Chapter XXIV: A Naval Study for All Time (2)

The fact is, Mr. Stokes swore to their positions _after their being warped off in consequence of the British fleet being prematurely brought to an anchor_—as being their positions _previous to their escape!_ which was the matter of inquiry before the court, viz. as to whether the Commander-in-chief had not committed a neglect of duty in permitting them to escape _by the rising tide_, when and before when the British force _could have operated with every advantage in its favour_. The court had nothing whatever to inquire about with regard to the ships which were _destroyed_, respecting which there could be no question; the subject of inquiry being whether the escape of the _other_ ships run ashore from terror of the explosion vessels on the night of the 11th, and _still ashore_ on the morning of the 12th, ought to have been prevented.

Not so much as one of the ships marked on Mr. Stokes’s chart formed part of the “group” to which he had sworn, in his oral evidence, as lying on the “western and northernmost edge of the Palles Shoal, _nearest the deep water_, all of which escaped towards the Charente, where he truly enough placed the _Ocean_ three-decker, but as she lay on the 13th instead of the 12th, he having sworn to the truth of his chart as showing her position on the morning of the 12th! It was a desperate venture, and can only be accounted for by the supposition that, in reality, Mr. Stokes had never seen the chart to which he was swearing. It was no wonder, as proved in the first chapter, that Mr. Stokes applied to the Admiralty for permission to _alter his chart_ before producing it in a court of law, where it must have fallen under my inspection!

I will indeed so far exonerate Mr. Stokes from a portion of blame, by declaring my belief that he never had looked at the chart to which he had sworn. There is little question in my mind but that this chart had been fabricated under the auspices of Mr. Lavie, Lord Gambier’s solicitor, the only hope of success consisting in affirming a false position for the grounded ships; the chart being then given to Stokes for paternity. Had it been otherwise, Stokes could not possibly have sworn to a chart in diametrical opposition to his oral evidence, which truly stated that on the morning of the 12th, the _Ocean_ and group lay on “_the north-west edge of the Palles shoal, nearest the deep water_,” where they were easily attackable. On his chart they were placed on the _opposite side of the shoal!_ where no ship could have got near them.

Lord Gambier no doubt saw the mistake committed by the evidence of his Master, and adroitly relieved him from the dilemma, by putting a question of a totally different nature. With this course the court complacently complied, notwithstanding that the president had detected a discrepancy so glaring.

Another material point on Mr. Stokes’s chart was his marking _a shoal_ between the Boyart and the Palles Sands, where Capt. Broughton and others present in the action, who _actually sounded there_, testify in corroboration of the French chart to there being _no shoal whatever_.[27] Yet Mr. Stokes marks only from twelve to sixteen feet, in the deepest part. That this statement was a misrepresentation on the part of Mr. Stokes, is proved by Lord Gambier himself, who, in his defence, says that “Mr. Stokes found on this bar or bank from _fourteen to nineteen feet”_ (_Minutes_, p. 134). When closely questioned on the point, Mr. Stokes deposed to these soundings as “_having been reported to him to have been found_”! (_Minutes_, p. 150.) The _Neptune François_ gives from twenty to thirty feet at low water, which was no doubt correct.

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Footnote 27:

See p. 68.

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But even had there been only nineteen feet of water Mr. Stokes again forgot his chart when he gave _oral_ evidence that “the rise of tide in Aix Roads is _twenty-one_ feet, which is more than we ever found in Basque Roads” (_Minutes_, p. 150). I had put the rise of tide at _twelve feet_ only, so that by the oral evidence of Mr. Stokes there was abundance of water for the British force to have operated with full effect.

A still further falsification of the chart was, that it reduced the channel by which the British fleet must have passed to the attack to little more than _a mile_ in width, in defiance of the fact that on all the official French charts the minimum distance between the Boyart Sand and the fortifications on Ile d’Aix was nearly _two miles_, and that Admiral Stopford, the second admiral in command, confirmed the correctness of the French charts so far as to admit a width of _a mile and a half_. The object of Mr. Stokes’s statement was to prove the danger to which, in a channel _only a mile wide_, the British ships would have been exposed from the batteries on Ile d’Aix had they been sent to the attack. To this end was the chart no doubt produced, and as narrowing the channel to a mile only—to meet the occasion—gave a colour to this view, his chart was accepted by the court, whilst the French charts which _marked two miles_, were rejected.

A yet more flagrant contradiction is—that within pistol shot of the _western_ and _north-western_ edge of the Palles Shoal, where Mr. Stokes first truly swore “the _Ocean_ three-decker and a group of four lay _aground_ on the morning of the 12th,” he has placed _the attacking British ships_, where their logs show that they never touched the ground, notwithstanding that they took up their positions on a _falling tide_. If they could float in safety much more could other ships have done so at 11 A.M on _a rising tide?_ How such a manifest discrepancy could have passed without comment from any member of the court-martial, is a point which is not in my power to explain.

Such are some of the leading features of this famous chart, upon which the acquittal of Lord Gambier was made to rest, though the chart was admittedly constructed—not from personal observation, otherwise than from the mizentop of the _Caledonia_, nine miles off—but from unofficial sources—from an anonymous manuscript, and _even from hearsay_!

Yet Lord Gambier did not scruple to introduce this chart for the guidance of the court, in the following terms:

“I have to call the attention of the Court to the plan drawn by Lord
Cochrane of the position of the enemy’s ships as they _lay aground on
the morning of the 12th of April_, and to that position marked upon
the chart verified by Mr. Stokes; the former laid down from uncertain
data, the latter _from angles measured and other observations made on
the spot_[28]; the difference between the two is too apparent to
escape the notice of the Court, and the respective merits of these
charts will not, I think, admit of a comparison.” (_Minutes_, p. 133.)

