Chapter LIV (2)

[713] Thucyd. iv, 128. It is not possible clearly to understand
this passage without some knowledge of the ground to which it
refers. I presume that the regular road through the defile, along
which the main army of Brasidas passed, was long and winding,
making the ascent to the top very gradual, but at the same time
exposed on both sides from the heights above. The detachment of
three hundred scaled the steep heights on one side, and drove
away the enemy, thus making it impossible for him to remain
any longer even in the main road. But I do not suppose, with
Dr. Arnold, that the main army of Brasidas followed the three
hundred, and “broke out of the valley by scaling one of its
sides:” they pursued the main road, as soon as it was cleared for
them.

[714] Thucyd. iv, 127, 128.

Perdikkas keenly resented this behavior of the troops of Brasidas, following as it did immediately upon his own quarrel with that general, and upon the mortification of his repulse from Lynkêstis. From this moment he broke off his alliance with the Peloponnesians, and opened negotiations with Nikias, then engaged in constructing the wall of blockade round Skiônê. Such was the general faithlessness of this prince, however, that Nikias required as a condition of the alliance, some manifest proof of the sincerity of his intentions; and Perdikkas was soon enabled to afford a proof of considerable importance.[715]

[715] Thucyd. iv, 128-132. Some lines of the comic poet Hermippus
are preserved (in the Φορμοφόροι, Meineke, Fragm. p. 407)
respecting Sitalkês and Perdikkas. Among the presents brought
home by Dionysus in his voyage, there is numbered “the itch from
Sitalkês, intended for the Lacedæmonians, and many shiploads
of lies from Perdikkas.” Καὶ παρὰ Περδίκκου ψεύδη ναυσὶν πάνυ
πολλαῖς.

The relations between Athens and Peloponnesus, since the conclusion of the truce in the preceding March, had settled into a curious combination. In Thrace, war was prosecuted by mutual understanding, and with unabated vigor; but everywhere else the truce was observed. The main purpose of the truce, however, that of giving time for discussions preliminary to a definitive peace, was completely frustrated; nor does the decree of the Athenian people, which stands included in their vote sanctioning the truce, for sending and receiving envoys to negotiate such a peace, ever seem to have been executed.

Instead of this, the Lacedæmonians despatched a considerable reinforcement by land to join Brasidas; probably at his own request, and also instigated by hearing of the Athenian armament now under Nikias in Pallênê. But Ischagoras, the commander of the reinforcement, on reaching the borders of Thessaly, found all farther progress impracticable, and was compelled to send back his troops. For Perdikkas, by whose powerful influence alone Brasidas had been enabled to pass through Thessaly, now directed his Thessalian guests to keep the new-comers off; which was far more easily executed, and was gratifying to the feelings of Perdikkas himself, as well as an essential service to the Athenians.[716] Ischagoras, however, with a few companions, but without his army, made his way to Brasidas, having been particularly directed by the Lacedæmonians to inspect and report upon the state of affairs. He numbered among his companions a few select Spartans of the military age, intended to be placed as harmosts or governors in the cities reduced by Brasidas: this was among the first violations, apparently often repeated afterwards, of the ancient Spartan custom, that none except elderly men, above the military age, should be named to such posts. Indeed, Brasidas himself was an illustrious departure from the ancient rule. The mission of these officers was intended to guard against the appointment of any but Spartans to such posts, for there were no Spartans in the army of Brasidas. One of the new-comers, Klearidas, was made governor of Amphipolis; another, Pasitelidas, of Torônê.[717] It is probable that these inspecting commissioners may have contributed to fetter the activity of Brasidas: and the newly-declared hostility of Perdikkas, together with disappointment in the non-arrival of the fresh troops intended to join him, much abridged his means. We hear of only one exploit performed by him at this time, and that too more than six months after the retreat from Macedonia, about January or February 422 B.C. Having established intelligence with some parties in the town of Potidæa, in the view of surprising it, he contrived to bring up his army in the night to the foot of the walls, and even to plant his scaling ladders, without being discovered. The sentinel carrying and ringing the bell had just passed by on the wall, leaving for a short interval an unguarded space (the practice apparently being, to pass this bell round along the walls from one sentinel to another throughout the night), when some of the soldiers of Brasidas took advantage of the moment to try and mount. But before they could reach the top of the wall, the sentinel came back, alarm was given, and the assailants were compelled to retreat.[718]

[716] Thucyd. iv, 132.

[717] Thucyd. iv, 132. Καὶ ~τῶν ἡβώντων αὐτῶν~ παρανόμως ἄνδρας
ἐξῆγον ἐκ Σπάρτης, ὥστε τῶν πόλεων ἄρχοντας καθιστάναι καὶ μὴ
~τοῖς ἐντυχοῦσιν~ ἐπιτρέπειν.

Most of the commentators translate ἡβώντων, “_young men_,” which
is not the usual meaning of the word: it signifies, “_men of
military age_,” which includes both young and middle-aged. If we
compare iv, 132 with iii, 36, v, 32, and v, 116, we shall see
that ἡβῶντες really has this larger meaning: compare also μέχρι
ἥβης (ii, 46), which means, “until the age of military service
commenced.”

It is not therefore necessary to suppose that the men taken out
by Ischagoras were very young, for example that they were below
the age of thirty, as Manso, O. Müller, and Göller would have us
believe. It is enough that they were within the limits of the
military age, both ways.

Considering the extraordinary reverence paid to old age at
Sparta, it is by no means wonderful that old men should have been
thought exclusively fitted for such commands, in the ancient
customs and constitution.

The extensive operations, however, in which Sparta became
involved through the Peloponnesian war, would render it
impossible to maintain such a maxim in practice: but at this
moment, the step was still recognized as a departure from a
received maxim, and is characterized as such by Thucydidês under
the term παρανόμως.

I explain τοῖς ἐντυχοῦσιν to refer to the case of men _not
Spartans_ being named to these posts: see in reference to this
point, the stress which Brasidas lays on the fact that Klearidas
was a Spartan, Thucyd. v, 9.

