Chapter X: Naval Education

I.--COMMON ENTRY.

(_Written in 1905_).

On the 25th of December, 1902, the new system of entry and training of officers for the Navy was inaugurated.

The fundamental principles of this great reform are:--

(_a_) The common entry and training of officers of the three
principal branches of the Service, viz., Combatant or
Executive, Engineer, and Marine.

(_b_) The practical amalgamation of these three branches of officers.

(_c_) The recognition of the fact that the existence of the Navy
depends on machinery, and that, therefore, all combatant
officers must be Engineers.

(_d_) The adoption of the principle that the general education
and training of all these officers must be completed before
they go to sea, instead of, as heretofore, dragging on in
a perfunctory manner during their service as midshipmen,
to be finally completed by a short “cram” at Greenwich and
Portsmouth.

When the details of the new scheme were published, it was stated that at about the age of 20 these officers, who up till then had all received an identical training, would be appropriated by selection to the three branches, viz., Executive, Marine, or Engineer; however, this is unlikely to be carried out in its entirety, and when the time comes, the march of progress will have prepared us to recognise that differentiation to this extent is unnecessary, and that the Fleet will be officered by the combatant officer, who will be equally an Executive, Marine, or Engineer Officer.

Let us assume this to be true. In spite of the great revolution that has been brought about since Christmas, 1902, in the Navy, and the consequent awakening and development of the minds of all officers, there is not one in one hundred who realises fully what the effects of this great reform will be.

The Cadets who are at present at Osborne College are being educated primarily as Mechanical Engineers concurrently with the special training necessary to make them good seamen, good navigators, and good commanders. The most important training they have to receive is undoubtedly that of the Mechanical Engineer, which will ultimately make them capable of dealing with and handling ANYTHING of a mechanical nature. In process of learning this they acquire a mathematical training of a very high order, and, as pure mathematics are the same all the world over, the various other subjects which the Naval Officer of the future will be required to be proficient in only necessitate a little training in the special application of the mathematics of which they possess a firm grasp. Navigation and nautical astronomy are simplicity exemplified once the student has learned trigonometry and algebra. Gunnery, torpedo, and electricity are simply special cases of mechanical problems. Modern seamanship is practically nothing else but a practical application of simple mechanical “chestnuts.”

What, therefore, is the meaning of it all?

It means that the Naval Officer of the future will regard machinery, mechanical work, and mechanical problems as his “bread and butter.” He will think no more of handling machinery of any sort than the ordinary mortal does of riding a bicycle; guns, gun-mountings, torpedoes, and electrical instruments and machines he will regard as special types, but differing no whit in principle from the primitive stock. Mystery will disappear. At present it is an unfortunate thing that departmental jealousy leads the members of each and every department of the Service to make a mystery of their particular speciality. The Gunnery Lieutenant, Torpedo Lieutenant, Engineer, and Marine Officer each resent discussion by “outsiders” of any point in connection with their speciality, as a piece of unwarrantable presumption, with the result that each knows all about his own job, and pursues it diligently, taking care not to poach on anybody else’s preserves, but without any regard as to whether the Service might not gain in efficiency by a little more co-operation and collaboration.

From one point of view they are right in being exclusive, because they know that no one else knows anything about their work, and therefore discussion with “outsiders” is mere waste of breath, but in future all this will be changed. Specialities will disappear; the Naval Officer of the future will see no greater difference between a gun-mounting and a torpedo, than an Engineer sees between the main engines and the feed pump.

However, although specialities will disappear, it will always be necessary to have “experts” in each department. We shall still require our Lieutenants G., T., and E.; but as at the present time when a Lieutenant G. is promoted to Commander he drops the G., so also it seems logical to conclude that the future Lieutenant E. on promotion to Commander should drop the E.

It is absolutely safe to predict that the Naval Officer of 50 years hence will smile when he reads that his forefathers had to have an officer of Commander’s rank appointed to a ship solely for charge of the main engines. Foreigners gasp when they hear that Lieutenants of two or three years standing command our destroyers; in other navies destroyers are usually commanded by Captains de Corvette; and then we smile when we remember youngsters like Lieutenant Rombulow-Pearse of the “Sturgeon,” who rescued the crew of the sinking “Decoy” in a gale of wind, with only his small whaler to help him, and with the loss of only one man, who disappeared nobody knows how.

