Chapter XIII (2)

And here, permit me to say that, in my judgment, Southern gentlemen who are not satisfied with his last message, so far as it relates to the abolitionists, are very unreasonable. With the general tone and spirit of that message no one has found any fault; no one can justly find any fault. In point of fact, it is not even liable to the solitary objection which has been urged against it, that he did not recommend to the legislature the passage of a law for the purpose of punishing those abolitionists who, in that State, should attempt to excite insurrection and sedition in the slaveholding States, by the circulation of inflammatory publications and pictures. It is true that he does not advise the immediate passage of such a law, but this was because he thought public opinion would be sufficient to put them down. He, however, looks to it as eventually proper, in case, contrary to his opinion, such a measure should become necessary to arrest the evil. He expressly asserts, and clearly proves, that the legislature possesses the power to pass such a law. This is the scope and spirit of his message.

Ought he to have recommended the immediate passage of such a law? I think not. The history of mankind, in all ages, demonstrates that the surest mode of giving importance to any sect, whether in politics or religion, is to subject its members to persecution. It has become a proverb, that “the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church.” By persecution, religious sects, maintaining doctrines the most absurd and the most extravagant—doctrines directly at war with the pure faith and principles announced to the world by the Divine Author of our religion, have been magnified into importance. I do not believe there is any State in this Union (unless the information which we have received from the Senators from Vermont might make that State an exception), where penal laws of the character proposed would not advance, instead of destroying the cause of the abolitionists. I feel confident such would be the event in Pennsylvania. Severe legislation, unless there is a manifest necessity for it, is always prejudicial. This question may be safely left to public opinion, which, in our age, and in our country, like a mighty torrent, sweeps away error. The people, although they may sometimes be misled in the beginning, always judge correctly in the end. Let severe penal laws on this subject be enacted in any State—let a few honest but misguided enthusiasts be prosecuted under them—let them be tried and punished in the face of the country, and you will thus excite the sympathies of the people, and create a hundred abolitionists where one only now exists. Southern gentlemen have no right to doubt our sincerity on this subject, and they ought to permit us to judge for ourselves as to the best mode of allaying the excitement which they believe exists among ourselves.

If the spirit of abolition had become so extensive and so formidable as some gentlemen suppose, we might justly be alarmed for the existence of this Union. Comparatively speaking, I believe it to be weak and powerless, though it is noisy. Without excitement got up here or elsewhere, which may continue its existence for some time longer, it will pass away in a short period, like the other excitements which have disturbed the public mind, and are now almost forgotten.

On the 9th of March (1836) the following proceedings took place:

The Senate proceeded to consider the petition of the Society of Friends in Philadelphia, on the subject of the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.

The question being on the motion “that the petition be not received”—Mr. Calhoun addressed the Senate in reply to what had fallen from other Senators on the subject.

Mr. Clay made a few remarks in explanation, called for by some part of the remarks of the Senator from South Carolina.

The question was then taken on the motion of Mr. Calhoun, “Shall the petition be received?” and decided as follows:

Yeas,—Messrs. Benton, Brown, Buchanan, Clay, Clayton, Crittenden, Davis, Ewing of Ill., Ewing of Ohio, Goldsborough, Grundy, Hendricks, Hill, Hubbard, Kent, King of Ala., King of Ga., Knight, Linn, McKean, Morris, Naudain, Niles, Prentiss, Robbins, Robinson, Ruggles, Shepley, Southard, Swift, Tallmadge, Tipton, Tomlinson, Wall, Webster, Wright.—36.

Nays.—Messrs. Black, Calhoun, Cuthbert, Leigh, Moore, Nicholas, Preston, Porter, Walker, White.—10.

The question being next on the motion of Mr. Buchanan, to reject the prayer of the petition,

Mr. Clay made some remarks on the motion, and concluded by moving to amend it by adding to it:—

For the Senate, without now affirming or denying the constitutional power of Congress to grant the prayer of the petition, believes, even supposing the power uncontested, which it is not, that the exercise of it would be inexpedient;

1st. Because the people of the District of Columbia have not themselves petitioned for the abolition of slavery within the District.

2d. Because the States of Virginia and Maryland would be injuriously affected by such a measure, whilst the institution of slavery continues to subsist within their respective jurisdictions, and neither of these States would probably have ceded to the United States the territory now forming the District if it had anticipated the adoption of any such measure without clearly and expressly guarding against it. And,

3d. Because the injury which would be inflicted by exciting alarm and apprehension in the States tolerating slavery, and by disturbing the harmony between them and the other members of the Confederacy, would far exceed any practical benefit which could possibly flow from the abolition of slavery within the District.

Mr. Porter wished more time to reflect, and moved to lay the motion on the table, but withdrew it at the instance of Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. Buchanan said that some remarks, both of the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun), and of the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay), compelled him to make a few observations in his own defence.

