Chapter XI (2)

The Government of the United States proceeded immediately to execute their part of the treaty. By the act of the 13th July, 1832, the duties on French wines were reduced according to its terms, to take effect from the day of the exchange of ratifications. At the same session, the Congress of the United States, impelled no doubt by their kindly feelings towards France, which had been roused into action by what they believed to be a final and equitable settlement of all our disputes, voluntarily reduced the duty upon silks coming from this side of the Cape of Good Hope to five per cent., whilst those beyond were fixed at ten per cent. And at the next session, on the 2d of March, 1833, this duty of five per cent. was taken off altogether; and ever since, French silks have been admitted into our country free of duty. There is now, in fact, a discriminating duty of ten per cent. in their favor, over silks from beyond the Cape of Good Hope.

What has France gained by these measures, in duties on her wines and her silks, which she would otherwise have been bound to pay? I have called upon the Secretary of the Treasury, for the purpose of ascertaining the amount. I now hold in my hand a tabular statement, prepared at my request, which shows, that had the duties remained what they were at the date of the ratification of the treaty, these articles, since that time, would have paid into the Treasury on the 30th September, 1834, the sum of $3,061,525. Judging from the large importations which have since been made, I feel no hesitation in declaring it as my opinion that, at the present moment, these duties would amount to more than the whole indemnity which France has engaged to pay to our fellow-citizens. Before the conclusion of the ten years mentioned in the treaty, she will have been freed from the payment of duties to an amount considerably above twelve millions of dollars.

By the same act of the 13th July, 1832, a board of commissioners was established to receive, examine, and decide the claims of our citizens under the treaty, who were to meet on the first day of the following August. This act also directed the Secretary of the Treasury to cause the several instalments, with the interest thereon, payable to the United States in virtue of the convention, to be received from the French government and transferred to the United States in such manner as he may deem best. In this respect the provisions of the act corresponded with the terms of the treaty, which prescribe that the money shall be paid into the hands of such person or persons as shall be authorized to receive it by the Government of the United States.

Were the French government immediately informed of all these proceedings? Who can doubt it? Certainly no one at all acquainted with the vigilance and zeal of their diplomatic agents.

The 19th of November, 1832, the day for the meeting of the Chambers, at length arrived.—Every American was anxious to know what the king would say in his speech concerning the treaty. No one could doubt but that he would strongly recommend to the Chambers to make the appropriation of twenty-five millions of francs, the first instalment of which would become due on the 2d of February following. All, however, which the speech contains in relation to the treaty is comprised in the following sentences: “I have also ordered my minister to communicate to you the treaty concluded on the 4th July, 1831, between my government and that of the United States of America. This arrangement puts an end to the reciprocal claims of the two countries.” Now, sir, I am well aware of the brevity and non-committal character of kings’ speeches in Europe. I know the necessity which exists there for circumspection and caution. But making every fair allowance for these considerations, I may at least say, that the speech does not manifest an anxious desire to carry the treaty into effect. What might the king have said; what ought he have said; what would he have said had he felt this anxious desire? It might all have been embraced in a single additional sentence, such as the following: “The Congress of the United States have already provided for the admission of French wines into their ports upon the terms of this treaty, and have voluntarily reduced their duties upon French silks, I must, therefore, request you to grant me the means of discharging the first instalment which will become due, under this treaty, on the 2d day of February next.” The king did not even ask the Chambers for the money necessary to redeem the faith of France. In this respect the debt due to the United States is placed in striking contrast to the Greek loan.—Immediately after the two sentences of the speech, which I have already quoted, the king proceeds: “You will likewise be called to examine the treaty by which Prince Otho of Bavaria is called to the throne of Greece. _I shall have to request from you the means of guaranteeing, in union with my allies, a loan which is indispensable for the establishment of the new State founded by our cares and concurrence._”

The establishment of the new State founded by our cares and concurrence! Russia, sir, has made greater advances by her skill in diplomacy than by her vast physical power. Unless I am much mistaken, the creation of this new State, with Prince Otho as its king, will accomplish the very object which it was the interest and purpose of France to defeat. It will, in the end, virtually convert Greece into a Russian province. I could say much more on the subject, but I forbear. My present purpose is merely to present in a striking view, the difference between the king’s language in relation to our treaty, and that treaty which placed the son of the king of Bavaria on the throne of Greece.

Time passed away, and the 2d February, 1833, the day when the first instalment under the treaty became due, arrived. It was to be paid “into the hands of such person or persons as shall be authorized by the Government of the United States to receive it.” The money on that day ought to have been ready at Paris. But strange, but most wonderful as it may appear, although the Chambers had been in session from the 19th of November until the 2d of February, the king’s government had never even presented the treaty to the Chambers,—had never even asked them for a grant of the money necessary to fulfil its engagements. Well might Mr. Livingston say, that they had never properly appreciated the importance of the subject.

