Chapter XXIV: A Naval Study for All Time (3)

This was said with the full knowledge that when “our own” were
reluctantly sent in, _no damage was sustained_. To use Lord Gambier’s
own words in making his defence, “_Not one, even of the smallest of
our vessels employed, has been disabled from proceeding on any service
that might have become necessary._” (_Minutes_, p. 138.)—A
circumstance not at all expected by the country when the destruction
of the enemy’s fleet was required.

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The only comment here necessary is, that nothing in the evidence volunteered by Titus Oates in former years displayed greater effrontery. The evidence of the other chartmaker Fairfax is almost as astounding.

QUESTION.—“Would ships of the line sent in have been within range of
shells and shot from the enemy’s batteries?”

MR. FAIRFAX.—“From every chart I have seen they certainly would.”

QUESTION.—“Could any of the enemy’s ships before they run up the
Charente have _annoyed and raked_ (!!) any of the king’s ships that
might have been sent to attack them?”

MR. FAIRFAX.—“_They certainly lay in a favourable place for it._”[38]
(_Minutes_, p. 144.)

QUESTION.—“Had even two or three ships of the line been sent in to
attack those two ships, were _any of the enemy’s ships aground(!)_ in
a position to annoy our ships, either in the anchorage or in their
approach to it?”

MR. FAIRFAX.—“_Some of them certainly were._” (P. 145.)

QUESTION.—“If a part of the fleet had gone into Aix Roads when the
_Impérieuse_ made the first signal, must it have remained within three
quarters of a mile of the batteries till the ebb made?”

MR. FAIRFAX.—“_They might have shifted with the flood!_” (P. 146.)

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Footnote 38:

This reply is very characteristic. He knew, as Stokes swore, that the
“_enemy’s ships were aground with their sterns to the westward_,” and
that not only could they not return a fire, but that a broadside from
a British ship must have gone clean through them from stern to bow;
but, unlike Stokes, he would not swear that ships in such a position
could have “_annoyed and raked the king’s ships_.” The enemy’s ships
were merely “_in a favourable place for it!!_” And so they were, had
they been _afloat_ instead of helplessly _ashore_, heeling over at an
angle of thirty degrees.

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The ingenuity of Mr. Fairfax in avoiding straightforward answers to embarrassing questions is remarkable. He was one of Lord Gambier’s tract distributors spoken of in the first volume, but though he had no objection to construct an imaginary chart to serve his chief, his conscience would not permit him to swear to its contents. Nevertheless such evasion ought not to have been tolerated by any tribunal. Yet on the charts and evidence of Stokes and this man was the result of the court-martial made to rest, in opposition to the testimony of officers of standing and character.

The opinion of another eminent officer, Captain Broughton of the _Illustrious_, will be even more to the purpose.

PRESIDENT.—“From the first attack on the ships of the enemy on the
evening of the 11th of April to the time of your leaving Basque Roads,
according to your judgment, was everything done that could be done to
effect the destruction of the enemy’s ships?”

CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I think it would have been more advantageous _if the
line-of-battle ships, frigates, and small vessels had gone in at half
flood_, which I take to be at about _eleven o’clock_ A.M. or
_twelve_.”[39]

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Footnote 39:

Precisely the time at which Lord Gambier ordered the fleet to come
to an anchor, after it had been got under weigh with every
indication of proceeding to an attack.

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“The French admiral and two more got off and made sail towards the
river, very soon after the two that were afloat.”

QUESTION.—“By the French admiral you mean the _Ocean_?”

CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“Yes.”

QUESTION.—“As the two ships that remained at anchor did not change
their position till about noon, and the _Ocean_ continued in her
position till about the same time, if the British fleet had been
ordered in at eleven o’clock, which you thought would have been the
proper time——”

CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I would rather say between eleven and twelve, which,
in my judgment, was more advantageous.”

QUESTION.—“Would not the ships sent in have been exposed to the fire
of the _two ships_ that remained at anchor, the French Admiral’s ship,
and the batteries of Isle d’Aix, at the same time?”

CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“Certainly; but I conceive they were partly _panic
struck_, and on the appearance of a force coming in might have been
induced to cut their cables, and try to make their escape up the
river.” (_Minutes_, pp. 219-221.)

There was not much to be feared from a “_panic-struck_” enemy, with only two ships afloat out of thirteen, eleven being on shore. Yet those who peruse the minutes of the court-martial will marvel to find these two ships set up as bugbears to a British fleet.

I will next adduce Captain Broughton’s testimony as to the trifling opposition to be anticipated from the batteries on Isle d’Aix, which three weeks previous to the action had been pronounced “_no obstacle_” by the Commander-in-chief, in his letter to the Admiralty[40], but were now considered formidable enough to prevent a British fleet from passing within two miles of them!

Footnote 40:

See vol. i. p. 342.

It may here be remarked that Captain Broughton was well acquainted with these batteries, from having previously been here under Admiral Keats, as they were familiar to me from having been employed on the same spot under Admiral Thornborough, and having, in fact, engaged the _Minerve_ frigate under their fire[41], which I held so cheap as not to consider them or their ineffectual fire worthy attention. As Admiral Austen well remarks—all Lord Gambier knew respecting them was from the reports of others, who had not even ventured closely to reconnoitre the batteries. The report of Captain Broughton, who had reconnoitred them, was not acted upon.

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Footnote 41:

See vol. i. p. 191.

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PRESIDENT.—“In your services in Basque Roads had you any opportunity
of making observations upon the state of the enemy’s fortifications on
Isle d’Aix?”

CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“Yes, I had.”

PRESIDENT.—“Narrate those observations.”

CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I was on board the _Amelia_ when she was ordered to
dislodge the enemy from the Boyart Shoal, and, being _nearly within
gunshot_[42], I observed the fortifications. They appeared to me in a
very different state to what I observed them when serving two or three
years before under Sir Richard Keats. I thought they were repairing
the works from the quantity of _rubbish that was thrown up_; and I
counted on a semicircular battery which commanded the roadstead where
the enemy lay between _fourteen and twenty guns_, I am not positive as
to the exact number. There was a small battery lower down, nearer the
sea. I do not know the exact number of guns; there might be _six_ or
_nine_, I suppose. What I had before taken to be a block-house above
the semicircular battery seemed to have _no guns whatever_; it
appeared to be a barrack for containing the guard. I thought from this
observation that the fortifications of the island, at least in that
part, were _not so strong as we supposed_, and I reported my opinion
to that effect to Lord Gambier.”

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Footnote 42:

Mr. Stokes said the ships going in must have been “_at half range of
shell and point blank shot_!” (_Minutes_, p. 148.) Mr. Stokes’s
observation was taken “from the mizentop of the _Caledonia_;” that
of Captain Broughton from actual exposure to the fire of the
batteries.

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PRESIDENT.—“Are those the only guns you observed on Isle d’Aix that
could bear upon the anchorage?”

CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“They were all that I observed; there might be more.”

QUESTION.—“Did it appear to you that the enemy was constructing new
works in front of the old ones, and nearer to the sea?”

CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I think the _rubbish_ was the remains of the old
works that _had been taken down_.

PRESIDENT.—“Would your Lordship wish to ask any questions on the
subject?”

LORD GAMBIER.—“I would wish Capt. Broughton to point out on the chart
the situation of the _Amelia_ when he was on board her and made those
observations?”

CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“The south point of Isle d’Aix was just shut in with
Fouras Castle, and I think the bearing was nearly S.E. and by E. when
it was open. When it was touching the point we were JUST OUT OF
GUNSHOT FROM BOTH SIDES. THEY FIRED AT US FROM BOTH SIDES, BUT THE
SHOT DID NOT REACH US.” (_Minutes_, pp. 218, 219.)

This was decisive, and in his defence, the Commander-in-chief thus attempted to evade the facts which had been officially reported to him by Captain Broughton. To contradict them was impossible.

“With respect to the force of the Aix batteries, I apprehend what
appeared to Lord Cochrane and to the master of his ship as ruins of
the fort were, in fact, materials for _improving or increasing the
work_! Indeed, can it be natural to _suppose_ that the enemy, who are
so active in forming batteries wherever they can be useful, and whose
engineers are considered to be equal to any, would, of all moments,
choose that for dismantling or blowing up works when they expected
those works would be most required; for it is very certain the enemy
was as fully apprised of _our intentions of attacking their fleet as
myself_!!![43] And it will perhaps be considered less likely that the
enemy should _weaken their defences_ on Isle d’Aix, _raised evidently
for the protection of their fleet_, when at the same time they were
endeavouring to form others on the Boyart Shoal as a protection for
it.” (_Minutes_, p. 135.)

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Footnote 43:

Lord Gambier had just before written to the Admiralty that an attempt
with fireships would be “_hazardous if not desperate_.” He had no
intention of attacking otherwise. And after the enemy’s ships had been
driven ashore by the explosion vessels, Captain Broughton testifies to
Lord Gambier’s expressions that he did not intend to make any attack,
as the object of their destruction seemed to be already accomplished.
That is, neither before nor after the action did he intend to make any
attack with the fleet, nor would he have done so unless a partial
attack had been forced on him by my signal on the _afternoon_ of the
12th of April.

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There was no “_supposition_” in the matter, nor any necessity for hypothesis, in face of the fact that the fortifications were for the most part _débris_, or as Captain Broughton termed them, a mass of “_rubbish_.” No one said that they had been “_blown up_” or that the enemy were _weakening their defences_! The fact is, that only a month before the action Lord Gambier had himself set the matter at rest, by writing to the Admiralty as follows:—“The advanced work between the Isles of Aix and Oleron, I _find_ was injured in its foundation, and is in no state of progress, _it is therefore no obstacle to our bombarding the enemy’s fleet_[44],” yet it was now an “obstacle” to even attempt attacking ships on shore; and Lord Gambier condescended to resort to the just quoted assertions, in contradiction to his own letter to the Admiralty.

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Footnote 44:

See vol. i. page 342.

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On the utter worthlessness of the batteries, as calculated to impede the operations of a British fleet, there was abundant evidence before the Court, as will be seen on an examination of the minutes of the court-martial, such testimony confirming the correctness of Lord Gambier’s letter to the Admiralty on the 11th of March, and completely disproving his Lordship’s contradictory assumptions in his extraordinary defence read to the Court.

Captain Broughton was next examined with reference to the imaginary shoal, which forms so conspicuous an object on Mr. Stokes’s chart (C).

“If the ships had been damaged in masts and rigging, considering the
direction and strength of the wind at that time, was there any place
those ships could have retired to?”

CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I think as the wind was north-westerly and
northerly, they might have found safe anchorage and protection in what
is called in the French chart I had on board “_Le Grand Trousse_” (see
Chart A), _where there is thirty or forty feet of water_ OUT OF RANGE
OF SHOT OR SHELLS IN ANY DIRECTION.”

QUESTION.—“How many ships would you have thought it necessary to send
into Aix Roads to attack the enemy?”

CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I should think _five or six ships_ of the least
draught of water.”

“I conjecture that the _discomfited_ French squadron _would have made
very little resistance_.”

“From the situation in which the enemy were, _not having recovered
from the fright of the night before, I think our loss would have been
very little_, as few of the French ships were in a situation to FIGHT
THEIR GUNS!!”

QUESTION.—“Do you know that from the anchorage in Aix Roads to the
anchorage you have just now described, that _there is_ A BAR GOES
ACROSS?”

CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“No! I do not know anything of it; I _sounded_ from
the wreck of the _Varsovie_ to that anchorage, and FOUND NO SHOAL
THERE!!”

PRESIDENT.—“_That is not the place!_ It _is_ marked in _some_ of the
charts that between the Boyart and the tail of the Pallas there _is_ a
bar!”

