Chapter XLVII (3)

M. Boeckh draws a distinction between the _autonomous_
allies (Chios and Lesbos, at the time immediately before the
Peloponnesian war) and the _subject_-allies: “the former class
(he says) retained possession of unlimited jurisdiction, whereas
the latter were compelled to try all their disputes in the
courts of Athens.” Doubtless this distinction would prevail
to a certain degree, but how far it was pushed we can hardly
say. Suppose that a dispute took place between Chios and one
of the subject islands, or between an individual Chian and an
individual Thasian; would not the Chian plaintiff sue, or the
Chian defendant be sued, before the Athenian dikastery? Suppose
that an Athenian citizen or officer became involved in dispute
with a Chian, would not the Athenian dikastery be the competent
court, whichever of the two were plaintiff or defendant? Suppose
a Chian citizen or magistrate to be suspected of fomenting
revolt, would it not be competent to any accuser, either Chian or
Athenian, to indict him before the dikastery at Athens? Abuse of
power, or peculation, committed by Athenian officers at Chios,
must of course be brought before the Athenian dikasteries, just
as much as if the crime had been committed at Thasos or Naxos.
We have no evidence to help us in regard to these questions; but
I incline to believe that the difference in respect to judicial
arrangement, between the autonomous and the subject-allies, was
less in degree than M. Boeckh believes. We must recollect that
the arrangement was not all pure hardship to the allies,—the
liability to be prosecuted was accompanied with the privilege of
prosecuting for injuries received.

There is one remark, however, which appears to me of importance
for understanding the testimonies on this subject. The Athenian
empire, properly so called, which began by the confederacy of
Delos after the Persian invasion, was completely destroyed at
the close of the Peloponnesian war, when Athens was conquered
and taken. But after some years had elapsed, towards the year
377 B.C., Athens again began to make maritime conquests, to
acquire allies, to receive tribute, to assemble a synod, and to
resume her footing of something like an imperial city. But her
power over her allies, during this second period of empire, was
nothing like so great as it had been during the first, between
the Persian and Peloponnesian wars: nor can we be at all sure
that what is true of the second is also true of the first. Now
I think it probable, that those statements of the grammarians,
which represent the allies as carrying on δίκας ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων in
ordinary practice with the Athenians, may really be true about
the second empire or alliance. Bekker Anecdota, p. 436. Ἀθηναῖοι
ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων ἐδίκαζον τοῖς ὑπηκόοις· οὕτως Ἀριστοτέλης. Pollux,
viii. 63. Ἀπὸ συμβόλων δὲ δίκη ἦν, ὅτε οἱ σύμμαχοι ἐδικάζοντο.
Also Hesychius, i, 489. The statement here ascribed to Aristotle
may very probably be true about the second alliance, though it
cannot be held true for the first. In the second, the Athenians
may really have had σύμβολα, or special conventions for judicial
business, with many of their principal allies, instead of making
Athens the authoritative centre, and heir to the Delian synod, as
they did during the first. It is to be remarked, however, that
Harpokration, in the explanation which he gives of σύμβολα treats
them in a perfectly general way, as contentions for settlement
of judicial controversy between city and city, without any
particular allusion to Athens and her allies. Compare Heffter,
Athenäische Gerichtsverfassung, iii, 1, 3, p. 91.

[84] Thucyd. i. 77. Οἱ δὲ (the allies) ~εἰθισμένοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ
τοῦ ἴσου ὁμιλεῖν~, etc.

[85] Compare Isokratês, Or. iv, Panegyric. pp. 62-66, sects.
116-138; and Or. xii, Panathenaic. pp. 247-254, sects. 72-111;
Or. viii, De Pace, p. 178, sect. 119, _seqq._; Plutarch, Lysand.
c. 13; Cornel. Nepos, Lysand. c. 2, 3.

[86] Xenophon, Repub. Ath. i, 17.

[87] Xenophon, Repub. Ath. i, 16. He states it as one of the
advantageous consequences, which induced the Athenians to bring
the suits and complaints of the allies to Athens for trial—that
the prytaneia, or fees paid upon entering a cause for trial,
became sufficiently large to furnish all the pay for the dikasts
throughout the year.

But in another part of his treatise (iii, 2, 3), he represents
the Athenian dikasteries as overloaded with judicial business,
much more than they could possibly get through; insomuch that
there were long delays before causes could be brought on for
trial. It could hardly be any great object, therefore, to
multiply complaints artificially, in order to make fees for the
dikasts.

We are now considering the Athenian empire as it stood before the Peloponnesian war; before the increased exactions and the multiplied revolts, to which that war gave rise,—before the cruelties which accompanied the suppression of those revolts, and which so deeply stained the character of Athens,—before that aggravated fierceness, mistrust, contempt of obligation, and rapacious violence, which Thucydidês so emphatically indicates as having been infused into the Greek bosom by the fever of an all-pervading contest.[88] There had been before this time many revolts of the Athenian dependencies, from the earliest at Naxos down to the latest at Samos: all had been successfully suppressed, but in no case had Athens displayed the same unrelenting rigor as we shall find hereafter manifested towards Mitylênê, Skiônê, and Mêlos. The policy of Periklês, now in the plenitude of his power at Athens, was cautious and conservative, averse to forced extension of empire as well as to those increased burdens on the dependent allies which such schemes would have entailed, and tending to maintain that assured commerce in the Ægean by which all of them must have been gainers,—not without a conviction that the contest must arise sooner or later between Athens and Sparta, and that the resources as well as the temper of the allies must be husbanded against that contingency. If we read in Thucydidês the speech of the envoy from Mitylênê[89] at Olympia, delivered to the Lacedæmonians and their allies in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war, on occasion of the revolt of the city from Athens,—a speech imploring aid and setting forth the strongest case against Athens which the facts could be made to furnish,—we shall be surprised how weak the case is, and how much the speaker is conscious of its weakness. He has nothing like practical grievances and oppressions to urge against the imperial city,—he does not dwell upon enormity of tribute, unpunished misconduct of Athenian officers, hardship of bringing causes for trial to Athens, or other sufferings of the subjects generally,—he has nothing to say except that they were defenceless and degraded subjects, and that Athens held authority over them without and against their own consent: and in the case of Mitylênê, not so much as this could be said, since she was on the footing of an equal, armed, and autonomous ally. Of course, this state of forced dependence was one which the allies, or such of them as could stand alone, would naturally and reasonably shake off whenever they had an opportunity:[90] but the negative evidence, derived from the speech of the Mitylenæan orator, goes far to make out the point contended for by the Athenian speaker at Sparta immediately before the war,—that, beyond the fact of such forced dependence, the allies had little practically to complain of. A city like Mitylênê, moreover, would be strong enough to protect itself and its own commerce without the help of Athens: but to the weaker allies, the breaking up of the Athenian empire would have greatly lessened the security both of individuals and of commerce, in the waters of the Ægean, and their freedom would thus have been purchased at the cost of considerable positive disadvantages.[91]

