Chapter XXIV: A Naval Study for All Time (5)

It will now be seen why the Government of that day refused the production of _“minutes”_ of the court-martial, almost every page of which would have rendered the defence of the Commander-in-chief—or rather that of his solicitor, Mr. Lavie, for I will do Lord Gambier the justice of believing that he did not write the defence read to the Court by the Judge-Advocate—untenable for a moment. That the Ministry of that corrupt day should have resorted to such a subterfuge can, however, scarcely add to the contempt with which history already regards them.

I told the House of Commons that “_posterity would judge their acts_.” Here, then, is matter for that judgment. That it was not made public at the time arose from two causes. First, that in those days the bulk of the press was influenced by the Ministry; and a jackal howl, from one end of the kingdom to the other, would have been—and was, the reward of my pains. Secondly, that until his Grace the Duke of Somerset gave me, a few months since, the chart and other official materials requisite to lay the matter before posterity, it was not in my power to do so; except, as on my previous attempts at justification, by assertions, which would have had no more effect on the public mind than now would those of the factions which persecuted me. As I belonged to no party in the House, I found no friends but the few who, like myself, stood alone in their independence of party. Those were themselves disorganised, and deceived by the well-timed eulogy of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, into the belief that the vote of thanks included me also. The numbers of the independent party were, however, as nothing compared to the organised masses in power, or eager to place themselves in power. The debate was felt to have most seriously damaged the party to whom I was politically opposed, and that party ever afterwards made me a mark for their revenge. In this brief sentence may my whole subsequent history be comprised.

CHAP. XXIX.

REFUSAL OF MY PLANS FOR ATTACKING THE FRENCH FLEET IN THE SCHELDT.

REFUSED PERMISSION TO REJOIN MY FRIGATE. I AM REGARDED AS A MARKED
MAN.—NO SECRET MADE OF THIS.—ADDITIONAL CAUSE OF OFFENCE TO THE
MINISTRY.—THE PART TAKEN BY ME ON THE REFORM QUESTION, THOUGH
MODERATE, RESENTED.—MOTION FOR PAPERS ON ADMIRALTY COURT
ABUSES.—EFFECT OF THE SYSTEM.—MODES OF EVADING IT.—ROBBERIES BY
PRIZE AGENTS.—CORROBORATED BY GEORGE ROSE.—ABOMINABLE SYSTEM OF
PROMOTION.—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT COMMITTED TO THE TOWER.—PETITIONS FOR
HIS LIBERATION INTRUSTED TO ME.—NAVAL ABUSES.—PITTANCES DOLED OUT TO
WOUNDED OFFICERS.—SINECURES COST MORE THAN ALL THE DOCKYARDS.—MY
GRANDMOTHER’S PENSION.—MR. WELLESLEY POLE’S EXPLANATION.—OVERTURE TO
QUIT MY PARTY.—DEPLORABLE WASTE OF PUBLIC MONEY.—BAD
SQUIBS.—COMPARISON WITH THE PRESENT DAY.—EXTRACT FROM “TIMES”
NEWSPAPER.

Just at the period of the court-martial on Lord Gambier, great national expectations were excited by the combined military and naval expedition to Walcheren, under the Earl of Chatham and Sir Richard Strachan. The object of this armament, the most formidable England had ever sent forth, was the capture or destruction of the French fleet in the Scheldt, and of the arsenals and dockyards of Flushing, Terneuse, and Antwerp, at the latter of which ports Buonaparte was carrying on naval works with great vigour.

The force employed for this purpose comprised 40,000 troops, 35 sail-of-the-line, 2 fifty gun-ships, 3 forty-four gun-ships, 18 frigates, and nearly 200 smaller vessels, besides dockyard craft; the first portion of the expedition quitting the Downs on the 28th of July, 1809, and anchoring the same evening near the coast of Walcheren.

To the reader acquainted with the views expressed in the first volume of this work, it will not be surprising that I viewed the departure of this force with regret; as had one half of the troops been placed, as suggested in my letter to Lord Mulgrave, on the islands of the French coast, and had half the frigates alone been employed, as had been the _Impérieuse_ and other vessels in the Mediterranean, not a man could have been detached from Western France to the Spanish peninsula, from which the remaining portion of the British army might have driven the French troops already there.

Full of these views, and knowing that short work might be made of the Walcheren expedition, so as to liberate both the naval and military force for service elsewhere, I laid before the Admiralty a plan for destroying the French fleet and the Flemish dockyards, somewhat analogous to that which would have proved completely effectual in Basque Roads, had it been followed up by the Commander-in-chief. My new plan had, moreover, received an important addition from the experience there gained, and was now as formidable against fortifications as against fleets.

The first measure of indignation against me for my late services to my country was the summary rejection of my plan, and not only this, but a refusal by Admiralty letter, given elsewhere, to proceed to the Scheldt to join my frigate, which had been sent there under the temporary command of the Hon. Captain Duncan, a most excellent and gallant officer.

Of the disastrous failure of the Walcheren expedition—the destruction of a large portion of the army by disease—and the retreat of the remainder, I shall not speak; these matters being already well known to the student of English history. I will, however, assert—and the assertion will be borne out by the plan of attack submitted by me to the Admiralty—that had my recommendation been adopted, even though not carried out under my own supervision, nothing could have saved the French fleet in the Scheldt from a similar fate to that which had befallen their armament in Aix Roads. Even—as with the disaster in Aix Roads fresh in remembrance, is probable—had the French fleet in the Scheldt taken refuge above Antwerp, it could only have placed itself in a _cul-de-sac_; whilst there was ample military and naval force to operate against the dockyards and fortifications during the period that my appliances for the destruction of the enemy’s fleet were in progress; for I in no way wished to interfere with the operations of the general or admiral commanding, but rather to conduct my own operations independently of extraordinary aid from either.