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Footnote 28:

See note, p. 26.

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This statement was made by Lord Gambier in face of the admission previously made by Mr. Stokes, that his observations were taken from the mizentop of the _Caledonia_, three leagues off—that he had never sounded in Aix Roads—that the soundings were only reported to him, the name of the reporter being omitted—and that he had only marked upon his chart, “_the ships that were destroyed_” on the evening and during the night of the 12th, the destruction, in fact, not being complete till the morning of the 13th.

This contradiction is so important to a right comprehension of what follows, that I will, at the risk of prolixity, bring into one focus Mr. Stokes’s admissions as to his _data_ for the construction of his chart.

“I prepared that drawing partly from the knowledge I gained _in
sounding_ to the southward of the Palles Shoal. The outlines of the
chart are taken from the _Neptune François_ (narrowed from two miles
to one!). The positions of the enemy’s fleet are from Mr. Fairfax and
the captain of the _Ville de Varsovie_. For the distance between the
sands I must refer the court to a chart _which I copied from a French
manuscript_!” (_Minutes_, pp. 23, 24.)

For this confused jumble from unauthoritative sources, the French charts were rejected as not being trustworthy, and Lord Gambier did not hesitate to endorse Mr. Stokes’s fabrication as being “from angles measured and other observations taken on the spot;” whilst by this act he decried the use of the French charts by which his own fleet had been guided!

Comment, whether on Lord Gambier’s statement or on Mr. Stokes’s involuntary contradiction thereof in his oral evidence, is superfluous. If such were wanted, it must be sought for in the fact already adduced in the first chapter, viz. that, in 1817 and 1818, Mr. Stokes, when conscious that his fabrication must become public, and that it might fall into my hands, thought it prudent to make affidavit before the Court of Admiralty that this chart, produced at the court-martial nine years before, _was incorrect_, and _therefore required alteration!!_ for which purpose the Admiralty gave him back his chart, though this, as already observed, remains to this day bound up amongst the Admiralty records. The affidavits of Mr. Stokes will be in the remembrance of the reader.

In a national point of view, Mr. Stokes’s chart has another and even more important feature. A comparison between the French chart and that produced by Mr. Stokes will show that the latter narrowed the entrance to Aix Roads—which on the French charts is two miles wide—to one mile, and that it filled a space with shoals where scarcely a shoal existed. Of the imaginativeness of Mr. Stokes in this respect, the French Government appears to have taken a very justifiable naval advantage, calculated to deter any British admiral in future from undertaking in Aix Roads offensive operations of any kind.

A chart of the Aix Roads based on a modern French chart has recently been shown me, as on the point of being issued by the Board of Admiralty, on which chart the main channel between Ile d’Aix and the Boyart sand is laid down according to charts copied from fabricated charts produced on Lord Gambier’s court-martial, and not according to the hydrographic charts of the _Neptune François_. The comparatively clear anchorage shown in the new chart is also filled with Mr. Stokes’s imaginary shoals! the result being that no British admiral, if guided by the new chart, would trust his ships in Aix Roads _at all_, though both under Admiral Knowles and at the attack in 1809 British ships found no difficulty whatever from want of water, or other causes, when once ordered in.

CHART D.
Constructed by M^r Fairfax and produced for the guidance of the Court
Martial. Like Stokes’s Chart, it narrows the channel to Aix Roads from
_two miles_ to _one mile_ though also like him professing to be an exact
outline of the French Official Chart.]

The solution of the matter is not difficult. For the purpose of deterring a future British fleet from entering Aix Roads, the modern French Government appears to have followed the chart of Mr. Stokes in place of their former official chart; and the British Admiralty, having no opportunity of surveying the anchorage in question, has copied this modern French chart; so that in future the fabrications of Mr. Stokes or rather I should say, the ingenuity of Lord Gambier’s solicitor, or whoever may have palmed the chart on Mr. Stokes, will form the best possible security to one of the most exposed anchorages on the Atlantic coast of France. Assuredly no British Admiral, with the new chart in his hands,—should such be issued—would for a moment think of operating in such an anchorage as is there laid down, notwithstanding that former British fleets have operated in perfect safety so far as soundings were concerned.

CHART D

was constructed by Mr. Fairfax, the Master of the Fleet, and was used by the Court as confirmatory of Mr. Stokes’s chart, agreeing with it, in fact, on nearly every point; a circumstance not at all extraordinary, as in his examination Mr. Stokes first says that “his _marks_ arose from the knowledge he gained in sounding in the anchorage of Aix” (_Minutes_, p. 23), whilst Mr. Fairfax swore that he “GAVE MR. STOKES THE MARKS.”!![29] A fact subsequently proved by Mr. Stokes, who admitted that he had “_never sounded there at all._” The credibility of either witness may be left to the reader’s judgment.

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Footnote 29:

I GAVE MR. STOKES THE MARKS!!! and I have all the different angles _in
my pocket_, with the different soundings! (_Mr. Fairfax’s Evidence,
Minutes_, p. 140.) This evidence is truly wonderful. Yet the Court
made no comment! and I was excluded from listening to the evidence!

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In one respect, the chart of Mr. Fairfax might have been considered by those interested to be an improvement on that of Mr. Stokes. The latter gentleman had narrowed the _two mile_ channel of the French charts to a _little more than a mile_, but the chart of Mr. Fairfax reduces it to _a mile_ only!

Mr. Fairfax’s chart was introduced to the Court with the same flourish as had been that of Mr. Stokes.

MR. FAIRFAX.—“This chart shows the state of the enemy’s ships at
daylight on the 12th of April. _This chart is correct_, except that
the head of the _Calcutta_ is placed by the engraver _too far to the
southward_. It should have been about N.W. by compass, and the head of
the three decker _Ocean_ is to the eastward, but _not sufficiently far
to the northward by compass_.”

