Chapter XIII (3)

But he wanted to know whence Congress derived the power to pass this law. It was said that it was to carry into effect the laws of the States. Where did they get such authority? He thought that their only authority to pass laws was in pursuance of the Constitution; but to pass laws to carry into effect the laws of the States, was a most prolific authority, and there was no knowing where it was to stop: it would make the legislation of Congress dependent upon the legislation of twenty-four different sovereignties. He thought the bill was of a most dangerous tendency. The Senator from Pennsylvania asked if the post-office power did not give them the right to regulate what should be carried in the mails. Why, there was no such power as that claimed in the bill; and if they passed such a law, it would be exercising a most dangerous power. Why, if such doctrine prevailed, the Government might designate the persons, or parties, or classes who should have the benefit of the mails, excluding all others.

It was too often in the condemnation of a particular evil that they were urged on to measures of a dangerous tendency. All must agree as to the dangerous consequences of persons residing out of certain States transmitting to them incendiary publications, calculating to promote civil war and bloodshed. All must see the evil, and a great evil it was, and he hoped that a stop would be put to it; but Congress had no power to pass beyond the Constitution for the purpose of correcting it. The States alone had the power, and their power was ample for the purpose. He hoped never to see the time when the General Government should undertake to correct the evil by such measures as the one before them. If (said Mr. C.) you can pass this law to prohibit the delivery through the post-office of publications touching the subject of slavery, might they not also pass laws to prohibit any citizen of New York or Massachusetts from publishing and transmitting through the mails touching that subject? If you may touch the subject of slavery at all, why not go to the root of the evil? Suppose one of the Southern States were to pass a law of this kind, would you not be called upon by all the arguments now used in favor of this bill, to carry such laws into effect? Mr. C. concluded by saying that the bill was calculated to destroy all the landmarks of the Constitution, establish a precedent for dangerous legislation, and to lead to incalculable mischief. There was no necessity for so dangerous an assumption of authority, the State laws being perfectly competent to correct the evil complained of. He must say, that from the first to the last he was opposed to the measure.

Mr. Calhoun could not concur with the views taken by the Senators from Massachusetts and Kentucky, that this bill would comprehend in its provisions all publications touching the subject of slavery. In order to bring any publications within the provision of the bill, two qualifications were necessary. The first was, that it must relate to the subject of slavery; and the next was, that it must be prohibited by the laws of the States to which it is transmitted. He thought that this was the view that would be taken of it by the courts. The object of this bill was to make it the duty of the postmasters in the States to conform to the laws of such States, and not to deliver out papers in violation of their laws. The simple question was, had this Government the power to say to its officers, you shall not violate the laws of the States in which you reside? Could it go further, and make it their duty to co-operate with the States in carrying their laws into effect? This was the simple question. Now could any man doubt that Congress possessed the power to pass both measures, so that their officers might not come in conflict with the State laws? Indeed, he looked upon measures of this kind to prevent conflicts between the General and State Governments, which were likely to ensue, as essentially necessary, for it was evident that when such conflicts took place, the State must have the ascendancy. Mr. C. then briefly recapitulated the principles on which this bill was founded, and contended that it was in aid of laws passed by the States, as far as Congress had the power constitutionally to go, and assumed no power to prohibit or interfere with the publication or circulation of any paper whatever; it only declared, that the officers of the Government should not make their official stations a shield for violating the State laws. Was there any one there who would say, that the States had not the power to pass laws prohibiting, and making penal, the circulation of papers calculated to excite insurrection among their slaves? It being admitted that they could, could not Congress order its officers to abstain from the violation of these laws? We do not (said Mr. C.) pass a law to abridge the freedom of the press, or to prohibit the publication and circulation of any paper whatever—this has been done by the States already. The inhibition of the Constitution was on Congress, and not on the States, who possessed full power to pass any laws they thought proper. They knew that there were several precedents to sanction this bill. Congress had passed laws to abstain from the violation of the health laws of the States. Could any one say that the Constitution gave to Congress the power to pass quarantine laws? He had not adverted to the message of the President on this subject, because he believed that the President acted from the best motives, and that that part of the message was drawn up without sufficient reflection. He denied, however, that this message was in conformity with the Constitution. It would be directly abridging the liberty of the press for Congress to pass such laws as the President recommended. One part of the message he would refer to, which was in these words:

“I would, therefore, call the special attention of Congress to the subject, and respectfully suggest the propriety of passing such a law as will prohibit, under severe penalties, the circulation in the Southern States, through the mail, of incendiary publications, intended to instigate the slaves to insurrection.” This was clearly unconstitutional, for it not only recommended the prohibition of publications and circulation of incendiary papers (abridging the freedom of the press), but it recommended also the infliction of severe penalties, which powers were expressly prohibited by the Constitution. On no other principle could this ever be defended, than that it was simply abstaining from a violation of the laws of the States.

