Chapter XXIV: A Naval Study for All Time (9)

Full discussion of this matter would, however, require more space than can here be devoted to it, and should my life be spared I will on a future occasion enter more extensively into this and other cognate subjects. Were I now to do so, I am afraid public faith in some of its newly cherished fortifications would be materially shaken, and will therefore refrain from so doing, in the hope that improvements in our navy, the only true basis of national safety, will render such remarks unnecessary.

In short, immovable stations of defence as a protection against invasion, are not only costly and of doubtful utility, but a _reliance on them_ is, in my mind, an indication of a declining state. It is little short of national imbecility to suppose that because we erect imposing fortifications an enemy _will come to them!_ when he can operate elsewhere without the slightest regard to them; and the more so, as the common experience of warfare will tell him that numerous fortifications are in the highest degree national weakness, by splitting up into detail the army which ought to be in the field against him, but who are compelled to remain and take care of their fortifications. Yet _half the sum_ required for fortifications as defences in case of war, would suffice to place the navy in a condition of affording far more effectual protection. There is no security equal to that which may be obtained _by putting it out of the power of an enemy to execute hostile intentions_. This can never be effected by forts, but may be accomplished by the adoption of proper measures, which I shall at present refrain from commenting on.

CHAP. XXXV.
NAVAL AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS IN PARLIAMENT.

SINECURES.—ADMIRALTY EXPENSES ILL DIRECTED.—WHAT MIGHT BE DONE WITH
SMALL MEANS.—FLOGGING IN THE ARMY AND NAVY ATTRIBUTABLE TO A BAD
SYSTEM: NEVERTHELESS, INDISPENSABLE.—NATIONAL MEANS WRONGLY
APPLIED.—INJURIOUS CONCESSIONS TO THE FRENCH.—DENIED BY THE
GOVERNMENT.—EXPLANATIONS OF MY PARLIAMENTARY CONDUCT ON THE
DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT.—LETTER TO MY CONSTITUENTS.—APPOINTMENT OF
OFFICERS BY MERIT INSTEAD OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE THE TRUE STRENGTH
OF THE NAVY.—MY RE-ELECTION FOR WESTMINSTER.—ADDRESS TO THE
ELECTORS.—MINISTERIAL VIEWS.—TREATMENT OF AN OFFICER.—MY
INTERFERENCE.

At the commencement of the session of 1812, it became known that His Royal Highness the late Duke of Cambridge had voluntarily given up a military emolument of nearly 5000_l._ a-year. The patriotism which moved His Royal Highness to relinquish a lucrative command which had dwindled into a sinecure, was too conspicuous to be lost sight of, not only on account of his disinterestedness, but because there was hope this practical specimen of reform, proceeding from so high a quarter, might be brought to bear on others in such a way as to induce them to emulate the example.

On the 23rd of January, I therefore moved for a copy of His Royal Highness’s letter of resignation, for the purpose of grounding thereon a resolution expressive of the opinion of the House on the subject, at the same time intimating to sinecure-holders in general the desirableness of imitating the magnanimity of the royal duke. The effort was, however, in vain.

On the 23rd of February, a question was raised by Mr. Bankes respecting the payment of 2790_l._ a-year to the Secretary of the Prince of Wales, as paymaster of widows’ pensions. A former report on a committee of the House had pronounced this office a perfect sinecure, of no public utility whatever, and that the office of deputy-paymaster was little better, the whole business being transacted by a clerk in the War Office at a salary of 100_l._ a-year. The reply of Mr. Perceval (then Prime Minister) to this statement was “that there was more danger to the country _from declamations against sinecures than from the sinecures themselves_!”

On this occasion I supported the _retention_ of the sinecure, on the ground that the abolition of so insignificant a sum might _deceive the public into a belief that their interests were watched in that House_. The House had suffered the reports of various committees on the subject to lie dormant for thirty years, and now wished to abolish _three only_ out of the long list of sinecures, which their committees had declared to be useless and burdensome to the country. It was the bounden duty of the House to have pronounced _on the whole class_, and not partially. They ought to have enumerated the sinecures to be abolished, and thus put it out of the power of ministers to exercise any discretion on the subject; instead of singling out a comparatively insignificant place from a long list of enormous sinecures, upon which the House had not so much as expressed an opinion, notwithstanding the numerous representations of its committees.

On the motion of the First Lord (the Right Hon. C. Yorke) that a sum of upwards a million should be granted for the contingent expences of the Admiralty, I spoke as follows:—

“LORD COCHRANE hoped, that, as a deviation from mere detail was
allowed when the army estimates were in a committee, it would not be
entirely out of course to offer a few general remarks while the supply
of the navy was before the House; not with a view to oppose the supply
for the ordinary establishment of the navy, but as to the proper
application of the enormous sums granted for that service generally.

“To this nothing could, in his opinion, contribute more than that the
Board of Admiralty should not be considered as a _mere appendage to
the minister of the day, and be displaced by every agitation of the
political system_—whereby misapplication of means was rendered
perpetual; for, just as the members acquired some knowledge of their
complicated duties, and of the powers they ought to direct against the
enemy, they were then displaced, to make room for others of _no
experience_.

