Chapter IX: Naval Problems

[The three privately printed volumes entitled “Naval
Necessities,” 1904, 1905, and 1906, contain papers written
or collected by Sir John Fisher, as Commander-in-Chief at
Portsmouth and as First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, bearing upon
the Naval Reforms which he then introduced or contemplated. The
following selections from these papers tell their own story.]

_Sir John Fisher to Lord Selborne, First Lord of the Admiralty._

DEAR LORD SELBORNE, ...

You remember you glanced through some manuscript in my office
at Portsmouth the day you embarked in “Enchantress,” and I
gathered that you saw much in them that commended itself to
you. Well! having thus more or less got a favourable opinion
from you, I elaborated that manuscript which you had read, and
printed it with my confidential printer; ... then I gave it
secretly to the five best brains in the Navy below the rank of
Admiral to thresh out; and associated two other brains for the
consideration of the types of future fighting vessels; then
I selected out of those seven brains the one with the most
facile pen and ... said to him: “Write a calm and dispassionate
précis for me to give the First Lord.” You may be confident (as
confident as I know you are) that the First Sea Lord won’t ever
sell you! that these seven brains may be absolutely relied
upon for secrecy. I have tested each of them for many years!

These are the seven brains: Jackson, F.R.S., Jellicoe, C.B.,
Bacon, D.S.O., Madden, M.V.O., Wilfred Henderson (who has all
the signs of the Zodiac after his name!), associated with Gard,
M.V.O., Chief Constructor of Portsmouth Dockyard, and who
splendidly kept the Mediterranean Fleet efficient for three
years, and Gracie, the best Marine Engineer in the world!

This is the “modus operandi” I suggest to you. If these
proposals in their rough outline commend themselves to you and
our colleagues on the Board, then let me have these seven,
assisted by Mr. Boar (who is a mole in the Accountant-General’s
Department--you know of him only by upheavals of facts and
figures!), and secretly these eight will get out a detailed
statement supported by facts and figures for consideration
before we take a step further!...

Please now just a few words of explanation at the possibly
apparent (but in no ways real) slight put on those at the
Admiralty who might be thought the right persons to conduct
these detailed inquiries instead of the eight brains I’ve
mentioned!

In the first place, any such heavy extraneous work (such as is
here involved) means an utter dislocation of the current work
of the Admiralty if carried out by the regular Admiralty staff!
and as any such _extraneous_ work must of necessity give place
to any very pressing _current_ work, then the extraneous work
doesn’t get done properly--so both suffer!--But further! these
seven other spirits (not more wicked than any of those at the
Admiralty!) will be absolutely untrammelled by any remarks of
their own in the official records in the Admiralty, and will
not be cognisant (and so not influenced!) by the past written
official minutes of the High and Mighty Ones, and so we shall
get the directness and unfettered candour that we desire!
(Parenthesis:--A most distinguished man at the War Office
used to think he had gained his point and blasted the Admiralty
by collecting extracts 20 years old with opposing decisions!
absolutely regardless that what is right to-day may be wrong
to-morrow! but he traded on what we all dislike--_the charge of
inconsistency!_--Why! the two most inconsistent men who ever
lived, the two greatest men who ever lived and the two most
successful men who ever lived, were Nelson and Napoleon!)

Nelson most rightly said that no sailor could ever be such a
born ass as to attack forts with ships (_he was absolutely
right_), and then he went straight at them at Copenhagen.
Napoleon said, “_L’audace, l’audace, toujours l’audace!_” and
then he went and temporised at Warsaw for three solid weeks
(was it a Polish Countess?), and so got ruined at Moscow in
consequence of this delay.

_Circumstances alter cases!_ That’s the answer to the charge
of inconsistency. So please let us have this excellent and
unparalleled small working Committee to thresh out all these
details (when the general outlines have been considered), but
this very special point will no doubt be borne in mind:--“Until
you have these details how can you say you approve of the
outline?” So what has to be said finally is that if the
facts and figures corroborate what is sketched out, then the
proposals can be considered for adoption, so the ultimate
result is this:--“Let the Committee get on at once.”

J. A. FISHER.
19/10/04.

MAIN PRINCIPLES OF SCHEME.

_Future Types of Fighting Vessels._

Four classes only of fighting vessels.

Uniform armament (except torpedo attack guns) in all classes of fighting vessels.

