Chapter XV: Final Causes; Universal Order (4)

236 Such terms as “corruptible,” “destructible,” etc., imply certain
attributes _of a thing_ which can be corrupted, destroyed.
Conceiving this attribute in the abstract we form the terms
“corruptibility,” “destructibility,” etc. So, too, the term
“possibility” formed from the adjective “possible,” simply implies
in the abstract what the latter implies in the concrete—an active or
passive power _of a thing_ to cause or to become something; or else
the mind’s conception of the non-repugnance of this something. To
substantialize a possibility, therefore, is sufficiently absurd; but
to speak of a possibility as real and at the same time to deny the
reality of any subject in which it would have its reality, is no
less so.

237 except in the Blessed Eucharist: here we know from Divine Revelation
that the accidents of bread and wine exist apart from their
connatural substance. We cannot, by the light of reason, prove
_positively_ the possibility of such separate existence of
accidents; at the most, men of the supreme genius of an Aristotle
may have strongly suspected such possibility, and may have convinced
themselves of the futility of all attempts to prove in any way the
impossibility of such a condition of things. Nor can we, even with
the light of Revelation, do any more than show the futility of such
attempts, thus _negatively_ defending the possibility of what we
know from Revelation to be a fact.

_ 238 Cf._ n. 1.

_ 239 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xxii., for a full analysis and
refutation of phenomenist theories that would deny the
substantiality of the human person.

240 “Substantia est res, cujus naturae debetur esse non in alio;
accidens vero est res, cujus naturae debetur esse in
alio.”—_Quodlib._, ix., a. 5, ad. 2.

_ 241 Cf._ DESCARTES, _Oeuvres_, edit. Cousin, tome ix., p. 166—_apud_
MERCIER, _Ontologie_, p. 280.

242 PAULSEN, _Einleitung in die Philosophie_, Berlin, 1896, S.
135—_apud_ MERCIER, _loc. cit._

243 and also _appetitive_; as in mental life appetition is a natural
consequent of perception. It is in accordance with this latter idea
that Wundt conceives all reality as being in its ultimate nature
appetitive activity: the _Ego_ is a “volitional unit” and the
universe a “collection of volitional units”.—_Cf._ WUNDT, _System
der Philosophie_, Leipzig, 1889, S. 415-421.

_ 244 Principles of Psychology_, Pt. ii., ch. i., § 59.

245 But from Descartes’ doctrine of two passive substances so
antithetically opposed to each other the transition to Spinozism was
easy and obvious. If mind and matter are so absolutely opposed as
thought and extension, how can they unite to form one human
individual in man? If both are purely passive, and if God alone puts
into them their conscious states and their mechanical movements
respectively, what remains proper to each but a pure passivity that
would really be common to both? Would it not be more consistent then
to refer this thought-essence or receptivity of conscious
activities, and this extension-essence or receptivity of mechanical
movements, to God as their proper source, to regard them as two
attributes of His unique and self-existent substance, and thus to
regard God as substantially immanent in all phenomena, and these as
only different expressions of His all-pervading essence? This is
what Spinoza did; and his monism in one form or other is the last
word of many contemporary philosophers on the nature of the universe
which constitutes the totality of human experience.—_Cf._ HÖFFDING,
_Outlines of Psychology_, ch. ii., and criticism of same _apud_
MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xxiii.

246 “Esse substantiæ non dependet ab esse alterius sicut ei inhærens,
licet omnia dependeant a Deo sicut a causa prima.”—ST. THOMAS, _De
Causa Materiæ_, cap. viii.

_ 247 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._ § 594.

_ 248 Ibid._, §§ 597-600.

249 “Illud proprie dicitur esse, quod ipsum habet esse, quasi in suo
esse subsistens. Unde solæ substantiæ proprie et vere dicuntur
entia; accidens vero non habet esse, sed eo aliquid est, et hac
ratione ens dicitur: sicut albedo dicitur ens quia ea aliquid est
album. Et propter hoc dicitur in _Metaph._, l. 7 [al. 6], c. i.
[Arist.], quod accidens dicitur magis entis quam ens.”—ST. THOMAS,
_Summa Theol._, i. q. 90, art. 2. “Illud cui advenit accidens, est
ens in se completum consistens in suo esse, quod quidem esse
naturaliter præcedit accidens, quod supervenit: et ideo accidens
superveniens, ex conjunctione sui cum eo, cui supervenit, non causat
illud esse in quo res subsistit per quod res est ens per se: sed
causat quoddam esse secundum, sine quo res subsistens intelligi
potest esse, sicut primum potest intelligi sine secundo, vel
prædicatum sine subjecto. Unde ex accidente et subjecto non fit unum
per se, sed unum per accidens, et ideo ex eorum conjunctione non
resultat essentia quædam, sicut ex conjunctione formæ cum materia:
propter quod accidens neque rationem completæ essentiæ habet, neque
pars completæ essentiæ est, sed sicut est ens secundum quid, ita et
essentiam secundum quid habet.”—_De Ente et Essentia_, ch. vii.

250 “Non est definitio substantiæ, ens per se sine subjecto, nec
definitio accidentis, ens in subjecto; sed quidditati seu essentiæ
substantiæ _competit_ habere _esse_ non in subjecto; quidditati
autem sive essentiæ accidentis _competit_ habere _esse_ in
subjecto.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, iii., q. 77, art. 1, ad. 2.

_ 251 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, §§ 595-596.

_ 252 ibid._, § 619.

_ 253 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, §§ 320-325.

254 KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, §§ 618, 624.

255 This logical usage is applied equally to attributes of a logical
subject which is not itself a substance but an accident; it turns
solely on the point whether the concept of the logical predicate of
a judgment is or is not connected by an absolute logical connexion,
a connexion of thought, with the concept of the logical subject.

_ 256 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _Quaest. Disp._, _De Spir. Creat._, art. 11, ad.
7.

_ 257 Cf._, however, § 68, p. 246, n. 2, _infra_.

258 St. Thomas, whose language is usually so moderate, thus expresses
his view of the doctrine afterwards propounded by Descartes when the
latter declared the essence of the soul to be thought: “Quidquid
dicatur de potentiis animae, tamen nullus unquam opinatur, nisi
insanus, quod habitus et actus animae sint ipsa ejus
essentia.”—_Quaest. Disp., De Spir. Creat._, art. 11, ad 1. For a
very convincing treatment of this question, _cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op.
cit._, §§ 625-626.

259 DE SAN, _Cosmologia_, § 323, _apud_ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 158.

_ 260 op. cit._, § 625.

261 ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, iii., q. 17, art. 2, c.