The ideal complement of officers of the future therefore will be: 1 Captain, 1 Commander, 1 Lieutenant G., 1 Lieutenant E., 1 Lieutenant T., 1 Lieutenant M., 1 Lieutenant N., 1 Lieutenant P., and as many other watchkeepers as necessary.

Enough has been said in the meantime to show how completely the new system of entry and training of officers has remodelled the British Navy, and it is with the object of using the case of the officers as an argument in considering the case of the men, that it has been dilated on at such length.

STATE EDUCATION IN THE NAVY.

(_This Paper was prepared in 1902 under great obligations to Mr. J. R. Thursfield._)

Everyone must now feel that the new system of Entry and Education of Naval Officers must have a fair trial, and all reasonable people will hold that it deserves one.

There still remains to be faced an argument which is certain to appeal to democratic sentiment. Broadly stated, it is this--that the new system, as at present organised, must of necessity take all officers of the Navy from among the sons of parents who can afford to spend about £120 a year on their sons from the age of 12½ until they become Lieutenants at the age of about 20, or even over. In other words, the officers of the Navy will be drawn exclusively from the well-to-do classes.

Democratic sentiment will wreck the present system in the long run, if it is not given an outlet. But let us take the far higher ground of efficiency: is it wise or expedient to take our Nelsons from so narrow a class?

Sir John Fisher, Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth.

Viscount Esher, President of the Committee of War Office
Reconstruction.

Sir George Sydenham Clarke, late Governor of Victoria.
]

Surely some small percentage of promising and intelligent boys from the other classes could be secured and (if caught early enough, as is now the case) trained to be _officers and gentlemen_ by the time they are grown up.

Nor is it the money barrier alone which excludes them. An exclusive system of nomination is distasteful, if not alien, to the democratic sentiment. Combined with the cost of the subsequent training, our present system absolutely excludes all but a very small fraction of the population from serving the King as naval officers. It admits the duke’s son if he is fit, but it excludes the cook’s son whether he is fit or not. It ought to admit both, _but only if both are fit_. The cook’s son may not often be fit, but when he is, why exclude him? Brains, character, and manners are not the exclusive endowment of those whose parents can afford to spend £1,000 on their education.

There seems to be only one way of solving this problem. Initial fitness must be secured, as at present, by careful selection at the outset, and if the promise is not fulfilled as time goes on, ruthless exclusion, whether of duke’s son or of cook’s son, must be the inflexible rule. But do not exclude for poverty alone, either at the outset or afterwards. Let every fit boy have his chance, irrespective of the depth of his parents’ purse. This might, of course, be done by a liberal system of reduced fees for cadets, midshipmen, and sub-lieutenants whose parents were in poor circumstances. But in the first place there would be a certain element of invidiousness in the selection of the recipients of the national bounty, and, in the second, mischievous class distinctions would inevitably arise among the cadets themselves--between those who were supported wholly or partially by the State and those who were not. It is most essential that there should be no such distinctions--that the cadets should be taught to look up only to those who are eminent in brains, character, and manners, and to look down only on those who are idle, vicious, vulgar, or incorrigibly stupid. Now, a common maintenance by the State would put them all on a common level of equality. Though the additional cost to the State would doubtless be great, the result would be well worth the extra expenditure.

The quarter of a million sterling required would be lost and unnoticeable in the millions of the Education Vote, yet it would be worth all the millions of the Education Vote if it makes the Navy more efficient, because

_The British Nation Floats on the British Navy._

It would put the Navy once for all on a basis as broad as the nation; it would immeasurably widen the area of selection, and place at the disposal of the Admiralty all the intellect and all the character of all classes of the people.

THE NEW NAVAL EDUCATION.

Masts and sails disappeared irretrievably with the demand for high speed.

Now, what went with them? Why! The education that the sole use of sail power gave to the eye, brain, and body, in battling with the elements!

It was a marvellous education which we had in the pure sailing days!

