Chapter XI (1)

1833–1836.

MR. BUCHANAN RETURNS HOME—GREETING FROM GENERAL JACKSON—ELECTED TO THE
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—STATE OF PARTIES—THE GREAT WHIG LEADERS
IN THE SENATE—PERIL OF A WAR WITH FRANCE.

Mr. Buchanan was greeted on his arrival at his home in Lancaster by the following letter from General Jackson:

[GENERAL JACKSON TO MR. BUCHANAN.]

WASHINGTON, Nov. 18, 1833.

MY DEAR SIR:—

I have received your note by Mr. John Van Buren, and am delighted to hear that you have reached your country in good health, after so long an absence in her service. I anticipate much pleasure from the personal interview, which you have promised me I shall have in the course of this week, but do not desire to hasten you more than your convenience, or the wishes of your friends will permit. I leave until then all else that I would say, except my congratulation on your safe arrival, which I beg you to accept with my best wishes for your health and happiness.

Very sincerely and respectfully,

ANDREW JACKSON.

The winter of 1833–34 appears to have been passed in private occupations which have left no traces. But in the latter part of the summer of 1834, Mr. Buchanan was appointed one of the commissioners on the part of the State of Pennsylvania, to arrange with commissioners of the State of New Jersey, concerning the use of the waters of the Delaware. It was not entirely convenient for him to accept this appointment; but as it was to be a public service without any pecuniary compensation, he felt that he had no alternative. How long he was occupied about it, I have not discovered. In the following December, the election of a Senator of the United States, to succeed Mr. Wilkins, who had been appointed minister to Russia, was to be made by the Legislature of Pennsylvania. Mr. Buchanan was chosen on the 6th of December (1834), upon the fourth balloting; his principal competitors being Joel B. Sutherland, James Clarke, and Amos Ellmaker. He was of course elected by the Democratic members of the Legislature, and as a supporter of the administration of President Jackson.[47]

The correspondence which took place between him and those who elected him, is of interest now, chiefly because it discloses that he held to what has been called the doctrine of instruction; that is to say, the right of a State Legislature to direct the vote of a Senator of the State in Congress, and the duty of the Senator to obey the direction.

[TO THE HON. JAMES BUCHANAN.]

HARRISBURG, Dec. 8, 1834.

DEAR SIR:—

Ere this reaches you, doubtless you will have been notified of your election to the Senate of the United States, by the Legislative body of this State to which we have the honor to belong. And it is with unfeigned gratification that we individually can claim a participation in the confidence which has on this occasion been reposed in your talents and integrity. Nor is that gratification by any means lessened, from the consideration that you are the personal as well as the political friend of both our State and National Executives, who have done so much within their respective spheres to exalt the character and promote the interests of our State and Nation. And above all, who, in their official relations, so nobly stood forth in the rescue of our common country from the grasp of a corrupt moneyed monopoly, as reckless as it was aristocratical, and as merciless as it was powerful. And it is with no less pride than pleasure that we shall look to you, in your new and high relations, as the champion of the measures projected by our venerable President, Andrew Jackson, and seconded by our worthy Executive, George Wolf.

Respectfully your friends and obedient servants,

(Signed by) JACOB KERN,

and Seventy other Members.

The following communication, in reply, was laid before the members, at a meeting held in the Capitol on the 7th instant, by Col. Jacob Kern, Speaker of the Senate:

[TO JACOB KERN, ESQ., AND OTHERS, MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE OF
PENNSYLVANIA.]

WASHINGTON, Dec. 22, 1834.

GENTLEMEN:—

I want language to express my feelings on the perusal of your kind letter, which was delivered to me at the moment I was about to leave Harrisburg. Elevated by your free and unsolicited suffrages to the only public station I desire to occupy, it shall be my constant endeavor to justify, by my conduct, the generous confidence which you have thus reposed. The interest and the honor of Pennsylvania, so far as you have committed them to my hands, shall never be wilfully abandoned or betrayed.

Although you have not asked me for any pledge or promise relating to my course in the Senate, yet I am sensible that many of you desire I should express my opinion publicly in regard to the right of legislative instruction. I shall do so with the utmost frankness. On this question I have not, and never have had, any serious difficulties. The right results from the very nature of our institutions. The will of the people, when fully and fairly expressed, ought to be obeyed by all their _political agents_. This is the very nature and essence of a representative democracy.

Without entering into an argument upon the general question, which would be altogether misplaced upon the present occasion, it may not be improper to observe that the principle applies with redoubled force to Senators in Congress. They represent the sovereign States, who are the parties to that constitutional compact which called the federal union into existence. In the Senate, these States are represented as distinct communities, each entitled to the same number of votes, without regard to their population. In that body they are all equal, as they were before the adoption of the federal constitution. Here, emphatically, if any where, the voice of the States ought to be heard, and ought to be obeyed. Shall it then be said that a Senator possesses the constitutional right to violate the express instructions of the sovereign State which he represents, and wield the power and the vote which have been conferred upon him for the benefit of his constituents in a manner which they have solemnly declared to be ruinous to their dearest interests, or dangerous to their liberties! The bare statement of the proposition carries conviction to my mind. All, or nearly all the State Legislatures, have long been in the practice of instructing their Senators, and this affords the strongest evidence of the principle upon which the custom is founded.

