Chapter VI: Section 7: Amended to read, “One bridge at the place where the Liberian (1)

Customs House is now erected, and one ferry at the place where the second Liberian Customs House may hereafter be erected; that said bridge and ferry will be accessible to the citizens of the Liberian Government without any restrictions or extra toll, or charges, more than is required to be paid by the subjects of His Majesty’s Government.”

The British Government left the settlement of the details of that portion of the agreement which had reference to the navigation of the Mano River to be settled between the Liberian Government and the Government of Sierra Leone. The colonial government imposed such restrictions that no understanding was ever arrived at. However, a joint commission for the demarcation of the Anglo-Liberian frontier was appointed and in 1903 proceeded with its work. In due time the boundary was satisfactorily settled by this commission. This boundary, however, very soon gave rise to a serious difficulty and to a flagrant aggression. By the delimitation, the town and district of Kanre-Lahun fell to Liberia; Colonel Williams, the Liberian Commissioner, hoisted the Liberian flag at that town which, at the time, was occupied by a detachment of the Sierra Leone Frontier Force; curiously enough, the British force was not withdrawn.

In 1904 the British Government complained to the Liberian Government that the Kissi were making raids into British territory in consequence of a war between Fabundah, a chief of the Kanre-Lahun District, and Kah Furah, a Kissi chief, and asked permission for the entrance of British troops into Liberian territory for the purpose of repressing the disorder which, it was said, threatened British interests. The request was granted; British troops advanced to the Mafisso where they established a post. In November the British Vice-Consul sent word to the President of Liberia saying that the chief Kah Furah had been driven out of the Kissi country, and that the people, at the invitation of the military authorities, had elected a new chief, and had pledged themselves not to receive Kah Furah among them again. The Liberian Government assumed that the matter was at an end and that the British force had been withdrawn. In 1906 Mr. Lomax, the Liberian Commissioner for the French frontier, was instructed to proceed to this point; he reached Kanre-Lahun in December, and found Waladi, a town in Liberian territory, garrisoned by a Sierra Leone force. While Mr. Lomax was at Kanre-Lahun, complaints were made against him by the Chief Fabundah and others. These complaints were examined in the presence of Governor Probyn, Sir Harry Johnston, Mr. Lamont, and leading military officers, and Mr. Lomax justified himself completely, except in a single case where damages of five pounds were suggested and paid. Later on, British officers sent in complaints that the escort with Mr. Lomax were plundering the country. It was impossible in such districts and under such circumstances to prevent some petty thieving. Mr. Lomax, however, accepted the complaints and paid the damages claimed. With a view to permanently settling the country under Liberian rule, Mr. Lomax ordered a local election to be held. Three chiefs were chosen--Fabundah for the lower section, Gardi for the Bombali section, and Bawma for the Gormah section. Fabundah, who before had been exercising jurisdiction over the Bombali, was dissatisfied. The Sierra Leone authorities promised to support him against the Liberian Government; they placed a frontier force at his disposal for the purpose of ruining the chiefs who were favorable to Liberian control or who had received commissions from the President; efforts to arouse opposition and dissatisfaction were made; Lomax was hounded from the district; the chief, Gardi, was driven from the country, his town was plundered, and his brother made a prisoner in Kanre-Lahun.

In 1908 attempts had been made in Europe to settle difficulties pending with Great Britain and France. Mr. F. E. R. Johnson, the Liberian Secretary of State, who had been sent to arrange these matters, found conditions threatening. In London the British Government stated that it had no designs against Liberia, but that they believed the French were planning encroachment, and that, if Liberia lost territory to France, Great Britain would find it necessary to take a new piece of territory contingent to Sierra Leone in her own defense. Matters appeared so serious that President Barclay was advised to come to Europe himself; he arrived in London on the 29th of August, accompanied by T. McCants Stewart, and there met Mr. Johnson. He told the British Government of his fears regarding further aggression upon Liberian territory and expressed the desire that Great Britain and America should jointly guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic. The reply was that Great Britain would on no account enter into any such guarantee; if the Liberian Government obtained a settled frontier with France, and inaugurated certain reforms, there would be little danger of any one’s troubling it; if the reforms desired by England were not undertaken, nothing would save it from the end which threatened. At the same time London refused to treat of the Kanre-Lahun and Mano River difficulties until after the troubles with France had been arranged. In France, as will be shortly seen, the Liberian envoys met with no success; a treaty was indeed arranged by means of which the Republic was robbed of a large amount of valuable territory. The envoys were again in London in September to take up the matters of the Kanre-Lahun and Mano River negotiations. The British officials now demanded that Fabundah should come entirely under the jurisdiction of the British Government, and that the frontier line on the northwest should be so altered as to place his territory within the British colony; the area thus demanded contained something like 250 square miles of territory. At no time had the area actually in charge of Fabundah amounted to any such quantity; the Liberians demurred at the largeness of the territorial claim--the British officials themselves stated that they were surprised at its extent, but insisted upon receiving the entire amount. No decision was actually reached, the matter being postponed until the delimitation of the new Franco-Liberian boundary should be achieved.

