Chapter XLVII (4)

Thus relieved from all danger, the Korkyræans picked up the dead bodies and the wrecks which had floated during the night on to their island, and even found sufficient pretence to erect a trophy, chiefly in consequence of their partial success on the left wing. In truth, they had been only rescued from ruin by the unexpected coming of the last Athenian ships: but the last result was as triumphant to them as it was disastrous and humiliating to the Corinthians, who had incurred an immense cost, and taxed all their willing allies, only to leave their enemy stronger than she was before. From this time forward they considered the thirty years’ truce as broken, and conceived a hatred, alike deadly and undisguised, against Athens; so that the latter gained nothing by the moderation of her admirals in sparing the Corinthian fleet off the coast of Epirus. An opportunity was not long wanting for the Corinthians to strike a blow at their enemy, through one of her wide-spread dependencies.

On the isthmus of that lesser peninsula called Pellênê, which forms the westernmost of the three prongs of the greater peninsula called Chalkidikê, between the Thermaic and the Strymonic gulfs, was situated the Dorian town of Potidæa, one of the tributary allies of Athens, but originally colonized from Corinth, and still maintaining a certain metropolitan allegiance towards the latter: insomuch that every year certain Corinthians were sent thither as magistrates, under the title of Epidemiurgi. On various points of the neighboring coast, also, there were several small towns belonging to the Chalkidians and Bottiæans, enrolled in like manner in the list of Athenian tributaries. The neighboring inland territory, Mygdonia and Chalkidikê,[113] was held by the Macedonian king Perdikkas, son of that Alexander who had taken part, fifty years before, in the expedition of Xerxes. These two princes appear gradually to have extended their dominions, after the ruin of Persian power in Thrace by the exertions of Athens, until at length they acquired all the territory between the rivers Axius and Strymon. Now Perdikkas had been for some time the friend and ally of Athens; but there were other Macedonian princes, his brother Philip and Derdas, holding independent principalities in the upper country,[114] apparently on the higher course of the Axius near the Pæonian tribes, with whom he was in a state of dispute. These princes having been accepted as the allies of Athens, Perdikkas from that time became her active enemy, and it was from his intrigues that all the difficulties of Athens on that coast took their first origin. The Athenian empire was much less complete and secure over the seaports on the mainland than over the islands:[115] for the former were always more or less dependent on any powerful land-neighbor, sometimes more dependent on him than upon the mistress of the sea; and we shall find Athens herself cultivating assiduously the favor of Sitalkês and other strong Thracian potentates, as an aid to her dominion over the seaports.[116] Perdikkas immediately began to incite and aid the Chalkidians and Bottiæans to revolt from Athens, and the violent enmity against the latter, kindled in the bosoms of the Corinthians by the recent events at Korkyra, enabled him to extend the same projects to Potidæa. Not only did he send envoys to Corinth in order to concert measures for provoking the revolt of Potidæa, but also to Sparta, instigating the Peloponnesian league to a general declaration of war against Athens.[117] And he farther prevailed on many of the Chalkidian inhabitants to abandon their separate small towns on the sea-coast, for the purpose of joint residence at Olynthus, which was several stadia from the sea. Thus that town, as well as the Chalkidian interest, became much strengthened, while Perdikkas farther assigned some territory near Lake Bolbê to contribute to the temporary maintenance of the concentrated population.

[113] See the geographical Commentary of Gatterer upon Thrace,
embodied in Poppo, Prolegg. ad Thucyd. vol. ii, ch. 29.

The words τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης—τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης χωρία (Thucyd. ii, 29)
denote generally the towns in Chalkidikê,—places _in the
direction or in the skirts of_ Thrace, rather than parts of
Thrace itself.

[114] Thucyd. i, 57; ii, 100.

[115] See two remarkable passages illustrating this difference,
Thucyd. iv, 120-122.