Sir, said Mr. B., I rejoice at the result of the vote which has this day been recorded. It will forever secure to the citizens of this country, the sacred right of petition. The question has now been finally settled by a decisive vote of the Senate. The memorial which I presented from a portion of the highly respectable Society of Friends, has been received by a triumphant majority. Another happy consequence of this vote is, that abolition is forever separated from the right of petition. The abolitionists will now never be able to connect their cause with the violation of a right so justly dear to the people. They must now stand alone. This is the very position in which every friend of the Union, both to the North and the South, ought to desire to see them placed.

From the remarks which have just been made by the Senators from South Carolina and Kentucky, it might almost be supposed that my motion to reject the prayer of the memorialists, was trifling with the right of petition, which, in the course of debate, I have defended with all my power. Is there the slightest foundation for such an imputation?

The memorial has been received by the Senate, and has been read. If this body are in doubt whether they will grant its prayer—if they wish further information upon this subject than what they already possess, then they ought to refer it. On the other hand, if every Senator has already determined how he will vote upon the question, why send the memorial to a committee? It presents but one simple question for our decision. It asks us to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. My motion proposes that this prayer shall be rejected. Now, is it not self-evident to every Senator upon this floor, that any committee which can be formed out of this body, will arrive at the same conclusion? Why, then, refer this memorial to obtain a report, when we already know what that report will be? Why keep the question open for further agitation and debate? Should it be referred to a committee, upon their report, we shall have the same ground to travel over again which we have been treading for so long a time. I have yet to learn that when a petition is presented to any tribunal, in a case so clear as not to require deliberation, that it is either disrespectful to the petitioners, or that it infringes the right of petition, to decide against its prayer without delay.

But in this case, powerful reasons exist why the memorial ought not to be referred. Although we all agree that slavery ought not to be abolished in the District of Columbia, yet we arrive at this conclusion by different courses of reasoning. Before I presented this memorial, I endeavored to ascertain from Senators whether it would be possible to obtain a strong vote in favor of any proposition more specific in its terms than that now before the Senate. I found this would be impossible. I then made the motion to reject the prayer of the memorial, after much deliberation.

I found the Senate divided upon this subject into four sections. One portion was opposed to the prayer of the memorial, because, in their opinion, it would be unconstitutional to grant it; another, because it would violate our compacts of cession with Virginia and Maryland; a third, because it would be inexpedient and unjust to abolish slavery in this District, whilst it exists in the surrounding States; and a fourth, who were unwilling to go even to this extent, but who equally condemned its abolition at the present moment. Here were the elements of discord. Whilst all, or nearly all, are harmonious in their conclusion that the prayer of the petition ought not to be granted, their premises are far different. My object was to get the strongest vote, for the purpose of calming the agitation, both to the South and to the North. In order to accomplish this purpose, my motion must be one on which the largest majority could agree, and on which each member might vote for his own peculiar reasons. I ask what motion could I have made, so well calculated to attain the end, as the one now before the Senate?

The amendment which has just been proposed by the Senator from Kentucky will, I fear, prove to be the apple of discord in this body. It is too strong a measure for one portion of the Senate, whilst it is too weak for another. Those who believe that we have no power under the Constitution to abolish slavery in this District, will not vote for the amendment, because it does recognize this principle; whilst such gentlemen as deem it inexpedient at the present time to act upon the subject, but who do not wish to commit themselves for the future, will be equally opposed to the reasons which this amendment assigns. For my own part, individually, I should not object to the amendment. I could most cheerfully vote for all the principles which it contains. If I believed it would unite in its favor as large a majority of the Senate as the motion which I have made, unaccompanied by these reasons, it should have my support. But this, I am convinced, will not be the case; and my purpose is to obtain the largest vote possible, because this will have the strongest influence upon public opinion. It would most effectually check the agitation upon this subject.

Sir, said Mr. B., this question of domestic slavery is the weak point in our institutions. Tariffs may be raised almost to prohibition, and then they may be reduced so as to yield no adequate protection to the manufacturer; our Union is sufficiently strong to endure the shock. Fierce political storms may arise—the moral elements of the country may be convulsed by the struggles of ambitious men for the highest honors of the Government—the sunshine does not more certainly succeed the storm, than that all will again be peace. Touch this question of slavery seriously—let it once be made manifest to the people of the South that they cannot live with us, except in a state of continual apprehension and alarm for their wives and their children, for all that is near and dear to them upon the earth,—and the Union is from that moment dissolved. It does not then become a question of expediency, but of self-preservation. It is a question brought home to the fireside, to the domestic circle of every white man in the Southern States. This day, this dark and gloomy day for the Republic, will, I most devoutly trust and believe, never arrive. Although, in Pennsylvania, we are all opposed to slavery in the abstract, yet we will never violate the constitutional compact which we have made with our sister States. Their rights will be held sacred by us. Under the Constitution it is their own question; and there let it remain.

Mr. Preston said there may be other reasons; he had some which were stronger than those assigned, and he should vote against these, which contained a negative pregnant, looking to a state of things when Congress could act on the subject.