Great Britain’s claim to this region was based upon the flimsiest pretext. It is true that she had had relations with Fabundah before the boundary had been delimited; it is true that, previous to that date, she had had a force in Kanre-Lahun; however, when the boundary was actually fixed, Kanre-Lahun was clearly within Liberian territory, and no objection whatever was made to the Republic’s taking possession and to the withdrawal of the Sierra Leone force. When, later on, Great Britain sent soldiers into the area, it was done on the pretext that intertribal difficulties in the region threatened British interests; permission was given as a favor to Great Britain and with the expectation that, as soon as the difficulty had been adjusted, the British force would be withdrawn. Such was not the case; once in Kanre-Lahun, it remained there; Major Lomax was hounded from the country; the Liberian customs officer, Mr. Hughes, was ordered to abandon his post of duty and to surrender the customs house to the British commander. This act of occupation was bad enough; but soon Great Britain demanded that the army of occupation should be paid by the Liberian Government before it would evacuate the district; no such understanding had been arranged, and the claim was unjustified and ridiculous; the frontier force of Sierra Leone was not increased, nor put to any extra expense in the matter. In asking for a new boundary line which should cut out Fabundah’s territory, flagrant injustice was committed; it is true that the boundary which had been arranged cut the land controlled by the chief; about one-twenty-fifth of his territory was on the British side, the remaining twenty-four-twenty-fifths being in Liberia; if a new line were to be drawn, it should have given the one-twenty-fifth to Liberia and reduced the Sierra Leone territory. The matter dragged along for months. December 8, 1909, President Barclay accepted a proposition to exchange or sell the district in dispute; the legislature refused to accept the proposition. In May, 1911, however, an agreement was finally arranged; the British authorities took over the Kanre-Lahun District, an area of extraordinary wealth and dense population; in return for this valuable and most needed area, Liberia received a piece of country lying between the Morro and Mano Rivers, which had formerly been a part of the Colony of Sierra Leone; this territory is almost without population, densely forested, and practically worthless. Even so, it is little likely that the Republic will be left in peaceful possession of it. On some pretext, in the future, Great Britain will no doubt regain it.

THE FRENCH BOUNDARY QUESTION.

When Maryland was added to the Liberian Republic, it possessed lands acquired by deeds of purchase and treaties as far east as the San Pedro River, sixty miles east of the Cavalla; this country was occupied by Kru tribes, and its eastern boundary practically marked their limit; it was hence not only a geographical, but an ethnographical boundary. For years no one questioned Liberia’s right to the whole area, and on maps and in repeated descriptions of the country its rights were recognized. In 1885, however, the French Government claimed that the French possessions extended continuously from the Ivory Coast westward beyond the Cavalla River and Cape Palmas as far as Garawé; at the same time it suggested certain shadowy claims to Cape Mount, Grand Bassa, and Grand Butu;--in other words, points at intervals along the whole coast of the Liberian Republic; these claims were based on agreements stated to have been drawn up between native chiefs and the commanders of war vessels. In 1891 the French Government officially communicated to Great Britain her intention of taking possession of and administering the district mentioned as far as Garawé; she modified her claim, however, in such a way as to extend her rights only to the Cavalla River. In 1891 a French commissioner was authorized to treat with Liberia in this matter. He claimed that the French had deeds to Grand Cesters, dating to 1788, and to Garawé, dating to 1842; he referred to other shadowy rights and mentioned treaties which, he asserted, chiefs in the neighborhood of the Cavalla and San Pedro Rivers had made with French authorities; asked to produce these documents, he admitted that he did not have them with him. The French Government asked that Liberia should recognize the right of France from the Cavalla River to the San Pedro, saying that, if this recognition were granted, they might not revive their old claims. Liberia urged that the treaty formed with her by the French Government in 1852 clearly recognized her rights to the region in question; a French war map, dated 1882, was shown, on which Liberia’s area was clearly shown to extend to the San Pedro River; at the same time Liberia asked that the whole matter should be referred to arbitration. Arbitration was refused; a treaty drawn up by France was offered for approval in August, 1892; the Liberian legislature refused absolutely to ratify it, and the Liberian Government appealed to the United States for assistance and advice. The country was greatly aroused over the manifest injustice of its powerful neighbor. Especially in Maryland, feeling ran high. A printed appeal was issued to the world. In it occurs the following passage:

“We appeal to all the civilized nations of the world.--Consider, we pray you, the situation. Having been carried away into slavery, and, by the blessing of God, returned from exile to our fatherland, are we now to be robbed of our rightful inheritance? Is there not to be a foot of land in Africa, that the African, whether civilized or savage, can call his own? It has been asserted that the race is not capable of self-government, and the eyes of many are watching the progress of Liberia with a view to determining that question. We only ask, in all fairness, to be allowed just what any other people would require--free scope for operation. Do not wrest our territory from us and hamper us in our operations, and then stigmatize the race with incapacity, because we do not work miracles. Give us a fair chance, and then if we utterly fail, we shall yield the point. We pray you, the civilized and Christian nations of the world, to use your influence in our behalf. We have no power to prevent this aggression on the part of the French Government: but we know that we have right on our side, and are willing to have our claims to the territory in question examined. We do not consent to France’s taking that portion of our territory lying between the Cavalla and San Pedro Rivers; nor do we recognize its claims to points on our Grain Coast which, as shown above, our government has been in possession of for so long. We protest, too, against that government’s marking off narrow limits of interior land for us. We claim the right to extend as far interiorward as our necessities require. We are not foreigners: we are Africans, and this is Africa. Such being the case, we have certain natural rights--God-given rights--to this territory which no foreigners can have. We should have room enough, not only for our present population, but also to afford a home for our brethren in exile who may wish to return to their fatherland and help us to build up a negro nationality. We implore you, the civilized and Christian nations of the world, to use your influence to have these, our reasonable requirements secured to us.” But neither the official appeal to the United States nor the unofficial appeal to the Christian nations of the world availed. France seized the territory and threatened to refuse to recognize rights beyond Grand Cesters on the seaboard, and Boporo in the interior. After fruitless remonstrance, the Republic was forced to yield and a treaty was accepted on December 8, 1892. By it the Cavalla River was recognized as the boundary between France and Liberia, from its mouth “as far as a point situated at a point” about twenty miles south of its confluence with the River “Fodedougouba” at the intersection of the parallel 6° 30′ north and the Paris meridian 9° 12′ west; thence along 6° 30′ as far as 10° west, with the proviso that the basin of the Grand Cesters River should belong to Liberia and the basin of the Fodedougouba to France; then north along 10° to 8° north; and then northwest to the latitude of Tembi Kunda (supposed 8° 35′), after which due west along the latitude of Tembi Kunda, until it intersects the British boundary near that place. But the entire Niger Basin should be French; Bamaquilla and Mahommadou should be Liberian; Mousardou and Naalah, French.

LATER FRENCH DIFFICULTIES.

Notwithstanding this delimitation, difficulties with the French continued. In 1895 French posts along the northern border began to crowd in upon the Republic. The town of Lola, in Liberia, was attacked by Senegalese soldiers; these were repulsed and two French officers were killed. Aggressions continued until, finally, in 1903, Liberia begged that a final delimitation might be arranged, as the old had proved completely unsatisfactory. In 1904 F. E. R. Johnson and J. J. Dossen were sent to France to arrange matters. On their way, they called at the British Foreign Office and asked their aid and interest in bringing about an understanding. Arrived in Paris, it was quickly found that the French were planning to possess themselves of all the territory situated in the basin of the Cavalla and the Upper St. Paul’s Rivers; the British Foreign Office expressed sympathy, but did nothing more. In 1905 several efforts were made toward bringing about an agreement. Dr. Blyden was sent to France, but accomplished nothing; in November Sir Harry Johnston was asked to treat with the French Government which, however, refused to recognize him as an official negotiator. In 1907 Secretary Johnson was commissioned to treat with the French Government, but found its attitude most hostile and unfriendly. President Barclay himself was summoned to Europe; taking T. McCants Stewart with him, they joined Johnson, and interviewed the French officials. A treaty was submitted to them by which Liberia would be deprived of a large portion of her territory situated in the richest and most prosperous districts of the Republic. It was in vain that the Liberian commissioners remonstrated; the French were inflexible. The English Government had refused to deal with the commissioners in regard to the British boundary difficulty until they had come to some arrangement with France. In this unhappy condition of affairs, the commissioners decided to consult the American Ambassador in Paris; they asked that the United States should assist Liberia and prevent her being robbed of so large a portion of her territory, and should use her influence in bringing the French Government to submit the whole matter in dispute to arbitration. Ambassador White replied that he doubted whether the United States would aid Liberia in this crisis; he advised President Barclay to accept the treaty, urging that, if he failed to do so, the French would make further encroachments, and the Republic would meet with greater losses. As the case seemed hopeless, the commissioners accepted the treaty. It involved the delimitation of a fixed boundary by an international commission. Liberia engaged two Dutch officials as her commissioners. They were on hand ready to fix the boundary in February, 1898, but were kept waiting until May by the dilatoriness of the French commissioners; in order to have a permanent boundary fixed, the Republic made great concessions and lost valuable regions. It was willing, however, to sacrifice much for peace.

Of course the sacrifice was without result. At the present time the whole question of the Franco-Liberian boundary is again open, and from the points urged by the French Government it is evident that it aims at new acquisition of territory and new restriction of the power of the little Republic.

We stand at the threshold of a new era; new political theories are
being advanced; new interpretations are being given to the principles
of international law; larger fulfilments of national obligations are
being required of individual nations; new duties are being thrust upon
us. They cannot be shirked, we must keep pace with world requirements.
Regeneration and reform must be our watchword. The people must see
that they become so. The process must operate from within outwards, or
else influences from without will compass our ruin.--E. BARCLAY.

THE FRONTIER FORCE.

