Chapter XV: Final Causes; Universal Order (3)

71 Certain medieval philosophers had made the same mistake. St. Thomas
points out their error frequently. _Cf._ _Contra Gentes_, i., c.
xxvi: “Quia id, quod commune est, per additionem specificatur vel
individuatur, æstimaverunt, divinum esse, cui nulla fit additio, non
esse aliquid proprium, sed esse commune omnium: non considerantes,
quod id, quod commune est, vel universale, sine additione esse non
potest, sed sine additione consideratur. Non enim animal potest esse
absque rationali vel irrationali differentia, quamvis sine his
differentiis consideretur; licet enim cogitetur universale absque
additione, non tamen absque receptibilitate additionis est. Nam si
animali nulla differentia addi posset, genus non esset; et similiter
est de omnibus aliis nominibus. Divinum autem esse est absque
additione, non solum cogitatione, sed etiam in rerum natura; et non
solum absque additione, sed absque receptibilitate additionis. Unde
ex hoc ipso quod additionem non recipit, nec recipere potest, magis
concludi potest quod Deus non sit esse commune, sed esse proprium.
Etenim ex hoc ipso suum esse ab omnibus aliis distinguitur, quia
nihil ei addi potest.”

_ 72 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, QQ. DD. _De Potentia_, q. i. art. 1, ad. 18.

73 ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, c. iv., v., _apud_ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, iii.,
p. 60.

_ 74 Contra Gentes_, II., c. vii.

_ 75 Cf._ LAMINNE, _Cause et Effet_—_Revue neo-scolastique_, February,
1914, p. 38.

76 St. Thomas uses what is for him strong language when he describes
such a view as ridiculous: “Ridiculum est dicere quod ideo corpus
non agat, quia accidens non transit de subjecto in subjectum; non
enim hoc modo dicitur corpus calidum calefacere, quod idem numero
calor, qui est in calefaciente corpore, transeat ad corpus
calefactum; sed quia virtute caloris, qui est in calefaciente
corpore, alius calor numero fit actu in corpore calefacto, qui prior
erat in eo in potentia. Agens enim naturale non est traducens
propriam formam in alterum subjectum, sed reducens subjectum quod
patitur de potentia in actum.”—_Contra Gentes_, L. III., c. lxix.

_ 77 Cf._ ZIGLIARA, _Ontologia_ (8), ix., _Quintum_. _Cf._ also
ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._ v., ST. THOMAS, _In Metaph._, v., § 14, and
_Contra Gentes_, i., c. xvi., where he emphasizes the truth that
potential being presupposes actual being: “Quamvis id quod quandoque
est in potentia, quandoque in actu, prius sit tempore in potentia
quam in actu, tamen simpliciter actus est prior potentia; quia
potentia non educit se in actum, sed opportet quod educatur in actum
per aliquid quod sit in actu. Omne igitur quod est aliquo modo in
potentia, habet aliquid prius se”.

78 KLIMKE, _Der Monismus und seine philosophischen Grundlagen_, p. 185.
_Cf._ _Irish Theological Quarterly_, vol. vii. (April, 1912), p. 157
_sqq._, art. _Reflections on Some Forms of Monism_.

79 For relations of _potentia_ and _actus_, _cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_,
§ 214.

_ 80 Cf._ _Physics_, v., 1; _De Anima_, i., 3.

81 Λεγώ δ᾽ ὕλην, ἢ καθ᾽ ἁυτὴν μήτε τὶ, μήτε ποσὸν, μήτε ποίον, μήτε
ἄλλο μεδὲν λέγεται οἶς ὤρισται τὸ ὄν.—_Metaph._ vi., c. iii.

82 “Decepit antiquos philosophos hanc rationem inducentes, ignorantia
formae substantialis. Non enim adhuc tantum profecerant ut
intellectus eorum se elevaret ad aliquid quod est supra sensibilia:
et ideo illas formas tantum consideraverunt, quæ sunt sensibilia
propria vel communia. Hujusmodi autem manifestum est esse
accidentia, ut album et nigrum, magnum et parvum, et hujusmodi.
Forma autem substantialis non est sensibilis nisi per accidens, et
ideo ad ejus cognitionem non bervenerunt, ut scirent ipsam materiam
distinguere.”—_In Metaph._ vii., 2.

83 “Esse actum quemdam nominat: non enim dicitur esse aliquid, ex hoc
quod est in potentia, sed ex hoc quod est in actu.”—ST. THOMAS,
_Contra Gentes_, i., ch. xxii., 4.

84 The etymology of Aristotle’s description of the essence as τὸ τί ἦν
εἶναι is not easy to explain. The expression τὸ εἶναι supposes a
dative understood, _e.g._ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, the being proper to man.
To the question τὶ ἐστι τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι; what is the being or
essence proper to man? the answer is: that which gives the
definition of man, that which explains what he is—τί ἦν. Is the
imperfect, τὶ ἦν, an archaic form for the present, τὶ ἐστι; or is it
a deliberate suggestion of the profound doctrine that the essence as
ideal, or possible, is anterior to its actual, physical realization?
Commentators are not agreed. _Cf._ MATTHIAS KAPPES,
Aristoteles-Lexicon, p. 25 (Paderborn, 1894); MERCIER, _Ontologie_,
p. 30 n.

85 Essentia est illud per quod res constituitur in proprio genere vel
specie, et quod significamus per definitionem indicantem quid est
res.—_De Ente et Essentia_, ch. i.

86 ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, v., 4; ST. THOMAS, _De Potentia Dei_, q. ix.,
art. 1.

87 Sometimes, however, the expression “metaphysical essence” is used to
signify those objective concepts, and those only, _without which the
thing cannot be conceived_, (or sometimes, even the one which is
considered most fundamental among these), and therefore as not
explicitly involving the concepts of properties which follow
necessarily from the former; while the “physical essence” is
understood to signify all those real elements _without which the
thing cannot actually exist_, including, therefore, all such
necessary properties. Taken in this sense the physical essence of
man would include not merely soul and body, but also such properties
as the capacity of speech, of laughter, of using tools, of cooking
food, etc.

88 Et ex hoc patet ratio, writes St. Thomas, quare genus et species et
differentia se habeant proportionaliter ad materiam, formam et
compositum in natura, quamvis non sint idem cum illis; quia neque
genus est materia, sed sumitur a materia ut significans totum; nec
differentia est forma, sed sumitur a forma ut significans totum.
Unde dicimus hominem esse _animal rationale_, et non _ex animali et
rationali_; sicut dicimus eum esse ex corpore et anima. Ex corpore
enim et anima dicitur esse homo, sicut ex duabus rebus quædam tertia
res constituta, quæ neutra illarum est: homo enim nec est anima
neque corpus; sed si homo aliquo modo ex animali et rationali
dicatur esse, non erit sicut res tertia ex duabus rebus sed sicut
intellectus [conceptus] tertius ex duobus intellectibus. Intellectus
enim _animalis_ est sine determinatione formae specialis naturam
exprimens rei, ex eo quod est materiale respectu ultimae
perfectionis. Intellectus autem hujus differentiae, _rationalis_,
consistit in determinatione formae specialis: ex quibus duobus
intellectibus constituitur intellectus speciei vel definitionis. Et
ideo sicut res constituta ex aliquibus non recipit prædicationem
earum rerum ex quibus constituitur; ita nec intellectus recipit
prædicationem eorum intellectuum ex quibus constituitur; non enim
dicimus, quod definitio sit genus vel differentia.—_De Ente et
Essentia_, cap. iii.

_ 89 Cf._ MERCIER, _Psychologie_, vol. ii., § 169 (6th edit., 1903, pp.
24-5).

_ 90 Cf._ ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, L. viii., 10; ST. THOMAS, _In_ viii.,
_Metaph._, Lect. iii., par. i.

_ 91 Cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, pp. 42-3. How do we know that not only
water (H2O) is a possible essence but also hydrogen di-oxide (H2O2)?
Because the latter substance has been _actually formed_ by chemists
(_Cf._ ROSCOE, _Elementary Chemistry_, Lesson VI.). Is hydrogen
tri-oxyde (H2O3) a possible substance? We may ask chemists,—and they
may not be able to tell us with any certainty whether it is or not.

92 The actual existence of a thinking mind is of course a necessary
condition, in the actual order, for the apprehension of objects in
this abstract way. But such existence is no part of the apprehended
object. That the human mind, which is itself finite, contingent,
allied with matter, and dependent on the activity of corporeal sense
organs for the objects of its knowledge, should nevertheless have
the power to apprehend contingent realities apart from their
contingent actual existence in time and space,—is a fact of the
greatest significance as regards the nature of the mind itself. But
if we try to prove the existence of God from a consideration of the
nature and powers of the human mind, our argument proceeds from the
actual, and is distinct from any argument based exclusively on the
nature and properties of possible essences as such. St. Augustine’s
argument assumes as a fact that the human mind represents to itself
possible essences as having reality independently both of its own
thought and of any actual existence of such essences (_Cf._ DE
MUNNYNCK, _Praelectiones de Dei Existentia_, p. 23). But _is_ this a
fact? This is the really debatable point.

93 Among others Henry of GHENT († 1293; _Cf._ DE WULF, _History of
Medieval Philosophy_, pp. 364-6; KLEUTGEN, _Philosophie der
Vorzeit_, Dissert, vi., cap. ii., 2 §§ 581-5), Capreolus
(1380-1444), certain Scotists, and certain theosophists of the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, are credited with this peculiar
view. For numerous references, _Cf._ URRABURU, _Ontologia_, Disp.
iii., cap. ii., art. v. pp. 650-63.

_ 94 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, pp. 652-3, for references; among others,
to ST. THOMAS, _De Potentia_, q. 3, art. 1, ad 2um; art. 7, ad 10um;
art. 5, argum. 2o; _ibid._, ad 2um. _Summa Theol._, i., q. 14, art.
9; q. 45, art. 1; _ibid._ , art. 2, ad 2um; q. 61, art. 2, corp.

95 Among others, BALMES (_Fundamental Philosophy_, bk. iv., ch. xxvi.),
LEPIDI (_Ontologia_, quoted by DE MUNYNCK, _Praelectiones de Dei
Existentia_, Louvain, 1904, p. 19); DE MUNYNCK (_ibid._, pp. 19-23,
46-7, 75); HICKEY (_Theologia Naturalis_, pp. 31-4); DRISCOLL
(_God_, pp. 72 sqq.); LACORDAIRE (_God_, p. 21); KLEUTGEN,
_Philosophie der Vorzeit_, Dissert. iv., § 476.

96 Truth is not the work of any human intelligence, says St. Augustine,
nor can any one arrogate to himself the right to say “_my_ truth,”
or “_thy_ truth,” but all must say simply “_the_ truth”:
“Quapropter, nullo modo negaveris esse incommutabilem veritatem,
haec omnia, quae incommutabiliter vera sunt, continentem, quam non
possis dicere vel tuam vel meam, vel cujuscumque hominis, sed
omnibus incommutabilia vera cernentibus, tamquam miris modis
secretum et publicum lumen, praesto esse ac se praebere communiter:
omne autem quod communiter omnibus ratiocinantibus atque
intelligentibus praesto est, ad ullius eorum proprie naturam
pertinere quis dixerit?”—_De Libero Arbitrio_, lib. ii., ch. xii.
_Cf._ his striking expression of the same thought in his Commentary,
_Super Genesim ad Litteram_, lib. ii., cap. vii.: “We may conceive
the heavens and the earth, that were created in six days, ceasing to
exist; but can we conceive the number ‘six’ ceasing to be the sum of
six units?”: “Facilius coelum et terra transire possunt, quae
secundum numerum senarium fabricata sunt, quam effici possit ut
senarius numerus suis partibus non compleatur” (_apud_ MERCIER,
_Ontologie_, pp. 35-6).

_ 97 Cf._ BALMES (_Fundamental Philosophy_, bk. iv., ch. xxvi.), who,
analysing the truth of the proposition “Two circles of equal
diameters are equal,” as an example of the necessary, eternal,
immutable characteristics of possible essences, goes so far as to
write (italics ours): “What would happen, if, withdrawing all
bodies, all sensible representations, _and even all intelligences_,
we should imagine absolute and universal nothing? We see the truth
of the proposition even on this supposition: for it is impossible
for us to hold it to be false. On every supposition, our
understanding sees a connection which it cannot destroy: the
condition once established, the result will infallibly follow.

“An absolutely necessary connection, founded neither on us, nor on
the external world, which exists before anything we can imagine, and
subsists after we have annihilated all by an effort of our
understanding, must be based upon something, it cannot have nothing
for its origin: to say this would be to assert a necessary fact
without a sufficient reason.

“It is true that in the proposition now before us nothing real is
affirmed, but if we reflect carefully we find even here the greatest
difficulty for those who deny a real foundation to pure possibility.
What is remarkable in this phenomenon, is precisely this, that our
understanding feels itself forced to give its assent to a
proposition which affirms an absolutely necessary connection
_without any relation to an existing object_. It is conceivable that
an intelligence affected by other beings may know their nature and
relations; but it is not so easy of comprehension how it can
discover their nature and relations in an absolutely necessary
manner, when it abstracts all existence, when the ground upon which
the eyes of the understanding are fixed, is the abyss of nothing.

“We deceive ourselves when we imagine it possible to abstract all
existence. Even when we suppose our mind to have lost sight of every
thing, a very easy supposition, granting that we find in our
consciousness the contingency of our being, the understanding still
perceives a possible order, and imagines it to be all occupied with
pure possibility, _independent of a being upon which it is based_.
We repeat, that this is an illusion, which disappears so soon as we
reflect upon it. In pure nothing, nothing is possible; there are no
relations, no connections of any kind; in nothing there are no
combinations, it is a ground upon which nothing can be pictured.

“The objectivity of our ideas and the perception of necessary
relations in a possible order, reveal _a communication of our
understanding with a being on which is founded all possibility_.
This possibility can be explained on no supposition except that
which makes the communication consist in _the action of God giving
to our mind faculties_ perceptive of the necessary relation of
certain ideas, based upon necessary being, and representative of His
infinite essence.”

Balmes, therefore, does not mean that we could continue to see
essences as possible were we to imagine withdrawn not merely finite
minds but even the Divine Mind. In such an absurd hypothesis,
nothing would appear true or false, possible or impossible. But he
contends that even when we _try_ to think away _all_ minds, even the
Divine Mind, we still see possible essences to be possible. And from
this he argues that, since we have successfully thought away finite
minds and the actuality of essences, while the possibility of these
latter still persists, these must be grounded in the Mind of God,
the Actual, Eternal, Necessary Being, where they have eternal ideal
being.

_Cf._ DE MUNNYNCK (_op. cit._, pp. 22-3): “Ponamus mundum non esse,
nec supponamus Dei existentiam. In nihilo illo, omne ens actuale
excludens, remanet intacta—hoc certissime scimus ex objectivo valore
intellectus nostri—realitas aeterna, immutabilis, ordinis idealis.
[Illa realitas essentiarum, he adds (_ibid._, n. 2), independens ab
omni actuali existentia, atque ab omni actu intellectus, est
fundamentum metaphysicum realismi platonici.—Habet praeterea mirum
hoc systema, ut omnes sciunt, fundamentum criteriologicum.]
Essentiae _sunt_, nec tamen existunt. Illa realitas, praeter mundum
totum, praeter entia rationis, indestructibilis perseverat, nec
tamen actualis est. Haec quomodo intelligi possit nescimus, nisi
ponatur illam fundari in plenitudine aeterna, infinita, absoluta τοῦ
Esse absoluti. Hoc ente supremo posito, omnia lucidissima se
praebent intellectui; illo Deo optimo—quem non possumus, perspectis
illis altissimis, non adorare—sublato, admittendae sunt essentiae
rerum ab aeterno reales sine actuali existentia; atque proinde quid
non-individuale est reale in se, quod tamen concipi non potest nisi
objective in mente.”

_ 98 Cf._ ST. AUGUSTINE, _De Libero Arbitrio_, lib. ii., ch. viii.

_ 99 Cf._ especially MERCIER, _Ontologie_, pp. 40-49.

100 It is, for example, just as necessarily and immutably true of any
actually existing man that he cannot be at the same time existing
and not existing as it is that a man cannot be an irrational animal.

101 “Unde, etiamsi intellectus humanus non esset, adhuc res dicerentur
verae in ordine ad intellectum divinum. Sed si uterque intellectus,
quod est impossibile, intelligeretur auferri, nullo modo ratio
veritatis remaneret.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. i., art. ii.

_ 102 Phædo_, 100, C. ff.

103 MERCIER, _Ontologie_, pp. 45-7.

_ 104 Cf_. DE MUNNYNCK, _op. cit._, pp. 24-5.

_ 105 Cf._ DE MUNNYNCK, _op. cit._, pp. 24-5.

_ 106 ibid._, pp. 22, 24.

107 “Quæ objecta non divina esse, luce clarius apparet. Attamen ilia
ponderando, _modumque inspiciendo quo representantur a mente
humana_, atque praesupponendo valorem objectivum intellectus,
concludimus ex ideis ad realitates illas quæ in Esse divino
fundantur ... ratione horum [objectorum _scil._ idearum nostrarum]
percipimus, ope ratiocinii, illa positive aeterna et immutabilia,
quæ reapse in Deitate fundantur, atque sunt ipse Deus quatenus
imitabilis.”—_ibid._, pp. 24-5. _Cf._ extract quoted above, p. 91 n.

108 “Non ideo voluit Deus mundum creare in tempore, quia vidit melius
sic fore, quam si creasset ab æterno; _nec voluit tres angulos
trianguli æquales esse duobus rectis, quia cognovit aliter fieri non
posse_. Sed contra, quia voluit creare mundum in tempore, ideo sic
melius est, quam si creatus fuisset ab æterno, _et quia voluit tres
angulos trianguli necessario æquales esse duobus rectis, idcirco jam
verum est, et aliter fieri non potest_, atque ita de
reliquis.”—DESCARTES, in _Resp. ad Sext. Objectiones_, ad 6um
scrupulum.

109 MERCIER, _op. cit._, pp. 58-60.

110 URRABURU (_op. cit._ Disp. iii., cap. ii., § iii., p. 671) mentions
Wolff, Leibniz, Genuensis and Storchenau as holding this view.

111 Among others, Liberatore, Lahousse, Pesch, Harper. _Cf._ URRABURU,
_op. cit._, _ibid._

112 Dupasquier, Mastrius and Rada, _apud_ URRABURU, _op. cit._, _ibid._,
pp. 679-81.

113 Urraburu, Schiffini, Mendive. _Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, _ibid._,
p. 671.

114 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

115 “Ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur, non solum esse, sed
ipsa quidditas creari dicitur: quia antequam esse habeat, nihil est,
nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est creatura, sed
creatrix essentia.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Potentia_, q. iii., art. v., ad
2 um.

116 “Ipsum esse competit primo agenti secundum propriam naturam: esse
enim Dei est ejus substantia, ut ostensum est (_C. G._, Lib. i., c.
22). Quod autem competit alicui secundum naturam suam, non convenit
aliis nisi per modum participationis, sicut calor aliis corporibus
ab igne [_i.e._ as caused or produced in them. _Cf._ Kleutgen, _op.
cit._, Dissert., i., c. iii., § 61]. Ipsum igitur esse competit
aliis omnibus a primo agente per participationem quamdam. Quod autem
alicui competit per participationem, non est substantia ejus.
Impossibile est igitur quod substantia alterius entis praeter agens
primum sit ipsum esse. Hinc est quod Exod. iii., proprium nomen Dei
ponitur esse _qui est_, quia ejus solius proprium est, quod sua
substantia non sit aliud quam suum esse.”—ST. THOMAS, _Contra
Gentes_, L. ii., cap. 52, n. 7.

“Quod inest alicui ab agente, oportet esse actum ejus; agentis enim
est facere aliquid actu. Ostensum est autem supra, quod omnes aliae
substantiæ habent esse a primo agente, et per hoc ipsæ substantiæ
creatæ sunt, quod esse ab alio habent. Ipsum igitur esse inest
substantiis creatis ut quidam actus earum. Id autem, cui actus
inest, potentia est: nam actus in quantum hujusmodi ad potentiam
refertur. In qualibet igitur substantia creata est potentia et
actus.”—_ibid._, cap. 53, n. 2.

“Omne quod recipit aliquid ab alio, est in potentia respectu illius:
et hoc quod receptum est in eo, est actus ejus; ergo oportet, quod
ipsa forma vel quidditas, quæ est intelligentia [_i.e._ a pure
spirit], sit in potentia respectu esse, quod a Deo recipit, et illud
esse receptum est per modum actus, et ita invenitur actus et
potentia in intelligentiis [_i.e._ pure spirits], non tamen forma et
materia nisi aequivoce.”—_De Ente et Essentia_, cap. v. _Cf._ also
_Summa Theol._, P. i., q. iii., art. 4; q. xiii., art. 11; q. lxxv.,
art. 5, ad 4 um. _Quodlibeta_, ii., art. 3; ix., art. 6. _De
Potentia_, q. vii., art. 2. _In Metaph._, iii., Dist. vi., q. 2,
art. 2. _Contra Gentes_, L. ii., cap. 54, 68. St. Thomas is usually
interpreted as teaching that the distinction between essence and
existence in created things is a real distinction. But there are
some who have been unable to convince themselves that the Angelic
Doctor has made his mind entirely clear on the subject. Kleutgen,
for instance, writes (_op. cit._, Dissert. vi., c. ii., § 574, n.
2): “In the extracts quoted above St. Thomas clearly states that the
distinction made by our thought is based on the nature of created
things, but not that this distinction is that which exists between
different parts, dependent on one another, each having its own
proper being or reality.”

_ 117 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 249, 5o.

_ 118 Cf._ REINSTADLER, _Ontologia_, lib. ii., cap. i., art. ii., § 2.

119 Zigliara (_Ontologia_ (14), iii. iv.) gives the virtual distinction
as a sub-class of the real distinction; adding, however (according
to Goudin, _Metaph._, Disp. i., q. iii. art. ii., § i) that “this
virtual distinction is not so much a [real] distinction as the basis
of a [mental] distinction”.

_ 120 op. cit._, p. 110.

121 These may be seen in abundance in the works of any of the scholastic
writers, medieval or modern, who discuss the question. _Cf._, _e.g._
URRABURU, _op. cit._, §§ 251-4.

122 Besides St. Thomas (_cf._ _supra_, p. 102, n. 2), Albertus Magnus
(1193-1280), Aegidius Romanus († _circa_ 1300), Capreolus
(1380-1444), Soncinas († 1494), Cajetan (1468-1534), Sylvester
Ferrariensis (1474-1528), Dominicus Bañez (1528-1604), John of St.
Thomas (1589-1644), Goudin (1639-95), are among the most noted
scholastics to hold this view. It is supported by the members of the
Dominican Order generally; and by not a few Jesuits among recent
scholastic writers; also by MERCIER, _op. cit._, §§ 48-51.

_ 123 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 575.

_ 124 ibid._, § 577.

_ 125 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, Disp. iv., cap. i., art. 2, pp. 730-31.

126 “Esse rei quamvis sit aliud ab ejus essentia, non tamen est
intelligendum, quod sit aliquod superadditum, ad modum accidentis,
sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae. Et ideo hoc nomen,
quod imponitur ab esse (ens) significat idem cum nomine quod
imponitur ab ipsa essentia.”—ST. THOMAS, _In Metaph._, L. iv., l. 2.

127 Among the advocates of this view are Alexander of Hales († 1245),
Aureolus († 1322), Durandus († 1332), Gabriel Biel († 1495), Suarez
(1548-1617), Toletus (1532-1596), Vasquez (1551-1604), Gregory of
Valentia († _circa_ 1600), and the Jesuits generally: some few
regarding the distinction as _purely_ logical, _e.g._ Franzelin
(_apud_ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 47, p. 110, n. 2). For details and
arguments on both sides, _cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, Disp. iv., cap.
i., art. 2.

128 “Compositum ex esse et essentia dicitur de ratione entis creati
secundum fundamentum, quod in ipso ente creato habet; hoc autem
fundamentum non est aliud nisi quia creatura non habet ex se actu
existere, sed tantum est ens potentiale, quod ab alio potest esse
participare: nam hinc fit, ut essentia creaturae concipiatur a nobis
ut potentiale quid, esse vero ut modus seu actus, quo talis essentia
ens in actu constituitur.”—SUAREZ, _Metaph._, Disp. xxxi., § 13.

129 When we speak of an essence as _receiving_ existence, we do not
necessarily imply a real distinction between receiver and received:
“Non est imaginandum quod una res sit, quae participat sicut
essentia, et alia quae participatur sicut esse, sed quia una et
eadem res est realitas modo participato et per vim alterius sicut
per vim agentis: haec enim realitas de se non est nisi sub modo
possibili; quod autem sit et vocari possit actus, hoc habet per vim
agentis.”—ALEXANDER OF HALES, _In Metaph._, L. vii., text 22. “Non
omne acceptum,” writes St. Thomas, “est receptum in aliquo subjecto;
alioquin non posset dici quod tota substantia rei creatae sit
accepta a Deo, cum totius substantiae non sit aliquod subjectum
receptivum”—_Summa Theol._, I., q. xxvii., art. ii., ad. 3um.

_ 130 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 49. Some of these doctrines we shall
examine later, by way of illustration, in connexion with the _Unity_
of being.

_ 131 Cf._ URRABURU, _ibid._, art. iii., Obj. 9, Resp.

132 This view is advocated by, among others, Duns Scotus (1266-1308),
Henry of Ghent († 1293), Francis de Vittoria (1480-1566), Dominicus
de Soto (1496-1560), Molina (1535-1600), Fonseca (1548-97), and
Scotists generally.

133 ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, lib. 5, text ii., cap. 6; ST. THOMAS, _in
loc._ et alibi.

134 “Si ... modus entis accipiatur ... secundum divisionem unius ab
altero, ... hoc exprimit hoc nomen _aliquid_, dicitur enim aliquid
quasi _aliud quid_. Unde sicut ens dicitur _unum_ inquantum est
_indivisum in se_, ita dicitur _aliquid_ inquantum est _ab aliis
diversum_.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. 1, a. 1.

135 “Nam omne ens est aut simplex, aut compositum. Quod autem est
simplex, est indivisum et actu et potentia. Quod autem est
compositum, non habet esse, quamdiu partes ejus sint divisae, sed
postquam constituunt et componunt ipsum compositum. Unde manifestum
est quod esse cujuslibet rei consistit in indivisione; et inde est,
quod unumquodque sicut custodit suum esse, ita custodit suam
unitatem.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xi., a. 1.

136 “Unum vero quod est principium numeri, addit supra substantiam
_rationem mensurae_, quae est propria passio quantitatis, et primo
invenitur in unitate. Et dicitur per privationem vel negationem
divisionis, quae est secundum quantitatem continuam. _Nam numerus ex
divisione continui causatur._”—ST. THOMAS, _In Metaph._, lib. 4,
lect. 2, par. _b_.

137 Those who regard the distinction between the essence and the
existence of an actually existing substance as real consider the
latter as an _ens unum per se_. The existence of a real distinction
between the essential constitutive factors of a composite substance
is universally regarded by scholastics as compatible with essential
unity—unitas _per se_—in the latter. Such factors are really
distinct, and separable or divisible, but actually undivided. So
also, the union of an individual nature and its subsistence (73)
forms a _unum per se_ (unum _compositionis_) in the view of those
who place a real distinction between these factors.

138 Of course essential unity of composition is also “natural”. _Cf._
KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, §§ 631-8.

139 “Unum quod convertitur cum ente ponit quidem ipsum ens, sed nihil
superaddit, nisi negationem divisionis. Multitudo autem ei
correspondens addit supra res, quæ dicuntur multæ, quod unaquæque
earum sit una, et quod una earum non sit altera.... Et sic, cum unum
addat supra ens unam negationem, secundum quod aliquid est indivisum
in se, multitudo addit duas negationes, prout scilicet aliquid est
in se indivisum, et prout est ab alio divisum, et unum eorum non
esse alterum.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Potent._, q. 9, a. 7.

140 “Sic ergo primo in intellectu nostro cadit _ens_, et deinde
_divisio_, et post hoc _unum_ quod divisionem privat, et ultimo
_multitudo_ quæ ex unitatibus constituitur.”—ST. THOMAS, _In
Metaph._, lib. 10, lect. 4, par. _c_.

141 Omnis pluralitas consequitur aliquam divisionem. Est autem duplex
divisio: una materialis quæ fit secundum divisionem continui, et
hanc sequitur numerus, qui est species quantitatis. Unde talis
numerus, non est nisi in rebus materialibus habentibus quantitatem.
Alia est divisio formalis, quæ fit per oppositas vel diversas
formas: et hanc divisionem sequitur multitudo quæ non est in aliquo
genere, sed est de transcendentibus, secundum quod ens dividitur per
unum et multa. Et talem multitudinem solam contingit esse in rebus
immaterialibus.—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xxx., art. 3.

142 We may confine our attention here to substances, assuming for the
present that accidents are individuated by the individual substances
in which they inhere. We may note further that it is only corporeal
individuals that fall directly within our experience. We can, of
course, infer from the latter the actual existence of individual
spiritual realities subsisting apart from matter, _viz._ human souls
after death, and also the possibility of purely spiritual individual
beings such as angels. But when we conceive these as individuals we
must conceive them after the analogy of individuals in the domain of
corporeal reality: it is only through concepts derived from this
domain, and finding their _proper_ application within it, that we
can have any knowledge of suprasensible or spiritual realities,
_viz._ by applying those concepts _analogically_ to the latter.

143 The “_formal-actual_” distinction, which Scotists advocate between
these grades of being, we shall examine later.

_ 144 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, p. 280: “Principium ... intrinsicum vel
formale est aliquid insitum rei, pertinensque ad intrinsecam et
ultimam individui constitutionem, et fundans formalitatem illam,
quae _individitatio_ dicitur. Sicut enim materia est in homine, v.g.
principium et fundamentum propter quod est, ac praedicatur
_materialis_, et forma fundat in eodem praedicatum _rationalis_,
totaque natura composita, _humanitas_, praedicatum _hominis_; ita
quaerimus quid sit illud primum principium, unde existit in quovis
individuo sua peculiaris ac propria individuatio.”

145 In ancient Greece the Eleatics argued against the possibility of
real plurality somewhat in this wise: If there were really different
beings any two of them would differ from each other only by some
third reality, and this again from each of the former by a fourth
and a fifth reality, and so on _ad infinitum_: which would involve
the absurdities of infinite number and infinite regress. A similar
argument was used by the medieval pantheist, David of Dinant, to
identify God with the material principle of corporeal reality: God
and primary matter exist and do not differ; therefore they are
identical: for if they differed they should differ by something
distinct from either, and this again should differ from both by
something distinct from all three, and so on _ad infinitum_: which
is absurd. Such sophisms arise from accepting the purely abstract
view of reality as adequate. We have seen already, in dealing with
the abstract notion of being, that from this point of view it must
be recognized and admitted that the reality whereby things differ
(_viz._ being) is also the reality wherein they agree (_viz._ being,
also). The paradox is restated below in regard to individuation.

146 Materia ... dupliciter accipitur, scilicet, ut signata et non
signata. Et dicitur signata, secundum quod consideratur cum
determinatione dimensionum harum scilicet vel illarum; non signata
autem, quæ sine determinatione dimensionum consideratur. Secundum
hoc igitur est sciendum, quod materia signata est individuationis
principium.—ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. ii., art. 6, ad. 7am.

_ 147 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, Disp. ii., cap. 2, § iii., pp. 271-3.

148 These will easily be found in any of the fuller scholastic
treatises. _Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, Disp. ii., cap. 2, art. 4.
_Philosophia Lacencis, Logica_, §§ 1282 _sqq._; MERCIER,
_Ontologie_, §§ 36-42; KLEUTGEN, _Philosophie Scolastique_, §§ 610
_sqq._; BULLIAT, _Thæsaurus Philosophiae Thomisticae_ (Nantes,
1899), pp. 171 _sqq._—a useful book of reference for the teaching of
St. Thomas.

149 A kindred view to this is the view that subsistence
(“_subsistentia_,” “_suppositalitas_”) or personality
(“_personalitas_”) is the principle of individuation. We shall see
later in what subsistence or personality is supposed to consist.
Here it is sufficient to observe that the individual nature as such
has not necessarily subsistence or personality; hence it cannot be
individuated by this latter.

150 The consistent attitude for the Thomist here would, however, appear
to be a denial that such a thing would be intrinsically possible.

151 Hujusmodi relatio non potest consistere nisi in quodam ordine, quem
ratio adinvenit alicujus ad seipsum secundum aliquas ejus duas
considerationes.—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xxviii., art. 3,
ad. 2am.

_ 152 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, vol. i., § 59.

153 It is only the concrete and individual that as such can exist
actually; the abstract and universal as such cannot exist actually:
abstractness and universality are mental modes—_entia
rationis_—annexed by the mind to the real content of its concepts:
considered as thought-objects they are themselves not real entities:
they do not affect reality as given to us in our experience. But
perhaps concreteness and individuality are also mere mental modes,
affecting reality not as given to us in our experience but only as
subjected to the process of intellectual conception, or at least as
subjected to the process of sense perception? This would appear to
be part of the general Kantian theory of knowledge: that we can
apprehend reality as concrete and individual only because space and
time, which characterize the concrete and individual mode of being,
are mental modes which must be applied to reality as a prerequisite
condition for rendering the latter capable of apprehension in our
experience. This contention is examined in another context. _Cf._
_infra_, pp. 145, 147, 151.

154 Thus the recognition of a virtual distinction in a being is a sign
of the _relative perfection_ of the latter: the being involves in
its higher sort of unity perfections elsewhere dispersed and
separate. The being is of a higher order than if the principles of
these perfections in it were really distinct from one another. But
the virtual distinction also seems to imply a _relative
imperfection_ when it is found in creatures, inasmuch as here the
thought-objects so distinguished are always principles of a
plurality of really distinct accidental perfections: and real
plurality in a being is less perfect than unity.—_Cf._ KLEUTGEN,
_op. cit._, § 633.

155 “Omnis cognitio est a potentia et objecto, sive a cognoscente et
cognito. Ratio a priori est, quia omnis cognitio saltem creata est
expressio et imitatio atque imago vitalis objecti. Inquantum igitur
est vitalis, procedit a cognoscente; implicat enim cognoscentem
vivere per aliquid, quod ab ipso non est, sed pure illud recipit ab
alio mere passive se habendo; inquantum vero cognitio est expressio,
imitatio et imago objecti, procedit ab objecto”—SILVESTER MAURUS,
_Quaest. Philos._, q. 2. This is the common scholastic distinction:
cognition as a product representative or expressive of reality is a
product determined by the influence of reality (as active) on the
mind (as passive); cognition as a vital process is active, a
reaction of mind to the influence of reality. It may be remarked,
however, that the cognitive process, as vital, has always a positive
term. Our cognitive processes are partly at least processes of
abstracting, comparing, relating, universalizing: processes which
produce “_intentiones logicas_” or “_entia rationis_,” such as the
“_intentio universalitatis_” the relation of subject to predicate,
and other logical relations and logical distinctions: and hence
arises the difficulty, when we come to reflect on our cognitive
experience, of discriminating between these “logical entities” and
the reality which we interpret by means of them: of discriminating,
in other words, between logical and real distinctions.

156 It is not necessary of course that this implicit embodiment of all
the others, by any one of them, be seen to be _mutual_. It is
sufficient, for instance, that of the concepts _a_, _b_, _c_ and
_d_, _a_ be seen implicitly to involve _b_, _b_ to involve _c_,
etc., though not _vice versa_. However, it must be remarked that in
the exercise of _thought_ upon its _abstract_ objects we feel
something wanting to our intellectual insight as long as the
relations we apprehend are not _reciprocal_. In the sciences of
abstract quantity we approximate to the ideal of establishing
reciprocal relations throughout the whole system of the concepts
analysed. But abstract thought does not give us an adequate
apprehension of the real: it represents reality only under the
_static_ aspect, and as _abstract_, _i.e._ apart from the
individualizing conditions of time and space which affect its
_concrete, actual existence_ as revealed in sense experience. Were
we to neglect the latter, and consider merely what abstract thought
gives us, we should regard as _really one_ what is _one for
thought_. But what is one for thought is _the universal_; and the
logical issue of holding the universal as such to be real is monism.
Or again, to put the matter in another way, in so far as intellect
sees the objects of its various abstract concepts to involve one
another necessarily, it has no reason—as long as it ignores the
verdict of sense experience on the real manifoldness of actually
existing being—to abstain from attributing a _real unity_ to the
whole system of abstract thought-objects which it contemplates as
reciprocally and necessarily interrelated. On the contrary, it
should pronounce that whatever plurality can be unified by the
dialectically necessary relations discovered by thought, is _really
one_, and must be regarded as _one reality_: which, again, is
monism. But a philosophy which thus ignores sense experience must be
one-sided and misleading.

_ 157 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, Disp. ii., cap. ii., art. 5 (p. 319).

_ 158 Cf._ _infra_, § 83.

_ 159 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, _ibid._ p. 322.

160 ST. THOMAS, _De Ente et Essentia_, cap. iv.: “Ideo, si quaeratur
utrum ista natura possit dici una vel plures, neutrum concedendum
est: quia utrumque est extra intellectum [conceptum] humanitatis, et
utrumque potest sibi accidere. Si enim pluralitas esset de ratione
ejus, nunquam posset esse una: cum tamen una sit secundum quod est
in Sorte. Similiter si unitas esset de intellectu et ratione ejus,
tunc esset una et eadem natura Sortis et Platonis, nec posset in
pluribus plurificari.” _Cf._ ZIGLIARA, _Summa Philos._, _Ontologia_
(1), iv., v.; (3) iv.

161 “Licet enim (natura) nunquam sit sine aliquo istorum, non tamen est
de se aliquod istorum, ita etiam in rerum natura secundum illam
entitatem habet verum ‘esse’ extra animam reale: et secundum illam
entitatem habet unitatem sibi proportionabilem, quae est indifferens
ad singularitatem, ita quod non, repugnat illi unitati de se, quod
cum quacumque unitate singularitatis ponatur.”—SCOTUS, _In L.
Sent._, 2, dist. iii., q. 7.—_Cf._ DE WULF, _History of Medieval
Philosophy_, p. 372.

_ 162 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 248. _Moral_ truth or veracity—the
conformity of language with thought—is treated in Ethics.

_ 163 Cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, P. ii., § 4, i.

_ 164 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., §§ 252-4.

165 “Si omnis intellectus (quod est impossibile) intelligeretur auferri,
nullo modo ratio veritatis remaneret.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q.
i., art 1, 2 in fine.

_ 166 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. i., and _passim_.

167 ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. i., art. 2.

168 ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. i., art. 4; _Summa Theol._, i., q. 16,
art. 6.

169 “Si intellectus humanus non esset, adhuc res dicerentur veræ in
ordine ad intellectum divinum. Sed si uterque intellectus, quod est
impossibile, intelligeretur auferri, nullo modo ratio veritatis
remaneret.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. i., art. 2.

170 “Si ergo accipiatur veritas _rei_ secundum ordinem ad intellectum
divinum, tunc quidem mutatur veritas rei mutablis in aliam
veritatem, non in falsitatem.”—ST. THOMAS, _ibid._ q. i., art. 6.

_ 171 Cf._ ARISTOTLE, _De Anima_, iii.; ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. i.,
art. 1.

172 “Res per se non fallunt, sed per accidens. Dant enim occasionem
falsitatis; eo quod similitudinem eorum gerunt quorum non habent
existentiam.... Res notitiam sui facit in anima per ea quae de ipsa
exterius apparent ... et ideo quando in aliqua re apparent
sensibiles qualitates demonstrantes naturam quae eis non subest,
dicitur res illa esse falsa.... Nec tamen res est hoc modo causa
falsitatis in anima, quod necessario falsitatem causat.”—ST. THOMAS,
_Summa Theol._, i., q. 17, art. 1, ad. 2; _De Veritate_, q. i., art.
10, c.

173 Καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθὸν, οὖ πάντα ἐφίεται.—ARISTOTLE, _Eth._, i.

_ 174 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 217.

175 “Bonum autem, cum habeat notionem appetibilis, importat habitudinem
causæ finalis.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 5, art. 2, ad. 1.

176 “Prima autem non possunt notificari per aliqua priora, sed
notificantur per posteriora, sicut causæ per proprios effectus. Cum
autem bonum proprie sit motivum appetitus, describitur bonum per
motum appetitus, sicut solet manifestari vis motiva per motum. Et
ideo dicit (Aristoteles) quod philosophi bene enunciaverunt bonum
esse id quod omnia appetunt.”—ST. THOMAS, _Comment. in Eth. Nich._,
i., lect. 1a.

177 The “end,” which is last in the order of actual attainment, is first
as the ideal term of the aim or tendency of the nature: _finis est
ultimus in executione, sed primus in intentione_: it is that for the
sake of which, and with a view to which, the whole process of
actualization or “perfecting” goes on. _Cf._ _infra_, § 108.

178 “Licet bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem; quia tamen differunt
secundum rationem, non eodem modo dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et
bonum simpliciter. Nam, cum ens dicat aliquid esse in actu, actus
autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam, secundum hoc simpliciter
aliquid dicitur esse ens secundum quod primo secernitur ab eo quod
est in potentia tantum; hoc autem est esse substantiale rei
uniuscujusque. Unde per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque
ens simpliciter; per actus autem superadditos dicitur aliquid esse
secundum quid.... Sic ergo secundum primum esse, quod est
substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum secundum
quid, id est, inquantum est ens; secundum vero ultimum actum dicitur
aliquid ens secundum quid, et bonum simpliciter.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa
Theol._, i., q. 5, art. 1, ad. 1.

179 “Respectus ... qui importatur nomine boni est _habitudo perfectivi_
secundum quodaliquid natum est perficere non solum secundum rationem
speciei [_i.e._ the abstract essence], sed secundum esse quod habet
in rebus; hoc enim modo finis perficit ea quae sunt ad finem.”—ST.
THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. 26, art. 6.

_ 180 Cf._ the familiar ethical distinction between objective, and formal
or subjective happiness, _beatitudo objectiva_ and _beatitudo
formalis seu subjectiva_.

181 “In motu appetitus, id quod est appetibile terminans motum appetitus
secundum quid, ut medium per quod tenditur in aliud, vocatur
_utile_. Id autem quod appetitur ut ultimum terminans totaliter
motum appetitus sicut quaedam res in quam per se appetitus tendit,
vocatur _honestum_; quia honestum dicitur quod per se desideratur.
Id autem quod terminat motum appetitus, ut quies in se desiderata,
est _delectabile_.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 5, art. 3.

182 Excellentia hominis maxime consideratur secundum virtutem, quae est
dis positio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in 6 Physic. Et ideo,
honestum, _proprie loquendo_, in idem refertur cum virtute.—_ibid._,
2a 2ae, q. 145, art. I, c.

183 “Eorum quae propter se apprehenduntur, quaedam apprehenduntur solum
propter se, et nunquam propter aliud, sicut felicitas, quae est
ultimus finis; quaedam vero apprehenduntur et propter se, in quantum
habent in seipsis aliquam rationem bonitatis, etiamsi nihil aliud
boni per ea nobis accideret, et tamen sunt appetibilia propter
aliud, in quantum scilicet perducunt nos in aliquod bonum
perfectius: et hoc modo virtutes sunt propter se
apprehendendae.”—_ibid._, ad I.

_ 184 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, p. 236.

185 “Omnia ... quae jam habent esse, illud esse suum naturaliter amant,
et ipsam tota virtute conservant.... Ipsum igitur esse habet
rationem boni. Unde sicut impossibile est quod sit aliquod ens quod
non habeat esse, ita necesse est quod omne ens sit bonum ex hoc ipso
quod habet esse.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. 21, art. 2, c.

186 “Non-esse secundum se non est appetibile, sed per accidens,
inquantum scilicet ablatio alicujus mali est appetibilis; quod malum
quidem aufertur per non-esse; ablatio vero mali non est appetibilis,
nisi inquantum per malum privatur quoddam esse. Illud igitur, quod
per se est appetibile, est esse; non-esse vero, per accidens tantum,
inquantum scilicet quoddam esse appetitur, quo homo non sustinet
privari; et sic etiam per accidens non-esse dicitur bonum.”—ST.
THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 5, art. 2, ad. 3.

187 “Malum est defectus boni quod natum est et debet haberi.”—ST.
THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 49, art. 1, c.

_ 188 ibid._

189 “Causam formalem malum non habet, sed est magis privatio
formae.”—St. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 49, art. 1, c.

190 “Nec causam finalem habet malum, sed magis est privatio ordinis ad
debitum finem.”—_ibid._

191 “Non est causa efficiens sed _deficiens_ mali, quia malum non est
effectio sed _defectio_.”—_De Civ. Dei_, xii., 7.

192 “O, altitudo divitiarum sapientiae, et scientiae Dei! Quam
incomprehensibilia sunt judicia ejus, et investigabiles viae
ejus!”—Rom. xi., 33.

193 Connected with the transcendental notion of unity is another
concept, that of _order_, which will be more fully examined when we
come to treat of causes.

194 BAUMGARTEN, a German philosopher of the eighteenth century, was the
first to use the term _Aesthetica_ in this sense.

195 “Dicendum est quod pulchrum est idem bono sola ratione differens.
Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est, quod in
eo quietetur appetitus; sed ad rationem pulchri attinet quod _in
ejus aspectu seu cognitione_ quietetur appetitus; unde et illi
sensus præcipue respiciunt pulchrum, qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt,
scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes; dicimus enim pulchra
visibilia et pulchros sonos; in sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum
non utimur nomine pulchritudinis; non enim dicimus pulchros sapores,
aut odores.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, ia. iiæ., q. 27, art. 1,
ad. 3.

196 “Ad rationem pulchri pertinet, quod in ejus aspectu seu _cognitione_
quietetur appetitus ... ita quod pulchrum dicatur id, cujus ipsa
_apprehensio_ placet.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, ia. iiæ., q. 27,
art. 1, ad. 3. And the Angelic Doctor justifies the extended use of
the term _vision_: “De aliquo nomine dupliciter convenit loqui, uno
modo secundum ejus primam impositionem, alio modo secundum usum
nominis, sicut patet in nomine _visionis_, quod primo impositum est
ad significandum actum sensus visus; sed propter dignitatem et
certitudinem hujus sensus extensum est hoc nomen, secundum usum
loquentium, ad omnem _cognitionem aliorum_ sensuum; dicimus enim:
Vide quomodo sapit, vel quomodo redolet, vel quomodo est calidum; et
ulterius etiam ad _cognitionem intellectus_, secundum illud Matt. v.
8: Beati mundi corde quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt.”—i., q. 67, art. 1,
c.

197 “Pulchrum et bonum in subjecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem
rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc bonum laudatur
ut pulchrum: sed ratione differunt: nam bonum proprie respicit
appetitum: ... et ideo habet rationem finis.... Pulchrum autem
respicit vim cognoscitivam: pulchra enim dicuntur quæ visa
placent.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 5, art. 4, ad. 1.

_ 198 Cf._ DE WULF, _La Valeur esthétique de la moralité dans l’art_, pp.
28-9.

_ 199 L’Art et la Morale_, p. 29.

_ 200 De la connaissance de Dieu et de soi-même_, ch. i., § 8.

_ 201 De Vera Religione_, c. 32.

_ 202 Cf._ POINCARÉ, _Conférence sur les rapports de l’analyse et de la
physique mathematique_.—_apud_ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, § 274, pp.
546-7 n.

203 When the object so excels in greatness or grandeur as to exceed more
or less our capacity to realize it we speak of it as _sublime_. The
sublime calls forth emotions of self-abasement, reverence, and even
fear. If an object possessing the other requisites of beauty is
wanting in due magnitude, we describe it as _pretty_ or _elegant_.
The terms _grace_, _graceful_, apply especially to gait, gesture,
movement.

204 On this point all the great philosophers are unanimous. For Plato,
beauty whether of soul or of body, whether of animate or of
inanimate things, results not from chance, but from order,
rectitude, art: οὐχ οὕτως εἰκῆ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται ἀλλὰ τάξει και
ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ἥτις ἑκάστῳ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν (Plato, _Gorg._
506D). Aristotle places beauty in grandeur and order: Τὸ γὰρ καλὸν
ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστί (_Poetics_, ch. viii., n. 8). Τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ
μέγιστα ἐίδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον (_Metaph._, xii.,
ch. iii., n. 11). “Nihil,” writes St. Augustine, “est ordinatum quod
non sit pulchrum.” “Pulchra,” says St. Thomas, “dicuntur quae visa
placent; unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit” (_Summa
Theol._, i., q. 5, art. 4, ad. 1).

205 “Ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur; primo quidem integritas sive
perfectio; quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt; et debita
proportio sive consonantia; et iterum claritas.”—_Summa Theol._, i.,
q. 39, art. 8, c. Elsewhere he omits integrity, supposing it implied
in order: “ad rationem pulchri sive decori concurrit et claritas et
debita proportio”. And elsewhere again he omits clarity, this being
a necessary effect of order: “pulchrum in debita proportione
consistit”.

206 By “natural perfection” is meant the perfection which a nature
acquires by the realization of its end (5): Τέλειον δὲ τὸ ἔχον τέλος
(Aristotle).

207 This definition coincides with that found in a medieval scholastic
treatise _De Pulchro et Bono_, attributed to St. Thomas or Albertus
Magnas: “Ratio pulchri in universali consistit in resplendentia
formae super partes materiae proportionatas, vel super diversas
vires vel actiones.” _Cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, p. 554.

_ 208 L’Idée du beau dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d’Aquin_, p. 2.

_ 209 Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien_, viie leçon.

_ 210 Kritik der Urtheilskraft_, Th. i., Abschn. 1, B. 1, passim.

211 “Omnis corporea creatura ... bonum est infimum, _et in genere suo
pulchrum_ quoniam forma et specie continetur.”—ST. AUGUSTINE, _De
Vera Relig._, c. 20.

212 At the same time it must be borne in mind that many of the judgments
by which things are pronounced “ugly” or “commonplace” are
erroneous. This is partly because they are based on first and
superficial sense impressions: beauty must be apprehended and judged
by the _intellect_, and by the intellect “informed” with genuine
knowledge; to the eye of enlightened intelligence there are beauties
of structure and organization in the beetle or the tadpole as well
as in the peacock or the spaniel. It is partly, too, because we
unconsciously or semi-consciously apply standards of human beauty to
beings that are merely animal: “To know really whether there are
ugly monkeys we should have to consult a monkey; for the beauty we
unconsciously look for, and certainly do not find, in the monkey, is
the beauty of the human form; and when we declare the monkey ugly
what we really mean is that it would be ugly if it were a human
being; which is undeniable.”—SULLY-PRUDHOMME, _L’Expression dans les
beaux arts_, p. 104.

213 Proverbs, xxxi. 30.

214 ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, ia, iiae, q. 57, art. 3, c.

_ 215 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., §§ 70 _sqq._

_ 216 Cf._ WINDELBAND, _History of Philosophy_ (tr. Tufts),
_Introduction_.

_ 217 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii. P. iv., ch. v.

_ 218 Metaph._, vi., 1.

_ 219 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 90, art. 2: “Illud proprie
dicitur esse quod ipsum habet esse quasi in suo esse subsistens.
Unde _solæ substantiæ proprie et vere dicuntur entia_; accidens vero
non habet esse sed eo aliquid est, et hac ratione ens dicitur ...
accidens dicitur _magis entis quam ens_.”

_ 220 In Metaph._, L. v., lect. 9; cf. _In Physic._, L. iii., lect. 5.

_ 221 Science of Logic_, i., §§ 71, 73-76.

_ 222 ibid._, §§ 74, 76.

_ 223 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 268 (p. 668); MERCIER, _Logique_, § 33
(4th edit., p. 99).

_ 224 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _In Metaph._, L. xi., lect. 9: “Sed sciendum est
quod prædicamenta diversificantur secundum diversos modos
prædicandi. Unde idem, secundum quod diversimode de diversis
prædicatur, ad diversa prædicamenta pertinet.... Similiter motus
secundum quod prædicatur de subjecto in quo est, constituit
prædicamentum passionis. Secundum autem quod prædicatur de eo a quo
est, constituit prædicamentum actionis.”

_ 225 Ontologie_, § 138 (3rd edit., p. 263).

_ 226 Cf._ _Essay concerning Human Understanding_, book iv., ch. vi., §
11: “Had we such ideas of substances, as to know what real
constitutions produce those sensible qualities we find in them, and
how these qualities flowed from thence, we could, by the specific
ideas of their real essences in our own minds, more certainly find
out their properties, and discover what properties they had or had
not, than we can now by our senses: and to know the properties of
gold, it would be no more necessary that gold should exist, than it
is necessary for the knowing the properties of a triangle, that the
triangle should exist in any matter; the idea in our minds would
serve for the one as well as the other.”

227 “Sensation convinces us that there are solid, extended substances;
and reflection, that there are thinking ones: experience assures us
of the existence of such beings.”—_ibid._, book ii., ch. xxiii., §
29. Locke protested repeatedly against the charge that he denied the
existence of substances.

228 The notion one has of pure substance is “only a supposition of he
knows not what support of such qualities, which are capable of
producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called
accidents.... The idea then we have, to which we give the general
name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown support
of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot
subsist, ‘sine re substante,’ without something to support them, we
call that support _substantia_.”—book ii., ch. xxiii., § 2. In the
following passage we may detect the idealistic insinuation that
knowledge reaches only to “ideas” or mental states, not to the
extramental reality, the “secret, abstract nature of substance”:
“Whatever therefore be the secret abstract nature of substance in
general, all the ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of
substances, are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas,
co-existing in such, though unknown, cause of their union, as makes
the whole subsist of itself”. It belongs, of course, to the Theory
of Knowledge, not to the Theory of Being, to show how groundless the
idealistic assumption is.

229 Inquiring into the causes of our “impressions” and “ideas,” he
admits the existence of “bodies” which cause them and “minds” which
experience them: “We may well ask, _What causes induce us to believe
in the existence of body_? but ’tis vain to ask, _Whether there be
body or not_? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all
our reasonings.”—_A Treatise on Human Nature_, Part iv., § ii.

230 Of the definition of a substance as _something which may exist by
itself_, he says: “this definition agrees to everything that can
possibly be conceiv’d; and will never serve to distinguish substance
from accident, or the soul from its perceptions.... Since all our
perceptions are different from each other, and from everything else
in the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and may be
consider’d as separately existent, and may exist separately, and
have no need of anything else to support their existence. They are,
therefore, substances, as far as this definition explains a
substance.”—_ibid._, § v. “We have no perfect idea of substance, but
... taking it for _something that can exist by itself_, ’tis evident
every perception is a substance, and every distinct part of a
perception a distinct substance.”—_ibid._

_ 231 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 142 (p. 272).

_ 232 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, Dissert. vi., ch. iii., li, § 592.

233 Assuming for the moment that we can know substance to be not _one_
but _manifold_: that experience reveals to us a plurality of
numerically or _really_, and even specifically and generically,
distinct substances. _Cf._ _infra_, p. 221.

_ 234 Cf._ HUXLEY, _Hume_, bk. ii., ch. ii. TAINE, _De L’Intelligence_,
t. i., Preface, and _passim_.

_ 235 Cf._ § 65, _infra_.