Chapter XLVIII (1)

FROM THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA DOWN TO THE END OF THE FIRST YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

Even before the recent hostilities at Korkyra and Potidæa, it had been evident to reflecting Greeks that the continued observance of the thirty years’ truce was very uncertain, and that the mingled hatred, fear, and admiration, which Athens inspired throughout Greece, would prompt Sparta and the Spartan confederacy to seize the first favorable opening for breaking down the Athenian power. That such was the disposition of Sparta, was well understood among the Athenian allies, however considerations of prudence and general slowness in resolving might postpone the moment of carrying it into effect. Accordingly, not only the Samians when they revolted had applied to the Spartan confederacy for aid, which they appear to have been prevented from obtaining chiefly by the pacific interests then animating the Corinthians,—but also the Lesbians had endeavored to open negotiations with Sparta for a similar purpose, though the authorities—to whom alone the proposition could have been communicated, since it remained secret and was never executed—had given them no encouragement.[123] The affairs of Athens had been administered under the ascendency of Periklês, without any view to extension of empire or encroachment upon others, though with constant view to the probabilities of war, and with anxiety to keep the city in a condition to meet it: but even the splendid internal ornaments, which Athens at that time acquired, were probably not without their effect in provoking jealousy on the part of other Greeks as to her ultimate views. The only known incident, wherein Athens had been brought into collision with a member of the Spartan confederacy prior to the Korkyræan dispute, was the decree passed in regard to Megara,—prohibiting the Megarians, on pain of death, from all trade or intercourse as well with Athens as with all ports within the Athenian empire. This prohibition was grounded on the alleged fact, that the Megarians had harbored runaway slaves from Athens, and had appropriated and cultivated portions of land upon the border; partly land, the property of the goddesses of Eleusis,—partly a strip of territory disputed between the two states, and therefore left by mutual understanding in common pasture without any permanent inclosure.[124] In reference to this latter point, the Athenian herald, Anthemokritus had been sent to Megara to remonstrate, but had been so rudely dealt with, that his death shortly afterwards was imputed as a crime to the Megarians.[125] We may well suppose that ever since the revolt of Megara, fourteen years before, which caused to Athens an irreparable mischief, the feeling prevalent between the two towns had been one of bitter enmity, manifesting itself in many ways, but so much exasperated by recent events as to provoke Athens to a signal revenge.[126] Exclusion from Athens and all the ports in her empire, comprising nearly every island and seaport in the Ægean, was so ruinous to the Megarians, that they loudly complained of it at Sparta, representing it as an infraction of the thirty years’ truce; though it was undoubtedly within the legitimate right of Athens to enforce,—and was even less harsh than the systematic expulsion of foreigners by Sparta, with which Periklês compared it.

[123] Thucyd. iii, 2-13. This proposition of the Lesbians at
Sparta must have been made before the collision between Athens
and Corinth at Korkyra.

[124] Thucyd. i, 139. ἐπικαλοῦντες ἐπεργασίαν Μεγαρεῦσι τῆς γῆς
τῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου, etc. Plutarch, Periklês, c. 30;
Schol. ad Aristophan. Pac. 609.

I agree with Göller that two distinct violations of right are
here imputed to the Megarians: the one, that they had cultivated
land, the property of the goddesses at Eleusis,—the other, that
they had appropriated and cultivated the unsettled pasture land
on the border. Dr. Arnold’s note takes a different view, less
correct, in my opinion: “The land on the frontier was consecrated
to prevent it from being inclosed: in which case the boundaries
might have been a subject of perpetual dispute between the
two countries,” etc. Compare Thucyd. v, 42, about the border
territory round Panaktum.

[125] Thucydidês (i, 139), in assigning the reasons of this
sentence of exclusion passed by Athens against the Megarians,
mentions only the two allegations here noticed,—wrongful
cultivation of territory, and reception of runaway slaves. He
does not allude to the herald, Anthemokritus: still less does
he notice that gossip of the day, which Aristophanês and other
comedians of this period turn to account in fastening the
Peloponnesian war upon the personal sympathies of Periklês,
namely, that first, some young men of Athens stole away the
courtezan, Simætha, from Megara: next, the Megarian youth
revenged themselves by stealing away from Athens “two engaging
courtezans,” one of whom was the mistress of Periklês; upon
which the latter was so enraged that he proposed the sentence
of exclusion against the Megarians (Aristoph. Acharn. 501-516;
Plutarch, Periklês, c. 30).

Such stories are chiefly valuable as they make us acquainted with
the political scandal of the time. But the story of the herald,
Anthemokritus, and his death, cannot be altogether rejected.
Though Thucydidês, not mentioning the fact, did not believe that
the herald’s death had really been occasioned by the Megarians;
yet there probably was a popular belief at Athens to that effect,
under the influence of which the deceased herald received a
public burial near the Thriasian gate of Athens, leading to
Eleusis: see Philippi Epistol. ad Athen. ap. Demosthen. p.
159, R.; Pausan. i, 36, 3; iii, 4, 2. The language of Plutarch
(Periklês, c. 30) is probably literally correct,—“the herald’s
death _appeared_ to have been caused by the Megarians,”—αἰτίᾳ τῶν
Μεγαρέων ἀποθανεῖν ἔδοξε. That neither Thucydidês, nor Periklês
himself, believed that the Megarians had really caused his
death, is pretty certain: otherwise, the fact would have been
urged when the Lacedæmonians sent to complain of the sentence of
exclusion,—being a deed so notoriously repugnant to all Grecian
feeling.

[126] Thucyd. i, 67. Μεγαρῆς, δηλοῦντες μὲν καὶ ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα
διάφορα, μάλιστα δὲ, λιμένων τε εἴργεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων
ἀρχῇ, etc.

