Chapter VI (2)

The Constitution has also conferred upon the President, “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur,” the power to make treaties.

By the second section of the sixth article of this instrument it is declared, in emphatic language, that “this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”

The Constitution having conferred upon Congress the power of legislation over certain objects, and upon the President and Senate the power of making treaties with foreign nations, the next question which naturally presented itself to those who framed it was, in what manner it would be most proper that the Constitution itself, and the laws and treaties made under its authority, should be carried into execution. They have decided this question in the following strong and comprehensive language: “The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.” [Art. 3, Sec. 2.] This provision is the only one which could have been made in consistency with the character of the Government established by the Constitution. It would have been a strange anomaly had that instrument established a judiciary whose powers did not embrace all the laws and all the treaties made under its authority. The symmetry of the system would thus have been destroyed; and, in many cases, Congress would have had to depend exclusively for the execution of their own laws upon the judiciary of the States. This principle would have been at war with the spirit which pervades the whole Constitution. It was clearly the intention of its framers to create a Government which should have the power of construing and executing its own laws, without any obstruction from State authority. Accordingly, we find that the judicial power of the United States extends, in express terms, “to all cases,” in law and in equity, arising under the Constitution, the laws, and the treaties of the United States. This general language comprehends precisely what it ought to comprehend.

If the judicial powers of the United States does thus extend to “all cases” arising under the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the Union, how could this power be brought into action over such cases without a law of Congress investing the Supreme Court with the original and appellate jurisdiction embraced by the Constitution?

It was the imperious duty of Congress to make such a law, and it is equally its duty to continue it; indeed, without it, the judicial power of the United States is limited and restricted to such cases only as arise in the Federal courts, and is never brought to bear upon numerous cases, evidently within its range.

When Congress, in the year 1789, legislated upon this subject, they knew that the State courts would often be called upon, in the trial of causes, to give a construction to the Constitution, the treaties, and laws of the United States. What, then, was to be done? If the decisions of the State courts should be final, the Constitution and laws of the Union might be construed to mean one thing in one State, and another thing in another State.

All uniformity in their construction would thus be destroyed. Besides, we might, if this were the case, get into serious conflicts with foreign nations, as a treaty might receive one construction in Pennsylvania, another in Virginia, and a third in New York. Some common and uniform standard of construction was absolutely necessary.

To remedy these and other inconveniences, the first Congress of the United States, composed, in a considerable proportion, of the framers of the Constitution, passed the 25th section of the judicial act of the 24th September, 1789. It is in the following words:

“SEC. 25. _And be it further enacted_, That a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a State, in which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of such their validity; or where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the Constitution, or of a treaty or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or exemption, specially set up or claimed by either party under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute, or commission, may be re-examined and reversed, or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error, the citation being signed by the chief justice, or judge, or chancellor of the court rendering or passing the judgment or decree complained of, or by a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States in the same manner, and under the same regulations, and the writ shall have the same effect, as if the judgment or decree complained of had been rendered or passed in a circuit court; and the proceeding upon the reversal shall also be the same, except that the Supreme Court, instead of remanding the cause for a final decision, as before provided, may, at their discretion, if the cause shall have been once remanded before, proceed to a final decision of the same, and award execution. But no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of reversal in any such case as aforesaid, than such as appears on the face of the record, and immediately respects the before-mentioned questions of validity, or construction of the said Constitution, treaties, statutes, commissions, or authorities, in dispute.”

This section embraces three classes of cases. The first, those in which a State court should decide a law or treaty of the United States to be void, either because it violated the Constitution of the United States, or for any other reason. Ought there not in such cases to be an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States? Without such an appeal, the General Government might be obliged to behold its own laws and its solemn treaties annulled by the judiciary of every State in the Union, without the power of redress.

The second class of cases is of a different character. It embraces those causes in which the validity of State laws is contested, upon the principle that they violate the Constitution, the laws, or the treaties of the United States, and have, therefore, been enacted in opposition to the authority of the “supreme law of the land.” Cases of this description have been of frequent occurrence. It has often been drawn into question before the State courts, whether State laws did or did not violate the Constitution of the United States. Is it not then essential to the preservation of the General Government, that the Supreme Court of the United States should possess the power of reviewing the judgments of State courts in all cases wherein they have established the validity of a State law in opposition to the Constitution and laws of the United States?