“The observations which he had to address to the chairman related
chiefly to the means of annoying the enemy, which means the Government
possessed in a right disposal of the naval force of the country. This
was at present totally useless, except for the purpose of passive
blockades. Had 5000 men, with attendant naval transports, been kept in
readiness in such a central situation as Minorca, for instance, it
would have been impossible for the French to have made any progress on
the eastern side of the Peninsula; for no sooner should the enemy have
laid siege to Tarragona, Valencia, Alicant, or any other place on the
Mediterranean coast of Spain, than their affairs might have been
reversed at the other extremity. Rosas, for instance, was within
_twelve hours’ sail_ of Minorca, and about eighteen from Alicant,
whereas on the other hand it was _twenty-five days’ march_ at least
from Alicant to Rosas.

“Comparing the respective populations of Britain and France, it was
impossible to think of carrying on an equal warfare in the Peninsula.
A greater number of men than all the British who were at present
there, must perish before it could be possible to drive out the
French. The desultory nature of naval warfare was, in his opinion, the
best calculated for that purpose, and for this we had the highest
authorities in ancient and modern times. If the French, with a
contemptible flotilla, could keep this country in alarm, what was our
gigantic navy not capable of doing? The whole of France lay at the
mercy of the British ministry. Had the enemy a naval superiority, and
only 10,000 disposable troops, on what part of the shores of England
could people repose in tranquillity?

“The war as at present conducted could not possibly have a successful
termination. It was a great misfortune that the House of Commons
listened to nothing which was beyond the sphere of their own
knowledge; and when any professional man, like himself, rose up to
give information, _party_ was immediately thrown in his teeth;
_factious motives_ were instantly imputed, however pure his wishes for
the good of his country. He put it to the committee, whether the whole
force of this country was not on the alert, and almost concentrated on
the coasts of Kent and Sussex, when an invasion was threatened by a
contemptible flotilla of the enemy; and if so, what might not be done,
if the gigantic naval power of England was to threaten the enemy’s
shores? It was his sincere opinion, that the whole coast of France was
completely at the mercy of His Majesty’s ministers.

“The noble lord next adverted to the coasting trade carried on by
France, and which it was in our power to destroy. That trade existed
to an extent almost incredible. It was in our power to dismantle their
batteries,—to blow up their towers,—and, above all, to destroy that
chain of signal-posts, by which a telegraphic communication was kept
up from Flushing to Bayonne, and from the south-east point of Spain to
Venice. Each of those signal-posts could be successfully attacked by
ten men, as, except in a few situations, they were exposed, and seldom
had above two or three maimed soldiers to conduct them. He had no
interest whatever in forcing those observations on the attention of
the committee, and he hoped the right hon. gentleman would not think
them altogether unworthy of his consideration. He should not, he said,
at that time attempt to say more; but he trusted that members who were
far more capable to do justice to the subject than he could pretend to
be, would turn it in their minds, and bring the subject forward, or
that His Majesty’s ministers would investigate the truth and act
accordingly. In either case he was certain attention to the hints he
had thus thrown out could not fail of being attended by the most
beneficial results to the country. He did not think ministers, in not
having attended to the subject, were so much to blame as the House
itself, for they were, or ought to be, the guardians of the public
purse; but he was sorry to say, the practice of the House was _to vote
estimates to a very great amount, without at all troubling themselves
to inquire how those estimates were applied_.

“Besides the signal-posts he had mentioned, there were placed along
the whole coast of Spain many small parties of soldiers in churches,
convents, and other buildings, for the purpose of keeping the people
of the maritime towns in awe, and passing along supplies to the
armies, which supplies it was in our power to intercept, as the only
practicable military road was within a pistol-shot of the margin of
the sea. The smallest assistance would encourage the people to rise
upon them; but without such assistance they are afraid to do so,
knowing that the French would burn their houses, violate their wives,
and murder themselves. This he had seen them do.

“During all the time he was off Catalonia, the French had barely
sufficient force to defend themselves against the natives, and in
every enterprise which they undertook they were foiled. It was
notorious, however, to all the world, that the attention of ministers
was always engaged exclusively on one or two objects, and that they
never took an extended view of things. If our commander on that coast
had had discretionary powers to supply Figueras, which was the key of
Catalonia, with provisions, it could not have been taken by force, for
it was impregnable. If Government would only act in a proper way, it
was impossible that Buonaparte could go on a twelvemonth longer.

“The noble lord then referred to the American war: had ministers
during that war, instead of marching large armies through the country,
only transported 10,000 men from one place to another, they would soon
have laid waste the whole sea-coast, and the country must have
submitted.

“MR. HUTCHINSON deprecated the species of warfare recommended by the
noble lord, which he thought would not be productive of the effects he
expected.

“LORD COCHRANE, in explanation, defended the system which he had
recommended, as peculiarly calculated to injure the enemy’s coasting
trade, which was the great nursery of his seamen.

“After a few questions from Admiral Markham and Mr. Tierney, as to the
decrease in the estimates, and replies from Mr. Yorke, the resolution
was agreed to, as were also the other usual annual resolutions
relating to the navy.”

As the subject of flogging in the army and navy forms a prominent subject in the present day, I may be pardoned for putting my own views, then and now, on record. On the 13th of March, on the motion for the third reading of the Mutiny Bill, Sir Francis Burdett, in a speech distinguished for humanity and eloquence, animadverted on the punishment of flogging in the army and navy, as a system derogatory to our country, where the principles of liberty, of humanity, and of civilisation were better understood and practised than in any other country.