262 Hence St. Thomas says, in regard to the Blessed Eucharist, that the
accidents of bread and wine had not an existence of their own as
long as the substance of bread and wine was there; that this is true
of accidents generally; that it is not they that exist, but rather
their subjects; that their function is to determine these subjects
to exist as characterized in a certain way, as whiteness gives snow
a white existence: “Dicendum quod accidentia panis et vini, manente
substantia panis et vini non habebant ipsa _esse_ sicut nec alia
accidentia, sed subjecta eorum habebant hujusmodi _esse_ per ea,
sicut nix est alba per albedinem.”—_Summa Theol._, iii., q. 77, art.
1, ad. 4.

263 For the arguments on both sides _cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, § 156
(pp. 308 _sqq._). The indirect argument which the author derives
from the fact that the Divine _Concursus_ is necessary for the
activity of creatures, while offering an intelligible explanation of
this necessity on Thomistic principles, does not touch the
probability of other explanations.

_ 264 Cf._ URRABURU’S definition: “entitas vel realitas a subjecto
realiter distincta, cujus totum esse consistit in ultima
determinatione rei ad aliquod munus obeundum, vel ad aliquam realem
denominationem actu habendam, sine qua, saltem in individuo sumpta,
res eadem potest existere absolute”.—_op. cit._, § 120 (p. 380).

_ 265 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 291 (p. 854, _quarta opinio_), p. 854.

266 Whether immanent vital acts—especially of the spiritual faculties in
man: thoughts, volitions, etc.—are mere modes, or whether they are
absolute accidents, having their own proper and positive reality
which perfects their subject by affecting it, is a disputed
question. Habits, acquired by repetition of such acts, _e.g._
knowledge and virtue, belonging as they do to the category of
quality, are more than mere modalities of the human subject: they
have an absolute, positive entity, whereby they add to the total
perfection of the latter.

_ 267 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 121 (pp. 386 _sqq._).

268 The fact that Aristotle [_Metaph._, lib. vii. (al. vi.), ch. iii.]
seems to have placed a _real distinction_ between extension and
corporeal substance, while he could not have suspected the absolute
_separability_ of the former from the latter, would go to show that
he did not regard separability as the only test of a real
distinction. _Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, _ibid._

269 Obviously we are not concerned herewith _all_ the attributes which
by a necessity of thought we ascribe to an essence, _e.g._ the
_corruptibility_ of a corporeal substance, or the _immortality_ of a
spiritual substance. These are not entities really distinct from the
substance, but only aspects which we recognize to be necessary
corollaries of its nature. We are concerned only with properties
which are real powers, faculties, forces, aptitudes of things.—_Cf._
KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 627.

_ 270 op. cit._, § 628.

271 “Tertii sunt, qui dicunt, quod potentiae animae nec adeo sunt idem
ipsi animae, sicut sunt ejus principia intrinsica et essentialia,
nec adeo diversae, ut cedant in aliud genus, sicut accidentia; sed
in genere substantiae sunt per reductionem ... et ideo quasi medium
tenentes inter utramque opinionem dicunt, quasdam animae potentias
sic differre ad invicem, ut nullo modo dici possint una potentia:
non tamen concedunt, eas simpliciter diversificari secundum
essentiam, ita ut dicantur diversae essentiae, sed differre
essentialiter in genere potentiae, ita ut dicantur diversa
instrumenta ejusdem substantiae.”—_In lib._ ii., dist. xxiv., p. 1,
art. 2, q. 1.

In the same context he explains what we are to understand by
referring anything to a certain category _per reductionem_: “Sunt
enim quaedam, quae sunt in genere _per se_, aliqua _per reductionem_
ad idem genus. Illa per se sunt in genere, quae participant
essentiam completam generis, ut species et individua; illa vero per
reductionem, quae nan dicunt completam essentiam.... Quaedam
reducuntur sicut principia ... aut essentialia, sicut sunt materia
et forma in genere substantiae; aut integrantia, sicut partes
substantiae.... Quaedam reducuntur sicut _viae_ ... aut sicut _viae
ad res_, et sic motus et mutationes, ut generatio, reducuntur ad
substantiam; aut sicut _viae a rebus_, et sic habent reduci
potentiae ad genus substantiae. Prima enim agendi potentia, quae
egressum dicitur habere ab ipsa substantia, ad idem genus reducitur,
quae non adeo elongatur ab ipsa substantia, ut dicat aliam essentiam
completam.”—_ibid._, ad. 8.

272 “Quoniam potentia creaturae arctata est, non potuit creatura habere
posse perfectum, nisi esset in ea potentiarum multitudo, ex quarum
collectione sive adunatione, una supplente defectum alterius,
resultaret unum posse completum, sicut manifeste animadverti potest
in organis humani corporis, quorum unumquodque indiget a virtute
alterius adjuvari.”—_In lib._ ii., dist. xxiv., p. 1, art. 2, q. 8.

273 The student will find in MAHER’S _Psychology_ (ch. iii.) a clear and
well-reasoned exposition of the inconsistency and groundlessness of
such attacks on the doctrine of faculties.

_ 274 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 636-637.

275 “Cum corpus hominis aut cujuslibet alterius animalis sit quoddam
totum naturale, dicit unum ex eo quod unam formam habeat qua
perficitur non solum secundum aggregationem aut compositionem, ut
accidit in domo et in aliis hujusmodi. Unde opportet quod quaelibet
pars hominis et animalis recipiat esse [_i.e._ sibi proprium] et
speciem ab anima sicut a propria forma. Unde Philosophus dicit (l.
ii. de anima, text. 9), quod recedente anima neque oculus neque caro
neque aliqua pars manet nisi aequivoce.”—ST. THOMAS, _Quaest. Disp.
de anima_, art. 10—_apud_ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 632.

276 The most perfect real unity is of course that which includes all
perfection in the simplicity of its actual essence, without any
dispersion or plurality of its being, without any admixture of
accident or potentiality. Such is the unity of the Infinite Being
alone. No finite being possesses its actuality _tota simul_. And the
creature falls short of perfect unity in proportion as it attains to
this actuality only by a multiplicity of real changes, by a variety
of really distinct principles and powers, essential and accidental,
in its concrete mode of being. In proportion as created things are
higher or lower in the scale of being (47), they realize a higher or
a lower grade of unity in their mode of individual existence.

277 We are concerned here only with finite, created substances, as
distinct from the Divine Uncreated Substance on whom these depend
(64).

278 ARISTOTLE, _Categ._ ch. iii., _passim_; _Metaph._, l. v. (al. vi.),
ch. viii.; ST. THOMAS, _In Metaph._, l. v. lect. 10; KLEUTGEN, _op.
cit._, § 589-591.

_ 279 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, §§ 587, 602-603.

_ 280 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, §§ 277, 279.