The third class differs essentially from each of the two first. In the cases embraced by it, neither the validity of acts of Congress, nor of treaties, nor of State laws is called in question. This clause of the 25th section merely confers upon the Supreme Court the appellate jurisdiction of construing the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, when their protection has been invoked by parties to suits before the State courts, and has been denied by their decision. Without the exercise of this power, in cases originating in the State courts, the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States would be left to be finally construed and executed by a judicial power, over which Congress has no control.

This section does not interfere, either directly or indirectly, with the independence of the State courts in finally deciding all cases arising exclusively under their own constitution and laws. It leaves them in the enjoyment of every power which they possessed before the adoption of the Federal Constitution. It merely declares that, as that Constitution established a new form of Government, and consequently gave to the State courts the power of construing, in certain cases, the Constitution, the laws, and the treaties of the United States, the Supreme Court of the United States should, to this limited extent, but not beyond it, possess the power of reviewing their judgments. The section itself declares that no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of reversal, in any such case as aforesaid, than such as appears on the face of the record, and immediately respects the before-mentioned questions of validity or construction of the said Constitution, treaties, statutes, commissions, or authorities in dispute.

The minority of the committee will now proceed to advance, in a more distinct form, a few of the reasons why, in their opinion, the 25th section of this act ought not to be repealed.

And, in the first place, it ought to be the chief object of all Governments to protect individual rights. In almost every case involving a question before a State court under this section of the judiciary act, the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States are interposed for the protection of individuals. Does a citizen invoke the protection of an act of Congress upon a trial before a State court which decides that act to be unconstitutional and void, and renders judgment against him? This section secures his right of appeal from such a decision to the Supreme Court of the United States.

When a citizen, in a suit before a State court, contends that a State law, by which he is assailed, is a violation of the Constitution of the United States and therefore void (if his plea should be overruled), he may bring this question before the Supreme Court of the United States.

In like manner, when an individual claims any right before a State court under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and the decision is against his claim, he may appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.

If this section were repealed, all these important individual rights would be forfeited.

The history of our country abundantly proves that individual States are liable to high excitements and strong prejudices. The judges of these States would be more or less than men if they did not participate in the feelings of the community by which they are surrounded. Under the influence of these excitements, individuals, whose rights happen to clash with the prevailing feeling of the State, would have but a slender hope of obtaining justice before a State tribunal. There would be the power and the influence of the State sovereignty on the one side, and an individual who had made himself obnoxious to popular odium on the other. In such cases, ought the liberty or the property of a citizen, so far as he claims the same under the Constitution or laws of the United States, to be decided before a State court, without an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, on whom the construction of this very Constitution and these laws has been conferred, in all cases, by the Constitution?

The Supreme Court, considering the elevated character of its judges, and that they reside in parts of the Union remote from each other, can never be liable to local excitements and local prejudices. To that tribunal our citizens can appeal with safety and with confidence (as long as the 25th section of the judicial act shall remain upon the statute book) whenever they consider that their rights, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, have been violated by a State court. Besides, should this section be repealed, it would produce a denial of equal justice to parties drawing in question the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. In civil actions, the plaintiff might then bring his action in a Federal or State court, as he pleased, and as he thought he should be most likely to succeed; whilst the defendant would have no option, but must abide the consequences without the power of removing the cause from a State into a Federal court, except in the single case of his being sued out of the district in which he resides; and this, although he might have a conclusive defence under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Another reason for preserving this section is, that without it there would be no uniformity in the construction and administration of the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. If the courts of twenty-four distinct, sovereign States, each possess the power, in the last resort, of deciding upon the Constitution and laws of the United States, their construction may be different in every State of the Union. That act of Congress which conforms to the Constitution of the United States, and is valid in the opinion of the supreme court of Georgia, may be a direct violation of the provisions of that instrument, and be void in the judgment of the supreme court of South Carolina. A State law in Virginia might in this manner be declared constitutional, whilst the same law, if passed by the Legislature of Pennsylvania, would be void. Nay, what would be still more absurd, a law or treaty of the United States with a foreign nation, admitted to be constitutionally made, might secure rights to the citizens of one State, which would be denied to those of another. Although the same Constitution and laws govern the Union, yet the rights acquired under them would vary with every degree of latitude. Surely the framers of the Constitution would have left their work incomplete, had they established no common tribunal to decide its own construction, and that of the laws and treaties made under its authority. They are not liable to this charge, because they have given express power to the Judiciary of the Union over “all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.”