CAPT. BROUGHTON.—“I _sounded as I came in from the fleet_ BUT DID NOT
FIND ANY BAR.” (_Minutes_, pp. 221-233.)

The extraordinary conduct of the President in saying “_That is not the place_” and then that “in _some_ of the charts there _is_ a bar,” in the place which was “_not_ the place,” needs no comment. The evidence of Captain Broughton, who _had_ sounded there, should have been fatal to the chart of Mr. Stokes, who _had not_ by his own admission taken soundings. The fact was, that this bar, made for the occasion, formed one of the main points in the Commander-in-chief’s defence, and Mr. Stokes’s chart was retained in spite of the testimony of those who, from having sounded, could alone know anything of the matter.

But Mr. Stokes shall first _prove_ and then disprove his imaginary _bar or shoal_.

Notwithstanding that Mr. Stokes admitted that his knowledge of the supposed shoal between the Palles and the Boyart was only founded on an anonymous French MS., he subsequently forgot the admission, and swore to his own _personal knowledge of the minutest particulars_ connected with the imaginary shoal!!

LORD GAMBIER.—“Is there not a bank between the Boyart and the Palles
Shoal?”

MR. STOKES.—“Yes.”

“What water is there generally upon that bank at low water?”

MR. STOKES.—“From _twelve to sixteen feet in the deepest part_, but
that part is _very narrow_.”

“If there are only _sixteen feet_, line-of-battle ships could not pass
over it at all times?”

MR. STOKES.—_No[45], not until nearly two-thirds flood._ You must
reckon on going over that part at _twelve feet_.”

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Footnote 45:

It is marked on Mr. Stokes’s chart that the rise of tide is
_twenty-one feet_.

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“To get to the anchorage, it _is_ necessary to pass over the bank just
mentioned?”

MR. STOKES.—“IT IS.”

ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“Is there a channel of sixteen feet all across?”

MR. STOKES.—“_There is a channel of sixteen feet all across_, but that
is _narrow_. There are about the middle of it patches of twelve feet.”

PRESIDENT.—“_There is_ no going into the channel of sixteen feet
without, in _some instances_, passing over that of twelve feet?”

MR. STOKES.—“You _may_ go over the channel of sixteen feet, but _it is
so narrow_ that I should calculate going over that part which is _only
twelve feet_.”

PRESIDENT.—“It is _so intricate_, you _must_ count on passing over
some part with only _twelve feet_?”

MR. STOKES.—“I should calculate on going over part of the twelve feet,
because _it is so narrow_, it is _difficult to hit_ the passage of
_sixteen feet_.”[46]

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Footnote 46:

Yet Captain Broughton had “hit” it, and that without finding any shoal
at all!

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This is pretty minute for a man who was not present in the action, who confessed that he was “ignorant of the distance between the sands,” and had, in fact, “never sounded there at all,” that his survey had been made from the mizentop of the _Caledonia_, nine miles off, and that he had his information from Mr. Fairfax and an “anonymous French MS.,” which was not even produced in Court, nor demanded by the Court, so that it is not known to this day who was the author of that MS., or, indeed, whether it ever existed; a matter which, from its non-production, I do not hesitate to doubt.

The President was, however, bent on confirming Mr. Stokes’s shoal, but the result was most unfortunate. In order further to substantiate the alleged fact, Captain Woolfe of the _Aigle_, which vessel was present during the action, thus replied to an interrogation on the point.

“I think _four or five sail of the line_ might have lain clear of the
enemy’s batteries. I lay there with the _Pallas_ and _fifteen or
sixteen brigs, gun-brigs, cutters, and schooners_!” (_Minutes_, p.
86.)

PRESIDENT.—“_Would the casting your eye upon this chart_ (Stokes’s)
_give you a clearer comprehension!!!_”

CAPT. WOOLFE.—“No! I have it all in my mind. _I received orders to
assist Mr. Stokes on a survey._

PRESIDENT.—“What was the report of the depth of water at any
particular time of tide in the situation _I have pointed out between
the Palles and the Boyart, if you can recollect it_?”

CAPT. WOOLFE.—“Mr. Stokes said HE HAD FOUND DEEPER WATER AND A LITTLE
MORE ROOM FARTHER TO THE SOUTHWARD.”

Is it not wonderful that in face of such facts, the Court should have acted on Mr. Stokes’s chart or his evidence? Where Mr. Stokes had found “_deeper water_” he had marked on his chart a shoal, on which no admiral in his senses would have trusted a frigate, though the _Revenge_ and _Valiant_ line-of-battle ships, with five or six frigates had found plenty of water, and, whilst destroying two enemy’s ships, remained there through a whole tide without grounding! The following are extracts from the logs of the ships present.

“3·0 p.m. Shortened sail and anchored _in 7 fathoms_, near the outer
ship of the enemy, _Valiant_ in company.” (_Log of the_ Pallas.)

“3·30. Came to with the best bower _in 6 fathoms_.” (_Log of_
Valiant.)

“4·0. Anchored _in 5½ fathoms_.” (_Log of_ Unicorn.)

“3·30. Anchored _in_ 7 _fathoms_.” (_Log of_ Indefatigable.)

“2·30. Anchored _in_ 6 _fathoms_.” (_Log of_ L’Aigle.)

The subjoined evidence of Mr. Spurling, the master of the _Impérieuse_, will render further allusion to the subject unnecessary.

“Where we anchored, which was _out of the reach of shot and shell_, we
lay _in five and a half fathoms at low water_. Three or four cables’
length _nearer_ to the Pallas Shoal than we lay, was a good berth for
three or four sail of the line to anchor in five and a half or six
fathoms _dead low water_. The marks for such anchorage I took myself.”
“I know this from my own observation. It was marked on the French
chart, but I did not choose to trust it, but wished to prove it. The
lead was kept going the whole of the time on both sides.”