It has been objected, that the right of instruction may destroy the tenure of the Senatorial office, and render it subject to all the political fluctuations in the several States. But the Senator is only bound to obey: he is not called upon to resign. And although there may be circumstances in which a man of honor might feel himself constrained to retire from the public service rather than give the vote of his State against his own convictions, yet these cases must, from their nature, be of rare occurrence.

Besides, this objection implies an entire want of confidence in the State legislatures. It supposes that they may become the instruments of faction for the purpose of harassing Senators, and compelling them to resign. In fact, it results in the principle that the people are incapable of managing their own concerns, and are, therefore, under the necessity of conferring an irresponsible political power upon one of their own number, to save them from themselves. From the nature of our institutions, we must repose such a degree of confidence in the State legislatures as to presume that they will not abuse the power with which they have been intrusted.

If it should ever clearly appear, in any case, that the immediate representatives of the people have not obeyed their will in voting instructions, this might present an exception to the general rule. Such an occurrence, however, though possible, is highly improbable. It is not to be presumed that State legislatures will exercise this important power, unless upon grave and solemn occasions, after mature deliberation and a thorough knowledge of the public will.

I have thus expressed my opinion freely upon this important question, though I am well aware it differs from that of some of the ablest and best men of our country.[48]

In relation to the course which I intend to pursue in the Senate, I shall say but little. My conduct must speak for itself. I feel sensible that in point of ability I shall disappoint the partial expectations of my friends. To become distinguished in that body, the ablest in the world in proportion to its numbers, requires a stretch of intellect and a range of political knowledge and experience, which I do not pretend to possess. Whilst, therefore, I cannot become “the champion of the measures projected by our venerable President,” I shall, both from principle and inclination, give them an honest and consistent support.

Before concluding this letter, permit me to state my entire concurrence in the sentiments you have expressed concerning “our worthy executive, George Wolf.” In the darkest hour of pressure and of panic during the last winter, when the internal improvements of the State were, to all appearance, about to be arrested, he stood unmoved, and met the storm in a manner which proved him to be the able, faithful, and fearless representative of Pennsylvania Democracy. His message contributed much to dispel the gloom which, for a time, seemed to have settled on our country. It was the bright dawn of that glorious day of prosperity which we have since enjoyed.

With sentiments of the most profound gratitude and respect, I remain

Your obedient servant,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

As I am now to trace a long senatorial career, which began at a period when the Senate of the United States contained men of the very highest ability and renown, it is proper to give a brief account of the state of parties and the questions of the time, and to fix Mr. Buchanan’s position among the statesmen whom he had to meet. When he took his seat in the Senate, on the 15th of December, 1834, General Jackson was in his second term of office, which began on the 4th of March, 1833. He had received a very large majority of the electoral votes—seventy-four more than were necessary to a choice. Mr. Van Buren had become Vice-President by a majority of electoral votes less than General Jackson’s, by the number of thirty. He was, of course, in the chair of the Senate. In Congress and throughout the country, the supporters of the administration had become known as the Democratic party, the old term of “Republicans,” and the more recent one of “Jackson men,” being generally dropped.[49] The opposition had become classified and consolidated under the name of the Whig party, a term substituted for that of “National Republicans.” Their leader and candidate in the presidential election of 1832 was Mr. Clay.[50] There was a third party, known as the “Anti-Masons,” who gave the seven electoral votes of Vermont to Mr. Wirt, as their candidate for the Presidency, and to Amos Ellmaker of Pennsylvania as their candidate for the Vice-Presidency.

Notwithstanding General Jackson’s great popularity and influence throughout the country, a large majority of the Senate were opposed to his administration and his measures. This opposition became concentrated and intensified by the President’s removal of the public deposits from the Bank of the United States, into certain selected State banks. A resolution, strongly condemning this act, had been carried in the Senate, by twenty-eight yeas against eighteen nays, on the 28th of March, 1834, nine months before Mr. Buchanan entered the Senate. This vote may therefore be regarded as a general index of the relative strength of parties in that body when Mr. Buchanan became a member of it. How this great opposition majority became so changed three years afterward, that the friends of General Jackson were able to expunge this resolution from the records of the Senate, will appear hereafter. The leading Senators of the opposition at the commencement of the session, in December, 1834, and distinctly classified as Whigs, were Mr. Clay, Mr. Webster, Mr. Clayton of Delaware, Mr. Ewing of Ohio, and Mr. Frelinghuysen and Mr. Southard of New Jersey.