The cost of this plan to the nation would have been ten rotten old hulks, some fifty thousand barrels of powder, and a proportionate quantity of shells. The cost of the expedition, which failed—in addition to the thousands of lives sacrificed—was millions; and the millions which followed by the prolongation of the war, by the refusal of the Admiralty to put in operation any naval expedition calculated to effect a beneficial object—who shall count? So much for war when conducted by cabinets! But I was now a marked man, and the Government evidently considered it preferable that the largest force which England had ever despatched from her shores should incur the chance of failure in its object, than that the simple and easily applied plans of a junior post-captain should again jeopardise the reputation of his Commander-in-chief.

It was very curious that whilst this animosity was being directed against me in my professional capacity, I had shortly before received from His Majesty George the Third the highest decoration of the order of the Bath for my professional services!

So little secret did the Government make of their determination not to employ me again, that the public press regarded this determination as a settled matter. It was nothing that I had been instrumental in destroying the fleet so much dreaded by our West India merchants and the nation generally, or that I had offered to serve the French fleet in the Scheldt in the same way. I was now an obnoxious man, and the national expenditure of millions for defeat, was by the ministry of that day deemed preferable to cheap victory if achieved by a junior officer, to whom the Chancellor of the Exchequer—whilst denying him thanks for the service—had attributed the destruction of a fleet quite as formidable as the one in the Scheldt.

It may be scarcely credible to the present age that the Government should have openly announced such a determination. On the principle adopted throughout this work, of adducing nothing without proof, it will be necessary to place the preceding facts beyond dispute. From one of the most talented periodicals of the time I extract the following passage: “The worst injury which the radical reformers have done the country, has been _by depriving it of Lord Cochrane’s services, and withdrawing him from that career_ which he had so gloriously begun.”[72] The pretence was, that I had _withdrawn myself!_ at the time I was entreating the Admiralty to permit me to return to my frigate! This matter will shortly be made very clear.

Footnote 72:

Ed. An. Reg. vol. iv. p. 107.

One grave cause of offence to the Ministry, in addition to my determination to oppose the vote of thanks to Lord Gambier, had been the part I took at the famous meeting; held at the Crown and Anchor in the Strand. For a junior naval officer in that day to associate with such persons as Sir Francis Burdett and Major Cartwright was bad enough, but that he should _act_ with them was a thing unheard of in the naval service.

At this meeting many irritating things were said, though not by me. The late trial of the Duke of York was freely handled, and Colonel Wardle, the principal promoter of it, held up to public admiration. The “borough-mongering faction,” as it was forcibly termed by Sir Francis Burdett, was painted as involving the country in perpetual misfortune, and consigning to hopeless imprisonment all who ventured to expose their practices; whilst, it was said, even His Majesty could not carry on his fair share of government, being compelled to choose his ministers from a faction which not only oppressed the people, but controlled the King himself.

The resolutions moved by good old Major Cartwright at this celebrated meeting were at that time regarded as treason, though at the present day sound doctrine, viz. that “so long as the people were not fairly represented corruption must increase—our debts and taxes accumulate—our resources be dissipated—the native energy of the people be depressed, and the country be deprived of its best defences. The remedy was only to be found in the principles handed down to us by the wisdom and virtue of our forefathers, in a full and fair representation of the people in Parliament.”

This was perfectly true, and singularly enough, after the lapse of fifty-one years, the very same question forms the principal feature of the present session of Parliament, the debates on the subject in our day differing very little from their predecessors of half a century ago, if we may credit the following picture from a _Times_ leader of April 23rd last. “Call Reform what you will, it is almost anything you please, except legislation. _The belligerent parties will fight and cheat one another, and both together will cheat the people!_”

If after a battle of fifty years the people have not achieved the victory which early Reformers began, I have some right to call on the public to estimate the amount of obloquy which befell myself for my volun- *tary enrolment amongst the combatants on their side; and in the belief that the public of the present day will do my memory that justice which through life has been denied me, I shall not shrink from laying these matters before them. If such a picture of our present legislators be truly drawn, what must have been that of the faction against which I had to contend?

The speech made by me at the Crown and Anchor was very moderate, and indeed was spoken of by the ministerial organs as expressing less of the spirit of faction than any which had been delivered on that day. The worst part of it, so far as I can recollect, was that generally recorded, that “I hoped the time would come when ministers would not be employed all day in thinking what they were to cavil about all night, and all night in useless debate—whereby the real business of the country was neglected; so much so indeed, that when the newspapers had reached me abroad, I felt ashamed at the manner in which the government of my country was conducted.”

I had even gone further in moderation, though the Ministry did not know it, viz. by observing to Sir Francis Burdett that I thought he was going _too far_. His reply was characteristic. “My dear Lord Cochrane you don’t know ministers. If you wish to get anything from them, you must go for a great deal more than you want. Even then you will get little enough.” “Oh!” replied I, “if those are your tactics, go on, I’ll follow.”