The Senator from Kentucky contended that this bill was useless, and he (Mr. C.) agreed that it was so in one sense, and that was, with or without this bill, the Southern States would execute their own laws against the circulation of such papers. It was a case of life and death with them; and did anybody suppose that they would permit so many magazines in their bosoms, to blow them to destruction, as these post-offices must be, if these incendiary publications continued to be circulated through them? While the Southern States contained so many postmasters opposed to their institutions, as it was in his own State, where almost every postmaster was opposed to it, it was absolutely necessary for them to take effectual measures for their own security. It was the assertion of the principle, that the States had a right to protect themselves, which made the bill valuable in his eye; it prevented the conflict which would be likely to take place between the General and State Governments, unless some measure of the kind should be adopted. The States had a right to go to the extent of this bill, and they would be wanting to themselves and to posterity, if they omitted to do it. It was on the doctrine of State rights and State intervention, that he supported this bill, and on no other grounds.

The Senator from Massachusetts objected to the returning of these papers, whose delivery was prohibited. He regretted this as much as the Senator did, but his objection was, that it did not go far enough; he thought that these papers should be delivered to the prosecuting officers of the States, to enable them to ferret out the designs of the incendiaries.

Mr. Webster remarked, that in general, it might be safely said, that when different gentlemen supported a measure admitted to be of a novel character, and placed their defence of it on different and inconsistent grounds, a very simple person might believe, in such case, that there were no very strong grounds for adopting the measure. The Senator from Pennsylvania and the Senator from South Carolina not only placed their defence of their bill on opposite grounds, but each opposed the principles on which the other founded his support of it. Where the object to be gained was apparently good, and the case urgent, as it was represented to be, how could limitations of power stand against powerful opponents, which have always been urging to despotism? Now, against the objects of this bill, he had not a word to say; but with constitutional lawyers, there was a great difference between the object and the means to carry it into effect. It was not the object to be gained, but the means to attain it, which they should look to, for though the object might be good, the means might not be so. His objections went to the means and not to the object; and he did not yield the argument because the object was a good one, and the case was urgent. It was better to limit the power, and run the risk of injury from the want of it, than to give a power which might be exercised in a dangerous manner.

The Senator from Pennsylvania said that this bill was calling on Congress to do nothing but to abstain from violating the laws of the States. It was one thing, said the Senator, for Congress to abstain from giving these incendiary papers circulation, and another to pass laws saying that they shall not be published. But if Congress had no mail through which these papers could be transmitted, what did the gentleman mean by Congress abstaining from giving them circulation? It meant that Congress should interfere and should create an especial exception as to what should be transmitted by their ordinary channel of intelligence, and that that exception should be caused by the character of the writing or publication. He contended that Congress had not the power, drawn from the character of the paper, to decide whether it should be carried in the mail or not, for such decision would be a direct abridgment of the freedom of the press. He confessed that he was shocked at the doctrine. He looked back to the alien and sedition laws which were so universally condemned throughout the country, and what was their object? Certainly to prohibit publications of a dangerous tendency. Mr. W. here quoted the sedition law, to show the objects it intended to effect. But the deputy postmasters (Mr. W. said) must look into the newspaper mail to see if there were any publications in it touching the subject of slavery calculated to excite insurrections among the slaves.

Now, said Mr. W., the country would have been rent into atoms if the sedition law, instead of saying that papers should not be published in such and such a way, had declared that the deputy postmasters should have the power to search the mails to see if they contained any publications calculated to “bring the Government into disrepute, promote insurrection, and lead to foreign war,” the evils the sedition law intended to guard against. All the papers described in the law of ’99 were unlawful by the laws of any of the States, and yet that law which had created so much excitement and met with such general reprobation, contained nothing like the power claimed by this bill. Any law distinguishing what shall or shall not go into the mails, founded on the sentiments of the paper, and making the deputy postmaster the judge, he should say, was expressly unconstitutional, if not recommended by gentlemen of such high authority. This bill (said Mr. W.) went beyond the recommendation of the President, for his recommendation was, that the person who circulated the papers described by him should be punished by severe penalties. Now, this was the old law of liberty—there was not a word of previous restraint in it as imposed by this bill. Mr. W. then went into an argument to show the vagueness of the bill in describing the paper, the delivery of which was prohibited. Under it, it was impossible to determine what publications should be prohibited; abolition pamphlets were to be stopped at the South, and anti-abolition papers were to be stopped at the North. In reply to Mr. Buchanan, he said that he did not assume that these prohibited publications either were or were not property. All he said was, that they ought not to make the deputy postmasters the judge, and take away the property without the authority of law. What he had to say was, that it was a question of property or no property, and that they could not make the deputy postmaster the judge of the fact, as he could not be a judge of property known to the Constitution and the law.