The first Congress of the United States have, to a considerable extent, carried this power into execution by the passage of the judicial act, and it contains no provision more important than the 25th section.

This section ought not to be repealed, because, in the opinion of the minority of the Committee on the Judiciary, its repeal would seriously endanger the existence of this Union. The chief evil which existed under the old confederation, and which gave birth to the present Constitution, was that the General Government could not act directly upon the people, but only by requisition upon sovereign States. The consequence was, that the States either obeyed or disobeyed these requisitions, as they thought proper. The present Constitution was intended to enable the Government of the United States to act immediately upon the people of the States, and to carry its own laws into full execution, by virtue of its own authority. If this section were repealed, the General Government would be deprived of the power, by means of its own judiciary, to give effect either to the Constitution which called it into existence, or to the laws and treaties made under its authority. It would be compelled to submit, in many important cases, to the decisions of State courts; and thus the very evil which the present Constitution was intended to prevent would be entailed upon the people. The judiciary of the States might refuse to carry into effect the laws of the United States; and without that appeal to the Supreme Court which the 25th section authorizes, these laws would thus be entirely annulled, and could not be executed without a resort to force.

This position may be illustrated by a few striking examples. Suppose the Legislature of one of the States, believing the tariff laws to be unconstitutional, should determine that they ought not to be executed within its limits. They accordingly pass a law, imposing the severest penalties upon the collector and other custom-house officers of the United States within their territory, if they should collect the duties on the importation of foreign merchandise. The collector proceeds to discharge the duties of his office under the laws of the United States, and he is condemned and punished before a State court for violating this State law. Repeal this section, and the decision of the State court would be final and conclusive; and any State could thus nullify any act of Congress which she deemed to be unconstitutional.

The Executive of one of the States, in a message to the Legislature, has declared it to be his opinion, that the land belonging to the United States within her territory is now the property of the State, by virtue of her sovereign authority. Should the Legislature be of the same opinion, and pass a law for the punishment of the land officers of the United States who should sell any of the public lands within her limits, this transfer of property might be virtually accomplished by the repeal of the 25th section of the judicial act. Our land officers might then be severely punished, and thus prohibited by the courts of that State from performing their duty under the laws of the Union, without the possibility of redress in any constitutional or legal form. In this manner, the title of the United States to a vast domain, which has cost the nation many millions, and which justly belongs to the people of the several States, would be defeated or greatly impaired.

Another illustration might be introduced. Suppose the Legislature of Pennsylvania, being of opinion that the charter of the Bank of the United States is unconstitutional, were to declare it to be a nuisance, and inflict penalties upon all its officers for making discounts or receiving deposits. Should the courts of that State carry such a law into effect, without the 25th section there would be no appeal from their decision; and the Legislature and courts of a single State might thus prostrate an institution established under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

In all such cases, redress can now be peaceably obtained in the ordinary administration of justice. A writ of error issues from the Supreme Court, which finally decides the question whether the act of Congress was constitutional or not; and if they determine in the affirmative, the judgment of the State court is reversed. The laws are thus substituted instead of arms, and the States kept within their proper orbits by the judicial authority. But if no such appeal existed, then, upon the occurrence of cases of this character, the General Government would be compelled to determine whether the Union should be dissolved, or whether there should be a recurrence to force—an awful alternative, which we trust may never be presented. We will not attempt further to portray the evils which might result from the abandonment of the present judicial system. They will strike every reflecting mind.