These complaints found increased attention after the war of Korkyra and the blockade of Potidæa by the Athenians. The sentiments of the Corinthians towards Athens had now become angry and warlike in the highest degree: nor was it simply resentment for the past which animated them, but also the anxiety farther to bring upon Athens so strong a hostile pressure as should preserve Potidæa and its garrison from capture. Accordingly, they lost no time in endeavoring to rouse the feelings of the Spartans against Athens, and in inducing them to invite to Sparta all such of the confederates as had any grievances against that city. Not merely the Megarians but several other confederates, appeared there as accusers; while the Æginetans, though their insular position made it perilous for them to appear, made themselves vehemently heard through the mouths of others, complaining that Athens withheld from them that autonomy to which they were entitled under the truce.[127]

[127] Thucyd. i, 67. λέγοντες οὐκ εἶναι αὐτόνομοι κατὰ τὰς
σπονδάς. O. Müller (Æginet. p. 180) and Göller in his note, think
that the _truce_ (or _covenant_ generally) here alluded to is,
not the thirty years’ truce, concluded fourteen years before
the period actually present, but the ancient alliance against
the Persians, solemnly ratified and continued after the victory
of Platæa. Dr. Arnold, on the contrary, thinks that the thirty
years’ truce is alluded to, which the Æginetans interpreted
(rightly or not) as entitling them to independence.

The former opinion might seem to be countenanced by the allusion
to Ægina in the speech of the Thebans (iii, 64): but on the
other hand, if we consult i, 115, it will appear possible that
the wording of the thirty years’ truce may have been general,
as,—Ἀποδοῦναι δὲ Ἀθηναίους ὅσα ἔχουσι Πελοποννησίων: at any rate,
the Æginetans may have pretended that, by the same rule as Athens
gave up Nisæa, Pegæ, etc., she ought also to renounce Ægina.

However, we must recollect that the one plea does not exclude
the other: the Æginetans may have taken advantage of _both_ in
enforcing their prayer for interference. This seems to have been
the idea of the Scholiast, when he says—κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τῶν
σπονδῶν.

According to the Lacedæmonian practice, it was necessary first that the Spartans themselves, apart from their allies, should decide whether there existed a sufficient case of wrong done by Athens against themselves or against Peloponnesus,—either in violation of the thirty years’ truce, or in any other way. If the determination of Sparta herself were in the negative, the case would never even be submitted to the vote of the allies; but if it were in the affirmative, then the latter would be convoked to deliver their opinion also: and assuming that the majority of votes coincided with the previous decision of Sparta, the entire confederacy stood then pledged to the given line of policy,—if the majority was contrary, the Spartans would stand alone, or with such only of the confederates as concurred. Each allied city, great or small, had an equal right of suffrage. It thus appears that Sparta herself did not vote as a member of the confederacy, but separately and individually as leader,—and that the only question ever submitted to the allies was, whether they would or would not go along with her previous decision. Such was the course of proceeding now followed: the Corinthians, together with such other of the confederates as felt either aggrieved or alarmed by Athens, presented themselves before the public assembly of Spartan citizens, prepared to prove that the Athenians had broken the truce, and were going on in a course of wrong towards Peloponnesus.[128] Even in the oligarchy of Sparta, such a question as this could only be decided by a general assembly of Spartan citizens, qualified both by age, by regular contribution to the public mess, and by obedience to Spartan discipline. To the assembly so constituted the deputies of the various allied cities addressed themselves, each setting forth his case against Athens. The Corinthians chose to reserve themselves to the last, after the assembly had been previously inflamed by the previous speakers.

[128] Thucyd. i, 67. κατεβόων ἐλθόντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὅτι σπονδάς
τε λελυκότες εἶεν καὶ ἀδικοῖεν τὴν Πελοπόννησον. The change of
tense in these two verbs is to be noticed.

Of this important assembly, on which so much of the future fate of Greece turned, Thucydidês has preserved an account unusually copious. First, the speech delivered by the Corinthian envoys. Next, that of some Athenian envoys, who happening to be at the same time in Sparta on some other matters, and being present in the assembly so as to have heard the speeches both of the Corinthians and of the other complainants, obtained permission from the magistrates to address the assembly in their turn. Thirdly, the address of the Spartan king Archidamus, on the course of policy proper to be adopted by Sparta. Lastly, the brief, but eminently characteristic, address of the ephor Stheneläidas, on putting the question for decision. These speeches, the composition of Thucydidês himself, contain substantially the sentiments of the parties to whom they are ascribed: neither of them is distinctly a reply to that which has preceded, but each presents the situation of affairs from a different point of view.

The Corinthians knew well that the audience whom they were about to address had been favorably prepared for them,—for the Lacedæmonian authorities had already given an actual promise to them and to the Potidæans at the moment before Potidæa revolted, that they would invade Attica. So great was the revolution in sentiment of the Spartans, since they had declined lending aid to the much more powerful island of Lesbos, when it proposed to revolt,—a revolution occasioned by the altered interests and sentiments of Corinth. Nor were the Corinthians ignorant that their positive grounds of complaint against Athens, in respect of wrong or violation of the existing truce, were both few and feeble. Neither in the dispute about Potidæa nor about Korkyra, had Athens infringed the truce or wronged the Peloponnesian alliance. In both, she had come into collision with Corinth, singly and apart from the confederacy: she had a right, both according to the truce and according to the received maxims of international law, to lend defensive aid to the Korkyræans at their own request,—she had a right also, according to the principles laid down by the Corinthians themselves on occasion of the revolt of Samos, to restrain the Potidæans from revolting. She had committed nothing which could fairly be called an aggression: indeed the aggression, both in the case of Potidæa and in that of Korkyra, was decidedly on the side of the Corinthians: and the Peloponnesian confederacy could only be so far implicated as it was understood to be bound to espouse the separate quarrels, right or wrong, of Corinth. All this was well known to the Corinthian envoys; and accordingly we find that, in their speech at Sparta, they touch but lightly, and in vague terms, on positive or recent wrongs. Even that which they do say completely justifies the proceedings of Athens about the affair of Korkyra, since they confess without hesitation the design of seizing the large Korkyræan navy for the use of the Peloponnesian alliance: while in respect of Potidæa, if we had only the speech of the Corinthian envoy before us without any other knowledge, we should have supposed it to be an independent state, not connected by any permanent bonds with Athens,—we should have supposed that the siege of Potidæa by Athens was an unprovoked aggression upon an autonomous ally of Corinth,[129]—we should never have imagined that Corinth had deliberately instigated and aided the revolt of the Chalkidians as well as of the Potidæans against Athens. It might be pretended that she had a right to do this, by virtue of her undefined metropolitan relations with Potidæa: but at any rate, the incident was not such as to afford any decent pretext for charge against the Athenians, either of outrage towards Corinth,[130] or of wrongful aggression against the Peloponnesian confederacy.