The most important Democratic or administration Senators were, Messrs. Wright of New York, Benton of Missouri, and Mr. King of Alabama. Calhoun stood apart from both the political parties. He had been chosen Vice-President in 1828 by the same party which then elected General Jackson for the first time, and he then had the same electoral votes, with the exception of seven of the votes of Georgia. He was consequently in the Chair of the Senate in 1830, when the great debate took place between Mr. Webster and Colonel Hayne on the subject of nullification. In 1833, when the South Carolina doctrine of nullification culminated in a threatened resistance to collection of the Federal revenue within her borders, and made it necessary for General Jackson to issue his celebrated proclamation, Mr. Calhoun was elected as a senator in Congress from South Carolina, and he determined to resign the Vice-Presidency. In December, 1832, he took his seat in the Senate. The breach between him and the President, which was caused by the attitude of the latter towards the “Nullifiers,” was understood to be widened by the probability that Mr. Van Buren would be the Democratic candidate for the Presidency, to succeed General Jackson in 1837, and by the well-known wish of the latter that Mr. Van Buren should become his successor. The breach between Mr. Calhoun and the President became still farther widened, when the State of South Carolina adopted her famous ordinance for preventing the collection of the Federal revenue within her limits. From General Jackson’s known firmness of character and tendency to severe measures, Mr. Calhoun found himself in some personal danger. Then followed Mr. Clay’s interposition, by means of his compromise tariff, which was designed to ward off an actual collision between the federal executive and the nullifying leaders of South Carolina. Mr. Calhoun was thus saved from personal humiliation, and perhaps from some personal peril. But no real reconciliation took place between him and General Jackson, and he remained in an isolated position in the Senate, a great and powerful debater, vindicating with singular ability, when a proper occasion offered, his peculiar views of the nature of the Constitution, always discharging his duties as a senator with entire purity, but never acting upon any measure as a member of either of the political parties into which the Senate was divided.

Taking the entire composition of the Senate at that period, with the opposing forces of the Democratic and the Whig parties, and with Mr. Calhoun’s intermediate position, there has never been a period in the history of that body, when there was more real power of debate displayed, or when public measures were more thoroughly considered. If Mr. Clay, Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Webster towered above the other senators, there were not wanting men who may be said to have approached them in ability; and if Mr. Clay and Mr. Webster, on the Whig side, sometimes appeared to give to the opposition a preponderating intellectual force, it was not always a supremacy that could be said to be undisputed by their Democratic opponents, although they did for a long time control the action of the Senate. The country looked on upon these great senatorial contests with predilections which varied, of course, with the political feelings and associations of men; but the President, his measures and his policy, notwithstanding the power of the Senatorial opposition, continued to grow in the popular favor, and to receive constant proofs of the popular support. To some of the principal questions of the time I now turn. The first in which Mr. Buchanan took part, soon after he entered the Senate, related to the conduct of France.

In 1831 a convention was concluded between the United States and the government of King Louis Philippe, by which the latter bound itself to pay to the United States twenty-five millions of francs, for the liquidation of certain claims of American citizens against France, and to be distributed to the claimants by the American Government, as it should determine. The Government of the United States, on its part, engaged to pay to the French government one million five hundred thousand francs, to liquidate the claims, urged by the French government for its citizens, on the United States, and to be distributed by the French government, as it should determine. Each party bound itself to pay its stipulated sum in six annual instalments: those payable by the United States to be deducted from the larger sums payable by France. The first French instalment, $4,166,666.66, became due at the expiration of one year next following the exchange of ratifications. The exchange of ratifications took place February 2d, 1832, and consequently the first French instalment became due on the 3d of February, 1833. A bill of exchange was drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury on the French Minister of Finance, for the amount of the instalment, and sold to the Bank of the United States. Payment was refused at the French Treasury when the bill was presented, for the reason that the Legislative Chambers had made no appropriation to meet the instalment. We have seen that when Mr. Buchanan was in Paris, in the summer of 1833 he held conversations on this matter with the Duc de Broglie and Count Pozzo di Borgo; from which it appears that moderate and rational persons in France then believed that the Chambers would at the next session make the necessary appropriation. In December, 1833, President Jackson, in his annual message to Congress, adverted to this subject, and said that he had despatched an envoy to the French government to attend to it, and that he had received from that government assurances that at the next meeting of the Chambers it would be brought forward and satisfactorily disposed of. He added that if he should be disappointed in this hope, the subject would be again brought before Congress, “in such manner as the occasion might require.” The opposition in France regarded this as a menace. The subject was brought before the Chambers several times, but in April, 1834, the appropriation necessary to carry the treaty into effect was refused. The king’s government then sent a national vessel to this country, bearing the king’s assurance that the Chambers should be called together, after the election of new members, as soon as the charter would permit, and that the influence of the executive should be exerted to procure the necessary appropriation, in time to be communicated to the President before the assembling of Congress in December, 1834. The Chambers met on the 31st of July, but this matter was not acted upon, and they were prorogued to the 29th of December. New assurances were given by the French government that at the ensuing session the appropriation should be pressed. In his annual message of December, 1834, the President made severe comments on the course of all branches of the French government, and recommended a law authorizing reprisals on French property, in case the appropriation should not be made at the ensuing session of the Chambers. This was the attitude of the matter when Mr. Buchanan entered the Senate.[51]

