Chapter XV: Final Causes; Universal Order (2)

Before passing on to deal, in our concluding section, with the great fact of order, let us briefly compare with the foregoing explanation of nature and its laws the attempt of mechanists to explain these without recognizing in the physical universe any influence of final causes, or any indication of a purposive intelligence. We have ventured to describe their attitude as philosophic fatalism.(520) According to their view there is no ground for the distinction between phenomena that happen “naturally” and phenomena that happen “accidentally” or “by chance”. All alike happen by the same kind of general necessity: the generation of a “monster” is as “natural” as the generation of normal offspring; the former, when it occurs, is just as inevitably the outcome of the physical forces at work in the particular case as the latter is the outcome of the particular set of efficient causes which do actually produce the normal result: the only difference is that the former, occurring less frequently and as the result of a rarer and less known conjunction of “physical” causes than the latter, is not expected by us to occur, and is consequently regarded, when it does occur, as exceptional. Now it is quite true that what we call “chance” effects, or “exceptional” effects, result just as inevitably from the set of forces operative in their case, as normal effects result from the forces operative in theirs. But this leaves for explanation something which the mechanist cannot explain. He regards a physical law merely as a generalization, beyond experience, of some experienced uniformity; and he holds that all our physical laws are provisional in the sense that a wider and deeper knowledge of the actual conditions of interaction among the physical forces of the universe would enable us to eliminate exceptions—which are all apparent, not real—by restating our laws in such a comprehensive way as to include all such cases. We may, indeed, admit that our physical laws are open to revision and restatement in this sense, and are _de facto_ often modified in this sense by the progress of science. But the important point is this, that the mechanist does not admit the existence, in physical agencies, of any law in the sense of a _natural inclination towards an end_, or in any sense in which it would imply intelligence, design, or purpose. On the contrary, claiming as he does that all physical phenomena are _reducible to mechanical motions of inert masses, atoms, or particles of matter in space_, he is obliged to regard all physical agencies as being, so far as their nature is concerned, wholly _indifferent_ to any particular form of activity.(521) Committed to the indefensible view that all qualitative change is reducible to quantitative (11), and all material differences to differences in the location of material particles and in the velocity and direction of the spatial motion impressed upon each by others extrinsic to itself, he has left himself no factors wherewith to explain the actual order and course of the universe, other than the purely _indifferent_ factors of essentially or naturally homogeneous particles of inert matter endowed with local motion. We emphasize this feature of indifference; for the conception of an inert particle of matter subject to mechanical motion impressed upon it from without, is the very type of an indifferent agency. What such an entity will do, whether or not it will move, with what velocity and in what direction it will move—in a word, its entire conduct, its rôle in the universe, the sum-total of its functions—nothing of all this is dependent on itself; everything depends on agencies extrinsic to it, and on its extrinsic time-and-space relations to these agencies; and these latter in turn are in the same condition as itself. Now is it conceivable that agencies of this kind, of themselves absolutely indifferent to any particular kind of effect, suitable or unsuitable, regular or irregular, orderly or disorderly, could actually produce and maintain the existing order of the universe? If they were themselves _produced by an All-Wise and All-Powerful Being_, and _definitely arranged_ in spatial relations to one another, and _initial mechanical motion in definite directions and velocities_ impressed on the different parts of the system, there is no denying that Infinite Wisdom and Power could, by Divine concurrence even with such indifferent agencies, realize and maintain a _cosmos_, or _orderly_ universe. Such _purely extrinsic finality_ (106) could, absolutely speaking, account for the existence of order, uniformity, regularity, system; though all the evidence furnished by the universe of our actual experience points to the existence of _intrinsic finality_ also as understood by Aristotle and the scholastics. But the mechanist will not allow even extrinsic finality; he will not recognize in the actual universe of our experience any evidence of a Ruling Intelligence realizing a plan or design for an intelligent purpose; he denies the necessity of the inference from the data of human experience to the existence of a Guiding Intelligence. And what are his alternatives? He may choose one or other of two.

He may restate in the more scientific and imposing terminology of modern mechanics the crude conception of the ancient Greek atomists: that the actual order of the universe is the absolutely inevitable and fatal outcome of a certain collocation of the moving masses of the physical universe, a collocation favourable to order, a collocation which _just happened to occur_ by some happy chance from the essentially aimless, purposeless, indifferent and _chaotic_ motions of those material masses and particles. We say “chaotic,” for _chaos_ is the absence of _cosmos_; and _order_ is the fact that has got to be explained. In the concept of _indifferent, inert_ atoms of matter moving through space there is emphatically no principle of order;(522) and hence the mechanist who will not admit the necessity of inferring an Intelligence to give these moving masses or atoms the collocation _favourable to order_ is forced to “explain” this supposed collocation by attributing it to pure chance—the _concursus fortuitus atomorum_ of the ancient Greeks. When, however, we reflect that the more numerous these atoms and the more varied and complex their motions, the smaller is the chance of a collocation favourable to order; that the atoms and motions are supposed actually to surpass any assignable number; that therefore the chance of any such favourable collocation occurring is indefinitely smaller than any measurable proportion,—we can draw our own conclusions about the value of such a speculation as a rational “explanation” of the existing _cosmos_. And this apart altogether from the consideration that the fact to be explained is not merely the _momentary_ occurrence of an orderly collocation, but the _maintenance_ of an orderly system of cosmic phenomena _throughout the lapse of all time_. No orderly finite system of mechanical motions arranged by human skill can preserve its orderly motions indefinitely without intelligent human supervision: the neglected machine will get out of order, run down, wear out, if left to itself; and we are asked to believe that the whole universe is one vast machine which not only goes on without intelligent supervision, but which actually made itself by chance!(523)

Naturally such an “explanation” of the universe does not commend itself to any man of serious thought, whatever his difficulties may be against the argument from the fact of order in the universe to the existence of an Intelligent Designer. Add to this the consideration that the mechanist theory does not even claim to account for the first origin of the universe: it postulates the existence of matter in motion. In regard to this supreme problem of the _first origin_ of the universe the attitude of the mechanist is avowedly _agnostic_; and in view of what we have just remarked about the “chance” theory as an “explanation” of the _existing order_ of the universe, it is no matter for surprise that most mechanists reject this theory and embrace the agnostic attitude in regard to this latter problem also. Whether the agnostic attitude they assume be negative or positive, _i.e._ whether they are content to say that they themselves at least fail to find any satisfactory rational explanation of the _origin_ and _nature_ of the _cosmos_, or contend further that no rational solution of these problems is within the reach of the human mind, their teaching is refuted in Natural Theology, where the theistic solution of these problems is set forth and vindicated.

110. THE ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE; A FACT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS.—The considerations so far submitted in this chapter, as pointing to the existence and influence of final causes in the universe, will be strengthened and completed by a brief analysis of _order_ and its implications.