Mr. Buchanan said he had not anticipated, when he first addressed the Senate upon this subject, that he should have occasion to make any further remarks, but the Senator from Massachusetts had replied to his argument, in such a special manner, that he felt himself constrained to reply to some of his remarks. Now, permit me to say (continued Mr. B.) that he has not at all met the point of my argument. He has invested this subject with an air of greater importance and responsibility than it deserves: he has played around it with all his powers, but without touching the real question involved in the discussion.

Congress has no power (says the gentleman) to pass any law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. Granted. He most freely admitted that Congress had no power to touch the press at all. We can pass no law whatever either to prevent or to punish any publication, under any circumstances whatever. The sedition law violated this principle. It punished libels against the Federal Government and its officers; and having met with general reprobation, it was repealed, or permitted to expire by its own limitation, he did not recollect which.

Mr. B. said he admitted these premises of the gentleman in their broadest extent; but did they justify his conclusions? In order to maintain his argument, he must prove that the Constitution, in declaring that Congress shall not pass any law abridging the freedom of the press, has thereby, and from the force of these terms alone, commanded us to circulate and distribute, through our post-offices, everything which the press may publish, no matter whether it shall promote insurrection and civil war or not. This is the proposition which he must establish. All the gentleman’s remarks in favor of the liberty of the press met his cordial approbation; but they did not apply to the constitutional question then under discussion. He had argued this question precisely as if, in addition to the words already in the Constitution, that “Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press,” there had been inserted, “or to prevent the circulation of any production of the press through the post-offices.” But these words were not in the instrument; and the only question was, whether the one prohibition could be inferred from the other. Mr. B. said he was in favor of a plain and literal construction of the Constitution. He took it for his guide; and he could never consent to interpolate what its framers never intended should be there. They have conferred upon Congress, in express terms, a general discretion in regard to the Post Office Department; and the question then was, shall we exercise it in the manner proposed by this bill, for the purpose of preventing servile war, bloodshed and disunion?

How had the gentleman from Massachusetts met his argument? He says that the principles upon which the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun) and himself had sustained this bill, were at variance with each other; and that this of itself was sufficient to cast doubt over the measure. But was it the first time the gentleman had known correct conclusions to be drawn from varying or even unfounded premises? The bill itself ought not to be condemned for the arguments of its friends. He would remind the gentleman of the advice given by a distinguished English judge, to a young friend about to occupy a judicial station in the West Indies, which was, never to give reasons for his judgments, where it could be avoided; because his natural sense and perception of justice would almost always enable him to decide correctly, though he might, and probably often would, assign insufficient reasons for his decisions. This bill ought to be judged by its own provisions, and ought not to be condemned for the reasons in support of it which had been advanced either by the Senator from South Carolina or himself.

The Senator from Massachusetts had argued as though he (Mr. B.) had said, that as the end proposed by this measure was good, he should vote for it, notwithstanding the means might be unconstitutional.

[Here Mr. Webster explained, and said he had not imputed to Mr. B. such an argument.]

Mr. B. proceeded. The Senator did not mean this imputation; but his argument seemed to imply as much. However necessary he might believe this bill to be, if he did not find a clear warrant for its passage in the Constitution, it should never have his support. He never could believe that this Government, having exclusive control over the Post-Office Department in all its various relations, was yet so impotent to prevent evil, that it must, under the fundamental law which called it into existence, whether it would or not, distribute publications tending directly to promote servile insurrection, and to produce its own destruction.

The Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun) had misapprehended him in one particular. He (Mr. B.) had disclaimed all authority to pass this bill derived from State laws, or from any other source than the Constitution of the United States. He had not said he would vote for a similar bill in all cases where the State Legislatures might think proper to pass laws to prohibit the circulation of any publication whatever. He considered the passage of such laws merely as evidence of the necessity for legislation by Congress; but he was very far from adopting the principle that it should be conclusive evidence in all cases. Congress must judge for itself under all the circumstances of each particular case.

In reply to the Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. B. said that this bill would not be a penal law. Everything like a penalty had been stricken from its provisions, unless the removal of a deputy postmaster from office by the Postmaster General might be viewed in that light. By it we merely directed our agent not to violate State laws by distributing publications calculated to excite insurrection. He would not have occasion to study all the laws of all the States on the subject of slavery, as the Senator from Massachusetts had alleged. All that would be required of him was to know the laws of the State of which he was a citizen, and to take care not to violate them.

The gentleman had said that he (Mr. B.) had mistaken the recommendation contained in the President’s message. Now he undertook to assert that this bill was in conformity with the recommendation of the President, and carried it out in all essential particulars.