[718] Thucyd. iv, 135.

In the absence of actual war between the ascendent powers in and near Peloponnesus, during the course of this summer, Thucydidês mentions to us some incidents which perhaps he would have omitted had there been great warlike operations to describe. The great temple of Hêrê, between Mykenæ and Argos (nearer to the former, and in early times more intimately connected with it, but now an appendage of the latter, Mykenæ itself having been subjected and almost depopulated by the Argeians), enjoyed an ancient Pan-Hellenic reputation; the catalogue of its priestesses, seemingly with a statue or bust of each, was preserved or imagined through centuries of past time, real and mythical, beginning with the goddess herself or her immediate nominees. Chrysis, an old woman, who had been priestess there for fifty-six years, happened to fall asleep in the temple with a burning lamp near to her head: the fillet encircling her head took fire, and though she herself escaped unhurt, the temple itself, very ancient, and perhaps built of wood, was consumed. From fear of the wrath of the Argeians, Chrysis fled to Phlius, and subsequently thought it necessary to seek protection as a suppliant in the temple of Athênê Alea, at Tegea: Phaeinis was appointed priestess in her place.[719] The temple was rebuilt on an adjoining spot by Eupolemus, of Argos, continuing as much as possible the antiquities and traditions of the former, but with greater splendor and magnitude: Pausanias, the traveller, who describes this temple as a visitor, near six hundred years afterwards, saw near it the remnant of the old temple which had been burned.

[719] Thucyd. ii, 5; iv, 133; Pausan. ii, 17, 7; iii, 5, 6.
Hellanikus (a contemporary of Thucydidês, but somewhat older,
coming in point of age between him and Herodotus) had framed a
chronological series of these priestesses of Hêrê, with a history
of past events belonging to the supposed times of each. And such
was the Pan-Hellenic importance of the temple at this time,
that Thucydidês, when he describes accurately the beginning of
the Peloponnesian war, tells us, as one of his indications of
time, that Chrysis had then been forty-eight years priestess at
the Heræum. To employ the series of Olympic prize-runners and
Olympiads as a continuous distribution of time, was a practice
which had not yet got footing.

The catalogue of these priestesses of Hêrê, beginning with
mythical and descending to historical names, is illustrated by
the inscription belonging to the temple of Halikarnassus in
Boeckh, Corpus Inscr. No. 2655: see Boeckh’s Commentary, and
Preller, Hellanici Fragmenta, pp. 34, 46.

We hear farther of a war in Arcadia, between the two important cities of Mantineia and Tegea, each attended by its Arcadian allies, partly free, partly subject. In a battle fought between them at Laodikion, the victory was disputed: each party erected a trophy, each sent spoils to the temple of Delphi. We shall have occasion soon to speak farther of these Arcadian dissensions.

The Bœotians had been no parties to the truce sworn between Sparta and Athens in the preceding month of March; but they seem to have followed the example of Sparta in abstaining from hostilities _de facto_: and we may conclude that they acceded to the request of Sparta so far as to allow the transit of Athenian visitors and sacred envoys through Bœotia to the Delphian temple. The only actual incident which we hear of in Bœotia during this interval, is one which illustrates forcibly the harsh and ungenerous ascendency of the Thebans over the inferior Bœotian cities.[720] The Thebans destroyed the walls of Thespiæ, and condemned the city to remain unfortified, on the charge of _atticizing_ tendencies. How far this suspicion was well founded we have no means of judging: but the Thespians, far from being dangerous at this moment, were altogether helpless, having lost the flower of their military force at the battle of Delium, where their station was on the defeated wing. It was this very helplessness, brought upon them by their services to Thebes against Athens, which now both impelled and enabled the Thebans to enforce the rigorous sentence above mentioned.[721]

[720] Xenophon, Memorabil. iii, 5, 6.

[721] Thucyd. iv, 133.

But the month of March, or the Attic Elaphebolion, 422 B.C., the time prescribed for expiration of the one year’s truce, had now arrived. It has already been mentioned that this truce had never been more than partially observed: Brasidas in Thrace had disregarded it from the beginning, and both the contracting powers had tacitly acquiesced in the anomalous condition, of war in Thrace coupled with peace elsewhere. Either of them had thus an excellent pretext for breaking the truce altogether; and as neither acted upon this pretext, we plainly see that the paramount feeling and ascendent parties, among both, tended to peace of their own accord, at that time. Nor was there anything except the interest of Brasidas, and of those revolted subjects of Athens to whom he had bound himself, which kept alive the war in Thrace. Under such a state of feeling, the oath taken to maintain the truce still seemed imperative on both parties, always excepting Thracian affairs. Moreover, the Athenians were to a certain degree soothed by their success at Mendê and Skiônê, and by their acquisition of Perdikkas as an ally, during the summer and autumn of 423 B.C. But the state of sentiment between the contracting parties was not such as to make it possible to treat for any longer peace, or to conclude any new agreement, though neither were disposed to depart from that which had been already concluded.

The mere occurrence of the last day of the truce made no practical difference at first in this condition of things. The truce had expired: either party might renew hostilities; but neither actually did renew them. To the Athenians, there was this additional motive for abstaining from hostilities for a few months longer: the great Pythian festival would be celebrated at Delphi in July or the beginning of August, and as they had been excluded from that holy spot during all the interval between the beginning of the war and the conclusion of the one year’s truce, their pious feelings seem now to have taken a peculiar longing towards the visits, pilgrimages, and festivals connected with it. Though the truce, therefore, had really ceased, no actual warfare took place until the Pythian games were over.[722]

[722] This seems to me the most reasonable sense to put upon the
much-debated passage of Thucyd. v, 1. Τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους
αἱ μὲν ἐνιαύσιοι σπονδαὶ διελέλυντο μέχρι τῶν Πυθίων· καὶ ἐν τῇ
~ἐκεχειρίᾳ~ Ἀθηναῖοι Δηλίους ἀνέστησαν ἐκ Δήλου; again, v, 2.
Κλέων δὲ Ἀθηναίους πείσας ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης χωρία ἐξέπλευσε μετὰ
τὴν ~ἐκεχειρίαν~, etc.