Not much correctness here, but abundance of misrepresentation. Mr. Fairfax is very particular about the positions of the _heads_ of the grounded ships, but, like Mr. Stokes, not at all particular to a league or two as to where they lay aground. For instance, he is very sensitive about the position of the _Ocean’s_ head, yet the _Ocean_ herself is _not to be found on his chart_!! though the names of other enemy’s ships aground, not far from where she had lain before her escape, are given, to mark the care with which the chart had been constructed!

I will not in this place make any further observations upon Mr. Fairfax’s chart, this being identical with that of Mr. Stokes. The exposure of the one in the next chapter will serve for the confutation of the other. The reader will, from what has been stated, be able to form a pretty correct idea as to why—in, and subsequently to 1809—inspection of these charts was refused to me. At that period it was in vain that I published explanations, which, without access to the charts, were incomprehensible to the public; my unsupported declarations, as has been said, falling to the ground unheeded, even if they were not the cause of attributing to me malicious motives towards the commander-in-chief, after his acquittal by sentence of a court-martial. But for the consideration of his Grace the Duke of Somerset a stigma must have followed me to the grave. It is now otherwise, and I am content to leave the matter to the judgment of posterity. I must, however, remark, that neither the charts of Mr. Stokes or Mr. Fairfax were shown to me on the court-martial, though shown to nearly every other witness, one—Capt. Beresford—being told that he “_must_” base his observations on those charts. Had they been shown to me, I should in an instant have detected their fallacy.

CHAP. XXVI.

A NAVAL STUDY—(continued).

THE EVIDENCE OF OFFICERS PRESENT IN BASQUE ROADS.—ADMIRAL AUSTEN’S
OPINIONS CONFIRMATORY OF MY STATEMENTS—FALLACY OF ALLEGED REWARDS TO
MYSELF, IN PLACE OF THESE PERSECUTIONS.—TREATMENT OF MY ELDEST SON
LORD COCHRANE.—LETTER FROM CAPT. HUTCHINSON COMFIRMATORY OF THE
ENEMY’S PANIC.—A MIDSHIPMAN NEAR TAKING THE FLAG-SHIP.—EVIDENCE OF
CAPT. SEYMOUR, CONCLUSIVE AS TO NEGLECT, WHICH WAS THE MATTER TO BE
INQUIRED INTO, IN NOT SENDING SHIPS TO ATTACK.—ATTEMPT TO WEATHER
HIS EVIDENCE.—CAPT. MALCOLM’S EVIDENCE CONFIRMATORY OF CAPT.
SEYMOUR’S.—CAPT. BROUGHTON’S TESTIMONY PROVES THE COMPLETE PANIC OF
THE ENEMY, AND THE WORTHLESSNESS OF THEIR FORTIFICATIONS.—LORD
GAMBIER DECLARES THEM EFFICIENT ON SUPPOSITION ARISING FROM
HEARSAY.—ENEMY UNABLE TO FIGHT THEIR GUNS.—THE IMAGINARY SHOAL.—A
GREAT POINT MADE OF IT.—MR. FAIRFAX’S MAP—LORD GAMBIER ON THE
EXPLOSION VESSELS.—CONTRADICTED BY MR. FAIRFAX.—CONTRAST OF THEIR
RESPECTIVE STATEMENTS.—FAIRFAX’S EVASIONS.—HIS LETTER TO THE “NAVAL
CHRONICLE.”—THESE MATTERS A WARNING TO THE SERVICE.

The matters related in the preceding chapter will appear yet more extraordinary when contrasted with, and confirmed by, the evidence of eminent officers present in the action of Aix Roads; that is, of such officers commanding ships as were permitted to give their testimony, for those who were suspected of not approving the Commander-in-chief’s conduct, _were not summoned to give evidence before the court-martial_! In one instance—that of Captain Maitland, of the _Bellerophon_, whose opinions on the subject had been freely expressed—this gallant officer was ordered to join the squadron in Ireland, so as to render his testimony unavailable.

To a gallant officer still living, Admiral Sir Francis William Austen, K.C.B., who was present in Basque Roads, but, like other eminent officers, _not examined on the court-martial_, I am indebted for a recently-expressed opinion as to the causes why the majority of the enemy’s ships were suffered to escape beyond reach of attack, as well as of the persecution which I afterwards underwent, in consequence of my conscientious opposition to a vote of thanks to the Commander-in-chief.

The following is an extract from the gallant Admiral’s letter:—

“I have lately been reading your book, the ‘Autobiography of a
Seaman,’ and cannot resist the desire I feel of stating how much
pleasure I derived from its perusal, especially of that part which has
reference to the movements of the fleet in the Mediterranean from 1798
to 1800. Having been serving for the greater part of those years on
that station, your narrative excited in my mind a vivid recollection
of former times—as it were living that part of my life over again.

“With reference to the latter part of the volume which details the
proceedings in the attack on the enemy’s squadron in the Charente, I
wish to say as little as possible which may inculpate the conduct of
the Commander-in-chief, to whom, as you probably know, I owe a debt of
gratitude for his kindness to me.

“But at the same time I cannot but admit that he appears to me to have
acted injudiciously. It would have been far better had he moved the
squadron to a position just out of reach of the batteries on Isle
d’Aix, when he would have been able to see the position of the enemy’s
ships, and thus have decided for himself whether they could have been
attacked without needless risk, and not have been compelled to form
his determination entirely on the report of others.[30]

Footnote 30:

Who were more interested in the failure of the action than its
success, from the fact shown in the first volume of the ill-feeling
manifested towards me in consequence of my being a junior officer
temporarily appointed, though against my own will, and after all
others had declined the enterprise.

“Had he done so, it seems probable that he would have seen things in a
different point of view, and decided to send in a force sufficient to
have captured or destroyed the whole.