The real grievance was, however, my support of the motions in Parliament which arose from the meetings at the Crown and Anchor. Mr. Madocks distinctly charged the Ministry with trafficking in seats, offering to prove to the House that Lord Castlereagh had, through the agency of the Honourable Mr. Wellesley, been instrumental in purchasing for Mr. Quintin Dick the borough of Cashel; and that when in the matter of the Duke of York Mr. Dick had determined to vote according to his conscience, Lord Castlereagh intimated to that gentleman the necessity of voting with the Government, or resigning his seat, which was accordingly done. The Ministry declined to accept the challenge.[73]

Footnote 73:

The defence to these charges consisted of what was termed eloquence,
but which was nothing but empty declamation, without the slightest
attempt at argument. The subjoined effort of Mr. Canning on this very
occasion is a specimen:—

“Good God! was this the time to suppose that the character of the
House of Commons was lost, and that the most hazardous experiments
should be made to restore it! It was the character and influence of
that House which achieved all our blessings! and distinguished the
character and condition of this country from that of any other country
in the world! Was the source from which such blessings flowed to be
stigmatised as a sink of corruption?”

Even at the present day this is amusing.

The subsequent motion of Mr. Curwen went further. But I must not forget that I am writing my autobiography, and not political history; I never made pretensions to parliamentary eloquence, and shall not inflict on the reader my humble efforts, excepting only those connected with the naval service.

On the 19th of February I moved for certain papers relative to the conduct of the Admiralty Court, and as my speech on that occasion was sufficiently comprehensive, I will adduce it with some slight explanations indicative of the practices which at that time were in full operation:—

“If these papers are granted it will be in my power to expose a system
of abuses in the Admiralty Court unparalleled in this country, even
exceeding those prevalent in Spain under the infamous administration
of Godoy.

“The whole navy of England was, by the existing system, compelled to
employ one individual to carry on its business before the Admiralty
Court; a person perhaps in whose competence or honesty they might have
no confidence. But admitting his ability and integrity to be
unquestionable, still the thing was preposterous. Would any man like
to employ an attorney who at the same time did business for the other
side? Was such a regulation consistent with equity or common sense?

“Even the personal liberty of naval officers was answerable for some
seizures, the produce of which notwithstanding went to the Crown, and
the most abominable compromises sometimes took place. Whether the
profits of these compromises found their way into the pockets of any
particular individual I was not absolutely sure, but had evidence to
presume that this was the fact. What indeed could be the design of
confining the captors to one proctor, except that secrecy as to these
questionable transactions may be preserved.”

One case was my own. In the first volume of this work is narrated the capture of the _King George_ privateer, or pirate, for which seizure by any vessel of war a reward of 500_l._ had been issued. The _King George_ in part actually belonged to parties connected with the Maltese Admiralty Court. As her condemnation was unavoidable, she was condemned as a _droit_ to the Crown; and costs to the extent of 600_l._ were decreed against myself, officers, and crew, for having taken her! A subject which will hereafter have to be further alluded to.

The effect of this system was to indispose officers to look after prizes, and thus many an enemy’s vessel was suffered to escape. One of my reasons for harassing the French on the coasts of Languedoc and Catalonia was, that it appeared more advantageous to effect something of service to the country, than to take prizes for no better end than to enrich the officers of the Maltese Admiralty Court, and at the same time to be ourselves condemned in costs for our trouble.

Some curious stories might be told of the effect of the system. It was my own practice, when any money was captured in a prize, to divide it into two portions, first, the Admiral’s share, and next our own. We then buried the money in a sand-bank, in order that it might not be in our possession; and, as opportunity occurred, it was afterwards taken up, the Admiral’s share being transmitted to him, our share was then distributed at the capstan, in the usual proportions. As I never made any secret of my own transactions, the Maltese officials regarded me with perfect hatred; they, no doubt, honestly believing that by appropriating our own captures to our own use, we were cheating them out of what they had more right to than ourselves! By their practices they appeared to entertain one idea only, viz. that officers were appointed to ships of war for the sole purpose of enriching them!

In a case narrated in the first volume, where I had, in Caldagues Bay, taken thirteen vessels laden with corn for the French army in Barcelona, after having sunk two small ships of war protecting them—we sold the corn vessels and their cargo to the Spaniards for a trifle, dividing the dollars amongst us, after sending Lord Collingwood his share. We afterwards took the vessels of war after raising them to Gibraltar, where I purchased one as a yacht. Had I sent those corn vessels to Malta, and had them condemned there—in place of obtaining anything for the capture, a heavy bill of costs for the condemnation of such small vessels would have greatly exceeded the sum realised by their sale.

To return to my address to the House:—

“The Navy was paralysed by this corrupt system. The most insignificant
vessels were condemned at an expense equal to that of the largest, so
that the condemnation of a fishing lugger might be swelled up to the
expense of condemning an Indiaman, the labour of capture ending in
nothing but putting money into the proctor’s pocket. As an instance
within my own knowledge, Moses Griffin, a Jew agent at one of the
outports, received two thirds out of the produce of a vessel, the
remaining third being the whole share distributed for admiral,
captain, inferior officers, petty officers, seamen, and marines. What
was the effect of such a system but to paralyse the Navy? It prevented
exertion on the part of the officers. Could it possibly be necessary
to have 120 ships of the line in commission to blockade twenty-three
ships of the enemy, if proper exertions were made. To insure alacrity
in harassing the shipping and commerce of the enemy, the abuses of the
Admiralty must be stopped, and nothing else would be effectual.”