The Government of the United States, knowing that the king in his speech had promised to present the treaty to the Chambers, and knowing that they had been in session since November, might have taken means to demand the first instalment at Paris on the 2d day of February. Strictly speaking, it was their duty to do so, acting as trustees for the claimants. But they did not draw a bill of exchange at Washington for the first instalment, until five days after it had become due at Paris. This bill was not presented to the French government for payment until the 23d of March, 1833. Even at that day the French ministry had not presented either the treaty, or a bill to carry it into effect, to the Chambers. The faith of France was thus violated by the neglect of the king’s government, long before any bill was presented. They, and not the Chambers, are responsible for this violation. It was even impossible for the Chambers to prevent it. Had this treaty and bill been laid before them in time to have enabled them to redeem the faith of France, the loyalty of the French character would never have permitted them to be guilty of a positive violation of national honor. The faith of the nation was forfeited before they were called upon to act. The responsibility was voluntarily assumed by the king’s ministers. The Chambers are clear of it. Besides, the ministry were all powerful with the Chambers during that session. They carried everything they urged. Even the bill providing the means of guaranteeing the Greek loan became a law. Can it then for a single moment be believed that if a bill to carry into effect our treaty—a treaty securing such important advantages to France—had been presented at an early period of the session, and had been pressed by the ministry, that they would have failed in the attempt? At all events, it was their imperative duty to pursue this course. The aspect of the political horizon in Europe was still lowering. There was still imminent danger of a general war. France was still in a position to make her dread any serious misunderstanding with the United States.

After all this, on the 26th March, the Duke de Broglie, in a note to Mr. Niles, our chargé d’affaires at Paris, stated that it was “a source of regret, and, indeed, of astonishment, that the Government of the United States did not think proper to have an understanding with that of France, before taking this step.” What step? The demand of an honest debt, almost two months after it had been due, under a solemn treaty. Indeed, the duke, judging from the tone of his note, appears almost to have considered the demand an insult. To make a positive engagement to pay a fixed sum on a particular day, and when that sum is demanded nearly two months after, to express astonishment to the creditor, would, in private life, be considered trifling and evasive.

The excuse made by the French ministry for their conduct is altogether vain. Had they dreaded the vote of the Chambers—had they been afraid to appear before them with their treaty and their bill, they would, and they ought to have communicated their apprehensions to this Government, and asked it to suspend the demand of the money. But they had never whispered such a suspicion, after the exchange of their ratifications of the treaty; and the first intimation of it on this side of the Atlantic, was accompanied by the astounding fact that the French government had dishonored our bill. It is true, that before the treaty was signed, they had expressed some apprehensions to Mr. Rives on this subject. These, it would seem, from their subsequent conduct, were merely diplomatic, and intended to produce delay; because, from the date of the treaty, on the 4th July, 1831, until after our bill of exchange was dishonored in March, 1833, no intimation of danger from that quarter was ever suggested. These circumstances made a great noise throughout Europe, and soon became the subject of general remark.

On the 6th of April, 1833, a year and more than two months after the exchange of the ratifications at Washington, the treaty and bill were first presented to the French Chambers. The session closed on the 25th of April, without any further action on the subject. No attempt was made by the ministry to press it; and as the session would terminate so soon, perhaps no attempt ought to have been made. But, as a new session was to commence the day after the termination of the old, and to continue two months, a favorable opportunity was thus presented to urge the passage of the law upon the Chambers. Was this done? No, sir. The ministry still continued to pursue the same course. They suffered the remainder of the month of April to pass, the month of May to pass, and not until the eleventh of June, only fifteen days before the close of the session, did they again present the bill to carry into effect the treaty. It was referred to a committee, of which Mr. Benjamin Delessert was the chairman. On the 18th of June, he made a report. This report contains a severe reprimand of the French government for not having presented the bill at an earlier period of the session; and expresses the hope that the treaty may be communicated at the opening of the next session. If we are to judge of the opinion of the Chamber from the tone and character of this report, instead of being hostile to the execution of the treaty, had it been presented to them in proper time, they felt every disposition to regard it in a favorable light. I shall read the whole report—it is very short, and is as follows:

“Gentlemen: The committee charged by you, to examine the bill relative to the treaty, concluded on the 4th of July, 1831, between France and the United States, has demanded a number of documents and reports, which must be examined, in order to obtain a complete knowledge of so important a transaction.

“The committee was soon convinced that a conscientious examination of these papers would require much time; and that, at so advanced a period of the session, its labors would have no definitive result. It regrets that, from motives which the government only can explain, the bill was not presented earlier to the Chamber for discussion. It regrets this so much the more as it is convinced of the importance of the treaty, which essentially interests our maritime commerce, our agriculture, and our manufactures.