We have seen already (55) that the apprehension of order in things implies the recognition of _some unifying principle in what is manifold_. What, in general, is the nature of this principle? It is the _point of view_, the _standpoint_ from which the unifying arrangement or disposition of the manifold is carried out; in other words it is the _end_, _object_, or _purpose_, of the orderly arrangement. The arrangement, and the order resulting from it, will vary according to the end in view—whether, for instance, it be an arrangement of books in a library, of pictures in a gallery, of materials in an edifice, of parts in a machine. Hence St. Thomas’s definition of order as the due adaptation of means to ends: _recta ratio rerum ad finem_. When this adaptation is the work of human intelligence the order realized is _artificial_, when it is the work of nature the order realized is _natural_. Art is an extrinsic principle of order, nature implies indeed also an intelligent extrinsic principle of order, but is itself an intrinsic principle of order: the works of nature and those of art have this feature in common, that they manifest adaptation of means to ends.(524)

The _subordination_ of means to ends realizes an order which has for its unifying principle the influence of an _end_, a _final cause_. The group of _dynamic_ relations thus revealed constitutes what is called _teleological_ order, the order of _purpose_ or _finality_. The realization or execution of such an order implies the simultaneous existence of _co-ordinated_ parts or members in a system, a realized whole with complex, co-ordinated, orderly parts, the principle of unity in this system being the _form_ of the whole. This realized, disposed, or constituted order, is called the _esthetic_ order (55), the order of co-ordination, composition, constitution. In ultimate analysis, however, these two orders, the _teleological_ and the _esthetic_, having as respective unifying principles the _final_ cause and the _formal_ cause, are not two really distinct orders, but rather two aspects of one and the same order: we have seen that in the things of nature the intrinsic end or final cause of each is identical with its _forma substantialis_ or formal cause (108). But the final cause is naturally prior to the formal cause, and consequently the teleological order is more fundamental than the esthetic.

St. Augustine’s definition of order as “the arrangement of a multiplicity of things, similar and dissimilar, according its proper place to each,”(525) reveals the _material_ cause of order in the multiplicity of varied elements, the _formal_ cause of order in the group of relations resulting from the arrangement or _dispositio_, and the _efficient_ cause of order in the agent that disposes or arranges them. The _final_ cause, though not directly mentioned, is implied in the fact that the place of each factor in the system is necessarily determined by the function it has to fulfil, the part it is suited by its nature to play, in contributing to the realization of the end or purpose of the arrangement.

If, then, order is _the right arrangement or disposition of things according to their destination, or in the mutual relations demanded by their ends_, it necessarily follows that the very existence of _natural_ order in the universe implies that this universe is not a work of _chance_ but a _purposive_ work, just as the existence of _artificial_ order in products of human art implies that these products are not the result of chance but of activity influenced by final causes.(526)

It is in fact impossible to conceive order except as resulting from the influence of final causes. Right reason rejects as an utterly inadequate explanation of the natural order of the universe the fantastic and far-fetched supposition of a chance collocation of indifferent, undetermined and aimless physical agencies.(527) If we find in the actual physical universe difficulties against the view that this universe reveals the influence of final causes, such difficulties do not arise from the fact that there is order in the universe, but rather from the fact that with this order there seems to coexist some degree of disorder also. In so far forth as there is natural order there is _cogent_ evidence of the influence of final causes. And so necessary is this inference that even one single authentic instance of natural order in an otherwise chaotic universe would oblige us to infer the existence and influence of a final cause to account for that solitary instance. We mean by an authentic instance one which evidences a real and sustained uniformity, regularity, mutual co-ordination and subordination of factors in the behaviour of any group of natural agencies; for we allow that transient momentary collocations and concurrences of _indifferent_ agencies, acting aimlessly and without purpose as a matter of fact, might present to our minds, accustomed to seek for orderly and purposive phenomena, the deceptive appearance of order.

Order, then, we take it, necessarily implies the existence and influence of final causes. This in turn, as we have already observed, implies with equal necessity the existence of _Intelligent Purpose_. If, then, there is natural order in the universe, there must exist an _Intelligent Will_ to account for this natural order.

Leaving the development of this line of argument to its proper place in Natural Theology, there remains the simple question of fact: Is the physical universe a _cosmos_? Does it reveal order—a natural order distinct from the artificial order realized by the human mind in the mechanical and fine arts, an order, therefore, realized not by the human mind but by some other mind, by the Divine Mind? The evidences of such order superabound. We have already referred to some of them (106), nor is there any need to labour the matter. Two points, however, in connexion with this universally recognized fact of order in the universe, call for a brief mention before we conclude. They are in the nature of difficulties against the ordinary, reasonable view of the matter, the view on which the theistic argument from order is based.

In accordance with the Kantian theory of knowledge it is objected that the order which we apprehend, or think we apprehend, in the universe, is not _really in_ the universe of our experience, but is as it were _projected into_ this universe by our own minds in the very process of cognition itself. It is therefore not real but only apparent, not noumenal but only phenomenal. It is simply a product of the categorizing, unifying, systematizing activity of our minds. It is a feature of the phenomenon or mental product, _i.e._ of the noumenal _datum_ as _invested with a category of thought_. But whether or not it is a characteristic of the real universe itself man’s speculative reason is by its very constitution essentially incapable of ever discovering. The theory of knowledge on which this difficulty is based can be shown to be unsound and erroneous. For a criticism of the theory we must refer the reader to scholastic works on Epistemology. It may be observed, however, apart from the merits or demerits of the theory, that the experienced fact of order is by no means demolished or explained away by any questions that may be raised about the exact _location_ of the fact, if we may so express it. Order is a fact, an undeniable, experienced fact; and it looms just as large, and cries out just as insistently for explanation, with whichever of the imposing adjectives “noumenal” or “phenomenal” a philosopher may choose to qualify it; nor do we diminish its reality by calling it phenomenal one whit more than we increase that reality by calling it noumenal.

The other difficulty arises from the existence of _disorder_ in the universe. Pessimists of the type of Schopenhauer or Nietzsche concentrate their attention so exclusively on the evidences of disorder, the failures of adaptation of means to ends, the defects and excesses, the prodigality and penury, the pain and suffering, which abound in physical nature—not to speak of moral evil,—that they become blind to all evidences of order, and proclaim all belief in order an illusion.

The picture of

Nature, red in tooth and claw
With ravine(528)

is, however, the product of a morbid and distraught imagination rather than a sane view of the facts. The undeniable existence of disorder, of physical evils, defects, failures, frustrations of natural tendency in the universe, does not obscure or conceal from the normal, unbiassed mind the equally undeniable evidences of a great and wide and generally prevailing order. Nor does it conceal from such a mind the fact that the existence of order in any measure or degree implies of necessity the existence of plan or design, and therefore of intelligent purpose also. Inferring from this fact of order the existence of a Supreme Intelligence, and inferring by other lines of reasoning from the data of experience the dependence of the universe on this Intelligence as Creator, Conserver and Ruler, the theist is confronted with the reality of moral and physical evil (52), _i.e._ of _disorder_ in the universe. But he does not see in this disorder anything essentially incompatible with his established conclusion that the universe is a finite creation of Infinite Wisdom, and a free manifestation of the latter to man. If the actual universe is imperfect, he knows that God created it freely and might have created a more perfect or a less perfect one. Knowing that God is All-Powerful as He is All-Wise, he knows that the actual universe, though imperfect _absolutely_, is perfect _relatively_, in that it infallibly reveals the Divine Wisdom and Goodness exactly in the measure in which God has willed to reveal Himself in His works. Conscious on the one hand that his finite mind cannot trace in detail all the purposes of God in nature, or assign to all individual events their divinely appointed ends, he is confident on the other hand that the whole universe is intelligible only as the working out of a Divine plan, and not otherwise. To his mind as a theist these lines are a clearer expression of rationally grounded optimism than they were perhaps even to the poet who penned them:—