[88] See his well-known comments on the seditions at Korkyra,
iii, 82, 83.

[89] Thucyd. iii, 11-14.

[90] So the Athenian orator Diodotus puts it in his speech
deprecating the extreme punishment about to be inflicted on
Mitylênê—ἤν τινα ἐλεύθερον καὶ βίᾳ ἀρχόμενον ~εἰκότως πρὸς
αὐτονομίαν ἀποστάντα χειρωσώμεθα~, etc. (Thucyd. iii, 46.)

[91] It is to be recollected that the Athenian empire was
essentially _a government of dependencies_; Athens, as
an imperial state, exercising authority over subordinate
governments. To maintain beneficial relations between two
governments, one supreme, the other subordinate, and to make
the system work to the satisfaction of the people in the one
as well as of the people in the other, has always been found a
problem of great difficulty. Whoever reads the instructive volume
of Mr. G. C. Lewis (Essay on the Government of Dependencies),
and the number of instances of practical misgovernment in this
matter which are set forth therein, will be inclined to think
that the empire of Athens over her allies makes comparatively a
creditable figure. It will, most certainly, stand full comparison
with the government of England, over dependencies, in the last
century; as illustrated by the history of Ireland, with the penal
laws against the Catholics; by the Declaration of Independence,
published in 1776, by the American colonies, setting forth the
grounds of their separation; and by the pleadings of Mr. Burke
against Warren Hastings.

A statement and legal trial alluded to by Mr. Lewis (p. 367),
elucidates, farther, two points not unimportant on the present
occasion: 1. The illiberal and humiliating vein of sentiment
which is apt to arise in citizens of the supreme government
towards those of the subordinate. 2. The protection which English
jury-trial, nevertheless, afforded to the citizens of the
dependency against oppression by English officers.

“An action was brought, in the court of Common Pleas, in 1773,
by Mr. Anthony Fabrigas, a native of Minorca, against General
Mostyn, the governor of the island. The facts proved at the trial
were, that Governor Mostyn had arrested the plaintiff, imprisoned
him, and transported him to Spain, without any form of trial, on
the ground that the plaintiff had presented to him a petition for
redress of grievances, in a manner which he deemed improper. Mr.
Justice Gould left it to the jury to say, whether the plaintiff’s
behavior was such as to afford a just conclusion that he was
about to stir up sedition and mutiny in the garrison, or whether
he meant no more than earnestly to press his suit and obtain a
redress of grievances. If they thought the latter, the plaintiff
was entitled to recover in the action. The jury gave a verdict
for the plaintiff _with_ £3,000 _damages_. In the following term,
an application was made for a new trial, which was refused by the
whole court.

“The following remarks of the counsel for Governor Mostyn,
on this trial, contain a plain and _naïve_ statement of the
doctrine, _that a dependency is to be governed, not for its
own interest, but for that of the dominant state_. ‘Gentlemen
of the jury,’ said the counsel, ‘it will be time for me now
to take notice of another circumstance, notorious to all the
gentlemen who have been settled in the island, that the natives
of Minorca are but ill-affected to the English, and to the
English government. It is not much to be wondered at. They are
the descendants of Spaniards; and they consider Spain as the
country to which they ought naturally to belong: it is not at all
to be wondered at that they are indisposed to the English, whom
they consider as their conquerors.—Of all the Minorquins in the
island, the plaintiff perhaps stands singularly and eminently
the most seditious, turbulent, and dissatisfied subject to the
crown of Great Britain that is to be found in Minorca. Gentlemen,
_he is, or chooses to be called, the patriot of Minorca_. Now
patriotism is a very pretty thing among ourselves, and we owe
much to it: we owe our liberties to it; but we should have but
little to value, and we should have but little of what we now
enjoy, were it not for our trade. _And for the sake of our
trade, it is not fit that we should encourage patriotism in
Minorca_; for it is there destructive of our trade, and there
is an end to our trade in the Mediterranean, if it goes there.
But _here it is very well_; for the body of the people in this
country will have it: they have demanded it,—and in consequence
of their demands, they have enjoyed liberties which they will
transmit to their posterity,—and it is not in the power of this
government to deprive them of it. But they will take care of all
our conquests abroad. If that spirit prevailed in Minorca, the
consequence would be the loss of that country, and of course of
our Mediterranean trade. We should be sorry to set all our slaves
free in our plantations.’”

The prodigious sum of damages awarded by the jury, shows the
strength of their sympathy with this Minorquin plaintiff against
the English officer. I doubt not that the feeling of the
dikastery at Athens was much of the same kind, and often quite as
strong; sincerely disposed to protect the subject-allies against
misconduct of Athenian trierarchs, or inspectors.