_ 281 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 217 (pp. 66 _sqq._).

282 Sciendum est quod nomen naturae significat quodlibet principium
intrinsicum motus; secundum quod Philosophus dicit quod _natura est
principium motus in eo in quo est per se, et non secundum
accidens_.—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, iii., q. 2, art. 1 in c.

283 And here we are reminded of the view of many medieval scholastics of
high authority, that the same material entity can have at the same
time a plurality of formative principles or _substantial forms_ of
different grades of perfection.

_ 284 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 282 (p. 825).

285 For want of a more appropriate rendering we translate the Latin term
_suppositum_ (Gr. ὑπόστασις) by the phrase “subsisting thing”;
though the classical terms are really generic: _suppositum_ being a
genus of which there are two species, _suppositum irrationale_
(“_thing_” or “subsisting _thing_”) and _suppositum rationale_
(“_person_”).—_Cf._ _infra_, pp. 265-6.

286 Complete in every way: in _substantial_ and in _specific_
perfections. The separated soul, though it is an existing individual
substance, retains its essential communicability to its connatural
material principle, the body. Hence it has not “subsistence,” it is
not a “person”.—_Cf._ _infra_, p. 264.

287 “Per se agere _convenit per se existenti_. Sed per se existens
quandoque potest dici aliquid, si non sit inhærens ut accidens, vel
ut forma materialis, etiamsi sit pars. Sed proprie et per se
subsistens dicitur quod neque est praedicto modo inhærens neque est
pars. Secundum quem modum oculus aut manus non potest dici per se
subsistens, et per consequens nec per se operans. Unde et
operationes partium attribuuntur toti per partes. Dicimus enim quod
homo videt per oculum et palpat per manum.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa
Theol._, i., q. 75, art. 2, ad. 2.

_ 288 Cf._ preceding note. St. Thomas continues: “Potest igitur dici quod
anima intelligit, sicut oculus videt, sed magis proprie dicitur quod
homo intelligat per animam” (ibid.); and elsewhere he writes:
“Dicendum quod anima est pars humanae speciei [_i.e._ naturae]. Et
ideo, licet sit separata, quia tamen retinet naturam unibilitatis,
non potest dici substantia individua quae est hypostasis vel
substantia prima, sicut nec manus, nec quaecumque alia partium
hominis; et sic non competit ei neque definitio personae, neque
nomen.”—_Summa Theol._, i., q. 29, art. 1, ad. 5.

_ 289 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., §§ 54-5.

290 All _created_ subsisting things and persons depend, of course,
essentially on the Necessary Being for their existence and for their
activity. This Necessary Being we know from Revelation to be
_Triune_, Three in Persons, One in Nature. The subsistence of each
Divine Person of the Blessed Trinity excludes _all_ modes of
dependence.

291 “Hoc ... quod est per se agere, excellentiori modo convenit
substantiis rationalis naturae quam aliis. Nam solae substantiae
rationales habent dominium sui actus, ita quod in eis est agere et
non agere; aliae vero substantiae magis aguntur quam agunt. Et ideo
conveniens fuit ut substantia individua _rationalis_ naturae
speciale nomen haberet.”—ST. THOMAS, _Quaest. Disp. de Potentia_, q.
ix., art. 1, ad. 3.

_ 292 Cf._ BILLOT, _De Verbo Incarnato_, q. ii.—_apud_ MERCIER, _op.
cit._, § 151 (pp. 299-300).

_ 293 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 291, for an exhaustive list of the
authorities in favour of each of the various views propounded in
this present context.

294 “Natura singularis et integra per se consituitur in sua
independentia, non aliquo positivo addito ultra illam entitatem
positivam, qua est haec natura.”—SCOTUS, iii., Dist. i. q. 1, n. 9
and n. 11, ad. 3. _Cf._ SUAREZ, _Metaph._, Disp. xxxiv. § 2;
KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 616; FRANZELIN, _De verbo Incarnato_, Th.
xxix.

_ 295 op. cit._, § 293 (p. 861).

296 Neither is it a _natural_ union in the sense of being _due_ to the
human nature; it is wholly _undue_ to the latter, and is in this
sense _supernatural_.

_ 297 op. cit._, § 293 (p. 861).

_ 298 ibid._ Farther on (p. 863) he says it is certain that the Divine
Nature of the Word is _substantially_ united with humanity in a
unity of person or subsistence: “certum est eamdem [naturam divinam]
substantialiter uniri cum humanitate in unitate suppositi;” and for
this he considers that the human nature must be incomplete “in
ratione personae”. But this proves nothing; for of course the human
nature must be wanting in personality. But it is complete _as a
nature_. Nor does the aphorism he quotes—“Quidquid substantiae in
sua specie completae accedit, accidens est,”—apply to subsistence or
personality supervening on a complete substance.

299 “Humanitas illa [_scil._ Christi], quamvis completa in _esse_
naturae, non tamen habet ultimum complementum in genere substantiae
cum in se non subsistat.”—_ibid._, § 296 (p. 866).

300 This view, which has many supporters, is clearly explained and ably
defended by MERCIER in his _Ontologie_, § 151 (pp. 298-302), § 52
(pp. 134-5), § 49 (p. 127, n. 1).

_ 301 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 49 (p. 127, n. 1).

302 Hence Urraburu gives this _real_ definition of subsistence: _ultimus
naturae terminus in ordine substantiali_ sive in ratione existentis
per se: the ultimate term (or determination) of a nature in the
order of substantiality or of “existing by itself”—_op. cit._, § 296
(p. 866).

303 “Sicut enim modus accidentalis figurae terminat quantitatem, et
modus ubicationis constituit rem hic et non alibi, ita modus
substantialis personalitatis terminans naturam reddit illam
incommunicabilem alieno supposito.”—URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 291 (p.
854).

304 The terms “Self,” “_Ego_,” and “Person” we take to be identical in
reference to the human individual. The _mind_ is not the _Ego_,
self, or person, but only a part of it.—_Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_,
ch. vi., p. 104.

_ 305 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xvii.

_ 306 ibid._, p. 365.

_ 307 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, p. 363.

_ 308 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, p. 365 (italics in last sentence ours).

_ 309 Cf._ RICKABY, _First Principles_, p. 370.

_ 310 Cf._ MAHER, _ibid._, pp. 487-92; MERCIER, _Psychologie_, ii., pp.
197-224 (6th edit.); _Ontologie_, § 153 (p. 304).

311 There are cogent theological reasons also against the view that
consciousness constitutes personality. For instance, the human
nature of our Divine Lord has its own proper consciousness, which,
nevertheless, does not constitute this nature a person.

_ 312 Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii., ch. xxvii.

