Chapter XLIX (3)

This passage is not only remarkable as it conveys the striking
persuasion entertained by the Athenians of their own naval
superiority, but also as it discloses the frank and intimate
communication between the Athenian captain and his seamen,—so
strongly pervading and determining the feelings of the latter.
Compare what is told respecting the Syracusan Hermokratês,
Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 30.

[339] Thucyd. ii, 83. Ἐπειδὴ μέντοι ἀντιπαραπλέοντάς τε ἑώρων
αὐτοὺς (that is, when the Corinthians saw the Athenian ships)
παρὰ γῆν σφῶν κομιζομένων, καὶ ἐκ Πατρῶν τῆς Ἀχαΐας πρὸς τὴν
ἀντιπέρας ἤπειρον διαβαλλόντων ἐπὶ Ἀκαρνανίας κατεῖδον τοὺς
Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῆς Χαλκίδος καὶ τοῦ Εὐήνου ποταμοῦ προσπλέοντας
σφίσι, ~καὶ οὐκ ἔλαθον νυκτὸς ὐφορμισάμενοι~, οὕτω δὴ
ἀναγκάζονται ναυμαχεῖν κατὰ μέσον τὸν πορθμόν.

There is considerable difficulty in clearly understanding what
was here done, especially what is meant by the words οὐκ ἔλαθον
νυκτὸς ὐφορμισάμενοι, which words the Scholiast construed as
if the nominative case to ἔλαθον were οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, whereas the
natural structure of the sentence, as well as the probabilities
of fact, lead the best commentators to consider οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι
as the nominative case to that verb. The remark of the Scholiast,
however, shows us, that the difficulty of understanding the
sentence dates from ancient times.

Dr. Arnold—whose explanation is adopted by Poppo and Göller—says:
“The two fleets were moving parallel to one another along the
opposite shores of the Corinthian gulf. But even when they had
sailed out of the strait at Rhium, the opposite shores were still
so near, that the Peloponnesians hoped to cross over without
opposition, if they could so far deceive the Athenians, as to
the spot where they brought to for the night, as to induce them
either to stop too soon, or to advance too far, that they might
not be exactly opposite to them to intercept the passage. If they
could lead the Athenians to think that they meant to advance in
the night beyond Patræ, the Athenian fleet was likely to continue
its own course along the northern shore, to be ready to intercept
them when they should endeavor to run across to Acarnania. But
the Athenians, aware that they had stopped at Patræ, stopped
themselves at Chalkis, instead of proceeding further to the
westward; and thus were so nearly opposite to them, that the
Peloponnesians had not time to get more than half-way across,
before they found themselves encountered by their watchful enemy.”

This explanation seems to me not satisfactory, nor does it take
account of all the facts of the case. The first belief of the
Peloponnesians was, that Phormio would not dare to attack them
at all: accordingly, having arrived at Patræ, they stretched
from thence across the gulf to the mouth of the Euenus,—the
natural way of proceeding according to ancient navigation,—going
in the direction of Akarnania (ἐπὶ Ἀκαρνανίας). As they were
thus stretching across, they perceived Phormio bearing down upon
them from the Euenus: this was a surprise to them, and as they
wished to avoid a battle in the mid-channel, they desisted from
proceeding farther that day, in hopes to be able to deceive
Phormio in respect of their night-station. They made a feint of
taking night-station on the shore between Patræ and Rhium, near
the narrow part of the strait; but, in reality, they “slipped
anchor and put to sea during the night,” as Mr. Bloomfield says,
in hopes of getting across the shorter passage under favor of
darkness, before Phormio could come upon them. That they must
have done this is proved by the fact, that the subsequent battle
was fought on the morrow in the mid-channel _very little after
daybreak_ (we learn this from what Thucydidês says about the
gulf-breeze, for which Phormio waited before he would commence
his attack—ὅπερ ἀναμένων τε περιέπλει, καὶ εἰώθει γίγνεσθαι ~ἐπι
τὴν ἕω~). If Phormio had returned to Chalkis, they would probably
have succeeded; but he must have kept the sea all night, which
would be the natural proceeding of a vigilant captain, determined
not to let the Peloponnesians get across without fighting: so
that he was upon them in the mid-channel immediately that day
broke.

Putting all the statements of Thucydidês together, we may be
convinced that this is the way in which the facts occurred. But
of the precise sense of ὐφορμισάμενοι, I confess I do not feel
certain: Haack says, it means “clam appellere ad littus,” but
here, I think, that sense will not do: for the Peloponnesians did
not wish, and could indeed hardly hope, to conceal from Phormio
the spot where they brought to for the night, and to make him
suppose that they brought to at some point of the shore west of
Patræ, when in reality they passed the night in Patræ,—which
is what Dr. Arnold supposes. The shore west of Patræ makes a
bend to the southwest,—forming the gulf of Patras,—so that the
distance from the northern, or Ætolian and Akarnanian, side of
the gulf becomes for a considerable time longer and longer, and
the Peloponnesians would thus impose upon themselves a longer
crossing, increasing the difficulty of getting over without a
battle. But ὐφορμισάμενοι may reasonably be supposed to mean,
especially in conjunction with οὐκ ἔλαθον, “taking up a simulated
or imperfect night-station,” in which they did not really intend
to stay all night, and which could be quitted at short notice and
with ease. The preposition ὑπὸ, in composition, would thus have
the sense, not of _secrecy_ (_clam_) but of _sham-performance_,
or of mere going through the forms of an act for the purpose of
making a false impression (like ὑποφέρειν, Xenoph. Hell. iv, 72).
Mr. Bloomfield proposes conjecturally ἀφορμισάμενοι, meaning,
“that the Peloponnesians slipped their anchors in the night:” I
place no faith in the conjecture, but I believe him to be quite
right in supposing, that the Peloponnesians _did actually_ slip
their anchors in the night.