The feelings expressed in the speech above cited would also often
find utterance from Athenian orators in the assembly; and it
would not be difficult to produce parallel passages, in which
these orators imply discontent on the part of the allies to be
the natural state of things, such as Athens could not hope to
escape. The speech here given shows that such feelings arise,
almost inevitably, out of the uncomfortable relation of two
governments, one supreme and the other subordinate. They are not
the product of peculiar cruelty and oppression on the part of the
Athenian democracy, as Mr. Mitford and so many others have sought
to prove.

Nearly the whole of the Grecian world, putting aside Italian, Sicilian, and African Greeks, was at this time included either in the alliance of Lacedæmon or in that of Athens, so that the truce of thirty years insured a suspension of hostilities everywhere. Moreover, the Lacedæmonian confederates had determined by majority of votes to refuse the request of Samos for aid in her revolt against Athens: whereby it seemed established, as practical international law, that neither of these two great aggregate bodies should intermeddle with the other, and that each should restrain or punish its own disobedient members.[92] Of this refusal, which materially affected the course of events, the main advisers had been the Corinthians, in spite of that fear and dislike of Athens which prompted many of the allies to vote for war.[93] The position of the Corinthians was peculiar; for while Sparta and her other allies were chiefly land-powers, Corinth had been from early times maritime, commercial, and colonizing,—she had been indeed once the first naval power in Greece, along with Ægina; but either she had not increased it at all during the last forty years, or, if she had, her comparative naval importance had been entirely sunk by the gigantic expansion of Athens. The Corinthians had both commerce and colonies,—Leukas, Anaktorium, Ambrakia, Korkyra, etc., along or near the coast of Epirus: they had also their colony Potidæa, situated on the isthmus of Pallênê, in Thrace, and intimately connected with them: and the interest of their commerce made them extremely averse to any collision with the superior navy of the Athenians. It was this consideration which had induced them to resist the impulse of the Lacedæmonian allies towards war on behalf of Samos: for though their feelings, both of jealousy and hatred against Athens were even now strong,[94] arising greatly out of the struggle a few years before for the acquisition of Megara to the Athenian alliance,—prudence indicated that, in a war against the first naval power in Greece, they were sure to be the greatest losers. So long as the policy of Corinth pointed towards peace, there was every probability that war would be avoided, or at least accepted only in a case of grave necessity, by the Lacedæmonian alliance. But a contingency, distant as well as unexpected, which occurred about five years after the revolt of Samos, reversed all these chances, and not only extinguished the dispositions of Corinth towards peace, but even transformed her into the forward instigator of war.

[92] See the important passage already adverted to in a prior
note.

Thucyd. i, 40. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σαμίων ἀποστάντων ψῆφον προσεθέμεθα
ἐναντίαν ὑμῖν, τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων δίχα ἐψηφισμένων εἰ χρὴ
αὐτοῖς ἀμύνειν, ~φανερῶς δὲ ἀντείπομεν τοὺς προσήκοντας ξυμμάχους
αὐτόν τινα κολάζειν~.

[93] Thucyd. i. 33.

[94] Thucyd. i. 42.

Amidst the various colonies planted from Corinth along the coast of Epirus, the greater number acknowledged on her part an hegemony, or supremacy.[95] What extent of real power and interference this acknowledgment implied, in addition to the honorary dignity, we are not in a condition to say; but the Corinthians were popular, and had not carried their interference beyond the point which the colonists themselves found acceptable. To these amicable relations, however, the powerful Korkyra formed a glaring exception, having been generally at variance, sometimes in the most aggravated hostility, with its mother-city, and withholding from her even the accustomed tributes of honorary and filial respect. It was amidst such relations of habitual ill-will between Corinth and Korkyra, that a dispute grew up respecting the city of Epidamnus, known afterwards, in the Roman times, as Dyrrachium, hard by the modern Durazzo,—a colony founded by the Korkyræans on the coast of Illyria, in the Ionic gulf, considerably to the north of their own island. So strong was the sanctity of Grecian custom in respect to the foundation of colonies, that the Korkyræans, in spite of their enmity to Corinth, had been obliged to select the œkist, or founder-in-chief of Epidamnus, from that city,—a citizen of Herakleid descent, named Phalius,—along with whom there had also come some Corinthian settlers: so that Epidamnus, though a Korkyræan colony, was nevertheless a recognized granddaughter, if the expression may be allowed, of Corinth, the recollection of which was perpetuated by the solemnities periodically celebrated in honor of the œkist.[96]

[95] Thucyd. i, 38. ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι.

[96] Thucyd. i, 24, 25.

Founded on the isthmus of an outlaying peninsula on the sea-coast of the Illyrian Taulantii, Epidamnus was at first very prosperous, and acquired a considerable territory as well as a numerous population. But during the years immediately preceding the period which we have now reached, it had been exposed to great reverses: internal sedition between the oligarchy and the people, aggravated by attacks from the neighboring Illyrians, had crippled its power: and a recent revolution, in which the people put down the oligarchy, had reduced it still farther,—since the oligarchical exiles, collecting a force and allying themselves with the Illyrians, harassed the city grievously both by sea and land. The Epidamnian democracy was in such straits as to be forced to send to Korkyra for aid: their envoys sat down as suppliants at the temple of Hêrê, cast themselves on the mercy of the Korkyræans, and besought them to act both as mediators with the exiled oligarchy and as auxiliaries against the Illyrians. Though the Korkyræans themselves, democratically governed, might have been expected to sympathize with these suppliants and their prayers, yet their feeling was decidedly opposite: for it was the Epidamnian oligarchy who were principally connected with Korkyra, from whence their forefathers had emigrated, and where their family burial-places as well as their kinsmen were still to be found:[97] while the demos, or small proprietors and tradesmen of Epidamnus, may perhaps have been of miscellaneous origin, and at any rate had no visible memorials of ancient lineage in the mother-island. Having been refused aid from Korkyra, and finding their distressed condition insupportable, the Epidamnians next thought of applying to Corinth: but as this was a step of questionable propriety, their envoys were directed first to take the opinion of the Delphian god. His oracle having given an unqualified sanction, they proceeded to Corinth with their mission; describing their distress as well as their unavailing application at Korkyra,—tendering Epidamnus to the Corinthians as to its œkists and chiefs, with the most urgent entreaties for immediate aid to preserve it from ruin,—and not omitting to insist on the divine sanction just obtained. It was found easy to persuade the Corinthians, who, looking upon Epidamnus as a joint colony from Corinth and Korkyra, thought themselves not only authorized, but bound, to undertake its defence, a resolution much prompted by their ancient feud against Korkyra. They speedily organized an expedition, consisting partly of intended new settlers, partly of a protecting military force,—Corinthian, Leukadian, and Ambrakiôtic: which combined body, in order to avoid opposition from the powerful Korkyræan navy, was marched by land as far as Apollônia, and transported from thence by sea to Epidamnus.[98]