PRESIDENT.—“What water did you find in working out between the tail of
the Pallas Shoal and the shoal towards the Boyart, when working to and
fro?”

“_From six and a half to seven fathoms._”

“Did you make any observation before you began to engage?”

“Yes. On the morning of the 12th I was desired by Lord Cochrane to lay
a buoy on the Boyart Shoal, which I did in _six and a half fathoms
water_, a sufficient distance to allow _any ship_ to tack round that
buoy.”

The reader must not imagine that I am too minutely descending into particulars. I am writing history—naval history—in which Lord Gambier is nothing—myself less, except as unavoidably connected with the proceedings of the court-martial. I have no wish to speak of Lord Gambier where it can be avoided. The subject is, however, one in which the nation is collectively interested, and the national, no less than naval character, involved. Now that the justice of the Duke of Somerset has given me the means of incontrovertible explanation, I am personally gratified in availing myself of it; but I repeat that my object is now, as it ever was, national; and having at length those means, it is my duty, no less than my pleasure, to use them as a warning to future generations of the noble service to which I have the honour to belong.

I must reluctantly turn for a moment to the evidence founded on Mr. Fairfax’s chart (D). First premising, that when Mr. Fairfax was asked to “state the situation of the enemy’s ships at noon,” he replied, that “at _eleven o’clock_ he went down below, and did not come up again till near two.” (_Minutes_, p. 143). That is, during the whole of the three hours’ delay, and the consequent escape of the grounded ships, which constituted the question before the Court, Mr. Fairfax had been, by his own voluntary admission, in his berth, recovering himself from the fatigues of the previous night.

During these three hours, as has been said, the _Océan_, three-decker, and the three other line-of-battle ships had _quietly hove off_, and were running into the Charente. This was proved by the concurrent testimony of _all_ the witnesses, and their escape formed the neglect, if any, of the Commander-in-chief. Yet Mr. Fairfax unblushingly testified that his chart showed their position on the morning of the 12th, and that when at two o’clock he returned from his _three hours’ nap_, the enemy’s ships were “NEARLY IN THE SAME POSITION as when he went below at _eleven o’clock_!” All the other witnesses, without exception, stating the fact that they had warped off and escaped beyond reach! Yet the Court made no comment on Mr. Fairfax’s evidence.

When pressed to describe their position more minutely, Mr. Fairfax, with real or assumed indignation, replied, “_I have described them in the chart produced by me_.” The Court complacently declined further question, and Mr. Fairfax thus escaped the struggle between his chart and the truth, which had so much embarrassed Stokes, who had not the sagacity to perceive that his silence would have been more acceptable than his volubility.

Mr. Fairfax’s minute description of the “nearly same position” of the ships which had _escaped while he was below!_ is yet more extraordinary.

“Were any of the enemy’s ships aground lying so close together as to
have the yards of two of them locked together?”

MR. FAIRFAX.—“By perspective those near the _Tonnerre_ seemed to be
_very close_. If you draw a line they appear in one.”

PRESIDENT.—“The question is, whether these two ships were lying so
close together that their masts and yards might be locked in, or
whether they were distinct?”

MR. FAIRFAX.—“They were _distinct at night_!”

“Were you in any situation which enabled you to determine that they
were _not_ near each other?”

MR. FAIRFAX.—“No; it was prior (_i. e._ before daylight) that I
distinguished them separate.”

“Can you determine _how far_ they were asunder?”

MR. FAIRFAX.—“I should think a ship’s length from each other, _those
three_.”

Yet even the reluctant vision of Mr. Stokes, at a distance of nine miles, could perceive _at daylight_ four of the enemy’s vessels lying helplessly “in a group.” Mr. Fairfax—from whom a straightforward answer could not be got—said, when pressed, that amidst _pitch_ darkness, and by “_perspective_,” he could plainly distinguish them as distinct from each other; and was thus, with difficulty, made to tell almost the truth as to how they lay when driven ashore on the preceding night. He could see in the darkness that their yards were not locked together, but they were only “a ship’s length from each other”—a distinction almost without a difference.

The whole affair was made to turn on the evidence of these two masters, Stokes and Fairfax, who unhesitatingly contradicted in that evidence the testimony of the most experienced officers present in the action, though the latter, had it not been for my pertinacity, as before described, _would not have been allowed to give evidence before the Court_. It has been shown that the charts of Messrs. Stokes and Fairfax were used to the exclusion of the actual charts of the enemy’s coast supplied under sanction of the Admiralty itself, because there were none more reliable in existence.

It would be easy to extract from the evidence of Fairfax much more to the same effect; but the subject is nauseating, and the naval reader may, if he choose, search the _Minutes_ of the court-martial for himself. The young officer could scarcely occupy himself more profitably, if he wish to become acquainted with the practice of the service fifty years ago.

A short extract from Mr. Fairfax’s evidence relative to the explosion vessel and the _Mediator_ is necessary, as Lord Gambier avowed in his defence that the “explosion vessels _failed in their object_;” and to corroborate this, Mr. Fairfax falsely placed on his chart the spot where the explosion took place, in a false position, in order to confirm to the _eye_ of the Court the asseverations of the Commander-in-chief in his defence. Like Mr. Stokes, Mr. Fairfax swore the _truth_ in his evidence in contradiction to his chart.

The assertion of the Commander-in-chief in his defence, with regard to the explosion vessels, is as follows:—

“The explosion vessels, conducted by Lord Cochrane, _failed in their
object_, as will be seen with reference to the _small chart_ which I
now deliver into Court. (Mr. Fairfax’s chart D.) This points out where
two of them blew up. The situation in which, and the time when, those
vessels blew up, _proved prejudicial to the enterprise in several
respects_.... In fact, had not Captain Wooldridge and some of the
other officers, wholly disregarding the explosion, taken their
fireships in _a proper direction_ for the enemy, it is more than
probable that _none of them would have produced any effect on the
enemy’s fleet_.” (Lord Gambier’s Defence, _Minutes_, p. 124.)