“I must, in conscience, declare that I do not think you were properly
supported, and that had you been so the result would have been very
different. _Much of what occurred I attribute to Lord Gambier’s being
influenced by persons about him who would have been ready to sacrifice
the honour of their country to the gratification of personal dislike
to yourself, and the annoyance they felt at a junior officer being
employed in the service._[31]

“I will only add that I consider your services in the _Speedy_,
_Pallas_, and _Impérieuse_ will entitle you to the warmest thanks of
your country, as well as to the highest honours which have been
awarded for similar services. Instead of which, you have in numerous
instances been persecuted in the most cruel and unrelenting manner.

“I desire to subscribe myself, with much respect and esteem,

“My dear Lord Dundonald,
“Yours very faithfully,
“FRANCIS W. AUSTEN.

“Admiral the Earl of Dundonald.”

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Footnote 31:

Though I had suggested the plan, after all other suggestions had
failed to satisfy the Board of Admiralty.

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If anything could alleviate the remembrance of the bitter persecutions originating with this one-sided court-martial, it is an unsolicited expression of opinion like that of the gallant Admiral Austen, whose name, for evident reasons, was _not_ included in the list of those summoned to give testimony on that remarkable occasion. That other gallant officers still living entertain similar sentiments, I make no doubt, for the simple reasons that, as honourable men, it is impossible for them to entertain other opinions. What would have been the result of the court-martial had such testimony as that of Admiral Austen been permitted, may safely be left to public decision.

The gallant Admiral and the naval public at large will perhaps be surprised to learn that my persecutions have not ceased at this day. Despite my restoration to rank and honours, my banner has never been restored to its place in Henry the Seventh’s Chapel, the unjust fine inflicted on me in 1814 has never been remitted, nor other rights withheld during my forced expulsion from the Navy conceded; the excuse being want of precedent, though with that of the gallant Sir Robert Wilson fresh in the archives of the nation.[32]

Footnote 32:

This fact, together with the particulars of Sir Robert Wilson’s
restoration, was obligingly communicated to me by that distinguished
patriot Joseph Hume, together with a letter expressive of his surprise
that my restoration had not been rendered complete. This letter and
the enclosures will be given in another place.

A few words may here be devoted to a point intimately connected with this subject. In several reviews on the first volume of this work, the public has been told of the handsome rewards which have been bestowed for my services. The reader will perhaps be scarcely prepared to learn, in answer to such statements, that with the exception of the ordinary good service pension granted for general service in 1844, thirty-five years after the action in Aix Roads, I never in my life received a recompense from my country in any shape, the Order of the Bath alone excepted. For my services in the _Pallas_, that of destroying three heavily-armed French corvettes at the embouchure of the Garonne, and cutting out the _Tapageuse_—all performed in one day—not a shilling was awarded to myself, officers, and crew, though in the late war with Russia I have been told that the destruction of a Russian gunboat was scrupulously paid for. For my services on the coast of Catalonia in the _Impérieuse_, to which Lord Collingwood testified that, single-handed, I had stopped the advance of a French army, not a farthing was conceded, whilst the thanks of Lord Collingwood were the only expressions of the kind ever awarded for what English historians have eulogised even more highly than did his Lordship.

For the partial destruction of the enemy’s fleet in Aix Roads not a farthing was given to myself, officers, or crew; but nine years afterwards, when told that I might take my share of head-money with the rest of the fleet, I replied by refusing both the offer and the money, on the ground that the ships only which took part in the action had a right to it.

The reader will pardon this brief digression, which has arisen from Admiral Austen’s allusions to the persecutions unworthily inflicted on me, and I have chosen the opportunity to set the public right on a subject which has been much misapprehended, to the detriment of myself and family. Neither directly nor indirectly have my services throughout my whole career ever cost the country a _penny_ beyond the ordinary pay and the ordinary good service pension to which my rank entitled me; nor did any of my family ever receive a place under government, other than that to which they have risen in the ordinary course of naval promotion.[33] After this positive assurance on my part, I feel confident that the portion of the press which has expressed an opinion that “I had been amply rewarded for my services,” will do me the justice to acknowledge an unintentional error.

Footnote 33:

My third son is a post-captain, and my youngest a commander in the
navy, both having won their rank by services in action. With regard to
my eldest son, Lord Cochrane, the public shall judge of the favour
shown to him on my account. He was originally placed in the navy, in
which he served four years, but was driven from the service by the
animosity excited by the imputations against his father. After this he
entered the army, in which he served eighteen years. He was engaged
throughout the Canadian rebellion, and subsequently for eight
consecutive years in the pestilential climate of China during the war.
He there served under Lord Clyde, acted as aide-de-camp to
Major-General D’Aguilar, and subsequently as Quartermaster-General.
His health having at length broken down under the arduous nature of
his duties—he having been, as I have reason to believe, the only
officer who remained for so long a period on a station proverbially
unhealthy—he was ordered home on sick leave, and had to undergo the
unusual mortification of being periodically, and that too at short
intervals, ordered to appear before the Medical Board in London. This
was actual persecution, nor did it cease till Major-General D’Aguilar
himself went to the Horse Guards and remonstrated against such conduct
being pursued towards an officer whom he had sent home as being worn
out by eight consecutive years’ hard duty. On my son’s asking for an
unattached majority _by purchase_, he was told that his length of
service, from 1833 to 1851, was insufficient, notwithstanding that he
gave the precedent of earlier promotion in the case of an officer who
had married the daughter of the Master-General of the Ordnance, and
who got his majority in eleven years. Finding no prospect of
promotion, my son sold out, quitting the army as a captain, as the
state of his health did not warrant him in returning to his regiment.
I adduce this as a specimen of the kind of reward bestowed on me or my
family.