On this occasion, I delivered my sentiments as follows:—

“Lord COCHRANE hoped that, by degrees, this punishment might in due
time be abolished, but declared that it was impracticable to govern
any large body of men without having the power of recourse to it. He
believed, however, that much of the mischief which arose from the
punishment of flogging, especially in the navy, had been caused by the
influence of that House. Great parliamentary interest had enabled the
first families in the kingdom to force their children into the
service, when too young to understand the nature of the authority
entrusted to them. Many of them insisted on their decks being as clean
and as shining as the floor of a drawing-room, and that their kitchen
utensils should be scoured as bright as silver, with a variety of
other useless and fantastic commands; and if such commands were not
obeyed, they flogged severely those who had those articles in charge.

“The discipline of the navy depended on the commanding officer of each
ship; and if they continued to flog for such offences, the navy must
suffer. Gentlemen might think otherwise, but he knew it to be true,
and he was afraid they would be convinced of it too soon. The family
interest he had alluded to prevailed also, to such a degree, that even
the Lords of the Admiralty had lists made out, and when an officer
went to offer his services, or to solicit promotion for services
performed, he was asked—‘Are you recommended by my Lady this, or Miss
that, or Madam t’other?’ and if he was not, he might as well have
stayed at home.

“He could not, however, vote for the motion. It would be better to
look to those to whom power was entrusted, than to take away the power
of punishing altogether. If it were so taken away, it would ruin the
service. The best seamen in the navy would say so, and if put to the
vote among the sailors, he was sure the decision would be in favour of
the present mode of punishment; but they would at the same time tell
the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that they ought to be
commanded by persons of experience, and not by young men appointed by
parliamentary or any other influence. He hoped he should see the
practice of flogging abolished, while the power of inflicting it was
suffered to remain.”

Good seamen are thoroughly aware that they have nothing to fear from a judicious and well-regulated captain, a man of sense, who knows his duty and that of those under him. Such captains have indeed no difficulty in manning their ships, whilst those in whom the men have no confidence find difficulty. Good men on board ship stand as little in awe of the cat as do the good people ashore—who make so much fuss about what they cannot possibly understand. Amongst many hundreds of men there are always some vagabonds, who, were it not for the fear of punishment, would throw their whole work on the hands of others. On such men reasoning has no effect, nor have good seamen any sympathy with them. On the contrary, they would rather see them compelled to do their duty by the dread, or even the application of the lash, than be obliged to do the work of lazy men in addition to their own.

Landsmen also forget that a naval officer cannot get rid of a worthless vagabond. He has to account for him to the Admiralty. Were it possible to give an officer power to turn such over the side, as a landsman can turn away an unprofitable servant, and he would have no occasion for the lash. But so long as he is obliged to retain such men, he must secure their obedience by the only means which will control them.

On the 16th of March came on one of those questions which added so materially to our national debt. Lord Castlereagh proposed a sum of two millions sterling as a subsidy to Portugal. He declared that the circumstances of Portugal were so much improved, and her troops exhibited so much valour, that he did not expect any opposition to the measure. This was, however, opposed by several members, on the ground of impoverishing ourselves by a system which did not produce the results the nation had a right to expect. By myself it was not opposed, but I embraced the opportunity of giving my opinion to the following effect:—

“LORD COCHRANE considered Portugal to be defensible against the French
arms chiefly at the lines of Torres Vedras, which were so strong as
not to require so great an army as we had there, and which gave us a
free communication with the sea; whereas our operations were conducted
on a much more extensive scale between Ciudad Rodrigo and
Badajoz,—places which, if we got possession of them both, were not
tenable unless we had a force perfectly capable of coping with the
French forces in the open field. Both these places stood on plains,
and the French, it should be recollected, were much superior to us in
the number of their cavalry, and had often brought a much larger
general force into the field.

“The war would be much less expensive, were the lines of Torres Vedras
considered as the true defence of Portugal; by which means, instead of
our keeping 60,000 or 70,000 men in Portugal, comparatively idle, or,
at least, not in a state of military activity, we might detach just
now, as we might have done before, a portion of our army to Cadiz, and
raise the blockade of that city. A small portion of our army might
also be sent to Catalonia, where they might reverse all the success of
the enemy; and we might act all along the margin of the Mediterranean
with the best effect. There were numerous small forts on the coast
which we might get possession of, and thereby command all the
neighbouring country. We might have done much on the whole eastern
side of Spain—at Valencia particularly, and might probably retake
Barcelona. All this was not only useful, but practicable at a much
smaller expense than our present system. Thus we might have constantly
checked and counteracted the objects of the French.

“This suggestion he did not make as his own. It had been the
recommendation of others as well as his, and seemed obvious to
anybody. For the principles on which it was founded he had the
advantage of great authority, which he quoted. He declared that he saw
nothing in the war to occasion our despair, if we conducted it on
principles by which we might be enabled entirely to clear the
sea-coast, and have, at the same time, a large proportion of our army,
now in Portugal, disposable at home or elsewhere, for such objects as
we desired to obtain. The vote for the two millions might, if
applicable to these views, prove very beneficial; for no service could
be more important than to sweep the French, as we might do with one
effort, from the neighbourhood of Cadiz, and clear the whole
Mediterranean coast from their intrusion.

