Chapter V: of my “Memories”)

ADMIRALTY HOUSE,
PORTMOUTH.
_April 20th, 1904._

MY DEAR FRIEND,

I will begin with the last thing in your letter, which is far
the most important, and that is our paucity of submarines. I
consider it the most serious thing at present affecting the
British Empire!--That sounds _big_, but it’s true. Had either
the Russians or the Japanese had submarines the whole face of
their war would have been changed for both sides. It really
makes me laugh to read of “Admiral Togo’s _eighth_ attack on
Port Arthur!” Why! had he possessed submarines it would have
been _one_ attack and _one_ attack only! It would have been
all over with the whole Russian Fleet, caught like rats in a
trap! Similarly, the Japanese Admiral Togo outside would never
have dared to let his transports full of troops pursue the even
tenor of their way to Chemulpo and elsewhere!

It’s astounding to me, _perfectly astounding_, how the very
best amongst us absolutely fail to realise the vast impending
revolution in naval warfare and naval strategy that the
submarine will accomplish! (I have written a paper on this,
but it’s so violent I am keeping it!) Here, just to take a
simple instance, is the battleship “Empress of India,” engaged
in manœuvres and knowing of the proximity of Submarines, the
Flagship of the Second Admiral of the Home Fleet nine miles
beyond the Nab Light (out in the open sea), so self-confident
of safety and so oblivious of the possibilities of modern
warfare that the Admiral is smoking his cigarette, the Captain
is calmly seeing defaulters down on the half-deck, no one
caring an iota for what is going on, and suddenly they see
a Whitehead torpedo miss their stern by a few feet! And how
fired? From a submarine of the “pre-Adamite” period, small,
slow, badly fitted, _with no periscope at all_--it had been
carried away by a destroyer lying over her, fishing for
her!--and yet this submarine followed that battleship for a
solid two hours under water, coming up gingerly about a mile
off, every now and then (like a beaver!), just to take a fresh
compass bearing of her prey, and then down again!

Remember, that this is done (and I want specially to emphasise
the point), with the Lieutenant in command of the boat out in
her for the first time in his life on his own account, and half
the crew never out before either! why, it’s wonderful! And so
what results may we expect with bigger and faster boats and
periscopes more powerful than the naked eye (such as the latest
pattern one I saw the other day), and with experienced officers
and crews, and with nests of these submarines acting together?

I have not disguised my opinion in season and out of season
as to the essential, imperative, immediate, vital, pressing,
urgent (I can’t think of any more adjectives!) necessity for
more submarines at once, at the very least 25 in addition to
those now ordered and building, and a hundred more as soon as
practicable, or we shall be caught with our breeches down just
as the Russians have been!

And then, my dear Friend, you have the astounding audacity to
say to me, “I presume you only think they (the submarines) can
act on the _defensive_!”... Why, my dear fellow! not take the
offensive? Good Lord! if our Admiral is worth his salt, he
will tow his submarines at 18 knots speed and put them into
the hostile Port (like ferrets after the rabbits!) before war
is officially declared, just as the Japanese acted before the
Russian Naval Officers knew that war was declared!

In all seriousness I don’t think it is even _faintly_ realised--

_The immense impending revolution which the submarines will
effect as offensive weapons of war._

When you calmly sit down and work out what will happen in the narrow waters of the Channel and the Mediterranean--how totally the submarines will alter the effect of Gibraltar, Port Said, Lemnos, and Malta, it makes one’s hair stand on end!

I hope you don’t think this letter too personal!

Ever yours,
J. A. FISHER.

Note made on January 5th, 1904:

Satan disguised as an Angel of Light wouldn’t succeed in persuading the Admiralty or the Navy that in the course of some few years Submarines will prevent any Fleet remaining at sea continuously either in the Mediterranean or the English Channel.

The shells for the 20-inch guns to be carried by H.M.S. “Incomparable” would have been far bigger, and would have weighed two tons.]

Now follows a paper on “The Effect of Submarine Boats,” which I wrote while I was Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth, October, 1903.