Since the receipt of Admiral Austen’s letter, I have been favoured with another, from Capt. Hutchinson, who, at the time of the action in Aix Roads, was a lieutenant in the _Valiant_, one of the two line-of-battle ships reluctantly sent to the assistance of the _Impérieuse_, when engaged single-handed with three of the enemy’s ships. Captain Hutchinson was, therefore, in action throughout the whole affair, but, like Admirals Austen and Maitland, _was not summoned to give evidence on the court-martial_.

Capt. Hutchinson’s letter, whether in point of fact or ability, deserves to be put on record as a proof that when naval officers have the opportunity of speaking their minds on any subject connected with their noble profession, there are few amongst them who will let self-interest outweigh the honour of the service. So complete is the information voluntarily given by Capt. Hutchinson, with whom I have not the pleasure of being even personally acquainted, that it might have saved me much of the lengthened critical explanation into which my sense of duty to the naval service, as well as to my own reputation, has compelled me to enter. As a further corroboration of my own proofs, written before the reception of Capt. Hutchinson’s letter, I can only tell that gallant officer how highly I appreciate it, and shall be surprised if the rest of my brother officers do not form the same judgment.

Cumberland House, Chilham, Canterbury,
June 8th, 1860.

“MY LORD,

“I have read, with very great interest, the first volume of your
Autobiography, and if the second is not yet published, it is possible
that what I have to communicate may be of some service in any further
notice you may give of the attack upon the French fleet in Aix Roads.
I would not otherwise have taken the liberty of writing merely to
express the interest taken in your Memoirs, since I can only entertain
_that_ in common with every naval officer who has any true love for
his profession, and of esteem for those who have so eminently adorned
it by their gallantry and skill.

“I was fifth or junior lieutenant of the _Valiant_, on the mortifying
occasion above mentioned, and can bear testimony _to the indignation
which pervaded the whole fleet in witnessing the total want of
enterprise, and even common sense of duty, which then permitted so
many of the enemy’s ships to escape, when they were entirely at our
mercy_.

“I have, however, to mention some circumstances which may throw light
upon the mystified despatch of Lord Gambier, which certainly surprised
all those who were present. In the first place, Lord Gambier can have
given no _positive_ orders to Capt. Bligh of the _Valiant_ to _attack_
the French ships which were aground at the time indicated in the
despatch, for after we had anchored off the Boyart Shoal, Capt. Bligh,
seeing you go in with the _Impérieuse_ _unsupported_ (after waiting
some time, expecting to be _ordered_ by the Commander-in-chief to
assist you) went in his gig on board the _Caledonia_ to _volunteer his
services_. Lord Gambier expressed himself greatly obliged, but said
some other ship must accompany, upon which Capt. Bligh selected the
_Revenge_, from regard for Capt. Kerr, who had been acting for him in
the _Valiant_ some time before, when he had occasion to go on leave of
absence for private affairs.

“We accordingly ran in, as your Lordship has detailed, and I have
nothing to remark as to what followed but one circumstance, of which
your Lordship does not appear to have been aware. No doubt you would
have observed that on the evening of the 12th the crews of the _Ocean_
and two other enemy’s line-of-battle ships near her, were evidently
_flying from them in a panic, numerous boats from the shore assisting
in conveying them from the ships_.

“This was so apparent that our Captain, Bligh, went in his gig, with
two other Captains, as soon as it was dark, to reconnoitre these
ships, with a view to take possession of them with boats, if they were
deserted.

“These Captains returned, however, reporting that they had found them
surrounded by boats, &c., and that, consequently, they could not be
attacked. In the morning, however, no boats were near them, nor were
any persons seen stirring on board them; and it was not till about ten
o’clock, I think, that the crews, _finding that we had not taken
possession, took courage, ventured to return on board their ships, and
immediately began to warp them out of our reach_.

“Captain Bligh was a man of the firmest nerve I ever knew, and
therefore I can only suppose that the boats he saw were still engaged
carrying the crews on shore, though I believe it was at least ten
o’clock at night when he went to reconnoitre, and I know we were
greatly puzzled at the time to account for the presence of these
boats. As a proof that these ships _were_ totally deserted that night,
I need only refer your Lordship to the account of Admiral Gravière,
quoted by you, where he says, ‘_The panic was so great, that ships
which had not even been attacked were abandoned by their crews_.’

“But, my Lord, we heard soon after this disgraceful affair, by means
of some French vessel which had been boarded or taken, that such was
the case. I do not now perfectly recollect _how_ this information
reached us, but we had no doubt of the fact at the time, it being only
in accordance with our own observations and conjectures. I exceedingly
regret that I did not make note of this at the time, but the belief in
the fact of the crews having deserted those three ships was so general
and undoubted, that it never occurred to me that it might be
questioned.

“The report went further, and added one singular circumstance—that
there was _one_ man who _did_ remain when all the remainder of the
crews had quitted. This was a quarter-master on board the _Ocean_,
who, indignant at the cowardly desertion of the ships, _hid himself_,
when the crews were ordered to quit, and this was the salvation of
that three-decker and the two other ships, in a very extraordinary
way. A little midshipman belonging to one of our smaller vessels (I
believe a brig) had been sent in a jolly-boat that night with a
message to another ship, and having delivered it, instead of returning
immediately to his own vessel, he proposed to his men to go and look
at the French ships from which the crews had been seen to fly. His men
of course were willing, and they approached cautiously _very near_ to
the three-decker (the night was very dark) before they could observe
any stir on board or around her. They were then suddenly hailed by the
quarter-master before mentioned with a loud “Qui vive!” Of course the
poor little midshipman took it for granted that the ship was occupied
by more than that one man, and he hastily retreated, glad to escape
capture himself; but had he known the truth, _that little midshipman,
with his jolly-boat and four men, might have taken possession of a
three-decker and two seventy-fours_!