Inviolate watertight bulkheads.

Subdivision of magazines.

Protection of magazines.

Abolish Ram.

No guns on main deck (so splendid light and airy accommodation for officers, and crew, with huge square ports and magnificent deck space).

Reduction of all weights and scantlings.

“_Out of Date_” _Fighting Ships_.

Removal as soon as possible of all “out of date” ships (that is, ships unfit for fighting).

To abolish gradually the employment of all _slow_ vessels below 1st Class Armoured Cruisers.

To substitute efficient fighting vessels with nucleus crews for all the stationary obsolete vessels now in commission, and also for all the training vessels and all the Coastguard Cruisers.

_Revision of Stations._

South Atlantic, West Indies, and Cape to form a squadron under chief command of the Admiral of the Cape Station, who will be a Vice-Admiral in the future with three Rear-Admirals under him.[6]

The Commander-in-Chief in China to have the chief command and strategic handling of the squadrons in China, Australia, East Indies, and Pacific. He can be a full Admiral with two Vice-Admirals and two Rear-Admirals under him. _The object is to employ Flag Officers as much as possible at sea._

Effective Cruisers to be substituted for the present varying types of vessels forming all these squadrons.

_Personnel._

Reduction in entry of Boys, and increase of entry of Non-continuous Service Men and of “Northampton” lads.

Introduction of new system of Reserve (long service tempered by short service!)

_Nucleus Crews._

Two-yearly commissions to be instituted, and with no material change of officers and men during the two years.

All the fighting vessels in Reserve to have an efficient nucleus crew of approximately two-fifths of the full crew, together with all important Gunnery ratings as well as the Captain of the ship and the principal Officers.

The periodical exercise and inspection of the ships by the responsible Flag Officer who will take them to the war.

This Flag Officer will suffer for any want of efficiency and preparation for war of these vessels. These vessels to be collected in squadrons at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham, according to the Station to which they are going as the reinforcements.

_Signals._

Revision of our methods of Signalling to be based on the class of Signals that will be used in war.

To abolish all systems and all Signals that are only of use in peace time.

The Signal and Exercise Books of the Fleet to be ruthlessly revised and cut down with this in view.

The present establishment of Signalmen on board all vessels to be reduced to the numbers that _are necessary_ in war (present system of superabundance of Signalmen embarked in Flagships criminally wrong).

_Defence of Naval Ports._

Modern conditions necessitate certain floating defences requiring seamen to manipulate them. Soldiers apparently can’t do it!

Divided control of defence of Naval Ports impossible between Navy and Army.

Admiralty must have sole responsibility that all our Naval Arsenals are kept open for egress and ingress of our Fleet in war.

Local defences should, therefore, apparently be under the Naval Commander-in-Chief.

But all these arrangements for any such transfer of responsibility from War Office to Admiralty must be so planned as to obviate all possibility of Fleet men being used for shore work in war, _and there must be no risk of lessening the sea experience of the officers and men of the Fleet_; hence it will be imperative that there should be an entire transference of the whole of the Garrison Artillery from Army to Navy, as well as the responsibility for all ordnance.

All this involves so immense an addition to the responsibilities of the Admiralty, apart from the one chief function of the Navy of seeking out and fighting the enemy’s fleets, that we have to hesitate; but we can’t let matters go on as at present.

NOTES BY SIR JOHN FISHER ON NEW PROPOSALS.

_Organisation for War._

“_If the Trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare
himself to the battle?_”

(St. Paul, I Corinthians, xiv. 8.)

The object of the following remarks is to make clear what has now to be done to organise and prepare for war. What are the two great essentials?

_I._ _The Sufficiency of Strength and the Fighting Efficiency
of the Fleet._

_II._ _Absolute Instant Readiness for War._

To get these two essentials an immense deal is involved! It is believed they can both be got with a great reduction in the Navy Estimates!

This reduction, combined with an undeniable increase in the fighting efficiency of the Navy, involves great changes and depends absolutely on one condition:--

_The Scheme herein shadowed forth must be adopted as a whole!_

Simply because all portions of it are absolutely essential--and it is all so interlaced that any tampering will be fatal!

The country will acclaim it! the income-tax payer will worship it! the Navy will growl at it! (they always do growl at first!)