Lord Gambier uttered this with the full knowledge that NOT A SINGLE FIRESHIP DID TAKE EFFECT ON THE ENEMY’S FLEET, a fact which his lordship openly states in another part of his defence; so prematurely were the fireships kindled, and so badly were they directed. That Captain Wooldridge took his fireship in “a proper direction,” is wholly disproved by the very man upon whose chart his lordship relies; viz. Fairfax, who states in his evidence that _after_ the explosion had taken place he “_hailed the Mediator_ to ALTER HER COURSE, OR SHE WOULD MISS THE FRENCH FLEET!!

I am sorry to bring such evidence as the subjoined to confute the unfounded assertions of a British admiral, but justice to myself leaves me no alternative.

QUESTION.—“Do you recollect when and where the explosion vessel blew
up on the night of the 11th of April?”

MR. FAIRFAX.—“She was about _two cables’ length from the Lyra_. The
_Lyra_ is marked in the chart produced by me, as well as the explosion
vessel. _When she blew up the fire vessels all seemed to steer for
that point_. I hailed four of them and the _Mediator_, and _desired
the Mediator to steer south-east, or else she would miss the French
fleet_.”

Here Mr. Fairfax proved; 1st, that the explosion-vessel took effect before a single fireship was kindled. 2ndly, that the _Mediator_ was steering in a _wrong direction_, not a “_proper direction_,” as alleged by Lord Gambier. 3rdly, and that therefore the boom was destroyed before the _Mediator_ could have got near it. The _Mediator’s_ log is, however, luckily amongst the Admiralty records, and is carried up to the time the ship was set on fire, viz. 9·30 P.M., but not a word is said of breaking any boom, or even coming in contact with one, though had she done so the shock must have shook her from stem to stern. The subjoined are the _Mediator’s_ last log entries previous to her being set on fire.

“8·30 P.M. Cut the cable and made sail for the French squadron.

“9·30. _Set the ship on fire._”

The preceding extract from Mr. Fairfax is taken from the “_revised_” minutes. He says: “_When the explosion vessel blew up all the fire-vessels seemed to steer from that point_.What he really said was, “_I was below at the time of the first explosion!_ which I supposed was some shells bursting in the top, but I got on deck time enough to see her blow up!” This was expunged, and the above version substituted. The fact was, as every seaman will comprehend in a moment, that there was not a grain of powder, or a single shell, anywhere but in _a mass in the hold_, and this, as a matter of course, exploded _in an instant_! I do not say that Mr. Fairfax can be accused of this perversion of his evidence, as it was evidently the work of the person who _revised_ the minutes for publication by a Portsmouth bookseller.

The _Mediator’s_ log was taken out of her previously to her being set on fire, and is subsequently continued up to midnight, two hours and a half afterwards, but still not a word is mentioned of coming in contact with a boom. This should be conclusive on the subject, and it is not my fault that a fact beyond dispute, must necessarily disprove the asseverations of the Commander-in-chief in his defence before the court-martial. These, however, are both facts. Let the reader make the most of them.

Yet in his letter to the Admiralty of April 14th, Lord Gambier stated that “the weight of the _Mediator_ broke the boom,” in that letter also ignoring the effect of the explosion vessels altogether. His Lordship says, in his defence, that they were _signals for the fireships_!! The subjoined are his Lordship’s words:—“Their explosion was to point out _the proper time for the officers commanding the fireships to set fire to their respective vessels_, and to intimidate and prevent the enemy from towing off the fireships.”[47] Three explosion vessels fitted at an enormous cost for ammunition, &c., to do that which a signal rocket could have done as well!! If the explosion vessels did not strike terror into the enemy assuredly nothing did, for at page 125 of his defence he admits that “_not one of the enemy’s ships was actually destroyed by means of fireships_.”

Footnote 47:

_Minutes_, p. 123.

This perseverance on the part of the Commander-in-chief in persisting that the explosion vessels “failed in their object,” though according to his own admission that the fireships failed also, was attempted to be corroborated by the evidence of Mr. Fairfax, but in a different way, viz. by swearing that she blew up at too great a distance from the enemy to produce any effect at all!

PRESIDENT.—“To the best of your judgment, what was the distance of the
explosion vessel from the enemy when she blew up?”

MR. FAIRFAX.—“About a mile.”

ADMIRAL YOUNG.—-“What sort of a night was it?”

MR. FAIRFAX.—“Very dirty, and blowing strong. The _Lyra_ was pitching
bows under.”

“Was the night light or dark?”

MR. FAIRFAX.—“_Very dark at intervals._”

“How then did you, in a _very dark night_, ascertain that the
explosion vessel blew up _within a mile_ of the enemy?”

MR. FAIRFAX.—“By her computed distance from us in the _Lyra_, judging
the distance she was from the enemy.” [_Minutes_, p. 177.)

At first sight, these questions on the part of the Court seem impartial, but their object was to make Mr. Fairfax say that she might have been _more_ than a mile from the enemy, as appears from the subsequent evidence. Mr. Fairfax would not say this. He, however, placed her on his chart on this _“very dark” night near the Boyart shoal_, and not _close to the Ile of Aix and the boom_, where Captain Proteau, who was lying under the lee of the boom, says she blew up.

Unfortunately for the veracity of Mr. Fairfax on this point, he had previous to the trial unwittingly written a letter to the editor of the _Naval Chronicle_, evidently not for publication, but in explanation of a chart. The editor of the _Naval Chronicle_, however, published the explanatory remarks, which are in complete contradiction to Mr. Fairfax’s evidence on the court-martial—in fact, this portion of the letter tells the truth in the following language:—

“I have it from good authority that the fuses on board one of the
explosion vessels only burned six minutes and a half, instead of
twenty.[48] Had they burned twelve minutes longer _nothing could have
been better placed_! I saw the French ships with lights up
_immediately after the explosion, before any of the fireships got
near_!!—EDWARD FAIRFAX.” (_Naval Chronicle for 1809_, vol. xxii. p.
49.)