_These remarks can only be fully appreciated by those who witnessed the Flotilla of Submarine Boats now at Portsmouth practising out in the open sea._

It is an historical fact that the British Navy stubbornly
resists change.

A First Sea Lord told me on one occasion that there were no
torpedoes when he came to sea, and he didn’t see why the devil
there should be any of the beastly things now!

This was _à propos_ of my attracting the attention of his
serene and contented mind to the fact that we hadn’t got any
torpedoes at that time in the British Navy, and that a certain
Mr. Whitehead (with whom I was acquainted) had devised an
automobile torpedo, costing only £500, that would make a hole
as big as his Lordship’s carriage (then standing at the door)
in the bottom of the strongest and biggest ship in the world,
and she would go to the bottom in about five minutes.

Thirty-five years after this last interview, on September 4th,
1903, at 11 a.m., the ironclad “Belleisle,” having had several
extra bottoms put on her and strengthened in every conceivable
manner that science could suggest or money accomplish, was sent
to the bottom of Portsmouth Harbour by this very Whitehead
automobile torpedo in seven minutes.

This Whitehead torpedo can be carried with facility in
Submarine Boats, and it has now attained such a range and such
accuracy (due to the marvellous adaptation of the gyroscope),
that even at two miles’ range it possesses a greater ratio
of power of vitally injuring a ship in the line of battle
than does the most accurate gun. This is capable of easy
demonstration (if anyone doubts it).

There is this immense fundamental difference between the
automobile torpedo and the gun--the torpedo has no trajectory:
it travels horizontally and hits below water, so all its hits
are vital hits; but not so the gun--only in a few places
are gun hits vital, and those places are armoured. It is
not feasible to armour the bottoms of ships even if it were
effectual--which it is not.

But the pith and marrow of the whole matter lies in the fact
that the Submarine Boat which carries this automobile torpedo
is up to the present date absolutely unattackable. When you see
Battleships or Cruisers, or Destroyers, or Torpedo Boats on
the horizon, you can send others after them to attack them or
drive them away! You see them--you can fire at them--you can
avoid them--you can chase them--but with the Submarine Boat
you can do nothing! You can’t fight them with other Submarine
Boats--they can’t see each other!

Now for the practical bearing of all this, and the special
manner it affects the Submarine Boat and the Army and the
Navy--for they are all inextricably mixed up together in this
matter:--

As regards the Navy, it must revolutionise Naval Tactics for
this simple reason--that the present battle formation of
ships in a single line presents a target of such a length
that the chances are altogether in favour of the Whitehead
torpedo hitting some ship in the line even when projected
from a distance of several miles. This applies specially to
its use by the Submarine Boat; but in addition, these boats
can, in operating defensively, come with absolute invisibility
within a few hundred yards to discharge the projectile, not at
random amongst the crowd of vessels but with certainty at the
Admiral’s ship for instance, or at any other specific vessel
desired to be sent to the bottom.

It affects the Army, because, imagine even one Submarine Boat
with a flock of transports in sight loaded each with some
two or three thousand troops! Imagine the effect of one such
transport going to the bottom in a few seconds with its living
freight!

Even the bare thought makes invasion impossible! Fancy 100,000
helpless, huddled up troops afloat in frightened transports
with these invisible demons known to be near.

Death
near--momentarily--sudden--awful--invisible--unavoidable!
Nothing conceivable more demoralising!

It affects the existence of the Empire, because just as we
were in peril by the non-adoption of the breech-loading gun
until after every Foreign nation had it, and just as we were
in peril when Napoleon the Third built “La Gloire” and other
French ironclads, while we were still stubbornly building
wooden three-deckers, and just as we were in peril when, before
the Boer War, we were waiting to perfect our ammunition and in
consequence had practically no ammunition at all, so are we
in peril now by only having 20 per cent. of our very minimum
requirements in Submarine Boats, because we are waiting for
perfection! We forget that “half a loaf is better than no
bread”--we strain at the gnat of perfection and swallow the
camel of unreadiness! We shall be found unready once too often!

In 1918 I wrote the following letter to a friend on “Submarines and Oil Fuel.”