“Several chambers of commerce, particularly those of Paris and Lyons, have manifested an ardent desire that the business should be speedily terminated.

“The committee would be satisfied if, after a deeper study of the question, it could enlighten the Chamber with regard to the justice of the claims alleged by each of the parties to the treaty, and which form the basis of it; but as time does not allow a definitive report to be made on the subject, it considers itself as the organ of the Chamber, in expressing the wish that this treaty be communicated, at the opening of the next session; and that its result may be such as to strengthen the bonds of friendship, which must ever exist between two nations so long united by common interest and sympathy.”

After a careful review of this whole transaction, I am convinced that the government of France never would have pursued such a course towards us, had they entertained a just sense of our power, and our willingness to exert it in behalf of our injured fellow-citizens. Had Russia or Austria been her creditors, instead of ourselves, the debt would have been paid when it became due; or, at the least, the ministers of the king would have exerted themselves, in a far different manner, to obtain the necessary appropriation from the Chambers. I am again constrained, however reluctantly, to adopt the opinion which I had formed at the moment. Our fierce political strife in this country is not understood in Europe; and least of all, perhaps, in France. During the autumn of 1832, and the session of 1832–3, it was believed abroad that we were on the very eve of a revolution; that our glorious Union was at the point of dissolution. I speak, sir, from actual knowledge. Whilst the advocates of despotism were looking forward, with eager hope, to see the last free republic blotted out from the face of nations, the friends of freedom throughout the world were disheartened, and dreaded the result of our experiment. The storm did rage in this country with the utmost violence. It is no wonder that those friends of liberty, on the other side of the Atlantic, who did not know how to appreciate the recuperative energies of a free and enlightened people, governed by Federal and State institutions of their own choice, should have been alarmed for the safety of the Republic. For myself I can say that I never felt any serious apprehension; yet the thrill of delight with which I received the news of the passage of the famous compromise law of March, 1833, can never be effaced from my memory. I did not then stop to inquire into the nature of its provisions. It was enough for me to know that the Republic was safe, not only in my own opinion, but in the opinion of the world.

Suppose, sir, that the President of the United States, under similar circumstances, had withheld a treaty from Congress requiring an appropriation, for fourteen months after it had been duly ratified, and had thus forfeited the national faith to a foreign government, what would have been the consequence? Sir, he ought to have been, he would have been impeached. No circumstances could ever have justified such conduct in the eyes of the American Congress or the American people.

After all the provocation which the President had received, as the representative of his country, what was his conduct? It might have been supposed that this violent man, as the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Southard) has designated him, would at once have recommended decisive measures. Judging from his energy,—from his well-known devotion to the interests of his country,—and above all, from his famous declaration to ask nothing from foreign nations but what was right, and to submit to nothing wrong, I should have expected from him an indignant message at the commencement of the next session of Congress. Instead of that, the message of December, 1833, in relation to French affairs, is of the mildest character. It breathes a spirit of confident hope that our ancient ally would do us justice during the next session of the Chambers. His exposition of the subject is concluded by the following declaration:

“As this subject involves important interests, and has attracted a considerable share of the public attention, I have deemed it proper to make this explicit statement of its actual condition; and should I be disappointed in the hope now entertained, the subject will be again brought to the notice of Congress in such a manner as the occasion may require.”

And thus ends the first act of this astonishing historical drama. Throughout the whole of it, beginning, middle and end, the French government, and not the French Chambers, were exclusively to blame.

We have now arrived at the mission of Mr. Livingston. He reached Paris in September, 1833. The Duc de Broglie assured him “that the king’s government would willingly and without hesitation promise to direct the deliberations of the Chambers to the _projet de loi_ relative to the execution of the convention of July 4, 1831, on the day after the Chamber is constituted, and to employ every means to secure the happy conclusion of an affair, the final determination of which the United States cannot desire more ardently than ourselves.” After this assurance, and after all that had passed, it was confidently expected that the king would, in strong terms, have recommended the adoption of the appropriation by the Chambers. In this we were again doomed to disappointment. In his opening speech he made no direct allusion to the subject. He simply says, that, “the financial laws, and those required for the execution of treaties, will be presented to you.”

The bill was presented, and debated, and finally rejected by the Chamber of Deputies on the 1st day of April, 1834, by a vote of 176 to 168. It is not my present purpose to dwell upon the causes of this rejection. No doubt the principal one was that the French ministers were surrounded near the conclusion of the debate, and were unable at the moment to show that the captures at St. Sebastians were not included in our treaty with Spain. I am sorry they were not better prepared upon this point; but I attribute to them no blame on that account.