_But we shall be Thirty per cent. more fit to fight and we
shall be ready for instant war!_

and in time when we get rid of our redundancies in useless ships and unnecessary men it will probably be 30 per cent. cheaper!

The outline of the various proposals will first be given. _No one single point must be taken as more important than another. Each is part of a whole_; As St. Paul well observes in the xii. Chapter of the I Corinthians:--

“_The eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee: nor
again the head to the feet, I have no need of you. Nay, much
more those members of the body which seem to be more feeble,
are necessary._”

So is it of this scheme! All its parts are essential for the perfection we must have if England is to remain the “Mistress of the Seas”!

The British Nation floats on the British Navy! So we must have no doubt whatever about its fighting supremacy and its instant readiness for war! To ensure this and at the same time _to effect the economy which the finances of the country render imperative_ there must be drastic changes! To carry these out we must have the three R’s! We must be Ruthless, Relentless, Remorseless! We must tell interested people whose interests are going to be ignored that what the Articles of War have said since the time of Queen Elizabeth is truer than ever!

“_It is the Navy whereon under the good providence of God, the wealth, peace, and safety of this country doth chiefly depend!_”

If the Navy is not supreme, no Army however large is of the slightest use. It’s not _invasion_ we have to fear if our Navy is beaten,

_It’s Starvation!_

What’s the good of an army if it has got an empty belly? In Mr. John Morley’s famous and splendid words at Manchester on November 8th, 1893: “_Everybody knows, Liberals as well as Tories, that it is indispensable that we should have not only a powerful Navy, but I may say, an all-powerful Navy._” And when we have that--then History may repeat itself, and Mahan’s glorious words _will be applicable in some other great national crisis!_ the finest words and the truest words in the English language!

“_Nelson’s far-distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the world._”--(Mahan, Vol. II, page 118.)

And the Navy must always so stand! Supreme--unbeaten! So we must have no tinkering! No pandering to sentiment! No regard for susceptibilities! No pity for anyone! We must be Ruthless, Relentless, and Remorseless! And we must therefore have The Scheme! The Whole Scheme!! And Nothing But The Scheme!!!

Just let us take one instance as an illustration of a mighty reform (lots more will follow later, but the sledge hammer comes in handy here!). During the 12 months ending June 30th, 1904 (this last month!) the ships of the Home Fleet, the Channel Fleet, and the Cruiser Squadron were in Portsmouth Dockyard for over 30 per cent. of the year! Disorganised and unfit for sea! See what this means! A battleship costs over £100,000 a year for its up-keep, irrespective of repairs, but it’s not the money waste! _it’s the efficiency waste!_

_Every day those Fleets and Squadrons are not together, they are deteriorating!_

It is only human nature that when in Portsmouth Dockyard, from the Admiral downwards, all are hankering after their homes! and somehow or other they get there! the fictions are endless and ingenious, and extend from “the cradle to the grave!” From an unexpected confinement to the serious illness of an aged relative! (nearly always a grandmother! and the baby is always the first one!)

What is the remedy?

It’s Nelsonic--and so simple!

Nelson could not leave Toulon with all his Fleet for nearly four months out of the year! No! he stayed there for two years without putting his foot on shore! What he did was to send one or two ships away at a time to get provisions and water, and to effect any needed repairs. Let us do the same! We want a fixed base for each Fleet (and so fixed for war reasons). Thus, for example, the Channel Fleet at Gibraltar, the Home Fleet at Bantry, or the Forth, and so on. But this is going into unnecessary detail, and anticipating other parts of the scheme which must be adopted to make this work! Thus it will be seen later on, that to enable this great economy in money to be effected (_putting aside increase of fighting efficiency!_), we must have two years’ commissions! But we can’t have two years’ commissions unless we have fewer ships in commission! But we can’t have fewer ships in commission unless we have a redistribution of our Fleet! But we can’t have a redistribution of our Fleet until we rearrange our strategy! and this strategy, strange to say, depends on our reserves, and our reserves depend on a fresh allocation of our personnel, and on a fresh system of service. _We must have the new scheme of Long Service tempered by Short Service!_ And this again largely hangs on the types of fighting ships we are going to have! _But what is the type of ship?_ Not one that goes to the bottom in two minutes from the effect of one torpedo, and drowns nearly a thousand men, and takes three years to replace, and costs over a million sterling! _How many types do we want!_ This is quite easy to answer if we make up our minds _how we are going to fight_! Who has made up his mind? _How many of our Admirals have got minds?_

It will be obvious then that the whole of this business is a regular case of “the house that Jack built,” for one thing follows on another, _they are all interlaced and interdependent_! That’s why it was said to begin with:--

_The Scheme! The Whole Scheme!! And Nothing but the Scheme!!!_

One essential feature which has been overlooked must be mentioned before going further _because imperatively necessary to ensure instant readiness for war_, but it hangs on all the other points previously mentioned and which are going to be examined in detail.