Another point remains to be adverted to. The battle took
place κατὰ μέσον τὸν πορθμόν. Now we need not understand this
expression to allude to the narrowest part of the sea, or the
strait, strictly and precisely; that is, the line of seven stadia
between Rhium and Antirrhium. But I think we must understand it
to mean a portion of sea not far westward of the strait, where
the breadth, though greater than that of the strait itself,
is yet not so great as it becomes in the line drawn northward
from Patræ. We cannot understand πορθμὸς (as Mr. Bloomfield and
Poppo do,—see the note of the latter on the Scholia) to mean
_trajectus_ simply, that is to say, the passage across even
the widest portion of the gulf of Patras: nor does the passage
cited out of c. 86 require us so to understand it. Πορθμὸς, in
Thucydidês, means a strait, or narrow crossing of sea, and Poppo
himself admits that Thucydidês always uses it so: nor would it be
reasonable to believe that he would call the line of sea across
the gulf, from Patræ to the mouth of the Euenus, a πορθμός. See
the note of Göller, on this point.

[340] Thucyd. ii, 86. μὴ δíδοντες διέκπλουν. The great object of
the fast-sailing Athenian trireme was, to drive its beak against
some weak part of the adversary’s ship: the stern, the side, or
the oars,—not against the beak, which was strongly constructed as
well for defence as for offence. The Athenian, therefore, rowing
through the intervals of the adversary’s line, and thus getting
in their rear, turned rapidly, and got the opportunity, before
the ship of the adversary could change its position, of striking
it either in the stern or some weak part. Such a manœuvre was
called the _diekplus_. The success of it, of course, depended
upon the extreme rapidity and precision of the movements of the
Athenian vessel, so superior in this respect to its adversary,
not only in the better construction of the ship, but the
excellence of rowers and steersmen.

In this position they were found and attacked shortly after daybreak, by Phormio, who bore down upon them with his ships in single file, all admirable sailors, and his own ship leading; all being strictly forbidden to attack until he should give the signal. He rowed swiftly round the Peloponnesian circle, nearing the prows of their ships as closely as he could, and making constant semblance of being about to come to blows. Partly from the intimidating effect of this manœuvre, altogether novel to the Peloponnesians,—partly from the natural difficulty, well known to Phormio, of keeping every ship in its exact stationary position,—the order of the circle, both within and without, presently became disturbed. It was not long before a new ally came to his aid, on which he fully calculated, postponing his actual attack until this favorable incident occurred. The strong land-breeze out of the gulf of Corinth, always wont to begin shortly after daybreak, came down upon the Peloponnesian fleet with its usual vehemence, at a moment when the steadiness of their order was already somewhat giving way, and forced their ships more than ever out of proper relation one to the other. The triremes began to run foul of each other, or become entangled with the store-vessels: so that in every ship the men aboard were obliged to keep pushing off their neighbors on each side with poles,—not without loud clamor and mutual reproaches, which prevented both the orders of the captain, and the cheering sound or song whereby the keleustês animated the rowers and kept them to time, from being at all audible. Moreover, the fresh breeze had occasioned such a swell, that these rowers, unskilful under all circumstances, could not get their oars clear of the water, and the pilots thus lost all command over their vessels.[341] The critical moment was now come, and Phormio gave the signal for attack. He first drove against and disabled one of the admiral’s ships,—his comrades next assailed others with equal success,—so that the Peloponnesians, confounded and terrified, attempted hardly any resistance, but broke their order and sought safety in flight. They fled partly to Patræ, partly to Dymê, in Achaia, pursued by the Athenians; who, with scarcely the loss of a man, captured twelve triremes, took aboard and carried away almost the entire crews, and sailed off with them to Molykreium, or Antirrhium, the northern cape at the narrow mouth of the Corinthian gulf, opposite to the corresponding cape called Rhium in Achaia. Having erected at Antirrhium a trophy for the victory, dedicating one of the captive triremes to Poseidon, they returned to Naupaktus; while the Peloponnesian ships sailed along the shore from Patræ to Kyllênê, the principal port in the territory of Elis. They were here soon afterwards joined by Knêmus, who passed over with his squadron from Leukas.[342]

[341] See Dr. Arnold’s note upon this passage of Thucydidês,
respecting the keleustês and his functions: to the passages
which he indicates as reference, I will add two more of Plautus,
Mercat. iv, 2, 5, and Asinaria, iii, 1, 15.

When we conceive the structure of an ancient trireme, we shall
at once see, first, how essential the keleustês was, to keep the
rowers in harmonious action,—next, how immense the difference
must have been between practised and unpractised rowers. The
trireme had, in all, one hundred and seventy rowers, distributed
into three tiers. The upper tier, called thranitæ, were sixty-two
in number, or thirty-one on each side: the middle tier, or
zygitæ, as well as the lowest tier, or thalamitæ, were each
fifty-four in number, or twenty-seven on each side. Besides
these, there were belonging to each trireme a certain number,
seemingly about thirty, of supplementary oars (κῶπαι περινέω),
to be used by the epibatæ, or soldiers, serving on board, in
case of rowers being killed, or oars broken. Each tier of
rowers was distributed along the whole length of the vessel,
from head to stern, or at least along the greater part of it;
but the seats of the higher tiers were not placed in the exact
perpendicular line above the lower. Of course, the oars of the
thranitæ, or uppermost tier, were the longest: those of the
thalamitæ, or lowest tier, the shortest: those of the zygitæ, of
a length between the two. Each oar was rowed only by one man. The
thranitæ, as having the longest oars, were most hardly worked and
most highly paid. What the length of the oars was, belonging to
either tier, we do not know, but some of the supplementary oars
appear to have been about fifteen feet in length.

What is here stated, appears to be pretty well ascertained,
chiefly from the inscriptions discovered at Athens a few years
ago, so full of information respecting the Athenian marine,—and
from the most instructive commentary appended to these
inscriptions by M. Boeckh, Seewesen der Athener, ch. ix, pp.
94, 104, 115. But there is a great deal still, respecting the
equipment of an ancient trireme, unascertained and disputed.

Now there was nothing but the voice of the keleustês to keep
these one hundred and seventy rowers all to good time with their
strokes. With oars of different length, and so many rowers, this
must have been no easy matter, and apparently quite impossible,
unless the rowers were trained to act together. The difference
between those who were so trained and those who were not, must
have been immense. We may imagine the difference between the
ships of Phormio and those of his enemies, and the difficulty of
the latter in contending with the swell of the sea,—when we read
this description of the ancient trireme.