313 “That being then one plant which has such an organization of parts
in one coherent body partaking of one common life, it continues to
be the same plant as long as it continues to partake of the same
life, though that life be communicated to different particles of
matter vitally united to the living plant, in a like continued
organization conformable to that sort of plants....

“The case is not so much different in brutes, but that anyone may
hence see what makes an animal and continues it the same....

“This also shows wherein the identity of the same man consists:
_viz._ in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by
constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally
united to the same organized body.... For if the identity of soul
alone makes the same man, and there be nothing in the nature of
matter why the same individual spirit may be united [_i.e._
successively] to different bodies, it will be possible that ... men
living in distant ages, and of different tempers, may have been the
same man....”—_Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii. ch.
xxvii. § 4-6. Yet though “identity of soul” does not make “the same
man,” Locke goes on immediately to assert that identity of
_consciousness_, which is but a function of the soul, makes _the
same person_.

_ 314 Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii., ch. xxvii., § 7.
Names do not stand for ideas or concepts but for _conceived_
realities; and the question here is: What is the conceived reality
(in the existing human individual) for which the term “person”
stands?

_ 315 ibid._, § 9.

_ 316 Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii., ch. xxvii., §§ 13,
14.

_ 317 Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii., ch. xxvii., § 13.

318 For a searching criticism of such theories of the Ego or human
person, _cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xxii.

_ 319 ibid._, § 19.

320 p. 276.

_ 321 Cf._ MAHER’S criticism of Professor James’ theory on double
personality (_op. cit._, ch. xxii., pp. 491-2): “Professor James
devotes much space to these ’mutations’ of the Ego, yet overlooks
the fact that they are peculiarly fatal, not to his adversaries, but
to his own theory that ‘the present thought is the only thinker,’
and that seeming identity is sufficiently preserved by each thought
’appropriating’ and ‘inheriting’ the contents of its predecessor.
The difficulties presented to this process of inheritance by such
facts as sleep and swooning have been already dwelt upon [_cf._
_ibid._, p. 480 (c)]; but here they are if possible increased. The
last conscious thought of, say, Felida 2 has to transmit its
gathered experience not to its _proximate_ conscious successor,
which is Felida 1, but across seven months of vacuum until on the
extinction of Felida 1 the next conscious thought which constitutes
Felida 2 is born into existence. If the single personality is hard
for Mr. James to explain, ‘double-personality’ at least doubles his
difficulties.”

_ 322 Cf._ _infra_, § 82.

323 Ποιότητα δὲ λέγω, καθ᾽ ἤν ποιοί τινες εἰναι λέγονται.—_Categ._, ch.
iv. _Cf._ ST. THOMAS: “Haec est ratio formalis qualitatis, per quam
respondemus interroganti qualis res sit.”

324 The other accidents, _e.g._ _actio_ and _passio_, in so far as they
change the perfection of the substance, do so only by producing
qualities in it. Quantity, which is the connatural accident of all
corporeal substance, adds of itself no special complement or degree
of accidental perfection to the latter, in the sense of disposing
(or indisposing) the latter for the attainment of the full and final
perfection due to its specific nature; but only in the sense that it
supposes more or less of that kind of substance to exist, or in the
sense in which it is understood to include the _qualities_ of which
it may be the _immediate_ subject.—_Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, §
326.

_ 325 In Praedicamenta_, ch. i.

_ 326 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xii, xiii, xxiii, xxv. BERGSON
rightly recognizes the irreducibility of quality to quantity (_Essai
sur les données immediates de la conscience, passim_). But he
wrongly infers from this “fundamental antinomy,” as he calls it, the
existence, in each human individual, of a two-fold _Ego_, a deeper
self where all is quality, and a superficial self which projects
conscious states, in static and numerical isolation from one
another, into a homogeneous space where all is quantitative,
mathematical. The reasonable inference is merely that the human mind
recognizes in the data of its experience a certain richness and
variety of modes of real being.

_ 327 Metaph._ V., ch. xiv., where the four groups are finally reduced to
two.

_ 328 Summa Theol._, ia, iiae, q. 49, art. 2.

329 To be distinguished from the _passio_ which is correlative of
_actio_ and which consists in the actual undergoing of the latter,
the actual reception of the accidental form which is the term of the
latter.

330 “Inter omnes qualitates, figurae maxime sequuntur et demonstrant
speciem rerum. Quod maxime in plantis et animalibus patet, in quibus
nullo certiori indicio diversitas specierum dijudicari potest, quam
diversitate figurae.”—ST. THOMAS, _In_ VII. _Physic_, lect. 5.

331 Every natural habit, as we have just seen, has an essential relation
to _activity_. Every such habit inheres immediately in some
operative faculty, as science in the intellect, or justice in the
will. All natural habits are _operative_. There is, however, as we
know from Divine Revelation, an “entitative” habit, a _habitus
entitativus_, which affects the substance itself of the human soul,
ennobling its natural mode of being and so perfecting it as to raise
it to a higher or supernatural plane of being, to an order of
existence altogether undue to its nature: the _supernaturally
infused_ habit of _sanctifying grace_.

_ 332 Eth. Eud._, ii., 2.

333 “Vires naturales non agunt operationes suas mediantibus aliquibus
habitibus, quia secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad unum.”—_Summa
Theol._, ia iiæ, q. 49, art. 4, ad 2.

334 “Intellectus ... est subjectum habitus. Illi enim competit esse
subjectum habitus quod est in potentia ad multa; et hoc maxime
competit intellectui....”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, ia, iie, q.
50, art. 4, ad. 1. “Omnis potentia quae diversimode potest ordinari
ad agendum, indiget habitu, quo bene disponatur ad suum actum.
Voluntas autem cum sit potentia rationalis, diversimode potest ad
agendum ordinari: et ideo oportet in voluntate aliquem habitum
ponere, quo bene disponatur ad suum actum ...,”—_ibid._ art. 5, in
c.

335 “Habitualis dispositio requiritur ubi subjectum est in potentia ad
multa. Operationes vero quae sunt ab anima per corpus, principaliter
quidem sunt ipsius animae, secundario vero ipsius corporis. Habitus
autem proportionantur operationibus; unde ex similibus actibus
similes habitus causantur, ut dicitur in 2 Ethic., cap. 1 et 2; in
corpore vero possunt esse secundario, inquantum scilicet corpus
disponitur et habilitatur ad prompte deserviendum operationibus
animae.”—_Summa Theol._, ia iiæ, q. 49, art. 1, in c.

_ 336 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _ibid._, q. 50, art. 1.—MERCIER, _Ontologie_, §
164.

337 According to the scholastic theory of matter and form the matter
must be predisposed by certain qualities for the reception of a
given substantial form. The chemical elements which form a compound
will not do so in any and every condition, but only when definitely
disposed and brought together under favourable conditions. These
elementary qualities, considered in themselves, are not habits or
dispositions: “Unde qualitates simplices elementorum, quae secundum
unum modum determinatum naturis elementorum conveniunt, non dicimus
_dispositiones_ vel _habitus_, sed _simplices qualitates_.”—ST.
THOMAS, _ibid._, q. 49, art. 4, in C. They are natural qualities and
not dispositions produced by disposing causes.

338 St. Thomas regards the distinction between _habits_ and mere
dispositions as a distinction not of _degree_ but of _kind_:
“Dispositio et habitus possunt distingui sicut diversae species
unius generis subalterni, ut dicantur _dispositiones_ illae
qualitates primae speciei quibus convenit secundum propriam rationem
ut de facili amittantur, quia habent causas mutabiles, ut aegritudo
et sanitas; _habitus_ vero dicantur illae qualitates quae secundum
suam rationem habent quod non de facili transmutentur quia habent
causas immobiles; sicut scientia et virtutes; et secundum hoc
disposito non fit habitus.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, ia, iiæ, q.
49, art. 2, ad. 3.

339 “Vires sensitivae _dupliciter_ possunt considerari: _uno modo_,
secundum quod operanter ex instinctu naturae; _alio modo_, secundum
quod operantur ex imperio rationis. Secundum igitur quod operantur
ex instinctu naturae, sic ordinantur ad unum, sicut et natura; et
ideo sicut in potentiis naturalibus non sunt aliqui habitus, ta
etiam nec in potentiis sensitivis, secundum quod ex instinctu
naturae operantur. Secundum vero quod operantur ex imperio rationis,
sic ad diversa ordinari possunt: et sic possunt esse in eis aliqui
habitus, quibus bene aut male ad aliquid disponuntur.”—ST. THOMAS,
_ibid._, q. 50, art. 3, in c. In this context the angelic doctor,
following Aristotle, places the virtues of temperance and fortitude
in the sense _appetite_ as controlled by the rational will. For the
same reason he admits the possibility of habits in the faculties of
_internal_ sense perception, though not in the _external_ senses
(_ibid._, ad. 3).

340 “Quia bruta animalia a ratione hominis per quandam consuetudinem
disponuntur ad aliquid operandum sic, vel aliter, hoc modo in brutis
animalibus habitus quodammodo poni possunt.... Deficit tamen ratio
habitus quantum ad usum voluntatis quia non habent dominium utendi
vel non utendi, quod videtur ad rationem habitus pertinere; et ideo,
proprie loquendo, in eis habitus esse non possunt.”—_ibid._, ad. 2.

341 It must not be forgotten that habit is an _accident_, an accidental
perfection of the substance or nature of an individual agent; it
immediately affects the operative power of the agent, which
operative power is itself an accident of this agent’s nature
(constituting the second sub-class of the accident, _Quality_).
Habit is thus at once an _actuality_ or actualization of the
operative power and a _potentiality_ of further and more perfect
acts. It is intermediate between the operative power and the
complete actualization which the power receives by the acts that
spring from the latter as perfected by the habit. Faculty and habit
form one complete proximate principle of those acts: a principle
which is at once a partial actualization of the individual agent’s
nature and a potentiality of further actualization of this nature.

342 “Si potentiae animae non sunt ipsa essentia animae, sequitur quod
sint accidentia in aliquo novem generum contenta. Sunt enim in
secunda specie qualitatis, quæ dicitur potentia vel impotentia
naturalis.”—_Q. Disp. de Spir. Creat._, art. 11, in c.

_ 343 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 76, art. 1, in c.—“Cum
potentia et actus dividant ens, et quodlibet genus entis, opportet
quod ad idem genus referatur potentia et actus; et ideo si actus non
est in genere substantiae, potentia, quæ dicitur ad illum actum, non
potest esse in genere substantiae. Operatio autem animae non est in
genere substantiae, sed in solo Deo, cujus operatio est ejus
substantia.”—_Cf._ ZIGLIARA, _Ontologia_ (9), xi.: “Actus et
potentia essentialiter ad illum actum ordinata sunt in eodem genere
supremo.”

344 “Nec in angelo, nec in aliqua creatura, virtus vel potentia
operativa est idem quod sua essentia.... Actus ad quem comparatur
potentia operativa est operatio. In angelo autem non est idem
intelligere et esse; nec aliqua alia operatio, aut in ipso aut in
quocunque alio creato, est idem quod ejus esse. Unde essentia angeli
non est ejus potentia intellectiva, nec alicujus creati essentia est
ejus operativa potentia.”—_ibid._, q. 54, art 3.

345 As we shall see later, action as such does not perfect or change the
_agens_, unless when, as in immanent action, the _agens_ is
identical with the _patiens_. Action formally actualizes or perfects
the _patiens_: _actio fit in passo_. But the exercise of any
activity by an agent undoubtedly connotes or implies a perfection of
this agent. It is not, however, that the actual operation as such
(unless it is immanent) adds a new perfection to the agent. Rather
the agent’s _power_ of acting, revealed to us in its exercise, is
for us a measure of the actual perfection of the agent. But the
question remains: Is this power or perfection, so far as we know it,
a _substantial_ perfection? Is it _the very perfection itself of the
agent’s substance or nature_ as known to us? Or is it an
_accidental_ perfection which is for us an index of a corresponding
degree of substantial perfection? In getting our knowledge of the
nature of a substance from a consideration of its _sensible_
accidents, its _phenomena_, its _operations_—according to the rule,
_Operari sequitur esse: qualis est operatio talis est natura_—can we
use a _single_ inference, from _action_ to _nature_, or must we use
a _double_ inference, from action to power, and from power to
nature? But even if we have to make the double inference, this _of
itself_ does not prove any more than a conceptual distinction
between _power_ and _nature_.

_ 346 Cf._. ST. THOMAS, _Q. Disp. de spir. creat._, art. 11, in c.—MAHER,
_Psychology_ ch. iii.

_ 347 Cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, § 168.

_ 348 Cf._ _ibid._, _op. cit._, § 169; MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. iii. (p.
29, n. 3.)

349 Of course all accidents are “forms” in the sense of being
_determining principles_ of their subjects, these being considered
as _determinable_ or _receptive_ principles. Even quantity is a form
in this sense. But quantity itself does not appear to be a “simple”
principle in the sense of being “indivisible”: its very function is
to make the corporeal substance divisible into integral parts. What
then of all those qualities which inhere _immediately_ in the
quantity of corporeal substances? They are determinations or
affections of a composite, extended, divisible subject. Conceived in
the abstract they have, of course, the attributes of indivisibility,
immutability, etc., characteristic of all _abstract_ essences (14).
But in their physical actuality in what intelligible sense can they
be said to be simple, indivisible entities?