[116] Thucyd. ii, 29-98. Isokratês has a remarkable passage on
this subject in the beginning of Or. v, ad Philippum, sects.
5-7. After pointing out the imprudence of founding a colony
on the skirts of the territory of a powerful potentate, and
the excellent site which had been chosen far Kyrênê, as being
near only to feeble tribes,—he goes so far as to say that
the possession of Amphipolis would be injurious rather than
beneficial to Athens, because it would render her dependent upon
Philip, from his power of annoying her colonists,—just as she
had been dependent before upon Mêdokus, the Thracian king, in
consequence of her colonists in the Chersonese,—ἀναγκασθησόμεθα
τὴν αὐτὴν εὔνοιαν ἔχειν τοῖς σοῖς πράγμασι διὰ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα (at
Amphipolis) κατοικοῦντας, οἵαν περ εἴχομεν Μηδόκῳ τῷ παλαιῷ διὰ
τοὺς ἐν Χεῤῥονήσῳ γεωργοῦντας.

[117] Thucyd. i, 56, 57.

The Athenians were not ignorant both of his hostile preparations and of the dangers which awaited them from Corinth after the Korkyræan sea-fight; immediately after which they sent to take precautions against the revolt of Potidæa; requiring the inhabitants to take down their wall on the side of Pellênê, so as to leave the town open on the side of the peninsula, or on what may be called the sea-side, and fortified only towards the mainland,—requiring them farther both to deliver hostages and to dismiss the annual magistrates who came to them from Corinth. An Athenian armament of thirty triremes and one thousand hoplites, under Archestratus and ten others, despatched to act against Perdikkas in the Thermaic gulf, was directed at the same time to enforce these requisitions against Potidæa, and to repress any dispositions to revolt among the neighboring Chalkidians. Immediately on receiving these requisitions, the Potidæans sent envoys both to Athens, for the purpose of evading and gaining time,—and to Sparta, in conjunction with Corinth, in order to determine a Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica, in the event of Potidæa being attacked by Athens. From the Spartan authorities they obtained a distinct affirmative promise, in spite of the thirty years’ truce still subsisting: at Athens they had no success, and they accordingly openly revolted (seemingly about midsummer, 432 B.C.), at the same time that the armament under Archestratus sailed. The Chalkidians and Bottiæans revolted at the same time, at the express instigation of Corinth, accompanied by solemn oaths and promises of assistance.[118] Archestratus with his fleet, on reaching the Thermaic gulf, found them all in proclaimed enmity, but was obliged to confine himself to the attack of Perdikkas in Macedonia, not having numbers enough to admit of a division of his force. He accordingly laid siege to Therma, in coöperation with the Macedonian troops from the upper country, under Philip and the brothers of Derdas; after taking that place, he next proceeded to besiege Pydna. But it would probably have been wiser had he turned his whole force instantly to the blockade of Potidæa; for during the period of more than six weeks that he spent in the operations against Therma, the Corinthians conveyed to Potidæa a reinforcement of sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light-armed, partly their own citizens, partly Peloponnesians, hired for the occasion,—under Aristeus, son of Adeimantus, a man of such eminent popularity, both at Corinth and at Potidæa, that most of the soldiers volunteered on his personal account. Potidæa was thus put into a state of complete defence shortly after the news of its revolt reached Athens, and long before any second armament could be sent to attack it. A second armament, however, was speedily sent forth.—forty triremes and two thousand Athenian hoplites, under Kallias, son of Kalliades,[119] with four other commanders,—who, on reaching the Thermaic gulf, joined the former body at the siege of Pydna. After prosecuting the siege in vain for a short time, they found themselves obliged to patch up an accommodation on the best terms they could with Perdikkas, from the necessity of commencing immediate operations against Aristeus and Potidæa. They then quitted Macedonia, first crossing by sea from Pydna to the eastern coast of the Thermaic gulf,—next attacking, though without effect, the town of Berœa,—and then marching by land along the eastern coast of the gulf, in the direction of Potidæa. On the third day of easy march, they reached the seaport called Gigônus, near which they encamped.[120]

[118] Thucyd. v, 30.