It has been urged over and over again, both on this floor and elsewhere, that the rejection of the treaty was occasioned by the publication in this country of Mr. Rives’s letter to Mr. Livingston of the 8th of July, 1831. Is this the fact? If it be so it ought to be known to the world. If it be not, both the character of this Government and of Mr. Rives should be rescued from the imputation. What is the opinion expressed in this letter? Is it that the American claimants would obtain, under the treaty, more than the amount of their just claims? No such thing. Is it that they would obtain the amount of their just claims with interest? Not even this. The negotiator merely expresses the opinion that they would receive every cent of the principal. He does not allege that they would receive one cent of interest for a delay of nearly a quarter of a century. This opinion is evidently founded upon that expressed by Mr. Gallatin in a despatch dated on the 14th January, 1822, cited by Mr. Rives, in which the former expresses his belief that five millions of dollars would satisfy all our just claims. It ought to be observed that the sum stipulated to be paid by the treaty is only 25,000,000 of francs, or about $4,700,000; and that more than nine years had elapsed between the date of Mr. Gallatin’s despatch and the signing of the treaty. These facts all appear on the face of the letter, with the additional fact that the statements of the claimants, which have from time to time been presented to Congress, carry the amount of the claims much higher. These statements, however, Mr. Rives did not believe were a safe guide.

This is the amount of the letter, when fairly analyzed, which, it is alleged, destroyed the treaty before the French Chambers. If a copy of it had been placed in the hands of every Deputy, it could not possibly have produced any such effect.

That it did not occasion the rejection of the treaty is absolutely certain. I have examined the whole debate for the purpose of discovering any allusion to this letter; but I have examined it in vain. Not the slightest trace of the letter can be detected in any of the numerous speeches delivered on that occasion. The topics of opposition were various, and several of them of a strange character; but the letter is not even once alluded to throughout the whole debate. If its existence were known at the time in the French Chamber, this letter, written by a minister to his own government, expressing a favorable opinion of the result of his own negotiations, was a document of a character so natural, so much to be expected, that not one Deputy in opposition to the treaty believed it to be of sufficient importance even to merit a passing notice. Still, I have often thought it strange it had never been mentioned in the debate. The mystery is now resolved. The truth is, this letter, which is alleged to have produced such fatal effects, was entirely unknown to the members of the French Chamber when they rejected the treaty. This fact is well established by a letter from Mr. Jay, the chairman of the committee appointed by the Chamber of Deputies to investigate our claims, addressed to Mr. Gibbes, and dated at Paris on the 24th January, 1835. I shall read it.

(_Extract of a letter from Mr. Jay to Mr. Gibbes, dated 24th January, 1835._)—“It is asserted in the American prints that the rejection of the American treaty by the Chamber of Deputies, at their last session, was chiefly owing to the publication of a letter from Mr. Rives to his own Government. This is an error, which justice to that distinguished statesman, and a sense of his unremitting exertions to promote the interests of his Government while here, induce me formally to contradict. No such evidence appears in the debates; and in none of my conversations with the members have I heard his letter alleged as the motive for disputing the amount due. I much question, indeed, if any other Deputy than myself ever read the letter alluded to.”

We have now arrived at that point of time when a majority of the French Chambers arrayed themselves against the treaty. This decision was made on the 1st April, 1834. Some apprehensions then prevailed among the king and his ministers. The business was now becoming serious. New assurances had now become necessary to prevent the President from presenting the whole transaction to Congress, which they knew would still be in session, when the information of the rejection would reach the United States. In his annual message, at the commencement of the session, it will be recollected, he had declared that should he be disappointed in the hope then entertained, he would again bring the subject before Congress, in such a manner as the occasion might require. They knew that he was a man who performed his promises, and a great effort was to be made to induce him to change his purpose.

Accordingly a French brig of war, the Cuirassier, is fitted out with despatches to Mr. Serrurier. They reached him on the 3d June. On the 4th, he has an interview with Mr. McLane, and makes explanations which the latter very properly requests may be reduced to writing. In compliance with this request, the French minister, on the 5th, addresses a note to Mr. McLane. After expressing the regrets of the French government at the rejection of the bill, he uses the following language: “The king’s government, sir, after this rejection, the object of so much painful disappointment to both governments, has deliberated, and its unanimous determination has been to make an appeal from the first vote of the present Chamber to the next Chamber, and to appear before the next legislature with its treaty and its bill in hand.

“It flatters itself that the light already thrown upon this serious question, during these first debates, and the expression of the public wishes becoming each day more clear and distinct, and, finally, a more mature examination, will have, in the mean time, modified the minds of persons, and that its own conviction will become the conviction of the Chambers. The king’s government, sir, will make every loyal and constitutional effort to that effect, and will do all that its persevering persuasion of the justice and of the mutual advantages of the treaty authorizes you to expect from it. Its intention, moreover, is to do all that our constitution allows, to hasten, as much as possible, the period of the new presentation of the rejected law.