Thucydidês says here, that “the truce was dissolved:” the
bond imposed upon both parties was untied, and both resumed
their natural liberty. But he does not say that “_hostilities
recommenced_” before the Pythia, as Göller and other critics
affirm that he says. The interval between the 14th of the month
Elaphebolion and the Pythian festival was one in which there
was no binding truce any longer in force, and yet no actual
hostilities: it was an ἀνακωχὴ ἄσπονδος, to use the words of
Thucydidês, when he describes the relations between Corinth and
Athens in the ensuing year (v, 32).

The word ἐκεχειρία here means, in my judgment, the truce
proclaimed at the season of the Pythian festival,—quite distinct
from the truce for one year which had expired a little while
before. The change of the word in the course of one line from
σπονδαὶ to ἐκεχειρία marks this distinction.

I agree with Dr. Arnold, dissenting both from M. Boeckh and
from Mr. Clinton, in his conception of the events of this year.
Kleon sailed on his expedition to Thrace after the Pythian holy
truce, in the beginning of August: between that date and the end
of September, happened the capture of Torônê and the battle of
Amphipolis. But the way in which Dr. Arnold defends his opinion
is not at all satisfactory. In the Dissertation appended to his
second volume of Thucydidês (p. 458), he says: “The words in
Thucydidês αἱ ἐνιαύσιοι σπονδαὶ διελέλυντο μέχρι Πυθίων, mean,
as I understand them, ‘that the truce for a year had _lasted
on_ till the Pythian games, and then ended:’ that is, instead
of expiring on the 14th of Elaphebolion, it had been _tacitly
continued_ nearly four months longer, till after midsummer: and
it was not till the middle of Hekatombæon that Cleon was sent out
to recover Amphipolis.”

Such a construction of the word διελέλυντο appears to me
inadmissible, nor is Dr. Arnold’s defence of it, p. 454, of much
value: σπονδὰς διαλύειν is an expression well known to Thucydidês
(iv, 23; v, 36), “to dissolve the truce.” I go along with Boeckh
and Mr. Clinton in construing the words, except that I strike
out what they introduce from their own imagination. They say:
“The truce was ended, and _the war again renewed_, up to the
time of the Pythian games.” Thucydidês only says “that the truce
was dissolved;” he does not say “_that the war was renewed_.” It
is not at all necessary to Dr. Arnold’s conception of the facts
that the words should be translated as he proposes. His remarks
also (p. 460) upon the relation of the Athenians to the Pythian
games, appear to me just: but he does not advert to the fact,
which would have strengthened materially what he there says, that
the Athenians had been excluded from Delphi and from the Pythian
festival between the commencement of the war and the one year’s
truce. I conceive that the Pythian games were celebrated about
July or August. In an earlier part of this History (ch. xxviii,
vol. iv, p. 67), I said that they were celebrated in _autumn_;
it ought rather to be “towards the end of summer.”

But though the actions of Athens remained unaltered, the talk at Athens became very different. Kleon and his supporters renewed their instances to obtain a vigorous prosecution of the war, and renewed them with great additional strength of argument; the question being now open to considerations of political prudence, without any binding obligation.

“At this time (observes Thucydidês)[723] the great enemies of peace were, Brasidas on one side, and Kleon on the other: the former, because he was in full success and rendered illustrious by the war; the latter, because he thought that if peace were concluded, he should be detected in his dishonest politics, and be less easily credited in his criminations of others.” As to Brasidas, the remark of the historian is indisputable: it would be wonderful, indeed, if he, in whom so many splendid qualities were brought out by the war, and who had moreover contracted obligations with the Thracian towns which gave him hopes and fears of his own, entirely apart from Lacedæmon,—it would be wonderful if the war and its continuance were not in his view the paramount object. In truth, his position in Thrace constituted an insurmountable obstacle to any solid or steady peace, independently of the dispositions of Kleon.

[723] Thucyd. v, 16. Κλέων τε καὶ Βρασίδας, οἵπερ ἀμφοτέρωθεν
μάλιστα ἠναντιοῦντο τῇ εἰρήνῃ, ὁ μὲν, διὰ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν τε καὶ
τιμᾶσθαι ἐκ τοῦ πολεμεῖν, ὁ δὲ, γενομένης ἡσυχίας καταφανέστερος
νομίζων ἂν εἶναι κακουργῶν, καὶ ἀπιστότερος διαβάλλων, etc.

But the coloring which Thucydidês gives to Kleon’s support of the war is open to much greater comment. First, we may well raise the question, whether Kleon had any real interest in war,—whether his personal or party consequence in the city was at all enhanced by it. He had himself no talent or competence for warlike operations, which tended infallibly to place ascendency in the hands of others, and to throw him into the shade. As to his power of carrying on dishonest intrigues with success, that must depend on the extent of his political ascendency; while matter of crimination against others, assuming him to be careless of truth or falsehood, could hardly be wanting either in war or peace; and if the war brought forward unsuccessful generals open to his accusations, it would also throw up successful generals who would certainly outshine him, and would probably put him down. In the life which Plutarch has given us of Phokion, a plain and straightforward military man, we read that one of the frequent and criminative speakers of Athens, of character analogous to that which is ascribed to Kleon, expressed his surprise on hearing Phokion dissuade the Athenians from embarking in a new war: “Yes (said Phokion), I think it right to dissuade them; though I know well, that if there be war, I shall have command over you; if there be peace, you will have command over me.”[724] This is surely a more rational estimate of the way in which war affects the comparative importance of the orator and the military officer, than that which Thucydidês pronounces in reference to the interests of Kleon. Moreover, when we come to follow the political history of Syracuse, we shall find the demagogue Athenagoras ultra-pacific, and the aristocrat Hermokratês far more warlike:[725] the former is afraid, not without reason, that war will raise into consequence energetic military leaders dangerous to the popular constitution. We may add, that Kleon himself had not been always warlike: he commenced his political career as an opponent of Periklês, when the latter was strenuously maintaining the necessity and prudence of beginning the Peloponnesian war.[726]

[724] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.