[119] Kallias was a young Athenian of noble family, who had
paid the large sum of one hundred minæ to Zeno of Elea, the
philosopher, for rhetorical, philosophical, and sophistical
instruction (Plato, Alkibiadês, i, c. 31, p. 119).

[120] Thucyd. i, 61. The statement of Thucydidês presents some
geographical difficulties which the critics have not adequately
estimated. Are we to assume as certain, that the _Berœa_ here
mentioned must be the Macedonian town of that name, afterwards
so well known, distant from the sea westward one hundred and
sixty stadia, or nearly twenty English miles (see Tafel, Historia
Thessalonicæ, p. 58), on a river which flows into the Haliakmon,
and upon one of the lower ridges of Mount Bermius?

The words of Thucydidês here are—Ἔπειτα δὲ ξύμβασιν ποιησάμενοι
καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἀναγκαίαν πρὸς τὸν Περδίκκαν, ὡς αὐτοὺς κατήπειγεν
ἡ Ποτίδαια καὶ ὁ Ἀριστεὺς παρεληλυθὼς, ~ἀπανίστανται ἐκ τῆς
Μακεδονίας~, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Βέροιαν κἀκεῖθεν ἐπιστρέψαντες,
καὶ πειράσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ χωρίου καὶ οὐχ ἑλόντες, ἐπορεύοντο
κατὰ γῆν πρὸς τὴν Ποτίδαιαν—ἅμα δὲ νῆες παρέπλεον ἑβδομήκοντα.

“The natural route from Pydna to Potidæa (observes Dr. Arnold in
his note) lay along the coast; and Berœa was _quite out of the
way_, at some _distance to the westward_, near the fort of the
Bermian mountains. But the hope of surprising Berœa induced the
Athenians to deviate from their direct line of march; then, after
the failure of this treacherous attempt, they returned again to
the sea-coast, and continued to follow it till they arrived at
Gigônus.”

I would remark upon this: 1. The words of Thucydidês imply that
Berœa was _not in_ Macedonia, but _out_ of it (see Poppo, Proleg.
ad Thucyd. vol. ii, pp. 408-418). 2. He uses no expression which
in the least implies that the attempt on Berœa on the part of the
Athenians was _treacherous_, that is, contrary to the convention
just concluded; though, had the fact been so, he would naturally
have been led to notice it, seeing that the deliberate breach of
the convention was the very first step which took place after
it was concluded. 3. What can have induced the Athenians to
leave their fleet and march near twenty miles inland to Mount
Bermius and Berœa, to attack a Macedonian town which they could
not possibly hold,—when they cannot even stay to continue the
attack on Pydna, a position maritime, useful, and tenable,—in
consequence of the pressing necessity of taking immediate
measures against Potidæa? 4. If they were compelled by this
latter necessity to patch up a peace on any terms with Perdikkas,
would they immediately endanger this peace by going out of their
way to attack one of his forts? Again, Thucydidês says, “that,
proceeding by slow land-marches, they reached Gigônus, and
encamped _on the third day_,”—κατ᾽ ὀλίγον δὲ προϊόντες τριταῖοι
ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. The computation of
time must here be made either from Pydna or from Berœa; and
the reader who examines the map will see that neither from the
one nor the other—assuming the Berœa on Mount Bermius—would it
be possible for an army to arrive at Gigônus on the third day,
marching round the head of the gulf, with easy days’ marches; the
more so, as they would have to cross the rivers Lydias, Axius.
and Echeidôrus, all not far from their mouths,—or, if these
rivers could not be crossed, to get on board the fleet and reland
on the other side.