“This seems more like a story of romance than an actual occurrence,
and I greatly regret that I did not then make note of every name and
circumstance, which at this distance of time I cannot call to mind,
but I have never entertained any doubts as to the facts here detailed,
and I have always mentioned them in speaking of that most
unsatisfactory affair of Basque Roads. Admiral Gravière’s account is a
positive confirmation of what we observed and fully believed as to the
abandonment of the ships, and I only wonder that he should not have
mentioned the noble conduct of the quarter-master.

“Admiral Gravière, however, would probably not have heard of the
approach of the boat, and the quarter-master himself would not perhaps
have reflected upon the possible danger the ships were in from the
approach of only _one little boat_; yet if he had not been there to
hail that boat, it is more than probable that the little midshipman
would have continued cautiously to approach, till he discovered that
the ships were entirely deserted, and he would either have ventured to
take possession himself, or would certainly have returned to report
the circumstance, and a proper force would have been despatched to
take advantage of the abandonment, if it had been found to be as he
reported.

“It was the supposed abandonment of the ships, indeed, which induced
him to approach them at all, and it was this also which induced Capt.
Bligh to reconnoitre. These, my Lord, are the only circumstances I had
to communicate, and no doubt they will be in some degree interesting,
though not wholly satisfactory, from my inability to establish the
perfect correctness and truth of them. I _have_ not, and never _had_,
any doubt myself, though I am by no means inclined to believe
cock-and-bull stories. Of one thing I am very certain, that there was
a universal conviction, that, but for the ingenious ruse adopted by
your lordship of _running in singly with the Impérieuse, and then
making a signal of distress, or rather of want of assistance, nothing
whatever would have been effected against the French fleet_.

“I remain, my Lord,
“Your very obedient servant,
“CHAS. HUTCHINSON, Capt. R.N.

“The Right Honble. the Earl of Dundonald.”

To return to the testimony of eminent officers at the court-martial, by which evidence Admiral Austen and Captain Hutchinson will be pleased to find their disinterested opinions corroborated.

The first evidence adduced shall be that of another distinguished officer, also still living, viz. Admiral Sir George Francis Seymour, K.C.B., G.C.H., who commanded the _Pallas_ frigate at the action in Aix Roads, and remained by me when the line-of-battle ships left the roads on the morning of the 13th of April.[34]

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Footnote 34:

See vol. i. p. 392.

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An attempt was made to stop the evidence of Captain Seymour nearly at its commencement, by Lord Gambier remarking that he had “_no further questions to propose to Captain Seymour_;” who however promptly asked whether he was not “bound by his oath to relate _every circumstance_ within his knowledge, respecting the proceedings of the fleet.” (_Minutes_, p. 190.)

To this pertinent query the President replied; “If the questions that _are asked you_ should not seem to embrace all the circumstances _to which it refers_, you are still bound to relate them.” (_Minutes_, p. 190.)

CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“From what period am I to give my answer?”

_President._—“From the time of your being _sent in to attack the
enemy_, and your having remained there.”

CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“_Without going back to the 11th?_”

PRESIDENT.—“No! _I take it from your going in on the 12th._”
(_Minutes_, p. 193.)

The President thus authoritatively stopped Captain Seymour from saying a single word relative to the neglect of the Commander-in-chief in not having sent ships to the attack before the _Ocean_ and group floated away, as the _Pallas_ and the other vessels were withheld until the _afternoon of the 12th_. This, however, did not prevent Captain Seymour from taking the course which he had evidently proposed to himself.

CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“I think the ships _might_ have floated in sooner; that
they might have come in on the last half of the flood-tide.”[35]

PRESIDENT.—“How much sooner would that have been than the time they
actually did go in?”

CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“At eleven o’clock.”

PRESIDENT.—“What time did the line-of-battle ships go in?”

CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“Within a short time after two o’clock.” (_Minutes_, p.
193.)

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Footnote 35:

Which rose as high as the last quarter of the ebb tide, when two
line-of-battle ships were sent in and remained without grounding.

-----

These three hours made all the difference in the result of the action, and were in fact the point of inquiry before the court. At eleven o’clock the whole fleet came to an anchor in Little Basque Roads, instead of detaching a force to attack the enemy, as Captain Seymour testifies they _might_ have done. The French ships were at that time helplessly aground. Seeing the British fleet come to an anchor, the enemy took heart, and strained every nerve to warp off, in which, being unmolested, they succeeded—by throwing their guns and stores overboard—and soon after _one o’clock_ had _effected their escape_.

At _two o’clock_—seeing me go in with the _Impérieuse_, in order to prevent the other ships from escaping also, and rightly appreciating the risk I was running single-handed, the Commander-in-chief then, but not till then, reluctantly sent in two line-of-battle ships and some frigates, and this only after repeated signals—the final one necessarily being _in want of assistance_. So that _no attack_ was made on the enemy’s ships till _after_ the escape of the _Ocean_, and all those nearest the deep water, though these were most easily attackable; nor would any attack have been made _at all_, but for my last signal. Had Admiral Seymour been permitted to speak to this point, his evidence would have been most conclusive, as the President must have seen when he ordered the witness to speak only as to what occurred _after_ he was sent in; that is, after the French ships had escaped, which was the subject of inquiry, about which Admiral Seymour was thus ordered to say nothing!