“The resolution was then put and carried.”

On the 4th of May, I gave notice of a motion for an account of the quantity of French silks imported into this country under licence. The effect of this system has on one or two occasions been brought under the notice of the reader, as encouraging the French Navy, by encouraging their shipping whilst our own laboured under every species of discouragement.

On the statement of Mr. Rose, Vice-President of the Board of Trade, that he had no objection to the motion, I then said that, if agreeable to the House, I would at once proceed with it, and adverted to the fact that large quantities of French silks were openly exposed for sale in this country to the prejudice of our manufacturers, to whom not the slightest concession was offered in return. Whether rightly or wrongly, it was the established policy of the legislature to prevent the importation of French manufactured goods, but the licence to do so to a small extent had been construed into a licence to import to any amount, and that without the necessary introduction through the Custom-house. I had been credibly informed that silks, to the value of several hundred thousand pounds, were at that moment lying in the river, whilst the only clause in the licences under which these goods were suffered to be imported, and which went to secure any reciprocity whatever to this country, was one requiring that sugar or coffee, to the value of 5_l._ per ton burden, should be exported in lieu of these rich manufactured goods of the enemy. If this were the policy of our ministry at the present period of unexampled distress to the manufacturing interests, the great dissatisfaction of the manufacturers was by no means surprising.

The correctness of the statement being denied by Mr. Rose, I remarked that if no silk goods had really been imported, the return would effectually show this, and as effectually calm any dissatisfaction that might prevail. After some further unimportant discussion, the motion was agreed to.

On the order of the day for the third reading of the Sinecure Offices Bill (June 15th), I expressed my conviction of the propriety of abolishing all unnecessary offices during the present state of the country, feeling persuaded that sinecures were the bond of union which held parties together in that House, and that if sinecures did not exist, much more attention would be paid to public expenditure. I did not so much object to the expense which necessarily devolved on the public, as to the influence which the power of giving sinecures gave to the ministry for the time being.

The Parliament being shortly afterwards dissolved, my explanations, to the electors of Westminster relative to the conduct I had deemed right to pursue in Parliament were comprised in the following letters:—

“Portman Square, 28th September, 1812.

“GENTLEMEN,—Being conscious that I have not used the trust reposed in
me to my private advantage, or to promote the interests of those with
whom I am connected by the bonds of consanguinity or friendship, and
that I have no personal object to attain, I shall venture to submit my
conduct to the scrutiny it must undergo, on presenting myself with a
view of again becoming one of the representatives of this great city;
an honour which I do not aspire to from a vain notion that I possess
the qualifications requisite to perform its duties, otherwise than by
acting uniformly according to the best of my judgment, uninfluenced by
considerations of a personal nature. Should it appear, however, that I
have erred, I am ready to assign the reasons which have determined my
vote on every occasion.

“It is unnecessary to apprise you, Gentlemen, who are so well
acquainted with the fact, that it is impossible for an individual,
unconnected with either party, to succeed in any measure which has for
its object a diminution of the means of corruption, or, in other
words, the power of rewarding those who are base enough to support men
in office, regardless of their measures. Had the list of places and
pensions, possessed by the members of the House of Commons and their
relations, been granted, which list I moved for shortly after my
return to Parliament, the public would long ago have been convinced
that sinecures ought not to be considered, as they generally are, a
burden of a known amount. It has ever been my opinion that their
abolition alone would relieve the Crown from the thraldom in which it
is held; and restore the depreciating currency, by promoting the
proper inquiry into the general application of the public money,
particularly as to the sums demanded for our enormous and
disproportionate military establishment.

“I have frequently stated, without avail, that simply by enforcing the
acts relative to prize concerns, two-thirds of the navy now employed
would be more efficient than the whole is, under the mortification of
finding the fruits of their toil, and often more, taken for the mere
condemnation of legal captures! History shows, without the example of
the House of Commons, that this is not the way to stimulate men to
undergo fatigue, and encounter that kind of danger, from which no
honour is to be derived. On this subject I have not been able to
induce the House to look at the proofs which I held in my hand, and
offered to produce. I am averse to trespass on your time, though I
feel that I have material points to explain; but these I shall defer
to a more fit opportunity.

“I am, however, anxious to add, that my absence lately, on occasions
when you have had a right to expect my attendance, has been occasioned
solely by ill health, and not by a disposition to tamper with
ministers for employment, even in the execution of important plans
which I had suggested; and which, if prosecuted on a fit scale, would
afford France full employment in her own defence, instead of suffering
her troops to employ themselves in the subjugation of our allies, by
whom they are paid and maintained!

“Whether I am returned to Parliament or not, as soon as I shall have
tried every means to promote measures which, if disclosed at present,
would prove highly prejudicial to the public interests, I pledge
myself to prove to the country, that ten millions sterling may
annually be saved, and that the relative military force of England
will be increased.

“Viewing your exertions in the cause of freedom and the purity of
election with that admiration which they so justly deserve,

“I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,
“Respectively, your obedient servant,
“COCHRANE.”

“Portman Square, Sept. 30, 1812.