About two hundred men, that is to say, one hundred and seventy
rowers and thirty supernumeraries, mostly epibatæ or hoplites
serving on board, besides the pilot, the man at the ship’s bow,
the keleustês, etc., probably some half dozen officers, formed
the crew of a trireme: compare Herodot. viii, 17; vii, 184, where
he calculates the thirty epibatæ over and above the two hundred.
Dr. Arnold thinks that, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian
war, the epibatæ on board an Athenian trireme were no more than
ten: but this seems not quite made out: see his note on Thucyd.
iii, 95.

The Venetian galleys in the thirteenth century were manned by
about the same number of men. “Les galères Vénitiens du convoi de
Flandre devaient être montées par deux cent hommes libres, dont
180 rameurs, et 12 archers. Les arcs ou balistes furent préscrits
en 1333 pour toutes les galères de commerce armées.” (Depping,
Histoire du Commerce entre le Levant et l’Europe, vol. i, p. 163.)

[342] Thucyd. ii, 84.

These two incidents, just recounted, with their details,—the repulse of Knêmus and his army from Stratus, and the defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet by Phormio,—afford ground for some interesting remarks. The first of the two displays the great inferiority of the Epirots to the Greeks,—and even to the less advanced portion of the Greeks,—in the qualities of order, discipline, steadiness, and power of coöperation for a joint purpose. Confidence of success with them is exaggerated into childish rashness, so that they despise even the commonest precautions either in march or attack; while the Greek divisions on their right and on their left are never so elate as to omit either. If, on land, we thus discover the inherent superiority of Greeks over Epirots involuntarily breaking out,—so in the sea-fight we are no less impressed with the astonishing superiority of the Athenians over their opponents; a superiority, indeed, noway inherent, such as that of Greeks over Epirots, but depending in this case on previous toil, training, and inventive talent, on the one side, compared with neglect and old-fashioned routine on the other. Nowhere does the extraordinary value of that seamanship, which the Athenians had been gaining by years of improved practice, stand so clearly marked as in these first battles of Phormio. It gradually becomes less conspicuous as we advance in the war, since the Peloponnesians improve, learning seamanship as the Russians, under Peter the Great, learned the art of war from the Swedes, under Charles the Twelfth,—while the Athenian triremes and their crews seem to become less choice and effective, even before the terrible disaster at Syracuse, and are irreparably deteriorated after that misfortune.

To none did the circumstances of this memorable sea-fight seem so incomprehensible as to the Lacedæmonians. They had heard, indeed, of the seamanship of Athens, but had never felt it, and could not understand what it meant: so they imputed the defeat to nothing but disgraceful cowardice, and sent indignant orders to Knêmus at Kyllênê, to take the command, equip a larger and better fleet, and repair the dishonor. Three Spartan commissioners—Brasidas, Timokratês, and Lykophron—were sent down to assist him with their advice and exertions in calling together naval contingents from the different allied cities: and by this means, under the general resentment occasioned by the recent defeat, a large fleet of seventy-seven triremes was speedily mustered at Panormus,—a harbor of Achaia near to the promontory of Rhium, and immediately within the interior gulf. A land-force was also collected at the same place ashore, to aid the operations of the fleet. Such preparations did not escape the vigilance of Phormio, who transmitted to Athens news of his victory, at the same time urgently soliciting reinforcements to contend with the increasing strength of the enemy. The Athenians immediately sent twenty fresh ships to join him: but they were induced by the instances of a Kretan named Nikias, their proxenus at Gortyn, to allow him to take the ships first to Krete, on the faith of his promise to reduce the hostile town of Kydonia. He had made this promise as a private favor to the inhabitants of Polichna, border enemies of Kydonia; but when the fleet arrived he was unable to fulfil it: nothing was effected except ravage of the Kydonian lands, and the fleet was long prevented by adverse winds and weather from getting away.[343] This ill-advised diversion of the fleet from its straight course to join Phormio is a proof how much the counsels of Athens were beginning to suffer from the loss of Periklês, who was just now in his last illness and died shortly afterwards. That liability to be seduced by novel enterprises and projects of acquisition, against which he so emphatically warned his countrymen,[344] was even now beginning to manifest its disastrous consequences.

[343] Thucyd. ii, 85.

[344] Thucyd. i, 144. Πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ
περιέσεσθαι, ἢν ἐθέλητε ἀρχήν τε μὴ ἐπικτᾶσθαι ἅμα πολεμοῦντες,
καὶ κινδύνους αὐθαιρέτους μὴ προστίθεσθαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ πεφόβημαι
τὰς οἰκείας ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίας ἢ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων διανοίας.

Through the loss of this precious interval, Phormio now found himself, with no more than his original twenty triremes, opposed to the vastly increased forces of the enemy,—seventy-seven triremes, with a large force on land to back them: the latter, no mean help in ancient warfare. He took up his station near the Cape Antirrhium, or the Molykric Rhium, as it was called,—the opposite cape to the Achaic Rhium: the line between them, seemingly about an English mile in breadth, forms the entrance of the Corinthian gulf. The Messenian force from Naupaktus attended him, and served on land. But he kept on the outside of the gulf, anxious to fight in a large and open breadth of sea, which was essential to Athenian manœuvring: while his adversaries on their side remained on the inside of the Achaic cape, from the corresponding reason,—feeling that to them the narrow sea was advantageous, as making the naval battle like to a land battle, effacing all superiority of nautical skill.[345] If we revert back to the occasion of the battle of Salamis, we find that narrowness of space was at that time accounted the best of all protections for a smaller fleet against a larger. But such had been the complete change of feeling, occasioned by the system of manœuvring introduced since that period in the Athenian navy, that amplitude of sea room is now not less coveted by Phormio than dreaded by his enemies. The improved practice of Athens had introduced a revolution in naval warfare.

[345] Thucyd. ii, 86-89: compare vii, 36-49.