“Such, sir, are the sentiments, such the intentions of his majesty’s government. I think I may rely that, on its part, the Government of the Republic will avoid, with foreseeing solicitude, in this transitory state of things, all that might become a fresh cause of irritation between the two countries, compromit the treaty, and raise up an obstacle perhaps insurmountable, to the views of reconciliation and harmony which animate the king’s council.”

Now, sir, examine this letter, even without any reference to the answer of Mr. McLane, and can there be a doubt as to its true construction? It was not merely the disposition, but “it was the _intention_ of the king’s government to do all that their constitution allows; to hasten, as much as possible, the period of the new presentation of the rejected law.” The President knew that under the constitution of France the king could at any time convoke the Chambers upon three weeks’ notice. It was in his power, therefore, to present this law to the Chambers whenever he thought proper. The promise was to hasten this presentation as much as possible. Without any thing further the President had a right confidently to expect that the Chambers would be convoked in season to enable him to present their decision to the Congress of the United States in his next annual message. The assurance was made on the 5th June, and Congress did not assemble until the beginning of December. But the letter of Mr. McLane, of the 27th June, removes all possible doubt from this subject. He informs Mr. Serrurier that “the President is still unable to understand the causes which led to the result of the proceeding in the Chamber, especially when he recollected the assurances which had so often been made by the king and his ministers, of their earnest desire to carry the convention into effect, and the support which the Chamber had afforded in all the other measures proposed by the king.” And again:

“The assurances which M. Serrurier’s letter contains, of the adherence of the king’s government to the treaty, of its unanimous determination to appeal from the decision of the present to the new Chamber, and its conviction that the public wish, and a mature examination of the subject, will lead to a favorable result, and its intention to make every constitutional effort to that effect, and finally, its intention to do all that the constitution allows to hasten the presentation of the new law, have been fully considered by the President.

“Though fully sensible of the high responsibility which he owes to the American people, in a matter touching so nearly the national honor, the President, still trusting to the good faith and justice of France, willing to manifest a spirit of forbearance so long as it may be consistent with the rights and dignity of his country, and truly desiring to preserve those relations of friendship, which, commencing in our struggle for independence, form the true policy of both nations, and sincerely respecting the king’s wishes, will rely upon the assurances which M. Serrurier has been instructed to offer, and will therefore await with confidence the promised appeal to the new Chamber.

“The President, in desiring the undersigned to request that his sentiments on this subject may be made known to his majesty’s government, has instructed him also to state his expectation that the king, seeing the great interests now involved in the subject, and the deep solicitude felt by the people of the United States respecting it, will enable him, when presenting the subject to Congress, as his duty will require him to do at the opening of their next session, to announce at that time the result of that appeal, and of his majesty’s efforts for its success.”

Had this letter of Mr. McLane placed a different construction upon the engagement of the French government from that which Mr. Serrurier intended to communicate, it was his duty to make the necessary explanations without delay. He, in that case, would have done so instantly. It was a subject of too much importance to suffer any misapprehension to exist concerning it for a single moment.

Notwithstanding all which had passed, the President, on the faith of these assurances of the French government, suffered Congress to adjourn without presenting the subject to their view. This rash, this violent man, instigated by his own good feelings towards our ancient ally, and by his love of peace, determines that he would try them once more, that he once more would extend the olive branch before presenting to Congress and the nation a history of our wrongs. I confess I do not approve of this policy. I think the time had then arrived to manifest to France some sensibility on our part on account of her delay in executing the treaty. I believe that such a course would have been dictated by sound policy.

What were the consequences of this new manifestation of the kindly feelings of the President towards France? Was it properly appreciated by the French government? Was it received in the liberal and friendly spirit from which it had proceeded? Let the sequel answer these questions. I shall read you Mr. Livingston’s opinion on the subject. In a letter to Mr. Forsyth, under date of the 22d November, 1834, he thus expresses himself:

“I do not hope for any decision on our affairs before the middle of January. One motive for delay is an expectation that the message of the President may arrive before the discussion, and that it may contain something to show a strong national feeling on the subject. _This is not mere conjecture: I know the fact_; and I repeat now, from a full knowledge of the case, what I have more than once stated in my former despatches as my firm persuasion, that the moderate tone taken by our Government, when the rejection was first known, was attributed by some to indifference, or to a conviction on the part of the President that he would not be supported in any strong measure by the people, and by others to a consciousness that the convention had given us more than we were entitled to ask.”

I shall now proceed to show in what manner the French government performed the engagement which had been made by their representative in Washington to hasten the presentation of the rejected law as much as possible.