[97] Thucyd. i, 26. ἦλθον γὰρ ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν οἱ τῶν Ἐπιδαμνίων
φυγάδες, τάφους τε ἀποδεικνύντες καὶ ξυγγένειαν ἣν προϊσχόμενοι
ἐδέοντο σφᾶς κατάγειν.

[98] Thucyd. i, 26.

The arrival of such a reinforcement rescued the city for the moment, but drew upon it a formidable increase of peril from the Korkyræans, who looked upon the interference of Corinth as an infringement of their rights, and resented it in the strongest manner. Their feelings were farther inflamed by the Epidamnian oligarchical exiles, who, coming to the island with petition for succor, and appeals to the tombs of their Korkyræan ancestors, found a ready sympathy. They were placed on board a fleet of twenty-five triremes, afterwards strengthened by a farther reinforcement, which was sent to Epidamnus with the insulting requisition that they should be forthwith restored, and the new-comers from Corinth dismissed. No attention being paid to these demands, the Korkyræans commenced the blockade of the city with forty ships, and with an auxiliary land-force of Illyrians,—making proclamation that any person within, citizen or not, might depart safely if he chose, but would be dealt with as an enemy if he remained. How many persons profited by this permission we do not know: but at least enough to convey to Corinth the news that their troops in Epidamnus were closely besieged. The Corinthians immediately hastened the equipment of a second expedition,—sufficient not only for the rescue of the place, but to surmount that resistance which the Korkyræans were sure to offer. In addition to thirty triremes, and three thousand hoplites, of their own, they solicited aid both in ships and money from many of their allies: eight ships fully manned were furnished by Megara, four by Palês, in the island of Kephallênia, five by Epidaurus, two by Trœzen, one by Hermionê, ten by Leukas, and eight by Ambrakia,—together with pecuniary contributions from Thebes, Phlius, and Elis. They farther proclaimed a public invitation for new settlers to Epidamnus, promising equal political rights to all; an option being allowed to anyone who wished to become a settler without being ready to depart at once, to insure future admission by depositing the sum of fifty Corinthian drachmas. Though it might seem that the prospects of these new settlers were full of doubt and danger, such was the confidence entertained in the metropolitan protection of Corinth, that many were found as well to join the fleet, as to pay down the deposit for the liberty of future junction.

All these proceedings on the part of Corinth, though undertaken with intentional hostility towards Korkyra, had not been preceded by any formal proposition, such as was customary among Grecian states,—a harshness of dealing arising not merely from her hatred towards Korkyra, but also from the peculiar political position of that island, which stood alone and isolated, not enrolled either in the Athenian or in the Lacedæmonian alliance. The Korkyræans, well aware of the serious preparation now going on at Corinth, and of the union among so many cities against them, felt themselves hardly a match for it alone, in spite of their wealth and their formidable naval force of one hundred and twenty triremes, inferior only to that of Athens. They made an effort to avert the storm by peaceable means, prevailing upon some mediators from Sparta and Sikyon to accompany them to Corinth; where, while they required that the forces and settlers recently despatched to Epidamnus should be withdrawn, denying all right on the part of Corinth to interfere in that colony,—they at the same time offered, if the point were disputed, to refer it for arbitration either to some impartial Peloponnesian city, or to the Delphian oracle; such arbiter to determine to which of the two cities Epidamnus as a colony really belonged, and the decision to be obeyed by both. They solemnly deprecated recourse to arms, which, if persisted in, would drive them as a matter of necessity to seek new allies such as they would not willingly apply to. To this the Corinthians answered, that they could entertain no proposition until the Korkyræan besieging force was withdrawn from Epidamnus: whereupon the Korkyræans rejoined that they would withdraw it at once, provided the new settlers and the troops sent by Corinth were removed at the same time. Either there ought to be this reciprocal retirement, or the Korkyræans would acquiesce in this _statu quo_ on both sides, until the arbiters should have decided.[99]

[99] Thucyd. i, 28.