For six or seven days successively, the two fleets were drawn out against each other,—Phormio trying to entice the Peloponnesians to the outside of the gulf, while they on their side did what they could to bring him within it.[346] To him, every day’s postponement was gain, since it gave him a new chance of his reinforcements arriving: for that very reason, the Peloponnesian commanders were eager to accelerate an action, and at length resorted to a well-laid plan for forcing it on. But in spite of immense numerical superiority, such was the discouragement and reluctance, prevailing among their seamen, many of whom had been actual sufferers in the recent defeat,—that Knêmus and Brasidas had to employ emphatic exhortations; insisting on the favorable prospect before them,—pointing out that the late battle had been lost only by mismanagement and imprudence, which would be for the future corrected,—and appealing to the inherent bravery of the Peloponnesian warrior. They concluded by a hint, that while those who behaved well in the coming battle would receive due honor, the laggards would assuredly be punished:[347] a topic rarely touched upon by ancient generals in their harangues on the eve of battle, and demonstrating conspicuously the reluctance of many of the Peloponnesian seamen, who had been brought to the fight again chiefly by the ascendency and strenuous commands of Sparta. To this reluctance Phormio pointedly alluded, in the encouraging exhortations which he on his side addressed to his men: for they too, in spite of their habitual confidence at sea, strengthened by the recent victory, were dispirited by the smallness of their numbers. He reminded them of their long practice and rational conviction of superiority at sea, such as no augmentation of numbers, especially with an enemy conscious of his own weakness, could overbalance: and he called upon them to show their habitual discipline and quick apprehension of orders, and above all to perform their regular movements in perfect silence during the actual battle,[348]—useful in all matters of war, and essential to the proper conduct of a sea-fight. The idea of entire silence on board the Athenian ships while a sea-fight was going on, is not only striking as a feature in the picture, but is also one of the most powerful evidences of the force of self-control and military habits among these citizen-seamen.

[346] Thucyd. ii, 86.

[347] Thucyd. ii, 87. Τῶν δὲ πρότερον ἡγεμόνων οὐ χεῖρον τὴν
ἐπιχείρησιν ἡμεῖς παρασκευάσομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδώσομεν πρόφασιν
οὐδενὶ κακῷ γενέσθαι· ἢν δέ τις ἄρα καὶ βουληθῇ, κολασθήσεται τῇ
πρεπούσῃ ζημίᾳ, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ τιμήσονται τοῖς προσήκουσιν ἄθλοις
τῆς ἀρετῆς.

[348] Thucyd. ii, 89. Καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ~κόσμον καὶ σιγὴν~ περὶ
πλείστου ἡγεῖσθε, ὃ ἔς τε τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν ξυμφέρει, καὶ
ναυμαχίᾳ οὐχ ἥκιστα, etc.

The habitual position of the Peloponnesian fleet off Panormus was within the strait, but nearly fronting the breadth of it,—opposite to Phormio, who lay on the outer side of the strait, as well as off the opposite cape: in the Peloponnesian line, therefore, the right wing occupied the north, or northeast side towards Naupaktus. Knêmus and Brasidas now resolved to make a forward movement up the gulf, as if against that town, which was the main Athenian station; for they knew that Phormio would be under the necessity of coming to the defence of the place, and they hoped to pin him up and force him to action close under the land, where Athenian manœuvring would be unavailing. Accordingly, they commenced this movement early in the morning, sailing in line of four abreast towards the northern coast of the inner gulf; the right squadron, under the Lacedæmonian Timokratês, was in the van, according to its natural position,[349] and care had been taken to place in it twenty of the best sailing ships, since the success of the plan of action was known beforehand to depend upon their celerity. As they had foreseen, Phormio the moment he saw their movement, put his men on shipboard, and rowed into the interior of the strait, though with the greatest reluctance; for the Messenians were on land alongside of him, and he knew that Naupaktus, with their wives and families, and a long circuit of wall,[350] was utterly undefended. He ranged his ships in line of battle ahead, probably his own the leading ship; and sailed close along the land towards Naupaktus, while the Messenians marching ashore kept near to him. Both fleets were thus moving in the same direction, and towards the same point, the Athenian close along shore, the Peloponnesians somewhat farther off.[351] The latter had now got Phormio into the position which they wished, pinned up against the land, with no room for tactics. On a sudden the signal was given, and the whole Peloponnesian fleet facing to the left, changed from column into line, and instead of continuing to sail along the coast, rowed rapidly with their prows shore-ward to come to close quarters with the Athenians. The right squadron of the Peloponnesians occupying the side towards Naupaktus, was especially charged with the duty of cutting off the Athenians from all possibility of escaping thither; and the best ships had been placed on the right for that important object. As far as the commanders were concerned, the plan of action completely succeeded; the Athenians were caught in a situation where resistance was impossible, and had no chance of escape except in flight. But so superior were they in rapid movement even to the best Peloponnesians, that eleven ships, the headmost out of the twenty, just found means to run by,[352] before the right wing of the enemy closed in upon the shore; and made the best of their way to Naupaktus. The remaining nine ships were caught and driven ashore with serious damage,—their crews being partly slain, partly escaping by swimming. The Peloponnesians towed off one trireme with its entire crew, and some others empty; but more than one of them was rescued by the bravery of the Messenian hoplites, who, in spite of their heavy panoply, rushed into the water and got aboard them, fighting from the decks and driving off the enemy even after the rope had been actually made fast, and the process of dragging off had begun.[353]

[349] Thucyd. ii, 90. ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ταξάμενοι τὰς ναῦς. Matthiæ
in his Grammar (sect. 584), states that ἐπὶ τεσσάρων means “four
deep,” and cites this passage of Thucydidês as an instance of it.
But the words certainly mean here _four abreast_; though it is to
be recollected that a column four abreast, when turned into line,
becomes four deep.

[350] Thucyd. iii, 102.