“GENTLEMEN,—Since I had the honour of addressing you, by letter, at
your last meeting, I have been informed by the public prints and
otherwise that some gentlemen deemed it a material omission that I had
neglected to state my opinions therein relative to Parliamentary
Reform,—a course which I adapted, perhaps erroneously, as most
respectful to the Committee for promoting the Purity of Election;
under the conviction that they would judge of the future by the past,
and not by professions. Now, however, to clear up this doubt, if any,
after reflection, remains on their minds, I hereby pledge myself to
vote on all occasions for Reform, from a persuasion that the ruin of
the country can be averted by that means only. I will likewise support
every measure for the abolition of sinecures, which form the bond of
union in the House of Commons against the interests of the people.
Indeed, reflection impresses this fact so strongly on my mind, that I
am disposed to think, if the advocates for Parliamentary Reform were
to direct their efforts first against these glaring evils, that an
efficient Reform would not be so far distant as the difference of
sentiments amongst its advocates unhappily indicates.

“As to the Catholic Question, Gentlemen, it is proper to inform you
that so long as its inquisitorial auricular confession and its
principles so favourable to despotism prevailed on the Continent, I
was hostile to it; but that I am now inclined to grant the claims of
the Catholics of Ireland, provided that they are content to receive
the privileges of Englishmen, and to relinquish their predilection in
favour of the jurisdiction of the Pope, which, however, they seem
anxious to establish in that part of these kingdoms.

“Having said thus much on the most important questions that occur to
me, I have only to add, relative to the objection made to a naval
officer being a representative for Westminster (which I conclude is
meant to extend to all other parts of the kingdom) that one half of
the taxes levied on the people of England is disbursed on the navy—for
objects which the ability of all the civil members of Parliament
cannot detect to be erroneous from the inspection of accounts. Neither
are they judges of the means best calculated to give protection to
trade, and annoy the enemy by that mode of warfare to which England
must at last resort.

“I had nearly omitted to notice that I am no advocate for flogging;
although I maintain, from a knowledge of fact, that your fleets could
not be governed at present if the power did not exist,—a power which
will cease to be abused when Parliamentary influence shall cease to
place incompetent persons in command, and that in a great measure
depends upon your exertions.

“I have the honour to be,
“Gentlemen,
“Your most humble obedient servant,
“COCHRANE.”

The concluding paragraph of this letter will bear comment, even in our day. The appointment of officers to commands ought to be regulated less by interest than _desert_. The truth of this is now practically admitted in other departments of the State, but unhappily the Admiralty, to which is confided our only protection from invasion, is, to a great extent, looked upon as a ministerial patronage preserve, and to this supposed necessity the national safety may one day be sacrificed. It has been urged, in defence of the system, that it is a matter of little consequence, for that steam having bridged the Channel, invasion is only a question of a few hours, whoever may be in command of our ships. This I deny. If our ships are in a fit condition, and properly commanded, it is as easy to destroy the enemy’s “bridge” as ever it was, and we shall be as much at liberty to use our own bridge as in former days.

If the Admiralty could be freed from its political trammels, there is no question but that those who direct its affairs would be generally guided in their appointments _by merit alone_. That it is not so, is a proof that, under the unfortunate prevalence of political influence and patronage, no fair and well-understood system of promotion can be established. Hence boys and subordinate officers, if destitute of influence, have no stimulus to acquiring a knowledge of their profession. Far otherwise, for whatever may be their proficiency or services, the only certainty they have is that some one with more influence and perhaps inferior claims may be promoted over their heads. It is not reasonable to suppose that such a system can produce energetic captains or admirals, except by accident.

As one ship well officered and manned is more effective than two of an opposite description, a defined and well-regulated system of promotion upon which all can rely will cost less to the nation, and become the most economical as well as the most effective. The true strength of the navy is not in the multitude of ships, but in the energies and alacrity of officers and crews; and the repression of these qualities by a false system of political influence, renders a double force requisite for the accomplishment of the vital objects of the naval service. This is as much a waste of power as the system itself is _want of power_.

The necessity of wholesome stimulating encouragement was deeply felt in the wars consequent on the French Revolution, and it will be felt in future wars whenever they arise. No one unacquainted with the matter can imagine how much was lost during those wars from a total disregard of the fitness of individuals appointed by political influence. The subordinate officers appointed to ships of war were frequently so incompetent as to paralyse the exertions even of the most able commanders, who could not be expected to sustain the fatigue of being always on deck. For my own part, I was so annoyed by the description of persons attempted to be palmed upon me, that, as I have somewhere else said, I preferred going to sea with midshipmen of my own training, making them perform the duties of lieutenants, rather than run the risk of receiving such lieutenants as were frequently appointed to situations in active frigates, through aristocratic or political influence. I am sorry the names of my midshipmen have for the most part escaped my memory, but I may point to three of my own making—the late Lord Napier, Captain Marryat, and the present gallant Admiral Sir Houston Stewart. These were my officers in Basque Roads, where I had only one lieutenant. On quitting Plymouth in the _Impérieuse_ to undertake that perilous duty, I sailed with _one lieutenant only_, to avoid the encumbrance of persons in whom I feared to repose confidence.