Although the Korkyræans had been unwarrantably harsh in rejecting the first supplication from Epidamnus, yet in their propositions made at Corinth, right and equity were on their side. But the Corinthians had gone too far, and assumed an attitude too decidedly aggressive, to admit of listening to arbitration, and accordingly, so soon as their armament was equipped, they set sail for Epidamnus, despatching a herald to declare war formally against the Korkyræans. As soon as the armament, consisting of seventy triremes, under Aristeus, Kallikratês, and Timanor, with two thousand five hundred hoplites, under Archetimus and Isarchidas, had reached Cape Aktium, at the mouth of the Ambrakian gulf, it was met by a Korkyræan herald in a little boat forbidding all farther advance,—a summons of course unavailing, and quickly followed by the appearance of the Korkyræan fleet. Out of the one hundred and twenty triremes which constituted the naval establishment of the island, forty were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus, but all the remaining eighty were now brought into service; the older ships being specially repaired for the occasion. In the action which ensued, they gained a complete victory, destroying fifteen Corinthian ships, and taking a considerable number of prisoners. And on the very day of the victory, Epidamnus surrendered to their besieging fleet, under covenant that the Corinthians within it should be held as prisoners, and that the other new-comers should be sold as slaves. The Corinthians and their allies did not long keep the sea after their defeat, but retired home, while the Korkyræans remained undisputed masters of the neighboring sea. Having erected a trophy on Leukimmê, the adjoining promontory of their island, they proceeded, according to the melancholy practice of Grecian warfare, to kill all their prisoners,—except the Corinthians, who were carried home and detained as prizes of great value for purposes of negotiation. They next began to take vengeance on those allies of Corinth, who had lent assistance to the recent expedition: they ravaged the territory of Leukas, burned Kyllênê, the seaport of Elis, and inflicted so much damage that the Corinthians were compelled towards the end of the summer to send a second armament to Cape Aktium, for the defence of Leukas, Anaktorium, and Ambrakia. The Korkyræan fleet was again assembled near Cape Leukimmê, but no farther action took place, and at the approach of winter both armaments were disbanded.[100]

[100] Thucyd. i, 29, 30.

Deeply were the Corinthians humiliated by their defeat at sea, together with the dispersion of the settlers whom they had brought together; and though their original project was frustrated by the loss of Epidamnus, they were only the more bent on complete revenge against their old enemy Korkyra. They employed themselves, for two entire years after the battle, in building new ships and providing an armament adequate to their purposes: and in particular, they sent round not only to the Peloponnesian seaports, but also to the islands under the empire of Athens, in order to take into their pay the best class of seamen. By such prolonged efforts, ninety well-manned Corinthian ships were ready to set sail in the third year after the battle: and the entire fleet, when reinforced by the allies, amounted to not less than one hundred and fifty sail: twenty-seven triremes from Ambrakia, twelve from Megara, ten from Elis, as many from Leukas, and one from Anaktorium. Each of these allied squadrons had officers of its own, while the Corinthian Xenokleidês and four others were commanders-in-chief.[101]

[101] Thucyd. i, 31-46.

But the elaborate preparations going on at Corinth were no secret to the Korkyræans, who well knew, besides, the numerous allies which that city could command, and her extensive influence throughout Greece. So formidable an attack was more than they could venture to brave, alone and unaided. They had never yet enrolled themselves among the allies either of Athens or of Lacedæmon: it had always been their pride and policy to maintain a separate line of action, which, by means of their wealth, their power, and their very peculiar position, they had hitherto been enabled to do with safety. That they had been able so to proceed with safety, however, was considered both by friends and enemies as a peculiarity belonging to their island; from whence we may draw an inference how little the islands in the Ægean, now under the Athenian empire, would have been able to maintain any real independence, if that empire had been broken up. But though Korkyra had been secure in this policy of isolation up to the present moment, such had been the increase and consolidation of forces elsewhere throughout Greece, that even she could pursue it no longer. To apply for admission into the Lacedæmonian confederacy, wherein her immediate enemy exercised paramount influence, being out of the question, she had no choice except to seek alliance with Athens. That city had as yet no dependencies in the Ionic gulf; she was not of kindred lineage, nor had she had any previous amicable relations with the Dorian Korkyra. But if there was thus no previous fact or feeling to lay the foundation of alliance, neither was there anything to forbid it: for in the truce between Athens and Sparta, it had been expressly stipulated, that any city, not actually enrolled in the alliance of either, might join the one or the other at pleasure.[102] While the proposition of alliance was thus formally open either for acceptance or refusal, the time and circumstances under which it was to be made rendered it full of grave contingencies to all parties; and the Korkyræan envoys, who now for the first time visited Athens, for the purpose of making it, came thither with doubtful hopes of success, though to their island the question was one of life or death.

[102] Thucyd. i, 35-40.

According to the modern theories of government, to declare war, to make peace, and to contract alliances, are functions proper to be intrusted to the executive government apart from the representative assembly. According to ancient ideas, these were precisely the topics most essential to submit for the decision of the full assembly of the people: and in point of fact they were so submitted, even under governments only partially democratical; much more, of course, under the complete democracy of Athens. The Korkyræan envoys, on reaching that city, would first open their business to the stratêgi, or generals of the state, who would appoint a day for them to be heard before the public assembly, with full notice beforehand to the citizens. The mission was no secret, for the Korkyræans had themselves intimated their intention at Corinth, at the time when they proposed reference of the quarrel to arbitration: and even without such notice, the political necessity of the step was obvious enough to make the Corinthians anticipate it. Lastly, their _proxeni_ at Athens, Athenian citizens who watched over Corinthian interests, public and private, in confidential correspondence with that government,—and who, sometimes by appointment, sometimes as volunteers, discharged partly the functions of ambassadors in modern times, would communicate to them the arrival of the Korkyræan envoys. So that, on the day appointed for the latter to be heard before the public assembly, Corinthian envoys were also present to answer them and to oppose the granting of their prayer.