When President Barclay was in London, the British Government demanded that certain internal reforms should take place in the Republic before it would discuss a final settlement of either the Mano River or Kanre-Lahun difficulties. Shortly after the President’s return to Monrovia, Mr. Braithwait Wallis, Consul-General of Great Britain to Liberia, issued a memorandum on the subject--apparently under the fear “lest we forget”. This memorandum, which bears the date of January 14, 1908, occupies four printed pages, and condenses into that brief space an astonishing amount of venom and insolence. A few quotations will show its spirit:

“Your Excellency will remember then being informed that a critical moment had arrived in the history of the Republic, that however it might have been twenty or even ten years ago, the time had now gone by when Liberia could re-enact the part of a hermit kingdom, and that she must not lose a moment in setting herself seriously to work to put her house in order, or be prepared at no distant date, to disappear from the catalogue of independent countries. His Majesty’s Government, as Your Excellency is aware, have absolutely no designs against either the independence or the integrity of the Republic. Their only desire is that a country which, on one of its frontiers, marches with an important British Colony, and with which not only that Colony, but Great Britain itself, has large and growing commercial relations, should have such a stable or effective Government as will conduce to its own prosperity, and remove any danger of its losing its independence. His Majesty’s Government do not consider that the Government of the Republic is either stable or effective. Improvement has indeed resulted from the appointment of two Customs Officers, and the Customs revenue of the country has largely developed. But it is also considered as absolutely essential, if such improvement is to continue and to extend to other branches of the Government, that the finances of the country be placed, at any rate for the time being, in the hands of an European financial expert, and that at least three more European Customs experts be appointed. And further, no Government can be said to have a stable basis, when it is without any means of enforcing its authority. His Majesty’s Government, therefore, considers that it is essential that a trustworthy police, under European officers, should be at once established. With regard to the appointment of a financial expert, who could advise and assist the Secretary of the Treasury, in the financial affairs of the Country, Mr. Lamont has already been appointed Financial Adviser to the Republic. He is, however, only so in name, but should now be made so in actual fact. His Majesty’s Government further consider that the Liberian judiciary ought to undergo drastic reform.” Mr. Wallis recapitulates the reforms demanded in the following statement: (a) the appointment of a financial expert, who will place the finances of the country on a sound footing, and will advise the Secretary of the Treasury on financial matters. (b) The establishment of an efficient, well armed, and well disciplined police force under competent European Officers; and one that will command the respect of the Powers. (c) The appointment of at least three more European Customs experts. (d) The reform of the judiciary. “If the Liberian Government carry out the reforms herein indicated within SIX MONTHS, counted from the date of Your Excellency’s return to Monrovia from England, His Majesty’s Government will on their side be happy to assist in carrying them into effect in the same way as they have recently been assisting in the work of re-organizing the Liberian Customs. They will further be happy to suspend pressing the monetary and other claims which they have against Liberia, and will endeavor to come to a settlement, on a mutually satisfactory basis, on the long outstanding question of the navigation of the Mano River and the trouble on the Anglo-Liberian Frontier.”

In other words, Great Britain was quite willing to assume the whole running of Liberian affairs; she would be glad to manage her financial matters, to train and handle her frontier force, to collect her customs duties, and manage them, to interfere with, and control her government completely. She hinted at what she might do if these reforms were not carried into effect; she ended with a querulous complaint regarding advantages which German shipping was said to be securing to the disadvantage of British interests. This truly extraordinary document was signed in the following highly dignified fashion:

I have the honor to be,
with great truth and regard
Sir,
Your Excellency’s
most obedient,
humble servant,
BRAITHWAIT WALLIS,
HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S CONSUL.

One of the cries of the present day internationalism is “effective occupation”. It is only as a country demonstrates itself able to protect its borders, and to maintain peace within its limits, that it is admitted to justly hold its territory; there are some strange features involved in the expression, but it has a just foundation and is at present generally accepted. It is true, if Liberia is to be recognized as an independent nation, she must guard her borders, must prevent her people from troubling their neighbors, must protect life and property within her area. There is a stipulation in the French treaty of 1907 in regard to this matter; if Liberia cannot maintain a frontier force to protect her boundary, the French claim the right to place their own forces on Liberian territory for that purpose; the English, in their demanded reforms, insist upon an adequate and well trained police force upon the frontier; the demands are not unjust and must be met. In fact, the frontier force is one of the urgent and crying needs of Liberia.

While President Barclay was in London, he was approached by Capt. Mackay Cadell, who had served in the South African War; Capt. Mackay Cadell desired to be put in charge of the frontier force which it was believed that Liberia would organize in response to the British demands; he was not actually engaged by the President, but put in his appearance in January, 1908, ready for business; his employment was opposed by many, but finally, largely in order not to offend British susceptibilities, he was engaged, given the rank of Major--some question has been raised as to exactly _how_ he came to carry the title captain--and was authorized, with the help of two British assistants, to organize the frontier force; he was also given authority to employ ten or more sergeants and buglers from Sierra Leone; it was naturally assumed that the force in general would be composed of Liberian natives. Major Mackay Cadell promptly began active work; barracks were erected upon the edge of Monrovia, and soon 250 men were enrolled for service. Their uniforms, arms, and ammunition were bought from Great Britain--so that the whole enterprise was good for British trade; it is not clear, however, why the caps and other articles were stamped with the crown and other emblems of His British Majesty’s service. Matters were going nicely, but it began to be suspected that a considerable number of the new soldiers were British subjects, and it was asked whether some of them had not served upon the Sierra Leone frontier force. These suspicions and doubts led finally to a protest from the French Vice-Consul who claimed that the force being organized was actually “a British army of occupation” which the Liberian Government was permitting to be organized in Liberian territory; he demanded that an equal number of French officers and of French subjects be added to the force. The Liberian Government inquired of Major Mackay Cadell with reference to the matter; he denied that there were any British subjects on the force, and depending on his answer, the Liberian Government denied the fact to the French official. Meantime, Major Mackay Cadell was making himself variously useful to the Monrovia city government; he undertook without compensation, the command of the city police force as chief of police; in place of the loyal Kru police, he put in Mende soldiers from the barracks; he also performed the functions of street commissioner, tax collector, city treasurer, and other duties until, finally, the citizens decided to dispense with his free services; he declined, however, to resign, and presented a large bill as the condition upon which he would deliver up the city property entrusted to him. (We quote from Ellis.) On October 27th Major Mackay Cadell was further questioned in regard to the composition of his force, and a report was demanded; it was then found that at least 71 out of the little army of 250 were actually British subjects; more than this, no doubt many of the Mende at the post, who were classed as “Liberians”, really came from the portion of that tribe residing on the other side of the Sierra Leone boundary. While this report was rendered, Major Mackay Cadell showed constant objection to supervision by the President of the Republic and to any suggestion of control. The President and his Cabinet, after meeting and discussing the matter, agreed upon the dismissal of Major Mackay Cadell, but out of courtesy gave him the opportunity of resigning his position.

The French Vice-Consul continued to insist on his demands; understanding that Capt. Wallis had given his consent to the appointment of French officers and subjects, the President prepared to make such appointments. Just at this juncture Capt. Wallis returned from an absence, and at his own request, on November 13, had a meeting with the President and the members of the Cabinet, at which he presented to them what purported to be a communication from the British Government. Some mystery seems to be associated with this document, but it is understood that its effect was that, if Frenchmen were appointed to the direction of the frontier force, and French subjects were enlisted in it, Great Britain would unite with France to disrupt and divide the Republic. In December the legislature demanded that the services of Major Mackay Cadell should be dispensed with. He, however, hesitated to hand in his resignation. The legislature ordered a complete re-organization of the frontier force under a Liberian officer, with only two British subjects to be employed in the whole organization--the two assistant officers whom Major Mackay Cadell had employed. On February 1 the Major sent in his resignation. Acting on order of Consul-General Wallis, he turned over the arms and ammunition in his charge to the Elder Dempster Co., and announced the fact to the Liberian Government; at the same time Consul-General Wallis applied for an official guard to protect the property thus placed in private British hands: the Secretary of State, F. E. R. Johnson, expressed his surprise that a consul, without consultation with the proper Liberian authorities, should order property belonging to Liberia (although payment had not yet been made for it) to be turned over into private hands, and refused to accept the responsibility of placing a guard in charge. On February 11, 1909, Major Mackay Cadell sent a remarkable message to President Barclay, informing him that the native soldiers were in serious danger of mutiny on account of arrears in payments; at the same time he sent messages to the two houses of the legislature, requesting that the men be permitted to appear before them and state their grievances; he said that, if some redress were not given, the men could not be blamed for what might be done. Steps were at once taken for public defense; fortunately some 400 of the militia were in Monrovia for quarterly drill. After some seventy soldiers from the barracks had appeared upon the public streets, parading, threatening and menacing the seizure of the arms and ammunition, a force was sent to demand the surrender of the camp; at the same time, notice of this was sent to Consul-General Wallis. Major Mackay Cadell refused to surrender, making conditions which would involve several days’ delay; his immediate surrender, however, was demanded, and other militia forces were sent for. Notice of this new demand was sent to Consul-General Wallis with the request that he should order British subjects out of the camp; this he did; Major Mackay Cadell decided to capitulate; the camp was occupied. At a court of inquiry held to investigate the difficulty, the British sergeants said that Major Mackay Cadell himself had instigated the mutiny; that he had selected a certain number of men to insult the President, to arrest him, and take him to camp. A curious fact in connection with this whole extraordinary procedure is that, on the 4th of February, one week before the President of the Republic was informed of the danger of imminent mutiny, notice of it had been cabled to Great Britain. It was perhaps by accident that a British gunboat was in the harbor on the 10th, the day before the outbreak--the name of this gunboat, by the way, quite appropriately was the _Mutin_. In closing the account of this strange incident, quotations may be made from the official report of the American Commission which visited Liberia shortly afterwards:

“But if Major Cadell got on very well with his troops, he got on very badly with the Liberian people and the Liberian Government. He was a man of indomitable energy, but guileless of tact. His actions on various occasions affronted the Liberian officials. Through indifference to the law, or by design, he enlisted a considerable number of British subjects among the troops, about one-fourth of his men being natives of Sierra Leone. When called to account for it, he at first denied and afterwards admitted that some of the men might have been born in Sierra Leone, but that he supposed them to be residents of Liberia, and therefore, Liberians. Being called upon to dismiss the British subjects, he neglected to do so. About the beginning of the present year he began to complain that his men were not paid, and demanded further supplies from the Government, though he was very dilatory in presenting accounts for the money already entrusted to him. The dissatisfaction with Major Cadell’s conduct in matters of the camp led to the passage of a law by the Liberian Legislature in January, 1909, re-organizing the force and dismissing its commander. The President, who had upheld Major Cadell, offered him an opportunity to resign, but on one pretext or another, he delayed doing so, and when he sent in his resignation, the Government could not accept it until his accounts had been adjusted. He remained, in the meantime, in charge of the command, and on February 11, 1909, wrote a threatening letter to the President, in which he stated that, if the demands of the troops for the payment of money due them were not met within twenty-four hours, he could not be responsible for the maintenance of peace or for the safety of the President. This remarkable letter naturally created much excitement in Monrovia, but the situation was handled with extreme adroitness by the Liberian Government which demanded that Major Cadell withdraw the British subjects composing his force, and that he turn over the camp to the Liberian authorities who would deal with the Liberian subjects. This order was reluctantly obeyed on the recommendation of the British Consul-General, and it was then discovered that seventy-one of the enlisted men were British subjects. Two or three weeks afterwards, after settling up his accounts, whereby it was revealed that he had involved the Government in a considerable unauthorized debt, he sailed for England and was soon followed by his brother officers.”

Again:

“On February 4, the British in Monrovia cabled to the Foreign Office that the lives of foreign residents in Liberia were in danger, and urged that a gunboat be sent for their protection. . . . On February 10 the British gunboat Mutin appeared and anchored off Monrovia. On February 11 and 12 England precipitated the rupture of the Government. But for the prompt and judicious action of the Liberian Executive, aided by the American Minister Resident, the following would presently have been the situation: A British gunboat in the harbor, a British officer in command of the frontier force, and a large number of British subjects among the enlisted men, a British official in charge of the Liberian customs, a British officer in command of the Liberian gunboat _Lark_, a British regiment in the streets of Monrovia.”

The fine hand of Consul-General Wallis of course is evident throughout these events. How seriously he was implicated is suggested in the following passage from the report of the Commission: “It is most unfortunate that the Commission has been unable to secure an account of these events from the principal British actors in them. When we reached Monrovia, Major Cadell had left Liberia. The British Consul-General was away on leave of absence. We were the more disappointed in not meeting the latter, as, before our departure, we had been shown in the State Department at Washington a despatch of the Ambassador in London, stating that the British Foreign Office there had instructed its representative in Monrovia to give the American Commission the fullest information about Liberian affairs. The acting Consul-General had no knowledge of the facts, and covered his obvious embarrassment, when asked to explain some of them, by the plea that he had no inside information.”

It has been said that the British Government admits that Consul-General Wallis went beyond his authority. It is, however, significant that he was not reduced in position; he left Liberia, of course--his usefulness there having more than ended; but he was transferred to Dakar, Senegal, the finest consular post in all West Africa.

As for Major Mackay Cadell, he now poses as Liberia’s real and great friend; he has, however, changed his name, and is now known as Major R. Mackay-Mackay. He is associated with the Cavalla River Co., Limited. This appears to be a strange mixture of a commercial, educational, and philanthropical character; always, however, primarily exploitative. Before going to Liberia in connection with his duties with this company, Major R. Mackay-Mackay traveled in the United States; arrived in Liberia, he gives the impression that the State Department of the United States is behind his enterprise, and that Booker T. Washington is deeply interested in its success. He throws the responsibility for all the past upon those “higher up”; it seems that personally he always loved Liberia and was her friend. When he passed through Monrovia on his way down to the Cavalla, he simply showered advice and benevolence along his path. An interview with him was published in _The Guide_. He says: “Liberia can not go on living on loans as in the past. Why should she be dependent on gold from outside when she has a hundredfold within her own borders, at the very door? Standing at the street corners, discussing politics, or waiting for dollar-bills to grow and fall from the trees around, will not advance the welfare of the Republic, nor attract the genuine sympathy and co-operation from the outside world. Work! work! work! that is what Liberia needs; and there are those who are prepared to create the opportunity, provided all make up their minds to work as they should. Is manual labor considered a disgrace in other countries? Why should it be in Liberia?”

Also: “I am here on a visit and to let Liberia know that she has more friends than she counts on; and they will increase in proportion to her efforts to help herself. I for my part will do all I can in my humble way to preach ‘Liberia regenerated’ to all, and help where I can without treading on ground other than within my rights as a visitor and friend.” Most touching, however, is this: “Yes” (there are signs of awakening), “since my return I see the most wonderful strides made in many directions, and a keen desire in the citizens of the wider ideas to aid in their country’s advancement. May it continue. In every season is some victory won. Let us bury the past with all its errors, sadness, and regrets.”

It is sad indeed that humanity is not prone to bury the past; even such expressions of affection may be received unkindly. What could be more dreadful, when a man oozes philanthropy from every pore, than to have such things said of him as the following which appeared about that time in Green’s paper, _The African League_?

“Major R. Mackay-Mackay, whose name stinks in the nostrils of all country-loving Liberians, because of his conduct when in command of our frontier force, is back in Liberia again, this time at the head of a company whose procedure thus far has not inspired the strongest confidence. More is known of this intimacy than the men themselves may think. The last steamer brought intelligence that an agent of Major Cadell’s company, the Cavalla River Co., Limited, is now in Sierra Leone, with 630 natives of that colony who are to be brought to Cape Palmas soon to serve this company. It is very strange that this company finds it necessary to employ natives from the colony of Sierra Leone, when in Liberia is the largest market for unskilled laborers in Western Africa, supplying, as it does, most, if not all, of that class of labor employed in the various enterprises in British, French, and German African colonies. We hope this is no new coup.”

The Frontier Force has continued in its development. The present plans involve the organization of a battalion of 600 men under a major; each of the two companies of 300 soldiers will be under a captain; and each company will have three Liberian lieutenants; the three chief officers will be Americans loaned to the Liberian Government by the United States. The general duties of the force will be those of a constabulary for the maintenance of law and order throughout the Republic and for the prevention and the detection of crime; it will also be used as a customs guard in such numbers and at such places as may be agreed upon by the Secretary of War and the general receiver of customs. Its estimated cost for the year 1913 was $86,159.60. The American officers arrived in the Republic in the spring of 1912. They were Major Ballard and Captains Brown and Newton. In entering upon their new duties of developing and organizing the Frontier Force, they had the great advantage of the advice and interest of Major Charles Young of the United States Army, who was in Monrovia as military attaché of our legation. We had ample opportunity of investigating this Frontier Force. It is composed for the most part of natives fresh from the interior; two hundred of them passed through our hands for examination and measurement; they were fine fellows, well built and in good physical condition; few of them understood English, and among them several languages were represented; they were proud of their position and anxious to improve; they were easily led, particularly by officers who treated them with kindness; we saw two parties of these soldiers started off for service; they made a good appearance. While we were there--as is true indeed much of the time--their payments were behind, and they were expressing some dissatisfaction, but were easily controlled; there is, however, always a danger of mutiny when the Government is behind in meeting its obligations to them; I quote from one who was in Monrovia October 10, 1911; he says: “I heard quite an altercation in the street. Upon going out I saw about 120 men moving through the street in a disorderly mass toward the office of the Secretary of War. Upon arriving at the office, there was quite a demonstration and matters looked serious. After a great deal of persuasion on the part of the Secretary and the one officer from the camp, the men moved away in the direction of Camp Johnson. I was informed that the men were demanding their pay.” There is also great danger of the Frontier Force, when marching through the interior, looting and destroying the fields and villages through which they pass; this is so much in the nature of ordinary native warfare that it must be particularly guarded against; the Frontier Force, however, is necessary, and it seems to be making a promising development.

Compare, you say, the present with the past. Where are the schooners
and cutters that were used to be built right here in Liberia, when
nearly every responsible man had his own? Where are the tons of sugar
that used to be shipped to foreign parts by our fathers, and the
barrels of molasses, and the tons of camwood? Where are the financial
men of the country that looked upon the holding of public offices
almost beneath them, who had to be begged to fill the offices? Where
are those who when they (had) made their farms lived off the farms?
Oh, where are the honest, upright and loyal government officials of
1847? You answer for yourselves. Where are the great Liberian
merchants of Monrovia, Grand Bassa, Sinoe, and Cape Palmas? Gone!--S.
D. FERGUSON, JR.

TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSPORTATION.

Liberia’s very existence depends upon her development of trade. If the Liberians push forward in this direction, her future may be assured. If, however, she neglects it, her neighbors, France and England, can not be expected to permit their opportunity to pass. The area of the Black Republic is far too rich by nature to be overlooked; if its legitimate owners fail to develop it, others will do so.

The past of Liberia was built on trade in wild produce; its immediate prosperity must depend upon the same source of wealth. For the moment the trade of Liberia must be in such things as palm nuts, piassava, and rubber.

The oil palm has been the most important source of wealth Liberia has. The tree produces great quantities of nuts, growing in large clusters, from which an oil is easily extracted, which finds enormous use in soap- and candle-making. This oil is derived from the stringy, fleshy coating of the nut; the nuts are thrown into pits dug in the ground, where they are allowed to ferment for some time; the mass of fermented nuts is then squeezed in a sort of press run by hand, and the oil is extracted. This is the primitive, native style of production. The oil may also be produced by boiling and pounding the nuts and then stone-boiling the mass in wooden troughs, the oil being skimmed off from the surface of the water. In Liberia palm oil is chiefly produced in the counties of Bassa and Sinoe. Liberian oil is not the best quality on the market, as carelessness in preparation leaves considerable dirt and impurities in it; it has, however, brought good prices--up to £24.10.0 a ton. Inside the palm nut is a hard kernel which remains after the oil has been extracted; this kernel at first was wasted; to-day it is known to yield a finer oil than the pulp; the idea of exporting palm nut kernels originated with a Liberian, and the first shipment was made in 1850; to-day there is a large demand for palm kernels which sell at prices ranging from $60 to $68 per ton, the oil derived from them selling at $130 to $133 per ton.