The Chambers met on the 31st July, and the king made them a speech. This speech contains no allusion to the subject of the treaty except the following: “The laws necessary for carrying treaties into effect, and those still required for the accomplishment of the promises of the Chamber, will be presented to you in the course of this session.” The rejected bill was not presented. After a session of two weeks, the Chambers were prorogued on the 16th August until the 29th December,—a day, almost a month after the next meeting of Congress.

I admit that strong reasons existed for dispensing with that part of the obligation which required the French government to present the bill at this short session. No good reason has ever been alleged to excuse them for proroguing the Chambers until so late a day as the 29th of December. They might have met, and they ought to have met, at an early period of the autumn. They have heretofore met, on different occasions, for the despatch of business, in every month of the year. It was in vain that Mr. Livingston urged the necessity of an earlier meeting on the Count de Rigny. It was in vain that he appealed to the positive engagement of the French government made by Mr. Serrurier. It was in vain that he declared to him, “that the President could not, at the opening of the next session of Congress, avoid laying before that body a statement of the then position of affairs on this interesting subject, nor, under any circumstances, permit that session to end, as it must, on the third of March, without recommending such measures as he may deem that justice and the honor of the country may require.” All his remonstrances were disregarded. Instead of hastening the presentation of the rejected law as much as possible, they refused to assemble the Chambers in time even to present the bill before the meeting of Congress. Their meeting was so long delayed, as to render it almost impossible that their determination should be known in this country before the close of the session, notwithstanding the President had agreed not to present the subject to Congress at the previous session, under a firm conviction that he would receive this determination in time to lay it before them at the commencement of their next session. Is there a Senator in this hall, who can believe for a moment, that if the President had been informed the rejected bill would not be laid before the Chambers until the 29th December, he would have refrained from communicating to Congress, at their previous session, the state of the controversy between the two countries? Upon this construction, the engagement of the French government was mere words, without the slightest meaning; and the national vessel which brought it in such solemn form, might much better have remained at home.

What was the apology—what was the pretext under which the king’s government refused to assemble the Chambers at an earlier period? It was, that Mr. Serrurier had made no engagement to that effect, and that the intention which he had expressed in behalf of his government to do all that the constitution allows, to hasten, as much as possible, the period of the new presentation of the rejected law, meant no more than that this was their disposition. The word “intention” is thus changed into “disposition” by the Count de Rigny, and the whole engagement which was presented to the President in such an imposing form, was thus converted into a mere unmeaning profession of their desire to hasten this presentation as much as possible.

Sir, at the commencement of the session of Congress, it became the duty of the President to speak, and what could any American expect that he would say? The treaty had been violated in the first instance, by the ministers of the French king, in neglecting to lay it before the Chambers until after the first instalment was due. It was then twice submitted, at so late a period of the session, that it was impossible for the Chambers to examine and decide the question before their adjournment. On the last of these occasions, the chairman of the committee, to which the subject was referred, had reported a severe reprimand against the government, for not having sooner presented the bill, and expressed a hope that it might be presented at an early period of the next session. It was then rejected by the Chamber of Deputies; and when the French government had solemnly engaged to hasten the presentation of the rejected law, as soon as their constitution would permit, they prorogue the Chambers to the latest period which custom sanctions, in the very face of the remonstrances of the minister of the United States. I ask again, sir, before such an array of circumstances, what could any man, what could any American expect the President would say in his message? The cup of forbearance had been drained by him to the very dregs. It was then his duty to speak so as to be heard and to be regarded on the other side of the Atlantic. If the same spirit which dictated the message, or anything like it, had been manifested by Congress, the money, in my opinion, would ere this have been paid.

The question was then reduced to a single point. We demanded the execution of a solemn treaty; it had been refused. France had promised again to bring the question before the Chambers as soon as possible. The Chambers were prorogued until the latest day. The President had every reason to believe that France was trifling with us, and that the treaty would again be rejected. Is there a Senator, within the sound of my voice, who, if France had finally determined not to pay the money, would have tamely submitted to this violation of national faith? Not one!

The late war with Great Britain elevated us in the estimation of the whole world. In every portion of Europe, we have reason to be proud that we are American citizens. We have paid dearly for the exalted character we now enjoy among the nations, and we ought to preserve it and transmit it unimpaired to future generations. To them it will be a most precious inheritance.

If, after having compelled the weaker nations of the world to pay us indemnities for captures made from our citizens, we should cower before the power of France, and abandon our rights against her, when they had been secured by a solemn treaty, we should be regarded as a mere Hector among the nations. The same course which you have pursued towards the weak, you must pursue towards the powerful. If you do not, your name will become a by-word and a proverb.