Thucydidês has given in his history the speeches of both; that is, speeches of his own composition, but representing in all probability the substance of what was actually said, and of what he perhaps himself heard. Though pervaded throughout by the peculiar style and harsh structure of the historian, these speeches are yet among the plainest and most business-like in his whole work, bringing before us thoroughly the existing situation; which was one of doubt and difficulty, presenting reasons of considerable force on each of the opposite sides. The Korkyræans, after lamenting their previous improvidence, which had induced them to defer seeking alliance until the hour of need arrived, presented themselves as claimants for the friendship of Athens, on the strongest grounds of common interest and reciprocal usefulness. Though their existing danger and want of Athenian support was now urgent, it had not been brought upon them in an unjust quarrel, or by disgraceful conduct: they had proposed to Corinth a fair arbitration respecting Epidamnus, and their application had been refused,—which showed where the right of the case lay; moreover, they were now exposed single-handed, not to Corinth alone, whom they had already vanquished, but to a formidable confederacy, organized under her auspices, including choice mariners hired even from the allies of Athens. In granting their prayer, Athens would, in the first place, neutralize this misemployment of her own mariners, and would, at the same time, confer an indelible obligation, protect the cause of right, and secure to herself a most important reinforcement. For, next to her own, the Korkyræan naval force was the most powerful in Greece, and this was now placed within her reach: if, by declining the present offer, she permitted Korkyra to be overcome, that naval force would pass to the side of her enemies: for such were Corinth and the Peloponnesian alliance,—and such they would soon be openly declared. In the existing state of Greece, a collision between that alliance and Athens could not long be postponed: and it was with a view to this contingency that the Corinthians were now seeking to seize Korkyra along with her naval force.[103] The policy of Athens, therefore, imperiously called upon her to frustrate such a design, by now assisting the Korkyræans. She was permitted to do this by the terms of the thirty years’ truce: and although some might contend that, in the present critical conjuncture, acceptance of Korkyra was tantamount to a declaration of war with Corinth, yet the fact would falsify such predictions; for Athens would so strengthen herself that her enemies would be more than ever unwilling to attack her. She would not only render her naval force irresistibly powerful, but would become mistress of the communication between Sicily and Peloponnesus, and thus prevent the Sicilian Dorians from sending reinforcements to the Peloponnesians.[104]

[103] Thucyd. i, 33. Τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους φόβῳ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ
πολεμησείοντας, καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους δυναμένους παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς
καὶ ὑμῖν ἐχθροὺς ὄντας καὶ προκαταλαμβάνοντας ἡμᾶς νῦν ἐς τὴν
ὑμετέραν ἐπιχείρησιν, ἵνα μὴ τῷ κοινῷ ἔχθει κατ᾽ αὐτῶν μετ᾽
ἀλλήλων στῶμεν, etc.

[104] Thucyd. i, 32-36.

To these representations on the part of the Korkyræans, the Corinthian speakers made reply. They denounced the selfish and iniquitous policy pursued by Korkyra, not less in the matter of Epidamnus, than in all former time,[105]—which was the real reason why she had ever been ashamed of honest allies. Above all things, she had always acted undutifully and wickedly towards Corinth, her mother-city, to whom she was bound by those ties of colonial allegiance which Grecian morality recognized, and which the other Corinthian colonies cheerfully obeyed.[106] Epidamnus was not a Korkyræan, but a Corinthian colony, and the Korkyræans, having committed wrong in besieging it, had proposed arbitration without being willing to withdraw their troops while arbitration was pending: they now impudently came to ask Athens to become accessory after the fact in such injustice. The provision of the thirty years’ truce might seem indeed to allow Athens to receive them as allies: but that provision was not intended to permit the reception of cities already under the tie of colonial allegiance elsewhere,—still less the reception of cities engaged in an active and pending quarrel, where any countenance to one party in the quarrel was necessarily a declaration of war against the opposite. If either party had a right to invoke the aid of Athens on this occasion, Corinth had a better right than Korkyra: for the latter had never had any transactions with the Athenians, while Corinth was not only still under covenant of amity with them, through the thirty years’ truce,—but had also rendered material service to them by dissuading the Peloponnesian allies from assisting the revolted Samos. By such dissuasion, the Corinthians had upheld the principle of Grecian international law, that each alliance was entitled to punish its own refractory members: they now called upon Athens to respect this principle, by not interfering between Corinth and her colonial allies,[107] especially as the violation of it would recoil inconveniently upon Athens herself, with her numerous dependencies. As for the fear of an impending war between the Peloponnesian alliance and Athens, such a contingency was as yet uncertain,—and might possibly never occur at all, if Athens dealt justly, and consented to conciliate Corinth on this critical occasion: but it would assuredly occur if she refused such conciliation, and the dangers thus entailed upon Athens would be far greater than the promised naval coöperation of Korkyra would compensate.[108]

[105] The description given by Herodotus (vii, 168: compare
Diodor. xi. 15), of the duplicity of the Korkyræans when
solicited to aid the Grecian cause at the time of the invasion of
Xerxes, seems to imply that the unfavorable character of them,
given by the Corinthians, coincided with the general impression
throughout Greece.

Respecting the prosperity and insolence of the Korkyræans, see
Aristotle apud Zenob. Proverb. iv, 49.

[106] Thucyd. i, 38. ἄποικοι δὲ ὄντες ἀφεστᾶσί τε διὰ παντὸς
καὶ νῦν πολεμοῦσι, λέγοντες ὡς οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ κακῶς πάσχειν
ἐκπεμφθείησαν· ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ᾽ αὐτοί φαμεν ἐπὶ τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων
ὑβρίζεσθαι κατοικίσαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ
εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι· αἱ γοῦν ἄλλαι ἀποικίαι τιμῶσιν ἡμᾶς, καὶ
μάλιστα ὑπὸ ἀποίκων στεργόμεθα.

This is a remarkable passage in illustration of the position of
the metropolis in regard to her colony. The relation was such as
to be comprised under the general word _hegemony_: superiority
and right to command on the one side, inferiority with duty of
reverence and obedience on the other,—limited in point of extent,
though we do not know where the limit was placed, and varying
probably in each individual case. The Corinthians sent annual
magistrates to Potidæa, called Epidemiurgi (Thucyd. i, 56).

[107] Thucyd. i, 40. φανερῶς δὲ ἀντείπομεν ~τοὺς προσήκοντας
ξυμμάχους αὐτόν τινα κολάζειν~.