[129] Thucyd. i, 68. οὐ γὰρ ἂν Κέρκυράν τε ὑπολαβόντες βίᾳ ἡμῶν
εἶχον, καὶ Ποτίδαιαν ἐπολιόρκουν, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐπικαιρότατον χωρίον
πρὸς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ἀποχρῆσθαι, ἡ δὲ ναυτικὸν ἂν μέγιστον παρέσχε
Πελοποννησίοις.

[130] Thucyd. i, 68. ἐν οἷς προσήκει ἡμᾶς οὐχ ἥκιστα εἰπεῖν, ὅσῳ
καὶ μέγιστα ἐγκλήματα ἔχομεν, ὑπὸ μὲν Ἀθηναίων ὑβριζόμενοι, ὑπὸ
δὲ ὑμῶν ἀμελούμενοι.

To dwell much upon specific allegations of wrong, would not have suited the purpose of the Corinthian envoy; for against such, the thirty years’ truce expressly provided that recourse should be had to amicable arbitration,—to which recourse he never once alludes. He knew that, as between Corinth and Athens, war had already begun at Potidæa; and his business, throughout nearly all of a very emphatic speech is, to show that the Peloponnesian confederacy, and especially Sparta, is bound to take instant part in it, not less by prudence than by duty. He employs the most animated language to depict the ambition, the unwearied activity, the personal effort abroad as well as at home, the quick resolves, the sanguine hopes never dashed by failure,—of Athens; as contrasted with the cautious, home-keeping, indolent, scrupulous routine of Sparta. He reproaches the Spartans with their backwardness and timidity, in not having repressed the growth of Athens before she reached this formidable height,—especially in having allowed her to fortify her city after the retreat of Xerxes, and afterwards to build the long walls from the city to the sea.[131] The Spartans, he observes, stood alone among all Greeks, in the notable system of keeping down an enemy not by acting, but delaying to act,—not arresting his growth, but putting him down when his force was doubled. Falsely, indeed, had they acquired the reputation of being sure, when they were in reality merely slow:[132] in resisting Xerxes, as in resisting Athens, they had always been behindhand, disappointing and leaving their friends to ruin,—while both these enemies had only failed of complete success through their own mistakes.

[131] Thucyd. i, 69.

[132] Thucyd. i, 69. ἡσυχάζετε γὰρ μόνοι Ἑλλήνων, ὦ
Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινὰ ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι,
καὶ μόνοι οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, διπλασιουμένην
δὲ, καταλύοντες. Καίτοι ἐλέγεσθε ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι, ὧν ἄρα ὁ λόγος
τοῦ ἔργου ἐκράτει· τόν τε γὰρ Μῆδον, etc.

After half apologizing for the tartness of these reproofs,—which, however, as the Spartans were now well-disposed to go to war forthwith, would be well-timed and even agreeable,—the Corinthian orator vindicates the necessity of plain-speaking by the urgent peril of the emergency, and the formidable character of the enemy who threatened them. “You do not reflect (he says) how thoroughly different the Athenians are from yourselves. _They_ are innovators by nature; sharp both in devising, and in executing what they have determined: _you_ are sharp only in keeping what you have got, in determining on nothing beyond, and in doing even less than absolute necessity requires.[133] _They_ again dare beyond their means, run risks beyond their own judgment, and keep alive their hopes even in desperate circumstances: _your_ peculiarity is, that your performance comes short of your power,—you have no faith even in what your judgment guarantees,—when in difficulties, you despair of all escape. _They_ never hang back,—_you_ are habitual laggards: they love foreign service,—you cannot stir from home: for they are always under the belief that their movements will lead to some farther gain, while you fancy that new projects will endanger what you have already. When successful, they make the greatest forward march; when defeated, they fall back the least. Moreover, they task their bodies on behalf of their city as if they were the bodies of others,—while their minds are most of all their own, for exertion in her service.[134] When their plans for acquisition do not come successfully out, they feel like men robbed of what belongs to them: yet the acquisitions when realized appear like trifles compared with what remains to be acquired. If they sometimes fail in an attempt, new hopes arise in some other direction to supply the want: for with them alone the possession and the hope of what they aim at is almost simultaneous, from their habit of quickly executing all that they have once resolved. And in this manner do they toil throughout all their lives amidst hardship and peril, disregarding present enjoyment in the continual thirst for increase,—knowing no other festival recreation except the performance of active duty,—and deeming inactive repose a worse condition than fatiguing occupation. To speak the truth in two words: such is their inborn temper, that they will neither remain at rest themselves, nor allow rest to others.[135]

[133] Thucyd. i, 70. Οἱ μέν γε νεωτεροποιοὶ, καὶ ἐπιχειρῆσαι
ὀξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ ὃ ἂν γνῶσιν· ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε
σώζειν, καὶ ἐπιγνῶναι μηδὲν, καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲ τἀναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι.

The meaning of the word ὀξεῖς—_sharp_—when applied to the latter
half of the sentence, is in the nature of a sarcasm. But this is
suitable to the character of the speech. Göller supposes some
such word as ἱκανοὶ, instead of ὀξεῖς, to be understood: but we
should thereby both depart from the more obvious syntax, and
weaken the general meaning.

[134] Thucyd. i, 70. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτοις ὑπὲρ
τῆς πόλεως χρῶνται, τῇ γνώμῃ δὲ οἰκειοτάτῃ ἐς τὸ πράσσειν τι ὑπὲρ
αὐτῆς.

It is difficult to convey, in translation, the antithesis between
ἀλλοτριωτάτοις and οἰκειοτάτῃ—not without a certain conceit,
which Thucydidês is occasionally fond of.

[135] Thucyd. _l. c._ καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων
δι᾽ ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν
ὑπαρχόντων, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ κτᾶσθαι καὶ μήτε ἑορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι
ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι, ξυμφορὰν δὲ οὐχ ἧσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα
ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον· ὥστε εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ξυνελὼν φαίη πεφυκέναι
ἐπὶ τῷ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἐᾷν,
ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποι.