The Senate’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, at the head of which was Mr. Clay, had made a report against the adoption of the President’s recommendation. On the 14th of January, (1835) on a resolution introduced by Mr. Cuthbert of Georgia, Mr. Buchanan took occasion to say:

IN SENATE, January 14, 1835.

France had, before the close of the last session of Congress, declared that it was the unanimous determination of the king’s government to appear before the new legislature with its treaty and its bill in hand, and that its intention was to do all that the charter allowed to hasten, as much as possible, the period of the new presentation of the rejected law. The President rested satisfied with this assurance, and, on the faith of it, did not present the subject to Congress. How has France redeemed this pledge? Has that government hastened, as much as possible, the presentation of the rejected law? At the first meeting of the new legislature the law was not presented; and in the face of this engagement, the Chambers were prorogued, not to meet in the autumn, but on the 29th of December, the very latest day which custom had sanctioned. If this assurance had any meaning at all, it was that the Chambers should be convened at least in sufficient time to communicate to the President information that they had assembled, before the meeting of Congress. The President, at the date of the message, was not aware that the Chambers would assemble on the first of the month. No such information had been communicated to him. It now appears that they did assemble on that day. And the only reason that he should vote for the resolution was, that he was willing to wait until the result of their deliberations could be known.

What effect this circumstance might have had on the President’s mind, had he known of its existence, he was not prepared to say. He had no information to give on that subject.

There is a point, sir, said Mr. Buchanan, in the intercourse between nations, at which diplomacy must end, and a nation must either consent to abandon her rights, or assert them by force. After having negotiated for a quarter of a century to obtain a treaty to redress the wrongs of our injured citizens, and after the French Chamber has once deliberately rejected that treaty, will not this point have been reached, should the Chamber again refuse to make the appropriation? If this be so, is it not right, is it not fair, to present the alternative to France? Would she not have just cause to complain if we should not adopt this very course? To inform her frankly and freely that we have arrived at this point, I am solemnly convinced, is the best diplomacy to which we can resort to obtain redress for the wrongs of the injured claimants. France will then have the alternative fairly presented; and it will be for her to decide whether she will involve herself in war with her ancient ally, rather than pay those claims which the Executive branch of her Government have determined to be just by a solemn treaty. Such an attitude on the part of America will do more for the execution of the treaty than any temporizing measures of policy which we can adopt. I never was more clearly impressed with the truth of any proposition.

France, from the language of the President, will have no right to consider this a menace. It is no more than to say, diplomacy has ended, and the treaty must be executed, or we shall, however reluctantly, be compelled to take redress into our own hands. France is a brave and a chivalrous nation; her whole history proves that she is not to be intimidated, even by Europe in arms; but she is wise as well as warlike. To inform her that our rights must be asserted, is to place her in the serious and solemn position of deciding whether she will resist the payment of a just debt by force. Whenever she is convinced that this result is inevitable, the money will be paid; and although I hope I may be mistaken, I believe there will be no payment until she knows we shall assume this attitude. France has never appeared to regard the question in this serious light.

It has been asked what the American Congress would do placed in similar circumstances. Would they appropriate money with a menace impending over their heads? I answer, no, never. But I should never consider it a menace, if, after refusing to vote an appropriation to carry a treaty into effect, a foreign government in the spirit of candor, in language mild and courteous, such as that used by the President, were to inform us they could not abandon their rights, and, however painful it may be, they should be compelled, by a sense of duty, to assert them by force.

After some further discussion, the resolution was so modified as to declare that it was at that time inexpedient to adopt any legislative measure in regard to the state of affairs between the United States and France. In this form the resolution was unanimously adopted.

The President’s message was received in Paris in the early part of January (1835). It was resented as a threat. The French minister at Washington was recalled, and on the 13th of January, the day before the vote in the Senate, Mr. Livingston, the minister of the United States at Paris, was informed that his passports were at his service. But a bill was introduced by the ministry in the Chambers, to make the necessary appropriation. It was passed in the latter part of April, but with an amendment making the payment conditional upon an apology from President Jackson for the language of his message of the previous December. There was little likelihood that any such apology would be made for language addressed by the President to the people of the United States through their representatives in Congress. On the contrary, in the early part of the next session (January, 1836) the world was somewhat startled by a recommendation made to Congress by the President, of partial non-intercourse with France.[52] On the 18th of January, on a motion by Mr. Clay to refer this recommendation to the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Buchanan said that he had been so much gratified with the message which had just been read, that he could not, and he thought he ought not, at this the very first moment, to refrain from expressing his entire approbation of its general tone and spirit. He had watched with intense anxiety the progress of our unfortunate controversy with France. He had hoped, sincerely hoped, that the explanations which had been made by Mr. Livingston, and officially approved by the President of the United States, would have proved satisfactory to the French government. In this he had found his hopes to be vain. After this effort had failed, he felt a degree of confidence, almost amounting to moral assurance, that the last message to Congress would have been hailed by France, as it was by the American people, as the olive branch which would have restored amity and good understanding between us and our ancient ally. Even in this, he feared, he was again doomed to be disappointed. The government of France, unless they change their determination, will not consider this message as sufficient. We have the terms clearly prescribed by the Duke de Broglie, upon which, and upon which alone, the French government will consent to comply with the treaty, and to pay the five millions of dollars to our injured fellow-citizens. Speculation is now at an end. The clouds and darkness which have hung over this question have vanished. It is now made clear as a sunbeam. The money will not be paid, says the organ of the French government, unless the Government of the United States shall address its claim officially in writing to France, accompanied by what appeared to him, and he believed would appear to the whole American people, without distinction of party, to be a degrading apology. The striking peculiarity of the case, the one which he would undertake to say distinguished it from any other case which had arisen in modern times, in the intercourse between independent nations, was, that the very terms of this apology were dictated to the American Government by the French Secretary of Foreign Affairs. One of these terms was, that it had never entered into the intention (_pensée_), the thought of this Government, to call in question the good faith of the government of France.

But the French Government proceed still further. Upon the refusal to make this apology, which they ought to have known would never be made—could never be made—they are not content to leave question where it then was. They have given us notice in advance that they will consider our refusal to make this degrading apology an evidence that the misunderstanding did not proceed on our part from mere error and mistake.

In addition to all this, the last note of the Duke de Broglie to Mr. Barton declares that the Government of the United States knows that henceforward the execution of the treaty must depend upon itself. They thus leave us to decide whether we shall make the apology in the prescribed terms, or abandon our claim to the fulfillment of the treaty.

He would not allow himself to express the feelings which were excited in his mind upon hearing these letters of the Duke de Broglie read. Most sincerely, most ardently, did he hope that the French government, when this message reached them, if not before, might reconsider their determination, and that all our difficulties might yet pass away. But their language is now clear, specific, incapable of ambiguity or doubt. It would, then, become our duty calmly, but firmly, to take such a stand as the interests and the honor of the country may require.

Mr. B. had already said much more than he intended when he rose. He would, however, make another remark before he took his seat. He felt a proper degree of confidence, he might add a great degree of confidence, in the President of the United States. He knew him to be honest and firm, and faithful to his country; prompt to resent its injuries and avenge its wrongs. He confessed he had anticipated a message of a stronger character. He had supposed that a general non-intercourse with France would, at least, have been recommended. But the recommendation was confined to the mere refusal to admit French ships or French productions to enter our ports. It left France free to receive her supplies of cotton from the United States, without which the manufacturers of that country could not exist. This was wise, it was prudent; it left to France to judge for herself if this unnatural contest must still continue, whether she would close her ports against our vessels and our productions.

In the spring of 1832 (Mr. B. did not recollect precisely the time) Congress passed an act to carry into effect our part of the treaty. Under this treaty, the wines of France had ever since been admitted into the United States upon the favorable terms therein stipulated. Her silks were imported free of duty, in contradistinction to those which came from beyond the Cape of Good Hope. She had for years been enjoying these privileges. Nothing milder, then, could possibly be recommended than to withdraw these advantages from her, and to exclude her vessels and her productions from our ports.

Mr. Buchanan said that when he made the observations which had called forth the remarks of the Senator from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun) he had believed the message to be the harbinger of peace, and not of war. This was still his opinion. In this respect he differed entirely from the gentleman. Under this impression, he had then risen merely to remark that, considering the provocation which we had received, the tone, the spirit, and the recommendations themselves, of the message, were mild and prudent, and were well calculated to make an impression upon France, and to render her sensible of her injustice.

It had been far from his intention to excite a general debate on the French question, and he would not be drawn into it now by the remarks of the Senator from South Carolina. He must, however, be permitted to say, he was sorry, very sorry, that the gentleman had proclaimed that, if war should come, we are the authors of that war, and it would be the fault, not of the French, but of the American Government. Such a declaration, proceeding from such a source, from a voice so powerful and so potent, would be heard on the other side of the Atlantic, and there might produce a most injurious effect. He was happy to say that this sentiment was directly at war with the opinion of our Committee on Foreign Relations, who, in their report of the last session, had expressed the decided opinion that the American Government, should it become necessary, must insist upon the execution of the treaty. It was at war with the unanimous resolution of the House of Representatives of the same session, declaring that the treaty must be maintained. He believed it was equally at war with the feelings and opinions of the American people.