One was alert by instinct! You never knew what might happen! A topsail-sheet carrying away, or a weather brace going, or a sudden shift of wind, or squall!

One thus got habituated to being quick and resourceful, and it was more or less a slur and a stigma not to be so! _Also_ (_as Officer of the Watch_) _men’s lives were in your hands!_ For instance with men on the yards, and any lubberly stupidity with braces or helm!

Both for Officers and Men then we no longer have this magnificent education by _the Elements_!

Steam has practically annihilated the wind and the sea!

What are we to do to get the same ready and resourceful qualities by other methods?

The answer is: The Gymnasium, Boat Sailing, the Destroyer, the Submarine, and the Engine Room.

Apparently, we are in this country in the infancy of Gymnastics for the training of the body when one reads of the Swedish system and its results. (“_Mens sana in corpore sano._”)

The one solitary element in which we are behind, and must be behind all nations, is “Men.” We have no Conscription with the unlimited resources it gives! How should we counterbalance this want? “By introducing every possible form of labour-saving appliance,” regardless of cost, weight, and space; for instance, is it really impossible to devise mechanical arrangements for feeding the fires with coal instead of using the mass of men we now are obliged to employ for the purpose? The coal is got out of the bunkers in the same way now as in the first steamship ever built. It is not only we thereby save men--we ensure success (for the next Naval War will be largely a question of physical endurance and nerves).

“A machine has no nerves and doesn’t tire!”

The other point necessary to consider is “not to waste educated labour, and to utilise and cultivate specialities!”

The present system of education both of Men and Officers is that we all go in at one end like the pigs of every type at Chicago, and come out a uniform pattern of sausages at the other!

Thus, what we want is, above all things, a “Corps d’Elite” of gun-firers! I should call them the “Bull’s Eye Party” (and give them all 10_s._ a day extra pay!)

They must do nothing else but practise hitting the target and lose their pay when they don’t!

Where would your violin player be if he didn’t daily practise? And if you made him pick oakum, where would his touch be?

This is what Paganini said: “The first day I omit to practise the violin I notice it myself!

“The second day my friends notice it!!

“The third day the public notice it!!!”

But if the “Bull’s Eye Party” are to hit the enemy as desired (and as they can be made competent to do!) then the Admirals and Captains, and all others, must equally play their parts to allow the “Bull’s Eye Party” to get within range and sight of the enemy. _Their_ education is therefore equally important. Scripture comes in here appropriately, “The eye cannot say to the hand, nor the hand to the foot,” etc., etc.

To put the matter very briefly:

“The education of all our Officers, without distinction, must be remodelled to cope with machinery, instead of sails!”

The Gymnasium, the Engine-room, the Destroyer, the Submarine, and Boat Sailing must be our great educational instruments.

Not for a single moment is it put forward that a year in a workshop and a year in an engine-room will make an efficient Engineer Officer! It is long experience in such work that does that!--as in every other thing! But in a small way, the argument of the abolition of the old Navigating Class applies here very forcibly. It was said their abolition would be absolutely fatal to the efficient navigation of the Fleet.

But what has been the result? There have been fewer cases of bad navigation since the old Navigating Class was done away with than in the whole history of the Navy! And with this immense gain--that the knowledge of navigation is now widely diffused through the Fleet.

One can suppose cases where it would be of the utmost value to us were engineering knowledge and the handling of mechanical appliances more widely diffused amongst our Officers!

But that is not _the vital point_! _The vital point_ is that were a Midshipman to be continuously serving in the engine-room of Destroyers and larger vessels (continuously under weigh) at high speeds, he would get a training assimilating in its nature to that marvellous training of the old sailing days, which kept the wits of Officer of the Watch in the utmost state of tension, and produced the splendid specimens of readiness and resource which we read of in the sea Officers of Nelson’s time and later!

TRAINING OF BOYS: No masts and sails--Gymnasium--Rifle and gun practice--Boat sailing--Little or no school. (No Binomial Theorem)--Destroyer work for sea-sickness--Sent straight from training-ships to hot foreign stations on the hot-house principle before bedding-out--Select from the very beginning the good shots and the smart signalmen and train them specially.