This forms, in fact, the history of the whole affair; three French ships only being attacked in the afternoon, after all the outermost had been quietly permitted to heave off and escape during the morning, and with a rising tide in favour of the British force. Captain Seymour’s highly honourable pertinacity in giving the above important opinion as to what was clearly the duty of the Commander-in-chief at _eleven o’clock_, after he had been cautioned by the President not to speak of anything which occurred previous to _two o’clock_, when the _Pallas_ was sent in, will be regarded—as it deserves to be regarded—in the light of truth and honour holding itself superior to power. For the sake of the service no less than for that of Admiral Seymour, I am proud to record this instance in which self-interest weighed nothing in comparison with the interest of the country, and the service which Captain Seymour evidently considered to be at stake.

This reply of Captain Seymour took the Court by surprise, as opening the very point sought to be avoided. This led to the subjoined angry remonstrance from Admiral Young.

ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“The general question is not meant to subject the
general conduct of the Commander-in-chief to the opinions of all the
officers serving under his command. If you think the two ships
(_Revenge_ and _Valiant_) not going in so early as you think they
might have floated to be an instance of neglect, it is your duty to
state it, that we may _inquire into it_, and hear _any other evidence_
upon it.”

The tendency and peculiarity of this remark to Captain Seymour, is worthy of note. It more than insinuates that he was incapable of forming a correct judgment, and plainly tells him that his evidence will go for nothing, but “_to hear any other evidence_” upon it. A perusal of the minutes of the court-martial will show the meaning of this expression, viz. that when any officer in command spoke his mind on the subject, the next witness was a master or other inferior officer _to contradict his evidence_. For this purpose masters and others were recalled over and over again—which is one of the most curious features of the court-martial.

Captain Seymour had said nothing about the _two ships_, but that _the ships_—meaning the British line-of-battle ships—might have gone in to the attack at _eleven o’clock_, and thus replied to the insinuation.

CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“I have already stated that I cannot say it was
misconduct. I STATE THE FACT AND LEAVE THE COURT TO JUDGE.”

ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“You state an opinion that _the fleet_ would have
floated in at eleven o’clock.”

CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“Yes, THAT THERE WAS WATER ENOUGH.”

ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“Is that all you mean to say, that there would have
been water enough for them to have floated in?”

CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“Yes. That is all I _have_ said.”

ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“When you say that the ships of the line would have
floated in at eleven o’clock, do you mean to speak to the depth of
water alone?”

CAPT. SEYMOUR.—“I confine myself to the _meaning of the words_, that
there WOULD HAVE BEEN WATER ENOUGH FOR THE LINE-OF-BATTLE SHIPS TO
HAVE FLOATED IN. That is what I mean to say. With regard to the
opposition they would have met with, THE COURT HAVE AS MUCH BEFORE
THEM AS I HAVE.”[36] (_Minutes_, p. 195.)

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Footnote 36:

Two ships of the enemy’s line afloat, viz. the _Foudroyant_ and
_Cassard_!! “These,” said Lord Gambier in his defence, “_must have
entirely crippled every one of our ships in their approach through so
narrow a channel_. Besides which, _some of the grounded ships were
upright!!_ and could have brought their guns to bear on the entrance.”
(Lord Gambier’s Defence, _Minutes_, p. 125.) Two enemy’s ships, both
of which made sail for the Charente the moment the escaped ships had
got off, “_must have entirely crippled_” a powerful British
squadron!!!

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That is, in Captain Seymour’s opinion, the fleet ought to have proceeded to the attack at eleven o’clock instead of then coming to an anchor, and by that act, giving the enemy’s ships aground ample time to warp off and escape, which they would not otherwise have attempted; a point on which all French writers agree.

Attention must here be drawn to Admiral Young’s constantly repeated expression “_floated in_.” The expression appears to have been used, not more to prevent Captain Seymour from using any other, than to convey the idea that there was no room in the Channel for operations, but that the ships, if sent to the attack, must have _floated_ or _drifted_ in, exposed to the fire of the enemy, had Lord Gambier directed them so to do!

At the conclusion of Captain Seymour’s evidence, so clear and so conclusive, the Commander-in-chief had the bad taste to remark that he “_did not consider it of the least consequence_!” (_Minutes_, p. 196.) An opinion in which posterity will assuredly not coincide.

I must here repeat that I was not permitted to be present in the court during the examination of the witnesses, _or to know who had been summoned to appear_, the evidence of Captain Seymour, and that of several other eminent officers, would not have been taken at all, had I not contrived to ascertain the names of those summoned. Finding that most of these had either not been present in the action, or were known to be in the interest of the Commander-in-chief, I went on the half deck of the _Gladiator_, and wrote a note to the Court, pointing out the unfairness of such proceeding, and naming other officers who ought to be examined. They were _then_ summoned, and their evidence will be conclusive to the reader, as it ought to have been to the Court, and would have been so had not the Court itself been picked by the Government, _i.e._ principally composed of officers who had been ordered to hoist their flags to qualify them for sitting on the court-martial, which, being ended, they were ordered again to strike their flags!

As a contrast to the evidence of Captain Seymour, I will turn to that of three officers who were _not present in the action_, and in fact, do not appear to have been in Aix Roads at all, either before or after it; though without a minute knowledge of those Roads they could not be competent to give even a general opinion on the subject. Without reason assigned—as indeed it was not in their power to assign any—each thus delivered his testimony.

QUESTION (_put to each in succession_).—“Was everything in your
judgment done that could be done, to effect the destruction of the
enemy’s ships?”

CAPT. BURLTON.—“I _think_ there was.”

CAPT. BALL.—“I _think_ there was everything done.”

CAPT. NEWMAN.—“Perfectly so.”

QUESTION.—“From the time the Commander-in-chief arrived in Basque
Roads to the time of your quitting it, can you state any instance of
neglect, misconduct, or inattention on his part to the public
service?”

CAPT. BURLTON.—“I know of none.”

CAPT. BALL.—“No; I cannot.”

CAPT. NEWMAN.—“None.”