[725] See the speeches of Athenagoras and Hermokratês, Thucyd.
vi, 33-36.

[726] Plutarch, Periklês, c. 33-35.

But farther, if we should even grant that Kleon had a separate party-interest in promoting the war, it will still remain to be considered, whether, at this particular crisis, the employment of energetic warlike measures in Thrace was not really the sound and prudent policy for Athens. Taking Periklês as the best judge of that policy, we shall find him at the outset of the war inculcating emphatically two important points: 1. To stand vigorously upon the defensive, maintaining unimpaired their maritime empire, “keeping their subject-allies well in hand,” submitting patiently even to see Attica ravaged. 2. To abstain from trying to enlarge their empire or to make new conquests during the war.[727] Consistently with this well-defined plan of action, Periklês, had he lived, would have taken care to interfere vigorously and betimes to prevent Brasidas from making his conquests: had such interference been either impossible or accidentally frustrated, he would have thought no efforts too great to recover them. To maintain undiminished the integrity of the empire, as well as that impression of Athenian force upon which the empire rested, was his cardinal principle. Now it is impossible to deny that in reference to Thrace, Kleon adhered more closely than his rival Nikias to the policy of Periklês. It was to Nikias, more than to Kleon, that the fatal mistake made by Athens in not interfering speedily after Brasidas first broke into Thrace is to be imputed: it was Nikias and his partisans, desirous of peace at almost any price, and knowing that the Lacedæmonians also desired it, who encouraged his countrymen, at a moment of great public depression of spirit, to leave Brasidas unopposed in Thrace, and rely on the chance of negotiation with Sparta for arresting his progress. The peace-party at Athens carried their point of the truce for a year, with the promise and for the express purpose of checking the farther conquests of Brasidas; also with the farther promise of maturing that truce into a permanent peace, and obtaining under the peace even the restoration of Amphipolis.

[727] Thucyd. i, 142, 143, 144; ii, 13. καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν
ᾗπερ ἰσχύουσιν ἐξαρτύεσθαι, ~τά τε τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ χειρὸς
ἔχειν~—λέγων τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τούτων εἶναι τῶν χρημάτων τῆς
προσόδου, etc.

Such was the policy of Nikias and his party, the friends of peace and opponents of Kleon. And the promises which they thus held out might perhaps appear plausible in March 422 B.C., at the moment when the truce for one year was concluded. But the subsequent events had frustrated them in the most glaring manner, and had even shown the best reason for believing that no such expectations could possibly be realized while Brasidas was in unbroken and unopposed action. For the Lacedæmonians, though seemingly sincere in concluding the truce on the basis of _uti possidetis_, and desiring to extend it to Thrace as well as elsewhere, had been unable to enforce the observance of it upon Brasidas, or to restrain him even from making new acquisitions, so that Athens never obtained the benefit of the truce, exactly in that region where she most stood in need of it. Only by the despatch of her armament to Skiônê and Mendê had she maintained herself in possession even of Pallênê. Now what was the lesson to be derived from this experience, when the Athenians came to discuss their future policy, after the truce was at an end? The great object of all parties at Athens was to recover the lost possessions in Thrace, especially Amphipolis. Nikias, still urging negotiations for peace, continued to hold out hopes that the Lacedæmonians would be willing to restore that place, as the price of their captives now at Athens; and his connection with Sparta would enable him to announce her professions even upon authority. But to this Kleon might make, and doubtless did make, a complete reply, grounded upon the most recent experience: “If the Lacedæmonians consent to the restitution of Amphipolis (he would say), it will probably be only with the view of finding some means to escape performance, and yet to get back their prisoners. But granting that they are perfectly sincere, they will never be able to control Brasidas, and those parties in Thrace who are bound up with him by community of feeling and interest; so that after all, you will give them back their prisoners on the faith of an equivalent beyond their power to realize. Look at what has happened during the truce! So different are the views and obligations of Brasidas in Thrace from those of the Lacedæmonians, that he would not even obey their order when they directed him to stand as he was, and to desist from farther conquest: much less will he obey them when they direct him to surrender what he has already got: least of all, if they enjoin the surrender of Amphipolis, his grand acquisition and his central point for all future effort. Depend upon it, if you desire to regain Amphipolis, you will only regain it by energetic employment of force, as has happened with Skiônê and Mendê: and you ought to put forth your strength for this purpose immediately, while the Lacedæmonian prisoners are yet in your hands, instead of waiting until after you shall have been deluded into giving them up, thereby losing all your hold upon Lacedæmon.”

Such anticipations were fully verified by the result: for subsequent history will show that the Lacedæmonians, when they had bound themselves by treaty to give up Amphipolis, either would not, or could not, enforce performance of their stipulation, even after the death of Brasidas: much less could they have done so during his life, when there was his great personal influence, strenuous will, and hopes of future conquest, to serve as increased obstruction to them. Such anticipations were also plainly suggested by the recent past: so that in putting them into the mouth of Kleon, we are only supposing him to read the lesson open before his eyes.

Now since the war-policy of Kleon, taken at this moment after the expiration of the one year’s truce, may be thus shown to be not only more conformable to the genius of Periklês, but also founded on a juster estimate of events both past and future, than the peace-policy of Nikias, what are we to say to the historian, who, without refuting such presumptions, every one of which is deduced from his own narrative, nay, without even indicating their existence, merely tells us that “Kleon opposed the peace in order that he might cloke dishonest intrigues and find matter for plausible crimination?” We cannot but say of this criticism, with profound regret that such words must be pronounced respecting any judgment of Thucydidês, that it is harsh and unfair towards Kleon, and careless in regard to truth and the instruction of his readers. It breathes not that same spirit of honorable impartiality which pervades his general history: it is an interpolation by the officer whose improvidence had occasioned to his countrymen the fatal loss of Amphipolis, retaliating upon the citizen who justly accused him: it is conceived in the same tone as his unaccountable judgment in the matter of Sphakteria.

Rejecting on this occasion the judgment of Thucydidês, we may confidently affirm that Kleon had rational public grounds for urging his countrymen to undertake with energy the reconquest of Amphipolis. Demagogue and leather-seller though he was, he stands here honorably distinguished, as well from the tameness and inaction of Nikias, who grasped at peace with hasty credulity through sickness of the efforts of war, as from the restless movement and novelties, not merely unprofitable but ruinous, which we shall presently find springing up under the auspices of Alkibiadês. Periklês had said to his countrymen, at a time when they were enduring all the miseries of pestilence, and were in a state of despondency even greater than that which prevailed in B.C. 422: “You hold your empire and your proud position, by the condition of being willing to encounter cost, fatigue, and danger: abstain from all views of enlarging the empire, but think no effort too great to maintain it unimpaired. To lose what we have once got is more disgraceful than to fail in attempts at acquisition.”[728] The very same language was probably held by Kleon when exhorting his countrymen to an expedition for the reconquest of Amphipolis. But when uttered by him, it would have a very different effect from that which it had formerly produced when held by Periklês, and different also from that which it would now have produced if held by Nikias. The entire peace-party would repudiate it when it came from Kleon; partly out of dislike to the speaker, partly from a conviction, doubtless felt by every one, that an expedition against Brasidas would be a hazardous and painful service to all concerned in it, general as well as soldiers; partly also from a persuasion, sincerely entertained at the time, though afterwards proved to be illusory by the result, that Amphipolis might really be got back through peace with the Lacedæmonians.

[728] Thucyd. ii, 63. Τῆς δὲ πόλεως ὑμᾶς εἰκὸς τῷ τιμωμένῳ ἀπὸ
τοῦ ἄρχειν, ᾧπερ ἅπαντες ἀγάλλεσθε, βοηθεῖν, καὶ μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς
πόνους ἢ μηδὲ τὰς τιμὰς διώκειν, etc. c. 62, αἴσχιον δὲ, ἔχοντας
ἀφαιρεθῆναι ἢ κτωμένους ἀτυχῆσαι. Contrast the tenor of the two
speeches of Periklês (Thucyd. i, 140-144; ii, 60-64) with the
description which Thucydidês gives of the simple “avoidance of
risk,” (τὸ ἀκίνδυνον), which characterized Nikias (v. 16).

If Kleon, in proposing the expedition, originally proposed himself as the commander, a new ground of objection, and a very forcible ground, would thus be furnished. Since everything which Kleon does is understood to be a manifestation of some vicious or silly attribute, we are told that this was an instance of his absurd presumption, arising out of the success of Pylus, and persuading him that he was the only general who could put down Brasidas. But if the success at Pylus had really filled him with such overweening military conceit, it is most unaccountable that he should not have procured for himself some command during the year which immediately succeeded the affair at Sphakteria, the eighth year of the war: a season of most active warlike enterprise, when his presumption and influence arising out of the Sphakterian victory must have been fresh and glowing. As he obtained no command during this immediately succeeding period we may fairly doubt whether he ever really conceived such excessive personal presumption of his own talents for war, and whether he did not retain after the affair of Sphakteria the same character which he had manifested in that affair, reluctance to engage in military expeditions himself, and a disposition to see them commanded as well as carried on by others. It is by no means certain that Kleon, in proposing the expedition against Amphipolis, originally proposed to take the command of it himself: I think it at least equally probable, that his original wish was to induce Nikias or the stratêgi to take the command of it, as in the case of Sphakteria. Nikias, doubtless, opposed the expedition as much as he could: when it was determined by the people, in spite of his opposition, he would peremptorily decline the command for himself, and would do all he could to force it upon Kleon, or at least would be better pleased to see it under his command than under that of any one else. He would be not less glad to exonerate himself from a dangerous service than to see his rival entangled in it; and he would have before him the same alternative which he and his friends had contemplated with so much satisfaction in the affair of Sphakteria: either the expedition would succeed, in which case Amphipolis would be taken, or it would fail, and the consequence would be the ruin of Kleon. The last of the two was really the more probable at Amphipolis, as Nikias had erroneously imagined it to be at Sphakteria.

It is easy to see, however, that an expedition proposed under these circumstances by Kleon, though it might command a majority in the public assembly, would have a large proportion of the citizens unfavorable to it, and even wishing that it might fail. Moreover, Kleon had neither talents nor experience for commanding an army, and the being engaged under his command in fighting against the ablest officer of the time, could inspire no confidence to any man in putting on his armor. From all these circumstances united, political as well as military, we are not surprised to hear that the hoplites whom he took out with him went with much reluctance.[729] An ignorant general, with unwilling soldiers, many of them politically disliking him, stood little chance of wresting Amphipolis from Brasidas: but had Nikias or the stratêgi done their duty, and carried the entire force of the city under competent command to the same object, the issue would probably have been different as to gain and loss; certainly very different as to dishonor.

[729] Thucyd. v, 7. καὶ οἴκοθεν ὡς ἄκοντες αὐτῷ ξυνῆλθον.