“Such is the city which stands opposed to you, Lacedæmonians,—yet ye still hang back from action.... Your continual scruples and apathy would hardly be safe, even if ye had neighbors like yourselves in character: but as to dealings with Athens, your system is antiquated and out of date. In politics as in art, it is the modern improvements which are sure to come out victorious: and though unchanged institutions are best, if a city be not called upon to act,—yet multiplicity of active obligations requires multiplicity and novelty of contrivance.[136] It is through these numerous trials that the means of Athens have acquired so much more new development than yours.”

[136] Thucyd. i, 71. ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτούς
ἐστιν. Ἀνάγκη δ᾽, ὥσπερ τέχνης, ἀεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν· καὶ
ἡσυχαζούσῃ μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ
ἀναγκαζομένοις ἰέναι, πολλῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ.

The Corinthians concluded by saying, that if, after so many previous warnings, now repeated for the last time, Sparta still refused to protect her allies against Athens,—if she delayed to perform her promise made to the Potidæans, of immediately invading Attica,—they, the Corinthians, would forthwith look for safety in some new alliance, and they felt themselves fully justified in doing so. They admonished her to look well to the case, and to carry forward Peloponnesus with undiminished dignity as it had been transmitted to her from her predecessors.[137]

[137] Thucyd. i, 71.

Such was the memorable picture of Athens and her citizens, as exhibited by her fiercest enemy, before the public assembly at Sparta. It was calculated to impress the assembly, not by appeal to recent or particular misdeeds, but by the general system of unprincipled and endless aggression which was imputed to Athens during the past,—and by the certainty held out that the same system, unless put down by measures of decisive hostility, would be pushed still farther in future to the utter ruin of Peloponnesus. And to this point did the Athenian envoy—staying in Sparta about some other negotiation, and now present in the assembly—address himself in reply, after having asked and obtained permission from the magistrates. The empire of Athens was now of such standing that the younger men present had no personal knowledge of the circumstances under which it had grown up: and what was needed as information for them would be impressive as a reminder even to their seniors.[138]

[138] Thucyd. i, 72.

He began by disclaiming all intention of defending his native city against the charges of specific wrong or alleged infractions of the existing truce: this was no part of his mission, nor did he recognize Sparta as a competent judge in disputes between Athens and Corinth. But he nevertheless thought it his duty to vindicate Athens against the general character of injustice and aggression imputed to her, as well as to offer a solemn warning to the Spartans against the policy towards which they were obviously tending. He then proceeded to show that the empire of Athens had been honorably earned and amply deserved,—that it had been voluntarily ceded, and even pressed upon her,—and that she could not abdicate it without emperiling her own separate existence and security. Far from thinking that the circumstances under which it was acquired needed apology, he appealed to them with pride as a testimony of the genuine Hellenic patriotism of that city which the Spartan congress now seemed disposed to run down as an enemy.[139] He then dwelt upon the circumstances attending the Persian invasion, setting forth the superior forwardness and the unflinching endurance of Athens, in spite of ungenerous neglect from Sparta and the other Greeks,—the preponderance of her naval force in the entire armament,—the directing genius of her general Themistoklês, complimented even by Sparta herself,—and the title of Athens to rank on that memorable occasion as the principal saviour of Greece. This alone ought to save her empire from reproach: but this was not all,—for that empire had been tendered to her by the pressing instance of the allies, at a time when Sparta had proved herself both incompetent and unwilling to prosecute the war against Persia.[140] By simple exercise of the constraining force inseparable from her presidential obligations, and by the reduction of various allies who revolted, Athens had gradually become unpopular, while Sparta too had become her enemy instead of her friend. To relax her hold upon her allies would have been to make them the allies of Sparta against her; and thus the motive of fear was added to those of ambition and revenue, in inducing Athens to maintain her imperial dominion by force. In her position, no Grecian power either would or could have acted otherwise: no Grecian power, certainly not Sparta, would have acted with so much equity and moderation, or given so little ground of complaint to her subjects. Worse they _had_ suffered, while under Persia; worse they _would_ suffer, if they came under Sparta, who held her own allies under the thraldom of an oligarchical party in each city; and if they hated Athens, this was only because subjects always hated the _present_ dominion, whatever that might be.[141]

[139] Thucyd. i, 73. ῥηθήσεται δὲ οὐ παραιτήσεως μᾶλλον ἕνεκα ἢ
μαρτυρίου, καὶ δηλώσεως πρὸς οἵαν ὑμῖν πόλιν μὴ εὖ βουλευομένοις
ὁ ἀγὼν καταστήσεται.

[140] Thucyd. i, 75. Ἆρ᾽ ἄξιοί ἐσμεν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ
προθυμίας ἕνεκα τῆς τότε καὶ γνώμης συνέσεως, ἀρχῆς γε ἧς ἔχομεν
τοῖς Ἕλλησι μὴ οὕτως ἄγαν ἐπιφθόνως διακεῖσθαι; καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν
τήνδε ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι, ἀλλ᾽ ὑμῶν μὲν οὐκ ἐθελησάντων
παραμεῖναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου, ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων
τῶν ξυμμάχων, καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστῆναι· ἐξ αὐτοῦ
δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐς τόδε,
μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελείας.

[141] Thucyd. i, 77.

Having justified both the origin and the working of the Athenian empire, the envoy concluded by warning Sparta to consider calmly, without being hurried away by the passions and invectives of others, before she took a step from which there was no retreat, and which exposed the future to chances such as no man on either side could foresee. He called on her not to break the truce mutually sworn to, but to adjust all differences, as Athens was prepared to do, by the amicable arbitration which that truce provided. Should she begin war, the Athenians would follow her lead and resist her, calling to witness those gods under whose sanction the oaths were taken.[142]

[142] Thucyd. i, 78. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ πω τοιαύτῃ ἁμαρτίᾳ
ὄντες, οὔτ᾽ αὐτοὶ οὔτε ὑμᾶς ὁρῶντες, λέγομεν ὑμῖν, ἕως ἔτι
αὐθαίρετος ἀμφοτέροις ἡ εὐβουλία, σπονδὰς μὴ λύειν μηδὲ
παραβαίνειν τοὺς ὅρκους, τὰ δὲ διάφορα δίκῃ λύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν
ξυνθήκην· ἢ θεοὺς τοὺς ὁρκίους μάρτυρας ποιούμενοι, πειρασόμεθα
ἀμύνεσθαι πολέμου ἄρχοντας ταύτῃ ᾗ ἂν ὑφηγῆσθε.

The facts recounted in the preceding chapters will have shown, that the account given by the Athenian envoy at Sparta, of the origin and character of the empire exercised by his city, though doubtless the account of a partisan, is in substance correct and equitable; the envoys of Athens had not yet learned to take the tone which they assumed in the sixteenth and seventeenth years of the coming war, at Melos and Kamarina. At any time previous to the affair of Korkyra, the topics insisted upon by the Athenian would probably have been profoundly listened to at Sparta. But now the mind of the Spartans was made up. Having cleared the assembly of all “strangers,” and even all allies, they proceeded to discuss and determine the question among themselves. Most of their speakers held but one language,[143]—expatiating on the wrongs already done by Athens, and urging the necessity of instant war. There was, however, one voice, and that a commanding voice, raised against this conclusion: the ancient and respected king Archidamus opposed it.

[143] Thucyd. i, 79. καὶ τῶν μὲν πλειόνων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αἱ γνῶμαι
ἔφερον, ἀδικεῖν τε Ἀθηναίους ἤδη, καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι ἐν τάχει.

The speech of Archidamus is that of a deliberate Spartan, who, setting aside both hatred to Athens and blind partiality to allies, looks at the question with a view to the interests and honor of Sparta only,—not, however, omitting her imperial as well as her separate character. The preceding native speakers, indignant against Athens, had probably appealed to Spartan pride, treating it as an intolerable disgrace that almost the entire land-force of Dorian Peloponnesus should be thus bullied by one single Ionic city, and should hesitate to commence a war which one invasion of Attica would probably terminate. As the Corinthians had tried to excite the Spartans by well-timed taunts and reproaches, so the subsequent speakers had aimed at the same objects by panegyric upon the well-known valor and discipline of the city. To all these arguments Archidamus set himself to reply. Invoking the experience of the elders his contemporaries around him, he impressed upon the assembly the grave responsibility, the uncertainties, difficulties, and perils, of the war into which they were hurrying without preparation.[144] He reminded them of the wealth, the population, greater than that of any other Grecian city, the naval force, the cavalry, the hoplites, the large foreign dominion of Athens,—and then asked by what means they proposed to put her down?[145] Ships, they had few; trained seamen, yet fewer; wealth, next to none. They could indeed invade and ravage Attica, by their superior numbers and land-force: but the Athenians had possessions abroad sufficient to enable them to dispense with the produce of Attica, while their great navy would retaliate the like ravages upon Peloponnesus. To suppose that one or two devastating expeditions into Attica would bring the war to an end, would be a deplorable error: such proceedings would merely enrage the Athenians, without impairing their real strength, and the war would thus be prolonged, perhaps, for a whole generation.[146] Before they determined upon war, it was absolutely necessary to provide more efficient means for carrying it on; and to multiply their allies, not merely among the Greeks, but among foreigners also: while this was in process, envoys ought to be sent to Athens to remonstrate and obtain redress for the grievances of the allies. If the Athenians granted this,—which they very probably would do, when they saw the preparations going forward, and when the ruin of the highly-cultivated soil of Attica was held over them _in terrorem_ without being actually consummated,—so much the better: if they refused, in the course of two or three years war might be commenced with some hopes of success. Archidamus reminded his countrymen that their allies would hold _them_ responsible for the good or bad issue of what was now determined;[147] admonishing them, in the true spirit of a conservative Spartan, to cling to that cautious policy which had been ever the characteristic of the state, despising both taunts on their tardiness and panegyric on their valor. “We, Spartans, owe both our bravery and our prudence to our admirable public discipline: it makes us warlike, because the sense of shame is most closely connected with discipline, as valor is with the sense of shame: it makes us prudent, because our training keeps us too ignorant to set ourselves above our own institutions, and holds us under sharp restraint so as not to disobey them.[148] And thus, not being overwise in unprofitable accomplishments, we Spartans are not given to disparage our enemy’s strength in clever speech, and then meet him with short-comings in reality: we think that the capacity of neighboring states is much on a par, and that the chances in reserve for both parties are too uncertain to be discriminated beforehand by speech. We always make real preparations against our enemies, as if they were proceeding wisely on their side: we must count upon security through our own precautions, not upon the chance of their errors. Indeed, there is no great superiority in one man as compared with another: he is the stoutest who is trained in the severest trials. Let us, for our parts, not renounce this discipline, which we have received from our fathers, and which we still continue, to our very great profit: let us not hurry on, in one short hour, a resolution upon which depend so many lives, so much property, so many cities, and our own reputation besides. Let us take time to consider, since our strength puts it fully in our power to do so. Send envoys to the Athenians on the subject of Potidæa, and of the other grievances alleged by our allies,—and that too, the rather as they are ready to give us satisfaction: against one who offers satisfaction, custom forbids you to proceed, without some previous application, as if he were a proclaimed wrong-doer. But, at the same time, make preparation for war; such will be the course of policy at once the best for your own power and the most terror-striking to your enemies.”[149]

[144] Thucyd. i, 80.

[145] Thucyd. i, 80. πρὸς δὲ ἄνδρας, οἳ γῆν τε ἑκὰς ἔχουσι καὶ
προσέτι πολέμου ἐμπειρότατοί εἰσι, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἄριστα
ἐξήρτυνται, πλούτῳ τε ἰδίῳ καὶ δημοσίῳ καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ ἵπποις
καὶ ὅπλοις, καὶ ὄχλῳ, ὅσος οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἑνί γε χωρίῳ Ἑλληνικῷ
ἐστὶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ξυμμάχους πολλοὺς φόρου ὑποτελεῖς ἔχουσι, πῶς
χρὴ πρὸς τούτους ῥᾳδίως πόλεμον ἄρασθαι, καὶ τίνι πιστεύσαντας
ἀπαρασκεύους ἐπειχθῆναι.

[146] Thucyd. i, 81. δέδοικα δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ καὶ τοῖς παισὶν αὐτὸν
ὑπολίπωμεν, etc.

[147] Thucyd. i, 82, 83.

