Chapter XV: Final Causes; Universal Order (5)

419 Among others Cajetan, Ferriariensis, Capreolus, Bañez, Joannes a St.
Thoma. _Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 338 (p. 994); MERCIER, _op.
cit._, § 174. It would be interesting to know how precisely those
authors conceived this “relative” entity, this “_esse ad_” as a
reality independent of their own thought-activity. _Cf._ art. by the
present writer in the _Irish Theological Quarterly_ (vol. vii.,
April, 1912: “Reflections on some Forms of Monism,” pp. 167-8): “The
whole universe of direct experience displays a unity of order or
design which pervades it through and through; it is a revelation of
intelligent purpose. Now a _Cosmos_, an orderly universe—which is
intelligible only as the expression of intelligent purpose, and not
otherwise—is a system of _interrelated_ factors. But _relating_ is
unintelligible except as an expression of the activity of mind or
spirit, that is, of something at least analogous to our mental
activity of comparing and judging. Scholastic philosophers, as we
know, discuss the question whether or how far the exact object of
our ‘relation’ concept is real; that is, whether this object is, in
itself and apart from the terms related [and the foundation], a mere
_ens rationis_, a product of our thought, or whether it is in itself
something more than this; and some of them hold that there are
relations which, in themselves and formally as relations, _are_
something more than mere products of our thought. Now if there be
such relations, since they are not products of _our_ thought, we may
fairly ask: Must they be the product of _some_ thought? And from our
analysis of our very notion of what a relation is, it would seem
that they must be in some sort or other a product or expression of
some thought-activity: even relations between _material_ things. It
is in determining how precisely this is, or can be, that the theist
and the monist differ. The theist regards all material things, with
their real relations—and all our finite human minds, which apprehend
the material world and its relations and themselves and one
another—as being indeed in a true sense terms or objects of the
Thought of God; not, however, as therefore identical or
consubstantial with the Divine Spirit, but as distinct from It
though dependent on It: inasmuch as he holds the Divine Thought to
be creative, and regards all these things as its _created_ terms.
The kinship he detects between matter and spirit lies precisely in
this, that matter is for him a created term of the Divine Thought.
For him too, therefore, matter can have no existence except as a
term of thought—the creative Thought of God.” Not that “the
intelligible relations apprehended by us in matter are ... identical
in reality with the thought-activity of the Divine Mind,” as
Ontologists have taught [_cf._ _supra_, 14, 18, 19]; nor that we can
directly infer the existence of a Supreme Spirit from the existence
of matter, as Berkeley tried to do by erroneously regarding the
latter merely as an essentially mind-dependent phenomenon; because
“for the orthodox theist matter is in its own proper nature not
spiritual, mental, psychical; not anything after the manner of a
thought-process, or endowed with the spirit-mode of being”. If
predicamental relations, such as _quality_ or _similarity_ of
material things, are, as those medieval scholastics contended, real
entities, “relative” in their nature, and really distinct from their
extremes and foundations, did those scholastics conceive such
“relative entities” as essentially mind-dependent entities? If they
did they would probably have conceived them in the sense of
Berkeley, as created terms of the Divine Thought, rather than in the
Ontologist sense which would identify them with the Divine Thought
itself. But it is not likely that they conceived such relative
entities as essentially thought-dependent, any more than the
absolute material realities related to one another by means of these
relative entities. On the other hand it is not easy to see how such
relative entities can be anything more than mere products of some
thought-activity or other.

420 They rely especially on this text from the _De Potentia_ (q. vii.,
art. 9): “Relatio est debilioris esse inter omnia praedicamenta;
ideo putaverunt quidam eam esse ex secundis intellectibus. Secundum
ergo hanc positionem sequeretur quod relatio non sit in rebus extra
animam sed in solo intellectu, sicut intentio generis et speciei, et
secundarum substantiarum. Hoc autem esse non potest. In nullo enim
praedicamento ponitur aliquid nisi res praeter animam existens. Nam
ens rationis dividitur contra ens divisum per decem
praedicamenta.... Si autem relatio non est in rebus extra animam non
poneretur _ad aliquid_ unum genus praedicamenti.”

_ 421 Cf._ ST. ANSELM, _Monolog._, ch. xxvi.

422 “Relatio habet quod sit res naturae ex sua causa per quam una res
naturalem ordinem habet ad alteram.”—_Quodl._ 1, art. 2.

423 “In hoc differt _Ad Aliquid_ [_i.e._ Relation] ab aliis generibus;
quod alia genera ex propria sui ratione habent, quod aliquid sint,
sicut quantitas ex hoc ipso quod est quantitas, aliquid ponit: et
similiter est de aliis. Sed _Ad Aliquid_ ex propria sui generis
ratione non habet, quod ponat aliquid, sed ad aliquid.... Habet
autem relatio quod sit aliquid reale ex eo, quod relationem
causat.”—_Quodl._ 9, art. 4. _Cf._ _De Potentia_, q. ii., art. 5.

424 “Relatio est aliquid inhaerens _licet non ex hoc ipso quod est
relatio_.... Et ideo nihil prohibet, _quod esse desinat hujusmodi
accidens sine mutatione ejus in quo est_.”—_De Potentia_, q. vii.,
art. 9, ad. 7.

425 “Et utroque modo contingit in realibus relationibus destrui
relationem: vel per destructionem quantitatis [or other foundation],
unde ad hanc mutationem quantitatis sequitur per accidens mutatio
relationis: vel etiam secundum quod cessat respectus ad alterum,
_remoto illo ad quod referebatur_; et tunc _relatio cessat, nulla
mutatione facta in ipsa_. Unde in illis in quibus non est relatio
nisi secundum hunc respectum, _veniunt et recedunt relationes sine
aliqua mutatione ejus, quod refertur_.”—In i. _Sent._, Dist. xxvi.,
q. ii., art. 1, ad. 3.