Kleon started from Peiræus, apparently towards the beginning of August, with twelve hundred Athenian, Lemnian, and Imbrian hoplites, and three hundred horsemen, troops of excellent quality and condition: besides an auxiliary force of allies, number not exactly known, and thirty triremes. This armament was not of magnitude at all equal to the taking of Amphipolis; for Brasidas had equal numbers, besides all the advantages of the position. But it was a part of the scheme of Kleon, on arriving at Eion, to procure Macedonian and Thracian reinforcements before he commenced his attack. He first halted in his voyage near Skiônê, from which place he took away such of the hoplites as could be spared from the blockade. He next sailed across the gulf from Pallênê to the Sithonian peninsula, to a place called the Harbor of the Kolophonians, near Torônê.[730] Having here learned that neither Brasidas himself, nor any considerable Peloponnesian garrison were present in Torônê, he landed his forces and marched to attack the town, sending ten triremes at the same time round a promontory which separated the harbor of the Kolophonians from Torônê, to assail the latter place from seaward. It happened that Brasidas, desiring to enlarge the fortified circle of Torônê, had broken down a portion of the old wall, and employed the materials in building a new and larger wall inclosing the proasteion, or suburb: this new wall appears to have been still incomplete and in an imperfect state of defence. Pasitelidas, the Peloponnesian commander, resisted the attack of the Athenians as long as he could; but when already beginning to give way, he saw the ten Athenian triremes sailing into the harbor, which was hardly guarded at all. Abandoning the defence of the suburb, he hastened to repel these new assailants, but came too late, so that the town was entered from both sides at once. Brasidas, who was not far off, rendered aid with the utmost celerity, but was yet at five miles’ distance from the city when he learned the capture, and was obliged to retire unsuccessfully. Pasitelidas the commander, with the Peloponnesian garrison and the Torônæan male population, were despatched as prisoners to Athens; while the Torônæan women and children, by a fate but too common in those days, were sold as slaves.[731]

[730] The town of Torônê was situated near the extremity of the
Sithonian peninsula, on the side looking towards Pallênê. But the
territory belonging to the town comprehended all the extremity
of the peninsula on both sides, including the terminating point
Cape Ampelos,—Ἄμπελον τὴν Τορωναίην ἄκρην (Herodot. vii, 122).
Herodotus calls the Singitic gulf θάλασσαν τὴν ἄντιον Τορώνης
(vii, 122).

The ruins of Torônê, bearing the ancient name, and Kufo, a
land-locked harbor near it, are still to be seen (Leake, Travels
in Northern Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 119).

[731] Thucyd. v, 3.

After this not unimportant success, Kleon sailed round the promontory of Athos to Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, within three miles of Amphipolis. From hence, in execution of his original scheme, he sent envoys to Perdikkas, urging him to lend effective aid as the ally of Athens in the attack of Amphipolis, with his whole forces; and to Pollês the king of the Thracian Odomantes, inviting him also to come with as many Thracian mercenaries as could be levied. The Edonians, the Thracian tribe nearest to Amphipolis, took part with Brasidas: and the local influence of the banished Thucydidês would no longer be at the service of Athens, much less at the service of Kleon. Awaiting the expected reinforcements, Kleon employed himself, first in an attack upon Stageirus in the Strymonic gulf, which was repulsed; next upon Galêpsus, on the coast opposite the island of Thasos, which was successful. But the reinforcements did not at once arrive, and being too weak to attack Amphipolis without them, he was obliged to remain inactive at Eion; while Brasidas on his side made no movement out of Amphipolis, but contented himself with keeping constant watch over the forces of Kleon, the view of which he commanded from his station on the hill of Kerdylion, on the western bank of the river-communication with Amphipolis by the bridge. Some days elapsed in such inaction on both sides; but the Athenian hoplites, becoming impatient of doing nothing, soon began to give vent to those feelings of dislike which they had brought out from Athens against their general, “whose ignorance and cowardice (says the historian) they contrasted with the skill and bravery of his opponent.”[732] Athenian hoplites, if they felt such a sentiment, were not likely to refrain from manifesting it; and Kleon was presently made aware of the fact in a manner sufficiently painful to force him against his will into some movement; which, however, he did not intend to be anything else than a march for the purpose of surveying the ground all round the city, and a demonstration to escape the appearance of doing nothing, being aware that it was impossible to attack the place with any effect before his reinforcements arrived.

[732] Thucyd. v, 7. Ὁ δὲ Κλέων τέως μὲν ἡσύχαζεν, ἔπειτα δὲ
~ἠναγκάσθη~ ποιῆσαι ὅπερ ὁ Βρασίδας προσεδέχετο. Τῶν γὰρ
στρατιωτῶν ἀχθομένων μὲν τῇ ἕδρᾳ, ἀναλογιζομένων δὲ τὴν
ἐκείνου ἡγεμονίαν, πρὸς οἵαν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τόλμαν μεθ᾽ οἵας
ἀνεπιστημοσύνης καὶ μαλακίας γενήσοιτο, καὶ οἴκοθεν ὡς ἄκοντες
αὐτῷ ξυνῆλθον, αἰσθόμενος τὸν θροῦν, καὶ οὐ βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς διὰ
τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καθημένους βαρύνεσθαι, ἀναλαβὼν ἦγε.

To comprehend the important incidents which followed, it is necessary to say a few words on the topography of Amphipolis, as far as we can understand it on the imperfect evidence before us. That city was placed on the left bank of the Strymon, on a conspicuous hill around which the river makes a bend, first in a southwesterly direction, then, after a short course to the southward, back in a southeasterly direction. Amphipolis had for its only artificial fortification one long wall, which began near the point northeast of the town, where the river narrows again into a channel, after passing through the lake Kerkinitis, ascended along the eastern side of the hill, crossing the ridge which connects it with Mount Pangæus, and then descended so as to touch the river again at another point south of the town; thus being, as it were, a string to the highly-bent bow formed by the river. On three sides therefore, north, west, and south, the city was defended only by the Strymon, and was thus visible without any intervening wall to spectators from the side of the sea (south), as well as from the side of the continent (or west and north).[733] At some little distance below the point where the wall touched the river south of the city, was the bridge,[734] a communication of great importance for the whole country, which connected the territory of Amphipolis with that of Argilus. On the western or right bank of the river, bordering it, and forming an outer bend corresponding to the bend of the river, was situated Mount Kerdylium: in fact, the course of the Strymon is here determined by these two steep eminences, Kerdylium on the west, and the hill of Amphipolis on the east, between which it flows. At the time when Brasidas first took the place, the bridge was totally unconnected with the long city wall; but during the intervening eighteen months, he had erected a palisade work—probably an earthen bank topped with a palisade—connecting the two. By means of this palisade, the bridge was thus at the time of Kleon’s expedition comprehended within the fortifications of the city; and Brasidas, while keeping watch on Mount Kerdylium, could pass over whenever he chose into the city, without any fear of impediment.[735]

[733] Thucyd. iv, 102. Ἀπὸ τῆς νῦν πόλεως, ἣν Ἀμφίπολιν Ἅγνων
ὠνόμασεν, ὅτι ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα περιῤῥέοντος τοῦ Στρύμονος, διὰ τὸ
περιέχειν αὐτὴν, τείχει μακρῷ ἀπολαβὼν ἐκ ποταμοῦ ἐς ποταμὸν,
περιφανῆ ἐς θάλασσάν τε καὶ τὴν ἤπειρον ᾤκισεν.