-----

Footnote 48:

This is incorrect. They were calculated to burn twelve minutes, and
exploded in about half that time.

-----

With this glaring contradiction between his evidence and his previous _honest_ assertion to the editor of the _Naval Chronicle_, I take my leave of Mr. Fairfax and the subject, being quite content to rest my character on the contradictory evidence of those suborned to serve the cause of an administration in want of the prestige of a victory, at the expense of truth and even common sense, had such been relied on in the investigation.

I will conclude with the remark, that had I been permitted access to the charts _before the lapse of fifty-one years_ from the date of the action—or could I after the court-martial have prevailed on Parliament to investigate the matter, by demanding the production of the minutes of the court-martial before voting thanks to the Commander-in-chief, the Administration of that corrupt day would never have dared to treat me as an officer maligning my Commander-in-chief unjustly, nor to have followed up their malignity to its final consummation of driving me from the British Navy, on the imputation of an offence of which I had not the smallest cognisance, as will by and by appear as plainly, and I trust as satisfactorily, as do these extraordinary revelations concerning a court-martial which will stand a beacon and a warning to the naval service as long as that service may exist. God grant that the records of that noble service to the latest day of its existence may never again be sullied in like manner!

CHAP. XXVII.

CONDUCT OF THE COURT-MARTIAL.

LORD GAMBIER’S DEFENCE.—SECOND DESPATCH IGNORING THE FIRST.—ATTEMPT
OF THE COURT TO STOP MY EVIDENCE.—EVIDENCE RECEIVED BECAUSE
OPPOSED TO MINE.—I AM NOT PERMITTED TO HEAR THE DEFENCE.—THE
LOGS TAMPERED WITH.—LORD GAMBIER’S DEFENCE AIMED AT ME UNDER AN
ERRONEOUS IMPUTATION.—MY LETTER TO THE COURT CONFUTING THAT
IMPUTATION.—ADMIRALTY ACCUSATION AGAINST LORD GAMBIER ON MY
REFUSAL TO ACCUSE HIS LORDSHIP.—HIS INSINUATIONS AGAINST ME
UNCALLED FOR.—ASSUMES THAT I AM STILL UNDER HIS COMMAND.—ENEMY
ESCAPED FROM HIS OWN NEGLECT.—THE SHOALS PUT IN THE CHART TO
EXCUSE THIS.—ATTEMPT TO IMPUTE BLAME TO ME AND CAPTAIN
SEYMOUR.—THE TRUTH PROVED BY CAPTAIN BROUGHTON THAT LORD GAMBIER
HAD NO INTENTION OF ATTACKING.—LORD HOWE’S ATTACK ON THE AIX
FORTS.—CLARENDON’S DESCRIPTION OF BLAKE.

The most damnatory point connected with the court-martial is—that on finding me inflexible with regard to the vote of thanks to Lord Gambier, the Board of Admiralty ordered his lordship, AFTER HIS RETURN TO ENGLAND, to _write a second despatch containing fresh details of the action_! thus superseding the first despatch written by himself as Commander-in-chief at the time of the action!!

With this extraordinary demand Lord Gambier appears to have gladly complied on the 10th of May, 1809; so that there are two despatches (Appendix A, _written on the spot_, and B, _written in England_), the first highly praising me for what I neither did nor intended to do—the second IGNORING MY SERVICES ALTOGETHER!! In fact, only mentioning me by name, as _lying “about three miles from the enemy.”_ One step more in the second despatch, viz. that I was not in Aix Roads at all! would only have been in keeping with the assertion just quoted. Were not these contradictory documents now adduced, the denial of such an act by suppressing all mention of it in the despatches would be incredible. Nevertheless, I fearlessly assert, that to my personal conduct of the explosion vessel was solely attributable the panic produced in the enemy’s fleet, and that such conduct was one of the most desperate acts on record. There, however, they are—printed in the Appendix at the end of this volume. The naval reader may regret their reproduction, as I do, for the sake of the service, but he can no more ignore them than I can pass them over.

There is nothing like this in the records of the British or any other naval service, and the reasons for a precedent so unusual must themselves have been extraordinary. It is clear to me, that from the order of the Board of Admiralty to the Commander-in-chief to make a second report of the action in Aix Roads the court-martial took its cue. This may be a harsh conclusion, and perhaps would be so were it not corroborated by circumstances, not the least significant of which was, that the Commander-in-chief’s official report had been long before _published in the Gazette_! No naval reason to invalidate this official report was alleged, or could have existed.

During my examination before the Court I alluded to the fact of having “reported to the Commander-in-chief the ruinous state of the Ile of Aix, it having the _inner fortifications completely blown up and destroyed_. This I not only ascertained from the deck of the _Impérieuse_ with perfect precision as to the side towards us, but also as to the opposite side, from personal observations made from the main-topgallant mast-head. There were thirteen guns mounted.” (_Minutes_, p. 58.)

This evidence, if admitted, and its truth was fully proved by the testimony of other officers, completely confirmed Lord Gambier’s previous statement to the Admiralty, that “_the fortifications were no obstacle_.” But now it was expedient that these fortifications should constitute the bugbear which, as was asserted, would have destroyed any British ships sent in to attack the enemy’s ships aground! and that the issue of the court-martial mainly rested on establishing the formidable character of the fortifications, a second despatch was called for. When, in my evidence, I was explaining to the Court the little danger to be apprehended from these fortifications—one of the principal points before the Court, Admiral Young stopped me with the query, “Will you consider, my Lord Cochrane, before you go on, HOW FAR THIS IS RELEVANT?”