I trust in nature for the stable laws
Of beauty and utility. Spring shall plant
And Autumn garner to the end of time.
I trust in God—the right shall be the right
And other than the wrong, while He endures;
I trust in my own soul, that can perceive
The outward and the inward, Nature’s good
And God’s.(529)

We have seen that the agencies which constitute the universal order have each its own inner principle of finality; that these agencies are not isolated but mutually related in such ways that the ends of each subserve an extrinsic and remoter end which is none other than this universal order whereby we recognize the world as a _cosmos_. The maintenance of this order is the _intrinsic_ end of the universe as a whole: an end which is _immanent_ in the universe, an end which is of course _a good_. But this universal order itself is _for an end_, an _extrinsic_, _transcendent_ end, distinct from itself; and this end, too, must be _a good_. “The universe,” says St. Thomas,(530) “has the good of order and another distinct good.” The universal order, says Aristotle, has itself an end, a _good_, which is _one_, and to which all else is ordained: “πρὸς ἕν ἅπαντα συντέτακται”.(531) What can this Supreme Good be, this absolutely Ultimate End, this Transcendent Principle of all nature, and of all nature’s tendencies and activities? Whence comes this universal tendency of all nature, if not from the Being who is the One, Eternal, Immutable Prime Mover,(532) and whose moving influence is Love?(533) Such is the profound thought of Aristotle, a thought re-echoed so sublimely by the immortal poet of Christian philosophy in the closing line of the _Paradiso_:—

L’amor che muove il Sole e l’altre stelle.

The immediate factors of the universal order of nature, themselves devoid of intelligence, must therefore be the work of Intelligent Will. To arrange these factors as parts of one harmonious whole, as members of one orderly system, Supreme Wisdom must have conceived the plan and chosen the means to realize it. The manifestation of God’s glory by the realization of this plan, such is the ultimate transcendent end of the whole created universe. “The whole order of the universe,” writes St. Thomas, developing the thought of Aristotle,(534) “is for the Prime Mover thereof; this order has for its purpose the working out in an orderly universe of the plan conceived and willed by the Prime Mover. And hence the Prime Mover is the principle of this universal order.”

The truths so briefly outlined in this closing chapter on the order and purpose of the universe have nowhere found more apt and lucid philosophical formulation than in the monumental writings of the Angel of the Christian Schools; nor perhaps have they ever elsewhere appeared in a more felicitous setting of poetic imagery than in these stanzas from the immortal epic of the Poet of the Christian Schools:—

... Le cose tutte quante
Hann’ ordine tra lora; e questa è forma
Che l’universo a Dio fa simigliante.

Qui veggion l’alte creature l’orma
Dell’eterno Valore, il quale è fine
Al quale è fatta la toccata norma.

Nell’ ordine ch’io dico sono accline
Tutte nature per diverse sorti
Più al Principio loro e men vicine;

Onde si muovono a diversi porti
Per lo gran mar dell’essere, e ciascuna
Con instinto a lei dato che la porti.

Questi ne porta il fuoco inver la Luna:
Questi ne’ cuor mortali è permotore;
Questi la terra in se stringe ed aduna.

Nè pur le creature, che son fuore
D’intelligenza, quest’ arco saetta
Ma quelle ch’ hanno intelletto ed amore.

La Providenza, che cotanto assetta,
Del suo lume fa il ciel sempre quieto,
Nel qual si volge quel ch’ha maggior fretta:

Ed ora li, com’ a sito decreto,
Cen porta la virtù di quella corda,
Che ciò che scocca drizzo in segno lieto.(535)

INDEX.

Absolute, the, 47 _sq._;
and relative, 332 _sqq._

Accidents, individuation of, 133 _sqq._;
causes of, 235-6;
divisions of, 237 _sqq._;
existence and relation to substance, 232 _sqq._, 240 _sqq._, 243, 247
_n._, 249, 313.

_Actio et passio_, _v._ causality, causes.

_Actio intentionalis_, 378.

_Actio in distans_, 395-6.

Action, immanent and transitive, 73, 369, 391-2.

Actual and potential, 52 _sqq._ and _passim_.

Actuality, goodness and perfection, 173 _sqq._

_Actus Purus_, 54, 58.

AEGIDIUS, 108 _n._

_Aeveternitas_, _aevum_, 230.

Agnosticism, 96, 97, 335, 383, 409, 414, 427.

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, 108 _n._, 201 _n._, 288.

ALEXANDER OF HALES, 110 _n._, 112 _n._

Analogy, analogical predication, 36 _sqq._, 122 _n._, 212, 240, 272, 330;
a. inference, 386-7, 391.

ANDRONICUS OF RHODES, 17.

_Anima mundi_, 284.

ANSELM, ST., 353 _n._

Anthropology, 19.

Appetite, 167 _sqq._

_Appetitus naturalis_, 409-10, 413-15.

ARISTOTLE, on philosophy, 5;
on esthetics, 13;
on theology, 15, 16;
on special sciences, 16;
on analogy, 40;
on change, 51, 56, 68 _sqq._;
on essence, 75;
on individual, 120-1;
on the good, 167 _sqq._;
on beauty, 200 _n._, 201 _n._;
on substance and accident, 209, 249;
on “first” and “second” substances, 252-3;
on quality, 287, 290-2;
on habits, 293-6;
on quantity, 311 _n._;
on place, 318;
on time, 342;
on relation, 337 _n._, 346-8;
on principles, 358 _n._;
on causes, 361 _sqq._, 367;
on final causes, 406 _sqq._;
on “nature,” 416 _sqq._, 422-4, 426;
on order of the universe, 433.

Art, and nature, 416-17.

Arts, fine and mechanical, 13, 14, 430;
and science, 194-5;
scope of, 204 _sqq._;
and morals, 205-6.

Atomism, _v._ Mechanism.

AUGUSTINE, ST., on basis of possible essences, 89 _n._, 94;
on evil, 185 _n._;
on beauty, 198, 200 _n._, 202 _n._;
on time, 322;
on order, 429.

AUREOLUS, 110 _n._

AVERROÏSM, 284.

BALMES, 89 _n._, 90 _n._, 93.

BAÑEZ, D., 108 _n._, 350 _n._

BAUMGARTEN, 192 _n._

_Beatitudo_, 175 _n._, 411.

Beauty, the Beautiful, 13, 14;
analysis of, 192 _sqq._;
definitions of, 201 _sqq._

Being, concept analysed, 32 _sqq._;
real being and logical being, 10, 42 _sqq._, 85, 140.

— and Ideal Being, 45 _sqq._, 85.

— fundamental distinction in, 46 _sqq._

— metaphysical grades of, 123 _sqq._

— potential and actual, 51 _sqq._

BERGSON, 30, 289 _n._, 303.

BERKELEY, 215, 221, 350 _n._, 400.

BIEL, G., 110 _n._

BILLOT, 266 _n._

Bilocation, 322.

BOËTIUS, 329.

BOIRAC, 343.

BONAVENTURE, ST., on distinction of soul and faculties, 247-8.

BOSSUET, 196, 360.

BROWNING, 432.

BRUNETIÈRE, 196.