[148] Thucyd. i, 84. Πολεμικοί τε καὶ εὔβουλοι διὰ τὸ εὔκοσμον
γιγνόμεθα, τὸ μὲν, ὅτι αἰδὼς σωφροσύνης πλεῖστον μετέχει,
αἰσχύνης δὲ εὐψυχία· εὔβουλοι δὲ, ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς
ὑπεροψίας παιδευόμενοι, καὶ ξὺν χαλεπότητι σωφρονέστερον ἢ ὥστε
αὐτῶν ἀνηκουστεῖν· καὶ μὴ, τὰ ἀχρεῖα ξυνετοὶ ἄγαν ὄντες, τὰς
τῶν πολεμίων παρασκευὰς λόγῳ καλῶς μεμφόμενοι, ἀνομοίως ἔργῳ
ἐπεξιέναι, νομίζειν δὲ τάς τε διανοίας τῶν πέλας παραπλησίους
εἶναι, καὶ τὰς προσπιπτούσας τύχας οὐ λόγῳ διαιρετάς.

In the construction of the last sentence, I follow Haack and
Poppo, in preference to Göller and Dr. Arnold.

The wording of this part of the speech of Archidamus is awkward
and obscure, though we make out pretty well the general sense.
It deserves peculiar attention, as coming from a king of Sparta,
personally, too, a man of superior judgment. The great points
of the Spartan character are all brought out. 1. A narrow,
strictly-defined, and uniform range of ideas. 2. Compression of
all other impulses and desires, but an increased sensibility to
their own public opinion. 3. Great habits of endurance as well as
of submission.

The way in which the features of Spartan character are
deduced from Spartan institutions, as well as the pride which
Archidamus expresses in the ignorance and narrow mental range
of his countrymen, are here remarkable. A similar championship
of ignorance and narrow-mindedness is not only to be found
among those who deride the literary and oratorical tastes of
the Athenian democracy (see Aristophanês, Ran. 1070: compare
Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 9-49), but also in the speech of Kleon
(Thucyd. iii, 37).

[149] Thucyd. i, 84, 85.

The speech of Archidamus was not only in itself full of plain reason and good sense, but delivered altogether from the point of view of a Spartan; appealing greatly to Spartan conservative feeling and even prejudice. But in spite of all this, and in spite of the personal esteem entertained for the speaker, the tide of feeling in the opposite direction was at that moment irresistible. Stheneläidas—one of the five ephors, to whom it fell to put the question for voting—closed the debate; and his few words mark at once the character of the man, the temper of the assembly, and the simplicity of speech, though without the wisdom of judgment, for which Archidamus had taken credit to his countrymen.

“I don’t understand (he said) these long speeches of the Athenians. They have praised themselves abundantly, but they have never rebutted what is laid to their charge,—that they are guilty of wrong against our allies and against Peloponnesus. Now, if in former days they were good men against the Persians, and are now evil-doers against us, they deserve double punishment, as having become evil-doers instead of good.[150] But _we_ are the same now as we were then: we know better than to sit still while our allies are suffering wrong: we shall not adjourn our aid while they cannot adjourn their sufferings.[151] Others have in abundance wealth, ships, and horses,—but _we_ have good allies, whom we are not to abandon to the mercy of the Athenians: nor are we to trust our redress to arbitration and to words, when our wrongs are not confined to words. We must help them speedily and with all our strength. Nor let any one tell us that we can with honor deliberate when we are actually suffering wrong,—it is rather for those who intend to do the wrong, to deliberate well beforehand. Resolve upon war then, Lacedæmonians, in a manner worthy of Sparta: suffer not the Athenians to become greater than they are: let us not betray our allies to ruin, but march, with the aid of the gods, against the wrong-doers.”

[150] Compare a similar sentiment in the speech of the Thebans
against the Platæans (Thucyd. iii, 67).

[151] Thucyd. i, 86. ἡμεῖς δὲ ὁμοῖοι καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἐσμὲν, καὶ
τοὺς ξυμμάχους, ἢν σωφρονῶμεν, οὐ περιοψόμεθα ἀδικουμένους, οὐδὲ
μελλήσομεν τιμωρεῖν· οἱ δὲ οὐκέτι μέλλουσι κακῶς πάσχειν.

There is here a play upon the word μέλλειν, which it is not easy
to preserve in a translation.

With these few words, so well calculated to defeat the prudential admonitions of Archidamus, Stheneläidas put the question for the decision of the assembly,—which, at Sparta, was usually taken neither by show of hands nor by deposit of balls in an urn, but by cries analogous to the Aye or No of the English House of Commons,—the presiding ephor declaring which of the cries predominated. On this occasion the cry for war was manifestly the stronger:[152] yet Stheneläidas affected inability to determine which of the two cries was the louder, in order that he might have an excuse for bringing about a more impressive manifestation of sentiment and a stronger apparent majority,—since a portion of the minority would probably be afraid to show their real opinions as individuals openly. He accordingly directed a division, like the Speaker of the English House of Commons, when his decision in favor of aye or no is questioned by any member: “Such of you as think that the truce has been violated, and that the Athenians are doing us wrong, go to _that_ side; such as think the contrary, to the other side.” The assembly accordingly divided, and the majority was very great on the warlike side of the question.

[152] Thucyd. i, 87. βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς φανερῶς ἀποδεικνυμένους
τὴν γνώμην ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν μᾶλλον ὁρμῆσαι, etc.

The first step of the Lacedæmonians, after coming to this important decision was, to send to Delphi and inquire of the oracle whether it would be beneficial to them to undertake the war: the answer brought back (Thucydidês seems hardly certain that it was really given[153]) was,—that if they did their best they would be victorious, and that the god would help them, invoked or uninvoked. They at the same time convened a general congress of their allies at Sparta, for the purpose of submitting their recent resolution to the vote of all.

[153] Thucyd. i, 118. ὁ δὲ ἀνεῖλεν αὐτοῖς, ~ὡς λέγεται~, etc.