[351] Thucyd. ii, 90. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς οἱ
Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ ἐπέπλεον ἐς τὸν κόλπον καὶ τὰ στενὰ, βουλόμενοι
ἄκοντας ἔσω προαγαγεῖν αὐτοὺς, ἀναγόμενοι ἅμα ἕῳ ἔπλεον, ἐπὶ
τεσσάρων ταξάμενοι τὰς ναῦς, ~ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἔσω~ ἐπὶ τοῦ
κόλπου, δεξιῷ κέρᾳ ἡγουμένῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ ὥρμουν· ἐπὶ δ᾽ αὐτῷ
εἴκοσι νῆας ἔταξαν τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἄρα νομίσας ἐπὶ
τὴν Ναύπακτον αὐτοὺς πλεῖν ὁ Φορμίων καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιβοηθῶν ταύτῃ
παραπλέοι, μὴ διαφύγοιεν πλέοντα τὸν ἐπίπλουν σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι
~ἔξω τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως~, ἀλλ᾽ αὗται αἱ νῆες περικλῄσειαν.

It will be seen that I have represented in the text the
movement of the Peloponnesian fleet as directed ostensibly
and to all appearance against Naupaktus: and I translate the
words in the fourth line of the above passage—ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν
γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου—as meaning “_against the station of the
Athenians up the gulf within_,” that is, against Naupaktus. Mr.
Bloomfield gives that meaning to the passage, though not to the
words; but the Scholiast, Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Göller, all
construe it differently, and maintain that the words τὴν ἐαυτῶν
γῆν mean _the Peloponnesian shore_. To my view, this latter
interpretation renders the whole scheme of the battle confused
and unintelligible; while with the other meaning it is perfectly
clear, and all the circumstances fit in with each other.

Dr. Arnold does not seem even to admit that τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν can
mean anything else but the coast of Peloponnesus. He says: “The
Scholiast says that ἐπὶ is here used for παρά. It would be better
to say that it has a mixed signification of motion towards a
place and neighborhood to it: expressing that the Peloponnesians
sailed _towards_ their own land (_i. e._ towards Corinth, Sikyon,
and Pellênê, to which places the greater number of the ships
belonged), instead of standing over to the opposite coast, which
belonged to their enemies: and at the same time kept close _upon_
their own land, in the sense of ἐπὶ with a dative case.”

It appears to me that Dr. Arnold’s supposition of Corinth and
Sikyon as the meaning of τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν is altogether far-fetched
and improbable. As a matter of fact, it would only be true of
part of the confederate fleet; while it would be false with
regard to ships from Elis, Leukas, etc. And if it had been
true with regard to all, yet the distance of Corinth from the
Peloponnesian station was so very great, that Thucydidês would
hardly mark _direction_ by referring to a city so very far off.
Then again, both the Scholiast and Dr. Arnold do great violence
to the meaning of the preposition ἐπὶ with an accusative case,
and cite no examples to justify it. What the sense of ἐπὶ is with
an accusative case signifying locality, is shown by Thucydidês
in this very passage.—εἰ ἄρα νομίσας ~ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον~ αὐτοὺς
πλεῖν ὁ Φορμίων, etc. (again, c. 85. ἐπὶ Κυδωνίαν πλεῦσαι; and
i. 29, ἐπὶ Ἐπίδαμνον, etc.—ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῦ of Perdikkas, i,
57), that is, against, or to go thither with a hostile purpose.
So sensible does the Scholiast seem to be of this, that he
affirms ἐπὶ to be used instead of παρά. This is a most violent
supposition, for nothing can be more different than the two
phrases ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν and παρὰ τὴν γῆν. Dr. Arnold again assigns
to ἐπὶ with an accusative case another sense, which he himself
admits that it only has with a dative.

I make these remarks with a view to show that the sense which
Dr. Arnold and others put upon the words of Thucydidês,—ἔπλεον
ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν,—departs from the usual, and even from the
legitimate meaning of the words. But I have a stronger objection
still. If that sense be admitted, it will be found quite
inconsistent with the subsequent proceedings, as Thucydidês
describes; and any one who will look at the map in reading this
chapter, will see plainly that the fact is so. If, as Dr. Arnold
supposes, the Peloponnesian fleet kept close along the shore of
Peloponnesus, what was there in their movements to alarm Phormio
for the safety of Naupaktus, or to draw him so reluctantly into
the strait? Or if we even grant this, and suppose that Phormio
construed the movement along the coast of Achaia to indicate
designs against Naupaktus, and that he therefore came into the
gulf and sailed along his own shore to defend the town,—still the
Peloponnesians would be separated from him by the whole breadth
of the gulf at that point; and as soon as they altered their line
of direction for the purpose of crossing the gulf and attacking
him, he would have the whole breadth of the gulf in which to take
his measures for meeting them, so that instead of finding himself
jammed up against the land, he would have been able to go out
and fight them in the wide water, which he so much desired. The
whole description given by Thucydidês, of the sudden wheeling of
the Peloponnesian fleet, whereby Phormio’s ships were assailed,
and nine of them cut off, shows that the two fleets must have
been very close together when that movement was undertaken. If
they had not been close,—if the Peloponnesians had had to row
any considerable distance after wheeling,—all the Athenian ships
might have escaped along shore without any difficulty. In fact,
the words of Thucydidês imply that _both_ the two fleets, at the
time when the wheel of the Peloponnesians was made, _were sailing
in parallel directions along the northern coast in the direction
of Naupaktus_,—ὅπως εἰ ἄρα νομίσας ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον αὐτοὺς πλεῖν
ὁ Φορμίων ~καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιβοηθῶν~ ταύτῃ παραπλέοι,—“if he _also_,
with a view to defend the place, should sail along that coast,”
(that is, if he, _as well as they_:) which seems to be the
distinct meaning of the particle καὶ in this place.

Now if we suppose the Peloponnesian fleet to have sailed from
its original station towards Naupaktus, all the events which
follow become thoroughly perspicuous and coherent. I apprehend
that no one would ever have entertained any other idea, except
from the words of Thucydidês,—ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ~ἑαυτῶν~ γῆν ἔσω
ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου. Since the subject or nominative case of the verb
ἔπλεον is οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, it has been supposed that the word
~ἑαυτῶν~ must necessarily refer to the Peloponnesians; and Mr.
Bloomfield, with whom I agree as to the signification of the
passage, proposes to alter ~ἑαυτῶν~ into ~αὐτῶν~. It appears
to me that this alteration is not necessary, and that ἑαυτῶν
may very well be construed so as to refer to the _Athenians_,
not to the Lacedæmonians. The reflective meaning of the pronoun
ἑαυτῶν is _not necessarily_ thrown back upon the subject of the
action _immediately_ preceding it, in a complicated sentence
where there is more than one subject and more than one action.
Thus, for instance, in this very passage of Thucydidês which I
have transcribed, we find the word ἑαυτῶν a second time used,
and used so that its meaning is thrown back, not upon the
subject immediately preceding, but upon a subject more distant
from it,—ἐπὶ δ᾽ αὐτῷ (τῷ κέρατι) εἴκοσι ναῦς ἔταξαν τὰς ἄριστα
πλεούσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἄρα..., μὴ διαφύγοιεν πλέοντα τὸν ἐπίπλουν
σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ~ἔξω τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως~, ἀλλ᾽ αὗται αἱ νῆες
περικλῄσειαν. Now here the words τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως, allude to
the Peloponnesian fleet, not to the Athenians, which latter is
the subject immediately preceding. Poppo and Göller both admit
such to be the true meaning; and if this be admissible, there
appears to me no greater difficulty in construing the words ἐπὶ
τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν to mean, “the land of the _Athenians_,” _not_
“the land of the _Peloponnesians_.” Ἑαυτῶν might have been more
unambiguously expressed by ἐκείνων αὑτῶν; for the reflective
signification embodied in αὑτῶν is here an important addition to
the meaning: “Since the Athenians did not sail into the interior
of the gulf and the narrow waters, the Peloponnesians, wishing to
bring them in even reluctantly, sailed _against the Athenians’
own land_ in the interior.”

Another passage may be produced from Thucydidês, in which the
two words ἑαυτοῦ and ἐκείνου are both used in the same sentence
and designate the same person, ii, 13. Περικλῆς, ὑποτοπήσας,
ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος αὐτῷ ξένος ὢν ἐτύγχανε, μὴ πολλάκις ἢ αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ
βουλόμενος χαρίζεσθαι τοὺς ἀγροὺς αὐτοῦ παραλίπῃ καὶ μὴ δῃώσῃ,
ἢ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων κελευσάντων ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ~ἑαυτοῦ~ γένηται
τοῦτο, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄγη ἐλαύνειν προεῖπον ἕνεκα ~ἐκείνου~·
προηγόρευε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος μὲν οἱ
ξένος εἴη, οὐ μέντοι ἐπὶ κακῷ γε τῆς πόλεως γένοιτο, τοὺς δ᾽
ἀγροὺς ~τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ~ καὶ οἰκίας ἢν ἄρα μὴ δῃώσωσιν οἱ πολέμιοι
ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀφίησιν αὐτὰ δημόσια εἶναι. Here ἑαυτοῦ
and ἐκείνου (compare an analogous passage, Xenophon, Hellen. i,
1, 27) both refer to Periklês; and ἑαυτοῦ is twice used, so that
it reflects back not upon the subject of the action immediately
preceding it, but upon another subject farther behind. Again, iv,
99. Οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ ἀπεκρίναντο, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ εἰσίν (οἱ
Ἀθηναῖοι), ἀπιόντας ~ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν~ ἀποφέρεσθαι τὰ σφέτερα· εἰ δ᾽
ἐν τῇ ~ἐκείνων~, αὐτοὺς γιγνώσκειν τὸ ποιητέον. Here the use of
ἑαυτῶν and ἐκείνων is remarkable. Ἑαυτῶν refers to the Bœotians,
though the Athenians are the subject of the action immediately
preceding; while ἐκείνων refers to the Athenians, in another case
where they are the subject of the action immediately preceding.
We should almost have expected to find the position of the two
words reversed. Again, in iv, 57, we have—Καὶ τούτους μὲν οἱ
Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβουλεύσαντο καταθέσθαι ἐς τὰς νήσους, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
Κυθηρίους ~οἰκοῦντας τὴν ἑαυτῶν~ φόρον τέσσαρα τάλαντα φέρειν.
Here ἑαυτῶν refers to the subject of the action immediately
preceding—that is, to Κυθηρίους, not to Ἀθηναῖοι: but when we
turn to another chapter, iii, 78: οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι φοβούμενοι τὸ
πλῆθος καὶ τὴν περικύκλωσιν, ἁθρόαις μέν οὐ προσέπιπτον οὐδὲ
κατὰ μέσον ~ταῖς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς τεταγμέναις~ (ναυσὶ)—we find ἑαυτῶν
thrown back upon the subject, _not_ immediately preceding it.
The same, iv, 47—εἴ πού τίς τινα ἴδοι ἐχθρὸν ἑαυτοῦ; and ii, 95.
Ὁ γὰρ Περδίκκας αὐτῷ ὑποσχόμενος, εἰ Ἀθηναίοις τε διαλλάξειεν
~ἑαυτὸν~ (_i. e._ Perdikkas), κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τῷ πολέμῳ πιεζόμενον,
etc.

Compare also Homer, Odyss. xvii, 387. Πτωχὸν δ᾽ οὐκ ἄν τις
καλέοι, τρύξοντα ἓ αὐτόν; and Xenophon, Memorab. iv, 2, 28; i, 6,
3; v, 2, 24; Anabas. vii. 2, 10; 6, 43; Hellen. v, 2, 39.

It appears to me, that when we study the use of the pronoun
ἑαυτὸς, we shall see reason to be convinced that in the passage
of Thucydidês now before us, the phrase οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἔπλεον
ἐς τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν, need not necessarily be referred to the
_Peloponnesian_ land, but may in perfect conformity with analogy
be understood to mean the _Athenian_ land. I am sure that, in so
construing it, we shall not put so much violence upon the meaning
as the Scholiast and Dr. Arnold have put upon the preposition
ἐπὶ, when the Scholiast states that ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν means the
same thing as παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν, and when Dr. Arnold admits
this opinion, only adding a new meaning which does not usually
belong to ἐπὶ with an accusative case.