On my insisting upon further explanation the Judge-Advocate attempted to stop me, by demanding—“CAN THIS RELATE TO THE QUESTION ASKED?” The President—seeing that I would not be stopped—remarked—“_Lord Cochrane states this as his reason for not taking a particular line of conduct_.” I stated it for no purpose of the kind, but to show that opposition from such fortifications was hardly worth taking into consideration, and thus continued:—

“I have felt that if I had answered ‘_Yes_’ or ‘_No_’ to all the
questions which had been put to me, I ought to be hung, and that if a
court-martial were held upon me and only the answers ‘_Yes_’ or ‘_No_’
appeared to those questions, I _should_ be hung for them.”

JUDGE-ADVOCATE.—“_I believe nobody has desired your Lordship to answer
merely ‘Yes’_ or ‘_No_!’”

A still more striking instance of the animus of the Court was the following attempted stoppage of Captain Beresford’s evidence.

CAPT. BERESFORD.—“The only thing I know with respect to the _Calcutta_
being fired, was by a conversation between Lord Cochrane and myself in
the presence of Captain Bligh, Captain Maitland, and others.”

PRESIDENT.—“_Is this strictly evidence, Mr. Judge-Advocate?_”

JUDGE-ADVOCATE.—“_Yes! I should think it is_; BECAUSE I CONCEIVE IT IS
TO AFFECT THE EVIDENCE OF LORD COCHRANE!!!” (_Minutes_, p. 163.)

At the present day such proceedings in any tribunal would be thought impossible. There, however, they are on record—showing that the openly-avowed object of the court-martial was the suppression and invalidation of my evidence by any means that could be brought to bear, rather than an inquiry into the conduct of the Commander-in-chief on the merits of the case.

One point more must be noticed, relative to the manner in which the Court was conducted. Having reason to believe, as has been shown, that the inquiry was being directed against myself, I was naturally anxious to be present at the reading of the Commander-in-chief’s defence, in order to judge how far I might thereby stand affected. With this view I presented myself at the Court on the fifth day of the inquiry, when it was known that the defence would be made.

To my surprise the Court saw fit to refuse the privilege.

PRESIDENT.—“All the witnesses must withdraw.”

LORD COCHRANE.—“With all due respect to the Court, in some former
courts-martial the witnesses have been permitted to hear the defence.”

PRESIDENT.—“_I never heard such a thing in my life._ The Court have
ruled the point.”

LORD COCHRANE.—“The case of Admiral Harvey is a case in point.”

PRESIDENT.—“Lord Cochrane, the Court have determined the contrary.”

“(_Lord Cochrane withdrew_”.) (_Minutes_, p. 105.)

One of my reasons for wishing to be present was to ascertain what use would be made of the logs of the small vessels present in the action; it being quite clear from circumstances which had come to my knowledge that some of these had been tampered with. As such an assertion may readily be doubted, it must be confirmed.

When Mr. Earp inspected the logs at the Record Office, several, for the date of the action, were found missing from the log books. One—the log of a line of battle ship—_had been torn out and was put back loose_! This, however, is after-knowledge, I will rather rest the matter on circumstances at the time.

When the master of the _Beagle_ was under examination, the subjoined conversation took place:—

PRESIDENT (_to the Master_).—“Were these things written (in the log)
day by day as they occurred?”

MASTER.—“Yes; everything was written every day at twelve o’clock.”

“Then what is called the log of the 6th of April _was_ written on the
6th of April?”

MASTER.—“Yes.”

“And what is inserted here as of the 7th, _was_ written on the 7th in
this book?”

MASTER.—“Yes.”

“Is this the identical book into which it was copied from the board?”

MASTER.—“Yes.”

“And there never was any other log-book kept?”

MASTER.—“No.”

“Who kept this?”

MASTER.—“I kept it myself.”

PRESIDENT.—“It is written so fair and so neat that _it bears every
mark of being a fair copy_!”

JUDGE-ADVOCATE.—“_I tell the gentleman I am sure no imputation rests
upon him!_”

PRESIDENT.—“No; _not the least_!”[49] (_Minutes_, pp. 30, 31.)

-----

Footnote 49:

Inspection of more than one of the logs can leave no doubt, from the
neatness of the handwriting, that those relating to the date of the
action had been recopied, and could not have been written from day to
day; which from the difference in the pen and other little
circumstances must have shown itself as in other logs. In one instance
portions of the signal book have been transcribed into the ship’s log.
G.B. EARP.

-----

It was nevertheless a fact that it _had_ been tampered with, as was unwittingly elicited by Mr. Bicknell from the same witness.

QUESTION.—“You say, on your oath, that you believe everything in this
log to be correct.”

MASTER.—“Yes.”

QUESTION.—“How does it happen that the signals of the _Impérieuse_ are
inserted in the margin of the log amongst the columns, and _not in the
body of the log_?”

MASTER.—“I wrote that _at the same time the log was written_!”

“Why did you not put it in the body of the log in the narrative?”

MASTER.—“_I made a mistake!_ in copying it from the log-board!”
(_Minutes_, pp. 29, 30.)

It will thus be seen that my most material testimony was attempted to be stopped by the Court as “irrelevant;”—that the Judge-Advocate gave as a reason for receiving testimony _really irrelevant_, that it _ought_ to be received because “_it would affect the evidence of Lord Cochrane_;”—that garbled logs were resorted to—that the whole proceedings were directed against me, and carefully in favour of Lord Gambier, by leading questions which abound in almost every page, that I was not allowed to be present whilst the witnesses were under examination, so that I had no opportunity of cross-examining them in my own vindication—a right granted to every man by the constitution of his country; and that I was _refused admission_ to the Court during the delivery of Lord Gambier’s defence, _by the Judge-Advocate himself_! a most unusual course, that defence being full of the most injurious insinuations against my honour, though these were not borne out by evidence. In short, I was refused admission to the Court, though I quoted a precedent _not two months old_, in support of my right to be present—a right the more important to me if only from the fact of Lord Gambier having written a second despatch relative to the action in Aix Roads, in which despatch my services were altogether omitted, notwithstanding his lordship’s praises of my conduct in his first despatch written on the spot, where everything had transpired under his own observation.