To return to my subject. On my re-election for Westminster, I published a long address to my constituents. From this I shall only adduce the following extracts:—

“GENTLEMEN,—Being unable to convey in words the sensations I
experience in reflecting on the manner in which you have returned me
to Parliament, I shall leave it to you, who are capable of such acts,
to estimate my feelings.

“Gentlemen, no part of the cant of the times seems to me more
hypocritical than the declamation by party-men against what they term
the ‘overwhelming influence of the Crown;’ when the fact is notorious
to us all that the ruling faction in Parliament seize the offices of
state and share them amongst themselves. If a doubt as to this truth
exist in the mind of any one, let him reflect on the language of the
parties themselves, ‘Such an administration cannot stand.’ And why,
Gentlemen?—not because the royal protection has been withdrawn, but
because a sufficient number do not agree as to the division of the
spoil. Our liberties in these days are not in danger from violent and
open exercise of regal authority; such acts, being free from the
deception practised by the mock representatives of the people, would
not be tolerated for an instant. No, Gentlemen, it is by the House of
Commons alone that the Constitution is subverted, the prerogatives of
the Crown usurped, the rights of the people trampled upon.

“Gentlemen, I shall not attempt to enumerate the decisions of the late
House of Commons,—these stamp little credit on the memory of the
principal actors, who cannot escape from the contempt of posterity, as
may, from their insignificance, the nameless individuals who composed
their corrupt majorities. The _effects_, however, of this system of
corruption may be thus briefly stated; the prolongation of war, the
increase of the national debt, the depreciation of our currency, the
disappearance of our coin, the stagnation of our commerce, and the
consequent unexampled embarrassment of our manufactures.

“Hurtful, however, as the measures pursued have been, our total
neglect of others has proved still more prejudicial; for whilst France
has inflicted on us the evils of war, intimidating surrounding states
into compliance with her views, we, who have possessed facilities to
direct every portion of our force to unknown points within the
extensive range of 2000 miles of unprotected shore, have never even
made a demonstration with intention to disturb the enemy’s projects
and force him to keep his legions at home, but have left him at full
liberty to prosecute his plans at the expense of our allies, or in the
way most conducive to his interests; and, surely, none could suit him
better than to fix the little army of England in the centre of the
Peninsula, where its movements are not of a desultory nature, and
where, admitting the great ability of its commander, a comparatively
small portion of the enemy’s force is fully adequate to counteract its
_known movements_! What part of these kingdoms would be secure from
attack if the French possessed a naval superiority, with only 20,000
troops at their disposal? It is obvious that there must be in every
district a force equal to that which the enemy could bring against it.

“Gentlemen, I cannot avoid stating a fact to you which I have often
offered to prove at the bar of the late House of Commons, namely, that
whilst our commerce has decreased, that kind of trade which is most
beneficial to a state has augmented on the shores of the enemy, in a
prodigious ratio; and the produce of the northern and southern
provinces is freely interchanged under the protection of the abuses of
our Admiralty Courts, which afford better security than all the
batteries of France. The plain reason for this is, that each of the
numerous coasting vessels must, for the benefit of the court, be
separately condemned, at an expense greater than was formerly demanded
for the adjudication of an Indiaman! Gentlemen, the rapacity of these
courts is frequently not satisfied by appropriating the _whole_
proceeds to themselves, but the captors are compelled _to pay_ an
additional sum for thus performing a service to their country.
Gentlemen, that you may have a correct notion of a proctor’s bill, I
take the liberty of inclosing one for your inspection, which, I assure
you, may be considered very moderate, being only six fathoms and a
quarter long, or thirty-seven feet six inches, whereas I now possess
others that extend to fifty feet; but I prefer sending this to your
committee, as it is the one produced by myself in the House of
Commons, and by the venerable Earl of Suffolk in the House of Lords;
the exhibition of which was pronounced by the present Lord Chancellor
Eldon (the brother of the judge of the Admiralty Court) to be a
species of _mummery_ never before witnessed within those walls, and
altogether unbecoming the gravity of that branch of the legislature.

“The example of the industrious bee demonstrates by the laws of nature
that the drone is not to live at the expense of the community,
notwithstanding what the Whigs have said of sinecures being held by
tenure equal to that of freehold property.”

From the preceding incomplete enumeration of my parliamentary efforts, it will be apparent that as regarded my profession I had not been idle; but every step I took appeared to remove me farther from my chance of being again employed. Notwithstanding that in those days the language of members frequently passed those bounds which the modern practice of the House of Commons has prescribed, in no instance, that I am aware of, could I be accused of intemperate treatment of any subject under discussion. Independently of the sore point of Lord Gambier’s court-martial, which was no act of mine—my offending could have been none other than the one of attempting to rouse the authorities to an effort for the amelioration of the navy, for objects which under the old system were notoriously not achieved, viz. _crippling the energies of the enemy_. It was in the circle of my political opponents considered that as member for Westminster I had no right to interfere with naval matters—_because I was a post-captain_!

It is, nevertheless, a singular fact—and one which cannot be said of any other officer of my then standing as a post-captain—that from 1801 to 1812,—on no occasion, not even for a single day was any vessel of war—save the one in which my pennant flew—once placed under my command, or once offered to me, with the single exception of the affair of Basque Roads, when I was for a few days appointed to organise and make use of a flotilla of explosion and fireships, the command of which _had been declined by several other officers to whom it had been proposed_, and then thrust on me contrary to my inclination.

That one cause of my being thus passed over was my unceasing advocacy of the navy, admits of no doubt. It must be apparent that my motions relative to the Courts of Admiralty raised the enmity of all who profited by their abuses, and these were neither few nor uninfluential,—that my repeated invectives against sinecures and pensions arrayed against me all who benefited by them—whether personally or through their connections. It is, indeed, not too much to say, that those interested in sinecures and pensions comprised in those days a majority of the House of Commons, who stood up for their own interest at the national expense as for a right.

My motion respecting the treatment of French prisoners, and especially my declaration of the probable motive for erecting the prison of Dartmoor in a dreary, desolate, and unhealthy position, such as ought not to have been selected for convicts, served to increase the ministerial anger. Nor was the evil abated. On a second visit to the place, I encountered a spectacle which made me ashamed of my country.

The reader will remember the action between the _Pallas_ and _Minerve_ in Basque Roads, as narrated in the first volume. My gallant adversary in that frigate was Captain Collett, who kept the deck after every one of his crew had been driven below by our fire, which, as the _Minerve_ had taken the ground, swept her decks. My gallant opponent, however, kept the deck, or rather stood on a gun, with as much _sang-froid_ as though we had been firing a salute. On our becoming entangled with the _Minerve’s_ rigging, he raised his hat, with all the politeness of a Frenchman of the old school, and bowed to me, a compliment which I returned. Judge of my surprise, when refused admission into the prison at Dartmoor, and prowling about its out-offices, at finding my gallant enemy _located in the stall of a stable_, he having been recently made prisoner. I promised to use my best endeavour to get him removed, and on my arrival in London did so. I believe with effect, but to what other locality has passed from my memory.

There is no necessity to enumerate other matters already familiar to the reader in order to show the estimation in which I must have been held by those who opposed what they considered innovations, though they must have been as well aware of the evils of a rotten system as myself.

CHAP. XXXVI.
MY MARRIAGE.

ROMANTIC CHARACTER OF MY MARRIAGE.—UNFORESEEN DIFFICULTIES.—FAMILY
RESULTS.

The event recorded in this chapter is the most important and the happiest of my life, in its results,—the “silver lining” to the “cloud,” viz. my marriage with the Countess of Dundonald. It has been said by a Scottish writer that “the Cochranes have long been noted for an original and dashing turn of mind, which was sometimes called genius—sometimes eccentricity.” How far this may be true of my ancestors, I shall not stay to inquire. Laying no claim to the genius, I however dispute the eccentricity in my own case, notwithstanding that appearances, so far as relates to my past life, may be somewhat against me. Without a particle of romance in my composition, my life has been one of the most romantic on record, and the circumstances of my marriage are not the least so.

Early in the year 1812, it was my good fortune to make the acquaintance of the orphan daughter of a family of honourable standing in the Midland Counties, Miss Katherine Corbett Barnes. In consequence of the loss of her parents, the lady had been placed during her minority under the guardianship of her first cousin, Mr. John Simpson of Portland Place and also of Fairlorn House, in the county of Kent, of which county he was then High Sheriff. The story is the old one. Shortly after my introduction to this lady I made proposals of marriage, and was accepted.

But here an unexpected difficulty arose. I was at that time residing with my uncle, the Hon. Basil Cochrane, who had realised a large fortune in the East Indies. My attachment—though not my engagement—to my _fiancée_ had by some means reached him, and he at once attempted to divert my purpose by proposing to me a marriage with the only daughter of an Admiralty Court official who had realised a very large fortune by the practices which have already been made familiar to the reader.

I cannot describe the repugnance which I felt even to the proposition, and pointed out to my uncle the impossibility of marrying the daughter of one of those persons whom I had so severely denounced; adding that not only would such a step be a deviation from those principles which ought to guide a well-regulated mind in the selection of a wife, but must be destructive of my public character, which would be so clearly sacrificed for money, that it would render me contemptible to my constituents, and would prevent my again meriting public confidence. His reply was brief and caustic. “Please yourself: nevertheless, my fortune and the money of the wife I have chosen for you, would go far towards reinstating future Earls of Dundonald in their ancient position as regards wealth.”

This conversation was communicated to the lady to whom I was affianced, on whom I urged a consent to a secret marriage,—a proposition in which she refused to acquiesce. My uncle, however, continuing firm in his resolves, I at length prevailed upon her to overcome her repugnance, and we were, on the 8th of August 1812, married at Annan in Scotland.

On my return my uncle again renewed the subject, and one morning, during our walk he informed me that he had made his will, leaving me one half his fortune. He, however declared, that compliance with his wish as to my marriage with the heiress of the Admiralty Court official was essential to its eventual confirmation. On arguing this, on the same grounds as before, he observed that some other person of wealth must be sought for, as his object was to retrieve the family fortune. Meanwhile he required my assurance that I would not marry without his sanction. Compliance with this was declined for the best of all reasons, that I was already married.