[Here Mr. B. again read the last paragraph of the message which he had read before.]

Now, sir, (said Mr. B.) does not the President expressly assert that Congress has authority to regulate what shall be distributed through the post-offices, and does he not “suggest the propriety of passing such a law as will prohibit, under severe penalties, the circulation in the Southern States, through the mail, of incendiary publications, intended to instigate the slaves to insurrection?” Except that this bill contained no severe penalties, it was framed both in its spirit and in its letter according to the suggestion of the President. What other bill could we pass of a milder character than the one now before us, to prevent the circulation of these incendiary publications? Let the President’s recommendation be entitled to what weight it might, this bill was in exact accordance with it.

The Senator from Massachusetts had contended that this bill conferred upon deputy postmasters the power of depriving individuals of their property in newspapers and other publications, in violation of that clause in the Constitution, which declares that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. By this bill we had not attempted to shield any postmaster from legal responsibility for his conduct. We could not do so, if we would. We had merely prescribed for him, as we had done for our other agents, the line of his duty. We did not attempt to protect him from the suit of any person who might consider himself aggrieved. If any individual to whom a publication was directed, and who had demanded it from the postmaster and had been refused, should believe our law to be unconstitutional, he might bring this question before the judiciary, and try it, like any other question. All our officers and agents are liable to be sued, and if the law under which they acted should prove to be unconstitutional, it would afford them no protection. On the present occasion we proposed to proceed in the spirit of the common law principle, that any individual may abate a nuisance; though he thereby rendered himself responsible, in case it should appear afterwards that the thing abated was not a nuisance. So here, the postmaster refusing to deliver a newspaper under our law, would be responsible in damages to the party aggrieved, in case it should appear that the law under which he had acted was unconstitutional.

As to the necessity for passing this bill, he should say but a few words. It was very easy for gentlemen to say that necessity was the plea of tyrants. He admitted it had been so, and would be so in all time to come. But after all, if we possessed the power to legislate in this case, from our situation we were compelled to judge whether it was necessary to call it into efficient action or not. This duty devolved upon us. We could not avoid deciding this question. Was it not, then, within our knowledge that the slaveholding States had been attempted to be flooded with pamphlets and pictorial representations calculated to excite servile insurrection? Had we not seen upon this floor many of these pictorial representations, whose direct effect would be to excite the wild and brutal passions of the slaves to cut the throats of their masters? Within the last few months, had there not been blood shed? and had there not been several attempted insurrections in some of the Southern States? These facts were incontestable. Believing and knowing all this to be true, he said the case of necessity, in his judgment, was fully established, and he should vote for the passage of the bill.

Mr. Cuthbert (of Georgia) was not desirous to throw himself into the current of this debate at this time. The position which he held—the infrequency of his occupying that floor, and the indisposition under which he labored, authorized him to expect the attention of the Senate for a short time, when he should be better able to address them than he then was. He therefore hoped the Senate would indulge him in an opportunity of being heard on the subject, by postponing it, to be taken up within a very short period. It appeared to him that the Senator from Pennsylvania had said precisely what should have been said in support of this bill. It appeared to him that that Senator had given an unanswerable reply to the Senator from Massachusetts on points on which he principally relied for his opposition to the measure before them. What is the state of the case (said Mr. C.)? The deputy postmaster in one of the States holds in his hand an incendiary publication, intended to carry blood and desolation through the land. Is he bound in duty to hold it from circulation? If he gives it to another, the evil intended by that publication will ensue; but then your officer, contends the Senator from Massachusetts, is bound to deliver it, because you have no power to pass a law abridging the freedom of the press. According to this doctrine, that which an individual cannot do, your officer is bound to do. It appeared to him that the obvious necessity of this law was to prevent the post-office agents from committing a criminal offence against the laws of the States, and then shielding themselves under the post-office law. But the Senator from Massachusetts had not met this point, but had rather evaded and played around it. This was a question which should not be discussed with the chicanery of a pettifogging lawyer, but should be considered with those enlarged ideas and noble sentiments which belong to the statesman. They should argue it as became enlightened patriots, anxious to promote harmony and good feeling through our common country, and to preserve all its parts from the dangers of insurrection.

He denied that property could be affected by this law, as contended by the Senator from Massachusetts. There could be no property in these incendiary publications. The postmaster holds in his hand that which, by the laws of the States, is in the condition of stolen property, and he is bound to give it back. He holds in his hand what, by his own judgment, he considers not to be property—which his own judgment condemns, and he is therefore bound to resign it. The Senator from Massachusetts said, rightly, that the person to whom this publication is directed may come forward and demand it, under the provision of this law. Now, if the Senator thought there was anything wanting in this provision of the bill, why did he not propose an amendment? If he did propose any, he (Mr. C.) had not heard it. The property is not to be destroyed; it must be returned to him who sent it.