[108] Thucyd. i, 37-43.

Such was the substance of the arguments urged by the contending envoys before the Athenian public assembly, in this momentous debate. For two days did the debate continue, the assembly being adjourned over to the morrow: so considerable was the number of speakers, and probably also the divergence of their views. Unluckily, Thucydidês does not give us any of these Athenian discourses,—not even that of Periklês, who determined the ultimate result. Epidamnus, with its disputed question of metropolitan right, occupied little of the attention of the Athenian assembly: but the Korkyræan naval force was indeed an immense item, since the question was, whether it should stand on their side or against them,—an item which nothing could counterbalance except the dangers of a Peloponnesian war. “Let us avoid this last calamity (was the opinion of many) even at the sacrifice of seeing Korkyra conquered, and all her ships and seamen in the service of the Peloponnesian league.” “You will not really avoid it, even by that great sacrifice (was the reply of others): the generating causes of war are at work,—and it will infallibly come, whatever you may determine respecting Korkyra: avail yourselves of the present opening, instead of being driven ultimately to undertake the war at great comparative disadvantage.” Of these two views, the former was at first decidedly preponderant in the assembly;[109] but they gradually came round to the latter, which was conformable to the steady conviction of Periklês. It was, however, resolved to take a sort of middle course, so as to save Korkyra, and yet, if possible, to escape violation of the existing truce and the consequent Peloponnesian war. To comply with the request of the Korkyræans, by adopting them unreservedly as allies, would have laid the Athenians under the necessity of accompanying them in an attack of Corinth, if required,—which would have been a manifest infringement of the truce. Accordingly, nothing more was concluded than an alliance for purposes strictly defensive, to preserve Korkyra and her possessions in case they were attacked: nor was any greater force equipped to back this resolve than a squadron of ten triremes, under Lacedæmonius, son of Kimon. The smallness of this force would satisfy the Corinthians that no aggression was contemplated against their city, while it would save Korkyra from ruin, and would in fact feed the war so as to weaken and cripple the naval force of both parties,[110]—which was the best result that Athens could hope for. The instructions to Lacedæmonius and his two colleagues were express; not to engage in fight with the Corinthians unless they were actually approaching Korkyra, or some Korkyræan possession, with a view to attack: but in that case to do his best on the defensive.

[109] Thucyd. i, 44. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἀκούσαντες ἀμφοτέρων, γενομένης
καὶ δὶς ἐκκλησίας, τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ οὐχ ἧσσον τῶν Κορινθίων
ἀπεδέξαντο τοὺς λόγους, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετέγνωσαν, etc.

Οὐχ ἧσσον, in the language of Thucydidês, usually has the
positive meaning of _more_.

[110] Thucyd. i, 44. Plutarch (Periklês, c. 29) ascribes the
smallness of the squadron despatched under Lacedæmonius to a
petty spite of Periklês against that commander, as the son of his
old political antagonist, Kimon. From whomsoever he copied this
statement, the motive assigned seems quite unworthy of credit.

The great Corinthian armament of one hundred and fifty sail soon took its departure from the gulf, and reached a harbor on the coast of Epirus, at the cape called Cheimerium, nearly opposite to the southern extremity of Korkyra: they there established a naval station and camp, summoning to their aid a considerable force from the friendly Epirotic tribes in the neighborhood. The Korkyræan fleet of one hundred and ten sail, under Meikiadês and two others, together with the ten Athenian ships, took station at one of the adjoining islands called Sybota, while the land force and one thousand Zakynthian hoplites were posted on the Korkyræan Cape Leukimmê. Both sides prepared for battle: the Corinthians, taking on board three days’ provisions, sailed by night from Cheimerium, and encountered in the morning the Korkyræan fleet advancing towards them, distributed into three squadrons, one under each of the three generals, and having the ten Athenian ships at the extreme right. Opposed to them were ranged the choice vessels of the Corinthians, occupying the left of their aggregate fleet: next came the various allies, with Megarians and Ambrakiots on the extreme right. Never before had two such numerous fleets, both Grecian, engaged in battle; but the tactics and manœuvring were not commensurate to the numbers. The decks were crowded with hoplites and bowmen, while the rowers below, on the Korkyræan side at least, were in great part slaves: the ships, on both sides, being rowed forward so as to drive in direct impact, prow against prow, were grappled together, and a fierce hand-combat was then commenced between the troops on board of each, as if they were on land,—or rather, like boarding-parties: all upon the old-fashioned system of Grecian sea-fight, without any of those improvements which had been introduced into the Athenian navy during the last generation. In Athenian naval attack, the ship, the rowers, and the steersman, were of much greater importance than the armed troops on deck: by strength and exactness of rowing, by rapid and sudden change of direction, by feints calculated to deceive, the Athenian captain sought to drive the sharp beak of his vessel, not against the prow, but against the weaker and more vulnerable parts of his enemy,—side, oars, or stern. The ship thus became in the hands of her crew the real weapon of attack, which was first to disable the enemy and leave him unmanageable on the water; and not until this was done did the armed troops on deck begin their operations.[111] Lacedæmonius, with his ten armed ships, though forbidden by his instructions to share in the battle, lent as much aid as he could by taking station at the extremity of the line, and by making motions as if about to attack; while his seamen had full leisure to contemplate what they would despise as the lubberly handling of the ships on both sides. All was confusion after the battle had been joined; the ships on both sides became entangled, the oars broken and unmanageable, orders could neither be heard nor obeyed, and the individual valor of the hoplites and bowmen on deck was the decisive point on which victory turned.

[111] Πεζομαχεῖν ἀπὸ νεῶν—to turn the naval battle into a
land-battle on shipboard, was a practice altogether repugnant
to Athenian feeling, as we see remarked also in Thucyd. iv, 14:
compare also vii, 61.