But under all the provocations which the country had received, what is the character of that message? Let it be scanned with eagle eyes, and there is nothing in its language at which the most fastidious critic can take offence. It contains an enumeration of our wrongs in mild and dignified language, and a contingent recommendation of reprisals, in case the indemnity should again be rejected by the Chambers. But in this, and in all other respects, it defers entirely to the judgment of Congress. Every idea of an intended menace is excluded by the President’s express declaration. He says: “Such a measure ought not to be considered by France as a menace. Her pride and power are too well known to expect any thing from her fears, and preclude the necessity of the declaration, that nothing partaking of the character of intimidation is intended by us.”

I ask again, is it not forbearing in its language? Is there a single statement in it not founded upon truth? Does it even state the whole truth against France? Are there not strong points omitted? All these questions must be answered in the affirmative. On this subject we have strong evidence from the Duke de Broglie himself. In his famous letter to Mr. Pageot of June 17th, 1835,—the arrow of the Parthian as he flew,—this fact is admitted. He says:

“If we examine in detail the message of the President of the United States, (I mean that part of it which concerns the relations between the United States and France,) it will possibly be found, that passing successively from phrase to phrase, none will be met that cannot bear an interpretation more or less plausible, nor of which, strictly speaking, it cannot be said that it is a simple exposé of such a fact, true in itself, or the assertion of such or such a right which no one contests, or the performance of such or such an obligation imposed on the President by the very nature of his functions. There will certainly be found several in which the idea of impeaching the good faith of the French government, or of acting upon it through menace or intimidation, is more or less disavowed.”

It was the whole message, and not any of the detached parts, at which the French government chose to take offence.

It is not my present purpose to discuss the propriety of the recommendation of reprisals, or whether that was the best mode of redress which could have been suggested. Some decided recommendation, however, was required from the executive, both by public opinion and by the wrongs which we had so long patiently endured.

Who can suppose that the executive intended to menace France, or to obtain from her fears what would be denied by her sense of justice? The President, in this very message, expressly disclaims such an idea. Her history places her far above any such imputation. The wonder is, how she could have ever supposed the President, against his own solemn declaration, intended to do her any such injustice. She ought to have considered it as it was, a mere executive recommendation to Congress, not intended for her at all—not to operate upon her fears, but upon their deliberations in deciding whether any and what measures should be adopted to secure the execution of the treaty. But on this subject I shall say more hereafter.

We have now arrived at the special message of the President to Congress of the 26th February last; a document which has a most important bearing on the appropriation of the three millions which was rejected by the Senate. I have given this historical sketch of our controversy with France, for the purpose of bringing Senators to the very point of time, and to the precise condition of this question, when the Senate negatived that appropriation.

What had Congress done in relation to the French question when this message was presented to us? Nothing, sir, nothing. The Senate had unanimously passed a resolution on the 15th January, that it was inexpedient, at present, to adopt any legislative measure, in regard to the state of affairs between the United States and France. This unanimity was obtained by two considerations. The one was, that the French Chambers had been convened, though not for the purpose of acting upon our treaty, on the first, instead of the twenty-ninth of December, a fact unknown to the President at the date of his message. The other, that this circumstance afforded a reasonable ground of hope, that we might learn their final determination before the close of our session on the 3d March. But whatever may have been the causes, the Senate had determined that, for the present, nothing should be done.

In the House of Representatives, at the date of the special message, on the 26th February, no measure whatever had been adopted. The President had just cause to believe that the sentiments contained in his message to Congress, at the commencement of their session, were not in unison with the feelings of either branch of the legislature. He therefore determined to lay all the information in his possession before Congress, and leave it for them to decide whether any or what measures should be adopted for the defence of the country. I shall read this message. It is as follows:

“I transmit to Congress a report from the Secretary of State, with copies of all the letters received from Mr. Livingston since the message to the House of Representatives of the 6th instant, of the instructions given to that minister, and of all the late correspondence with the French government in Paris, or in Washington, except a note of Mr. Serrurier, which, for the reasons stated in the report, is not now communicated.

“It will be seen that I have deemed it my duty to instruct Mr. Livingston to quit France with his legation, and return to the United States, if an appropriation for the fulfilment of the convention shall be refused by the Chambers.

“The subject being now, in all its present aspects, before Congress, whose right it is to decide what measures are to be pursued on that event, I deem it unnecessary to make further recommendation, being confident that, on their part, every thing will be done to maintain the rights and honor of the country which the occasion requires.”

The President leaves the whole question to Congress. What was the information then communicated? That a very high state of excitement existed against us in France. That the French minister had been recalled from this country; an act which is generally the immediate precursor of hostilities between nations. Besides, Mr. Livingston, who was a competent judge and on the spot, with the best means of knowledge, informed his Government that he would not be surprised, should the law be rejected, if they anticipated our reprisals, by the seizure of our vessels in port, or the attack of our ships in the Mediterranean, by a superior force. Such were his apprehensions, upon this subject, that he felt it to be his duty, without delay, to inform Commodore Patterson of the state of things, so that he might be upon his guard.