The reduction in the number of ships in commission _which is as necessary for fighting efficiency_ (_when the whole Navy is mobilised for war_) _as it is conducive to an immense economy must be accompanied by and associated with two vital requisites_:

I. Every fighting ship in reserve must have a nucleus crew.

II. The reinforcements for the fighting fleets and squadrons must be collected together while in the reserve at the most convenient ports and be placed under the Flag Officer who will take them to their war stations, and this Flag Officer to understand he will be shot like a dog in case of any inefficiency in these ships in war.

Unless this is carried out the great strategic scheme in contemplation could not be entertained nor could the number of ships in commission be reduced as is absolutely essential for the efficiency of those in reserve, _not on the score of economy at all, but the reduction of ships in commission is imperative for the fighting efficiency of the whole fleet when mobilised_.

So we thus get one more illustration of the interdependence of all portions of the scheme and beg again to refer to St. Paul as previously quoted.

It is convenient here to mention that the paucity of efficient Admirals is a most serious matter, and will probably compel the manufacture of Commodores or of Acting Admirals under a resuscitated Order-in-Council. The least capable in the respective ranks of the Navy are the Admirals. It’s not their own fault solely, they have had no education, and this blot will continue till we have a Naval War College established at Portsmouth, and Flag Officers and Captains, hoping for employment, can practically prove their capacity by manœuvring two fleets of destroyers against each other. This will be much cheaper and less risky to the Empire than their manœuvring with the big ships. _Experiments on the scale of 12 inches to a foot are not economical!_

Mr. Childers was our Attila! He was the “scourge” of the Navy in many ways, but most of all by his disastrous and frightfully costly retirement schemes. _The secret of efficiency lies in large lists of Officers!_ You have then a large field of selection, and a great flow of promotion, and also no Officer considers it a stigma to be passed over in company with forty others, and so not to pose as a solitary monument of ineptitude as he appears at present to himself and his friends when passed over with the present small lists of Flag Officers.

Also “_Selection by non-employment_” goes so easily with large lists (and with large lists is accepted as a necessity, and not resented as a personal affront!).

PURGING THE NAVY OF OBSOLETE VESSELS.

Out of 193 ships at present in commission (not counting destroyers) organised in fleets, 63 _only_ are of such calibre as not to cause an Admiral grave concern if allowed to wander from the protection of larger ships. There are among these several ships which should be paid off as soon as possible, being absolutely of no fighting value. And there are, further, several ships having trained naval crews doing the work usually performed by small merchant tramps. Further still, there are in our Home Ports many ships taking up valuable berthing space, requiring maintenance and repair, which never under any circumstances whatever would be used in war time.

The above useless vessels being in commission means awful waste of money.

Every ship that has defects taken in hand, and which would not be of use in war, is a waste of money to the country.

Of course objections will be raised, and it will be shown that the Navy cannot be run without them, but wipe them out, and in a year no one will remember that they ever existed.

It is well to review generally our distant stations and the composition of their squadrons.

The Navy and the country have grown so accustomed to the territorial nomenclature of our distant squadrons that their connection with the sea is considerably obscured, and their association with certain lands has led to a tacit belief that those particular squadrons are for the protection of the lands they frequent, and not generally for the destruction of the enemy’s fleet wherever it may happen to be. Of course no such idea is accepted by the Admiralty, but, in spite of the broad principles of strategy involved, certain fleets are composed largely with a view to work in restricted waters, which vessels would be a source of danger and weakness on the sudden outbreak of war with a combination of Powers.