_ 350 Summa Theol._, ia, iiae, q. 52, art. 2; iia, iiae, q. 24, art. 4,
5.—_Q. Disp. de Virtutibus in communi_, q. i, art. 11, in c.—I. _In
Sentent._, _Dist._, 17, q. 2, art. 2.—_Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, §§
329-332, for arguments and authorities. The author himself defends
the former view, according to which alteration takes place by a real
addition or substraction of grades of the same quality.

351 I. _In Sentent._, _Dist._, 17, q. 2, art. 2.

352 iia, iiae, q. 24, art. 4, ad. 3.

_ 353 Q. Disp. de Virtut._, q. 1, art. 11, in c.

354 The scientific concept of “volume” is identical with the common and
philosophical concept of “external, actual, local, or spatial
extension”. The functions ascribed by physics and mechanics to the
“mass” of a body have no other source, in the body, than what
philosophers understand by the “internal extension” or “quantity” of
the body.—_Cf._ Nys, _Cosmologie_ (Louvain, 1903), §§ 192-203.

355 The terms _quantity_ and _extension_ are commonly taken as
synonymous; but _quantity_ is more properly applied to the internal
plurality of integral parts of the substance itself, _extension_ to
the dispersion of these parts outside one another in space.

356 Hence Aristotle’s definition in _Metaph._, iv.: “Quantum dicitur,
quod [est] in insita divisibile, quorum utrumque aut singula unum
quid et hoc quid apta sunt esse”: a quantified substance is one
which is divisible into parts that are really in it [_i.e._ _partes
integrantes_], parts each of which is capable of becoming a distinct
subsisting individual thing.—_Cf._ NYS, _Cosmologie_, § 154.

357 “Longitudo, latitudo et profunditas quantitates quaedam, sed non
substantiae sunt. Quantitas enim non est substantia, sed magis cui
haec ipsa primo insunt illud est substantia.”—_Metaph._, L. vii.,
ch. iii.

_ 358 Physic_, L. i., ch. ii.

359 L. ii., ch. iv.

_ 360 Cf._ § 62 _supra_.

361 “Propria ... totalitas substantiae continetur indifferenter in parva
vel magna quantitate; sicut ... tota natura hominis in magno, vel
parvo homine.”—_Summa Theol._, iii., q. 76, art. 1, ad. 3.

362 No argument in favour of this view can be based on the use of the
term _species_ (“_manentibus dumtaxat speciebus panis et vini_”) by
the Fathers of the Council of Trent. For them, as for all Catholic
philosophers and theologians of the time, the scholastic term
_species_, used in such a context, meant simply the objective,
perceptible accidents of the substance. _Cf._ NYS, _op. cit._, §
175.

363 Hence the significance of the lines in ST. THOMAS’ hymn, _Adoro Te
devote_:—

_Visus, tactus, gustus_ in te fallitur,
Sed _auditu_ solo tuto creditur.

364 and neither does Revelation. The Body of our Blessed Lord exists in
the Eucharist without its connatural external extension and
consequent impenetrability. But according to the common teaching of
Catholic theologians it has its _internal quantity_, its distinct
integral parts, organs and members—really distinct from one another,
though interpenetrating and not spatially external to one another.
Its mode of existence in the space occupied by the sacramental
species is thus analogous to the mode in which the soul is in the
body, or a pure spirit in space.

365 We know from Revelation that the Body of our Lord exists in this way
in the Eucharist. We know, too, from Revelation that after the
general resurrection the glorified bodies of the just will be _real_
bodies, real _corporeal substances_, and nevertheless that they will
be endowed with properties very different from those which they
possess in the present state: that they will be immortal,
incorruptible, impassible, “spiritual” (_cf._ 1 Cor. xv.). The
Catholic philosopher who adds those scattered rays of revealed light
to what his own rational analysis of experience tells him about
matter and spirit, will understand the possibility of such a kinship
between the latter as will make the fact of their union in his own
nature and person not perhaps any less wonderful, but at any rate a
little less surprising and inscrutable: and this without committing
himself to the objective idealism whereby Berkeley, while
endeavouring to show the utter unreality of matter, only succeeded
in persuading himself that its reality was not independent of all
mind.

366 “Ὥστε τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρας ἀκίνητον πρῶτον, τουτ᾽ ἔστιν ὁ
τόπος.”—_Physic_, L. iv., ch. iv. (6).

367 The category _Situs_ is commonly interpreted to signify the _mutual_
spatial relations or dispositions of the various parts of a body in
the place actually occupied by the latter.

368 A body deprived of its connatural extension exists in space in a
manner analogous to that in which the soul is in the body. The Body
of our Divine Lord is in the Eucharist in this
manner—“_sacramentaliter_”.

_ 369 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 624.

_ 370 Cf._ ZIGLIARA, _Ontologia_ (35), iv.

_ 371 Cf._ NYS, _La Notion d’Espace_ (Louvain, 1901), pp. 95 _sqq._—_La
Notion de Temps_ (Louvain, 1898), pp. 123 _sqq._

372 “Quid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti
explicare velim, nescio.”—_Confess_. L. xi., ch. xiv.

373 “Cum enim intelligimus extrema diversa alicujus medii, et anima
dicat, illa esse duo _nunc_, hoc _prius_, illud _posterius_ quasi
numerando _prius_ et _posterius_ in motu, tunc hoc dicimus esse
tempus.”—ST. THOMAS, in _Phys._, L. iv. lect. 17a.

_ 374 Sentent._, Dist. xix., q. ii., art. 1.—_Cf._ Lect. xxiii. in iv.
_Physic._

_ 375 Physic._, iv., ch. xi.—_Cf._ ST. THOMAS _in loc_.

376 “The conception of variation united with sameness is not, however,
the whole cognition of time. For this the mind must be able to
combine in thought two different movements or pulsations of
consciousness, so as to represent an interval between them. It must
hold together two _nows_, conceiving them, in succession, yet
uniting them through that intellectual synthetic activity by which
we _enumerate_ a collection of objects—a process or act which
carries concomitantly the consciousness of its own continuous
unity.”—MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xvii.

377 That is, provided we abstract from all comparison of this internal
time duration with that of any other current of conscious
experiences in the estimating mind. As a matter of fact we always
and necessarily compare the time duration of any particular
experienced change with that of the remaining portion of the whole
current of successive conscious states which make up our mental
life. And thus we feel, not that the four-mile walk had a longer
time duration than the three-mile walk, but rather that it took
place at a quicker _rate_, more rapidly, than the latter. But if a
mind which had no other consciousness of change whatsoever than,
_e.g._ that of the two walks experienced successively, no other
standard change with which to compare each of them as it occurred—if
such a mind experienced each in this way, would it pronounce the
four-mile walk to have occupied a longer time than the three-mile
walk?—_Cf._ _infra_, p. 327.