TRAINING OF THE MEN: Re-model instruction in Gunnery and Torpedo Schools--“Corps d’Elite” of three classes of (1) gun firers or “Marksmen”; (2) gun loaders; (3) gun manipulators--From the time the boy enters the Navy in the training-ship till he gets his pension, the sole object to be to select, train, and improve and retain “the good shot,” and all training subordinated to this!

TRAINING OF OFFICERS: Return to early entry at 12 years of age--A much lower standard of entrance, educational examination, and a high standard of physical entrance examination--Colloquial French obligatory, no grammar, and no other language, dead or alive!--A combined course of “Britannia” and “Keyham” Colleges with at least two years of engine-room and shop work and Destroyer practice.

These great changes are not fanciful ideas!

The stubborn fact that we cannot provide what is required on the present system forces the change both as regards Officers as well as Men and Boys.

NAVAL OFFICERS’ TRAINING.

_Some Opinions on the Admiralty Scheme_ (1902).

1. ADMIRAL LORD CHARLES BERESFORD.

In 1902 Lord Charles Beresford, in an interview on the then recent Admiralty memorandum on the subject of the entry, training, and employment of officers and men of the Royal Navy, said:--

“The strongest opponent of the scheme will acknowledge that
it is a brilliant and statesmanlike effort to grapple with _a
problem upon the sound settlement of which depends the future
efficiency of the British Navy_. To-day the commander of fleets
must possess a greater combination of characteristics than
has ever before been required of him. He must not only be a
born leader of men, but he must have the practical scientific
training which the development of mechanical invention renders
an absolute and indispensable essential. The executive officer
of to-day should possess an intimate knowledge of all that
relates to his profession. Up to now he has been fairly
educated in the different branches. The most important,
however--in that we depend entirely upon it--that relating
to steam and machinery, has been sadly neglected. The duties
of this branch have been delegated to, and well and loyally
performed by, a body of officers existing for this special
purpose, and there have been two results. _The executive
officer has remained ignorant of one of the most important
parts of his profession; the engineer officer has never
received that recognition to which the importance of his duties
and responsibilities so justly entitled him._ The Board of
Admiralty have now unanimously approved a plan which provides
that naval officers shall have an opportunity of adding
to their professional attainments the essential knowledge
of marine engineering. Further than this, the Board have
recognised that the present status of naval engineer officers
could not continue, in fairness either to themselves or to the
Service. _The abolition of distinction regarding entry has
settled this point once and for ever, and it is satisfactory to
find that constituted authority has taken the matter in hand
before it became a political or party question._

“There seems to be a doubt as to whether it will be possible
under the new scheme for an executive officer to have the
knowledge he should possess of marine engineering. There is no
cast-iron secret or mystery with regard to marine engineering,
as some seem to imagine. This being so, there is no reason why
lieutenants (E.) should not be just as good and useful experts
in their speciality as the gunnery, torpedo, or navigating
lieutenant of the present day, without in the slightest degree
detracting from their ability to become excellent executive
officers. It is imperative that all officers of the present day
should be well acquainted with all the general duties connected
with the management of ships and fleets. The wider and fuller
the education the naval officer receives in matters relating to
science within his own profession, the more likely the Service
is to produce men who will be capable of seeing that the fleet
in its entirety is perfect for its work, and that there is no
weak link in the chain that may jeopardise the whole.

“The memo, referring to the marines will be, I believe,
received with the greatest satisfaction by that splendid
corps as a whole as by the Service as a whole. _It is a marvel
that the zeal and ability of the officers of the Royal Marines
has not been effectively utilised long ago._ Many important
positions will now be open to them, and _they will feel that
they are taking a real part in the executive working of the
ship and fleet which is so proud to own them as a component
part_. It is to be hoped the way will now be open to give them
appointments as general officers commanding at many of the
naval bases. No part of the scheme will give the Service in its
entirety more sincere pleasure than the improvements promised
with regard to the position of the warrant officers. Promotion
of warrant officers to lieutenant’s rank has long been urged
by those who argued that the lower deck were fully entitled
to a right that had from time immemorial been engaged by the
non-commissioned ranks of the sister Service. Placing the
signal ratings on an equality with gunnery and torpedo ratings
is of far more importance than is generally realised. The vital
necessity of a good line of communication and good signalmen
has never been thoroughly appreciated.