You ask for information in regard to a prophecy I made before
the War in relation to Submarines, because, you say, that my
statement made in 1912 that Submarines would utterly change
Naval Warfare is now making a stir. However, I made that same
statement in 1904, fourteen years ago.

I will endeavour to give you a brief, but succinct, synopsis of
the whole matter. I have to go some way back, but as you quite
correctly surmise the culmination of my beliefs since 1902 was
the paper on Submarine Warfare which I prepared six months
before the War.[9]...

In May, 1912 (I am working backwards), Mr. Asquith, the Prime
Minister, and Mr. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, came
to Naples, where I then was, and I was invited to be Chairman
of a Royal Commission on Oil Fuel for the Navy, and on Oil
Engines. What most moved me to acceptance was to push the
Submarine, because oil and the oil engine had a special bearing
on its development.

Continuing my march backwards in regard to the Submarine,
there was a cessation in the development of the Submarine
after I left the Admiralty as First Sea Lord on January 25th,
1910. When I returned as First Sea Lord to the Admiralty in
October, 1914, there were fewer Submarines than when I left the
Admiralty in January, 1910, and the one man incomparably fitted
to develop the Submarine had been cast away in a third-class
Cruiser stationed in Crete. No wonder! An Admiral, holding a
very high appointment afloat, derided Submarines as playthings!

In one set of manœuvres the young officer commanding a
Submarine, having for the third time successfully torpedoed
the hostile Admiral’s Flagship, humbly said so to the Admiral
by signal, and suggested the Flagship going out of action. The
answer he got back by signal from the Admiral was: “You be
damned!”

I am still going on tracing back the Submarine. In 1907,
King Edward went on board the “Dreadnought” for a cruise and
witnessed the manœuvres of a Submarine Flotilla. I then said
to His Majesty: “The Submarine will be the Battleship of the
future!”

In February, 1904, Admiral Count Montecuccoli, the Austrian
Minister of Marine, invited himself to stay with me at
Portsmouth, where I was then Commander-in-Chief. He had been
Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian Navy at Pola when I was
Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. We became very great
friends out there. The Austrian Fleet gave us a most cordial
reception. He also was an ardent believer in the Submarine.
That’s why he invited himself to stay, but I refused to let him
see our Submarines at Portsmouth, which were then advancing
by leaps and bounds. Admiral Bacon was then the admirable
Captain in charge of Submarines, and he did more to develop the
Submarine than anyone living. The Submarine is not the weapon
of the weak. Had it only been properly used and developed,
it’s the weapon of the strong, if you use your Naval Supremacy
properly, and

_seize the exits of the enemy, and make a blockade effectual by
Submarines and Mines, which our predominant and overwhelming
naval superiority renders feasible_.

All that was required to meet a German Submarine Menace was the possession of Antwerp, the Belgian Coast, and the Baltic. We could quite easily have accomplished these three objects.

Nearly three months before the War, before the meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence held on May 14th, 1914, I sent the Prime Minister the following Memorandum which I had written in the previous January; and added:--

THE SUBMARINE IS THE COMING TYPE OF WAR VESSEL FOR SEA FIGHTING.

But for that consummation to be reached we must perfect the oil
engine and we must store oil.

There is a strong animus against the submarine--of course there
is!

An ancient Admiralty Board minute described the introduction of
the steam engine as fatal to England’s Navy.

Another Admiralty Board minute vetoed iron ships, because iron
sinks and wood floats!

The whole Navy objected to breech-loading guns, and in
consequence sure disaster was close to us for years and years.

There was virulent opposition to the water-tube boiler (fancy
putting the fire where the water ought to be, and the water
where the fire should be!)

The turbine was said by eminent marine engineers to have an
“insuperable and vital defect which renders it inadmissible as
a practical marine engine--its vast number of blades--it is
only a toy.” 80 per cent. of the steam-power of the world is
now driving turbines.

Wireless was voted damnable by all the armchair sailors when we
put it on the roof of the Admiralty, and yet we heard what one
ship (the “Argyll”) at Bombay was saying to another (the “Black
Prince”) at Gibraltar.

“Flying machines are a physical impossibility,” said a very
great scientist four years ago. To-day they are as plentiful as
sparrows.