378 This is true on the assumption that the intrinsic _time-duration_ of
a successive, continuous change, its divisibility into distinct
“nows” related as “before” and “after,” is _really identical with_
the continuous, successive _states constituting the change_ itself,
and is not _a really distinct mode_ superadded to this change, a
continuous series of “_quandocationes_,” distinct from the change,
and giving the latter its temporal duration. But many philosophers
hold that in all creatures _duration_ is a mode of their existence
really distinct from the creatures themselves that have this
duration or continued existence.—_Cf._ _infra_, § 86.

_ 379 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 246, pp. 201 _sqq._

_ 380 op. cit._, c. xvii.

_ 381 op. cit._, c. xvii.

_ 382 Cf._ NYS, _La Notion de Temps_ (Lovain, 1898), p. 104.

383 The fact that we can perceive and estimate temporal duration only
_extrinsically_, and in ultimate analysis by comparison with the
flow of our own conscious states, and that therefore we can have no
perception or conception of the intrinsic time duration of any
change, seems to have been overlooked by DE SAN _(Cosmologia_, pp.
528-9) when he argues from our perception of different _rates_ of
motion, in favour of the view that time _duration_ is not really
identical with motion or change, but a superadded mode, really
distinct from the latter.

_ 384 Cf._ NYS, _La Notion de Temps_, pp. 85 _sqq._

_ 385 Cf._ NYS, _op. cit._, pp. 120 _sqq._, for a defence of the view
that an actually infinite multitude involves no contradiction.

_ 386 ibid._, pp. 162-9.

_ 387 De Consolatione_, L. v., _pr. ult._

_ 388 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 624.

389 “Est ergo dicendum, quod, cum aeternitas sit mensura esse
permanentis secundum quod aliquid recedit a permanentia essendi,
secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate. Quaedam autem sic recedunt a
permanentia essendi, quod esse eorum est subjectum transmutationis,
vel in transmutatiose consistit; et hujusmodi mensurantur _tempore_,
sicut omnis motus, et etiam esse omnium corruptibilium. Quaedam vero
recedunt minus a permanentia essendi, quia esse eorum nec in
transmutatione consistit nec est subjectum transmutationis; tamen
habent transmutationem adjunctam vel in actu vel in potentia ...
patet de angelis, quod scilicet habent esse intransmutabile cum
transmutabilitate secundum electionem, quantum ad eorum naturam
pertinet, et cum transmutabilitate intelligentiarum, et affectionum,
et locorum suo modo. Et ideo hujusmodi mensurantur _aevo_, quod est
medium inter aeternitatem et tempus. Esse autem quod mensurat
_aeternitas_, nec est mutabile nec mutabilitati adjunctum. Sic ergo
tempus habet prius et posterius, aevum non habet in se prius et
posterius, sed ei conjungi possunt; aeternitas autem non habet prius
neque posterius, neque ea compatitur.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._,
i., q. x., art. 5, in c.

390 pp. 517-57.

_ 391 Invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt
intellecta, conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque ejus virtus et
divinitas, ita ut [qui veritatem Dei in injustitia detinent] sint
inexcusabiles._—Rom. ii. 20 [18].

_ 392 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_ (4th edit.), pp. 90-2.

393 For a clear and trenchant criticism of modern relativist theories,
_cf._ VEITCH, _Knowing and Being_, especially ch. iv., “Relation,”
pp. 129 _sqq._

_ 394 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, §§ 179-80.

_ 395 Principles of Psychology_, P. ii., ch. iii., § 88.

_ 396 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, pp. 157-9.

397 “We cannot of course _perceive_ an _unperceived_ world, nor can we
conceive a world the conception of which is not in the mind; but
there is no contradiction or absurdity in the proposition: ‘A
material world of three dimensions has existed for a time
unperceived and unthought of by any created being, and then revealed
itself to human minds’.”—MAHER, _Psychology_, p. iii, n.

398 “I do not pretend to demonstrate anything, nor do I feel much
concern, about any unknowable _noumenon_ which never reveals itself
in my consciousness. If there be in existence an inscrutable
‘transcendental Ego,’ eternally screened from my ken by this
self-asserting ‘empirical Ego,’ I confess I feel very little
interest in the nature or the welfare of the former. _The only soul
about which I care is that which immediately presents itself in its
acts, which thinks, wills, remembers, believes, loves, repents, and
hopes._”—MAHER, _op. cit._, p. 475. _Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, §
180, pp. 363.

399 Πρός τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτά, ἄπερ ἐστὶν, ἑτέρων εἶναι
λέγεται, ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον.—_Categ._ v. 1.

400 I _Sentent._, Dist. xxvi., q. 2, art. 1.

401 “Sicut realis relatio consistit in ordine rei ad rem, ita relatio
rationis consistit in ordine intellectuum [ordination of concepts];
quod quidem dupliciter potest contingere. Uno modo secundum quod
iste ordo est adinventus per intellectum, et attributus ei, quod
relative dicitur; et hujusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuuntur ab
intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio
generis et speciei; has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando
ordinem ejus, quod est in intellectu ad res, quae sunt extra, vel
etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem. Alio modo secundum quod
hujusmodi relationes consequuntur modum intelligendi, videlicet quod
intellectus intelligit aliquid in ordine ad aliud; licet illum
ordinem intellectus non adinveniat, sed magis ex quadam necessitate
consequatur modum intelligendi. Et hujusmodi relationes intellectus
non attribuit ei, quod est in intellectu, sed ei, quod est in re. Et
hoc quidem contingit secundum quod aliqua non habentia secundum se
ordinem, ordinate intelliguntur; licet intellectus non intelligit ea
habere ordinem, quia sic esset falsus. Ad hoc autem quod aliqua
habeant ordinem, oportet quod utrumque sit ens, et utrumque
ordinabile ad aliud. Quandoque autem intellectus accipit aliqua duo
ut entia, quorum alterum tantum vel neutrum est ens; sicut cum
accipit duo futura, vel unum praesens et aliud futurum, et
intelligit unum cum ordine ad aliud, dicit alterum esse prius
altero; unde istae relationes sunt rationis tantum, utpote modum
intelligendi consequentes. Quandoque vero accipit unum ut duo, et
intelligit ea cum quodam ordine; sicut cum dicitur aliquid esse idem
sibi: et sic talis relatio est rationis tantum. Quandoque vero
accipit aliqua duo ut ordinabilia ad invicem, inter quae non est
ordo medius, immo alterum ipsorum essentialiter est ordo; sicut cum
dicit relationem accidere subjecto; unde talis relatio relationis ad
quodcumque aliud est rationis tantum. Quandoque vero accipit aliquid
cum ordine ad aliud, inquantum est terminus ordinis alterius ad
ipsum, licet ipsum non ordinetur ad aliud: sicut accipiendo scibile
ut terminum ordinis scientiae ad ipsum.”—_De Potentia_, q. vii.,
art. 11; _cf._ _ibid._ art. 10.

“Cum relatio requirit duo extrema, tripliciter se habet ad hoc quod
sit res naturae aut rationis. Quandoque enim ex utraque parte est
res rationis tantum, quando scilicet ordo vel habitudo non potest
esse inter aliqua nisi secundum apprehensionem intellectus tantum,
utpote cum dicimus idem eidem idem. Nam secundum quod ratio
apprehendit bis aliquod unum statuit illud ut duo; et sic
apprehendit quandam habitudinem ipsius ad seipsum. Et similiter est
de omnibus relationibus quae sunt inter ens et non ens, quas format
ratio, inquantum apprehendit non ens ut quoddam extremum. Et idem
est de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur actum rationis, ut
genus, species, et hujusmodi....”—_Summa Theol._, i., q. xiii., art.
7.

_ 402 Summa Theol._,1. q. xiii. art. 7. Elsewhere he points the
distinction in these terms: “Respectus ad aliud aliquando est in
ipsa natura rerum, utpote quando aliquae res secundum suam naturam
ad invicem ordinatae sunt, et ad invicem inclinationem habent; et
hujusmodi relationes oportet esse reales.... Aliquando vero
respectus significatus per ea, quae dicuntur _Ad aliquid_, est
tantum in ipsa apprehensione rationis conferentis unum alteri; et
tunc est relatio rationis tantum, sicut cum comparat ratio hominem
animali, ut speciem ad genus.”—_ibid._, q. xxviii., art. 1.

403 St. Thomas gives expression to it in these sentences: “Perfectio et
bonum quae sunt in rebus extra animam, non solum attenduntur
secundum aliquid absolute inhaerens rebus, sed etiam secundum
ordinem unius rei ad aliam; sicut etiam in ordine partium exercitus,
bonum exercitus consistit: huic enim ordini comparat Philosophus
[Aristot., xii. (x.) _Metaph._, Comment. 52 _sqq._] ordinem
universi. Oportet, ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quemdam esse; hic
autem ordo relatio quaedam est.... Sic ergo oportet quod res
habentes ordinem ad aliquid, realiter referantur ad ipsum, et quod
in eis aliqua res sit relatio.”—_QQ. Disp. De Potentia_, q. vii.,
art. 9.

_ 404 Kritik der reinen Vernunft_, bk. i., Hauptst. ii., Abschn. ii., §
26.

_ 405 Logic_, bk. i., ch. iii., § 10.

_ 406 L’Idée du phénomène_, p. 181—_apud_ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 173.

407 “Quaedam vero relationes sunt quantum ad utrumque extremum res
naturae, quando scilicet est habitudo inter aliqua duo secundum
aliquid realiter conveniens utrique; sicut patet de omnibus
relationibus quae consequuntur quantitatem, ut magnum et parvum,
duplum et dimidium, et hujusmodi; nam quantitas est in utroque
extremorum: et simile est de relationibus quae consequuntur actionem
et passionem, ut motivum et mobile, pater et filius, et
similia.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xiii., art. 7.

408 “Quandoque vero relatio in uno extremorum est res naturae, et in
altero est res rationis tantum: et hoc contingit quandocunque duo
extrema non sunt unius ordinis; sicut sensus et scientia referuntur
ad sensibile et scibile; quae quidem, inquantum sunt res quaedam in
esse naturale existentes, sunt extra ordinem esse sensibilis et
intelligibilis. Et ideo in scientia quidem et sensu est relatio
realis, inquantum ordinantur ad sciendum vel sentiendum res; sed res
ipsae in se consideratae sunt extra ordinem hujusmodi; unde in eis
non est aliqua relatio realiter ad scientiam et sensum, sed secundum
rationem tantum, inquantum intellectus apprehendit ea ut terminos
relationum scientiae et sensus. Unde Philosophus dicit in 5 Metaph.,
text. 20, quod non dicuntur relative, eo quod ipsa referantur ad
alia, sed quia alia referantur ad ipsa.”—_ibid._

409 Being really and adequately identical with its foundation, which is
the essence of its subject, this relation does not necessarily need
the _actual_ existence of its term. Thus actual knowledge or
science, which is a habit of the mind, has a transcendental relation
to its object even though this latter be not actual but only a pure
possibility. Similarly the accident of quantity sustained without
its connatural substance in the Eucharist, retains its
transcendental relation to the latter.—_Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, §
335 (p. 997).

_ 410 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 336 (p. 990).

_ 411 Metaph._, L. v., ch. xv. _Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _in loc._, lect. 17,
where, approving of this triple division, he writes: “Cum enim
relatio quae est in rebus, consistat in ordine unius rei ad aliam,
oportet tot modis hujusmodi relationes esse, quot modis contingit
unam rem ad aliam ordinari. Ordinatur autem una res ad aliam, vel
secundum esse, prout esse unius rei dependet ab alia, et sic est
tertius modus. Vel secundum virtutem activam et passivam, secundum
quod una res ab alia recipit, vel alteri confert aliquid; et sic est
secundus modus. Vel secundum quod quantitas unius rei potest
mensurari per aliam; et sic est primus modus.”

_ 412 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 175. For transcendental and
predicamental unity, _cf._ _supra_, §§ 26, 28.

_ 413 Cf._ _infra_, p. 355. Some authors hold that the relation in
question is predicamental. _Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, p. 987. The
nature or essence of any individual would seem to imply in its very
concept a transcendental relation of specific identity with all
other actual and possible individual embodiments of this essence.
The point is one of secondary importance.

414 Even virtually, though not formally. The creative act is not
formally transitive; it is virtually so: and in the creature it
grounds the latter’s relation of real dependence on the Creator.

415 Cf. URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 336 (p. 989), § 341 (p. 1011); ST.
THOMAS, iii. _Sentent._, Dist., viii., q. i., art. 5.

416 MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 175.

417 MERCIER, _ibid._

418 “Cum igitur Deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturae, et omnes
creaturae ordinentur ad ipsum et non e converso; manifestum est quod
creaturae realiter, referuntur ad ipsum Deum; sed in Deo non est
aliqua realis relatio ejus ad creaturas, sed secundum rationem
tantum, inquantum creaturae referantur ad ipsum.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa
Theol._, i., q. xiii., art. 7.