Whilst he expressed his hope and his belief that this message would prove to be the olive branch of peace, still there was so much uncertainty in the event, that it now became our imperative duty to prepare for the worst. Shall we (said Mr. B.) whilst a powerful fleet is riding along our southern coast, in a menacing attitude, sit here and withhold from the President the means which are necessary to place our country in a state of defence? He trusted this would never, never be the case.

The messages and documents were then read, and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, as moved by Mr. Clay.

On the last night of the session, which terminated on the 3d-4th of March, 1835, an amendment made in the House of Representatives, to the Fortification bill, was before the Senate. It proposed:

“That the sum of three millions of dollars be and the same is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, to be expended, in whole or in part, under the direction of the President of the United States, for the military and naval service, including fortifications and ordnance and increase of the navy: Provided such expenditures shall be rendered necessary for the defence of the country, prior to the next meeting of Congress.”

The motive of this amendment was to enable the President to put the country into a more efficient state of defence, in view of the danger of a war with France. It was opposed by Mr. Webster and Mr. Clay as an unconstitutional mode of action, and also because the state of the French question did not require such action. Mr. Buchanan (on the 3d of March, 1835,) vindicated the amendment in the following manner:

Mr. Buchanan said he was astonished at the remarks which had been made by gentlemen on the subject of this appropriation. The most fearful apprehensions had been expressed, the destruction of our liberties had been predicted, if we should grant to the President three millions of dollars to defend the country, in case it should become necessary to expend it for that purpose, before the next meeting of Congress. For his part, he could realize no such dangers.

Gentlemen have said, and said truly, that the Constitution of the United States has conferred upon Congress, and Congress alone, the power of declaring war. When they go further, and state that this appropriation will enable the executive to make war upon France, without the consent of Congress, they are, in my humble judgment, entirely mistaken.

Sir, said Mr. B., what is the true nature, and what are the legitimate objects of this appropriation? Do we not know that, although the President cannot make offensive war against France, France may make war upon us; and that we may thus be involved in hostilities in spite of ourselves, before the next meeting of Congress? If the Chamber of Deputies should determine to violate the treaty, and to fix an enduring stigma upon the public faith of the French nation, is it certain that France may not proceed a step further, and strike the first blow? Mr. Livingston himself, in the correspondence which had been communicated to us by the President, has expressed serious apprehensions that this may be the result. France may consider war, eventually, to be inevitable; she may, and I trust does, believe that we have determined not to submit patiently to her violation of a solemn treaty and thus abandon the just claims of our injured citizens; and taking advantage of our unprepared condition, she may commence hostilities herself. The first blow is often half the battle between nations as well as individuals. Have we any security that such will not be her conduct? Have we any reason to believe she will wait until we are ready? Her past history forbids us to indulge too securely in any such belief. If she should adopt this course, in what a fearful condition shall we place the country, if we adjourn without making this appropriation! The Senate will observe that not a dollar of this money can be drawn from the Treasury, unless it shall become necessary for the defence of the country, prior to the next meeting of Congress.

Another circumstance which renders this appropriation indispensable is, that Congress cannot possibly be convened by the President much before their usual time of meeting. There are, I believe, nine States in this Union, who have not yet elected their representatives to the next Congress. Some of these elections will take place in April, and others not till August, and even October. We have now arrived almost at the last hour of our political existence; and shall we leave the country wholly defenceless until the meeting of the next Congress? Gentlemen have warned us of the fearful responsibility which we should incur in making this appropriation. Sir, said Mr. B., I warn them that the responsibility will be still more dreadful, should we refuse it. In that event, what will be our condition should we be attacked by France? Our sea-coast, from Georgia to Maine, will be exposed to the incursions of the enemy; our cities may be plundered and burned; the national character may be disgraced; and all this whilst we have an overflowing Treasury. When I view the consequences which may possibly flow from our refusal to make this grant, I repeat that the responsibility of withholding it may become truly dreadful. No portion of it shall rest upon my shoulders.

Our constitutional right to appropriate this money is unquestionable. Whilst I express this opinion, I am sorry that the present appropriation is not more specific in its objects. Appropriation bills ought to be passed in such a manner as to leave as little to executive discretion as possible. The purposes for which the money is to be applied ought to be clearly and distinctly stated. If there were time to do it, the bill might be improved in this respect. But, sir, this is an extraordinary crisis, and demands prompt action. We must now take it as it is, or not take it at all. There is no time left to make the changes which might be desired.