A more startling practice was the following:—

“The commerce of the enemy was carried on to an immense extent by a
system of licenses, which permitted the enemy to trade where they
pleased. These licenses, issued by us, _formed an article of common
sale_ in Hamburgh and other places, and by means of such licenses the
enemy’s ships were seen coasting along by hundreds in perfect
security, even filling the river Thames, contrary to the Navigation
Act! We were thus raising up sailors for Buonaparte, _to whose
commerce and navy our ministers were the best friends_.”

My representations were met by Sir William Scott, the Judge of the Admiralty Court, with the inquiry as to “how that Court could possibly be answerable for the accounts of the agents on which I had founded my invectives? Lord Cochrane was a prompt accuser, but an unfortunate one, and he pledged his credit these accusations would prove as unfortunate as any that had preceded them.”

Unluckily for Sir William Scott’s allusion to my “unfortunate habit of making unfounded accusations,” Mr. Rose, the treasurer of the Navy, got up and officially confirmed my statements, by admitting the abuses complained of!

“This evil,” said Mr. Rose, “had been so strongly represented to him,
that soon after he had become treasurer to the Navy he had bestowed
many days and nights in its investigation. The result was, that _he
had before him no less than 153 cases, nine out of which were now
before the judge of the Admiralty Court_ (Sir W. Scott himself!) _in
consequence of the enormous charges which their accounts contained_.
In one case the charges of an agent at Portsmouth, who had 62,000_l._
to distribute, _amounted to 9462l., of which 1200l. was stated to be
for postage_!”

Mr. Rose recommended me to alter my motion, and to move for papers relative to a particular ship. I took this advice and moved for documents relating to two vessels, which was carried. Sir William Scott, however, never forgave me.

On the 9th of March, when these papers were laid before the House, I moved for others in order to elucidate them. This gave rise to another debate, in which some curious facts were brought to light by Colonel Wardle:—

“In the Navy Pay Office it was usual to promote junior clerks over the
heads of men who were many years their seniors in the service. One
junior clerk, eleven years in the office, was promoted to a place of
300_l._ a year, over the heads of senior clerks from twenty-seven to
thirty years in the service. In another case a gentleman was obliged
to retire against his will on 170_l._ per annum, and a _boy of
fourteen_ was appointed to his situation _with a raised salary_, and
over the heads of many senior clerks. The Secretary of the Sick and
Hurt Office was pensioned off at his full salary of 500_l._, and an
assistant appointed in his stead _with a salary of 1000l._!!”

On the 12th of March, my respected colleague, Sir Francis Burdett, than whom a purer patriot never breathed, moved that Mr. Gale Jones should be discharged from Newgate, to which prison he had been committed by order of the House, for placarding a handbill, the contents of which were construed into a violation of the privileges of the House. Sir Francis—conceiving that the people had privileges as well as those claiming to be their representatives, or rather that the popular voice constituted the power of their representatives—demanded the release of Mr. Jones, on the ground that the House possessed no privilege to commit a man for asserting his right to discuss its measures, and that neither legally nor constitutionally could such privilege exist.

The debate which ensued, not coming within the scope of this work, may be omitted. Suffice it to say that Sir Francis published in _Cobbett’s Weekly Register_ a revised account of his speech, in which he declared that the House of Commons sought to set aside Magna Charta and the laws of England by an order founded on their own irresponsible power.

Accompanying this revised speech was a letter addressed by Sir Francis to his constituents of Westminster; and these coupled together the House chose to construe into a breach of their privileges also. The result, as every one knows, was a motion for the committal of Sir Francis Burdett to the Tower.

My worthy colleague, however, refused to surrender. As there was no knowing to what lengths the despotism of the House might extend, a rumour of breaking into the honourable Baronet’s house being prevalent, a number of his friends, myself amongst them, assembled at his residence in Piccadilly to see fair play; but one morning, during our absence, an officer, armed with the Speaker’s warrant, forcibly entered, and Sir Francis was carried off to the place of his imprisonment.

It is quite unnecessary to detail these circumstances, as they are well known to every reader of English history. On the day after my excellent colleague’s capture the electors of Westminster held a meeting in Palace Yard, and adopted a petition which fell to my lot to present to the House.

The petition went even farther than had Sir Francis, by denouncing the House as “prosecutor and juror, judge and executioner,” and denying its right to exercise these combined offices. It taunted the House with evading the offer of a member to prove at the bar that two of the ministers had been distinctly charged with the sale of a seat on their benches, and that such practices were “as notorious as the sun at noonday.” They therefore prayed not only for the release of their member, but for a reform of the House itself, “as the only means of preserving the country from despotism.”

To have committed the whole of the electors of Westminster for adopting such a petition would have been inconvenient. To have committed me for presenting it would have been scarcely less dangerous, as depriving Westminster of both its representatives. The predominant feeling in the House appeared to be that of astonishment that a naval officer should dare to meddle with such matters. One member opposed its reception at all, another begged me to withdraw it, which I refused to do; and, therefore, the House adopted the only possible alternative of “ordering it to lie on the table.” The feeling towards myself may be conceived.

A similar petition from the freeholders of Middlesex was presented by Mr. Byng, and denounced by Mr. Perceval as a “deliberate and unparalleled insult to the House;” the petition denying the right of the House to imprison Sir Francis, and accusing Mr. Perceval and Lord Castlereagh by name as openly trafficking in seats; the petitioners further declaring that the presence of Sir Francis Burdett in the House was necessary to “enforce his plan of reform.” Angry debate followed, but neither Sir Francis nor Mr. Jones were released till the following month of June.

On the 11th of May Mr. Croker proposed a vote for the ordinances of the Navy, when I embraced the opportunity of making what was at the time termed “one of the most remarkable speeches ever delivered in that House.” The speech indeed was remarkable—not for its eloquence, for it had none, but for some very awkward statistics which _my enforced leisure_ had enabled me to collect and arrange. And let me here remark, that when my parliamentary speeches are adduced, the object is to give a faithful picture of the condition as well of the House as of the Navy at that period, not as specimens of an eloquence to which I had no pretension. My parliamentary efforts, such as they are, are on record, and the reproduction of a portion may save both myself and the reader the trouble of further dilating thereon.

One besetting sin of the Administration was the bestowal of pensions, which was carried on to a wonderful extent. Wives, daughters, distant relatives, &c., of all sorts of people who had votes or influence claimed a pension as a matter of right. Another besetting sin of the Government was doling out pittances scarcely sufficient for the support of life to those who had fought and bled for their country.

Bearing this in mind, the reader will readily comprehend the following “remarkable” address—as it has been termed by historical writers—to the House of Commons:—

“An admiral, worn out in the service, is superannuated at 410_l._ a
year, a captain at 210_l._, a _clerk of the ticket office retires on_
700_l._ _a year!_ The widow of Admiral Sir Andrew Mitchell has _one
third_ of the allowance given to the widow of a Commissioner of the
Navy!

“I will give the House another instance. Four daughters of the gallant
Captain Courtenay have 12_l._ 10_s._ each, the daughter of Admiral Sir
Andrew Mitchell has 25_l._, two daughters of Admiral Epworth have
25_l._ each, the daughter of Admiral Keppel 24_l._, the daughter of
Captain Mann, who was killed in action, 25_l._, four children of
Admiral Moriarty 25_l._ each. That is—thirteen daughters of admirals
and captains, several of whose fathers fell in the service of their
country, receive from the gratitude of the nation a sum _less than
Dame Mary Saxton, the widow of a commissioner_.

“The pension list is not formed on any comparative rank or merit,
length of service, or other rational principle, but appears to me to
be dependent on parliamentary influence alone. Lieutenant Ellison, who
lost his arm, is allowed 91_l._ 5_s._, Captain Johnstone, who lost his
arm, has only 45_l._ 12_s._ 6_d._, Lieutenant Arden, who lost his arm,
has 91_l._ 5_s._, Lieutenant Campbell, who lost his leg, 40_l._, and
poor Lieutenant Chambers, who lost both his legs, has only 80_l._,
_whilst Sir A.S. Hamond retires on_ 1500_l._ _per annum_. The brave
Sir Samuel Hood, who lost his arm, has only 500_l._, _whilst the late
Secretary of the Admiralty retires, in full health, on a pension of_
1500_l._ _per annum_!

“To speak less in detail, 32 flag officers, 22 captains, 50
lieutenants, 180 masters, 36 surgeons, 23 pursers, 91 boatswains, 97
gunners, 202 carpenters, and 41 cooks, in all 774 persons, cost the
country 4028_l._ _less than the nett proceeds of the sinecures of
Lords Arden_ (20,358_l._), _Camden_ (20,536_l._), _and Buckingham_
(20,693_l._).

“All the superannuated admirals, captains, and lieutenants put
together, have but 1012_l._ more than Earl Camden’s sinecure alone!
All that is paid to the wounded officers of the whole British navy,
and to the wives and children of those dead or killed in action, do
not amount by 214_l._ to as much as Lord Arden’s sinecure alone, viz.
20,358_l._ What is paid to the mutilated officers themselves is _but
half as much_!

“Is this justice? Is this the treatment which the officers of the Navy
deserve at the hands of those who call themselves His Majesty’s
Government? Does the country know of this injustice? Will this too be
defended? If I express myself with warmth I trust in the indulgence of
the House. I cannot suppress my feelings. Should 31 commissioners,
commissioners’ wives, and clerks have 3899_l._ more amongst them _than
all the wounded officers of the Navy of England_?

“I find upon examination that the Wellesleys receive from the public
34,729_l._, _a sum equal to 426 pairs of lieutenants’ legs, calculated
at the rate of allowance of Lieutenant Chambers’s legs. Calculating
for the pension of Captain Johnstone’s arm, viz. 45l., Lord Arden’s
sinecure is equal to the value of 1022 captains’ arms! The Marquis of
Buckingham’s sinecure alone will maintain the whole ordinary
establishment of the victualling department at Chatham, Dover,
Gibraltar, Sheerness, Downs, Heligoland, Cork, Malta, Mediterranean,
Cape of Good Hope, Rio de Janeiro, and leave 5460l. in the Treasury.
Two of these comfortable sinecures would victual the officers and men
serving in all the ships in ordinary in Great Britain, viz. 117 sail
of the line, 105 frigates, 27 sloops, and 50 hulks. Three of them
would maintain the dockyard establishments at Portsmouth and
Plymouth._ The addition of a few more would amount to as much as the
whole ordinary establishments of the royal dockyards at Chatham,
Woolwich, Deptford, and Sheerness; whilst the sinecures and offices
executed wholly by deputy would more than maintain the ordinary
establishment of all the royal dockyards in the kingdom!

“Even Mr. Ponsonby, who lately made so pathetic an appeal to the good
sense of the people of England against those whom he was pleased to
term demagogues, actually receives, for having been _thirteen months
in office_, a sum equal to nine admirals _who have spent their lives
in the service of their country_; three times as much as all the
pensions given to all the daughters and children of all the admirals,
captains, lieutenants, and other officers who have died in indigent
circumstances, or who have been killed in the service!”

This portion of the speech, true in every figure, was not incorrectly termed “remarkable;” and it made an enemy of every sinecurist named, as I had afterwards but too good reason to know. Nevertheless, the Administration had made a mistake. I was not permitted to be employed _afloat_, and was determined to effect all the good I could for the naval service by advocating its interests _ashore_.

But the worst was yet to come. My very excellent grandmother, of whom I have spoken in the first volume of this work in terms feebly expressive of her worth, had a pension of 100_l._ for the services of her gallant husband, Captain Gilchrist; and _though she had been dead eight years_, some patriotic individual had been _drawing her pension, as though she were still living_! Given, a hundred dead widows, with a pension of 100_l._ each, and some one was at the national expense the richer by 10,000_l._ per annum!

On this point, I thus proceeded, no doubt to the intense disgust of the party enjoying the defunct pensions:—

“From the minute expenses noticed in the naval estimate, viz. for
oiling clocks, killing rats, and keeping cats, I suppose that great
care has been taken to have everything correct. It was, therefore,
with great surprise that I found the name of my worthy and respected
grandmother, the widow of the late Captain Gilchrist of the navy,
continuing on the list as receiving 100_l._ per annum, _though she
ceased to exist eight years ago_!”

Notwithstanding the unanswerable argument of my grandmother’s pension, and the equally unanswerable comparison of sinecures and naval rewards—the Secretary of the Admiralty, Mr. Wellesley Pole, considered that he satisfactorily replied to both, by pronouncing my statements “inaccurate, and my complaints inconsistent! As to the pensions to the children of admirals, Lord Cochrane must know very well that _the widow or children of an admiral were not entitled, strictly speaking, to any pension_!”

In his defence to the sinecures of his own family, Mr. Wellesley Pole was even more infelicitous:—

“Lord Cochrane has thought proper to make an attack on the Wellesley
family, of which I am a member. He asserts that the Wellesleys receive
from the public no less than 34,000_l._ a year in sinecure places, and
then makes a calculation of _the number of arms and legs which that
sum would compensate_. In answer to this, I must observe that no
member of the Wellesley family, _except the noble lord at the head of
it_, possesses any sinecure. That noble lord certainly did, many years
ago, receive the _reversion_ of a sinecure which had since fallen in,
when he was about to go to a distant part of the world, in a most
arduous and important public situation. He was at that time in a
delicate state of health, and had a large family!”

That is, Mr. Wellesley Pole confirmed my calculation of the arms and legs. Though one sinecure had “fallen in,” he neither said when, nor what other sinecures had since accrued to the head of the family. His general reply to the matter is curious even at the present day. Mr. Wellesley Pole proceeded:—

“There is a considerable degree of eccentricity in the noble lord’s
manner, but at the same time he has so much good British stuff about
him, and so much knowledge of his profession, that he will always be
listened to with great respect. It is, therefore, the more to be
lamented that he does not follow the dictates of his own good
understanding, instead of being guided _by the erroneous advice, and
adopting the wild theories of others_. Let me advise him that
_adherence to the pursuits of his profession_, of which he is so great
an ornament, will tend more to his own honour and to the advantage of
his country, than a perseverance in _the conduct which he has of late
adopted, conduct which can only lead him into error_, and make him the
dupe of those who use the authority of his name to advance their own
mischievous purposes.”

This overture was unmistakable. If I would quit Sir Francis Burdett, sell my constituents, and come over to the ministerial side, the Government would—despite the affair of Lord Gambier—put me in the way of advancement. If I did not forsake my party, the high professional character drawn by Mr. Wellesley Pole would avail me nothing—not even to get employed again! I need scarcely say that the overture,—politely insinuating, as it did, that I was to be bought—was rejected on my part.

The remainder of my speech consisted of a contrast between this reckless extravagance in pensions and sinecures, and the petty saving which rendered the Navy useless:—

“Such are some of the pretended savings by which, when any are made,
the country is duped. Were there a prospect of success, I could point
out some savings better worthy attention. By adopting canvass of a
better quality, a saving equal to the additional income-tax imposed by
the Whigs may be made, equal, in fact, to one fourth of the Navy. The
remaining three fourths of the ships will be more effectual than the
whole, as their velocity would be increased by upwards of half a mile
in seven, and they would thus be enabled to capture those vessels
which at present escape from them all. The enemy distinguish our ships
of war from foreign ships by the colour of the wretched canvass, and
run away the moment they perceive our black sails rising above the
horizon, a circumstance to which they owe their safety, even more than
to its open texture. I have observed the meridian altitude of the sun
through the foretopsail, and by bringing it to the horizon through the
foresail, have ascertained the latitude as correctly as I could have
done otherwise. The paltry increase of cost will be more than
compensated by the superior strength of the canvass, on which depend
the safety of the ship and the preservation of all the lives on board.

“I shall, no doubt, hear it urged that a remedy is about to be
applied, and so it has ever since I can remember, but remedies at
public boards are sought in vain.”

To comprehend the preceding statements, it may be necessary to observe that we had at that time more than 1000 ships of war of all classes afloat, and that from the general bad character of their sailing and equipment, the enemy, who had little more than a tenth of the number, fairly laughed at us. Under any circumstances, the waste of money was deplorable, but under the corrupt system by which worthless ships were then introduced into the Navy, to which subject allusion is made in the first volume, it was utter paralysation of every natural effort.

The amount of obloquy these efforts to raise the condition of the naval service brought on me, amongst persons who held that afloat or ashore the duty of a naval officer was implicit obedience to the ministry of the day, will be readily understood. Reply to my statements being impossible, the ministerial organs made me the subject of numerous bad squibs, one of which is subjoined:—

“You fight so well and speak so ill, Your case is somewhat odd,
Fighting abroad you’re quite _at home_, Speaking at home—_abroad_;

Therefore your friends, than hear yourself, Would rather of you hear;
And that your name in the _Gazette_, Than _Journals_, should appear.”

The wit is somewhat obtuse, but the feeling here expressed was no doubt sincere. The Ministers indeed began to suspect that they had committed an error in preventing me from joining my ship, and shortly afterwards attempted to repair it by ordering me immediately to sea! With what effect will appear in the next chapter.

To the credit of the present age, wilful corruption has passed away, but false economy still prevails. It is only six years ago that we commenced a war without a single gun-boat, the only description of vessel that could operate with effect in the enemy’s waters. The consequence was that nothing was effected. At the close of the war we built gun-boats by the score, but now that they may be required for the defence of our own coasts, only to find them so rotten, as to be in danger of crumbling under the concussion arising from their own fire.

In the absence of a more assignable reason, it may be assumed that they have been cheaply built, for it cannot for a moment be supposed that the disaster arose from want of proper supervision. The subjoined extract from a leading article of the _Times_ of April 25th, 1860, will tell the story better than I can, and by that the public will see that the vice of what may be termed extravagant saving is not yet extinct:—

“Five years ago we were compelled to denounce the management of our
military and naval establishments. The public and the Government have
long since done us justice in this matter, the former by demanding
that ‘the system’ which paralysed the efforts of Englishmen should be
at once reformed, the latter by setting about those reforms with more
or less activity. We have now, most unwillingly, to return to the
charge, and to lay before our readers a sad history of mismanagement
and waste.

“At this time, we are told, there are forty-seven gunboats, besides
mortar vessels, hauled up at Haslar yard. All the world remembers the
pæan which was sung over this miniature fleet. Christened with
coquettish little names, the gunboats, built according to the newest
model and commanded by gallant young officers, were the pets and the
pride of the country. It was told how after the war they were all
drawn up ready for use on the shortest notice, how they could be
brought down to the water in less than an hour, and the enemy
confronted in less than a week with an extempore fleet as formidable
as any that could issue from Cherbourg. Twenty-two, we are told, have
been repaired at a great cost, and, with the exception of coppering,
are fit for launching. Nine vessels are under repair, fourteen are
waiting examination. These repairs began more than three years ago,
and have been continued at intervals to the present time. It will
appear singular that vessels built only in 1854 and 1855 should so
soon require such extensive reconstruction. Very quietly do these
repairs seem to have been carried on. The decay has been attributed to
the fact that the gunboats had been stripped of their copper, and
placed high and dry in a current of air. But now it is announced that
the decay must be attributed to another cause. Some gunboats which had
been kept afloat have been hauled up, and have been found to be ‘far
more defective than those stored beneath the sheds, and the only
conclusion which can be arrived at is that the whole of our gunboats
afloat are unfit for service.’ They have been constructed with the
most reckless disregard to the quality of the material. If those which
have been examined are a sample of the whole, we are at this moment
without an efficient gunboat. Scarcely a sound piece of wood can be
seen about them, every part bearing marks of ‘sap,’ and some of the
ribs are completely enveloped with it; the pressure of the hand on
their frame crumbles it to dust. Much more to this effect is given in
our Naval Intelligence. The copper bolts, also, which should have gone
through and been clinched on each side, ‘were found to have been
changed into short ends of about two inches, driven in on each side;’
a fact which, if correct, convicts either the builders or their
workmen of a deliberate and most disgraceful fraud.

“It may be that _the Government price was too low, and it is said that
the only two sound vessels were built by a firm which lost money by
their construction_. But that cannot be an excuse for the others. The
public will demand a searching and unsparing inquiry into these
delinquencies, and if it should appear that men holding a foremost
position in the community have been guilty of such malpractices, they
should be duly exposed and punished.”

CHAP. XXX.

MY PLANS FOR ATTACKING THE FRENCH COAST REFUSED, AND MYSELF SUPERSEDED.

PLANS FOR ATTACKING THE FRENCH COAST SUBMITTED TO THE FIRST LORD, THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE CHARLES YORKE.—PEREMPTORILY ORDERED TO JOIN MY SHIP
IN AN INFERIOR CAPACITY.—MY REMONSTRANCE.—CONTEMPTUOUS REPLY TO MY
LETTER.—THREATENED TO BE SUPERSEDED.—MR. YORKE’S IGNORANCE OF NAVAL
AFFAIRS.—RESULT OF HIS ILL-TREATMENT OF ME.—MY REPLY PASSED
UNNOTICED, AND MYSELF SUPERSEDED.

It has already been stated that the _Impérieuse_ frigate under my command had been placed by the Admiralty under the orders of the Honourable Captain Duncan, son of the distinguished admiral of that name, as acting-captain; but that permission to resume her command in the Scheldt had been refused on my application to rejoin her; no doubt with the intention of preventing me from effecting anything more which might become obnoxious to another admiral.

Now that my presence in the House of Commons had become inconvenient, the Admiralty affected to consider that _I was unjustifiably absenting myself from my ship!_ and an intimation was given that I must join her _within a week_!

So far from my absence being voluntary, _it had been forced_ upon me from the necessity of attending the court-martial and an acting-captain was to be put in my place. When I found that this step was determined on, I asked that Captain Duncan might be appointed, knowing that he would carry out my views in the management of a crew to which I was attached, as from long and arduous service they were attached to me. But notwithstanding this temporary appointment, I was anxiously urging on the Board of Admiralty the necessity of further operations in which it was my earnest wish to bear a part.

The correspondence which took place with the Admiralty will not only show this, but the record may prove useful in case of future wars.

On the 7th of June, 1810, I transmitted the subjoined letter to the Hon. Charles Yorke, who had succeeded Lord Mulgrave as First Lord of the Admiralty:—

“London, 7th June, 1810.

“SIR,—When I had the honour to present myself to you the other day, I
used the freedom to submit to your judgment the mode by which the
commerce of the enemy might, in my humble opinion, be greatly injured,
if not completely ruined, and that such mode, whilst assisting the
present, would be providing for the future, exigencies of the State.
The subject has pressed itself so forcibly on my attention, that I am
induced to address you by letter, which is perhaps the best means to
avoid engaging too much of your time.

“Passing over the points I then noticed as a stimulus to the Navy,
which, unfortunately for this country, though for the benefit of our
inveterate foe, is checked and restrained in its operations, I shall
beg permission to call your attention to other parts of the subject I
had then the honour to introduce.

“I am the more impelled to the intrusion by the intelligence recently
received of the islands of Las Medas on the coast of Catalonia having
been taken by the French, who were doubtlessly influenced by the
motive _that ought to actuate us to possess ourselves of the islands
on the coast of France_, or such of them as tend to aid her best
interests.

“In the present state of our Navy, the French rest in the fullest
confidence of assured security, and are, therefore, entirely at our
mercy, as regards the objects in my contemplation.

“In the present state of French security, L’Ile Groa at the mouth of
the Loire, and L’Ile Dieu on the coast of Brittany, may be easily
seized by 800 men, in defiance of any opposition; and by a _coup de
main_ a fourth part of that number would be sufficient. These islands
would afford safe anchorage to our cruisers, with the wind on shore,
and when, in the winter season, it is dangerous to approach them.

“The islands at the entrance of the port of Marseilles could be taken
by 100 men, and their importance is demonstrable by their situation.
United with the possession of one of the Hières, they would enable us
to cut off the communication between that part of France which
consumes the commodities of Italy, and thus the trade of Leghorn and
Genoa—once of importance to us—would be lost to our enemy, who now
exclusively enjoys it.

“The port of Bayonne, whence the French supply their dockyards at
Rochefort and Brest with timber, may be rendered useless by sinking a
few old vessels laden with stones. In like manner the anchorage of Ile
d’ Aix might be destroyed—the passages in the entrance of the Garonne
rendered impracticable—and that of Mamusson filled up.

“Proceeding on a more extensive scale, Belle Isle offers itself to
particular notice, and would be a most valuable acquisition, as it
gives shelter at all times to shipping. At Cette—commanding the
entrance of the canal through which the whole produce of Italy and the
shores of the Mediterranean are transported to the north of the French
empire—the locks might be seized on with facility, and held or blown
up, in defiance of the whole power of Buonaparte now in France. The
island of Elba might be reduced with as little difficulty, and as it
contains two excellent harbours, and protects the anchorage in the
Piombia passage, it is well calculated to interrupt all intercourse
between the Roman, Italian, and Tuscan States. Were it in our hands at
this moment, it would be an invaluable depôt for our manufactures,
which, on cutting off the trade with France, would be in the greatest
demand throughout the whole of Italy. It was given up at the
termination of the last war in ignorance—as may be presumed—of the
great advantage which it affords in this respect.

“I need not suggest to you, Sir, that if the measures on which I have
thus slightly touched were carried into effect, it would—even should
the enemy be disposed to disturb us—require a large portion of the
force _intended for the subjugation of Spain_, to be diverted from its
purpose. If these measures were to be followed up by a flying naval
expedition of trifling extent, and with comparatively only a handful
of troops, the enemy might be held in check, or at any rate their
plans elsewhere would be frustrated in part, and the remainder must
become insignificant from perplexity and embarrassment.

“I submit to you, Sir, that were it not for our naval superiority, and
a few thousand troops were at Buonaparte’s disposal, our coasts would
not be safe—the vessels in our ports would be swept away—and very
possibly the ports themselves laid in ashes. As we have at least
physical powers, and more honourable incitements than Buonaparte to
aid our energies and direct our objects, we ought bravely to pursue
all that he would dare to attempt.

“If, Sir, these points should appear to interest you, and you should
think it necessary to require of me further detail or information, I
shall be happy to wait on you for that purpose at any time you may be
pleased to name. I had intended to bring this subject before the
House, but a variety of obvious reasons showed me the propriety of
addressing you in the first instance.

“I have the honour, &c.,
“COCHRANE.

“The Right Hon. Charles Yorke.”

In reply to this letter, I was told by Mr. Yorke that the acting-captain had been appointed to the _Impérieuse_ for _“my accommodation”!!_ instead of Captain Duncan having been appointed from the necessity before mentioned! Mr. Yorke concluded his letter with a peremptory order for me to proceed to sea within a week:—

“Admiralty, June 8th, 1810.

“MY LORD,—I had the honour this morning of receiving your Lordship’s
letter of yesterday, communicating your Lordship’s opinions on various
points of service connected with operations on the French coast in the
Bay as well as in the Mediterranean, which appear to be nearly of the
same effect with those which I had the honour of hearing from your
Lordship personally some days ago.