BULLIAT, 130 _n._

CAJETAN, 24, 38 _n._, 108 _n._, 350 _n._

CAPREOLUS, 87 _n._, 108 _n._, 350 _n._

CARY, 434 _n._

Categories, ultimate, analysis of, 208 _sqq._;
not adequately distinct as modes, 210-11, 350;
but exhaustive, 211-12.

_Causa exemplaris_, 362.

_Causalitas_ “_intentionalis_,” 413.

Causality, causes, notion analysed, 357 _sqq._;
classification, 361 _sqq._;
principle of C., 369 _sqq._, 384-5;
“plurality” of causes, 380;
causality and uniformity, 377, 381, 382;
“physical” cause, 382, 419;
phenomenist view of, 382 _sqq._;
and inductive science, 359, 379, 381, 382 _n._;
and determinism, 377;
and creation, 391, 400-1.

Causality, efficient, as index of real distinction, 148;
classification of efficient causes, 372 _sqq._;
instrumental, 373-6;
objective validity of concept, 382 _sqq._;
origin of concept, 385 _sqq._;
analysis of, 366 _sqq._, 388 _sqq._;
erroneous theories of, 392-6;
and occasionalism, 396 _sqq._, 400 _sqq._

— final (_v._ purpose), 361, 368;
intrinsic and extrinsic finality, 404 _sqq._, 426;
all-pervading influence of, 409;
divisions of, 409 _sqq._;
analysis of, 411_sqq._;
as implying intelligence, 409, 414-15, 426.

— formal, 361, 364-5.

— material, 361, 364-6.

Chance, 423 _sqq._

Change, 61 _sqq._, 302-5;
and time, 323;
and causality, 367, 389-96.

CICERO, 1.

CLARKE, 135.

_Cognitio_ “_vulgaris_,” 2.

Composition, logical and metaphysical, 34;
essential and integral, 311, 314-16;
as index of finiteness, 248.

COMTE, 30, 334.

Conceptualism, 24, 125.

_Concursus Divinus_,66, 329, 348, 375 _n._, 388 _sqq._;
necessity of, 389-91, 401-3.

Condition, and cause, 358-9, 419.

Consciousness, and personality, 273, 277 _sqq._;
“subliminal,” 282 sqq.

Constitutive or constructive factors in thought, 45, 74, 340, 355-6.

Contingent and necessary Being, 47.

Co-operation, in philosophical studies, 30.

Correlatives, 388.

_Corruptio et generatio_, 71, 186.

Cosmology, 16, 19, 285, 309, 364, 388, 393.

COUSIN, 301, 387.

_Creatio ab aeterno_, 89, 328.

Criteriology, _v._ Knowledge, theory of.

DANTE, 434 n.

DAVID OF DINANT, 125 _n._

DE MUNNYNCK, 84 _n._, 89 _n._, 91 _n._, 94 _n._, 95 _n._

DE SAN, 241 _n._, 327 _n._, 331 _n._

DESCARTES, on basis of essences, 96, 97;
on substance, 214, 226-8, 230, 241 _n._;
on accidents, 244;
on corporeal substance, 312-13, 315, 397.

Design, _v._ purpose and final cause.

DE WULF, 6 _n._, 27 _n._, 29 _n._, 156 _n._, 195 _n._, 284.

Disposition, _v._ habit.

_Dispositiones ad formam_, 295 n.

Disorder, fact of, 431-2.

Distinctions, doctrine of, 105 _sqq._, 139 _sqq._, 242-3, 249-51, 301-5.

DOMET DE VORGES, 387 _n._

“Double law” in man, 176.

“Double personality,” 282-4.

DRISCOLL, 89 _n._

DUPASQUIER, 99 _n._

DURANDUS, 110 _n._

Duration, 322, 325 _n._, 328 _sqq._

Education, and habits, 298.

Efficiency, concept of, _v._ cause (efficient).

Ego, _v._ person.

ELEATICS, 51, 125, 303.

End (_v._ purpose), 406.

Energies, equivalence of, 395.

_Ens a se_, _ab alio_, 47;
and _ens in se_, 230-1, 334.

_Ens rationis_, _v._ Being.

Entitative habit, 292 _n._

Epistemology, _v._ Knowledge, theory of.

_Esse_ “_intentionale_,” 45, 46, 412.

Essence, analysis of, 75 _sqq._;
and nature and substance, 79, 258.

Esthetics, 13, 14, 192 sqq.

Eternity, 328 _sqq._;
of essences, 80 _sqq._

Ether, hypothesis of, 317, 395.

Ethics, 11-12, 296-7, 428-9.

Eucharist, and substance and accidents, 223 _n._, 233, 243 _n._;
and quantity, 312-16; 319 _n._, 322, 345 _n._

EUCKEN, 28.

Evil, analysis of, 182 _sqq._

Exemplarism, 98, 100, 161-2.

Existence, and essence, 101-13;
of accidents, 243-61;
and subsistence, 266, 269;
and action, 301.

Extension, _v._ quantity.

Extrinsic denominations, 238, 239.

Faculties, 298 _sqq._;
and substance, 300 _sqq._

Faith and reason, 5.

Fatalism, 424 _n._

Figure, or form, as indicative of nature, 292-3.

_Finis_, finality, _v._ purpose and final causes.

Finite and Infinite, 47, 301-3.

FONSECA, 113 n.

“_Forma_” as essence or nature, 78-9, 130.

_Formae subsistentes_, 129.

“Formal” unity, 156.

_Formalitates_, 154.

Formative principles, simplicity of, 317-18;
plurality in the individual, 365 (_n._ 4).

FRANCIS OF VITTORIA, 113 _n._

FRANZELIN, 110 _n._, 267 _n._

Free causes, 376-7;
and occasionalism, 398.

Freedom of thought, 6.

_Generatio_, _v._ _corruptio_.

Genuensis, 98 _n._

“_Genus_” and “_differentia_” as “_materia_” and “_forma_,” 79 _n._, 365
(_n._ 4).

GEULINCX, 397.

GIOBERTI, 94.

Good, analysis of the, 167 _sqq._;
divisions of the, 175 _sqq._;
and being, 177 _sqq._;
and beauty, 193.

GOUDIN, 108 _n._

Graceful, elegant, the, 199 _n._

GREGORY OF VALENTIA, 110 _n._

Habit, analysis of, 292 _sqq._

_Haecceitas_, 125, 132.

HARPER, 99 _n._

HEGEL, Hegelianism, 30, 33, 46, 49, 67-8, 97, 208, 335.

HENRY OF GHENT, 87 _n._, 113 _n._

HERACLITUS, 51, 303.

HICKEY, 89 _n._

HOBBES, 334.

HÖFFDING, 230 _n._

HUME, 213;
on substance, 215, 217, 221;
on cause, 370 _n._, 385.

HUNLEY, 219 _n._

_Hypostasis_, 265.

Hypostatic Union, 267-71.

Idealism, 214, 334-6, 341, 343, 400.

Identity, 135 _sqq._;
and change, 139, 226, 241, 278;
personal, 276, 277 _sqq._

Immaterial, positively and negatively, 16.

Immensity, Divine, 319.

Impenetrability, 309, 322.

_Incommutabilia vera_, 89 _n._

Indiscernibles, identity of, 135.

Individuation, 120, 123 _sqq._, 148, 261.

Infinite and Finite, 47;
and categories, 212.

Infinite regress in causation, 373.

Inherence, _v._ accident.

_Intentio mentis_, 10, 43, 144 _n._, 145, 211, 339.

“_Intentio naturae_,” 414 _n._, 416, 423.

“Intentional” causality, 413.

JAMES, 30;
on personal identity, 283-4.

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, 108 _n._, 350 _n._

JOSEPH, on meanings of “cause,” 379-80.

JOUFFROY, 275.

KANT, 21, 30, 121, 145, 201, 208, 228, 334, 335, 343, 385, 393, 394, 430.

KAPPES, M., 75 _n._

KLEUTGEN, 38, 39, 40, 43, 87 _n._, 103 _n._, 142 _n._;
on accidents, 242, 247 _n._, 267 _n._, 330 _n._

KLIMKE, 67 _n._

Knowledge, relativity of, 335 _sqq._

—scientific, 2.

—theory of, 11, 20, 23, 45, 46, 70, 108;
and doctrine of distinctions, 143-6, 151-3;
and categories of being, 207 _sqq._, 285, 289;
and category of relation, 332 _sqq._, 385;
and causality, 393;
and order, 430-1.

_Lacensis, Philosophia_, 21.

LACORDAIRE, 89 _n._

LADD, 24, 27.

LAHOUSSE, 99 _n._

LAMINNE, 60 _n._, 371 _n._

Law, of nature, 418 _sqq._

LEIBNIZ, 21, 98 _n._, 135, 182, 227, 298, 387, 406.

LEO XIII, 7, 26.

LIBERATORE, 99 _n._

LITTRÉ, 213.

LOCKE, on substance, 214, 221;
on personality, 277-84, 334.

Logic, 10.

MAHER, 223 _n._, 230 _n._, 273 _n._;
on consciousness of self, 274-6, 282 _n._;
on theories of self, 283-4, 289 _n._;
on perception of time, 324 _n._, 326-7;
on relativity of knowledge, 336 _n._;
on cause, 386 _n._

MALEBRANCHE, 397-400.

Manicheism, 182, 189-91.

MASTRIUS, 99 _n._

_Materia prima_, Aristotle on, 71-2.

_Materia signata_, 127, 129, 131, 135.

Mathematical unity, 116, 119.

Mathematics, philosophy of, 17, 25.

Matter, and evil, 190.

— divisibility of (_v._ individuation), 317;
continuity of, 317-18.

Measurement, relativity of, 325-7.

Mechanism, mechanical conception of universe, 69, 265, 289, 393-6, 404,
409, 413, 414, 424-9.

Memory, and personality, 276-84.

MENDIVE, 99 _n._

MERCIER, on division of metaphysics, 21;
on scholasticism, 26-7;
on characteristics of essences, 83, 93-4;
on analogical concept of God, 97;
on distinction, 107;
on phenomenism, 213, 224 _n._, 269 _n._;
on faculty and substance, 305 _n._;
on interaction, 391;
on efficient cause, 393 _n._;
on occasionalism, 398 _n._;
on mechanism, 426 _n._, 429 _n._

Metaphor, and analogy, 39.

Metaphysics, division of, 15 _sqq._;
etymology of, 17, 18;
scope of, 24, 25, 27;
and physics, _v._ physics.

MILL, 213, 220, 334, 343;
on causes, 382.

Modal distinction, 150, 245 _sqq._

Modes, accidental and substantial, 150-1, 239, 245 _sqq._, 270, 325 _n._,
330-1.

MOLINA, 113 _n._

Monadology, of Leibniz, 227.

Monism, 46, 97, 103, 125, 230, 284, 350 _n._, 399. 409.

Monophysites, 268.

Monopsychism, 284.

Moral cause, 377-8.

Morality and art, 205-6.

Motion (_v._ change), and efficient causality, 392-6.

Multitude, actually infinite, 321-2.

Nature and substance, 257 _sqq._;
and person, 261 _sqq._;
analysis of notion of, 461 _sqq._

Necessary and Contingent Being, 47.

Necessity of essences, 81 _sqq._

— of physical laws, 419-28.

NEWMAN, on scope of philosophy, 22, 31;
on causality, 377, 387.

NIETZSCHE, 431.

_Nisus naturae_, 421.

Nominalism, 125.

_Notas individuantes_, 124, 131.

NYS, 309 _n._, 311 _n._, 321 _n._, 327 _n._, 328 _n._, 395 _n._

Occasion, and cause, 359.

Occasionalism, 226, 387, 388;
examined, 396-403.

Ontology, 21, 23.

Ontologism, 95, 350 _n._

Optimism, 181-2, 432.

Older, static and dynamic, 199, 428;
and beauty, 194, 199, 428;
natural and artificial, 428;
and relation, 342;
and final cause, 428;
and formal cause, 429;
and intelligent purpose, 417, 429-30, 433.

Panpsychism, 250.

Pantheism, _v._ monism.

PAULSEN, 213, 226-7.

Perfection, analysis of, 171 _sqq._;
and beauty, 201;
grades of, 59, 172-3;
in substances, 134, 255;
and distinction, 142 _n._;
and habit, 297;
and relation, 342.

Person, personality, 262 _sqq._;
definition of, 265, 270 _n._;
distinction from individual nature, 266 _sqq._;
false theories of, 276 _sqq._;
“subconscious,” 283-4.

PESCH, 99 _n._

Pessimism, 181-2, 431.

Phenomenism, and substance, 213 _sqq._, 223;
substantializes accidents, 215;
substantializes consciousness, 281, 282-4;
and causality, 382 _sqq._, 398, 421.

Philosophy, notion of, 2 _sqq._;
divisions of, 7 _sqq._;
and special sciences, 28-9.

Place, analysis of, 318 _sqq._

PLATO, 93, 94, 95, 167, 200 _n._, 201.

Pleasure, sensible and esthetic, 196-7, 205-6.

POINCARÉ, 199 _n._

Positivism, 214, 334, 383, 409, 421.

Possible, the, 52 _sqq._, 82 _sqq._;
and intelligible, 97;
and passive potentiality, 109.

_Potentia obediantialis_, 372.

Potential, _v._ actual.

Power, operative, 55;
and passive potentiality, 298 _sqq._;
as index of perfection, 202 _n._;
classification of, 305.

_Praescisio objectiva et formalis_, 34, 146-7.

Prime mover, necessity of, 65-7.

Principle, notion of, 357-8.

_Privatio_, 62, 358.

Providence, and chance, 424.

Psychology, 19, 296.

Purpose, and the good, 169, 405 _sqq._;
and perfection, 408;
and order, 429.

PYTHAGORAS, 1.

QUALITY, analysis of, 286 _sqq._;
divisions of, 288 _sqq._;
characteristics of, 305 _sqq._;
grades of intensity in, 307.

Quantity, and individuation, 133;
analysis of, 309 _sqq._;
and corporeal substance, 311 _sqq._;
internal and external, 309-10, 314.

Rate, notion of, 325 _n._, 327 _n._

RADA, 99 _n._

Realism, moderate, 23, 125, 133, 242-3, 320.

— extreme, 46, 156-7.

Reason, and cause, 359-60.

— “sufficient,” 135, 182, 360.

REINSTADLER, 106 _n._

Relation, analysis of, 336 _sqq._;
logical, 338 _sqq._;
real, 341 _sqq._;
transcendental, 345;
predicamental, 346 _sqq._ ;
reality of the “_esse ad_,” 350-6.

Relative, the, 47 _sqq._, 332 _sqq._

RENOUVIER, 335.

Revelation, 4 _sqq._, 12, 25, 189, 233, 247, 252, 263, 265, 267, 312-15,
328, 358 _n._

RICKABY, 276 _n._

ROSCOE, 83 _n._

ROYCE, 25.

SCHIFFINI, 99 _n._

Scholasticism, 26, 30;
on substance, 218 _sqq._

SCHOPENHAUER, 431.

Science, _v._ knowledge.

Sciences, special, 16, 27;
at Louvain and Maynooth, 29 _n._

SCOTUS, 34, 39 _sqq._, 99, 113, 125, 132, 153 _sqq._, 247, 267 _n._

Self, consciousness of, 274 _sqq._ (_v._ person.)

SENECA, 424 _n._

_Sensibilia propria et communia_, objectivity of, 70;
_per se et per accidens_, 218, 260.

Sensism, 334, 383 _n._, 394 _n._

Similarity, and identity, 137, 306;
and distinction, 153.

Simplicity, and quantity, 307 _n._

_Situs_, category of, 309, 319 _n._

SOCRATES, 167.

Solipsism, 86.

SONCINAS, 108 _n._

SOTO, D. DE, 113 _n._

Space, analysis of, 319 _sqq._;
problems on, 321-2.

Specialists, scientific, and metaphysics, 27-28.

_Species expressa_, 46;
_sensibilis_, 313.

SPENCER, 30, 213, 228, 229, 335.

SPINOZA, on substance, 230-2, 334, 399.

Spirits, individuation of, 129, 131.

STORCHENAU, 98 _n._

SUAREZ, 41, 44, 110 _n._, 111 _n._, 267 _n._

Sublime, the, 199 _n._

_Subsistentia_, 131, 261 _sqq._ (_v._ person), 271-3.

Substance, category of, undeniable in thought, 209, 215, 220, 281, 282-4;
reality of, 213 _sqq._;
cognoscibility of, 213 _sqq._, 219 _sqq._;
plurality of, 221;
distinction from accidents, 224 _sqq._, 301-5;
erroneous notions of, 225 _sqq._;
permanence of, 229, 277;
divisions of, 252 _sqq._;
complete and incomplete, 254 _sqq._;
corporeal and spiritual, 253-4, 315-6;
relation to space, 319.

Substantial change, 71.

SULLY-PRUDHOMME, 203 _n._

Supernatural theology, 5, 12, 13.

— end, 411.

_Suppositum, suppositalitas_, _v._ person, personality.

TAINE, 213.

Taste, esthetic, 197.

Teleology, _v._ purpose and final cause.

TENNYSON, 31, 431.

Theodicy, 21.

Theology, natural, 15, 19, 182, 189, 285, 334, 438, 430.

THOMAS, ST., on division of philosophy, 9, 18, 26;
on analogy, 36;
on absolute being, 49;
on action, 60, 64;
on essences, 76, 79, 92;
on existence and essences, 102 _n._, 110 _n._, 112 _n._;
on unity, 116 _n._, 117 _n._, 119 _n._, 120 _n._, 156 _n._, 250;
on individuation, 127 _n._;
on ontological truth, 162-3, and falsity, 165 _n._;
on the good, 169 _n._, 174 _n._, 176 _n._, 180 _n._;
on evil, 183 _n._, 184 _n._;
on the beautiful, 193 _n._, 194 _n._, 200 _n._;
on Aristotle’s categories, 210, 211 _n._;
on substance and accident, 209 _n._, 223 _n._, 231 _n._, 232 _n._, 234
_n._, 241 _n._, 243 _n._, 248;
on essence as nature, 258-61;
on subsistence and personality, 263 _n._, 266 _n._, 269;
on quality, 283, 290, 293;
on habits, 294-6;
on power and substance, 300 _sqq._;
on grades in quality, 307-8;
on quantity and corporeal substance, 311 _sqq._;
on body and spirit, 314-6;
on time, 323-4;
on _creatio ab aeterno_, 328;
on duration, 330 _n._;
on relations, 339-40, 341 _n._, 342 _n._, 344 _n._, 347, 348 _n._, 351
_n._, 353 _n._, 354 _n._, 355 _n._, 356 _n._;
on classification of causes, 362 _n._;
on material and formal causes, 365 _n._;
on action, 367-8;
on instrumental cause, 375;
on created causes, 388 _n._, 389 _n._;
on occasionalism, 400 _n._;
on final causality, 408 _n._, 412 _n._, 415 _n._;
on nature and art, 417, 428 _n._;
on order, 428, 432 _n._, 433.

Thought and imagery, 392-6.

Time, analysis of, 322 _sqq._;
problems on, 328.

Tradition, 31.

Transcendental and generic notions, 35;
attributes of being, 114 _sqq._;
relations, 345.

Transubstantiation, 233.

Truth, ontological, 158 _sqq._

TURNER, 21 _n._

_Ubi_, category of, 309, 319.

Ubiquity, Divine, 319.

Uniformity of Nature, 377;
and law, 418;
and inductive science, 419;
degrees of, 422 _sqq._

Union, substantial and personal, 268.

Unity, doctrine of, 114 _sqq._, 242-3;
“organic” and “mechanical,” 249-51, 260-1, 278;
of living individual, 280-1, 301-5;
conceptual, 337.

Universal and individual (_v._ individuation), 252-3.

Univocal, _v._ analogical.

URRABURU, 35, 87 _n._, 88 _n._, 99 _n._, 124 _n._;
on modes, 245 _n._;
on nature and person, 267-8, 270 _n._, 288 _n._, 345 _n._, 355 _n._;
on instrumental causes, 374 _n._;
on cause, 393 _n._

Vacuum, and motion, 321.

VALLET, 201.

Variety, and beauty, 200.

VASQUEZ, 110 _n._

VEITCH, 334 _n._

Vital change, 64-5.

— acts, 246 _n._

Voluntarism, 96-7.

Weltanschauung, World-view, 4, 29, 30.

WILLIAM OF OCKAM, 95.

WINDELBAND, 7, 208 _n._

WOLFF, 21, 98.

WUNDT, 213, 226, 267 _n._

ZIGLIARA, 64 _n._, 107 _n._, 156 _n._, 301 _n._, 320 _n._, 398 _n._

FOOTNOTES

1 2 vols. Longmans, 1912.

_ 2 Institutions Metaphysica, quas Roma, in Pontificia Universitate
Gregoriana tradiderat_ P. JOANNES JOSEPHUS URRABURU, S.J. Volumen
Secundum: _Ontologia_ (Rome, 1891).

3 French version by SIERP, 4 vols. Paris, Gaume, 1868.

_ 4 Ontologie, ou Métaphysique Générale_, par D. MERCIER. Louvain, 3me
édit., 1902.

5 Τὴν ὀνομαζομένην σοφίαν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια καὶ τὰς ὑπολαμβάνουσι
πάντες.—ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, I., 1. “Sapientia [philosophia] est
scientia quae considerat primas et universales causas.”—ST. THOMAS,
_In Metaph._, I., I. 2.

_ 6 Cf._ DE WULF, _Scholasticism Old and New_, pp. 59-61, 191-4;
_History of Medieval Philosophy_, pp. 311-13; also two articles in
the _Irish Ecclesiastical Record_ (March and May, 1906) on _Thoughts
on Philosophy and Religion_, and an article in the _Irish
Theological Quarterly_ (October, 1910) on _Philosophy and
Sectarianism in Belfast University_, by the present writer.

_ 7 Cf._ Encyclical _Aeterni Patris_, on Philosophical Studies, by Pope
Leo XIII., August 4,1880.

8 Introduction, § 1.

9 As a brief general statement of the matter this is sufficiently
accurate and will not be misunderstood. Of course the general
standpoint of ultimate causes and reasons admits within itself some
variety of aspects. Thus Epistemology and Psychology deal with human
thought, but under different aspects; Psychology and Ethics deal
with human volition, but under different aspects, etc.

10 “Theoreticus sive speculativis intellectus, in hoc proprie ab
operativo sive practico distinguitur, quod speculativus habet pro
fine veritatem quam considerat, practicus autem veritatem
consideratam ordinat in operationem tamquam in finem; et ideo
differunt ab invicem fine; finis speculativae est veritas, finis
operativae sive practicae actio.”—ST. THOMAS, _In lib. Boetii de
Trinitate_.

11 Here is St. Thomas’ exposition and justification of the doctrine in
the text: “Sapientis est ordinare. Cujus ratio est, quia sapientia
est potissima perfectio rationis, cujus proprium est cognoscere
ordinem.... Ordo autem quadrupliciter ad rationem comparatatur. Est
enim quidam ordo quem ratio non facit, sed solum considerat, sicut
est ordo rerum naturalium. Alius autem est ordo, quem ratio
considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos
ad invicem, et signa conceptuum, quae sunt voces significativae.
Tertius autem est quem ratio considerando facit in operationibus
voluntatis. Quartus autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit in
exterioribus rebus, quarum ipsa est causa, sicut in arca et domo. Et
quia consideratio rationis per habitum perficitur, secundum hos
diversos ordines quos proprie ratio considerat, sunt diversae
scientiae. Nam ad _philosophiam naturalem_ pertinet considerare
ordinem rerum quem ratio humana considerat sed non facit; ita quod
sub naturali philosophia comprehendamus _et metaphysicam_. Ordo
autem quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, pertinet ad
_rationalem philosophiam_, cujus est considerare ordinem partium
orationis ad invicem et ordinem principiorum ad invicem et ad
conclusiones. Ordo autem actionum voluntariarum pertinet ad
considerationem _moralis philosophiae_. Ordo autem quem ratio
considerando facit in rebus exterioribus constitutis per rationem
humanam, pertinet ad _artes mechanicas_.”—_In X. Ethic. ad Nichom._,
i., lect. 1.

_ 12 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., Introduction, ch. ii. and iii.

13 ARISTOTLE and the scholastics distinguished between the domain of
the practical (πρᾶσσω, πρᾶξις, _agere_, _agibilia_) and the
operative or productive (ποιεῖν, ποίησις, _facere_, _factibilia_).

_ 14 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., § 8.

15 “Quædam igitur sunt _speculabilium_ quæ dependent a materia secundum
esse, quia non nisi in materia esse possunt, et hæc distinguuntur
quia dependent quædam a materia secundum esse et intellectum, sicut
illa in quorum definitione ponitur materia sensibilis: unde sine
materia sensibili intelligi non possunt; ut in definitione hominis
oportet accipere carnem et ossa: et de his est _physica_ sive
scientia naturalis. Quædam vero sunt quæ, quamvis dependeant a
materia sensibili secundum esse, non tamen secundum intellectum,
quia in eorum definitionibus non ponitur materia sensibilis, ut
linea et numerus: et de his est _mathematica_. Quædam vero sunt
speculabilia quæ non dependent a materia secundum esse, quia sine
materia esse possunt: sive nunquam sint in materia, sicut Deus et
angelus, sive in quibusdam sint in materia et in quibusdam non, ut
substantia, qualitas, potentia et actus, unum et multa, etc., de
quibus omnibus est _theologia_, id est scientia divina, quia
præcipuum cognitorum in ea est Deus. Alio nomine dicitur
_metaphysica_, id est, transphysica, quia post physicam dicenda
occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus competit in insensibilia
devenire. Dicitur etiam _philosophia prima_, in quantum scientiae
aliæ ab ea principia sua accipientes eam sequuntur.”—ST. THOMAS, _In
lib. Boetii de Trinitate_, q. 5, a. 1.

16 Ἐττιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἤ θεωοεῖ τὸ ὄν και τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ᾽
ἁυτό.—_Metaph._ III., I (ed. Didot).

_ 17 Metaph._ X., ch. vii., 5 and 6.

_ 18 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., §§ 251-5.

19 When the term “science” is used nowadays in contradistinction to
“philosophy,” it usually signifies the knowledge embodied in what
are called the special, or positive, or inductive sciences—a
knowledge which Aristotle would not regard as strictly or fully
scientific.

20 Aristotle’s conception of the close relation between _Physics_ (or
the _Philosophy_ of Nature) and those analytic studies which we
nowadays describe as the physical sciences, bears witness to the
close alliance which he conceived to exist between sense observation
on the one hand and rational speculation on the other. This sane
view of the continuity of human knowledge, a view to which the
Schoolmen of the Middle Ages were ever faithful, was supplanted at
the dawn of modern philosophy in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries by the opposite view, which led to a divorce between
physics and metaphysics, and to a series of misunderstandings which
still prevail with equal detriment to science and philosophy alike.

_ 21 Cf._ DE WULF, _History of Medieval Philosophy_, pp. 28-9, 66;
MERCIER, _Ontologie_, Introd., p. v., n.

22 “Dicitur metaphysica [scientia] id est, transphysica, quia post
physicam dicenda occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus competit in
insensibilia devenire.”—ST. THOMAS, _In Lib. Boetii de Trinitate_,
q. 5, a. 1.

23 This is also the title of the social and ethnological study of the
various races of men, their primitive habits, customs, institutions,
etc.

24 Not entirely; for instance, what is perhaps the most comprehensive
course of philosophy published in recent times, the _Philosophia
Lacensis_ (11 vols., Herder, 1888-1900) apparently follows the
arrangement of metaphysics outlined above. The fundamental questions
on _knowing_ and _being_, which usually constitute distinct
departments under the respective titles of _Epistemology_ and
_Ontology_, are here treated under the comprehensive title of
_Institutiones Logicales_ (3 vols.). However, they are really
metaphysical problems, problems of speculative philosophy, wherever
they be treated; and the fact that the questions usually treated in
Ontology are here treated in a volume apart (vol. iii. of the
_Institutiones Logicales_: under the peculiar title of _Logica
Realis_), and not in the volumes assigned to general metaphysics,
shows the necessity and convenience of the more modern arrangement.
General metaphysics are dealt with in 2 vols. of _Institutiones
Philosophiae Naturalis_ and 3 vols. of _Institutiones
Psychologicae_; special metaphysics in the _Institutiones
Theodicœae_ (1 vol.); ethics in 2 vols. of _Institutiones Juris
Naturae_.