It has of late years been contended that this section of the judicial act was unconstitutional, and that Congress do not possess the power of investing the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction in any case which has been finally decided in the courts of the States. It has also been contended that, even if they do possess this power, it does not extend to cases in which a State is a party. On this branch of the question, we would refer the House to the very able and conclusive argument of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the cases of Martin _vs._ Hunter’s Lessee (1st Wheaton, 304) and Cohens vs. the State of Virginia (6 Wheaton, 264) by which the affirmative of these propositions is clearly established. It may be proper, however, that we should make a few observations upon this part of the question. Those who have argued in favor of these positions, assert that the general words of the Constitution, extending the judicial power of the Union “to all cases, in law and equity,” arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, ought, by construction, to be restricted to such cases in law and equity as may originate in the courts of the Union. They would thus establish a limitation at war with the letter, and, in our opinion, equally at war with the spirit of the instrument. Had such been the intention of the framers of the Constitution, they well knew in what language to express that intention. Had it been their purpose to restrict the meaning of the general language which they had used in the first clause of the section, they could have done so with much propriety in the second. This clause, after providing “that, in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction,” proceeds to declare “that, in all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the Congress shall make.” On the supposition contended for, it is wholly unaccountable that the framers of the Constitution did not limit the natural effect of the words used in the first clause, by making the second to read “that, in all the other cases before mentioned,” arising in the inferior courts of the United States, “the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” But no such restriction exists; and, from the fair import of the words used in both clauses, the Supreme Court possess the power of finally deciding “all cases, in law and equity,” arising under the Constitution, the laws, and the treaties of the United States, no matter whether they may have originated in a Federal or in a State court, and no matter whether States or individuals be the parties.

But it is not our intention to enter into a protracted constitutional argument upon the present occasion, because this question has long since been put at rest, if any constitutional question can ever be considered as settled in this country. The Federalist, which is now considered a text-book in regard to the construction of the Constitution, and deservedly so, as well from the great merit of the work as the high character of its authors, is clear and explicit on this subject. After reasoning upon it at some length, the author of the 83d number of that production arrives at the following conclusion: “To confine, therefore, the general expressions which gave appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to appeals from the subordinate Federal courts, instead of allowing their extension to the State courts, would be to abridge the latitude of the terms, in subversion of the intent, contrary to every sound rule of interpretation.”

The Federalist, it will be recollected, was written between the formation of the Constitution and its adoption by the States. Immediately after its adoption, Congress, by passing the 25th section of the judicial act, now sought to be repealed, fully confirmed this construction. This appellate jurisdiction has ever since been exercised by the Supreme Court in a great variety of cases; and we are not aware that the constitutionality of its exercise has ever been questioned by the decision of any State court, except in a single instance, which did not occur until the year 1815. And even in that case (Hunter _vs._ Fairfax), the judgment of the Supreme Court was carried into effect according to the existing law, without endangering the peace of the country.

The last topic to which we would advert is, the claim which has been set up to exempt the judgments obtained by the States of this Union, before their own courts, in civil and criminal suits, prosecuted in their name, from being reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error. Much stress has been laid by those who sustain this claim, upon the general proposition that a sovereign independent State cannot be sued, except by its own consent. But does this proposition apply, in its extent, to the States of this Union. That is the question for discussion.

We have in this country an authority much higher than that of sovereign States. It is the authority of the sovereign people of each State. In their State conventions they ratified the Constitution of the United States; and so far as that Constitution has deprived the States of any of the attributes of sovereignty, they are bound by it, because such was the will of the people. The Constitution, thus called into existence by the will of the people of the several States, has declared itself, and the laws and treaties which should emanate from its authority, to be “the supreme law of the land;” and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

Why, then, should a State, who has obtained a judgment in her own courts against an individual, in violation of this “supreme law of the land,” be protected from having her judgment reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States? Is there any reason, either in the Constitution or in natural justice, why judgments obtained by a State in her own courts should be held sacred, notwithstanding they violated the Constitution and laws of the Union, which would not apply, at least with equal force, in favor of individual plaintiffs? The Constitution subjects to the review of the Supreme Court all cases in law or equity arising under itself, or the laws of the Union. It excepts no case bearing this character. Whether the party be a State or an individual, all must alike bow to the sovereign will of the people, expressed in the Constitution of the United States.

In suits brought by a State against an individual in her own courts, there is much greater danger of oppression, considering the relative power and influence of the parties, than there would be in controversies between individuals. And are these to be the only cases selected, in which the citizen shall not be permitted to protect himself by the Constitution and laws of the Union before the Supreme Court of the United States? Is it not sufficient that, under the Constitution, the States cannot be sued as defendants, without adding to this, by a strained and unnatural construction, the additional privilege that the judgments which they may obtain as plaintiffs or prosecutors before their own courts, whether right or wrong, shall in all cases be irreversible?

We will not repeat the considerations which have been already urged to prove that, unless this provision of the Constitution applies to the States, the rights of individuals will be sacrificed, all uniformity of decision abandoned, and each one of the States will have it in her power to set the Constitution and laws of the United States at defiance.

The eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States interferes in no respect with the principles for which we have contended. It is in these words:

“The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit, in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.”

Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court in the case of Cohens vs. Virginia, has given so clear, and in our opinion, so correct an exposition of the true construction of the amendment, that we shall, in conclusion, present to the House a few extracts from that opinion, instead of any argument of our own. He says that “the first impression made on the mind by this amendment is, that it was intended for those cases, and for those only, in which some demand against a State is made by an individual in the courts of the Union. If we consider the causes to which it is to be traced, we are conducted to the same conclusion. A general interest might well be felt, in leaving to a State the full power of consulting its convenience in the adjustment of its debts, or of other claims upon it; but no interest could be felt in so changing the relation between the whole and its parts, as to strip the Government of the means of protecting, by the instrumentality of its courts, the Constitution and laws from active violation. The words of the amendment appear to the court to justify and require this construction.

“To commence a suit, is to demand something by the institution of process in a court of justice; and to prosecute the suit is, according to the common acceptation of language, to continue that demand. By a suit commenced by an individual against a State, we should understand a process sued out by that individual against the State, for the purpose of establishing some claim against it by the judgment of a court; and the prosecution of that suit is its continuance. Whatever may be the stages of its progress, the actor is still the same. Suits had been commenced in the Supreme Court against some of the States before the amendment was introduced into Congress, and others might be commenced before it should be adopted by the State Legislatures, and might be depending at the time of its adoption. The object of the amendment was not only to prevent the commencement of future suits, but to arrest the prosecution of those which might be commenced when this article should form a part of the Constitution. It therefore embraces both objects; and its meaning is, that the judicial power shall not be construed to extend to any suit which may be commenced, or which, if already commenced, may be prosecuted against a State, by the citizens of another State. If a suit, brought in one court, and carried by legal process to a supervising court, be a continuation of the same suit, then this suit is not commenced nor prosecuted against a State. It is clearly, in its commencement, the suit of a State against an individual, which suit is transferred to this court, not for the purpose of asserting any claim against the State, but for the purpose of asserting a constitutional defence against a claim made by a State.

“Under the judiciary act, the effect of a writ of error is simply to bring the record into court, and submit the judgment of the inferior tribunal to re-examination. It does not, in any manner, act upon the parties; it acts only on the record. It removes the record into the supervising tribunal. Where, then, a State obtains a judgment against an individual, and the court rendering such judgment overrules a defence set up under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the transfer of this record into the Supreme Court for the sole purpose of inquiring whether the judgment violates the Constitution or laws of the United States can, with no propriety, we think, be denominated a suit commenced or prosecuted against the State, whose judgment is so far re-examined. Nothing is demanded from the State. No claim against it, of any description, is asserted or prosecuted. The party is not to be restored to the possession of anything. Essentially, it is an appeal on a single point; and the defendant who appeals from a judgment rendered against him, is never said to commence or prosecute a suit against the plaintiff, who has obtained the judgment. The writ of error is given rather than an appeal, because it is the more usual mode of removing suits at common law; and because, perhaps, it is more technically proper, where a single point of law, and not the whole case, is to be re-examined. But an appeal might be given, and might be so regulated as to effect every purpose of a writ of error. The mode of removal is form, not substance. Whether it be by writ of error or appeal, no claim is asserted, no demand is made by the original defendant; he only asserts the constitutional right to have his defence examined by that tribunal whose province it is to construe the Constitution and laws of the Union.