In another point of view (Mr. C. said), the postmaster must judge whether these papers are legal or not. He holds in his hand papers which the laws of his State have said shall not be circulated, under a penalty. Is he not to decide whether he shall incur that penalty or not? How stood the argument of the Senator from Massachusetts? He requires that the officer shall violate the laws of his State, or that the General Government shall protect him in it. With regard to the members that compose the Senate, every gentleman was conscious in his own breast of a strong desire to prevent the evils of a servile war in the Southern States. Of this he was confident. But with regard to the Senator from Massachusetts, he should be guilty of a want of candor if he allowed him that clearness of judgment which belonged to the statesman; he should be wanting in that sincerity of heart on which he had ever prided himself, if he declared his conviction that the honorable Senator had treated this subject with the liberal and impartial spirit it deserved. The gentleman’s course had uniformly been opposed to all those measures which tended to quiet the country, and heal those sectional dissensions which disturb the Union.

When a large and overwhelming vote was taken in the Senate, on the motion of the Senator from Pennsylvania, believed by all to be so necessary to settle a question, threatening the most fearful consequences, it was held to be highly desirable that there should be an unanimous vote. Yet, on an occasion when the Senator could well have shown a desire to harmonize and conciliate, his vote was found in the negative. Again, the Senator from Massachusetts had put forth a paper calculated to excite great distrust in the body of the people affected by it. He alluded to the resolutions adopted at a meeting held in Boston on the subject of slavery, of which the gentleman was said to be the author, in which it was declared that Congress had the power to regulate the transfer of slaves from one State to another. Mr. C. said that he had addressed the Senate but seldom, and as he wished to be heard on this subject more at large, when his health was better and under more favorable circumstances, he hoped the Senate would indulge him by a postponement.

Mr. Webster said that he had heard the remarks of the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Cuthbert) with attention and with respect; and considering his speech of a personal character, it became him to notice it; but as the gentleman proposed to discuss this subject more at large when his health was better, and, as he said, under circumstances less tending to irritation, he should postpone his reply till then. He should hear the gentleman with pleasure, and he looked forward to it with much solicitude, and should endeavor to reply to him according to his best abilities. Mr. W. then entered into a lengthy reply to the remarks of Mr. Buchanan, in the course of which he contended that the law was unnecessary, because the States had at present the power to punish the deputy postmasters who should circulate incendiary publications in violation of their laws.

Mr. Buchanan did not rise again to argue the question. He did not feel any petty desire to have the last word. He should now merely remark that the Senator from Massachusetts, in his last observations, had done nothing more than again to restate his proposition, without offering any new argument in its support. He reminded him of another powerful man, in the ancient time, who was condemned to roll a large stone to the top of a mountain, which was always falling back upon him, and which he never could accomplish. The gentleman’s position was one which even his great powers did not enable him to maintain.

Mr. B. should not again have risen but for the purpose of making a single remark. The Senator from Massachusetts had just expressed the opinion that deputy postmasters could be punished, under State authority, for circulating inflammatory pamphlets and papers in violation of State laws. If this be true, then all the power over the post-office which we confer by this bill already exists in the States. The effect of it, then, will be nothing more than to express our assent to the exercise of a power over deputy postmasters by the States, which the gentleman admits to exist already. Upon this principle there can be no objection to the adoption of the present measure.

Mr. Cuthbert only rose to repeat the request that the Senate would, by the postponement of the subject to a short day, allow him an opportunity of being heard on it when his health was better.

Mr. C. then moved to lay the bill on the table; which motion was lost.

The bill was then rejected by the following vote:

Yeas—Messrs. Black, Brown, Buchanan, Calhoun, Cuthbert, Grundy, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Mangum, Moore, Nicholas, Porter, Preston, Rives, Robinson, Tallmadge, Walker, White and Wright—19.

Nays—Messrs. Benton, Clay, Crittenden, Davis, Ewing of Illinois, Ewing of Ohio, Goldsborough, Hendricks, Hubbard, Kent, Knight, Leigh, McKean, Morris, Naudain, Niles, Prentiss, Ruggles, Shepley, Southard, Swift, Tipton, Tomlinson, Wall, and Webster—25.

During this session of Congress (1836), Michigan sought admission into the Union. The following speech was made by Mr. Buchanan on the first of April, in reply to some of the arguments against the admission of that State:

MR. PRESIDENT: Nothing was more remote from my intention, when I closed my remarks on Wednesday last, than again to address you on the subject of the admission of Michigan into the Union; but my argument on that occasion has been so strongly assailed by the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Southard), and other gentlemen, that I feel myself almost constrained to reply. Even under this strong necessity, I would not now trespass upon your time, if I believed I should thus provoke a protracted debate, and thereby prevent the decision of the question before we adjourn this afternoon.