“Submarines are only playthings!” was the official remark of
our Chief Admiral afloat only a little while ago, and yet now
submarines are talked of as presently ousting Dreadnoughts.

The above texts, extracted from comparatively modern naval
history (history is a record of exploded ideas!), should make
anyone chary of ridiculing the writer when he repeats:

THE SUBMARINE IS THE COMING TYPE OF WAR VESSEL FOR SEA FIGHTING.

And what is it that the coming of the submarine really means?
It means that the whole foundation of our traditional naval
strategy, which served us so well in the past, has been broken
down! The foundation of that strategy was blockade. The Fleet
did not exist merely to win battles--that was the means, not
the end. The ultimate purpose of the Fleet was to make blockade
possible for us and impossible for our enemy. Where that
situation was set up we could do what we liked with him on the
sea, and, despite a state of war, England grew steadily richer.
But with the advent of the long-range ocean-going submarine
that has all gone! Surface ships can no longer either maintain
or prevent blockade, and with the conception of blockade are
broken up all the consequences, direct and indirect, that used
to flow from it. All our old ideas of strategy are simmering in
the melting pot! Can we get anything out of it which will let
us know where we are and restore to us something of our former
grip? It is a question that must be faced.

* * * * *

Sea-fighting of to-day, or at any time, entails the removal of
the enemy’s sea forces. If, as is maintained, the submarine
proves itself at once the most efficient factor for this
purpose and also the most difficult sea force to remove, let us
clear our minds of all previous obsessions and acknowledge the
facts once and for all.

HOSTILE SUBMARINES.

_It has to be freely acknowledged that at the present time no
means exist of preventing hostile submarines emerging from
their own ports and cruising more or less at will._

It is, moreover, only barely possible that, in the future,
mining and other blocking operations on a very extensive scale
may so develop as to render their exit very hazardous; but it
is plain that such operations would require a large personnel,
unceasing energy and vigilance, and an immense quantity of
constantly replaceable materials.

* * * * *

THE SUBMARINE AND COMMERCE.

Again, the question arises as to what a submarine can do
against a merchant ship when she has found her. She cannot
capture the merchant ship; she has no spare hands to put a
prize crew on board; little or nothing would be gained by
disabling her engines or propeller; she cannot convoy her
into harbour; and, in fact, it is impossible for the submarine
to deal with commerce in the light and provisions of accepted
international law. Under these circumstances, is it presumed
that the hostile submarine will disregard such law and sink
any vessel heading for a British commercial port and certainly
those that are armed or carrying contraband?

There is nothing else the submarine can do except sink her
capture, and it must therefore be admitted that (provided it
is done, and however inhuman and barbarous it may appear) this
submarine menace is a truly terrible one for British commerce
and Great Britain alike, for no means can be suggested at
present of meeting it except by reprisals. All that would
be known would be that a certain ship and her crew had
disappeared, or some of her boats would be picked up with a few
survivors to tell the tale. Such a tale would fill the world
with horror, and it is freely acknowledged to be an altogether
barbarous method of warfare; but, again, if it is done by the
Germans the only thing would be to make reprisals. The essence
of war is violence, and moderation in war is imbecility.

It has been suggested that it should be obligatory for a
submarine to fire a warning gun, but is such a proceeding
practical? We must bear in mind that modern submarines are
faster on the surface than the majority of merchantmen, and
will not necessarily need to dive at all. Therefore, as the
submarine would in most cases be sighted, and as she has no
prize crew to put on board, the warning gun is useless, as the
only thing the submarine could do would be to sink the enemy;
also, the apparently harmless merchant vessel may be armed, in
which case the submarine may but have given herself away if she
did not sink her.

The subject is, indeed, one that bristles with great
difficulties, and it is highly desirable that the conduct
of submarines in molesting commerce should be thoroughly
considered. Above all, it is one of overwhelming interest to
neutrals. One flag is very much like another seen against the
light through a periscope, should he have thought it necessary
to dive; and the fear is natural that the only thing the
officer of the hostile submarine would make sure of would be
that the flag seen was not that of his own country.

