed upon Mardonius to employ his cavalry in cutting off such communication. The first movement of this sort, undertaken by night against the pass called the Oak Heads, was eminently successful: a train of five hundred beasts of burden with supplies, was attacked descending into the plain with its escort, all of whom were either slain or carried prisoners to the Persian camp: nor was it safe for any farther convoys to approach the Greeks.[338] Eight days had already been passed in inaction before Timegenidas suggested, or Mardonius executed, this manœuvre, which it is fortunate for the Greeks that he did not attempt earlier, and which afforded clear proof how much might be hoped from an efficient employment of his cavalry, without the ruinous risk of a general action. Nevertheless, after waiting two days longer, his impatience became uncontrollable, and he determined on a general battle forthwith.[339] In vain did Artabazus endeavor to dissuade him from the step,—taking the same view as the Thebans, that in a pitched battle the united Grecian army was invincible, and that the only successful policy was that of delay and corruption to disunite them: he recommended standing on the defensive, by means of Thebes, well fortified and amply provisioned,—which would allow time for distributing effective bribes among the leading men throughout the various Grecian cities. This suggestion, which Herodotus considers as wise and likely to succeed, was repudiated by Mardonius as cowardly and unworthy of the recognized superiority of the Persian arms.[340]

[334] Herodot. ix, 36, 38. μεμισθωμένος οὐκ ὀλίγου.

These prophets were men of great individual consequence, as may
be seen by the details which Herodotus gives respecting their
adventures: compare also the history of Euenius, ix, 93.

[335] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. xi; Thucyd. ii, 74.

[336] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 13.

[337] Herodot. ix, 40, 49, 50. τήν τε κρήνην τὴν Γαργαφίην, ἀπ’
ἧς ὑδρεύετο πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα τὸ Ἑλληνικόν—ἐρυκόμενοι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ
Ἀσωποῦ, οὕτω δὴ ἐπὶ τὴν κρήνην ἐφοίτεον· ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ γάρ σφι
οὐκ ἐξῆν ὕδωρ φορέεσθαι, ὑπό τε τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τοξευμάτων.