To the Corinthians, in their anxiety for the relief of Potidæa, the decision of this congress was not less important than that which the Spartans had just taken separately: and they sent round envoys to each of the allies, entreating them to authorize war without reserve. Through such instigations, acting upon the general impulse then prevalent, the congress came together in a temper decidedly warlike: most of the speakers were full of invective against Athens, and impatient for action, while the Corinthians, waiting as before to speak the last, wound up the discussion by a speech well calculated to insure a hearty vote. Their former speech had been directed to shame, exasperate, and alarm the Lacedæmonians: this point had now been carried, and they had to enforce, upon the allies generally, the dishonor as well as the impolicy of receding from a willing leader. The cause was one in which all were interested, the inland states not less than the maritime, for both would find themselves ultimately victims of the encroaching despot city: whatever efforts were necessary for the war, ought cheerfully to be made, since it was only through war that they could arrive at a secure and honorable peace. There were good hopes that this might soon be attained, and that the war would not last long,—so decided was the superiority of the confederacy, in numbers, in military skill, and in the equal heart and obedience of all its members.[154] The naval superiority of Athens depended chiefly upon hired seamen,—and the confederacy, by borrowing from the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia, would soon be able to overbid her, take into pay her best mariners, and equal her equipment at sea: they would excite revolt among her allies, and establish a permanent fortified post for the ruin of Attica. To make up a common fund for this purpose, was indispensably necessary; for Athens was far more than a match for each of them single-handed, and nothing less than hearty union could save them all from successive enslavement,—the very supposition of which was intolerable to Peloponnesian freemen, whose fathers had liberated Greece from the Persian. Let them not shrink from endurance and sacrifice in such a cause,—it was their hereditary pride to purchase success by laborious effort. The Delphian god had promised them his coöperation; and the whole of Greece would sympathize in the cause, either from fear of the despotism of Athens, or from hopes of profit. They would not be the first to break the truce, for the Athenians had already broken it, as the declaration of the Delphian god distinctly implied. Let them lose no time in sending aid to the Potidæans, a Dorian population now besieged by Ionians, as well as to those other Greeks whom Athens had enslaved. Every day the necessity for effort was becoming stronger, and the longer it was delayed, the more painful it would be when it came. “Be ye persuaded then, (concluded the orator), that this city, which has constituted herself despot of Greece, has her position against all of us alike, some for present rule, others for future conquest; let us assail and subdue her, that we may dwell securely ourselves hereafter, and may emancipate those Greeks who are now in slavery.”[155]

[154] Thucyd. i, 120, 121. Κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς ἐπικρατῆσαι,
πρῶτον μὲν πλήθει προὔχοντας καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ πολεμικῇ, ἔπειτα
~ὁμοίως~ πάντας ἐς τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ἰόντας.

I conceive that the word ~ὁμοίως~ here alludes to the equal
interest of all the confederates in the quarrel, as opposed to
the Athenian power, which was composed partly of constrained
subjects, partly of hired mercenaries: to both of which points,
as weaknesses in the enemy, the Corinthian orator goes on
to allude. The word ὁμοίως here designates the same fact as
Periklês, in his speech at Athens (i, 141), mentions under the
words πάντες ἰσόψηφοι: the Corinthian orator treats it as an
advantage to have all confederates equal and hearty in the cause:
Periklês, on the contrary, looking at the same fact from the
Athenian point of view, considers it as a disadvantage, since it
prevented unity of command and determination.

Poppo’s view of this passage seems to me erroneous.

The same idea is reproduced, c. 124. εἴπερ βεβαιότατον τὸ ταὐτὰ
ξυμφέροντα καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ἰδιώταις εἶναι, etc.

[155] Thucyd. i, 123, 124.

If there were any speeches delivered at this congress in opposition to the war, they were not likely to be successful in a cause wherein even Archidamus had failed. After the Corinthian had concluded, the question was put to the deputies of every city, great and small, indiscriminately and the majority decided for war.[156] This important resolution was adopted about the end of 432 B.C., or the beginning of January 431 B.C.: the previous decision of the Spartans separately may have been taken about two months earlier, in the preceding October or November 432 B.C.

[156] Thucyd. i, 125. καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐψηφίσαντο πολεμεῖν. It seems
that the decision was not absolutely unanimous.

Reviewing the conduct of the two great Grecian parties at this momentous juncture, with reference to existing treaties and positive grounds of complaint, it seems clear that Athens was in the right. She had done nothing which could fairly be called a violation of the thirty years’ truce: and for such of her acts as were alleged to be such, she offered to submit them to that amicable arbitration which the truce itself prescribed. The Peloponnesian confederates were manifestly the aggressors in the contest; and if Sparta, usually so backward, now came forward in a spirit so decidedly opposite, we are to ascribe it partly to her standing fear and jealousy of Athens, partly to the pressure of her allies, especially of the Corinthians. Thucydidês, recognizing these two as the grand determining motives, and indicating the alleged infractions of truce as simple occasions or pretexts, seems to consider the fear and hatred of Athens as having contributed more to determine Sparta than the urgency of her allies.[157] That the extraordinary aggrandizement of Athens, during the period immediately succeeding the Persian invasion, was well calculated to excite alarm and jealousy in Peloponnesus, is indisputable: but if we take Athens as she stood in 432 B.C., it deserves notice that she had neither made, nor, so far as we know, tried to make, a single new acquisition during the whole fourteen years which had elapsed since the conclusion of the thirty years’ truce;[158]— and, moreover, that that truce marked an epoch of signal humiliation and reduction of her power. The triumph which Sparta and the Peloponnesians then gained, though not sufficiently complete to remove all fear of Athens, was yet great enough to inspire them with the hope that a second combined effort would subdue her. This mixture of fear and hope was exactly the state of feeling out of which war was likely to grow,—and we see that even before the quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, sagacious Greeks everywhere anticipated war as not far distant:[159] it was near breaking out even on occasion of the revolt of Samos,[160] and peace was then preserved partly by the commercial and nautical interests of Corinth, partly by the quiescence of Athens. But the quarrel of Corinth and Korkyra, which Sparta might have appeased beforehand had she thought it her interest to do so,—and the junction of Korkyra with Athens,—exhibited the latter as again in a career of aggrandizement, and thus again brought into play the warlike feelings of Sparta; while they converted Corinth from the advocate of peace into a clamorous organ of war. The revolt of Potidæa,—fomented by Corinth, and encouraged by Sparta in the form of a positive promise to invade Attica,—was, in point of fact, the first distinct violation of the truce, and the initiatory measure of the Peloponnesian war: nor did the Spartan meeting, and the subsequent congress of allies at Sparta, serve any other purpose than to provide such formalities as were requisite to insure the concurrent and hearty action of numbers, and to clothe with imposing sanction a state of war already existing in reality, though yet unproclaimed. The sentiment in Peloponnesus at this moment was not the fear of Athens, but the hatred of Athens,—and the confident hope of subduing her. And indeed such confidence was justified by plausible grounds: men might well think that the Athenians would never endure the entire devastation of their highly cultivated soil,—or at least that they would certainly come forth to fight for it in the field, which was all that the Peloponnesians desired. Nothing except the unparalleled ascendency and unshaken resolution of Periklês, induced the Athenians to persevere in a scheme of patient defence, and to trust to that naval superiority which the enemies of Athens, save and except the judicious Archidamus, had not yet learned fully to appreciate. Moreover, the confident hopes of the Peloponnesians were materially strengthened by the wide-spread sympathy in favor of their cause, proclaiming, as it did, the intended liberation of Greece from a despot city.[161]