The fact of our marriage was not long concealed, and I did not inherit a shilling of my uncle’s wealth, for which loss however, I had a rich equivalent in the acquisition of a wife whom no amount of wealth could have purchased. A yet more singular sequel has to be told. On the discovery of the marriage, my uncle, though then an old man, also married, and was easily made to believe that non-payment of a large sum due to him from Government, on account of some contracts undertaken before he quitted India, had been delayed on account of my parliamentary opposition to the Ministry. This may or may not have been the case, but it induced my uncle to request that our future association might be less frequent. An intimation followed by the still more questionable course of his requesting an interview with Lord Liverpool, for the purpose of informing his lordship of the step he had taken with regard to myself, and assuring him that he had never countenanced my conduct in Parliament. Singularly enough, my uncle’s demands upon the Government were soon afterwards settled.

It was my wish here to have spoken of my wife’s devotedness to me amidst the many trying circumstances in which, I have been placed. They do not however, come within the scope of this volume, as regards their chronological order, I therefore postpone their narration.

CHAP. XXXVII.
NAVAL ABUSES.

GREENWICH HOSPITAL.—DROITS OF ADMIRALTY.—PENSIONS.—MY EFFORTS
FRUITLESS.—CONTRADICTION OF MY FACTS.—THE MANCHESTER PETITION.—NAVAL
DEBATES.—RESOLUTIONS THEREON.—MR. CROKER’S REPLY.—REMARKS
THEREON.—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT.—MY REPLY TO MR. CROKER.—RESOLUTIONS
NEGATIVED WITHOUT A DIVISION.—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT’S MOTION.—MR.
CROKER’S EXPLANATION.—HIS ATTACK ON ME CONFIRMING MY ASSERTIONS.—THE
TRUTH EXPLAINED.—ANOTHER UNFOUNDED ACCUSATION.—OFFICIAL CLAPTRAP OF
HIS OWN INVENTION.—MY REPLY.—ITS CONFIRMATION BY NAVAL WRITERS.—LORD
COLLINGWOOD’s OPINION.—MY PROJECTS ADOPTED IN ALL IMPORTANT
POINTS.—OFFICIAL ADMISSIONS.—THE RESULT TO MYSELF.

Soon after the commencement of the session of 1813, I made an attempt to direct the attention of Parliament to the administration of the funds of Greenwich Hospital, in the hope of restoring them to their legitimate purpose of rewards for wounds and long service in the navy. At this period their perversion had become notorious. In place of old retired seamen, not a few of the wards were occupied, and pensions enjoyed, by men who had never been in the navy at all, but were thus provided for, to the exclusion of worn-out sailors, by the influence of patrons upon whose political interest they had a claim.

As the only way to arrive at the full extent of the evil, in the absence of definite knowledge as to the specific documents required, I moved in the House of Commons, on the 11th of March 1813, for _all papers_ relative to the chest at Greenwich.

The motion was met by a suggestion from the Speaker—that “if those papers _had been_ laid on the table during the present session there would be no difficulty in granting them, but that if not, I must _specify_ the particular papers required.” This, of course, I was unable to do, but gave my reason for the motion as follows.

“LORD COCHRANE then proceeded to express his wish that the state of
the funds in Greenwich Hospital should be known, in order to ascertain
whether they were sufficient to make provision for that great body of
seamen and petty officers who would be entitled to be placed on the
establishment at the conclusion of the present war. The House, he was
satisfied, could have no objection to this information being laid
before them. One of his reasons for moving for it now was, the fact of
his having learned that it was in contemplation to devote the Droits
of the Admiralty to the current services of the year. The noble lord
concluded by moving, ‘That there be laid before this House an account
showing the revenues of Greenwich Hospital and the sources whence they
are derived, also the disbursements for management and the number of
pensioners in each class; distinguishing those maintained within the
hospital from the out-pensioners; also an account of the number
admitted in each year since 1800, and the amount of the pensioners at
that time maintained within and without the hospital.’

“LORD A. HAMILTON seconded the motion.

“THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said it was perfectly new to him that
there was any intention to devote the Droits of Admiralty in the
manner stated by the noble lord. He knew of no right which existed in
His Majesty’s Government to make such an application of those Droits,
and if they were so applied, it must be considered entirely as arising
from an act of royal bounty. The noble lord had adduced no reasonable
ground for the production of the papers for which he had moved.
Whether they were of an objectionable description or not he was unable
to judge; but he could not see why the table of the House was to be
crowded with useless and unnecessary documents. He should, therefore,
move the previous question.”

It was true that my having heard of the intention of the Government with relation to the Droits of Admiralty might not be a parliamentary ground for their production, but it was a ground for asking the question. Had I, however, stated my real motives, the only effect would have been prompt denial of the fact by all interested in the continuance of the abuse, which could only be proved by the papers themselves. I therefore endeavoured to procure them on other grounds.

“LORD COCHRANE persisted in the propriety of the House having before
them the information for which he had moved. There never was a period
at which it was more desirable that some steps should be adopted to
ameliorate the situation of His Majesty’s navy. Those brave men of
which it was composed were subject to the most heartrending
oppressions; and, in his opinion, had every cause to complain of their
situations. After having been released from the labours of a long and
arduous service, they were not, as they richly deserved, suffered to
return to the bosoms of their families, but were kept almost to the
last hour of their existence in a constant and unremitting state of
servitude, unless where they determined to sacrifice that reward which
their country had provided for them as a consolation for the buffeting
they had undergone to purchase their discharge.