I shall undertake to demonstrate, notwithstanding all that has been said, that under the ordinance of 1787, aliens who were residents of the Northwestern Territory, had a clear right to exercise the elective franchise.

The territory ceded by Virginia to the United States was sufficiently extensive for an immense empire. The parties to this compact of cession contemplated that it would form five sovereign States of this Union. At that early period we had just emerged from our revolutionary struggle, and none of the jealousy was then felt against foreigners, and particularly against Irish foreigners, which now appears to haunt some gentlemen. There had then been no attempts made to get up a native American party in this country. The blood of the gallant Irish had flowed freely upon every battle-field in defence of the liberties which we now enjoy. Besides, the Senate will well recollect that the ordinance was passed before the adoption of our present Constitution, and whilst the power of naturalization remained with the several States. In some, and perhaps in all of them, it required so short a residence, and so little trouble, to be changed from an alien to a citizen, that the process could be performed without the least difficulty. I repeat that no jealousy whatever then existed against foreigners.

What, at that early period, was the condition of the vast Territory, part of which has been formed into the State of Michigan? It was a wilderness and a frontier. The wise men of the old Congress who framed this ordinance desired to promote its population, and to render it a barrier against foreign invasion. They were willing that all persons, whether citizens of any of the States, or foreigners, who should establish a fixed residence in the Territory, and become the owners of a freehold, might not only enjoy the privilege of voting, but that of holding offices. In regard to the construction of the ordinance itself, I shall not follow in detail the argument of the Senator from New Jersey. Indeed, I do not consider it a question for construction. The language is so plain, that he who runs may read. No ingenuity can cast the slightest shade of doubt over it.

The ordinance declares that “so soon as there shall be five thousand _free male inhabitants_ of full age, in the district, upon giving proof thereof to the governor, they shall receive authority, with time and place, to elect representatives from their counties or townships, to represent them in the general assembly; provided that, for every five hundred _free male inhabitants_, there shall be one representative, and so on, progressively, with the number of free male inhabitants, shall the right of representation increase, until the number of representatives shall amount to twenty-five; after which the number and proportion of representatives shall be regulated by the legislature; provided, that no person be eligible or qualified to act as a representative, _unless he shall have been a citizen of one of the United States three years, and be a resident in the district, or unless he shall have resided in the district three years_; and in either case, shall likewise hold in his own right, in fee simple, two hundred acres of land within the same; provided also, that a freehold of fifty acres of land in the district, _having been a citizen of one of the States, and being resident in the district, or the like freehold and two years residence in the district, shall be necessary to qualify a man as an elector of a representative_.”

Now, sir, I have said that this language is too plain for construction. When had the people of this Territory the right to elect representatives? Was it when there were five thousand free male _citizens_ within its borders? By no means; but as soon as there were that number of _free male inhabitants_, whether citizens or not. Who were entitled to vote at these elections? _They_, referring directly and immediately to the _five thousand free male inhabitants of full age_.

The subsequent portion of the clause which I have just read, makes this question, if possible, still plainer. It divides those capable of being elected representatives, as well as the electors, into two distinct classes, conferring advantages, in both cases, upon those inhabitants who had been citizens of one of the States for a period of three years. If a candidate for the House of Representatives had been “a citizen of one of the United States three years,” he was eligible, although he might not have been a resident of the Territory for more than a single day. Nothing more, in this case, is required than that he should be a resident. No period of residence was necessary. If the candidate, on the other hand, belonged to the second class—if he had been a naturalized citizen of one of the States for less than three years, or if he still continued to be an alien, in order to render him eligible as a representative, he must “have resided in the district three years.” In short, if he had been a citizen for three years, it was no matter how brief his residence might have been; but if “a free male inhabitant” of any other description, a residence of three years was indispensable. A similar distinction prevails in regard to the electors. “A citizen of any of the States, if a resident of the district but for a single day, had a right to exercise the elective franchise. If, on the other hand, he were not a citizen, “two years residence in the district” was required.

The property qualification was the same both for citizens and for other residents.

[Mr. Buchanan here read other portions of the ordinance to prove that its framers were careful in their use of terms, and always distinguished with great precision, between the use of the words “_free male inhabitants_,” and “citizens of one of the United States,” etc. He also referred, as a further proof of his position, to the language of that portion of the ordinance which provides for the election of the legislative council.]

Now, sir, said Mr. B., have I not clearly established the position, that, under this ordinance, aliens were entitled to elect and to be elected, provided they had resided a sufficient time in the territory, and were possessed of the necessary freehold qualification? If I can comprehend the meaning of the plainest English words, neither doubt nor difficulty can longer rest upon this question.