Take the combination of ships on each of the following stations: North America, Cape of Good Hope, East Indies, and Australia. Remember the “Variag.” What happened in the small area of the theatre of operations in the present war will be repeated in the larger theatre of operations of a conflict of European Powers when the whole world will be involved. What will happen to our “Odins,” “Redbreasts,” “Fantomes,” “Dwarfs,” etc.? aye! and what will happen to our “Scyllas,” “Katoombas,” and “Hyacinths,” if caught sight of by first class cruisers of modern armament on foreign stations?[7] Lucky if they can reach a neutral port, disarm, and have their crews interned for the remainder of the war. Lucky, indeed, if a far worse fate does not befall them. At all events, such wholesale scattering of the British foreign fleets would lead to irreparable loss of prestige among the smaller States where these little vessels were usually located.

Now is there any necessity for such numbers of useless fighting ships? Cannot more efficient classes be substituted for them, or, at all events, some of them?

What we have to face is the probability of a serious combination of strong Powers against us, for then we will be unable to spare two first class cruisers to go in search of individual enemy’s first class cruisers, who, if not caught, may sweep round and lick up or force into neutral ports all our inefficient small fry.

Surely the three Atlantic squadrons should be of such strength as to be able to rendezvous and form a fleet more or less absolutely self-protective, to say nothing of being offensive. Such a squadron, under one admiral in war time, would be an effective Atlantic squadron, and would protect our interests by holding the ocean against enemy’s cruisers.

Such squadrons can be formed without increasing the personnel of the Navy, and, moreover, the crews would be in ships that would be used in war instead of being in “floating anxieties.”

Now for the present, sufficient cruisers, first class, do not exist to meet the requirements of supplying ships to take the place of smaller obsolete ones, and also for reserve purposes.

For the present a large proportion of cruisers, second class, must be retained, but it is hoped that these will in time be replaced by cruisers, first class, in the proportion of one cruiser, first class, to three cruisers, second or third class. No one can argue that one first class cruiser is not a superior fighting unit to three cruisers second or third class. Also one defect list instead of three!

If it should be insisted on that certain ports require certain small vessels, then they should be earmarked for that purpose, and only such places be recognised which larger vessels cannot frequent, such as the rivers on the West Coast of Africa (our territory), shallow rivers in China where no question of neutrality can arise, or special places of this nature. It should be overwhelmingly proved to the satisfaction of the Admiralty that essential conditions necessitate the presence of useless fighting ships before they relax their efforts to have such useless ships removed.

It should be accepted as a principle that the great aim and object of the Admiralty is to have nothing floating on the waters except the four fundamental types of fighting vessels, and that (for the present) lack of ships of the necessary classes prevents this being realised, but that as the delivery of ships takes place, the substitution will automatically follow.

The Foreign Office will in time be bound to recognise the real efficiency of the scheme, even if a consul is robbed of the shadow of support of a gunboat under his window, but has the substantial strength of a first class cruiser substituted at the end of a telegraph wire.

_The danger that is eternally present to the Navy is over confidence in our preparedness for war._

The chief cause of unpreparedness for war is want of appreciation of the cumulative effect of daily small changes in our ships and armament on the whole question of strategy and shipbuilding.

Changes have slipped so gradually from wooden sailing ships through slow steam iron vessels to our present splendid ships of war that the tendency has always been to subordinate our strategy to our ship construction, rather than to mould our war ship design to suit our strategy.

_Strategy should govern the types of ships to be designed._

_Ship design, as dictated by strategy, should govern tactics._

_Tactics should govern details of armaments._

In approaching the important question of ship design the first essential is to divest our minds totally of the idea that a single type of ship as now built is necessary, or even advisable, then to consider the strategic use of each different class, especially weighing the antagonistic attributes of nominally similar classes in the old wars.

To commence with the battleship.

The sole reason for the existence of the old line of battleship was that that ship was the only vessel that could not be destroyed except by a vessel of equal class. This meant that a country possessing the largest number of best equipped battleships could lay them alongside the enemy, or off the ports where the enemy were. Transports with the escort of a few battleships could then proceed to make oversea conquests. Squadrons of battleships or cruisers escorting the convoy of merchant ships and keeping the line of communications open. In each case the battleship, being able to protect everything it had under its wing from any smaller vessel, was the ultimate naval strength of the country. _Then_ it was that, by means of the battleship only, was the command of the sea gained and held. _Let us be quite clear on the matter, it was solely from the fact that the battleship was unassailable by any vessel except a battleship that made the command of the sea by battleships a possibility!_

Hence battleships came to symbolise naval sea strength and supremacy. For this reason battleships have been built through every change of construction and material, although by degrees other vessels not battleships have arisen which can attack and destroy them.