[157] Thucyd. i, 88. Ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς σπονδὰς
λελύσθαι καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι, ~οὐ τοσοῦτον τῶν ξυμμάχων
πεισθέντες τοῖς λόγοις, ὅσον φοβούμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους~, μὴ ἐπὶ
μεῖζον δυνηθῶσιν, ὁρῶντες αὐτοῖς τὰ πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑποχείρια
ἤδη ὄντα: compare also c. 23 and 118.

[158] Plutarch’s biography of Periklês is very misleading, from
its inattention to chronology, ascribing to an earlier time
feelings and tendencies which really belong to a later. Thus
he represents (c. 20) the desire for acquiring possession of
Sicily, and even of Carthage and the Tyrrhenian coast, as having
become very popular at Athens even before the revolt of Megara
and Eubœa, and before those other circumstances which preceded
the thirty years’ truce: and he gives much credit to Periklês
for having repressed such unmeasured aspirations. But ambitious
hopes directed towards Sicily could not have sprung up in the
Athenian mind until after the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.
It was impossible that they could make any step in that direction
until they had established their alliance with Korkyra, and this
was only done in the year before the Peloponnesian war,—done
too, even then, in a qualified manner, and with much reserve. At
the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians had
nothing but fears, while the Peloponnesians had large hopes of
aid, from the side of Sicily. While it is very true, therefore,
that Periklês was eminently useful in discouraging rash and
distant enterprises of ambition generally, we cannot give him the
credit of keeping down Athenian desires of acquisition in Sicily,
or towards Carthage,—if, indeed, this latter ever was included
in the catalogue of Athenian hopes,—for such desires were hardly
known until after his death, in spite of the assertion again
repeated by Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 17.

[159] Thucyd. i, 33-36.

[160] Thucyd. i, 40, 41.

[161] Thucyd. ii, 8.

To Athens, on the other hand, the coming war presented itself in a very different aspect; holding out scarcely any hope of possible gain, and the certainty of prodigious loss and privation,—even granting, that, at this heavy cost, her independence and union at home, and her empire abroad, could be upheld. By Periklês, and by the more long-sighted Athenians, the chance of unavoidable war was foreseen even before the Korkyræan dispute.[162] But Periklês was only the first citizen in a democracy, esteemed, trusted, and listened to, more than any one else by the body of the citizens, but warmly opposed in most of his measures, under the free speech and latitude of individual action which reigned at Athens,—and even bitterly hated by many active political opponents. The formal determination of the Lacedæmonians, to declare war, must of course have been made known at Athens by those Athenian envoys, who had entered an unavailing protest against it in the Spartan assembly. No steps were taken by Sparta to carry this determination into effect until after the congress of allies and their pronounced confirmatory vote. Nor did the Spartans even then send any herald, or make any formal declaration. They despatched various propositions to Athens, not at all with a view of trying to obtain satisfaction, or of providing some escape from the probability of war; but with the contrary purpose,—of multiplying demands, and enlarging the grounds of quarrel.[163] Meanwhile, the deputies retiring home from the congress to their respective cities, carried with them the general resolution for immediate warlike preparations to be made, with as little delay as possible.[164]

[162] Thucyd. i, 45; Plutarch, Periklês. c. 8.

[163] Thucyd. i, 126. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐπρεσβεύοντο τῷ χρόνῳ πρὸς τοὺς
Ἀθηναίους ~ἐγκλήματα ποιούμενοι, ὅπως σφίσιν ὅτι μεγίστη πρόφασις
εἴη τοῦ πολεμεῖν, ἢν μή τι ἐσακούωσι~.

[164] Thucyd. i, 125.

The first requisition addressed by the Lacedæmonians to Athens was a political manœuvre aimed at Periklês, their chief opponent in that city. His mother, Agaristê, belonged to the great family of the Alkmæônids, who were supposed to be under an inexpiable hereditary taint, in consequence of the sacrilege committed by their ancestor Megaklês, nearly two centuries before, in the slaughter of the Kylonian suppliants near the altar of the Venerable Goddesses.[165] Ancient as this transaction was, it still had sufficient hold on the mind of the Athenians to serve as the basis of a political manœuvre: about seventy-seven years before, shortly after the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, it had been so employed by the Spartan king Kleomenês, who at that time exacted from the Athenians a clearance of the ancient sacrilege, to be effected by the banishment of Kleisthenês, the founder of the democracy, and his chief partisans. This demand, addressed by Kleomenês to the Athenians, at the instance of Isagoras, the rival of Kleisthenês,[166] had been then obeyed, and had served well the purposes of those who sent it; a similar blow was now aimed by the Lacedæmonians at Periklês, the grand nephew of Kleisthenês, and doubtless at the instance of his political enemies: religion required, it was pretended, that “the abomination of the goddess should be driven out.”[167] If the Athenians complied with this demand, they would deprive themselves, at this critical moment, of their ablest leader; but the Lacedæmonians, not expecting compliance, reckoned at all events upon discrediting Periklês with the people, as being partly the cause of the war through family taint of impiety,[168]—and this impression would doubtless be loudly proclaimed by his political opponents in the assembly.