Ought these apprehensions of Mr. Livingston to have been disregarded? Let the history of that gallant people answer this question. How often has the injustice of their cause been concealed from their own view by the dazzling brilliancy of some grand and striking exploit? Glory is their passion, and their great emperor, who knew them best, often acted upon this principle. To anticipate their enemy, and commence the war with some bold stroke, would be in perfect accordance with their character.

Every Senator, when he voted upon the appropriation, must have known, or at least might have known, all the information which was contained in the documents accompanying the President’s message.

It has been objected, that if the President desired this appropriation of three millions, he ought to have recommended it in his message. I protest against this principle. He acted wisely, discreetly, and with a becoming respect for Congress, to leave the whole question to their decision. This was especially proper, as we had not thought proper to adopt any measure in relation to the subject.

Suppose the President had, in his special message, recommended this appropriation, what would have been said, and justly said, upon the subject? Denunciations the most eloquent would have resounded against him throughout the whole country, from Georgia to Maine. It would have everywhere been proclaimed as an act of executive dictation. In our then existing relations with France, it would have been said, and said with much force, that such a recommendation from the executive might have had a tendency to exasperate her people, and produce war. Besides, I shall never consent to adopt the principle that we ought to take no measures to defend the country, without the recommendation of the executive. This would be to submit to that very dictation, against which, on other occasions, gentlemen themselves have so loudly protested. No, sir, I shall always assert the perfect right of Congress to act upon such subjects, independently of any executive recommendation.

This special message was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, in the House of Representatives, on the 26th February. On the next day they reported three resolutions, one of which was, “that contingent preparation ought to be made, to meet any emergency growing out of our relations with France.” The session was rapidly drawing to a close. But a few days of it then remained. It would have been vain to act upon this resolution. It was a mere abstraction. Had it been adopted, it could have produced no effect; the money was wanted to place the country in a state of defence, and not a mere opinion that it ought to be granted. The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, therefore, on the 28th February, had this resolution laid upon the table, and gave notice that he would move an amendment to the fortification bill, appropriating three millions of dollars, one million to the army, and two millions to the navy, to provide for the contingent defence of the country.

It has been urged, that because the President, in his last annual message, has said that this contingent appropriation was inserted according to his views, that some blame attaches to him from the mode of its introduction. Without pretending to know the fact, I will venture the assertion, that he never requested any member, either of this or the other branch of the legislature, to make such a motion. He had taken his stand—he had left the whole subject to Congress. From this he never departed. If the chairman of any committee, or any other member of the Senate or the House, called upon him to know his views upon the subject, he no doubt communicated them freely and frankly. This is his nature. Surely no blame can attach to him for having expressed his opinion upon this subject to any member who might ask it. It has been the uniform course pursued on such occasions.

On the 2d of March, the House of Representatives, by a unanimous vote, resolved that, in their opinion, the treaty with France, of the 4th July, 1831, should be maintained, and its execution insisted on. This was no party vote. It was dictated by a common American feeling, which rose superior to party. After this solemn declaration of the House, made in the face of the world, how could it be supposed they would adjourn, without endeavoring to place the country in an attitude of defence? What, sir! The representatives of the people, with an overflowing treasury, to leave the country naked and exposed to hostile invasion, and to make no provision for our navy, after having declared unanimously that the treaty should be maintained! Who could have supposed it?

On the 3d of March, upon the motion of the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations (Mr. Cambreleng) and in pursuance of the notice which he had given on the 28th of February, this appropriation of three millions was annexed as an amendment to the fortification bill. The vote upon the question was 109 in the affirmative, and 77 in the negative. This vote, although not unanimous, like the former, was no party vote. The bill, thus amended, was brought to the Senate. Now, sir, let me ask, if this appropriation had proceeded from the House alone, without any message or any suggestion from the executive, would this not have been a legitimate source? Ought such an appropriation to be opposed in the Senate, because it had not received executive sanction? Have the Representatives of the people no right to originate a bill for the defence and security of their constituents and their country, without first consulting the will of the President? For one, I shall never submit to any such a slavish principle. It would make the Executive every thing, and Congress nothing.

Had the indemnity been absolutely rejected by the Chambers, the two nations would have been placed in a state of defiance towards each other. In such a condition it was the right—nay, more, it was the imperative duty of the House of Representatives to make contingent preparation for the worst. The urgency of the case was still more striking, because in ten or eleven of the States Representatives could not be elected until months after the adjournment, and, therefore, Congress could not have been assembled to meet any emergency which might occur.