Mr. Porter said one of his reasons for wishing to lay on the table the amendment was, that he might examine and ascertain if such reasons as would be satisfactory to him, so as to command his vote, could be assigned. He renewed his motion, and again withdrew it; when

Mr. Clay stated that he had no objection to let the amendment lie for further examination.

After a few words from Mr. Cuthbert, on motion of Mr. Morris, the Senate adjourned.

On the 11th of March, the following proceedings occurred:

Mr. Leigh rose, and said that, in pursuance of the promise which he yesterday made to the Senate to move to resume the consideration of the abolition petition at the earliest moment that he should have decided what course his duty required him to pursue in regard to the amendment which he yesterday offered to the motion for rejection, now moved that the Senate take up that subject.

The motion having been agreed to, Mr. Leigh withdrew the amendment offered by him yesterday; and the question recurred on Mr. Buchanan’s motion that _the prayer of the petition be rejected_.

[The following is a copy of the petition:

TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES:

The memorial of Caln Quarterly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends, commonly called Quakers, respectfully represents: That, having long felt deep sympathy with that portion of the inhabitants of these United States which is held in bondage, and having no doubt that the happiness and interests, moral and pecuniary, of both master and slave, and our whole community, would be greatly promoted if the inestimable right to liberty was extended equally to all, we contemplate with extreme regret that the District of Columbia, over which you possess entire control, is acknowledged to be one of the greatest marts for the traffic in the persons of human beings in the known world, notwithstanding the principles of the Constitution declare that all men have an unalienable right to the blessing of liberty.

We therefore earnestly desire that you will enact such laws as will secure the right of freedom to every human being residing within the constitutional jurisdiction of Congress, and prohibit every species of traffic in the persons of men, which is as inconsistent in principle, and inhuman in practice, as the foreign slave trade.

Signed by direction, and on behalf of the aforesaid quarterly meeting, held in Lancaster county, Pennsylvania, the 19th of 11 mo., 1835.

LINDLEY COATS,
ESTHER HAYES,

_Clerks_.]

The yeas and nays were ordered on the question of rejection.

Mr. McKean moved to amend the motion by striking out all after the word “that”—(namely, the words “the prayer of the petition to be rejected,”) and inserting “it is inexpedient at this time to legislate on the subject of slavery in the District of Columbia.”

On this question the yeas and nays were ordered, on his motion.

The question being taken, it was decided as follows:

Yeas—Messrs. Hendricks, McKean—2.

Nays—Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Buchanan, Clay, Crittenden, Cuthbert, Davis, Ewing of Illinois, Ewing of Ohio, Goldsborough, Grundy, Hill, Hubbard, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Knight, Leigh, Linn, Nicholas, Niles, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Robbins, Robinson, Ruggles, Shepley, Swift, Tallmadge, Tipton, Tomlinson, Walker, Wall, Webster, White, Wright—37.

Mr. McKean moved to amend the motion by inserting between the first word “that” and the words “the prayer of the petition be rejected,” the words “inexpedient to legislate on the subject of slavery in the District of Columbia, and that.”

On this question he called for the yeas and nays, which were ordered.

The question was then taken, and decided as follows:

Yeas—Messrs. Ewing of Ohio, Hendricks, McKean—3.

Nays—Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Buchanan, Clay, Crittenden, Cuthbert, Davis, Ewing of Illinois, Goldsborough, Grundy, Hill, Hubbard, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Knight, Leigh, Linn, Moore, Niles, Nicholas, Preston, Porter, Robbins, Robinson, Ruggles, Shepley, Swift, Tallmadge, Tipton, Tomlinson, Walker, Wall, Webster, White, Wright—36.

The question being on the original motion of Mr. Buchanan, “that the prayer of the petition be rejected”—

Mr. McKean said that, in offering the amendments which he had proposed, he had discharged his conscience of an imperative duty. It had pleased the Senate to reject these amendments, and, as he was thus deprived of the power of making the motion more palatable, all that he could now do was to vote for the proposition of his colleague.

Same day, after debate.—The question was then taken on the motion to reject the prayer of the petition, and decided as follows:

Yeas—Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Buchanan, Clay, Crittenden, Cuthbert, Ewing of Illinois, Ewing of Ohio, Goldsborough, Grundy, Hill, Hubbard, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Leigh, Linn, McKean, Moore, Nicholas, Niles, Porter, Preston, Robbins, Robinson, Ruggles, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, Tomlinson, Walker, Wall, White, Wright—34.

Nays—Messrs. Davis, Hendricks, Knight, Prentiss, Swift, Webster—6.

So the prayer of the petition was rejected.

On the 25th of April, Mr. Buchanan presented a petition from the Society of Friends, in Philadelphia, on which he said:

He rose to present the memorial of the Yearly Meeting of the religious Society of Friends, which had been recently held in the city of Philadelphia, remonstrating against the admission of Arkansas into the Union, whilst a provision remained in her constitution which admits of and may perpetuate slavery. This Yearly Meeting embraced within its jurisdiction the greater part of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, the whole of the State of Delaware, and the Eastern Shore of Maryland. The language of this memorial was perfectly respectful. Indeed, it could not be otherwise, considering the source from which it emanated. It breathed throughout the pure and Christian spirit which had always animated the Society of Friends; and although he did not concur with them in opinion, their memorial was entitled to be received with great respect.

When the highly respectable committee,[54] which had charge of this memorial, called upon him this morning, and requested him to present it to the Senate, he had felt it to be his duty to inform them in what relation he stood to the question. He stated to them that he had been requested by the delegate from Arkansas to take charge of the application of that Territory to be admitted into the Union, and that he had cheerfully taken upon himself the performance of this duty. He also read to them the 8th section of the act of Congress of 6th March, 1820, containing the famous Missouri compromise; and informed them that the whole Territory of Arkansas was south of the parallel of 36 degrees and a half of north latitude; and _that he regarded this compromise, considering the exciting and alarming circumstances under which it was made, and the dangers to the existence of the Union which it had removed, to be almost as sacred as a constitutional provision_. That there might be no mistake on the subject, he had also informed them that in presenting their memorial he should feel it to be his duty to state these facts to the Senate. With this course on his part they were satisfied, and still continued their request that he might present the memorial. He now did so with great pleasure. He hoped it might be received by the Senate with all the respect it so highly deserved. He asked that it might be read; and as the question of the admission of Arkansas was no longer before us, he moved that it might be laid upon the table. The memorial was accordingly read, and was ordered to be laid upon the table.

The next time that the subject of slavery came before the Senate was in June, 1836. It then arose upon a bill which had been proposed in conformity with a special recommendation by President Jackson, in his annual message of December, 1835, to restrain the use of the mails for the circulation of _incendiary publications_. The bill contained the following provisions:

_Be it enacted, &c_., That it shall not be lawful for any deputy postmaster, in any State, Territory, or District of the United States, knowingly to deliver to any person whatever, any pamphlet, newspaper, handbill, or other printed paper or pictorial representation touching the subject of slavery, where, by the laws of the said State, Territory, or District, their circulation is prohibited; and any deputy postmaster who shall be guilty thereof, shall be forthwith removed from office.

SEC. 2. _And be it further enacted_, That nothing in the acts of Congress to establish and regulate the Post Office Department, shall be construed to protect any deputy postmaster, mail carrier, or other officer or agent of said department, who shall knowingly circulate in any State, Territory, or District, as aforesaid, any such pamphlet, newspaper, handbill, or other printed paper or pictorial representation, forbidden by the laws of such State, Territory, or District.

SEC. 3. _And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid_, That the deputy postmasters of the offices where the pamphlets, newspapers, handbills, or other printed papers or pictorial representations aforesaid, may arrive for delivery, shall, under the instructions of the Postmaster General, from time to time give notice of the same, so that they may be withdrawn, by the person who deposited them originally to be mailed, and if the same shall not be withdrawn in one month thereafter, shall be burnt or otherwise destroyed.

This bill, on the 2d of June, 1836, was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, by the casting vote of Mr. Van Buren, the Vice-President. On the 8th of June the following debate and proceedings took place:

Mr. Webster addressed the Senate at length in opposition to the bill, commencing his argument against what he contended was its vagueness and obscurity in not sufficiently defining what were the publications, the circulation of which it intended to prohibit. The bill provided that it should not be lawful for any deputy postmaster, in any State, Territory, or District of the United States, knowingly to deliver to any person whatever, any pamphlet, newspaper, handbill, or other printed matter or pictorial representation, touching the subject of slavery, where by the laws of said State, District, or Territory, their circulation was prohibited. Under this provision Mr. W. contended that it was impossible to say what publications might not be prohibited from circulation. No matter what was the publication, whether for or against slavery—if it touched the subject in any shape or form, it would fall under the prohibition. Even the Constitution of the United States might be prohibited; and the person who was clothed with the power to judge in this delicate matter was one of the deputy postmasters who, notwithstanding the difficulties with which he was encompassed in coming to a correct decision must decide correctly, under pain of being removed from office. It would be necessary, also, he said, for the deputy postmasters referred to in this bill to make themselves acquainted with all the various laws passed by the States, touching this subject of slavery, and to decide them, no matter how variant they might be with each other. Mr. W. also contended that the bill conflicted with that provision in the Constitution which prohibited Congress from passing any law to abridge the freedom of speech or of the press. What was the liberty of the press? he asked. It was the liberty of printing as well as the liberty of publishing, in all the ordinary modes of publication; and was not the circulation of the papers through the mails an ordinary mode of publication? He was afraid that they were in some danger of taking a step in this matter, that they might hereafter have cause to regret, by its being contended that whatever in this bill applies to publications touching slavery, applies to other publications that the States might think proper to prohibit; and Congress might, under this example, be called upon to pass laws to suppress the circulation of political, religious, or any other description of publications, which produced excitement in the States. Was this bill in accordance with the general force and temper of the Constitution and its amendments? It was not in accordance with that provision of the instrument, under which the freedom of speech and of the press was secured. Whatever laws the State Legislatures might pass on the subject, Congress was restrained from legislating in any manner whatever, with regard to the press. It would be admitted, that if a newspaper came directed to him, he had a property in it; and how could any man, then, take that property and burn it without due form of law? and he did not know how this newspaper could be pronounced an unlawful publication and having no property in it, without a legal trial.

Mr. W. argued against the right to examine into the nature of publications sent to the post-office, and said that the right of an individual in his papers, was secured to him in every free country in the world. In England, it was expressly provided that the papers of the subject shall be free from all unreasonable searches and seizures—language, he said, to be found in our Constitution. This principle established in England, so essential to liberty, had been followed out in France, where the right of printing and publishing was secured in the fullest extent; the individual publishing being amenable to the laws for what he published; and every man printed and published what he pleased, at his peril. Mr. W. went on at some length to show that the bill was contrary to that provision of the Constitution, which prohibits Congress to pass any law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.

Mr. Buchanan said, that as he had voted for the engrossment of this bill, and should vote for its final passage, he felt himself bound to defend and justify his vote against the argument of the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster). In doing so, he would imitate that Senator, if in no other respect, at least in being brief.

It is indispensable to the clear and distinct understanding of any argument, to know precisely what is the question under discussion. Without this knowledge, we cannot tell whether in any or what degree the argument is applicable to the subject. What, then, is the naked question now under discussion, stripped of all the mist which has been cast around it? This bill embraced but a single principle, though this principle was carried out through three sections. It provides that deputy postmasters, within the limits of such slaveholding States as have found it necessary for their own safety to pass laws making it penal to circulate inflammatory publications and pictorial representations calculated to excite the slaves to insurrection, shall not be protected by the laws of the United States, in violating these State laws. Postmasters within these States who shall _knowingly_ distribute such publications are liable to be removed from office. The bill also provides that the post-office laws of the United States shall not protect postmasters, mail carriers, or other officers or agents of the department who shall knowingly circulate such incendiary publications, from the penalties denounced against this offence under the laws of the States. This is the spirit and principle of the bill. It does no more than to withdraw the protection of the laws of the United States, establishing the Post Office Department, from postmasters and other agents of this Government who shall wilfully transgress State laws deemed absolutely necessary to secure the States, within which they exist, from servile insurrection.

This bill did not affect, in the slightest degree, any of the non-slaveholding States. Neither did it apply to any of the slaveholding States, except those within which the danger of insurrection had become so imminent as to compel them to pass laws of the character referred to in the bill.

Of the policy and justice of passing such a bill he could not doubt, provided we possess the power. No person would contend that this Government ought to become the instrument of exciting insurrection within any of the States, unless we were constrained to pursue this course by an overruling constitutional necessity. The question then is, does any such necessity exist? Are we bound by the Constitution of the United States, through our post-offices, to circulate publications among the slaves, the direct tendency of which is to excite their passions and rouse them to insurrection? Have we no power to stay our hand in any case? Even if a portion of this Union were in a state of open rebellion against the United States, must we aid and assist the rebels by communicating to them, through our Post Office Department, such publications and information as may encourage and promote their designs against the very existence of the confederacy itself? If the Constitution of the United States has placed us in this deplorable condition, we must yield to its mandates, no matter what may be the consequences.

Mr. B. did not believe that the Constitution placed us in any such position. Our power over the mails was as broad and general as any words in the English language could confer. The Constitution declares that “Congress shall have power to establish post-offices and post roads.” This is the only provision which it contains touching the subject. After the establishment of these post-offices and post roads, who shall decide upon the purposes for which they shall be used? He answered, Congress, and Congress alone. There was no limitation, no restriction, whatever, upon our discretion contained in the bond. We have the power to decide what shall and what shall not be carried in the mail, and what shall be the rate of postage. He freely admitted that, unless in extreme cases, where the safety of the Republic was involved, we should never exercise this power of discrimination between what papers should and should not be circulated through the mail. The Constitution, however, has conferred upon us this general power, probably for the very purpose of meeting these extreme cases; and it is one which, from its delicate nature, we shall not be likely to abuse.

He differed entirely from the opinion of the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun), as to the source whence the power was derived to pass this bill. No action of the State Legislatures could either confer it or take it away. It was perfect and complete in itself under the Federal Constitution, or it had no existence. With that Senator he entirely concurred in opinion, that the sedition law was clearly unconstitutional. Congress have no power to abridge the freedom of the press, or to pass any law to prevent or to punish any publication whatever. He understood the freedom of the press to mean precisely what the Senator from Massachusetts had stated. But does it follow, as the gentleman contends, that because we have no power over the press, that therefore we are bound to carry and distribute anything and everything which may proceed from it, even if it should be calculated to stir up insurrection or to destroy the Government? So far as this Government is concerned, every person may print, and publish, and circulate whatever he pleases; but are we, therefore, compelled to become his agents, and to circulate for him everything he may choose to publish? This is the question. Any gentleman upon this floor may write what he thinks proper against my character; but because he can exercise this liberty, am I therefore bound to carry and to circulate what he has written? So any individual within the broad limits of this Union, without previous restraint and without danger of punishment from the Federal Government, may publish what is calculated to aid and assist the enemies of the country in open war; but does it follow, as a necessary consequence, that this very Government is bound to carry and circulate such publications through its mails? A more perfect _non sequitur_ never had been presented to his mind. It was one thing not to restrain or punish publications; it was another and an entirely different thing to carry and circulate them after they have been published. The one is merely passive; the other is active. It was one thing to leave our citizens entirely free to print and publish and circulate what they pleased; and it was another thing to call upon us to aid in their circulation. From the prohibition to make any law “abridging the freedom of speech or of the press,” it could never be inferred that we must provide by law for the circulation through the post-office of everything which the press might publish. And yet this is the argument both of the Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator from South Carolina. If this argument were well founded, it was very clear to his mind, that no State law could confer upon Congress any power to pass this bill. We derived our powers from the Federal Constitution, and from that alone. If, under its provisions, we have had no authority to pass the bill, we could derive no such authority from the laws of the States.

Why, then, did Mr. B. vote for a bill to prevent the circulation of publications prohibited by State laws? Not because we derived any power from these laws; but, under the circumstances, they contained the best rule to guide us in deciding what publications were dangerous. The States were the best judges of what was necessary for their own safety and protection; and they would not call for the passage of this bill, unless they were firmly convinced that the situation in which they were placed imperiously demanded it. They were willing to submit to a great evil in depriving themselves of information which might be valuable to them, in order to avoid the still greater evil that would result from the circulation of these publications and pictorial representations among their slaves. Such a law would not be permitted to exist after the necessity for it had ended. He was therefore willing, upon this occasion, to refer to the laws of the States, not for the purpose of conferring any power on Congress, but merely for a description of the publications which it should be unlawful for our deputy-postmasters within these States to circulate.

This bill was in strict conformity with the recommendations contained in the President’s message on this subject, which had, he believed, found favor everywhere. The principles of this message, which had been pronounced unconstitutional by the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun), had, he believed, been highly commended in a resolution passed by the legislature of that State. He would read an extract from the President’s message:

“In connection with these provisions in relation to the Post Office Department, I must also invite your attention to the painful excitement produced in the South, by attempts to circulate through the mails inflammatory appeals addressed to the passions of the slaves, in prints, and in various sorts of publications, calculated to stimulate them to insurrection, and to produce all the horrors of a servile war.

“There is, doubtless, no respectable portion of our countrymen who can be so far misled as to feel any other sentiment than that of indignant regret at conduct so destructive of the harmony and peace of the country, and so repugnant to the principles of our national compact, and to the dictates of humanity and religion. Our happiness and prosperity essentially depend upon peace within our borders—and peace depends upon the maintenance, in good faith, of those compromises of the Constitution upon which the Union is founded. It is fortunate for the country that the good sense, the generous feeling, and the deep-rooted attachment of the people of the non-slaveholding States to the Union, and to their fellow-citizens of the same blood in the South, have given so strong and impressive a tone to the sentiments entertained against the proceedings of the misguided persons who have engaged in these unconstitutional and wicked attempts, and especially against the emissaries from foreign parts who have dared to interfere in this matter, as to authorize the hope, that those attempts will no longer be persisted in. But if these expressions of the public will shall not be sufficient to effect so desirable a result, not a doubt can be entertained that the non-slaveholding States, so far from countenancing the slightest interference with the constitutional rights of the South, will be prompt to exercise their authority in suppressing, so far as in them lies, whatever is calculated to produce this evil.

“In leaving the care of other branches of this interesting subject to the State authorities, to whom they properly belong, it is nevertheless proper for Congress to take such measures as will prevent the Post Office Department, which was designed to foster an amicable intercourse and correspondence between all the members of the confederacy, from being used as an instrument of an opposite character. The General Government, to which the great trust is confided, of preserving inviolate the relations created among the States by the Constitution, is especially bound to avoid in its own action, anything that may disturb them. I would, therefore, call the special attention of Congress to the subject, and respectfully suggest the propriety of passing such a law as will prohibit, under severe penalties, the circulation in the Southern States, through the mail, of incendiary publications intended to instigate the slaves to insurrection.”

In reply to Mr. Webster, Mr. B. said, that he did not think there was any vagueness in that part of the bill on which the gentleman had commented, except what arose from the nature of the subject. It is vague, says the gentleman, because it contains no description of the publications, the circulation of which it intends to prohibit, except the words “touching the subject of slavery.” On this foundation he had erected a considerable portion of his argument. Mr. B. acknowledged that if the bill contained no other description than this, it would be impossible to carry it into execution. But this was not the fact. The subsequent language restricted this vague description; because it confined the operation of the bill to such publications only, “touching the subject of slavery,” as were prohibited from circulation by the laws of the respective States.

We have, said Mr. B., wisely and properly referred, for the description of the offence, to the laws of the different States which will be embraced by the bill. It was just—it was politic—it was treating those States with a proper degree of respect, to make our law conform with their laws, and thus to take care that no conflict should arise between our deputy postmasters and their State authorities. Could the gentleman from Massachusetts himself make the bill more explicit? He could not do it, consistently with the principles upon which it was founded, without incorporating into its provisions all the laws of all the States who had thought proper to pass laws upon this subject. Our deputy postmasters were resident citizens of those States. They were bound to know the State laws under which they lived, and all that this bill requires is, that they shall not violate them.

The Senator from Massachusetts has contended that any newspaper which had been sent to an individual by mail, and was deposited in a post-office, was his property; and we had, therefore, no right to say it should not be delivered. But this was begging the question. It was taking that for granted which remained to be proved. If Congress, as he (Mr. B.) had contended, possessed the incontestable power of declaring what should and what should not be circulated through the mails, no man could have the right to demand from any post-office that which the law had declared should not thus be circulated. If we can, without violating the Constitution, say that these inflammatory publications tending to excite servile war shall not be distributed by our postmasters among the individuals to whom they are directed, no question of property could then arise. No man can have a property in that which is a violation of the law. It then becomes a question, not of property, but of public safety. Admit the gentleman’s premises, that we have no right to pass any law upon this subject, and he can establish his position that a property exists in those publications whilst in the post-offices. Without this admission, his argument entirely fails.

He felt as reluctant as any man could feel, to vote for any law interfering with the circulation through the mails of any publication whatever, no matter what might be its character. But if the slaves within any Southern State were in rebellion, or if a palpable or well-founded danger of such a rebellion existed, with his present convictions, should he refuse to prevent the circulation of publications tending to encourage or excite insurrection, he would consider himself an accomplice in their guilt. He entertained no doubt whatever of the power of Congress to pass this bill, or of the propriety of exercising that power. He would not have voted for the bill which had been reported by the Senator from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun) because he thought it a measure far beyond what was required by the necessity of the case. This bill, whilst it was sufficiently strong to correct the evil, would be confined in its operation to those States within which the danger existed.

Mr. Davis (of Massachusetts) stated at length his objections to the passage of the bill. Senators assumed that there were no difficulties in the way, because the post-office power gave to Congress the right to decide what should be carried in the mails. On a former occasion he had said all that was proper in regard to this matter. He then drew the attention of the Senate to the constitutional question involved, and demonstrated, as he thought, that there was no authority in the Constitution to pass this bill, or anything like it. The language of the Constitution was very simple: it only said that Congress should have the power to establish post-offices and post roads. Now what was a post-office, in the meaning of the Constitution? To understand this, it would be necessary to ascertain what was the meaning held at the time the Constitution was adopted. You had a post-office at the time the Constitution was made, and a press also; and the provision in the Constitution was made in reference to both these known things. The object in establishing the post-office, then, was to send abroad intelligence throughout the country; and it was intended for the transmission of newspapers, pamphlets, judicial and legislative proceedings, and all matters emanating from the press, relating to politics, literature, and science, and for the transmission of private letters. It would be, therefore, in his opinion, in conflict with the provision of the Constitution, giving Congress the power to establish the post-office, as well as an abridgment of the freedom of the press, to carry into effect the provisions of the bill.

The Senator from Pennsylvania reïterated the argument used the other day by his friend from Georgia, that you have no right to diffuse publications through the agency of the post-office, for the purpose of exciting a servile war. Now let me tell the gentleman, (said Mr. D.) that this is an old argument against the liberty of the press, and that it has been used whenever it was thought necessary to establish a censorship over it. The public morals were said to be in danger; it was necessary to prevent licentiousness, tumult, and sedition; and the public good required that the licentiousness of the press should be restrained. All these were the plausible pretences under which the freedom of the press had been violated in all ages. Now they knew that the press was at all times corrupt; but when they came to decide the question whether the tares should be rooted up, and the wheat along with it, those who had decided in favor of liberty, had always decided that it was better to put up with a lesser evil than to draw down upon themselves one of such fearful magnitude, as must result from the destruction of the press. Mr. D. contended that the power to be given to the deputy postmasters to decide what should, and what should not be distributed from the post-office, gave them a dangerous discretion over a very delicate matter, and that the power was one highly susceptible of abuse, and always liable to misconstruction.