Second, certainly, in importance, among the raw products exported from Liberia is piassava; it is the fiber of a palm--_raphia vinifera_. Large use is made of this extremely resistant fiber for brooms and brushes for street sweeping and the like; its use, too, was suggested by a Liberian in 1889; it was first exported in 1890 and for a time brought the astonishingly high price of from $300 to $350 per ton; as the fiber was easy to prepare and the trees were plentiful, a rapid development took place; Liberia was for a long time the only source of supply; carelessness ensued in the preparation of the fiber, the demand lessened and the price dropped; it went down to £10 per ton; at present the price is somewhat better and is stationary at £20. Sir Harry Johnston, from whom these details are borrowed, says that it is difficult to judge the quality of raphia, that it shrinks in weight, and that trade in it is somewhat speculative and uncertain; still, piassava fiber occupies an important position in the Liberian trade to-day.

Africa appears to be the continent which presents the greatest number of rubber-yielding plants; in Liberia the precious exudation is obtained from some sixteen different kinds of trees and vines, varying as to the quality and character of rubber yielded. The rubber of Liberia is not considered of the highest class, but it is of good grade; the natives of the interior are skilled in its collection; there is no doubt that great quantities of wild rubber are still to be obtained within the limits of the Republic and experiments in rubber-planting have already been made with promise.

Sir Harry Johnston gives a long list of other natural products which have been exported from Liberia at one time or another in varying quantities. There was a time when camwood found a ready market and formed perhaps the most important element in Liberian trade--of course with the invention of other dye-stuffs, the use of camwood, annatto, etc., has practically ceased; the name “Grain Coast” or “Pepper Coast” was long given to this country on account of the malagueta pepper which was exported in great quantities--this, too, has ceased to be a product of practical importance; kola nuts are to some degree exported from Liberia, and with the ever-increasing use of the kola in America and European countries, trade along this line should develop; ivory has always been among the export products of Liberia, though it has never had great significance; vegetable ivory nuts are produced here and to some extent form an article of trade--the demand for them in button-making is large and increasing, and exportation of them may reasonably be developed; hides and oil-yielding seeds complete the list of actual native export products. Sir Harry Johnston calls attention to the fact that the country is rich in ebony, mahogany, and other fine woods, in copal and other gums, in ground nuts, fruits, and minerals; these, however, have never been actual materials for export; all are valuable, however, and trade in them might be developed.

All of these raw products of natural production are valuable, but that they shall form an element in trade depends upon the natives. These things all come from the forests of the interior; if they are to be traded to the outside world, they must be collected and transported by the people within whose territory they are found; this dependence is an uncertain thing. The natives have few needs; in their little towns they take life easily; they have no sentimental interest in the development of trade as such nor in the upbuilding of the country; they care comparatively little for the returns of trade; they will work when necessary, but only as they please; when they need some money for buying wives, they will prepare some piassava fiber or dig a pit, ferment some nuts, and squeeze some oil. When they have enough for the immediate and pressing necessity, work stops, and with it the supply of oil or fiber or whatever they may have seen fit to produce. More than this, the native is little concerned about the quality of his production. So long as he can sell it and raise the resources that he needs, he does not care whether the oil is clean, whether the piassava fiber is of good quality, or whether the rubber contains dirt and stones. Impurity, however, of products is a very serious matter to the outside world; a district which neglects quality loses trade. Liberian oil, fiber, rubber, all are at a disadvantage at present through the carelessness of the producers.

It must, then, be the policy of the Liberian Government to encourage, by every legitimate means within its power, the increase of the production of the natural resources. Nor is the simple question of production the whole difficulty. Transportation is quite as important. The product, no matter how good or how precious, has no value as long as it remains in the bush. There are different methods of dealing with this matter of getting the natural products down to the coast settlements. The simplest and most natural is to let the native bring it out--but the natives are as little inclined to travel and carry as they are to produce; they will fetch down their product when they feel inclined--but the demand from without is constant. Liberians may go into the bush to bring out the products; there are always little traders who divide their time between the settlements and the interior; they travel in, sit down for several days at native towns, trade with the natives for whatever stuff they have on hand, then have it carried out; such traders are usually independent men of small means who are trading on their own account. It is not uncommon for the large trading-houses to hire agents,--Liberians or natives,--and send them into the interior to buy up and bring down products. Another method--which, in the long run, will prove no doubt the most satisfactory,--is to establish here and there in the interior permanent trading stations, supplied with a fair stock of goods, to be traded with the natives against their raw products--trading stations of this kind are already established by the Monrovia Rubber Company and by various of the great trading-houses.

In some way or other the Government should adopt a method of encouraging the natives of the interior to gather, to properly prepare, and to bring in raw produce; a definite scheme of practical education and encouragement must be devised.