Moreover, under numerous circumstances can a submarine allow
a merchant ship to pass unmolested? Harmless trader in
appearance, in reality she may be one of the numerous fleet
auxiliaries, a mine-layer, or carrying troops, and so on. Can
the submarine come to the surface to inquire and lose all
chance of attack if the vessel should prove to be faster than
she is? The apparent merchant ship may also be armed. In this
light, indeed, the recent arming of our British merchantmen is
unfortunate, for it gives the hostile submarine an excellent
excuse (if she needs one) for sinking them; namely, that of
self-defence against the guns of the merchant ship.

What can be the answer to all the foregoing but that (barbarous
and inhuman as, we again repeat, it may appear), if the
submarine is used at all against commerce, she must sink her
captures?

For the prevention of submarines preying on our commerce, it is
above all necessary that merchant shipping should take every
advantage of our favourable geographical position, and that we
should make the Straits of Dover as difficult as we possibly
can.

It is not proposed here to enter into the technical details of
such arrangements; but even after every conceivable means has
been taken, it must be conceded that there is at least a chance
of submarines passing safely through; while at night, or in
thick weather, it is probable that they would not fail to pass
in safety.

I conclude with some details of British Submarines before and during the War:--

I. When I left the Admiralty in January, 1910:
Submarines ready for fighting 61
Building and on order 13

II. When I returned to the Admiralty, in October, 1914, as First Sea
Lord:
Submarines fit for fighting 53
Building and on order 21
But of these 21, only 5 were any good!
2 were paid off as useless.
3 sold to the Italians, not of use to us.
4 sold to the French, not of use to us.
7 of unsatisfactory design.
--
16 leaving only 5 of oversea modern (“E”) Type.
--

Nominally, there were 77 Submarines when I returned in October, 1914, but out of these 24 were useless, or had gone to the Antipodes, as follows:

2 to Australia.
3 to Hong Kong.
1 sold to Italy useless.
8 “A” Class scrapped, 10 years old.
10 “B” Class scrapped, 9 years old.
--
24

77 - 24 = 53 total Submarines fit for Service when I returned in October, 1914.

There were 61 Submarines efficient when I left the Admiralty in January, 1910.

Of those that were on order when I returned, 14 were of “G” Class, but were of an experimental type, and so were not ready till _June, 1916_, or one year after the Submarines were ready which I ordered on my return to the Admiralty in October, 1914.

Here may be stated the great service rendered by Mr. Schwab, of the Bethlehem Steel Works. I specially sent for him. I told him the very shortest time hitherto that a Submarine had been built in was 14 months. Would he use his best endeavours to deliver in six months? _He delivered the first batch in five months!_ And not only that, but they were of so efficient a type (“H” Class) that they came from America to the Dardanelles without escort, and were of inestimable service out there, and passed into the Sea of Marmora, and were most effective in sinking Turkish Transports bringing munitions to Gallipoli.

The type of Submarine (“H” Class) he built hold the field for their special attributes. I saw one in dock at Harwich that had been rammed by a Destroyer--I think a German Destroyer--and had the forepart of her taken clean away, and she got back to Harwich by herself all right. The Commander of her, an aged man, was in the Merchant Service. (What a lot we do indeed owe to the Merchant Service, and especially to those wonderful men in the Trawlers!)

But Mr. Schwab did far more than what I have narrated above. He undertook the delivery of a very important portion of the armament of the Monitors.

The idea was followed up in making old Cruisers immune from German Submarines--the “Grafton,” an old type Cruiser (and so also the “Edgar”), thus fitted, was hit fair amidships by a torpedo from a German submarine off Gibraltar, and the Captain of the “Grafton” reported himself unhurt and going all the faster for it (as it had blown off a good bit of the hull!), and those vessels were ever so much the better sea boats for it!

It is lamentable that no heed was given to the great sagacity of Mr. Churchill in his special endeavour to give further application to this invention.

In the Submarine Monitor M1, which carries a 12-inch gun, and which is illustrated in this volume, we have the type of vessel I put before the Admiralty in August, 1915. She is the forerunner of the Battleship of the future; but her successors should be built in a much shorter time than she was.