This clear mark of time laid down by Thucydidês,—even apart
from the objections which I have just urged in reference to
Berœa on Mount Bermius,—made me doubt whether Dr. Arnold and
the other commentators have correctly conceived the operations
of the Athenian troops between Pydna and Gigônus. The _Berœa_
which Thucydidês means cannot be more distant from Gigônus, at
any rate, than a third day’s easy march, and therefore cannot
be the Berœa on Mount Bermius. But there was another town named
Berœa, either in Thrace or in Emathia, though we do not know
its exact site (see Wassi ad Thucyd. i, 61; Steph. Byz. v,
Βέρης; Tafel, Thessalonica, Index). This other Berœa, situated
somewhere between Gigônus and Therma, and out of the limits of
that Macedonia which Perdikkas governed, may probably be the
place which Thucydidês here indicates. The Athenians, raising
the siege of Pydna, crossed the gulf _on shipboard_ to Berœa,
and after vainly trying to surprise that town, marched along _by
land_ to Gigônus. Whoever inspects the map will see that the
Athenians would naturally employ their large fleet to transport
the army by the short transit across the gulf from Pydna (see
Livy, xliv, 10), and thus avoid the fatiguing land-march round
the head of the gulf. Moreover, the language of Thucydidês
would seem to make the land-march _begin at Berœa_ and not at
Pydna,—~ἀπανίστανται~ ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας, καὶ ~ἀφικόμενοι ἐς
Βέροιαν~ κἀκεῖθεν ἐπιστρέψαντες, καὶ πειράσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ
χωρίου καὶ οὐχ ἑλόντες, ~ἐπορεύοντο κατὰ γῆν~ πρὸς Ποτίδαιαν—ἅμα
δὲ νῆες παρέπλεον ἑβδομήκοντα. Κατ᾽ ὀλίγον δὲ προϊόντες τριταῖοι
ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. The change of tense
between ἀπανίστανται and ἐπορεύοντο,—and the connection of the
participle ἀφικόμενοι with the latter verb,—seems to divide the
whole proceeding into two distinct parts; first, departure from
Macedonia to Berœa, as it would seem, by sea,—next, a land-march
from Berœa to Gigônus, of three short days.

This is the best account, as it strikes me, of a passage, the
real difficulties of which are imperfectly noticed by the
commentators.

The site of Gigônus cannot be exactly determined, since all that
we know of the towns on the coast between Potidæa and Æneia, is
derived from their enumerated names in Herodotus (vii, 123); nor
can we be absolutely certain that he has enumerated them all in
the exact order in which they were placed. But I think that both
Col. Leake and Kiepert’s map place Gigônus too far from Potidæa;
for we see, from this passage of Thucydidês, that it formed the
camp from which the Athenian general went forth immediately to
give battle to an enemy posted between Olynthus and Potidæa; and
the Scholiast says of Gigônus,—οὐ πολὺ ἄπεχον Ποτιδαίας: and
Stephan. Byz. Γίγωνος, πόλις Θρᾴκης ~προσεχὴς τῇ Παλλήνῃ~.

See Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii, ch.
xxxi, p. 452. That excellent observer calculates the march, from
Berœa on Mount Bermius to Potidæa, as being one of four days,
about twenty miles each day. Judging by the map, this seems lower
than the reality; but admitting it to be correct, Thucydidês
would never describe such a march as ~κατ᾽ ὀλίγον~ δὲ προϊόντες
τριταῖοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον: it would be a march rather rapid
and fatiguing, especially as it would include the passage of the
rivers. Nor is it likely, from the description of this battle
in Thucydidês (i, 62), that Gigônus could be anything like a
full day’s march from Potidæa. According to his description,
the Athenian army advanced by three very easy marches; then
arriving at Gigônus, they encamp, being now near the enemy, who
on their side are already encamped, expecting them,—προσδεχόμενοι
τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ~ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο~ πρὸς Ὀλύνθου ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ: the
imperfect tense indicates that they were already there at the
time when the Athenians took camp at Gigônus; which would hardly
be the case if the Athenians had come by three successive marches
from Berœa on Mount Bermius.

I would add, that it is no more wonderful that there should be
one Berœa in Thrace and another in Macedonia, than that there
should be one Methônê in Thrace and another in Macedonia (Steph.
B. Μεθώνη).