Ὁ καλλιγέφυρος ποταμὸς Στρύμων, Euripid. Rhesus, 346.

I annex a plan which will convey some idea of the hill of
Amphipolis and the circumjacent territory: compare the plan in
Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxv, p.
191, and that from Mr. Hawkins, which is annexed to the third
volume of Dr. Arnold’s Thucydidês, combined with a Dissertation
which appears in the second volume of the same work, p. 450.
See also the remarks in Kutzen, De Atheniensium imperio circa
Strymonem, ch. ii, pp. 18-21; Weissenborn, Beiträge zur genaueren
Erforschung der alt-griechischen Geschichte, pp. 152-156;
Cousinéry, Voyage dans la Macédoine, vol. i, ch. iv, p. 124,
_seq._

Colonel Leake supposes the ancient bridge to have been at the
same point of the river as the modern bridge; that is, north of
Amphipolis, and a little westward of the corner of the lake.
On this point I differ from him, and have placed it, with Dr.
Arnold, near the southeastern end of the reach of the Strymon,
which flows round Amphipolis. But there is another circumstance,
in which Col. Leake’s narrative corrects a material error in
Dr. Arnold’s Dissertation. Colonel Leake particularly notices
the high ridge which connects the hill of Amphipolis with Mount
Pangæus to the eastward (pp. 182, 183, 191-194), whereas Dr.
Arnold represents them as separated by a deep ravine (p. 451):
upon which latter supposition the whole account of Kleon’s march
and survey appears to me unintelligible.

The epithet which Thucydidês gives to Amphipolis, “conspicuous
both towards the sea and towards the land,” which occasions some
perplexity to the commentators, appears to me one of obvious
propriety. Amphipolis was indeed situated on a hill; so were many
other towns: but its peculiarity was, that on three sides it had
no wall to interrupt the eye of the spectator: one of those sides
was towards the sea.

Kutzen and Cousinéry make the long wall to be the segment of a
curve highly bent, touching the river at both ends. But I agree
with Weissenborn that this is inadmissible; and that the words
“long wall” imply something near a straight direction.

[734] Ἀπέχει δὲ τὸ πόλισμα πλέον τῆς διαβάσεως: see a note a few
pages ago upon these words. This does not necessarily imply that
the bridge was at any considerable distance from the extreme
point where the long wall touched the river to the south: but
this latter point was a good way off from the town properly so
called, which occupied the higher slope of the hill. We are not
to suppose that the _whole_ space between the long wall and the
river was covered by buildings.

[735] Thucyd. v. 10. Καὶ ὁ μὲν (Brasidas) κατὰ τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ
σταύρωμα πύλας, καὶ τὰς πρώτας τοῦ μακροῦ τείχους τότε ὄντος
ἐξελθὼν, ἔθει δρόμῳ τὴν ὁδὸν ταύτην εὐθεῖαν, ᾗπερ νῦν, etc.

The explanation which I have here given to the word σταύρωμα is
not given by any one else; but it appears to me the only one
calculated to impart clearness and consistency to the whole
narrative.

When Brasidas surprised Amphipolis first, the bridge was
completely unconnected with the Long Wall, and at a certain
distance from it. But when Thucydidês wrote his history, there
were a pair of _connecting walls_ between the bridge and the
fortifications of the city as they then stood—οὐ καθεῖτο τείχη
ὥσπερ νῦν (iv, 103): the whole fortifications of the city had
been altered during the intermediate period.

Now the question is, was the Long Wall of Amphipolis connected
or unconnected with the bridge, at the time of the conflict
between Brasidas and Kleon? Whoever reads the narrative of
Thucydidês attentively will see, I think, that they must have
been connected, though Thucydidês does not in express terms
specify the fact. For if the bridge had been detached from the
wall, as it was when Brasidas surprised the place first, the hill
of Kerdylium on the opposite side of the river would have been
an unsafe position for him to occupy. He might have been cut off
from Amphipolis by an enemy attacking the bridge. But we shall
find him remaining quietly on the hill of Kerdylium with the
perfect certainty of entering Amphipolis at any moment that he
chose. If it be urged that the bridge, though unconnected with
the Long Wall, might still be under a strong separate guard,
I reply, that on that supposition an enemy from Eion would
naturally attack the bridge first. To have to defend a bridge
completely detached from the city, simply by means of a large
constant guard, would materially aggravate the difficulties of
Brasidas. If it had been possible to attack the bridge separately
from the city, something must have been said about it in
describing the operations of Kleon, who is represented as finding
nothing to meddle with except the fortifications of the town.

Assuming, then, that there was such a line of connection between
the bridge and the Long Wall, added by Brasidas since the first
capture of the place, I know no meaning so natural to give to
the word σταύρωμα. No other distinct meaning is proposed by any
one. There was, of course, a gate, or more than one, in the Long
Wall, leading into the space inclosed by the palisade; through
this gate Brasidas would enter the town when he crossed from
Kerdylium. This gate is called by Thucydidês αἱ ἐπὶ τὸ σταύρωμα
πύλαι. There must have been also a gate, or more than one, in
the palisade itself, leading into the space without: so that
passengers or cattle traversing the bridge from the westward and
going to Myrkinus (_e. g._) would not necessarily be obliged to
turn out of their way and enter the town of Amphipolis.