Here therefore there is good ground for inquiry whether the naval supremacy of a country can any longer be assessed by its battleships. To build battleships merely to fight enemy’s battleships, so long as cheaper craft can destroy them, and prevent them of themselves protecting sea operations, is merely to breed Kilkenny cats unable to catch rats or mice. For fighting purposes they would be excellent, but for gaining practical results they would be useless.

This at once forces a consideration as to how a battleship differs from an armoured cruiser. Fundamentally the battleship sacrifices speed for a superior armament and protective armour. It is this superiority of speed that enables an enemy’s ships to be overhauled or evaded that constitutes the real difference between the two. At the present moment _naval experience is not sufficiently ripe to abolish totally the building of battleships_ so long as other countries do not do so.

_But it is evidently an absolute necessity in future construction
to make the speed of the battleship approach as nearly as
possible that of the armoured cruiser._

Next consider the case of the armoured cruiser.

In the old days the frigate was the cruiser, she was unarmoured, that is, her sides were so much thinner than those of the battleship that she was not able to fight in the line of battle, but the weak gun fire of those days permitted close scouting by such unprotected vessels, she could approach a battleship squadron very closely without fear of damage, she could sail round a fleet and count their numbers without danger to herself, unless chased off by other frigates, she was a scout and a commerce destroyer. Similarly with present day armoured cruisers, they can force their way up to within sight of a fleet, and observe them, unless chased off by other armoured cruisers, but to do this they have to be given a certain amount of protective armour.

The range of eyesight has remained constant, that of gunfire has increased. Speed is a necessity to ensure safety, armour protection to ensure vision.

It is evident, from the above considerations, that the functions of the frigate have devolved on the armoured cruiser to a greater extent than have the functions of the line of battleship devolved on the modern battleship.

But how about the unarmoured cruisers and those of low speed?

With loss of protection a cruiser loses her power of reasonable approach for observation purposes, and if to this be added a loss of reasonable speed her safety is gone. Cruisers without high speed and protection are entirely and absolutely useless.

Every vessel that has not high scouting speed, or the highest defensive and offensive powers, _is useless for fighting purposes_.

This is true of every class of vessel between the first class armoured cruiser and the fast torpedo vessel.

NUCLEUS CREWS.

It is impossible to exaggerate the vital importance to the nation of having all the reserve ships absolutely ready for instant war.

Our reserve ships, as they are now, are not, and cannot be made really efficient fighting units under several months of commission. There is no doubt that great strides towards rapid mobilisation have been made of late years, but merely to hustle a complement of the required ratings into a ship, is not to make her a really efficient fighting machine.

_The keystone of our preparedness for war has now to be
inserted, namely, the provision of efficient nucleus crews._

_This can be done to-morrow._

A nucleus crew should consist of approximately two-fifths of her engine-room complement, the whole of her turret crews, gun layers and sight-setters for all guns, all important special ratings, and two-fifths of her normal crew, her captain, and all important officers.

The ship can proceed half-yearly, or quarterly, as may be required, to sea with her fighting ship’s company to carry out firing exercises, or to work under the Admiral or Commodore who will command her and her consorts in war, and be as nearly perfectly efficient as any ship, not always at sea, can be.

No more men above our present requirements need be entered, training in gunnery and torpedo schools need not be interfered with, and a saving of money to the taxpayer effected.

SUBSIDIARY SERVICES OF WAR.

We are now busily engaged in perfecting each and all of these subsidiary services; but they are not yet perfect. In some important respects we are as yet far from it (Rome was not built in a day!), but we now emphasise the fact in order that matters may be pushed on by all concerned, from the Prime Minister downwards, with the utmost energy and vigour!

The items are not taken in the order of their relative importance, but for convenience of argument.

There is the service of all the auxiliary vessels of the Fleet for supplying coal, ammunition, stores, provisions, water, materials for repairs, &c., and also the multitudes of fast mercantile vessels we require as Scouts; and there is also the nature of the employment of the armed mercantile cruisers to be settled. All these points have been carefully considered in the past, but in all and every one of them there is that most deadly of all deadly drawbacks to fighting readiness, the leaving certain things to be dealt with “_when the time comes_.” The time will come like the Day of Judgment! There won’t be time for doing anything, not even for repentance! We must go to the very utmost limit of preparedness, not one little item must be left to be dealt with “when the time comes.” We want all these vessels, without any exception whatever, to be as ready for a sudden emergency as is now the main Fighting Fleet! So therefore, day by day, we must know by name each vessel for every service, and the orders for every captain of every single one of this multitude of mercantile auxiliaries must be prepared, and he (each several captain) must thoroughly understand these orders beforehand; they must be explained to him by “one who knows,” and when that captain leaves England for his next trade voyage (and his ship is therefore no longer available), then the operation must be repeated with the captain of the substituted vessel! It must be laid down where every ship is to load, what route she is to follow, what eventualities she has to guard against! _All, and together, must be detailed and day by day kept perfect!_

Again, who are the officers at every port superintending the imparting of this information every day of the year, to the daily fresh captains of daily fresh ships, replacing others daily, going on their usual trade voyages? Who is the Flag Officer in supreme charge of all these superintending Port Officers? What are the names of the retired Commissioned or Warrant Officers who may be allocated to take passage in all the more important auxiliary vessels? such, for instance, and above all, as the Ammunition and Repair ships, so as to ensure the proper control and distribution of the cargo, as well as the efficient and prompt action of the ship herself, to be at the right place at the right time. Every Commander-in-Chief must know in minute detail every particular about every one of these vessels that are coming to him. He must know it _now_. He must know it _day by day_! He must have his own agent at home to look after his interests and to be responsible to him (the Commander-in-Chief) for the completeness of all the arrangements,--if not complete, then this agent must report the Superintending Port Officers for their incompetency.

All this scheme above sketched out may involve immense labour and great expense, _but it has got to be done_! Not a bit of use having the Fleet at all, if you don’t feed it, and also feed it well!

Quite as a separate service, apart from all that has been mentioned above, is the dissemination of intelligence and its suppression.

We must not (as has been hitherto accepted) permit the splendid costly fighting vessels of the Fleet to be criminally wasted by being sent here and there as messengers! Fast unarmoured mercantile steamers must constitute the squadrons of the Sea Intelligence Department, and instead of our Admirals running after information with costly armoured cruisers, we must run after the Admirals with the information, with easily obtainable cheap (because non-fighting), fast mercantile vessels.

All this is but a brief review of what is in progress, and what has to be done, but _there remains above all_ that daily consideration at the Admiralty, and by every Admiral in command, of what would have to be done _that very day_ in case of war, with the most unexpected, as well as the most expected opponent!

A RETROSPECT (JULY, 1906).

The most striking fact to an outsider is the astonishing confidence and loyalty of the Navy in its rulers which has been exhibited during the last two years of relentless reorganisation.

Naval Officers, as a class, are conservative and dislike change, and as a rule are prepared to resist it. The manner in which the recent changes have been received, root and branch and sweeping as they were, shows, as nothing else can, the necessity for reforms. Compare the insignificant agitation (which has, however, now entirely collapsed), in the Navy over the vast and drastic reforms of the last two years with the agitation in the Army over the trifling matter of getting rid of two battalions of Guards!

So let us be grateful--adequately grateful--to the officers and men of the Navy for their splendid loyalty during the introduction of reforms, some of which have hit them very hard, notably the sudden bringing home and paying off of the large number of vessels that were wiped out of the Navy as not being up to the required standard of fighting efficiency. And there was also the redistribution of the Fleet, which deprived many officers of advantageous appointments and seriously disturbed domestic arrangements.

But the fact is that the Navy sees the fighting advantages we have gained, and so has loyally responded to the demands on its sense of duty.

As an excellent writer in the “North American Review” for June so aptly expresses it, the Navy saw that it was steam-manship that was wanted, and so, as a body, they welcomed the new scheme of training both of officers and men. They saw also that to have every vessel of the Navy, large and small, mobilised and efficient to fight within three hours in the dead of night, as practically exemplified in the recent Grand Manœuvres, is a result which justifies all the drastic measures of the Board of Admiralty.

The Navy also recognises the incomparable fighting advantages of the new era in giving us an unparalleled gunnery efficiency, as exemplified in the fact that before that new era there were 2,000 more misses than hits in the annual gunlayers’ competition, while in the year after there were 2,000 more hits than misses! In the new order the best ship is the one that can catch the enemy soonest, and hit him hardest and oftenest; under the old system these considerations were certainly not the primary ones.