In spite of the convention concluded at Pydna, Perdikkas, whose character for faithlessness we shall have more than one occasion to notice, was now again on the side of the Chalkidians, and sent two hundred horse to join them, under the command of Iolaus. Aristeus posted his Corinthians and Potidæans on the isthmus near Potidæa, providing a market without the walls, in order that they might not stray in quest of provisions: his position was on the side towards Olynthus,—which was about seven miles off, but within sight, and in a lofty and conspicuous situation. He here awaited the approach of the Athenians, calculating that the Chalkidians from Olynthus would, upon the hoisting of a given signal, assail them in the rear when they attacked him. But Kallias was strong enough to place in reserve his Macedonian cavalry and other allies as a check against Olynthus; while with his Athenians and the main force he marched to the isthmus and took position in front of Aristeus. In the battle which ensued, Aristeus and the chosen band of Corinthians immediately about him were completely successful, breaking the troops opposed to them, and pursuing for a considerable distance: but the remaining Potidæans and Peloponnesians were routed by the Athenians and driven within the walls. On returning from pursuit, Aristeus found the victorious Athenians between him and Potidæa, and was reduced to the alternative either of cutting his way through them into the latter town, or of making a retreating march to Olynthus. He chose the former as the least of two hazards, and forced his way through the flank of the Athenians, wading into the sea in order to turn the extremity of the Potidæan wall, which reached entirely across the isthmus, with a mole running out at each end into the water: he effected this daring enterprise and saved his detachment, though not without considerable difficulty and some loss. Meanwhile, the auxiliaries from Olynthus, though they had begun their march on seeing the concerted signal, had been kept in check by the Macedonian horse, so that the Potidæans had been beaten and the signal again withdrawn, before they could make any effective diversion: nor did the cavalry on either side come into action. The defeated Potidæans and Corinthians, having the town immediately in their rear, lost only three hundred men, while the Athenians lost one hundred and fifty, together with the general Kallias.[121]

[121] Thucyd. i, 62, 63.

The victory was, however, quite complete, and the Athenians, after having erected their trophy, and given up the enemy’s dead for burial, immediately built their blockading wall across the isthmus, on the side of the mainland, so as to cut off Potidæa from all communication with Olynthus and the Chalkidians. To make the blockade complete, a second wall across the isthmus was necessary, on the other side towards Pallênê: but they had not force enough to detach a completely separate body for this purpose, until after some time they were joined by Phormio with sixteen hundred fresh hoplites from Athens. That general, landing at Aphytis, in the peninsula of Pallênê, marched slowly up to Potidæa, ravaging the territory in order to draw out the citizens to battle: but the challenge not being accepted, he undertook, and finished without obstruction, the blockading wall on the side of Pallênê, so that the town was now completely inclosed, and the harbor watched by the Athenian fleet. The wall once finished, a portion of the force sufficed to guard it, leaving Phormio at liberty to undertake aggressive operations against the Chalkidic and Bottiæan townships. The capture of Potidæa was now only a question of more or less time, and Aristeus, in order that the provisions might last longer, proposed to the citizens to choose a favorable wind, get on shipboard, and break out suddenly from the harbor, taking their chance of eluding the Athenian fleet, and leaving only five hundred defenders behind: though he offered himself to be among those left behind, he could not determine the citizens to so bold an enterprise, and he therefore sallied forth in the way proposed with a small detachment, in order to try and procure relief from without,—especially some aid or diversion from Peloponnesus. But he was able to accomplish nothing beyond some partial warlike operations among the Chalkidians,[122] and a successful ambuscade against the citizens of Sermylus, which did nothing for the relief of the blockaded town: it had, however, been so well-provisioned that it held out for two whole years,—a period full of important events elsewhere.

[122] Thucyd. i, 65.

From these two contests between Athens and Corinth, first indirectly at Korkyra, next distinctly and avowedly at Potidæa, sprung those important movements in the Lacedæmonian alliance which will be recounted in the next chapter.