The Corinthian and Syracusan ships ultimately came to counteract
the Athenian manœuvring by constructing their prows with
increased solidity and strength, and forcing the Athenian vessel
to a direct shock, which its weaker prow was unable to bear
(Thucyd. vii, 36).

On the right wing of the Corinthians, the left of the Korkyræans was victorious; their twenty ships drove back the Ambrakiot allies of Corinth, and not only pursued them to the shore, but also landed and plundered the tents. Their rashness in thus keeping so long out of the battle proved incalculably mischievous, the rather as their total number was inferior: for their right wing, opposed to the best ships of Corinth, was after a hard struggle thoroughly beaten. Many of the ships were disabled, and the rest obliged to retreat as they could,—a retreat which the victorious ships on the other wing might have protected, had there been any effective discipline in the fleet, but which now was only imperfectly aided by the ten Athenian ships under Lacedæmonius. These Athenians, though at first they obeyed the instructions from home, in abstaining from actual blows, yet,—when the battle became doubtful, and still more, when the Corinthians were pressing their victory,—could no longer keep aloof, but attacked the pursuers in good earnest, and did much to save the defeated Korkyræans. As soon as the latter had been pursued as far as their own island, the victorious Corinthians returned to the scene of action, which was covered with disabled and water-logged ships, their own and their enemies, as well as with seamen, soldiers, and wounded men, either helpless aboard the wrecks, or keeping above water as well as they could,—among them many of their own citizens and allies, especially on their defeated right wing. Through these disabled vessels they sailed, not attempting to tow them off, but looking only to the crews aboard, and making some of them prisoners, but putting the greater number to death: some even of their own allies were thus slain, not being easily distinguishable. They then picked up their own dead bodies as well as they could, and transported them to Sybota, the nearest point of the coast of Epirus; after which they again mustered their fleet, and returned to resume the attack against the Korkyræans on their own coast. The latter got together as many of their ships as were seaworthy, together with the small reserve which had remained in harbor, in order to prevent at any rate a landing on the coast: and the Athenian ships, now within the strict letter of their instructions, prepared to coöperate with full energy in the defence. It was already late in the afternoon: but the Corinthian fleet, though their pæan had already been shouted for attack, were suddenly seen to back water instead of advancing; presently they headed round, and sailed directly away to the Epirotic coast. Nor did the Korkyræans comprehend the cause of this sudden retreat, until at length it was proclaimed that an unexpected relief of twenty fresh Athenian ships was approaching, under Glaukon and Andokidês, which the Corinthians had been the first to descry, and had even believed to be the forerunners of a larger fleet. It was already dark when these fresh ships reached Cape Leukimmê, having traversed the waters covered with wrecks and dead bodies;[112] and at first the Korkyræans even mistook them for enemies. The reinforcement had been sent from Athens, probably after more accurate information of the comparative force of Corinth and Korkyra, under the impression that the original ten ships would prove inadequate for the purpose of defence,—an impression more than verified by the reality.

[112] Thucyd. i, 51. διὰ τῶν νεκρῶν καὶ ναυαγίων προσκομισθεῖσαι
κατέπλεον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον.

Though the twenty Athenian ships were not, as the Corinthians had imagined, the precursors of a larger fleet, they were found sufficient to change completely the face of affairs. In the preceding action, the Korkyræans had had seventy ships sunk or disabled,—the Corinthians only thirty,—so that the superiority of numbers was still on the side of the latter, who were, however, encumbered with the care of one thousand prisoners, eight hundred of them slaves, captured, not easy either to lodge or to guard in the narrow accommodations of an ancient trireme. Even apart from this embarrassment, the Corinthians were in no temper to hazard a second battle against thirty Athenian ships, in addition to the remaining Korkyræan: and when their enemies sailed across to offer them battle on the Epirotic coast, they not only refused it, but thought of nothing but immediate retreat,—with serious alarm lest the Athenians should now act aggressively, treating all amicable relations between Athens and Corinth as practically extinguished by the events of the day before. Having ranged their fleet in line, not far from shore, they tested the dispositions of the Athenian commanders by sending forward a little boat with a few men to address to them the following remonstrance,—the men carried no herald’s staff (_we_ should say, no flag of truce), and were therefore completely without protection against an enemy. “Ye act wrongfully, Athenians (they exclaimed), in beginning the war and violating the truce; for ye are using arms to oppose us in punishing our enemies. If it be really your intention to hinder us from sailing against Korkyra, or anywhere else that we choose, in breach of the truce, take first of all us who now address you, and deal with us as enemies.” It was not the fault of the Korkyræans that this last idea was not instantly realized: for such of them as were near enough to hear, instigated the Athenians by violent shouts to kill the men in the boat. But the latter, far from listening to such an appeal, dismissed them with the answer: “We neither begin the war nor break the truce, Peloponnesians; we have come simply to aid these Korkyræans, our allies. If ye wish to sail anywhere else, we make no opposition: but if ye are about to sail against Korkyra, or any of her possessions, we shall use our best means to prevent you.” Both the answer, and the treatment of the men in the boat, satisfied the Corinthians that their retreat would be unopposed, and they accordingly commenced it as soon as they could get ready, staying, however, to erect a trophy at Sybota, on the Epirotic coast, in commemoration of their advantage on the preceding day. In their voyage homeward, they surprised Anaktorium, at the mouth of the Ambrakiôtic gulf, which they had hitherto possessed jointly with the Korkyræans; planting in it a reinforcement of Corinthian settlers as guarantee for future fidelity. On reaching Corinth, the armament was disbanded, and the great majority of the prisoners taken—eight hundred slaves—were sold; but the remainder, two hundred and fifty in number, were detained and treated with peculiar kindness. Many of them were of the first and richest families of the island, and the Corinthians designed to gain them over, so as to make them instruments for effecting a revolution in the island. The calamitous incidents arising from their return will appear in a future chapter.