But it has been urged that in order to become a freeholder, a person must first have been a citizen of one of the States. In reply, I might content myself by saying that this is begging the question. It is assuming the very proposition to be proved. But I shall give this objection two answers. In the first place, although I have become somewhat rusty in my legal knowledge, yet I feel perfectly safe in asserting, that, under the strict principles of the common law of England, an alien may purchase real estate, may hold real estate, may transmit real estate to his heirs, or devise it by his will. His title is good against all mankind, except the crown; and can only be divested by what in technical language is termed “an office found” in favor of the king. Admitting that the Government in this country possessed the same right, they have, in the most solemn terms, abandoned it, by holding out inducements, under the ordinance, to foreigners, to become the proprietors of real estate within the Northwestern Territory.

An answer still more conclusive may be given to this objection. The old Congress which framed the ordinance had the unquestionable power to enable aliens to purchase and hold real estate. It was their policy to promote the settlement of this Territory; and for this purpose they have plainly declared, by the ordinance, that aliens, or in other words, that any free male inhabitant, might hold real estate. Even at this day aliens, without any restriction, purchase lands from the United States. To lure them to make purchases, as we have done, and then to attempt to forfeit their estates, would be a violation of every principle of justice and public faith.

The Congress of the United States have repeatedly, in relation to Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, placed the same construction on this ordinance which I have done. I shall not exhaust either myself, or the Senate, by referring to more than one or two of these instances. In April, 1802, when Congress passed the act authorizing the people of Ohio to form a constitution and State government, it became necessary to prescribe the qualifications of the electors of delegates to the convention. They performed this duty in the fourth section of that act. It declares as follows: “That all male citizens of the United States who shall have arrived at full age, and resided within the said Territory at least one year previous to the day of election, and shall have paid a territorial or county tax, _and all persons having, in other respects, the legal qualifications to vote for representatives in the general assembly of the territory_, be, and they are hereby, authorized to choose representatives to form a convention.”

Who were these persons having, in other respects, the legal qualifications to vote for Territorial representatives? Let the ordinance itself answer this question. They were free male persons, not citizens of the United States, who held a freehold in fifty acres of land within the Territory, and had resided there for two years. Congress, actuated by the more liberal and enlightened spirit of the age, in the year 1802, dispensed with the freehold qualification in regard to citizens of the United States. They suffered it to remain, however, in relation to those persons within the Territory who were not citizens: but who possessed the legal qualifications, in other respects, to vote for Territorial representatives.

I shall merely refer to another instance in the case of Illinois. On the 20th May, 1812, Congress passed an act to extend the right of suffrage in that Territory. Under this act, no freehold was necessary, in any case, to the exercise of the elective franchise. The spirit of the age had corrected this error in politics. I am glad of it. Our own experience has taught us that the citizen, in humble circumstances, who pays his personal tax, feels as deep an interest in the welfare of the country, and would make as many sacrifices to promote its prosperity and glory, as the man who has an income of thousands from his real estate. Wealth has never been, and never can be, a true standard of patriotism. By the first section of this act, Congress declared that “_each and every free white male person_, who shall have attained the age of twenty-one years, and who shall have paid a county or Territorial tax, and who shall have resided one year in said Territory previous to any general election, and be, at the time of such election, a resident thereof, shall be entitled to vote for members of the legislative council and house of representatives for the said Territory.” You perceive, sir, that Congress, by this act, no longer retained the distinction which they had established in regard to Ohio, between citizens of the United States and persons in other respects entitled to vote for members of the Territorial legislature. They are all blended together into the same mass, and the elective franchise is conferred upon them all, under the denomination of free white male persons, who have paid taxes and resided one year in the Territory. The phrase citizens of the United States does not once occur in the act. In the second and third sections these free white male persons are denominated citizens of the Territory, not citizens of the United States. Under the ordinance of 1787, they were, in fact, constituted citizens of the Territory; and this phraseology is, therefore, perfectly correct.

The Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Southard) has undertaken the Herculean task of proving that neither the ordinance nor the act of 1802, in relation to Ohio, nor the act to which I have just referred, nor the other similar acts conferred upon any persons not citizens of the United States the right of voting. How far he has been successful, I shall leave for the Senate to judge.