426 “Relationes differunt in hoc ab omnibus aliis rerum generibus, quia
ea quae sunt aliorum generum, ex ipsa ratione sui generis habent,
quod sint res naturae, sicut quantitates ex ratione quantitatis, et
qualitates ex ratione qualitatis. Sed relationes non habent quod
sint res naturae ex ratione respectus ad alterum.... Sed relatio
habet quod sit res naturae ex sua causa, per quam una res naturalem
ordinem habet ad alteram, qui quidem ordo naturalis et realis est
ipsis ipsa relatio.”—_Quodl._, 1, art. 2.

_ 427 Cf._ _supra_, p. 351, n. 1; in which context we may reasonably
suppose him to be arguing that relation _considered adequately_ is
not a _mere logical entity_, “ex secundis intellectibus,” inasmuch
as, having _a real foundation_ in things outside the mind, it is in
this respect real, independently of our thought.

_ 428 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 341 (p. 1008).

_ 429 ibid._, p. 1007; _cf._ _supra_, p. 347.

430 In i. _Sentent._, Dist. iv., q. 1, art. 1, ad. 3.

_ 431 Cf._ URRABURU, _ibid._, pp. 1006-7: “Deinde _nullam relationem esse
substantiam_ scripsit [S. Thomas] vel quia plerumque ratio fundandi
non est substantia ... vel potius quia semper relatio, etiam cum in
substantia fundatur, aliquid addit supra substantiam cujuslibet
extremi relati singillatim sumpti, quia non identificatur cum
fundamento prout se tenet ex parte solius subjecti, vel solius
termini, sed prout se tenet ea parte utriusque. Quare relatio ...
semper exprimit denominationem contingentem et accidentaliter
supervenientem subjecto, utpote quae adesse vel abesse potest, prout
adsit vel deficiat terminus.”

432 “Illi enim [the reference is to certain medieval idealists] quamvis
agnoscerent duo alba existentia negabant dari actu in rebus formalem
similaritatem [_i.e._ even after the comparative activity of
thought], sed formalem similitudinem, et aliam quamvis relationem,
reponebant in actu intellectus unum cum alio comparantis; nos vero
ante actum intellectus agnoscimus in rebus, quidquid sufficit ad
constituendam relationem similitudinis, diversitatis, paternitatis,
etc., ita ut hujusmodi denominationes non verificentur de actu
intellectus unum cum alio comparantis, sed plenam habeant in rebus
ipsis verificationem.”—URRABURU, _op. cit._, p. 1010.

433 In what sense “extramental”?—_Cf._ _supra_, p. 350, n. 1 (end).

_ 434 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 218. For the concepts of “cause”
and “causality” in the inductive sciences, as well as for much that
cannot be repeated here, the student may consult with advantage vol.
ii., p. iv., ch. iii., iv. and vi. of the work referred to.

435 “Id a quo aliquid procedit quocunque modo.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa
Theol._, i., q. xxxiii., art. 1.

436 Hence Aristotle’s definition of principle, including both logical
and real principles: Πασῶν μὲν οὖν κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι
ὅθεν ἡ ἐστιν ἢ γίγνεται ἢ γιγνώσκεται.—_Metaph._ IV., ch. i.

437 A _cause_ must be prior _in nature_ to its effect, but not
necessarily prior _in time_. In fact the _action_ of the cause and
the _production_ of the effect must be simultaneous. _Cf._ _Science
of Logic_, ii., § 220. Considered formally as correlatives they are
_simul natura_. A _principle_ must likewise be in some sense _prior_
to what proceeds from it, not necessarily, however, by priority of
time, nor by priority of nature involving real dependence. The
Christian Revelation regarding the Blessed Trinity involves that the
First Divine Person is the “principle” from which the Second
proceeds, and the First and the Second the “principle” from which
the Third proceeds; yet here there is no dependence or inequality,
or any priority except the “relation of origin” be called priority.

_ 438 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 216.

_ 439 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., § 16; ii., §§ 214, 224 (p. 113).

_ 440 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 252.

_ 441 Cf._ _Physic._, Lib. ii., cap. 3; _Metaph._, Lib. i., cap. 3; v.,
cap. 2.

_ 442 i.e._ from the effect considered _formally_ as a term of the
activity; in the case of _immanent_ activity, as, _e.g._ thought or
volition, where the effect remains within the agent (as a _verbum
mentale_ or other mental term), uniting with the concrete reality of
the latter, the effect is not adequately distinct from the agent as
affected by this term or product.

_ 443 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _In Physic._, ii., lect. 10: “Necesse est quatuor
esse causas: quia cum causa sit, ad quam sequitur esse alterius,
esse ejus quod habet causam potest considerari dupliciter: uno modo
absolute, et sic causa essendi est forma per quam aliquid est ens in
actu; alio modo secundum quod de potentia ente fit actu ens: et quia
omne quod est in potentia, reducitur ad actum per id quod est actu
ens, ex hoc necesse est esse duas alias causas, scilicet materiam,
et agentem quod reducit materiam de potentia in actum. Actio autem
agentis ad aliquod determinatum tendit, sicut ab aliquo determinato
principio procedit; nam omne agens agit quod est sibi conveniens. Id
autem ad quod intendit actio agentis dicitur causa finalis. Sic
igitur necesse est esse causas quatuor.”

_ 444 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, §§ 247-8.

445 Certain medieval scholastics, especially of the Franciscan School,
regarded spiritual substances as having in their constitution a
certain potential, determinable principle, which they called
“_materia_”. St. Thomas, without objecting to the designation,
insisted that such potential principle cannot be the same as the
_materia prima_ of corporeal substances (_cf._ _De Substantis
Separatis_, ch. vii.).

_ 446 Cf._ ST. THOMAS: “Actio est actus activi _et passio est actus
passivi_” (iii. _Physic._, l. 5); “_Materia_ non fit _causa in actu_
nisi _secundum quod alteratur et mutatur_” (i. _Contra Gentes_,
xvii.); “Materia est causa formae, inquantum forma non est nisi in
materia” (_De Princip. Naturae_).

_ 447 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _De Princip. Naturae_, _ibid._: “... et similiter
forma est causa materiae, inquantum materia non habet esse in actu
nisi per formam; materia enim et forma dicuntur relative ad invicem;
dicuntur etiam relative ad compositum, sicut pars ad totum”.

448 “Materia cum sit infinitarum formarum determinatur per formam, et
per eam consequitur aliquam speciem.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._,
i., q. vii., art. 1.

449 To Special Metaphysics also belongs the controverted question
whether or not a plurality of really distinct substantial forms can
enter into the constitution of an individual corporeal substance.
When we classify corporeal things into _genera_ and _species_
according to their _natural kinds_ (_cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., §
67), these latter are determined by the _formae substantiales_ of
the things classified, and are called _infimæ species_. Numerically
distinct individuals which have (conceptually) the same _forma
substantialis_, fall into the same _infima species_; while if such
individuals have (conceptually and numerically) distinct _formae
substanialis_ they fall into distinct _infimae species_ of some
higher common genus. The wider the generic concept the larger the
group of individuals which it unifies: it is a principle of
conceptual unity, _i.e._ of universality. The objects of our
_generic_, _differential_, and _specific_ concepts, throughout this
process of classification, are only virtually distinct metaphysical
grades of being in the individuals. Now if the _forma substantialis_
which yields the unifying concept of the _species infima_ for the
individuals, and the material principle which is the ground of the
numerical distinction between these latter, were likewise regarded
by the scholastics as being merely virtually distinct metaphysical
grades of being, in each individual, then the question of a
plurality of really distinct forms in one and the same individual
would have no meaning: all “forms” in the latter would be only
virtually distinct from one another and from the material principle.
But the scholastics did not conceive that the real ground for
grouping individuals into _species infimae_ was the same as that for
grouping these latter into wider genera. They regarded the relation
between the _forma substantialis_ and the _materia prima_ in the
individual as quite different from that between the generic and
specific grades of being in the individual (_cf._ _supra_, § 38;
_Science of Logic_, i., § 44; JOSEPH, _Introduction to Logic_, pp.
93-6). While they considered the latter a relation of virtual
distinction they held the former to be one of real distinction. And
while they recognized the concept of the _species infima_ to be a
principle of conceptual unity in grouping the individuals together
mentally, St. Thomas emphasized especially the rôle of the _forma
substantialis_ (on which that concept was founded) as a principle of
_real unity_ in the individual: “Ab eodam habet res _esse_ et
_unitatem_. Manifestum est autem quod res habet esse per formam.
Unde et per formam res habet unitatem” (_Quodlib._ i., art. 6). If
we accept this doctrine of St. Thomas the arguments which he bases
on it against the possibility of a plurality of distinct substantial
forms in the same corporeal individual are unanswerable (_Cf._
MERCIER, _Ontologie_, § 215).

450 “Idem actus secundum rem est duorum secundum diversam rationem:
agentis quidem, secundum quod est ab eo, patientis autem, secundum
quod est in ipso.... Ex eo quod actio et passio sunt unus motus non
sequitur quod actio et passio, vel doctio et doctrina, sint idem;
sed quod motus cui inest utrumque eorum, sit idem. Qui quidem motus
secundum unam rationem est actio, et secundum aliam rationem est
passio; alterum enim est secundum rationem esse actus hujus, ut _in
hoc_, et esse actus hujus, ut _ab hoc_; motus autem dicitur actio
secundum quod est actus agentis ut ab hoc; dicitur autem passio
secundum quod est actus patientis ut in hoc. Et sic patet quod licet
motus sit idem moventis et moti, propter hoc quod abstrahit ab
utraque ratione: tamen actio et passio differunt propter hoc quod
diversas rationes in sua significatione habent.”—ST. THOMAS, _In
Phys._, iii. 1. 5.

451 “Solet dubium esse apud quosdam, utrum motus sit in movente, aut in
mobili.... Sed manifestum est quod actus cujuslibet est in eo cujus
est actus; actus autem motus est in mobili, cum sit actus mobilis,
causatus tamen in eo a movente ... cum motus sit actus existentis in
potentia, sequitur quod motus non sit actus alicujus inquantum est
movens, sed inquantum est mobile.”—_ibid._, 1. 4.

452 Some languages mark the distinction between these two kinds of
action: “Differt autem _facere_ et _agere_: quia _factio_ est actio
transiens in exteriorem materiam, sicut aedificare, secare et
hujusmodi; _agere_ autem est actio permanenslin ipso agente sicut
videre, velle et hujusmodi.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._ iae iia, q.
lxvii., art. 4, c.

453 Hume went even farther, at least in language; for he alleged
(whether he really believed is another question) that he could
overcome the supposed merely psychological difficulty, that he could
easily—and, presumably, without doing violence to his rational
nature—conceive a non-existent thing as coming into existence
without a cause! He proclaimed that he could achieve the feat of
thinking what the universal voice of mankind has declared to be
unthinkable: _an absolute beginning of being from nothingness_. “The
knowledge of this relation (causality) is not,” he writes, “in any
instance attained by reasonings _a priori_; but arises entirely from
experience, when we find that any particular objects are _constantly
conjoined_ with each other ”(_Works_, ed. Green and Grose, iv., 24).
“All distinct ideas are separable from each other, and, as the ideas
of cause and effect are evidently distinct, ’twill be easy for us
(!) to conceive any object as nonexistent this moment, and existent
the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or
producing principle” (_Treatise on Human Nature_, p. 381). On this
argument (?) even such an ardent admirer of the pan-phenomenist as
Huxley was, is forced to remark that “it is of the circular sort,
for the major premise, that all distinct ideas are separable in
thought, assumes the question at issue” (HUXLEY’S _Hume_, p. 122).

454 Thus, for instance, man, elevated by sanctifying grace, can perform
acts which merit the supernatural reward of the Beatific Vision.

_ 455 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 231.

_ 456 Cf._ ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, ii., cap. 2.

_ 457 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 392 (p. 1123): “Unde adaequata virtus
instrumentalis videtur conflari ex naturali instrumenti virtute vel
efficacitate et ex virtute causae principalis sibi transeunter
addita, docente S. Thoma: _Instrumentum virtutem instrumentalem
acquirit dupliciter scilicet quando accipit formam instrumenti et
quando movetur a principali agente ad effectum_ (_Summa Theol._,
iii., q. xix., art. 3, ad. 2).”

458 “Ad aliquem effectum aliquid operatur dupliciter. Uno modo sicut per
se agens; et dicitur per se agere quod agit per aliquam formam sibi
inhaerentem per modum naturae completae, sive habeat illam formam a
se, sive ab alio.... Alio modo aliquid operatur ad effectum aliquem
instrumentaliter, quod quidem non operatur ad effectum per formam
sibi inhaerentem, sed solum inquantum est motum a per se agente.
Haec est ratio instrumenti, inquantum est instrumentum, ut moveat
motum; unde sicut se habet forma completa ad per se agentem, ita se
habet motus, quo movetur a principale agente, ad instrumentum, sicut
serra operatur ad scamnum. Quamvis enim serra habeat aliquam
actionem quae sibi competit secundum propriam formam, ut dividere;
tamen aliquem effectum habet qui sibi non competit, nisi inquantum
est mota ab artifice, scilicet facere rectam incisionem, et
convenientem formae artis: et sic instrumentum habet duas
operationes; unam quae competit ei secundam rationem propriam; aliam
quae competit ei secundam quod est motum a per se agente, quae
transcendit virtutem propriae formae.”—_De Veritate_, q. xxvii.,
art. 4. It is not clear, however, that St. Thomas regarded these two
“_operationes_” of the instrumental cause as really distinct, for he
says that it acts as an instrument (_i.e._ modifies the efficiency
of the principal cause) only by exercising its own proper function:
“Omne agens instrumentale exsequitur actionem principalis agentis
per aliquam operationem propriam, et connaturalem sibi, sicut calor
naturalis generat carnem dissolvendo et digerendo, et serra operatur
ad factionem scamni secando” (_Contra Gentes_, ii., ch. xxi.): from
which he goes on to argue that no creature can act even as an
instrumental cause _in creating_.—_Cf._ iv. _Sent._, Dist. i., q.
i., art. 4, sol. 2.—_De Potentia_, q. iii., art. 7.—_Summa Theol._,
iii., q. lxii., art. 1, ad. 2.

459 St. Thomas, proving the necessity of the Divine _concursus_ for all
created causes, illustrates the general distinction between a
_principal_ and an _instrumental_ cause: “Virtus naturalis quae est
rebus naturalibus in sua institutione collata, inest eis _ut quaedem
forma habens esse ratum et firmum in natura_. Sed id quod a Deo fit
in re naturali, quo actualiter agat, est ut intentio sola, habens
esse quoddam incompletum, per modum quo ... virtus artis [est] in
instrumento artificis. Sicut ergo securi per artem dari potuit
acumen, ut esset forma in ea permanens, non autem dari ei potuit
quod _vis artis_ esset in ea quasi quaedam forma permanens, _nisi
haberet intellectum_; ita rei naturali potuit conferri virtus
propria, ut forma in ipsa permanens, non autem _vis qua agit ad
esse_ ut instrumentum primae causae, _nisi daretur ei quod esset
universale essendi principium_; nec iterum virtuti naturali conferri
potuit ut moveret seipsam, nec ut conservaret se in esse: unde sicut
patet quod instrumento artificis conferri non oportuit quod
operaretur absque motu artis; ita rei naturali conferri non potuit
quod operaretur absque operatione divina.”—_QQ. DD. De. Pot._, q.
iii., art. 7.

_ 460 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xix.—MERCIER, _Psychologie_, ii., ch.
i. § 2.

461 For a fuller treatment of this whole subject, _cf._ _Science of
Logic_, ii., Part iv., chs. iii., iv.; Part v., ch. i.—MAHER,
_Psychology_, ch. xix., pp. 423-4.

_ 462 Cf._ NEWMAN, _Grammar of Assent_, Part i., ch. iv., § 1 (5), (6); §
2, remark 1.

_ 463 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., §§ 216, 218, 219.

_ 464 ibid._, § 216.

_ 465 ibid._, § 220.

_ 466 Introduction to Logic_, pp. 64-5.

_ 467 Cf._ what was said above (32) about the causal or extrinsic, as
distinct from the intrinsic, principle of individuation.

468 “Whenever science tries to find the cause not of a particular event,
such as the French Revolution (whose cause must be as unique as that
event itself is), but of an event of a kind, such as consumption, or
commercial crises, it looks in the last resort for a _commensurate_
cause. What is that exact state or condition of the body, given
which it must and without which it cannot be in consumption? What
are those conditions in a commercial community, given which there
must and without which there cannot be a commercial crisis?”—JOSEPH,
_op. cit._, p. 65. _Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 221.

_ 469 System of Logic_, iii., v., § 2.

470 For instance: (_a_) The “ontological” or “true” cause, which
“actually produces” the effect, need not necessarily be the
“ultimate” cause of the latter. (_b_) A “physical fact” can be the
cause of another in the sense of being the invariable antecedent (or
_physical_ cause) of the latter, but not “in that sense alone”; it
may also be an _efficient_ cause of the latter by exerting an active
influence on the happening of this latter. (_c_) Whether or not
efficiency is “a mysterious and most powerful tie,” at any rate it
does exist between “physical facts” in the universe. (_d_) Its
analysis reveals not a “supposed necessity of ascending ... to ...
the true cause, ... which ... produces the effect,” as if the
proximate causes did not also truly produce the latter; but a real
necessity of ascending to a First Cause as the source and support
and complement of the real efficiency of these proximate causes.
(_e_) A merely _logical_ theory of Induction does not indeed demand
any inquiry either into the efficiency of natural agencies, or into
the nature and grounds of the “invariability” or “necessity” or
“law” whereby these are connected with their effects. But a
_philosophical_ theory of Induction does imply such inquiries. And
here phenomenist writers like Mill have laid themselves open to two
accusations. For while professing merely to abstract from the
problem of _efficiency_ they have tried equivalently to deny its
existence by proclaiming it superfluous and insoluble, besides
consciously or unconsciously misrepresenting it. And similarly, in
dealing with the _invariability_ of causal sequences in the
universe, with the _necessary_ character of its physical laws, they
have misconceived this necessity as being mechanical, fatal,
absolutely inviolable; and have wrongly proclaimed its ultimate
grounds to be unknowable (Agnosticism). Cf. _infra_, § 104; _Science
of Logic_, ii., Part IV., chs. iii., iv., and v.; Part V., ch. i.
Thus, while eschewing the genuine Metaphysics, which seeks the real
nature and causes of the world of our experience, as superfluous and
futile, they have substituted for it a masked and spurious
metaphysics which they have wrongly fathered on Physical Science: a
mass of more or less superficial speculations which have not even
the merit of consistency. No philosopher, starting with their views
on the nature of the human mind, can consistently claim for the
latter any really valid or reliable knowledge of _laws_, any more
than of causes. For the knowledge of a _law_, even as a
_generalized_ fact, is a knowledge that claims to pass beyond the
limits of the individual’s present and remembered experiences. But
there can be no rational justification, whether psychological or
ontological, for the certain reliability of such a step, in the
philosophy which logically reduces all certain knowledge to the mere
awareness of a flow of successive sensations supposed to constitute
the total content of the individual consciousness and the total
reality of human experience.

_ 471 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xvii., pp. 368-70.—MERCIER, _op.
cit._, § 229.

472 “When an _effort_ of attention combines two ideas, when one billiard
ball moves another, when a steam hammer flattens out a lump of solid
iron, when a blow on the head knocks a man down, in all these cases
there is something more than, and essentially different from, the
mere _sequence_ of two phenomena: there is _effective force_—_causal
action_ of an agent endowed with _real energy_.”—MAHER, _op. cit._,
_ibid._, p. 370.

_ 473 Grammar of Assent_, p. 66.

_ 474 Cf._ DOMET DE VORGES, _Cause efficiente et cause finale_, p. 39.
Volitional activity is no doubt the most prominent type of efficient
causality in our mental life. But it is not the only type; we have
direct conscious experience of intellectual effort, of the work of
the imagination, of the exercise of organic and muscular energy.
There is no warrant therefore for conceiving all efficient power or
energy, after the model of will-power, as Newman among others
appears to have done when he wrote in these terms: “Starting, then,
from experience, I consider a cause to be an effective will: and by
the doctrine of causation, I mean the notion, or first principle,
that all things come of effective will” (_ibid._, p. 68). No doubt,
all things do come ultimately from the effective will of God. This,
however, is not a first principle, but a remote philosophical
conclusion.

_ 475 ibid._, p. 66.

476 ST. THOMAS, _QQ. Disp. De Potentia_, q. iii., art. 7, in c.

477 “Nulla res per seipsam movet vel agit, nisi sit movens non motum....
Et quia natura inferior agens non agit nisi mota ... et hoc non
cessat quousque perveniatur ad Deum, sequitur de necessitate quod
Deus sit causa actionis cujuslibet rei naturalis, ut movens et
applicans virtutem ad agendum.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Potentia Dei_, q.
iii., art. 7.

478 This is the principle repeatedly expressed by ST. THOMAS: “Unde
quarto modo unum est causa alterius, sicut principale agens est
causa actionis instrumenti: et hoc modo etiam oportet dicere, quod
Deus est causa omnis actionis rei naturalis. Quanto enim aliqua
causa est altior, tanto est communior et efficacior, tanto
profundius ingreditur in effectum, et de remotiori potentia ipsum
reducit in actum. In qualibet autem re naturali invenimus _quod est
ens_ et quod est res naturalis, et quod est talis vel talis naturae.
Quorum primum est commune omnibus entibus; secundum omnibus rebus
naturalibus; tertium in una specie; et quartum, si addamus
accidentia, est proprium huic individuo. Hoc ergo individuum agendo
non potest constituere aliud in simili specie, nisi prout est
instrumentum illius causae _quae respicit totam speciem_ et ulterius
_totum esse_ naturae inferioris. Et propter hoc nihil agit in
speciem in istis inferioribus ... nec aliquid agit _ad esse_ nisi
per virtutem Dei. _Ipsum enim esse est communissimus effectus,
primus et intimior omnibus aliis effectibus; et ideo soli Deo
competit secundum virtutem propriam talis effectus_: unde etiam, ut
dicitur in _Lib. de Causis_ (prop. 9), intelligentia non dat esse,
nisi prout est in ea virtus divina. Sic ergo Deus est causa omnis
actionis prout quodlibet agens est instrumentum divinae virtutis
operantis.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Potentia Dei_, q. iii. art 7.—_Cf._
_supra_, 99 (_c_), p. 375, n. 2.

479 Why, then, is a finite cause not capable of acting uninterruptedly?
why are its powers, forces, energies, fatigued, lessened, exhausted
by exercise? Simply because its action is proportionate to its
powers, and these to its _finite_ nature.

480 “Creatio non est mutatio nisi secundum modum intelligendi tantum.
Nam de ratione mutationis est quod aliquid idem se habeat aliter
nunc et prius.... Sed in creatione, per quam producitur tota
substantia rei, non potest accipi aliquid idem aliter se habens nunc
et prius, nisi secundum intellectum tantum; sicut si intelligatur
aliqua res prius non fuisse totaliter, et postea esse. Sed cum actio
et passio conveniant in una substantia motus, et differant solum
secundum habitudines diveras ... oportet quod subtracto motu, non
remaneant nisi diversae habitudines in creante et creato. Sed quia
modus significandi sequitur modum intelligendi ... creatio
significatur per modum mutationis; et propter hoc dicitur quod
creare est ex nihilo aliquid facere; quamvis facere et fieri magis
in hoc conveniant quam mutare et mutari; quia facere et fieri
important habitudinem causae ad effectum et effectus ad causam, sed
mutationem ex consequenti.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xlv.,
art. 2, ad. 2.

481 “Remoto motu, actio nihil aliud importat quam ordinem originis
[effectus] secundum quod [effectus] a causa aliqua procedit.”—_op.
cit._, i. q. xli., art. 1, ad 2.

482 The act of the will is, of course, virtually transitive when it
wills or determines bodily movements.—_Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_,
chs. x., xxiii. (pp. 517-24).

483 At the same time it must be noted that organic vital activity is
transitive in the sense that no part or member of the organism acts
upon itself, but only on other parts, in the production of the
local, quantitative and qualitative changes involved in nutrition.
It is subject to the inductively established law which seems to
regulate all _corporeal_ action: that all such action involves
_reaction_ of the _patiens_ on the _agens_. Mental activity is
outside this law. Cognitive and appetitive faculties do not react on
the objects which reduce these faculties to act, thus arousing their
immanent activity.—_Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 227.

_ 484 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._

_ 485 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, chs. xiii. and xiv.

_ 486 Cf._ URRABURU: “Vel, si mavis, dic causam efficientem esse causam,
a qua fit aliquid, vel a quo proprie oritur actio, intelligendo per
actionem emanationem et fluxum ac dependentiam effectus a
causa.”—_op. cit._, § 389 (p. 1112).

_ 487 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 229: “L’action, l’efficience, qu’est
elle, en quoi consiste-t-elle? Est-ce une sorte d’écoulement de la
cause dans l’effet? Évidemment non. Lorsque nous voulons nous élever
à une conception métaphysique, nous nous raccrochons à une image
sensible, et nous nous persuadons volontiers, que la netteté de la
première répond à la facilité avec laquelle nous nous figurons la
seconde. Il faut se défier de cette illusion. Puisque l’action, même
corporelle, ne modifie point l’agent, la causalité efficiente ne
peut consister dans un influx physique, qui passerait de la cause
dans l’effet.”

_ 488 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., §§ 228-9.

489 We might add this other fact: that _all_ kinds of corporeal activity
and change (11) seem to involve _motion_ or local change. This does
not prove that they all _are_ motion or local change. The
significance of the fact lies probably in this, that local motion is
necessary for procuring and continuing physical contact between the
interacting physical agencies.—_Cf._ NYS, _Cosmologie_, §§ 227-9.

_ 490 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _Contra Gentes_, iii., 69.

491 “Une cause véritable est une cause, entre laquelle et son effet
l’esprit aperçoit une liaison nécessaire: c’est ainsi que je
l’entendes. [This is ambiguous.] Or il n’y a que l’être infiniment
parfait entre la volonté duquel et les effets l’esprit aperçoive une
liaison nécessaire. Il n’y a donc que Dieu qui soit véritable cause,
et il semble même qu’il y ait contradiction à dire que les hommes
puissent l’être”—_De la récherche de la vérité_, Liv. 6me, 2e
partie, ch. iii.

492 “Si l’on vient à considérer attentivement l’idée que l’on a de cause
ou de puissance d’agir, on ne peut en douter que cette idée ne
présente quelque chose de divin.”—_ibid._

493 “Il n’y a point d’homme qui sache seulement ce qu’il faut faire pour
remuer un de ses doigts par le moyen des esprits animaux.”—_ibid._

494 “J’ai toujours soutenue que l’âme était l’unique cause de ses actes,
c’est à dire de ses déterminations libres ou de ses actes bons ou
mauvais.... J’ai toujours soutenu que l’âme était active, mais que
ses actes ne produisaient rien de physique.”—_Réflexions sur la
prémotion physique_. “Je crois que la volonté est une _puissance
active_, qu’elle a un véritable pouvoir de se déterminer; mais son
action est _immanente_; c’est une action qui ne produit rien par son
efficace propre, pas même le mouvement de son bras.”—_Réponse à la
3__me__ lettre d’Arnauld_.

_ 495 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, §§ 230-2; ZIGLIARA, _Ontologia_ (45);
URRABURU, _op. cit._, §§ 393 _sqq._

496 We may reasonably ask the occasionalist to suppose for the moment
that we are efficient causes of our mental processes and to tell us
what better proof of it could he demand, or what better proof could
be forthcoming, than this proof from consciousness.

497 MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. x., p. 220.

498 Should anyone doubt that consciousness does testify to this fact, we
may prove it inductively from the constant correlation between the
mental state and the bodily movement: “I will to move my arm, it
moves; I will that it remain at rest, it does not move; I will that
its movement be more or less strong and rapid, the strength and
rapidity vary with the determination of my will. What more complete
inductive proof can we have of the efficiency of our will-action on
the external world?”—MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 231.

499 “Si effectus non producuntur ex actione rerum creatarum, sed solum
ex actione Dei, impossibile est quod per effectus manifestetur
virtus alicujus causae creatae: non enim effectus ostendit virtutem
causae nisi ratione actionis, quae a virtute procedens ad effectum
terminatur. Natura autem causae non cognoscitur per effectum, nisi
inquantum per ipsum cognoscitur virtus, quae naturam consequitur. Si
igitur res creatae non habent actiones ad producendum effectum,
sequitur, quod nunquam naturam alicujus rei creatae poterit cognosci
per effectum; et sic subtrahitur nobis omnis cognitio scientiae
naturalis, in qua praecipuae demonstrationes per effectum
sequuntur.”—ST. THOMAS, _Contra Gentes_, L. iii., cap. 69.

500 “Je demeure d’accord que la foi oblige à croire qu’il y a des corps;
mais, pour l’évidence, il me semble qu’elle n’est point entière, et
que nous ne sommes point invinciblement portés à croire qu’il y ait
quelqu’autre chose que Dieu et notre esprit.”—_Récherche de la
vérite_, 6me éclaircissement.

_ 501 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 217.

_ 502 Metaph._, v., 17.

503 “Quaedam vero ad bonum inclinantur cum aliqua cognitione; non quidem
sic quod cognoscant ipsam rationem boni, sed cognoscunt aliquod
bonum particulare.... Inclinatio autem hanc cognitionem sequens
dicitur appetitus _sensitivus_. Quaedam vero inclinantur ad bonum
cum cognitione qua cognoscant ipsam boni rationem; et haec
inclinatio dicitur _voluntas_.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q.
xlix., art. 1.

504 “Sicut influere causae efficientis est agere, ita influere causae
finalis est appeti et desiderari.”—_De Veritate_, q. xxii., art. 2.

505 In its modern usage the term “intention” is inseparable from the
notion of _conscious_ direction. The scholastics used the term
“_intentio_” in a _wider_ and _deeper_ sense to connote the natural
tendency of all created agencies towards their natural activities
and lines of development. And in unconscious agencies they did not
hesitate to refer to it as “_intentio naturae_” or “_appetitus
naturalis_”.

506 “Res naturalis per _formam_ qua perficitur in sua specie, habet
inclinationem in proprias operationes et proprium finem, quem per
operationes consequitur; quale enim unumquodque est, talia operatur,
et in sibi convenientia tendit.”—ST. THOMAS, _Contra Gentes_, iv.,
19.

“Omnia suo modo per appetitum inclinantur in bonum, sed diversimode.
Quaedam enim inclinantur in bonum per solam naturalem habitudinem
absque cognitione, sicut plantae et corpora inanimata; et talis
inclinatio ad bonum vocatur appetitus naturalis.”—_Summa Theol._,
i., q. xlix., art. 1.

507 “Causa efficiens et finis sibi correspondent invicem, quia efficiens
est principium motus, finis autem terminus. Et similiter materia et
forma: nam forma dat esse, materia autem recipit. Est igitur
efficiens causa finis, finis autem causa efficientis. Efficiens est
causa finis quantum ad esse, quidem, quia movendo perducit efficiens
ad hoc, quod _sit_ finis. Finis autem est causa efficientis non
quantum ad esse sed quantum ad _rationem causalitatis_. Nam
efficiens est causa in quantum agit; non autem agit nisi causa
[gratia] finis. Unde ex fine habet suam causalitatem efficiens.”—ST.
THOMAS, _In Metaph._, v., 2.

“Sciendum quod licet finis sit ultimus in esse in quibusdam, in
causalitate tamen est prior semper, unde dicitur _causa causarum_,
quia est causa causalitatis in omnibus causis. Est enim causa
causalitatis efficientis, ut jam dictum est. Efficiens autem est
causa causalitatis et materiae et formae.”—_ibid._, lect. 3.

508 Φύσις ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τὶς καὶ αἰτία του κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἠρεμεῖν ἐν ῷ ὑπάχει
πρώτως καθ᾽ αὑτο, καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Natura est principium
quoddam et causa cur id moveatur et quiescat, in quo inest primum,
per se et non secundum accidens.—_Physic._, L. ii., cap. 1.

509 “Ars nihil aliud est quam recta ratio aliquorum operum
faciendorum.”—_Summa Theol._ ia iiae, q. lvii., art. 3.—_Cf._ _In
Post. Anal._, l. 1.

510 “Natura nihil aliud est quam ratio cujusdam artis, scilicet divinae,
indita rebus qua ipsae res moventur ad finem determinatum; sicut si
artifex factor navis posset lignis tribuere quod ex seipsis
moverentur ad navis formam inducendam.”—_In II Phys._, lect. 14.

“Omnia naturalia, in ea quae eis conveniunt, sunt inclinata,
habentia in seipsis aliquod inclinationis principium, ratione cujus
eorum inclinatio naturalis est, _ita ut quodammodo ipsa vadant, et
non solum ducantur in fines debitos_.”—_De Veritate_, q. xxii., art.
7.

511 “In nullo enim alio natura ab arte videtur differre, nisi quia
natura est principium intrinsecum, et ars est principium
extrinsicum. Si enim ars factiva navis esset intrinseca ligno, facta
fuisset navis a natura, sicut modo fit ab arte.”—_In II. Phys._,
lect. 13.

_ 512 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 217.

_ 513 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii, § 227.

_ 514 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., §§ 226-31.

515 ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, iv., ch. v.

_ 516 Physic._, ii., ch. v.

_ 517 ibid._

_ 518 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., §§ 264, 268-9.

519 Οὐδὲν γὰρ ὤς ἔτυχε ποιεῖ ἡ φυσις.—_De Coelo_, ii., 8.

520 Fatalism is the view that all things happen by a blind, inevitable,
eternally foredoomed and unintelligible necessity. Thus SENECA
(_Nat. Quaest._, L. III., cap. 36) describes _fatum_ as _necessitas
omnium rerum actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat_. This _necessitas
ineluctabilis_ is totally different from the conditional physical
necessity of the course of Nature dependently on the _Fiat_ of a
Supreme Free Will guided by Supreme Intelligence (_Cf._ _Science of
Logic_, §§ 224, 249, 253, 257). If the necessity of actual
occurrences is not ultimately traceable to the _Fiat_ of an
Intelligent Will—and mechanists deny that it can be so traced—it is
rightly described as fatalistic, blind, purposeless, unintelligible.

_ 521 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, §§ 259, 260.

522 “Expliquer par une rencontre fortuite, la convergence d’éléments,
dont chacun a sa poussée propre, c’est rendre raison de la
_convergence_ par des principes de _divergence_.... Il est donc
contradictoire d’attribuer au hasard la raison explicative de
l’ordre.”—MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 260.

_ 523 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., §§ 224, 250, and _passim_.

524 “Similiter ex prioribus pervenitur ad posteriora in arte et in
natura: unde si artificialia, ut domus, fierent a natura, hoc ordine
fierent, quo nunc fiunt per artem: scilicet prius institueretur
fundamentum, et postea erigerentur parietes, et ultimo supponeretur
tectum.... Et similiter si ea quae fiunt a natura fierent ab arte,
hoc modo fierent sicut apta nata sunt fieri a natura; ut patet in
sanitate, quam contigit fieri, et ab arte et a natura.... Unde
manifestum est quod in natura est alterum propter alterum, scilicet
priora propter posteriora, sicut et in arte.”—ST. THOMAS, _In II.
Phys._, lect. 13.—_Cf._ _supra_, p. 417, n. 3.

525 “Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens
dispositio.”—_De Civ. Dei_, xix., 13.

_ 526 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, §§ 257-61.

527 “_La convergence de causes indifférentes qui réalisent d’une manière
harmonieuse et persistante un même objet ordonné, ne s’explique
point par des coincidences fortuites; elle réclame un principe
interne de convergence._”—_Ibid._, § 260.

528 TENNYSON, _In Memoriam_, lvi.

529 BROWNING, _A Soul’s Tragedy_, Act. 1.

530 “Universum habet bonum ordinis et bonum separatum.”—_In Metaph._,
xii., l. 12.

531 ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, xi., 10. Does Aristotle teach that God moves
the universe only as its Final Cause, as the Supreme Good towards
which it tends, or also as Efficient Cause? His thought is here
obscure, and has given rise to much controversy among his
interpreters.

532 Ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον καὶ καθ᾽ ἁυτὸ καὶ κατὰ
συμβεβηκός, κινοῦν δὲ τὴν πρώτην ἀΐδιον καὶ μίαν κίνησιν.—_Ibid._,
xi., 8.

533 Κινεῖ δὲ (οὐ ἕνεκα) ὡς ἐρώμενον, κινούμενον δὲ τᾶλλα κινει.—_ibid._,
7.

534 “Totus ordo universi est propter primum moventem, ut scilicet
explicetur in universo ordinato id quod est in intellectu et
voluntate primi moventis. Et sic oportet quod a primo movente sit
tota ordinatio universi.”—_Ibid._, xii., l. 12.

535 ... Among themselves all things
Have order; and from hence the form, which makes
The universe resemble God. In this
The higher creatures see the printed steps
Of that eternal worth, which is the end
Whither the line is drawn. All natures lean
In this their order, diversely, some more,
Some less approaching to their primal source.
Thus they to different havens are moved on
Through the vast sea of being, and each one
With instinct giv’n, that bears it in its course;
This to the lunar sphere directs the fire,
This prompts the hearts of mortal animals,
This the brute earth together knits and binds.
Nor only creatures, void of intellect,
Are aim’d at by this bow; but even those
That have intelligence and love, are pierced.
That Providence, who so well orders all,
With her own light makes ever calm the heaven,
In which the substance that hath greatest speed
Is turned: and thither now, as to our seat
Predestin’d, we are carried by the force
Of that strong cord, that never looses dart,
But at fair aim and glad ...

—DANTE, _Paradiso_, Cant. i. (tr. by CARY).

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