Gentlemen have contended that, under this appropriation, the President would be authorized to increase the army, and appoint as many new officers to command it as he thought proper. But this is not the case. He could not, under any just construction of this bill, raise a single new company, or appoint a single officer, not authorized by existing laws. No such power is conferred upon him by its terms. It will authorize him to expend three millions of the public money, should the contingency happen which it contemplates, for putting the vessels of war now in ordinary in a condition for actual service, and for completing those the building of which has already been authorized by Congress. The money may also be applied to the completion and repair of our fortifications, and in placing them in a state of security and defence against any attack. Should it become necessary to call out the militia under existing laws, to garrison these fortifications, or defend our coast, this money may also be expended for that purpose. There is nothing in the language of the appropriation to justify the construction that the President might raise new armies, and create new officers to command them.

It is my own impression that there will be no necessity for expending any portion of this money. If there should be, however: and it is the part of wisdom to provide against such a contingency; let the responsibility rest upon those who refuse the appropriation. The country will be left defenceless, and the very knowledge of this circumstance may invite an attack.

The entire Fortification Bill failed to be passed at this session, in consequence of the disagreement between the two houses in regard to this three million appropriation. At the next session, which began in December, 1835, Colonel Benton of Missouri introduced in the Senate certain resolutions for setting apart so much of the surplus revenue as might be necessary for the defence and permanent security of the country. On the 1st and 2d of February, 1836, Mr. Buchanan addressed the Senate on these resolutions as follows:

Mr. PRESIDENT: I am much better pleased with the first resolution offered by the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Benton) since he has modified it upon the suggestion of the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy). When individuals have more money than they know how to expend, they often squander it foolishly. The remark applies, perhaps, with still greater force to nations. When our Treasury is overflowing, Congress, who are but mere trustees for the people, ought to be especially on their guard against wasteful expenditures of the public money. The surplus can be applied to some good and useful purpose. I am willing to grant all that may be necessary for the public defence but no more. I am therefore pleased that the resolution has assumed its present form.

The true question involved in this discussion is, on whom ought the responsibility to rest for having adjourned on the 3d of March last without providing for the defence of the country. There can be no doubt a fearful responsibility rests somewhere. For my own part, I should have been willing to leave the decision of this question to our constituents. I am a man of peace; and dislike the crimination and recrimination which this discussion must necessarily produce. But it is vain to regret what cannot now be avoided. The friends of the administration have been attacked; and we must now defend ourselves. I deem it necessary, therefore, to state the reasons why I voted, on the 3d of March last, in favor of the appropriation of three millions for the defence of the country, and why I glory in that vote.

The language used by Senators in reference to this appropriation has been very strong. It has been denounced as a violation of the Constitution. It has been declared to be such a measure as would not have received the support of the minority, had they believed it could prevail, and they would be held responsible for it. It has been stigmatized as most unusual—most astonishing—most surprising. And finally, to cap the climax, it has been proclaimed that the passage of such an appropriation would be virtually to create a dictator, and to surrender the power of the purse and the sword into the hands of the President.

I voted for that appropriation under the highest convictions of public duty, and I now intend to defend my vote against all these charges.

In examining the circumstances which not only justified this appropriation, but rendered it absolutely necessary, I am forced into the discussion of the French question. We have been told, that if we should go to war with France, we are the authors of that war. The Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Southard), has declared that it will be produced by the boastful vanity of one man, the petulance of another, and the fitful violence of a third. It would not be difficult to conjecture who are the individuals to whom the Senator alludes.

He has also informed us, that in the event of such a war, the guilt which must rest somewhere will be tremendous.

Now, sir, I shall undertake to prove, that scarcely an example exists in history of a powerful and independent nation having suffered such wrongs and indignities as we have done from France, with so much patience and forbearance. If France should now resort to arms,—if our defenceless seacoast should be plundered,—if the blood of our citizens should be shed,—the responsibility of the Senate, to use the language of the gentleman, will be tremendous. I shall not follow the example of the Senator, and say, their guilt,—because that would be to attribute to them an evil intention, which I believe did not exist.

In discussing this subject, I shall first present to the view of the Senate the precise attitude of the two nations towards each other, when the appropriation of three millions was refused, and then examine the reasons which have been urged to justify this refusal. After having done so, I shall exhibit our relations with France as they exist at the present moment, for the purpose of proving that we ought now to adopt the resolutions of the gentleman from Missouri, and grant all necessary appropriations for the defence of the country.

In discussing this subject, it is not my intention to follow the fortification bill either into the chamber of the committee of conference, or into the hall of the House of Representatives. It is not my purpose to explain the confusion which then existed, and which always must exist after midnight, on the last evening of the session. I shall contend that the Senate ought to have voted the three millions; that the fortification bill ought to have passed the Senate with this amendment; and that, therefore, the Senate is responsible not only for the loss of this appropriation, but for that of the entire bill.

What then was the attitude in which we stood towards France at the moment when the Senate rejected this appropriation for the defence of the country? What, at that moment, was known, or ought to have been known, in regard to this question by every Senator on this floor?