These portions of the ordinance to which I have heretofore referred were subject to the control of Congress. They have been modified and changed in several instances, some of which have been referred to and commented upon in this debate. But I now come to speak of one of those articles of the ordinance, essential to the correct decision of this question, which is placed beyond the power of Congress. To use its own emphatic language, they “shall be considered as articles of compact between the original States and the people and States in the said Territory, and forever remain unalterable, unless by common consent.” This solemn agreement has been confirmed by the Constitution of the United States. No person either denies or doubts the sacred character and the binding force of this contract. The fifth of these articles of this ordinance declares as follows: “And whenever any of the said States shall have _sixty thousand free inhabitants therein_, such State shall be admitted by its delegates into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever; and shall be at liberty to form a permanent constitution and State government; provided the constitution and government so to be formed shall be republican, and in conformity to the principles contained in these articles; and, so far as it can be consistent with the general interest of the confederacy, such admission shall be allowed at an earlier period, and when there may be a less number of free inhabitants in the State than sixty thousand.”

Now, sir, under this provision, these sixty thousand free inhabitants had a right to frame a constitution whenever they pleased. They had a right to determine which of them should be electors of delegates to their own convention for that purpose, and which of them should not. It rested solely within their own discretion, whether the elective franchise should be confined to the citizens of the United States, or be extended to other inhabitants of the Territory. It was the right and the duty of Congress first to determine the boundaries of the States to be formed within the limits of the Northwestern Territory. Had this duty been performed, the free inhabitants of Michigan, after they amounted to sixty thousand, would have become a distinct political community under the ordinance. They would have possessed the sovereign right to form a constitution; and if the constitution were republican, and in conformity to the ordinance, they might have demanded admission, by their delegates, into the Congress of the United States. They could not have been refused without a direct violation of the solemnly pledged faith of the nation. If Congress had objected that persons, not citizens of the United States, had been permitted to vote at the election for delegates, they might have triumphantly presented this ordinance, and declared that the question was settled by its terms and its spirit; that the time had arrived when they were entitled to shake off their Territorial dependence, and assume an equal rank with the other States of the Union. Throughout the ordinance there is a marked distinction between “free inhabitants” and “citizens of the United States.”

It is true that Congress have never yet determined the boundaries of the State of Michigan; but their omission to do so could not affect, in any degree, the right of the free male inhabitants to vote for delegates to the convention which framed their constitution. As soon as Michigan shall have been admitted into the Union, the boundaries of Wisconsin will then be irrevocably determined. It will be the last of the five States into which the Northwestern Territory can be divided under the terms of the ordinance. When that Territory shall contain sixty thousand free inhabitants, they will have an absolute right to demand admission, as a State, into the Union, and we cannot refuse to admit them without violating the public faith. Still, I should not advise them to frame a constitution without a previous act of Congress.

The precedent in the case of Tennessee, on which I commented when I addressed the Senate on Wednesday last, has completely silenced all opposition in regard to the necessity of a previous act of Congress to enable the people of Michigan to form a State constitution. It now seems to be conceded, that our subsequent approbation is equivalent to our previous action. This can no longer be doubted. We have the unquestionable power of waiving any irregularities in the method of framing the constitution, had any such existed. It is wiser, I admit, for Congress, in the first instance, to pass such an act; but, after they had refused to do so, from year to year, the people of Michigan had no other alternative but either to take the matter into their own hands, or abandon the hope of admission into the Union, within any reasonable time.

But I am not done with this Tennessee precedent.

It will be recollected that when North Carolina ceded to the United States the territory which now composes the State of Tennessee, it was specially stipulated that the inhabitants within the same should “enjoy all the privileges, benefits and advantages,” set forth in the ordinance for the government of the Northwestern Territory. This provision makes the case of Tennessee one precisely in point with the present. I would ask, then, who voted at the election for delegates to frame the constitution of Tennessee? Let the proclamation of Governor Blount, issued in obedience to an act of the Territorial legislature, answer this question. He declares “that all free males (not free male citizens,) twenty-one years of age and upwards,” shall be entitled to vote. Under this proclamation every free male inhabitant of the Territory had a right to vote, no matter how short a time his inhabitancy may have continued. In this respect it differs from the Territorial law of Michigan, which requires a previous residence of three months.

With a full knowledge of these facts, General Washington, in his message to Congress of the 8th of April, 1796, on the subject of the admission of Tennessee into the Union, declares that “among the privileges, benefits and advantages thus secured to the inhabitants of the Territory south of the river Ohio, appear to be the right of forming a permanent constitution and state of government, and of admission as a State by its delegates into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever, when it should have therein sixty thousand free inhabitants; provided the constitution and government so to be formed should be republican, and in conformity to the principles contained in the articles of the said ordinance.”

The State of Tennessee was accordingly admitted. At this early day, when the ordinance was better understood than it can be at present, no objection was made from any quarter, so far as I can learn, that delegates to the convention which formed the constitution of that State, were voted for by inhabitants who were not citizens of the United States. Certain it is, that no such question was raised by General Washington. Even Mr. King, whose report was decidedly adverse to the admission of this State, never, in the most distant manner, adverts to this objection which has now been so strongly urged by Senators.