Mr. Grundy (of Tennessee) observed that this bill was intended simply to prevent any officer of the Government, who should violate the laws of the States in which he resided, from sheltering himself under the post-office law. As the bill now stood, the objections with regard to abridging the freedom of the press had no application whatever. There was no provision in the bill interfering with the printing or publishing of any matter whatever, nor was it even pretended that Congress possessed the power of doing so. It was not even said that certain publications, no matter how incendiary in their character, should not be deposited in the post-office, and transmitted through the mails. Therefore all the objections that he had heard to the bill fell to the ground. In this bill, the Government simply said to the individuals in its employ, “We will not help you to do an act in violation of the laws of the State in which you live.” That was the ground on which the bill was framed, and it could not be pretended that this was an abridgment of the liberty of the press. It was only the Government declining to assist an individual in the violation of the law, and that was the whole bill. The Government, under the Constitution, had an entire control of the Post-Office Department. It had the power to regulate what matters should be carried through the mails, and what should not. We say to everybody that to these slaveholding States you may transmit through the mails what you please, but if you transmit to one of our officers what is prohibited by the laws of the State in which he resides, we shall say to that officer, you shall not put on the mantle of the Government to assist you in the violation of that law; you shall be subject to the penalties of the State laws, besides removal from office. In fact there was not the slightest pretext for saying that this bill violates in the remotest degree the freedom of the press. Nothing should be carried in the mails but what was proper for transmission through them; but if there was anything sent through them tending to excite insurrection and bloodshed, how could there be an objection to the passage of a law, saying that it should not be delivered out of the post-office?

The gentleman from Massachusetts objected to the vagueness of the bill in saying what shall not be distributed from the post-offices. How could the matter, he asked, be made more specific? When the publication arrived at the post-office where it was prohibited, and was about to be handed out, the State law would be consulted, and by it, it would be decided whether it was in violation of the State law or not, and it could thus be determined whether it was proper for delivery. He should not say anything as to the report—he did not concur in it farther than that this was a great evil, and should be corrected in the mildest way that it could be done. This bill did not affect any individual but those of the post-offices of the States where laws have been passed prohibiting publications and pictorial representations, calculated to excite insurrection among the slaves. He was opposed to the original bill, because it interfered with what publications should be deposited in, as well as delivered from, the post-offices. But it was only at the delivery office where this bill would operate, and the postmaster at such office would be operated on by the laws of the State in which it is situated. If this bill was not passed, nothing could be done, and the post-office would be made (for there were persons wicked enough to do it) the medium through which to send fire-brands throughout the country.

Mr. Clay said that he considered this bill totally unnecessary and uncalled for by public sentiment; and in this he differed with the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan); for he believed that the President’s message on the subject had met with general disapprobation; that it was unconstitutional; and if not so, that it contained a principle of a most dangerous and alarming character. When he saw that the exercise of the most extraordinary and dangerous power had been assumed by the head of the post-office, and that it had been sustained by this message, he turned his attention to the subject and inquired whether it was necessary that the General Government should, under any circumstances, exercise such a power, and whether it possessed it; and after much reflection, he had come to the conclusion, that they could not pass any law interfering with the subject in any shape or form whatever.

The evil complained of was the circulation of papers having a certain tendency. The papers, unless circulated, did no harm, and while in the post-office or in the mail—it was a circulation solely which constituted the evil. It was the taking them out of the mail, and the use that was to be made of them, that constituted the mischief.—Then it was perfectly competent to the State authorities to apply the remedy. The instant that a prohibited paper was handed out, whether to a citizen or sojourner, he was subject to the laws which might compel him either to surrender them or burn them. He considered the bill not only unnecessary, but as a law of a dangerous, if not a doubtful authority.

It was objected that it was vague and indefinite in its character; and how is that objection got over? The bill provided that it shall not be lawful for any deputy postmaster, in any State, Territory, or District of the United States, knowingly to deliver to any person whatever, any pamphlet, newspaper, handbill, or other printed paper or pictorial representation, touching the subject of slavery, where, by the laws of said State, Territory, or District, their circulation is prohibited. Now, what could be more vague and indefinite than this description? Now, could it be decided by this description, what publications should be withheld from distribution? The gentleman from Pennsylvania said that the laws of the States would supply the omission. He thought the Senator was premature in saying that there would be a precision in State laws, before he showed it by producing the law. He had seen no such law, and he did not know whether the description in the bill was applicable or not. There was another objection to this part of the bill: it applied not only to the present laws of the States, but to any future laws they might pass.

Mr. C. denied that the bill applied to the slaveholding States only, and went on to argue that it could be applied to all the States, and to any publication touching the subject of slavery whatever, whether for or against it, if such publication was only prohibited by the laws of such State. Thus, for instance, a non-slaveholding State might prohibit publications in defence of the institution of slavery, and this bill would apply to it as well as to the laws of the slaveholding States; but the law would be inoperative: it declared that the deputy postmaster should not be amenable, unless he knowingly shall deliver, etc. Why, the postmaster might plead ignorance, and of course the law would be inoperative.