Widely different was the testimony of Captain Malcolm of the _Donegal_—the late Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm—-whose love of truth, like that of Captain Seymour, was not to be fettered by negatives in reply to leading questions. Captain Malcolm thus spoke of the only two enemy’s ships afloat, _Foudroyant_ and _Cassard_, which two ships Lord Gambier in his defence said “_must have entirely crippled_” the whole British force, had it attempted to pass the channel leading to Aix Roads.

“When those ships quitted their stations there was then _no obstacle_
to prevent the small ships from going in; by which I mean the
_frigates_, or even SEVENTY-FOURS. The fire from Isle d’Aix they
nearly _avoid_ by keeping near the Boyart.” (Capt. Malcolm’s evidence,
_Minutes_, pp. 208, 209.)

Lord Gambier had stated in his defence that he refrained from sending in the ships on account of the danger from the fire of the fortifications. Mr. Stokes supported this view by swearing that the ships would have been “within point-blank range of shot.” The assertion of Captain Malcolm that they would be nearly out of reach of shot, which was true, was _malapropos_, though not to be shaken by the testimony of an inferior officer. It was therefore dangerous to recal Mr. Stokes in opposition to so high an authority as Captain Malcolm; Captain Kerr was consequently recalled whilst Captain Malcolm _was under examination!_ to say that his ship was _once_ hit from the batteries. After which extraordinary interruption Captain Malcolm was suffered to proceed with his testimony.

PRESIDENT.—“Was the enemy’s three-decker in a situation on the morning
of the 12th to have done any mischief to ships that had been sent in?”

CAPT. MALCOLM.—“Till about noon she was heeling considerably, _and
appeared to me to be throwing her guns overboard_. When she righted,
she could have annoyed ships coming in.”

QUESTION.—“At what time did the three-decker remove from the situation
where you saw her on shore _heeling_?”

CAPT. MALCOLM.—“About two o’clock. I took no note of the time.”

QUESTION.—“Would you have sent ships in before the two ships were
removed and the three decker got off?”

CAPT. MALCOLM.—“Had it appeared to me that there was no other chance
of destroying those ships _but by such an attack_, I certainly think
it _ought to have been made_. It was understood that they must all
again ground in the mouth of the Charente where it was the _received
opinion_ they could be attacked by bombs, gun-vessels, and fire-ships
again, _without risk_.”

QUESTION.—“Upon the whole, are you of opinion that, of all the French
ships which got ashore on the night of the 11th of April, any more
could have been destroyed than were destroyed had the British ships
been earlier sent in on the 12th of April to attack them?”

CAPT. MALCOLM.—“Had they been attacked by the British ships, in my
opinion _they could not have been warped off from the shore, as it was
necessary to lay out anchors to heave them off_. Those that were not
aground had always the option of running further up the Charente. It
should be understood that it must have been at the risk of our fleet,
as I have already mentioned.” (_Minutes_, pp. 209 to 211).

Of course, every naval combat must be at the risk of fleets; such risk, in my judgment, forming the chief object in building fleets for the purpose of encountering it. But the risk to a whole squadron from two ships afloat, and a three-decker ashore, “_heeling over, and throwing her guns overboard_,” is what no brave seaman would ever take into consideration. The chief risk, as has been alleged by Lord Gambier, was from the fire of the batteries on Ile d’Aix, which he had shortly before pronounced “_no obstacle_.” What this was, may be judged from the fact that Captain Seymour, in the _Pallas_, Captain Woolfe, in the _Aigle_, and myself in the _Impérieuse_, lay for two days in this formidable position without loss of any kind.

The reply to the next question put to Captain Malcolm ought to have been conclusive with the Court.

QUESTION.—“_Would you, had you commanded the British fleet, have sent
in ships to attack the enemy’s ships on shore?_”

CAPT. MALCOLM.—“The moment that the two ships quitted their defensive
position the risk was then small of sending ships, and, OF COURSE, I
WOULD HAVE SENT THEM IN INSTANTLY.” (_Minutes_, p. 212.)

This was spoken like a seaman. No greater contrast can be set in juxtaposition with such evidence than that of the chartmaker Stokes, the master of Lord Gambier’s flagship, who, though of no higher rank than that of a warrant officer, was gravely consulted as to what, in his opinion, was the Commander-in-chief’s duty!!

The subjoined evidence of Mr. Stokes is very curious, not only from its effrontery in contradiction of superior officers, but in its own flat and unblushing contradiction to itself. The portion of Mr. Stokes’s evidence placed in a double column is truly wonderful; but it is more wonderful that any tribunal should have so far forgot itself as to act upon it.

“The ships would have been at half range of shell and point-blank
shot.” (_Minutes_, p. 148.)

“They would have remained under the fire of the enemy’s batteries till
the tide floated them to the southward of the Palles Shoal; but this
retreat, in my opinion, they would not have been able to have gained.”
(P. 148.)

“If we had made the attack on the morning of the 12th, we should have
sacrificed our own ships without making any impression on the enemy,
or destroying _any_ of their ships.” (P. 148.)

“The enemy’s ships were _fast on the ground_ with their sterns to the
westward; and they _could not bring their guns to bear on the ships
that attacked them_. Had the French ships _grounded with their
broadsides flanking the passage, they could not have been attacked
with the least prospect of success_.” (P. 151.)

“I told Sir H. Neale that perhaps we might destroy _some_ of their
ships, but that we should sacrifice our own.”[37] (P. 151.)

“The three decker lay with her _broadside flanking the passage_. They
all three could have fired with _complete effect on any ships that
might approach_!!!” (P. 149.)

“Had four sail of the line run into Aix Roads when Lord Cochrane made
the signal, the whole fire of Isle d’Aix, as well as the fire of the
_Foudroyant_, _Cassard_, and _Ocean, three-decker_, would _have been
directed on them_!!” (P. 152.)

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Footnote 37: