Chapter VIII: Jonah’s Gourd

“Came up in a night
And perished in a night.”

JONAH, chap. iv, verse 10.

The above words came into my mind late last night when tired out with destroying masses of papers and letters (mostly malignant abuse or the emanations of senile dotage), I sat back in my chair and soliloquised over what had happened to all these pestilent attackers of mine; and I said to myself in those immortal words in Jonah, “_Doest thou well to be angry?_” and for a few brief moments I really quite felt like Stephen praying for his enemies when they stoned him! What has become of all these stone-throwers and backbiters, I asked myself! Like Jonah’s Gourd--“A worm has smote them all”--and they have withered into obscurity. But yet it’s interesting, as this is a Book of Records, to tear out one sheet or so and reproduce here some replies to the nefarious nonsense one had to deal with at that time of democratising the Navy. I reprint verbatim a few pages I wrote in October, 1906. These particular words that follow here were directed against those who assailed my principles of (1) The fighting efficiency of the Fleet, (2) Its instant readiness for war.

ADMIRALTY POLICY: REPLIES TO CRITICISMS.

[In the autumn of 1906 there was considerable criticism of
the Government’s naval policy, particularly in the daily and
weekly Press. Just before the dissolution of Mr. Balfour’s
administration, Lord Cawdor, then First Lord, had issued a
memorandum on “Admiralty Work and Progress,” dated November
30th, 1905, in which it was stated that “At the present time
strategic requirements necessitate an output of four large
armoured ships annually.” In July, 1906, however, it was
announced in Parliament that only three battleships would
be included in the current programme, the reason for the
abandonment of the fourth ship being that there was a temporary
cessation of warship building on the Continent caused by the
advent of the “Dreadnought” and the “Invincibles.” Coming in
the first year of office of the new Liberal administration,
however, the reduction in the British programme aroused genuine
disquiet among certain people, and by others was utilised
for a political attack on the Government, who were alleged
to be jeopardising the security of the country. In addition,
there was another body of opinion strongly adverse to certain
features in the design of the new “Dreadnoughts.” The following
notes were prepared by Lord Fisher at the time for use by
Lord Tweedmouth and Mr. Edmund Robertson (afterwards Lord
Lochee), who were then First Lord and Parliamentary Secretary
respectively.]

The most brilliant preacher of our generation has said what a stimulus it is to have always some friends to save us from that “Woe unto you when all men shall speak well of you”! When criticism goes, life is done! You must squeeze the fragrant leaf to get the delicious scent! Hence, it may be truly said that the Board of Admiralty should just now heartily shake hands with themselves, because Korah, Dathan, and Abiram (in the shape of three Retrograde Don Quixotes) are trying to raise a rebellion, but the earth will now open and swallow them all up quick as in the days of Moses. They and all their company, with their small battleships and their slow speeds, and their invasion fright and foreign shipbuilding houses of cards are each and all capable of absolute pulverisation! Why people don’t laugh at it all is the wonder! Here, for instance, is a military correspondent lecturing the Board of Admiralty on types of ships; and Admirals, whose names were bywords of inefficiency and ineptitude when they were afloat, and who never--one single one of them--left anything better than they found it, are being seriously quoted by serious magazines and serious newspapers as “a most distinguished Admiral,” etc., etc. “These prophets prophesy falsely and the people love to have it so,” as Jeremiah says! This is because of the inherent pessimistic British instinct!

Perhaps the most laughable and silly emanation of these Rip Van Winkles is the outcry against large ships and high speeds, and an Admiral has gone so far as to resort to mathematics and trigonometrical absurdities to prove that slow speed and 6-inch guns are of primary importance in a sea fight!!! Archbishop Whately dealt with a similar critic by a celebrated _jeu d’esprit_ entitled “Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Buonaparte.” The Archbishop by a process of fallacious reasoning demonstrated with all the exactitude of a mathematical problem the impossibility of the existence of such a person as Buonaparte! But as someone has well said, if these strange oddities can convert our enemies (the Germans) to the priceless advantage of slow ships and small guns they are patriots in disguise, and Providence is employing them (as it employs worms and other such things) in assisting to work out the unfailing and invincible supremacy of the British Navy.

But to say no more--the plain man sees that it is of vital importance that we should obtain the highest possible speed in order that, in face of emergencies on the south or east or west of the British Isles, we may be able to concentrate adequate Naval Force with as little delay as possible, and that had the British Admiralty held the opinions expressed by “the Blackwood Balaam” our battleships would still be steaming at about 10 knots an hour, because he must remember that the progress which has been made from 10 knots to 22 knots (as attained in “Dreadnought” at deep, or war load draught) has been gradual, and at any period during this progression it was quite open to other Balaams to retard the action of the Admiralty by pointing out that the slight gain in speed which has been chronicled year by year in battleships was really not worth the price which was being paid for it! But, Blessed be God! In this and all other criticisms of Admiralty Policy the public pulse is totally unaffected, and the reputation of the Admiralty unlowered.

For 12 months past not a single battleship has been laid down in Europe, and this simply and solely owing to the dramatic appearance of the “Dreadnought,” which upset all the calculations in Foreign Admiralties and deserved the calculated letter written by Lord Selborne to the Committee on Designs. The Admiralty has done more than all the Peace party with all their dinners to arrest the contest for Sea Power!

In the criticisms we are dealing with, “Party” as usual has come before “Patriotism,” but the Sea Lords can, each one of them, confidently say, with the poet’s version of a patriot’s motto,

“Sworn to no party, of no sect am I,
I can’t be silent and I will not lie,”

and so the Sea Lords have no desire to avoid any odium the Tory papers[3] may be pleased to bring upon them. There is undoubted authority for stating that a skilfully organised “Fleet Street” conspiracy aided by Naval Malcontents is endeavouring to excite the British public against the Board of Admiralty, but it has fallen flat.

There is, however, a very serious danger in the propagation of the view so ably combated by Sir C. Dilke in his speech at Coleford, Forest of Dean, on September 27th last, that this country requires a military force of 640,000 men!

His comparison of Navy and Army expenditure is illuminating but has been totally ignored by the Press and the country. The “Fiery Cross” has been sent round to resuscitate the “Invasion Bogey.”

There has been for many years past a general feeling in this country that questions of international relationship and of national defence should be withdrawn as far as possible from the arena of party politics. Such divergences of opinion as must exist on these topics have no obvious connection with the divisions of our internal politics; and it is surely legitimate to go further than this, and say that the main problems in these departments can be dealt with in such a way as to win the assent of every reasonable man, whatever his opinions may be on Trade Unionism or Elementary Education.

At any rate successive Boards of Admiralty have for something like 20 years acted on the assumption--which has hitherto been justified--that their policy would be accepted by the public as based on a fully considered estimate of the requirements of national defence, and, if criticised (as it was bound to be from time to time), criticised on other than partisan grounds. Between the date of the Naval Defence Act and 1904 the Navy Estimates were approximately trebled. The increase was continuous under four successive First Lords, and under both Liberal and Conservative Governments. In 1904 the maximum of the curve of expenditure was reached, and the Navy Estimates began to decline, at first rapidly, under a Conservative Government, then more slowly, and in part subject to certain provisos, under the present Liberal Government. And this, it appears, is the moment chosen for the first considerable outbreak of political rancour in naval affairs since the modern Navy came into existence!

It is, however, of such supreme importance to the Navy that the Admiralty Board should not be suspected of being governed in its decisions on matters of national defence by partisan considerations that it may be well to set out again, and very explicitly, what are the reasons which have led the Board to adopt the policy now impugned.

Here we have to go back to first principles. It has become too much the fashion to employ the phrase “a two-Power standard” as a mere shibboleth. The principle this phrase embodies has been of the utmost value in the past, and is likely to be so in the future; but if used unintelligently at the present moment it merely gives the enemy cause to blaspheme. Great Britain must, it is agreed, maintain at all costs the command of the sea. Therefore we must be decisively stronger than any possible enemy. Who then is the possible enemy? Ten years ago, or even less, we should probably have answered, France and Russia in alliance. As they were then respectively the second and third naval Powers, the two-Power standard had an actuality which it has since lost. The United States and Germany are competing for the second place which France has already almost yielded. Russia’s fleet has practically disappeared. Japan’s has sprung to the front rank. Of the four Powers which are primarily in question, Japan is our ally, France is our close friend, America is a kindred State with whom we may indeed have evanescent quarrels, but with whom, it is scarcely too much to say, we shall never have a parricidal war. The other considerable naval Powers are Italy and Austria, of whom we are the secular friends, and whose treaty obligations are in the highest degree unlikely to force them into a rupture with us which could in no possible way serve their own interests.

There remains Germany. Undoubtedly she is a possible enemy.[4] While there is no specific cause of dispute there is a general commercial and--on the German side--political rivalry which has unfortunately but indisputably caused bad blood between the two countries. For the moment, it would be safe to build against Germany only. But we cannot build for the moment: the Board of Admiralty are the trustees of future generations of their countrymen, who may not enjoy the same comparatively serene sky as ourselves. The ships we lay down this year may have their influence on the international situation twenty years hence, when Germany--or whoever our most likely antagonist may then be--may have the opportunity of the co-operation (even if only temporary) of another great naval Power. Hence a two-Power standard, rationally interpreted, is by no means out of date. But it is not a rational interpretation to say that we must instantly lay down as many ships as any other two Powers are at this moment laying down. We must take long views; we must be sure what other Powers are doing; we must take the average of their efforts, and average our own efforts in response.

Now this matter of averaging the shipbuilding, of equalising the programme over a number of years, deserves further consideration. Some Powers, notably Germany, attempt to achieve this end by creating long statutory programmes. The British Admiralty has abandoned the idea since the Naval Defence Act. For us, in fact, it would be a thoroughly vicious system. For a Power which is trying to “set the pace,” and which is glad to avoid annual discussion of the financial aspect of the question, it, no doubt, has its advantages. But Great Britain does not build to a naval strength that can be determined _a priori_; she builds simply and solely to maintain the command of the sea against other Powers. For this end the Admiralty must have its hands free to determine from year to year what the shipbuilding requirements are. But, again, this does not mean that our efforts must be spasmodic, that because foreign Powers lay down six ships one year and none the next, therefore we must do the same. For administrative reasons, which should be obvious, and which in any case this is not the place to dilate upon, it is very necessary that shipbuilding should approximate year by year, so far as practicable, to some normal figure, and that increases or decreases, when they become necessary, should be made gradually. This double principle, of determining the programme from year to year, and yet averaging the number of ships built over a number of years, has to be firmly grasped by anyone who desires to understand the Admiralty shipbuilding policy.

With this preamble we are in a position to discuss the actual situation. And first we have to consider what is the existing relative strength of Great Britain and the other naval Powers. About this there is really no difference of opinion--British naval supremacy was never better assured than at the present moment. Even admitting the combination of two of the three next naval Powers (France, Germany, and the United States) to be conceivable, it is certain that any two of them would hesitate to attack us, and it is more than probable that if they did they would be defeated, even without the assistance of our Japanese allies. The alleged alarm as to our naval strength is therefore admittedly in regard to the future, not in regard to the present. And here (to digress for a moment) we may remark that agitations have occurred in earlier years when it was supposed that some foreign Power or combination of Powers was actually in a position to sweep us off the Channel, but never before have we been invited to panic by prophecy. Is there not something slightly absurd in alarm--not calculation, for that is justifiable enough, but alarm--about our position in 1920? At any rate, it is clear that it is the future which we are called on to consider.

In this connection two facts have to be remembered: first, that we start in a position of security, and need therefore be in no undue haste to build more ships; _secondly, that we are on the threshold of a new era in naval construction_, and can therefore not rest content with the advantage which we secured in an era which is passing away. The problem need not be complicated by a somewhat futile attempt to bring the existing and the new ships of our own and foreign navies to a common denominator; we must build new ships to meet new ships, always, however, remembering that until the new ships are in commission we have got plenty of the old ones to fight with.

But here it is really impossible to avoid commenting on the gross insincerity of some recent attacks on the Admiralty. It was no doubt only to be expected that the four ships of the Cawdor memorandum, which were explicitly stated to be a maximum, should always be quoted as a minimum by anyone who wishes to belabour the present Board. But there is a further point which the convenient shortness of the journalistic memory has suffered to be overlooked. When the Cawdor memorandum was issued, it was generally (though wrongly) assumed that only two of the four ships would be battleships, and two “armoured cruisers.” _And at that time the public had certainly no idea what the_ “_Invincible_” Fast Battle Cruiser type was like, with its 6 knots superiority of speed to everything afloat, and the biggest guns alive. The “Invincibles” are, as a matter of fact, perfectly fit to be in line of battle with the battle fleet, and _could more correctly be described as battleships which, thanks to their speed, can drive anything afloat off the seas_. But this was not known, and the calculations generally made in the Press added only two units per annum to our battle fleet. Yet there was no outcry; that was reserved to a later date, when it was beginning to be understood that the “Invincibles” could be reckoned side by side with the “Dreadnought,” and it had been announced that three new “Dreadnoughts,” instead of two, were to be laid down this winter. Surely the ways of the party journalist are past finding out.

In this connection it may be well also to make some observations on the diminution by the authority of the Board of programmes of shipbuilding already approved by Parliament. The allegation that there is anything unconstitutional in the procedure may be left to the constitutional lawyer to pulverise. Probably all that is usually meant by the statement is that it is desirable to let Parliament know of the change in the programme as soon as convenient after it has been decided, and to this there would usually be no possible objection. But the idea that, because Parliament has voted a certain sum of money for the current year’s programme, and certain commitments for future years (a much more important matter), therefore the Board is bound to build ships it really does not want, is not only pernicious, but also ridiculous in the extreme. The only legitimate ground for complaint, if any, would be that the Board had misled Parliament in the first instance by overestimating the requirements. The Board are faced each summer with the necessity of saying what they expect to have to lay down 18 months later. This, of course, is prophecy. Generally it is found to be pretty accurate, but the advent of the new era in shipbuilding (which is principally due to the lessons of the only big naval war of modern times) has made prophecy more than usually difficult. Moreover, if the matter is at all in doubt, the prophet has special inducements to select the higher rather than the lower figure. Increase of a programme during a given year will involve a supplementary estimate with all its accompanying inconveniences. If on the other hand it is found that the original programme was unnecessarily extensive, it is a comparatively simple matter to cut it down. It is best of course to have the right number of new ships in the Navy Estimates; but it is next best to have a number in excess of that ultimately required, which can be pruned as requisite.

Let us repeat: sufficient unto the year is the shipbuilding thereof. Panic at the present time is stupid. The Board of Admiralty is not to be frightened by paper programmes. They will cautiously do all that they judge necessary to secure the existing naval supremacy of this country: the moment that is threatened they will throw caution to the winds and outbuild our rivals at all costs.

H.M. SHIPS “DREADNOUGHT” AND “INVINCIBLE.”

The accompanying papers[5] contain arguments in support of the “Dreadnought” and “Invincible.”

The features of these novel designs, which have been most adversely criticised, are:--

1. The uniform Big Gun armament.
2. The great increase in speed.

It is admitted that strategically speed is of very great importance. It enables the fleet or fleets possessing it to concentrate at any desired spot as quickly as possible, and it must therefore exercise an important influence on the course of a naval war, rapid concentration being one of the chief factors of success.

Many adverse critics of high speed maintain that it is the weapon of the weaker Fleet, the only advantage conferred being the ability to refuse an action by running away: two cases may be cited from the actions of the late war in the East showing the fallacy of this argument and that the Japanese successes were solely due to a command of speed.

In the battle of the 10th August, 1904, after the preliminary manœuvres, the Russian Admiral turned to the eastward at 2.30 p.m. to escape to Vladivostok. The Japanese Fleet was then on the starboard quarter of the Russian and practically out of range. Captain Pakenham, the British Naval Attaché, who was on board Admiral Togo’s flagship, in his report, states that the “‘Tzæsarevitch’ (leading the Russian line) was almost out of sight.” A slightly superior speed in the Russian line would have ensured their escape, but the excess of speed lay with the Japanese and they slowly drew up into range and reopened the action; but it was late in the evening before they drew far enough ahead to concentrate a heavy fire on the leader of the Russian line and so break up their formation. When this was accomplished it was nearly dark and the Russians, though thrown into confusion and beaten, were not destroyed, for the approaching darkness and the destroyer threat necessitated the Japanese Battle Fleet hauling off, yet the retreat to Vladivostok was prevented.

A higher speed in the Japanese line would have wrought confusion to the Russians earlier in the day, and probably have allowed a sufficient period of daylight for their total destruction.

Again. At the opening of the Battle of the Sea of Japan in May, the Japanese Fleet, due to skilful handling, held a commanding position, giving a concentration of fire on the heads of the Russian lines. Had they not possessed superior speed, the Japanese would rapidly have lost this advantage, as the Russians turned away to starboard and compelled the Japanese to move along a circle of larger radius; their greater speed enabled the Japanese to maintain their advantage and so continue the concentration of fire on the Russian van until so much damage had been inflicted that the Russians lost all order and were crushed.

These, therefore, are two of the most convincing instances that could now be given, where speed was of overwhelming tactical value to the victorious side, and such evidence is unanswerable and is a justification of the speeds adopted in the designs of the new ships.

DEFECTS AND REPAIRS

[Lord Fisher found fruitful scope for his reforming energy in
the Royal dockyards, and was very keen on making them efficient
in working as well as economical in administration. The former
tendency had been for ships to accumulate defects until they
went into dock, when their stay was accordingly prolonged,
and the longer they were in dockyard hands the more work was
provided for the officials and workmen, so that there was a
double incentive to spend money. In the following memorandum,
Lord Fisher insists that this drain upon the limited funds
available for the Navy must stop, and explains how the
Admiralty meant to discriminate between vessels which it was
essential to keep thoroughly efficient and others which were
not worth any, or so much, money for repairs. Elsewhere in this
volume Lord Fisher has shown how he got rid of 6,000 redundant
dockyard workmen.]

The head has got to wag the tail. The tail sometimes now wags the head. It is for the Admiralty, and the Admiralty alone, to decide _whether_, _how_, or _when_ the defects and repairs of the Fleet are to be taken in hand.

_The sole governing condition is what the Admiralty require for fighting purposes!_ It is desirable to put an extreme case to accentuate this:--

In the secrets of Admiralty Fighting Policy undesirable to make known to our enemies there are certain vessels never going to be used for actual fighting, but they serve an extremely useful purpose for subsidiary purposes. In such vessels there are defects and repairs of a particular character that might stand over till Doomsday! whilst there are other vessels where only defects affecting purely seagoing and actually direct fighting efficiency should be attended to. All this entirely depends on our probable enemy and may vary from time to time, and the sole judge can only be the Admiralty. But what it is feared now obtains is a blind rushing at all defects and repairs of all kinds and classes in all vessels. It is perfectly natural that the Commander-in-Chief and Admirals Superintendent may wish for the millennium of having all their vessels perfect--but this cannot be. What does it lead to? Extreme local pressure accentuated by Parliamentary action to enter more Dockyard workmen. What does this mean? It means in some recent cases that practically the upkeep of three cruisers is swallowed up in pay to Dockyard workmen! No--the Admiralty Policy is sound, consistent and irrefutable, which is _never_ to exceed the normal number of Dockyard workmen as now fixed by the recent Committee, and have such a great margin of Naval strength--such as we now possess--as admits of a leisurely and economical refit of ships without extravagant overtime or inefficient hustling of work. Therefore, what it comes to is this:--The Admiralty decide what vessels they require first and what defects and repairs in those vessels are most material, and they give orders accordingly. It is _not_ the responsibility of the local authorities at all to say that this vessel or that vessel must be completed at once, for, as before-mentioned, it may be that in the Admiralty scheme of fighting those vessels are not required at all.

The Controller has great difficulties to contend with because he has not the free hand of a private employer who can discharge or enter men just as he requires. To get rid of a Dockyard workman involves agitation in every direction--in Parliament, at the Treasury and locally, and even Bishops throw themselves into the fray, like the Bishop of Winchester at Portsmouth, instead of looking after his own disorganised and mutinous Established Church. There is now a plethora of shipwrights at Chatham, because the Treasury will not allow their transfer to other yards, and a paucity of boilermakers because unwanted men occupy their places, and the scandal exists of men being entered at Devonport with men having no work at Chatham. But, of course, this is one of the blessings of Parliamentary Government, Treasury Control, and a Free Press!

Where the special influence of the Commander-in-Chief is desired by the Admiralty is to bring before them cases where defects have not been dealt with in the initial stages by the ship’s artificers and so allowed to increase as to necessitate Dockyard intervention. Such cases would be drastically dealt with by the Admiralty if only they could be informed of them, but there is an amiable desire to avoid severe punishments, and the dire result is that the zealous and efficient are on the same footing as the incompetent and the careless who get more leave and time with their friends because their vessels are longer in Dockyard hands.

It is desired to give prominence to the following facts:--It is a matter of everyday occurrence that vessels come home from Foreign stations, often immense distances, as from China or Australia, and are inspected by the Commander-in-Chief on arrival home and reported thoroughly efficient, and praise is given by the Admiralty accordingly, and the full-power steam trial is conducted with great care, and the mere fact of the vessel having steamed home those thousands of miles is itself a manifest evidence of her propelling machinery being efficient, and yet instantly after paying off we are asked to believe that such a vessel instantly drops down to a totally incapable condition of either seagoing or fighting efficiency, by our being presented with a bill of thousands upon thousands of pounds.

The attention of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Home Ports and of the Admirals Superintendent will be specially drawn to a new series of instructions which will specifically detail their responsibility in carrying out the orders of the Admiralty in regard to defects and repairs. It is admitted that no comprehensive statement has as yet been issued as to the order and urgency in which both Fleet and Dockyard labour should be applied.

This statement is now about to be issued--it is based, and can only be based, on the knowledge of what vessels are most required for war at that particular time, and so must emanate direct from the Admiralty, who alone can decide on this matter. For instance, at this present moment there are vessels, even in the first line as some might suppose, which would not be employed until the last resort, whilst there are others almost believed to be out of the fighting category which under certain present conditions might be required for the first blow. This fact came so notably into prominence some months since that it has led to the adoption of what may be termed the “sliding scale” of nucleus crews, with the Torpedo craft and Submarines at almost full complement down to the vessels in “Special Reserve” with only a “skeleton” crew capable of raising steam periodically and working only the heavy armament. So no local knowledge could determine from day to day which are the first vessels required. This is changing from day to day and it is the duty of the necessarily _very few_ to determine the daily fighting requirements. The ideal is for only _one_ to know, and the nearer this is adhered to the more likely are we to surprise our enemies.

THE USE OF THE GUNBOAT.

[The notes and letters which follow were prepared by
Lord Fisher in the course of his advocacy that the Navy
Estimates and the Service itself should not be saddled with
establishments not directly contributing to the fighting
efficiency of the Fleet and its instant readiness for war.
Such services, he maintained, not only reduced the sum of
money available for the real work of the Navy, but constituted
elements of weakness in the event of hostilities. The first
document concerns the maintenance of small craft on foreign
stations, on which a number of “gunboats” were kept to fulfil
duties for departments other than the Admiralty. Lord Fisher
differentiates between vessels which the Board should rightly
supply, and others which had no naval value but were retained
for duties connected with the Foreign or Colonial Offices--for
which, if necessary, a proper fighting ship could be lent
temporarily and then returned to her squadron. The second
document deals with the Coastguard, which no longer served the
purpose of a reserve for the Navy, and which had come to be
mainly employed on duties connected with revenue, life-saving,
etc., although paid for out of Navy Votes and employing Navy
personnel. Thirdly, the Admiralty letter on Observatories shows
that heavy expense was borne upon naval funds for duties no
longer necessary to the Royal Navy.]

In the Cawdor memorandum of last year (1905) will be found an exposition of the Admiralty policy in this matter, and attention may particularly be drawn to the following passage:--

“Gunboats, and all vessels of like class, have been gradually losing value except for definite purposes under special conditions. As far as this country is concerned, the very places consecrated as the sphere of gunboat activity are those remote from the covering aid of large ships. Strained relations may occur at the shortest notice; the false security of the period of drifting imperceptibly into actual hostilities is proverbial, and the nervous dread of taking any action that might even be construed into mere precautionary measures of defence, which experience has shown to be one of the peculiar symptoms of such a period, is apt to deprive these small vessels of their last remaining chance of security by not allowing them to fall back towards material support. The broadcast use of gunboats in peace time is a marked strategic weakness, and larger vessels can generally do the work equally well, in fact far better, for they really possess the strength necessary to uphold the prestige of the flag they fly, whereas the gunboat is merely an abstract symbol of the power of the nation, not a concrete embodiment of it.

“It might be thought that the withdrawal of the small non-effective vessels and the grouping of fleets and squadrons at the strategic positions for war involved the loss of British prestige, and of the ‘Showing the Flag’ (as it was termed). But the actual fact is that never before in naval history has there been a more universal display of sea power than during this year by this country. The Channel Fleet in the North Sea and Baltic receiving the courtesies of Holland, Denmark, and Germany; the Atlantic Fleet at Brest; the Mediterranean Fleet at Algiers; the Fourth Cruiser Squadron, consisting of five powerful fighting vessels, now in the West Atlantic; a powerful squadron of six of the finest armoured cruisers in the world visiting Lisbon, Canada, Newfoundland, and United States; a squadron of cruisers, under a Commodore, proceeding from Labrador to Cape Horn and back by the coast of Africa, and two cruisers visiting the Pacific Coast and the adjacent islands; the movements of the Cape Squadron and of the Eastern Fleet in China, Australia, and the Indian Ocean: so imposing and ubiquitous a display of the flag and of naval power has never before been attained by our own Navy.”

The statement goes on to explain the special circumstances--use in shallow inland waters, etc., etc., which alone are held by the Admiralty to justify the use of gunboats.

This policy is from time to time impugned by people who have no need to count the cost of the alternative policy. Doubtless it would be convenient, as a temporary emergency arises here or there over the surface of the globe, if at that very spot some British cruiser or gunboat promptly appeared ready to protect British interests, or to sink in the attempt. Indeed, for some time this was the ideal at which the Admiralty aimed. But since the redistribution of the Fleet the Empire has had to do without the ubiquitous gunboat, and, if the truth be told, scarcely seems to have missed it. There are one or two valuable cases in point. For a long time the Foreign Office, or rather the Ambassador at Constantinople, pressed for the restoration of the second stationnaire. The Admiralty sternly refused. The only noticeable result of this dangerous policy so far has been that the French have followed our example and withdrawn their second vessel.

An even more remarkable case occurred in Uruguay. A poaching Canadian sealer had been captured by the Uruguayan authorities, and language was used as if the disruption of the Empire would follow a refusal on the part of the Admiralty to liberate her crew by force. For a time the Admiralty was practically in revolt against H.M. Government, and then--everything blew over. The dispute was settled by diplomatic action and the local courts of law.

The question of the small vessel for police duties will long be with us. Vice-Consuls and Resident Commissioners will, no doubt, continue to act on the great principle: When in doubt wire for a gunboat. The Foreign and Colonial Offices, to whom the dispatch of a gunboat means no more than persuading a gentleman in Whitehall to send a telegram saying she is to go, will probably never quite realise why the gentleman should be so perverse as to refuse. But the matter is really now a “chose jugée”; the Admiralty battle has been fought and won, and it only remains for the Admiralty to adhere to its principles and decline to give way simply for the sake of a quiet life.

COAST GUARD

_June, 1906._

The Coast Guard Service was transferred from the control of the Commissioners of Customs to that of the Admiralty by the Coast Guard Service Act, 1856, in order to make better provision for--

(i) The defence of the coasts of the realm;

(ii) The more ready manning of His Majesty’s Navy in case of
war or sudden emergency;

(iii) The protection of the Revenue;

and there is little doubt that at that time the Coast Guard force was required for these three purposes.

Since that date, however, these requirements have been greatly modified by the great developments that have taken place in steam, in electricity, and generally in the conduct of Naval warfare, and also as regards the inducements and facilities for smuggling.

It is now considered that about 170 War Signal and Wireless Telegraphy Stations in the United Kingdom are sufficient to give warning of the approach of an enemy’s ships, and that, as far as the use of the Coast Guard for Coast Defence is concerned, the remaining 530 Stations and their personnel are quite unnecessary.

_As an Active Service force the Coast Guard is far from fulfilling modern fighting requirements, which are so exacting that a man’s efficiency depends upon his being_ continuously _associated with highly technical duties on board ship, and employment in the Coast Guard_ (_even with the arranged periodical training in the Fleet_) _is found to be inconsistent with these requirements._

Again, as a Reserve, though it fulfils the requirements of such a force, yet its cost (largely due to the heavy expense of housing the men and their families) is out of all proportion to that at which the efficient Royal Fleet Reserve can now be maintained.

The Coast Guard being treated as an Active Service force in the Estimates, the numbers are included in the number of men voted for the Fleet, and help to make up the total of 129,000; but as the 4,000 Coast Guard men are appropriated for duties away from the chief Naval ports, they are not available for the ordinary work of the Fleet, and the peace resources are correspondingly reduced, while the extra charges for the Coast Guard tend largely to increase the expense of maintaining the Active Service force.

If, on the other hand, the Coast Guard be treated as a Reserve only, the expense is still more disproportionate, as, in comparison with the small retainers, charges for a week’s annual drill and small prospective pension, which make up the whole expense entailed in the maintenance of the Royal Fleet Reserve, there are the Full Pay, Victualling, Housing, and numerous miscellaneous allowances and charges of a permanent force maintained in small units under the most expensive conditions.

Therefore, the maintenance of the Coast Guard by the Admiralty not only entails a reduction of the number of highly-trained active service ratings in the Fleet at sea, but also an unnecessarily large expenditure on a Reserve.

As regards the use of the Coast Guard for the protection of the Revenue, the arrangements made when the Coast Guard was transferred to the control of the Admiralty might now be considerably modified. A large proportion of the coast of the United Kingdom is still patrolled nightly by the Coast Guard as a precaution against smuggling, but looking to the increase in population and the number of towns and villages round the coasts, the development of telegraphic communication, and the great reduction in the inducements to smuggling, this service seems to be no longer required; and some other adequate arrangement for the protection of the Revenue might be made by a small addition to the present Customs Force, assisted by the local Police, in addition to the watch still kept at those Coast Guard Stations which would be maintained as Naval Signal Stations.

Even in the cases in which the existing Coast Guard may be considered to afford valuable protection to the Revenue, it must be remembered that in case of War or for Great Manœuvres, the men would be withdrawn to the Fleet from all stations except the Naval War Signal Stations.

In any case the employment of highly-trained seamen to perform simple police duties on shore cannot be justified, and the expense is much greater than it would be were a civilian force to be employed.

Certain other duties, principally in connection with life-saving and wrecks, under the Board of Trade, have also been undertaken by the Coast Guard; but these, however valuable, do not constitute a _raison d’être_ for the Coast Guard, and it is quite feasible to make adequate local arrangements for carrying out these services, should the Coast Guard be removed. No more striking illustration of the feasibility of this can be given than the National Lifeboat Organisation, and to that body, aided perhaps by a Government grant, these services could, no doubt, be easily, economically, and efficiently transferred.

Owing to the growing naval armaments of other Nations, and the consequent necessary increase in the Navy, the Admiralty has found it necessary carefully to consider the whole question of the expenditure under the Naval Votes in order to eliminate therefrom any services which are unnecessary from the point of view of immediate readiness and efficiency for war. About £1,000,000 of the Naval Votes is diverted to services which only indirectly concern the Navy, and are not material to the fighting efficiency of the Service. Of this about half (£500,000) is annually absorbed by the Coast Guard.

From a Naval point of view the greater part of this heavy annual expenditure is wholly unnecessary, and it is also very doubtful, from what has been before pointed out, whether for Revenue purposes a force such as the Coast Guard is now required; while if it be still required in certain localities, it would be more economical to replace the present expensive Naval detachments by a Civilian service. By such a transfer the whole of the present expense of training men as a fighting force would be saved and there would be no deterioration in an important part of the Naval active personnel such as is now inevitable.

There can be no comparison between the cost of a Revenue force and that of a Naval force, the cost of Naval training, which is very considerable, being dispensed with in the former case. Therefore, there is no doubt that, from the point of efficiency and economy, the substitution of civilians for Naval ratings would be a great saving to the State.

OBSERVATORIES.

_21st August, 1906._

In the past Greenwich Observatory has been of great importance to the Navy, inasmuch as all the data necessary for the navigation of ships by astronomical observation have been compiled there. The testing of chronometers has been carried out at Greenwich since their invention in 1762, while the Cape Observatory was instituted in 1820 in order to supply data concerning Southern stars not visible from Greenwich.

In recent years, however, the familiarity with Ocean routes that has been attained; the greatly extended area of coast surveys, and the admirable system of lights and beacons established throughout the navigational zones of the world, have in the course of years caused the work of the Observatories to become of less importance to practical navigation, and more a matter of scientific research. The photographic mapping of the heavens, by which stars invisible to the naked eye are discovered, is not a necessity to navigation, nor to the Naval Service.

At the present time, therefore, it may be said that the only work done by the Observatories which is directly useful to the Navy, is the testing and storing of chronometers; observing the astronomical changes connected with the heavenly bodies for the purpose of obtaining data for the correction of the Nautical Almanack; supplying accurate time for time signals and meridian distance work, and taking magnetic observations.

This sphere of usefulness is not of advantage to the Navy alone. The Mercantile Marine derives equal benefit from the work of the Observatories. Greenwich time is indispensable to Railway Companies to enable them to work their complicated systems with accuracy, and it is equally indispensable to the Postal Authorities for the proper working of every post and telegraph office in the Kingdom. Although the staff of the Observatories is very largely occupied upon services of this public character, neither the Board of Trade, nor Lloyd’s, nor the various Mercantile Shipping Associations, nor the Railway Companies, nor the General Post Office, have made any contribution towards their cost, while, on the other hand, in one case, that of the Post Office, the Admiralty is charged with a heavy annual payment for postal and telegraphic communications. The London Water Companies are greatly assisted by the Greenwich rainfall observations, but they pay nothing for them, neither do they supply the Admiralty with water gratuitously.

It is fitting that the British Empire should possess a National Observatory, but it is not equitable that Naval funds should bear the whole expense.

When criticism is directed against the magnitude of the Navy Estimates, it rarely happens that the critic takes the trouble to ascertain of what Items the Votes are made up; on the other hand, money voted for the Royal Observatories is passed by the House without much question, because it happens to form part of Estimates which are of such great magnitude.

The present procedure tends therefore to obscure the actual sum total of the Navy Estimates, and at the same time it prevents the application to the Royal Observatories of the same Parliamentary criticism which is applied to the Civil Service Estimates.