“The only part of the proceeding which is in any manner personal is the citation. And what is the citation? It is simply notice to the opposite party that the record is transferred into another court, where he may appear, or decline to appear, as his judgment or inclination may determine. As the party who has obtained a judgment is out of court, and may, therefore, not know that his cause is removed, common justice requires that notice of the fact should be given him: but this notice is not a suit, nor has it the effect of process. If the party does not choose to appear, he cannot be brought into court, nor is his failure to appear considered as a default. Judgment cannot be given against him for his non-appearance; but the judgment is to be re-examined, and reversed or affirmed, in like manner as if the party had appeared and argued his cause.

“The point of view in which this writ of error, with its citation, has been considered uniformly in the courts of the Union, has been well illustrated by a reference to the course of this court in suits instituted by the United States. The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United States; that the judiciary act does not authorize such suits; yet writs of error, accompanied with citations, have uniformly issued for the removal of judgments in favor of the United States into a superior court, where they have, like those in favor of an individual, been re-examined, and affirmed or reversed. It has never been suggested that such writ of error was a suit against the United States, and therefore not within the jurisdiction of the appellate court.

“It is, then, the opinion of the court that the defendant who removes a judgment rendered against him by a State court into this court, for the purpose of re-examining the question whether that judgment be in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, does not commence or prosecute a suit against the State, whatever may be its opinion, where the effect of the writ may be to restore the party to the possession of a thing which he demands.”

All which is respectfully submitted.

JAMES BUCHANAN, WM. W.
ELLSWORTH, E. D.
WHITE.

It was Mr. Buchanan’s intention to retire from public life at the close of this session of Congress in March, 1831. But in the early part of February, without his previous knowledge, a movement was set on foot in Pennsylvania to bring him forward as the candidate of that State for the Vice-Presidency at the next election, on the ticket with General Jackson, whose re-election to the Presidency was already anticipated by his party. As soon as information of this purpose reached Mr. Buchanan, he did what he could to discourage it, as will appear from the following letter to one of his Pennsylvania friends and neighbors:

[JAMES BUCHANAN TO GEORGE PLITT, ESQ.]

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1831.

DEAR SIR:—

I received your kind letter of the 7th instant and the Chester County _Democrat_ of the 8th by the same mail; and I confess the information which they contained was wholly unexpected. I can say nothing upon the subject to which they refer, unless it be to express a profound and grateful sense of the kindness and partiality of those of my friends in Chester County who would elevate me to a station to which I have never aspired. I cannot flatter myself, for a single moment, that the people of the State will respond to a nomination which I feel has been dictated in a great degree by personal friendship; and I shall retire to private life, after the close of the present session, without casting one lingering look behind. As a private citizen I shall always remember with the deepest sensibility the many favors which I have received from the people of the district whom I have so long represented, perfectly convinced that they have already bestowed upon me quite as many honors as I have ever deserved.

I sent you by yesterday’s mail a copy of the correspondence between the President and Vice-President. Its publication has not produced the sensation here which was expected. I think it will not injure General Jackson in the estimation of his friends in Pennsylvania. Its effect, however, will be still more to divide the personal friends of Mr. Crawford and Mr. Calhoun.

The speech which I made upon Peck’s trial will probably not appear until a full report of the case shall be published. The commendations which have been bestowed upon it, both here and elsewhere, have been of a character so far beyond its merits that I fear the public will be disappointed upon the appearance in print.

I would suggest to you the propriety of considering this letter confidential so far as it regards myself. The subject is of a nature so delicate, and anything I can say upon it is so liable to misconstruction, that I should not have answered your letter, had I not felt that you have always deserved my friendship, and that I might rely with confidence on your discretion.

From your friend,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

P. S.—What is now the state of anti-masonry in your county?

The truth is that a longer continuance in public life did not accord with Mr. Buchanan’s plans. His professional income had fallen to the low rate of about $2000 per annum, and he determined to restore it to what it had previously been, and to take his chances for raising it still higher.

He had many qualifications for great success at the bar: competent learning, untiring industry, a ready and pleasing address, an uncommon reasoning power, and a reputation of perfect integrity. Had he been impelled by the wants of a family to devote himself exclusively to his profession, there can be no doubt that he would have risen in it to great eminence. His talents were not of that order which would have enabled him to unite in his own person the very different functions of a statesman and a lawyer; a union which has been exhibited in a very marked manner by only one person in America, and perhaps by no one in England. But my estimate of Mr. Buchanan’s abilities leads me to say, that if he had not at this period of his life been again drawn into a political career, he would have ranked among the first lawyers of his time. He must have soon encased in the forensic discussion of constitutional questions. He had very early imbibed a deep reverence for the Constitution of the United States, and his turn of mind would have adapted him to the handling of questions such as were then arising and are likely long to arise upon its interpretation. As he grew older and his sphere of professional employment became widened, he must have been found at the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, if not as the peer of Webster and Pinkney, at least as the peer of many against whom those great advocates had to put forth their strength. But from such a professional career Mr. Buchanan was drawn away, not by the prospect of the Vice-Presidency, but by the unexpected offer of the mission to Russia, an account of which will be found in the next chapter.

[FROM GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.]

PITTSBURGH, March 4, 1830.

DEAR BROTHER:—

I am much pleased to observe from the _U. S. Telegraph_ of the 25th ultimo that you have taken a manly stand on the constitutional side of the Indian question. In this pleasure there is no doubt a spice of personal vanity, as your sentiments, so far as they can be inferred from the debate, are in perfect accordance with my own. It is a question which has produced an unaccountable excitement in our city. Every word on the subject is devoured with wonderful avidity; and I can assure you that you did not put too high an estimate on public feeling when you moved for the printing of _ten thousand_ copies of the report. As public opinion is yet unsettled, it is important that the report of the committee, if temperate and decided, should have an extensive circulation.

I have read your speech on the Judiciary with great interest and advantage. The legal gentlemen in our city have highly complimented both its style and research. The best evidence of its effect is, that all those with whom I have conversed on the subject are decidedly in favor of _your bill_.

Anti-masonry is still flourishing. I do not know the state of feeling in the eastern section of Pennsylvania, but I am now perfectly convinced that no western county will return _a mason_ to the next Legislature. Strong, however, as anti-masonry is, much of its apparent strength is borrowed from extrinsic circumstances. In this city, for instance, many persons are anxious to be rid of a set of rulers who have managed with so much political dexterity as to control the destinies of this county for many years. _These men happen to be masons._ No other hobby could be mounted with the same prospect of success. The honest anti-masons, the old Adams men, and the disappointed office-seekers are easily induced to unite their influence against the “powers that be.” The motley materials are thus thrown into one caldron and stirred up into a _dangerous compound_. These remarks I have made to account for the extraordinary strength of anti-masonry in this quarter......

I am obliged to you for the salutary counsel contained in your last letter. I believe that a whole volume of advice (both moral and political) is contained in that single direction, “Be wise as the serpent, but harmless as the dove.” ...... My health is very good.

Your grateful and affectionate brother,

GEO. W. BUCHANAN.

It appears, however, that a meeting was held at Lancaster in March, at which he was nominated for the Vice-Presidency, with what effect may be learned from the following letters written by his brother George from Pittsburgh:

[GEORGE W. BUCHANAN TO JAMES BUCHANAN.]

PITTSBURGH, March 23, 1831.

DEAR BROTHER:—

I have just read with great pleasure the proceedings of the Lancaster meeting which nominated you for the Vice-Presidency. Whether success shall crown the exertions of your friends or not, no public man can receive so flattering and precious a testimonial as the unanimous and unsolicited voice of his neighbors and acquaintances. In this part of the State, the idea seems to take very well. Both this county and Washington will, I think, hold meetings in your favor. I saw the editor of the _Manufacturer_ this morning and ascertained that he will be disposed to take a prominent part. The _Democrat_ will probably not be unfavorable. The editor, however, is a very timid creature.

On Thursday last I was so unfortunate as to fall and break my arm. The pain has subsided in a great degree, and I think that my arm will be restored in a short time to its wonted strength and action. I can now attend to any business that does not require the use of both hands.

I write under a feeling of great inconvenience, and will therefore close.

Your grateful and affectionate brother,

GEO. W. BUCHANAN.

PITTSBURGH, April 29, 1831.

DEAR BROTHER:—

I have been absent from home in attendance upon a sale of United States property at Uniontown for a week past. I succeeded in effecting a very good disposition of the property. The Government, I have no doubt, will approve my proceedings.

I find that in every county in which I have been, your nomination for the Vice-Presidency is very popular. In Fayette and Washington there will scarcely be a division of sentiment. Still, however, it is thought proper to suspend all public proceedings in your favor till the time of holding their regular Democratic meetings in the summer. That course will also be adopted in this county. Every leading _Jackson politician_ here, with the exception of one or two Ingham men, is favorable to your nomination. It will, however, be probably better to wait for a further expression of public opinion at _the regular meetings of the party throughout the State_. I observe that in the _Kentucky Gazette_ your name is placed on the Democratic ticket, under General Jackson’s.

It is believed here that the appointment of Attorney-General has been tendered to you. If so, I hope that you will accept it. It is a most honorable station, and free from that abuse which attaches to the Secretaryships. Will Van Buren be a candidate for the Vice-Presidency?

My arm is not yet so far restored as to be of any use. I trust, however, that the weakness is only of a temporary nature. My health, in other respects, is good.

I am your grateful brother,

GEO. W. BUCHANAN.

Mr. Buchanan returned to Lancaster after this meeting had been held. His nomination to the Vice-Presidency continued to be agitated in other parts of Pennsylvania, and in June a great meeting of the supporters of General Jackson was held at Williamsport, of which George Buchanan gives the following account:

[GEORGE W. BUCHANAN TO JAMES BUCHANAN.]

PITTSBURGH, June 15, 1831.

DEAR BROTHER:—

I arrived here on Thursday. The heat was so oppressive on horseback that I sold my horse at Bellefonte, and returned in the stage. The journey has, in a very great degree, restored my health.

The Jackson meeting at Williamsport was an exceedingly respectable one. Fifteen counties were represented. There can be no doubt that you were the Pennsylvanian to whom the resolution respecting the Vice-Presidency was intended to point. I have every reason to believe that your name would have been inserted by an almost unanimous vote, if Mr. Potter, from Centier, had not been detained at home by the illness of his wife. He would have offered a resolution nominating you; and I can say, _from information of the most undoubted credit_, that at least two-thirds of all the jurors would have warmly sustained it. Mr. Ward, editor of the _Susquehanna Register_, and Mr. Youngman, editor of the _Union Times_, with both of whom I became intimately acquainted, are decidedly favorable to your nomination. They are intelligent young men, and have, in a warm and flattering manner, solicited my correspondence.

In the Western country, I find that the Ingham faction is extremely weak. Out of Bradford County, and apart from their family connections, they appear to have no friends in the West. The people in our district speak very favorably of Mr. Muhlenburg as _the next Governor_, and, I assure you, I did nothing to discountenance that feeling. The popularity of the present Governor has been injured by the appointment of General McKean, the proposition to tax coal, and the character of certain county appointments. The resolution adopted at our meeting, and opposing General Jackson’s course in the Cabinet affair, was intended as a direct censure upon Messrs. Ingham, &c. Owing to the relation I bore to you and to General Jackson, I determined to take no active part in the meeting.

I should like very much to see you and hold a long conversation on matters and things. In July I shall endeavor to visit Franklin County, and, if you should be unable to meet me there, I will extend my journey to Lancaster.

Governor Wolf left our city this morning for Erie. He was here at the time of my arrival, and, in company with several ladies and gentleman, I escorted him to Economy. He was exceedingly well received by the people of that singular village. His plain manners and German language endeared him very much to Raff and his whole Society. The Governor treated me with great attention, and evinced a disposition to be very familiar. His daughter, however, _pleased my fancy_ much more than the old gentleman himself. She is a very interesting lady, and has well nigh _stolen my heart_.

I observe that the newspapers are determined to give you some office. They now make you Minister to Russia. Is this report true? If so, it will then become your duty to consider _what sort of a Secretary your brother George would make_. It would be a very interesting time to visit Europe.[25]

I remain your grateful and affectionate brother,

GEO. W. BUCHANAN.

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Footnote 23:

Mr. Buchanan’s speech extended through two sessions of the Committee
of the Whole. After some amendments by the Senate, the bill was
finally passed, and was approved by the President May 19, 1828. The
speech may be found in Gales & Seaton’s Register of Debates, Vol. IV,