“_I consider the return to the early age of entry of infinite
value._ It has not yet been decided whether on first going
to sea midshipmen will be appointed to ships ordinarily in
commission or to ships specially in commission for training
purposes. I am strongly of opinion that it would be by far the
best plan to send them to learn their duties in the ordinary
ships of the regularly commissioned fleet. With regard to the
proposed arrangement of nomination to branches, I consider it
a fair contract, and it keeps the power of appointment to the
various branches in the hands of the constituted authorities.
In my opinion this gives the best young officer the fairest
chance of holding the best positions.

“In conclusion, I am of the opinion that the plan is one that
has been thoroughly matured and well thought out, and I believe
that when its details have been definitely settled it will
make more complete the well-being, contentment, and efficiency
of that Service on which the safety of the empire absolutely
depends.”

2. SIR JOHN HOPKINS.

I succeeded Admiral Sir John Hopkins, one of the most distinguished Officers in the Navy, in seven different appointments--as Head of the Gunnery School at Portsmouth, as Director of Naval Ordnance at the Admiralty, as Admiral Superintendent of Portsmouth Dockyard, as Controller of the Navy, as 3rd Sea Lord, as Commander-in-Chief in North America, and as Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. In each of these appointments force of circumstances compelled me to have a revolution. So the following spontaneous letter, which he wrote me long after, is the more gratifying and shows his magnanimity:

GREATBRIDGE, ROMSEY,
_16th April, 1906_.

MY DEAR FISHER,

There is a small band of writing critics “making mouths and
ceasing not” at the Education Scheme; but let them not trouble
you. The wonder will be in twenty years’ time how such a bold
forecast could have been made, that produced such excellent
results; and, in my opinion, the “Common Entry” man will be as
great a success as the best friends of the Service could wish.

Believe me,
Sincerely yours,
(Signed) J. O. HOPKINS.

3. CHIEF INSPECTOR OF MACHINERY, SIR HENRY BENBOW, K.C.B., D.S.O., R.N.

HABESHI, DORMAN’S PARK,
SURREY,
_20th April, 1908_.

DEAR SIR,

Permit me to congratulate you on the success of the new
system of Entry and Education of Naval Cadets, which has
always elicited my warmest sympathy as the only means of
doing away with class prejudice. A relative and namesake of
mine, a Lieutenant in the Service, only the other day spoke
to me most highly of the mental and physical development of
the present-day Cadets, and remarked how very favourably they
compared with the Cadets entered under the old _régime_.

I remain, dear Sir,
Yours faithfully,
HENRY BENBOW.

Admiral of the Fleet
Sir JOHN FISHER, G.C.B., O.M.

A NAVAL CANDIDATE’S ESSAY.

I give here an essay written on 20th February, 1908, by a candidate for entry at Osborne as a Naval Cadet. His age was 12½; his height four foot nothing. The subjects were suddenly set to the candidates by the Interview Committee, and they were allowed only ten minutes to write the essay in. The original of this essay I sent to King Edward.

_What Nation ought we to protect ourselves most against--and
why?_

“In my opinion we should protect ourselves most against Germany.

“The most important reason is that they have the second
largest Navy in the world; to which (their Navy) they are
rapidly adding. They are also building three ships equal to
our ‘Dreadnought.’ Their Army also is very formidable; though
they are suffering from flat-feet. It is also rumoured that the
present German Emperor has a feud against King Edward; namely,
when they were young, King Edward punched the German Emperor’s
head; how far that is true, I don’t know.

“I always think that Englishmen and Germans are, more or less,
natural enemies. One of the reasons for this is, I think,
that Englishmen and Germans are so different; for most of the
Germans I’ve met in Switzerland were not quarter so energetic
as our English friends. They (the Germans) would never go
much above the snow line. Also I think we rather despise the
Germans, because of their habit of eating a lot. The Germans
also would like a few of our possessions.”