The justice of our claims upon France are now admitted by all mankind. Our generosity was equal to their justice. When she was crushed in the dust by Europe in arms—when her cities were garrisoned by a foreign foe—when her independence was trampled under foot, we refused to urge our claims. This was due to our ancient ally. It was due to our grateful remembrance of the days of other years. The testimony of Lafayette conclusively establishes this fact. In the Chamber of Deputies, on 13th June, 1833, he declared that we had refused to unite with the enemies of France in urging our claims in 1814 and 1815; and that, if we had done so, these claims would then have been settled. This circumstance will constitute one of the brightest pages of our history.

Was the sum secured to our injured fellow-citizens by the treaty of the 4th July, 1831, more than they had a right to demand? Let the report of our Committee on Foreign Relations, at the last session, answer this question. They concur entirely with the President, in the statement he had made in his message, that it was absolutely certain the indemnity fell far short of the actual amount of our just claims, independently of damages and interest for the detention; and that it was well known at the time that in this respect, the settlement involved a sacrifice. But there is now no longer room for any conjecture or doubt upon this subject. The commissioners under the treaty have closed their labors. From the very nature of their constitution, it became the interest of every claimant to reduce the other claims as much as possible, so that his own dividend might thus be increased. After a laborious and patient investigation, the claims which have been allowed by the commissioners amount to $9,352,193.47. Each claimant will receive but little more than half his principal, at the end of a quarter of a century, after losing all the interest.

Why then has this treaty remained without execution on the part of France, until this day? Our Committee on Foreign Relations, at the last session, declared their conviction that the King of France “had invariably, on all suitable occasions, manifested an anxious desire, faithfully and honestly, to fulfil the engagements contracted under his authority and in his name.” They say, that “the opposition to the execution of the treaty, and the payment of our just claims, does not proceed from the king’s government, but from a majority in the Chamber of Deputies.”

Now, sir, it is my purpose to contest this opinion, and to show, as I think I can conclusively, that it is not a just inference from the facts.

And here, to prevent all possible misconstruction, either on this side, or on the other side of the Atlantic, if by any accident my humble remarks should ever travel to such a distance, permit me to say that I am solely responsible for them myself. These opinions were in a degree formed while I was in a foreign land, and were there freely expressed upon all suitable occasions. I was then beyond the sphere of party influence and felt only as an American citizen.

Is it not then manifest, to use the language of Mr. Livingston in his note to the Count de Rigny of the 3d August, 1834, that the French government have never appreciated the importance of the subject at its just value? There are two modes in which the king could have manifested this anxious desire faithfully to fulfil the treaty. These are, by words and by actions. When a man’s words and his actions correspond, you have the highest evidence of his sincerity. Even then he may be a hypocrite in the eyes of that Being before whom the fountains of human action are unveiled. But when a man’s words and his actions are at variance,—when he promises and does not perform or even attempt to perform,—when “he speaks the word of promise to the ear and breaks it to the hope,”—the whole world will at once pronounce him insincere. If this be true in the transactions of common life, with how much more force does it apply to the intercourse between diplomatists? The deceitfulness of diplomacy has become almost a proverb. In Europe the talent of over-reaching gives a minister the glory of diplomatic skill. The French school has been distinguished in this art. To prove it, I need only mention the name of Talleyrand. The American school teaches far different lessons. On this our success has, in a great degree, depended. The skillful diplomatists of Europe are foiled by the downright honesty and directness of purpose which have characterized all our negotiations.

Even the established forms of diplomacy contain much unmeaning language, which is perfectly understood by everybody, and deceives nobody. If ministers have avowed their sincerity, and their ardent desire to execute the treaty; to deny them, on our part, would be insulting, and might lead to the most unpleasant consequences. In forming an estimate of their intentions, therefore, every wise man will regard their actions, rather than their words. By their deeds they shall be known. Let us then test the French government by this touchstone of truth.

The ratifications of the treaty of the 4th July, 1831, were exchanged at Washington, on the 2d February, 1832. When this treaty arrived in Paris, the French Chambers were in session, and they continued in session for several weeks. They did not adjourn, until the 19th of April. No time more propitious for presenting this treaty to the Chambers, could have been selected, than that very moment. Europe then was, as I believe it still is, one vast magazine of gunpowder. It was generally believed, that the Polish revolution was the spark which would produce the explosion. There was imminent danger of a continental war, in which France, to preserve her existence, would have to put forth all her energies. Russia, Prussia, and Austria, were armed and ready for the battle. It was then the clear policy of France to be at a good understanding with the United States. If it had been the ardent desire of the king’s government, to carry into effect the stipulations of the treaty, they would have presented it to the Chambers before their adjournment. This would undoubtedly have been the course pursued by any President of the United States, under similar circumstances. But the treaty was not presented.

I freely admit, that this omission, standing by itself, might be explained by the near approach of the adjournment, at the time the treaty arrived from Washington. It is one important link, however, in the chain of circumstances, which cannot be omitted.