On the plan which I have here given, the line running nearly from
north to south represents the Long Wall of Agnon, touching the
river at both ends, and bounding as well as fortifying the town
of Amphipolis on its eastern side.

The shorter line, which cuts off the southern extremity of this
Long Wall, and joins the river immediately below the bridge,
represents the σταύρωμα, or palisade: probably it was an earthen
mound and ditch, with a strong palisade at the top.

By means of this palisade, the bridge was included in the
fortifications of Amphipolis, and Brasidas could pass over from
Mount Kerdylium into the city whenever he pleased.

In the march which Kleon now undertook, he went up to the top of the ridge which runs nearly in an easterly direction from Amphipolis to Mount Pangæus, in order to survey the city and its adjoining ground on the northern and northeastern side which he had not yet seen; that is, the side towards the lake, and towards Thrace,[736] which was not visible from the lower ground near Eion. The road which he was to take from Eion lay at a small distance eastward of the city long wall, and from the palisade which connected that wall with the bridge. But he had no expectation of being attacked in his march, the rather as Brasidas with the larger portion of his force was visible on Mount Kerdylium: moreover, the gates of Amphipolis were all shut, not a man was on the wall, nor were any symptoms of movement to be detected. As there was no evidence before him of intention to attack, he took no precautions, and marched in careless and disorderly array.[737] Having reached the top of the ridge, and posted his army on the strong eminence fronting the highest portion of the Long Wall, he surveyed at leisure the lake before him, and the side of the city which lay towards Thrace, or towards Myrkinus, Drabêskus, etc., thus viewing all the descending portion of the Long Wall northward towards the Strymon. The perfect quiescence of the city imposed upon and even astonished him: it seemed altogether undefended, and he almost fancied that, if he had brought battering-engines, he could have taken it forthwith.[738] Impressed with the belief that there was no enemy prepared to fight, he took his time to survey the ground; while his soldiers became more and more relaxed and careless in their trim, some even advancing close up to the walls and gates.

[736] Thucyd. v, 7; compare Colonel Leake, _l. c._ p. 182; αὐτὸς
ἐθεᾶτο τὸ λιμνῶδες τοῦ Στρύμονος, καὶ τὴν θέσιν τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τῇ
Θρᾴκῃ, ὡς ἔχοι.

[737] Thucyd. v, 7. Κατὰ θέαν δὲ μᾶλλον ἔφη ἀναβαίνειν τοῦ
χωρίου, καὶ τὴν μείζω παρασκευὴν περιέμενεν, οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ,
ἢν ἀναγκάζηται, περισχήσων, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς κύκλῳ περιστὰς βίᾳ αἱρήσων
τὴν πόλιν.

The words οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ, etc. do not refer to μείζω
παρασκευὴν, as the Scholiast, with whom Dr. Arnold agrees,
considers them, but to the general purpose and dispositions of
Kleon. “He marched up, not like one who is abundantly provided
with means of safety, in case of being put on his defence; but
like one who is going to surround the city and take it at once.”

Nor do these last words represent any real design conceived in
the mind of Kleon (for Amphipolis from its locality _could not
be really surrounded_), but are merely given as illustrating the
careless confidence of his march from Eion up to the ridge: in
the same manner as Herodotus describes the forward rush of the
Persians before the battle of Platæa, to overtake the Greeks whom
they supposed to be running away—Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν βοῇ τε καὶ ὁμίλῳ
ἐπήισαν, ὡς ~ἀναρπασόμενοι~ τοὺς Ἕλληνας (ix, 59): compare viii,
28.

[738] Thucyd. v, 7. ὥστε καὶ μηχανὰς ὅτι οὐκ κατῆλθεν ἔχων,
ἁμαρτεῖν ἐδόκει· ἑλεῖν γὰρ ἂν τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ ἐρῆμον.

I apprehend that the verb κατῆλθεν refers to the coming of the
armament to Eion: analogous to what is said v, 2, ~κατέπλευσεν~
ἐς τὸν Τορωναίων λιμένα: compare i, 51; iii, 4, etc. The march
from Eion up to the ridge could not well be expressed by
the word κατῆλθεν: but the arrival of the expedition at the
Strymon, the place of its destination, might be so described.
Battering-engines would be brought from nowhere else but from
Athens.

Dr. Arnold interprets the word κατῆλθεν to mean that Kleon had
first marched up to a higher point, and then descended from this
point upon Amphipolis. But I contest the correctness of this
assumption, as a matter of topography: it does not appear to me
that Kleon ever reached any point higher than the summit of the
hill and wall of Amphipolis. Besides, even if he had reached a
higher point of the mountain, he could not well talk of “bringing
down battering-machines _from that point_.”

But this state of affairs was soon materially changed. Brasidas knew that the Athenian hoplites would not long endure the tedium of absolute inaction, and he calculated that by affecting extreme backwardness and apparent fear, he should seduce Kleon into some incautious movement of which advantage might be taken. His station on Mount Kerdylium enabled him to watch the march of the Athenian army from Eion, and when he saw them pass up along the road outside of the Long Wall of Amphipolis,[739] he immediately crossed the river with his forces and entered the town. But it was not his intention to march out and offer them open battle; for his army, though equal in number to theirs, was extremely inferior in arms and equipment;[740] in which points the Athenian force now present was so admirably provided, that his own men would not think themselves a match for it, if the two armies faced each other in open field. He relied altogether on the effect of sudden sally and well-timed surprise, when the Athenians should have been thrown into a feeling of contemptuous security by an exaggerated show of impotence in their enemy.

[739] Thucyd. v, 6. Βρασίδας δὲ—ἀντεκάθητο καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τῷ
Κερδυλίῳ· ἔστι δὲ τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο Ἀργιλίων, πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ, οὐ
πολὺ ἀπέχον τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως, καὶ ~κατεφαίνετο πάντα αὐτόθεν, ὥστε
οὐκ ἂν ἔλαθεν αὐτόθεν ὁρμώμενος ὁ Κλέων τῷ στρατῷ~, etc.

[740] Thucyd. v, 8.