An objection to the meaning which I propose may possibly be
grounded on the word νομίσας, applied to Phormio. If the
Peloponnesian fleet was sailing directly towards Naupaktus, it
may be urged, Phormio would not be said to _think_ that they
were going thither, but _to see_ or _become aware_ of it. But
in reply to this we may observe, that the Peloponnesians never
really intended to attack Naupaktus, though they directed their
course towards it; they wished in reality to draw Phormio within
the strait, and there to attack him. The historian, therefore,
says with propriety, that Phormio would _believe_, and not that
he would _perceive_, them to be going thither, since his belief
would really be erroneous.

[352] Thucyd. ii, 90. How narrow the escape was, is marked in
the words of the historian—τῶν δὲ ἕνδεκα μὲν αἵπερ ἡγοῦντο
~ὑπεκφεύγουσι~ τὸ κέρας τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ τὴν ἐπιστροφήν, ἐς
τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν.

The proceedings of the Syracusan fleet against that of the
Athenians in the harbor of Syracuse, and the reflections of the
historian upon them, illustrate this attack of the Peloponnesians
upon the fleet of Phormio (Thucyd. vii. 36).

[353] Compare the like bravery on the part of the Lacedæmonian
hoplites at Pylus (Thucyd. iv, 14).

The victory of the Peloponnesians seemed assured, and while their left and centre were thus occupied, the twenty ships of their right wing parted company with the rest, in order to pursue the eleven fugitive Athenian ships which they had failed in cutting off. Ten of these got clear away into the harbor of Naupaktus, and there posted themselves in an attitude of defence near the temple of Apollo, before any of the pursuers could come near; while the eleventh, somewhat less swift, was neared by the Lacedæmonian admiral; who, on board a Leukadian trireme, pushed greatly ahead of his comrades, in hopes of overtaking at least this one prey. There happened to lie moored a merchant vessel, at the entrance of the harbor of Naupaktus; and the Athenian captain in his flight, observing that the Leukadian pursuer was for the moment alone, seized the opportunity for a bold and rapid manœuvre. He pulled swiftly round the merchant vessel, directed his trireme so as to meet the advancing Leukadian, and drove his beak against her midships with an impact so violent as to disable her at once; her commander, the Lacedæmonian admiral, Timokratês, was so stung with anguish at this unexpected catastrophe, that he slew himself forthwith, and fell overboard into the harbor. The pursuing vessels coming up behind, too, were so astounded and dismayed by it, that the men, dropping their oars, held water, and ceased to advance; while some even found themselves half aground, from ignorance of the coast. On the other hand, the ten Athenian triremes in the harbor were beyond measure elated by the incident, so that a single word from Phormio sufficed to put them in active forward motion, and to make them strenuously attack the embarrassed enemy: whose ships, disordered by the heat of pursuit, and having been just suddenly stopped, could not be speedily got again under way, and expected nothing less than renewed attack. First, the Athenians broke the twenty pursuing ships, on the right wing; next, they pursued their advantage against the left and centre, who had probably neared to the right; so that after a short resistance, the whole were completely routed, and fled across the gulf to their original station at Panormus.[354] Not only did the eleven Athenian ships thus break, terrify, and drive away the entire fleet of the enemy, with the capture of six of the nearest Peloponnesian triremes,—but they also rescued those ships of their own which had been driven ashore and taken in the early part of the action: moreover, the Peloponnesian crews sustained a considerable loss, both in killed and in prisoners.

[354] Thucyd. ii, 92. It is sufficiently evident that
the Athenians defeated and drove off not only the twenty
Peloponnesian ships of the right or pursuing wing,—but also
the left and centre. Otherwise, they would not have been able
to recapture those Athenian ships which had been lost at the
beginning of the battle. Thucydidês, indeed, does not expressly
mention the Peloponnesian left and centre as following the
right in their pursuit towards Naupaktus. But we may presume
that they partially did so, probably careless of much order, as
being at first under the impression that the victory was gained.
They were probably, therefore, thrown into confusion without
much difficulty, when the twenty ships of the right were beaten
and driven back upon them,—even though the victorious Athenian
triremes were no more than eleven in number.

Thus, in spite not only of the prodigious disparity of numbers, but also of the disastrous blow which the Athenians had sustained at first, Phormio ended by gaining a complete victory; a victory, to which even the Lacedæmonians were forced to bear testimony, since they were obliged to ask a truce for burying and collecting their dead, while the Athenians on their part picked up the bodies of their own warriors. The defeated party, however, still thought themselves entitled, in token of their success in the early part of the action, to erect a trophy on the Rhium of Achaia, where they also dedicated the single Athenian trireme which they had been able to carry off. Yet they were so completely discomfited,—and farther, so much in fear of the expected reinforcement from Athens,—that they took advantage of the night to retire, and sail into the gulf to Corinth: all except the Leukadians, who returned to their own home.

Nor was it long before the reinforcement actually arrived, after that untoward detention which had wellnigh exposed Phormio and his whole fleet to ruin. It confirmed his mastery of the entrance of the gulf and of the coast of Akarnania, where the Peloponnesians had now no naval force at all. To establish more fully the Athenian influence in Akarnania, he undertook during the course of the autumn an expedition, landing at Astakus, and marching into the Akarnanian inland country with four hundred Athenian hoplites and four hundred Messenians. Some of the leading men of Stratus and Koronta, who were attached to the Peloponnesian interest, he caused to be sent into exile, while the chief named Kynês, of Koronta, who seems to have been hitherto in exile, was reëstablished in his native town. The great object was, to besiege and take the powerful town of Œniadæ, near the mouth of the Achelôus; a town at variance with the other Akarnanians, and attached to the Peloponnesians. But the great spread of the waters of the Achelôus rendered this siege impracticable during the winter, and Phormio returned to the station at Naupaktus. From hence he departed to Athens towards the end of the winter, carrying home both his prize-ships and such of his prisoners as were freemen. The latter were exchanged man for man against Athenian prisoners in the hands of Sparta.[355]

[355] Thucyd. ii, 102, 103.