_ 25 Cf._ TURNER, _History of Philosophy_, p. 525.

26 MERCIER, _Logique_, Introd., § 9.

27 pp. 45, 51.

_ 28 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., § 17.

_ 29 Cf._ _ibid._ i., Introd., ch. i.

30 CAJETAN, _In 2 Post Anal._, ch. xiii.

_ 31 Cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, §§ 6-13; LADD, _A Theory of Reality_,
ch. i.

_ 32 infra_, ch. viii.; _Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., Part IV., ch.
iii.-vi.; Part V., ch. i.

33 p. 18—in which context will be found a masterly analysis and
criticism of current prejudices and objections against systematic
metaphysics.

_ 34 ibid._ pp. 19-20.

35 ROYCE, _The Conception of God_, p. 207.

36 MERCIER, _Logique_, Introd., § 14.

37 Encyclical, _Aeterni Patris_, on philosophical studies.

_ 38 Summa Theologica_, 1, q. 1, a. 8, ad. 2.

_ 39 Cf._ MERCIER, _Origines de la psychologie contemporaine_, ch.
viii.; DE WULF, _Scholasticism Old and New_ (_passim_).

_ 40 Cf._ LADD, _op. cit._, pp. 9, 10.

41 EUCKEN, _Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Philosophie und Lebensanschauung_,
§ 157 (Leipzig, 1903).

_ 42 Cf._ art. _Philosophy and the Sciences at Louvain_, in the _Irish
Ecclesiastical Record_, May, 1905, reprinted as Appendix in DE
WULF’S _Scholasticism Old and New_.

43 Hence the necessity of equipping the student of philosophy with a
knowledge of the main conclusions and theories of the sciences that
have an immediate bearing on philosophy: chemistry, physics,
geology, astronomy, mechanics, the axioms and postulates of pure and
applied mathematics, cellular biology, embryology, the physiology of
the nervous system, botany and zoology, political economy, sociology
and ethnology. Nowhere is the system of combining the scientific
with the philosophical formation of mind more thoroughly carried out
at the present time than in the curriculum of the Philosophical
Institute at the University of Louvain. In the College of Maynooth
not only is the study of philosophy completed by a fuller course of
Christian Theology,—both disciplines thus combining to give the
student all the essential elements of a complete _Philosophy of
Life_ (ii.),—but it is preceded by an elementary training in the
physical sciences and accompanied by courses on the history of
scientific theories in chemistry, physics, physiology, and general
biology.

44 “We may mention it in passing,” writes Mercier in his general
introduction to philosophy (_Logique_, § 1, p. 6)—“it was this
feeling of individual impotence in face of the task confronting the
philosopher at the present day, that inspired the foundation of the
Philosophical Institute at the University of Louvain”. He had
previously outlined the project in his _Rapport sur les études
philosophiques_ at the Congress of Mechlin in 1891. Here are a few
brief extracts from that memorable document: “Since individual
effort feels itself well nigh powerless in the presence of the field
of observation which goes on widening day by day, association must
make up for the insufficiency of the isolated worker; men of
analysis and men of synthesis must come together and form, by their
daily intercourse and united action, an atmosphere suited to the
harmonious development of science and philosophy alike....” “Man has
multiplied his power of vision; he enters the world of the
infinitely small; he fixes his scrutinizing gaze upon regions where
our most powerful telescopes discern no limits. Physics and
Chemistry progress with giant strides in the study of the properties
of matter and of the combinations of its elements. Geology and
Astronomy reconstruct the history of the origin and formation of our
planet. Biology and the natural sciences study the minute structure
of living organisms, their distribution in space and succession in
time; and Embryology explores their origin. The archæological,
philological and social sciences reconstruct the past ages of our
history and civilizations. What an inexhaustible mine is here to
exploit, what regions to explore and materials to analyse and
interpret; finally what pioneers we must engage in the work if we
are to have a share in garnering those treasures!”

_ 45 Grammar of Assent_, p. 229.

46 Lucerna pedibus meis verbum tuum, et lumen semitis meis.—Ps.
cxviii., 105.

47 TENNYSON, _In Memoriam_.

_ 48 Cf._ _Logic_, i., § 123.

_ 49 Cf._ _Logic_, i., pp. 204-6.

_ 50 Cf._ SCOTUS, _Summa Theologica_, edit. by Montefortino (Rome,
1900), i., p. 106, _Ad tertium_.

_ 51 Cf._ _Logic_, i., pp. 119-20.

_ 52 Cf._ SCOTUS, _op. cit._, i., pp. 104, 129; also URRABURU,
_Ontologia_, Disp. III., Cap. II., Art. III., p. 155.

53 Hence St. Thomas calls the things about which a generic or specific
concept is predicated “analoga secundum esse et non secundum
intentionem” (_In 1 Sent._, Dist. xix., q. 5, a. 2, ad a am): we
bring them under the same notion or “intentio” (_e.g._ “living
being”), but the content of this notion is realized in the various
things (_e.g._ in Socrates, this horse, that rose-tree, etc.) in
varying and unequal degrees of perfection. Hence, too, this univocal
relation of the genus to its subordinate subjects is sometimes
(improperly) called “analogy of inequality”.

_ 54 Cf._ _infra_, ch. viii.

_ 55 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _Philosophie der Vorzeit_, §§ 599, 600.

56 This, of course, is the proper sort of analogical predication: the
predication based upon similarity of proportions or relations.
Etymologically, analogy means equality of proportions (_Cf._
_Logic_, ii., p. 160). On the whole subject the student may consult
with profit Cajetan’s _Opusculum de Nominum Analogia_, published as
an appendix to vol. iv. of St. Thomas’ _Quæstiones Disputatæ_ in De
Maria’s edition (1883).

_ 57 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, §§ 40-42.

_ 58 Cf._ SCOTUS, _op. cit._, i., pp. 318-22, 125-131, 102-7 (especially
p. 128, _Ad tertium_); p. 131, _Ad sextum_; p. 321, _Ad tertium_.

59 KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 599.

_ 60 ibid._, § 600.

61 SUAREZ, _Metaph._, Dist. xxviii., § 3; Dist. xxxii., § 2.

62 SCOTUS, _op. cit._, i., pp. 106-7, 128-9.

_ 63 ibid._, p. 107.

_ 64 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _La philosophie scolastique_ (“_Die Philosophie der
Vorzeit_”). Fr. trans. by Sierp (Paris, 1868), vol. i., p. 66, § 35.

65 The logical copula, which expresses this relation and asserts the
truth of the judgment, expresses, of course, a logical entity, an
_ens rationis_. True judgments may be stated about logical entities
as well as about realities. But since the former can be conceived
only after the manner of the latter, the appropriateness of using
the verb which expresses existence or reality, as the logical
copula, will be at once apparent. _Cf._ _Logic_, i., p. 249, n. 1.

66 SUAREZ, _Metaph._, Dist. 54, § i., 6.

_ 67 Cf._ _Logic_, i., pp. 28-9.

_ 68 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, §§ 551-2.

_ 69 Cf._ _Logic_, i., pp. 70-1.

70 “Esse actum quondam nominat: non enim dicitur esse aliquid ex hoc,
quod est in potentia, sed ex hoc, quod est in actu.”—ST. THOMAS,
_Contra Gent._ i., c. xxii., 4.