The Navy sees also that, while the fighting efficiency of the British Fleet and its instant readiness for war has become a household word amongst the Admiralties of the world, at the same time vast economies--to be reckoned in many millions--have been effected; for instance, our harbours, docks, and basins are ridded of obsolete vessels and thus made adequate for the accommodation of our fighting fleet, for which there was no room previously, and no less a sum than 13 millions sterling was at one time contemplated as necessary to give the required accommodation. The whole of that 13 millions in proposed works has been cancelled.

Nor have the officers and men been forgotten. The men have had a quarter of a million sterling practically added to their pay; one item alone is £75,000 a year for increase of pensions to petty officers, and another £47,000 a year in giving them their food allowance when on leave, and other similar and just concessions make up the balance. Further improvements in the position of the lower deck are now under consideration and will shortly be ready for announcement, _i.e._, Ratings Committee.

The officers, again, no longer pay for the bands out of their own pockets, and the system of Nucleus Crews gives them an amount of Home Service combined with sea-time, with all its domestic advantages, beyond anything ever before obtaining in the Navy.

Again, it is recognised by all but a few misguided misanthropes that the new shipbuilding policy is a magnificent departure in fighting policy. _We ask the officers who are going to fight, what they want, and we build thereto._ Formerly vessels were simply belated improvements on their predecessors. Admirals had to make the best use they could of the heterogeneous assemblage of vessels which the idiosyncrasies of talented designers and Controllers of the Navy had saddled us with, to the embarrassment of those whose business it was to use them in battle, and to the bitter bewilderment of types in the brain of the Board of Admiralty! Theory was entirely divorced from practice, with the lamentable result that when the two were recently brought together, and the “Dreadnought” was evolved, it was found that the whole Navy had practically become obsolete!

“First catch your hare” is the recipe in Mrs. Glasse’s Cookery Book for “jugged hare,” and so speed has been put in the forefront in every class of vessel from battleship to submarine, and as it’s no use having the speed without the wherewithal to demolish the enemy, the armament of our new ships, as so fully exemplified in the “Dreadnought,” has received such a development that that vessel is equal to any two and a half battleships at present existing.

The efficacy of the Nucleus Crew system has also been obvious to the whole Fleet in the unprecedented exemptions from machinery defects, and the unexampled gunnery efficiency, coupled with a saving of about 50 per cent. in repairs of ships, which incidentally has led in a large measure to the reduction of 6,000 Dockyard workmen. _And it must never be forgotten that every penny not spent in a fighting ship or on a fighting man is a penny taken away from the day of battle!_

The management of the Royal Dockyards has now been placed on a much sounder footing, more akin to the organisation in similar commercial establishments, where any undue extravagance or unnecessary executive machinery means loss of money to the shareholders, and is visited by pains and penalties on the officials directly responsible. At the same time the desirable possibilities of ready expansion in war time to suit the varying requirements of a purely naval repairing and building establishment have been maintained.

The Navy also sees the great strategic advantages of our Fleets exercising where they are likely to fight. As Nelson said, “_The battle ground should be the drill ground_.”

The placid waters and lovely weather of the Mediterranean do not fit our seamen for the fogs and gales of the North Sea, or accustom them to the rigours of a northern winter, when the icicles hang down over the bed or the hammock of the Torpedo Boat Commander and his men, as in the North Sea last winter when we sent 147 Torpedo Craft suddenly to exercise at sea; and though sent on a full power trial of many hours, on first being mobilised, not a single defect or breakdown was experienced. Since that date the arrangements for the Torpedo Craft have been still further perfected, and now the Destroyers are all organised according to the strategic requirements of the situation of the moment, and are definitely detailed in flotillas and divisions, with their store and repair ships and reserves, according to the approved modern methods of torpedo warfare as exemplified in the Russo-Japanese War.

The Navy also sees and welcomes the untold advantage given by the Nucleus Crew system of instant war readiness, as exemplified when last July all our vessels, large and small, in reserve went to sea unnoticed by the Press and engaged in fighting Manœuvres in the Channel with 200 pendants under the chief command of the Admiral of the Channel Fleet.

No calling out of Reserves or such disorganisation as was incidental to the old system, when the crews of ships in commission had to be broken up to leaven the ships of the Reserve that then had no crews at all.