After abandoning the naval contest at Rhium, and retiring to Corinth, Knêmus and Brasidas were prevailed upon by the Megarians, before the fleet dispersed, to try the bold experiment of a sudden inroad upon Peiræus. Such was the confessed superiority of the Athenians at sea, that, while they guarded amply the coasts of Attica against privateers, they never imagined the possibility of an attack upon their own main harbor. Accordingly, Peiræus was not only unprotected by any chain across the entrance, but destitute even of any regular guard-ships manned and ready. The seamen of the retiring Peloponnesian armament, on reaching Corinth, were immediately disembarked and marched, first across the isthmus, next to Megara,—each man carrying his sitting-cloth,[356] and his oar, together with the loop whereby the oar was fastened to the oar-hole in the side, and thus prevented from slipping. There lay forty triremes in Nisæa, the harbor of Megara, which, though old and out of condition, were sufficient for so short a trip; and the seamen immediately on arriving, launched these and got aboard. But such was the awe entertained of Athens and her power, that when the scheme came really to be executed, the courage of the Peloponnesians failed, though there was nothing to hinder them from actually reaching Peiræus: but it was pretended that the wind was adverse, and they contented themselves with passing across to the station of Budorum, in the opposite Athenian island of Salamis, where they surprised and seized the three guard-ships which habitually blockaded the harbor of Megara, and then landed upon the island. They spread themselves over a large part of Salamis, ravaged the properties, and seized men as well as goods. Fire-signals immediately made known this unforeseen aggression, both at Peiræus and at Athens, occasioning in both the extreme of astonishment and alarm; for the citizens in Athens, not conceiving distinctly the meaning of the signals, fancied that Peiræus itself had fallen into the hands of the enemy. The whole population rushed down to the Peiræus at break of day, and put to sea with all the triremes that were ready against the Peloponnesians; but these latter, aware of the danger which menaced them, made haste to quit Salamis with their booty, and the three captured guard-ships. The lesson was salutary to the Athenians: from henceforward Peiræus was furnished with a chain across the mouth, and a regular guard, down to the end of the war.[357] Forty years afterwards, however, we shall find it just as negligently watched, and surprised with much more boldness and dexterity, by the Lacedæmonian captain Teleutias.[358]

[356] Thucyd. ii, 93. ἐδόκει δὲ λαβόντα τῶν ναυτῶν ἕκαστον τὴν
κώπην, καὶ τὸ ὑπηρέσιον, καὶ τὸν τροπωτῆρα, etc. On these words
there is an interesting letter of Dr. Bishop’s published in the
Appendix to Dr. Arnold’s Thucydidês, vol. i. His remarks upon
ὑπηρέσιον are more satisfactory than those upon τροπωτήρ. Whether
the fulcrum of the oar was formed by a thowell, or a notch, on
the gunwale, or by a perforation in the ship’s side, there must
in both cases have been required—since it seems to have had
nothing like what Dr. Bishop calls a _nut_—a thong to prevent it
from slipping down towards the water; especially with the oars of
the thranitæ, or upper tier of rowers, who pulled at so great an
elevation, comparatively speaking, above the water. Dr. Arnold’s
explanation of τροπωτὴρ is suited to the case of a boat, but not
to that of a trireme. Dr. Bishop shows that the explanation of
the purpose of the ὑπηρέσιον, given by the Scholiast, is not the
true one.

[357] Thucyd. ii, 94.

[358] Xenophon, Hellen. v. 1, 19.

As during the summer of this year, the Ambrakiots had brought down a numerous host of Epirotic tribes to the invasion of Akarnania, in conjunction with the Peloponnesians,—so during the autumn, the Athenians obtained aid against the Chalkidians of Thrace from a still more powerful barbaric prince, Sitalkês, king of the Odrysian Thracians. Amidst the numerous tribes, between the Danube and the Ægean sea,—who all bore the generic name of Thracians, though each had a special name besides,—the Odrysians were at this time the most warlike and powerful. The Odrysian king Têrês, father of Sitalkês, had made use of this power to subdue[359] and render tributary a great number of these different tribes, especially those whose residence was in the plain rather than in the mountains. His dominion, the largest existing between the Ionian sea and the Euxine, extended from Abdêra, or the mouth of the Nestus, in the Ægean sea, to the mouth of the Danube in the Euxine; though it seems that this must be understood with deductions, since many intervening tribes, especially mountain tribes, did not acknowledge his authority. Sitalkês himself had invaded and conquered some of the Pæonian tribes who joined the Thracians on the west, between the Axius and the Strymon.[360] Dominion, in the sense of the Odrysian king, meant tribute, presents, and military force when required; and with the two former, at least, we may conclude that he was amply supplied, since his nephew and successor Seuthes, under whom the revenue increased and attained its maximum, received four hundred talents annually in gold and silver as tribute, and the like sum in various presents, over and above many other presents of manufactured articles and ornaments. These latter came from the Grecian colonies on the coast, which contributed moreover largely to the tribute, though in what proportions we are not informed: even Grecian cities not in Thrace sent presents to forward their trading objects, as purchasers for the produce, the plunder, and the slaves, acquired by Thracian chiefs or tribes.[361] The residence of the Odrysians properly so called, and of the princes of that tribe now ruling over so many of the remaining tribes, appears to have been about twelve days’ journey inland from Byzantium,[362] in the upper regions of the Hebrus and Strymon, south of Mount Hæmus, and northeast of Rhodopê. The Odrysian chiefs were connected by relationship more or less distant with those of the subordinate tribes, and by marriage even with the Scythian princes north of the Danube: the Scythian prince Ariapeithês[363] had married the daughter of the Odrysian Têrês, the first who extended the dominion of his tribe over any considerable portion of Thrace.

[359] Thucyd. ii, 29, 95, 96.

[360] Thucyd. ii, 99.

[361] See Xenophon, Anabas. vii, 3, 16; 4, 2. Diodorus (xii, 50)
gives the revenue of Sitalkês as more than one thousand talents
annually. This sum is not materially different from that which
Thucydidês states to be the annual receipt of Seuthes, successor
of Sitalkês,—revenue, properly so called, and presents, both
taken together.

Traders from Parium, on the Asiatic coast of the Propontis, are
among those who come with presents to the Odrysian king, Mêdokus
(Xenophon _ut supra_).

[362] Xenoph. Anabas. _l. c._

[363] Herodot. iv, 80.