I must now briefly advert to his lordship’s defence, but only so far as personally concerns myself.

Lord Gambier stated at the outset of his defence, that he had been compelled to demand a court-martial in consequence of “the insinuations thrown out against him by Lord Cochrane, which not only compromised his own honour, but that of brave officers and men serving under his command.” (_Minutes_, p. 105.)

I never threw out against his lordship a single insinuation, nor does one exist, either on the records of the Court or elsewhere. I merely told Lord Mulgrave, as narrated in the first volume, that I did not consider Lord Gambier’s services worthy of a vote of thanks from Parliament, and that on this ground, as bound by public duty to my constituents, I should resist it. As will presently be seen, this was also the opinion of many eminent men in Parliament, and on the same ground too—that of public duty. If I committed any offence in this, it was that of refusing to have my name coupled with that of Lord Gambier in the vote of thanks, and resisting an offer of an independent squadron and a regiment[50], not to persist in my determination of opposing it.

-----

Footnote 50:

See vol. i. p. 404.

-----

That my objection to the vote of thanks to Lord Gambier included any of the officers serving under him was a gratuitous assumption to secure sympathy for himself. As I have shown, the opinions of those officers present in the action, whose opinions were to be relied on, were _anything but in Lord Gambier’s favour_. Not a single word did I utter against any officer; though, on the ninth and last day of the court-martial, it was with the greatest difficulty, and _after a positive refusal_, that I succeeded in getting a denial of Lord Gambier’s unfounded assertion attached to the Minutes. It will be better to give the whole transaction.

The Right Honourable Lord Cochrane called in.

PRESIDENT.—“Lord Cochrane, I have received the note which you
addressed to me, and have taken the sense of the Court upon it. The
decision of the Court is, that as the matter to which your lordship
refers _does not at all bear upon the trial of Lord Gambier they
cannot enter into it_.”

LORD COCHRANE.—“I would request, sir, that that letter may appear as
an official letter to you, and that it may be entered upon the
Minutes.”

PRESIDENT.—“The Court will take that into their consideration.”

The Court was cleared.

The Court was re-opened at one o’clock.

PRESIDENT.—“Lord Cochrane, the Court have taken into their
consideration the note you addressed to them, and have agreed that it
shall be attached to the Minutes.”

The letter was read, and is as follows:—

“August 4, 1809.

“SIR,—Having learnt from my brother officers that a report has gone
abroad that I censured, in general terms, the conduct of the officers
employed in the Road of Aix, on the 12th of April, I wish to have an
opportunity to declare the truth on oath; considering reports of that
nature highly injurious to the service of our country. I am also
desirous to lay before the Court the orders given to the fireships for
their guidance, as these will tend to elucidate and clear some of
those who consider that blame has been imputed to them.

“I have the honour to be, sir,
“Your most obedient humble servant,
“COCHRANE.

“Admiral Sir Roger Curtis, President.”

Let the reader mark that expression of the president, “_it does not at all bear upon the trial of Lord Gambier!_” Though the very first sentence of Lord Gambier’s defence was an accusation of myself upon an assumption for which there was no foundation whatever. Nothing but fear of a parliamentary debate caused that letter to be attached to the Minutes.

So clumsily was this accusation made against me, that Lord Gambier, despite the unwarrantable assumption just quoted, subsequently admitted my objection to the vote of thanks to have _been solely aimed at himself_, and not, as he had just said, at the officers and men of the fleet. Here are his lordship’s words:—

“Lord Cochrane _warned_ the noble lord at the head of the Admiralty
that if this measure (the vote of thanks) were attempted he should, if
standing alone, oppose it; thus, without specifically objecting to
thanks being given for the service performed, directing his hostility
_personally at me_.” (_Minutes_, p. 107.)

That is—I should not have objected to a vote of thanks to the officers and men of the fleet, but only to himself _personally_. Yet in the same breath he accused me of traducing the officers and men of the fleet; with the intention, no doubt, of sheltering himself under the pretence of my having traduced them also. Could anything be more puerile? I gave no other “_warning_” to Lord Mulgrave than that which Lord Gambier correctly stated, and that I certainly did give, but without a word which could give rise to the slightest imputation on the officers and men of the fleet.

The fact is, that I never accused Lord Gambier at all, _not even to Lord Mulgrave_, to whom I only expressed an intention of opposing a parliamentary vote of thanks. It was the Board of Admiralty who accused him. Here are their accusations in full:—

“_By the Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c._

“Whereas Admiral the Right Hon. Lord Gambier has, by his letter to our
Secretary, of the 30th of May, 1809, requested that his conduct, as
Commander-in-chief of the Channel Fleet employed in Basque Roads,
between the 17th day of March and the 29th day of April, 1809, may be
inquired into by a court-martial:

“And whereas, by the log-books and minutes of signals of the
_Caledonia_, _Impérieuse_, and other ships employed on that service,
_it appears to us_ that the said Admiral Lord Gambier, on the 12th
day of the said month of April, the enemy’s ships being then on
shore, and the signal having been made that they could be destroyed,
did, for a considerable time, neglect or delay taking effectual
measures for destroying them: We, therefore, in compliance with his
lordship’s request, and _in consequence of what appears in the said
log-books and minutes of signals_, think fit that a court-martial
shall be assembled for the purpose of examining into his lordship’s
conduct, and trying him for the same: We send you herewith his
lordship’s said letter, and also his letter of the 10th of the said
month therein referred to, together with an attested copy of a
letter of our Secretary, dated the 29th of last month, and addressed
to Lord Cochrane, and his lordship’s reply thereto, with the
log-books and minutes of signals above-mentioned: and we do hereby
require and direct you to assemble a court-martial on Monday the
19th day of this month (if the witnesses shall be then ready, and if
not then ready, as soon after as they shall be so) to try the said
Admiral the Right Hon. Lord Gambier, for his conduct in the instance
hereinbefore mentioned; and also to inquire into his whole conduct
as Commander-in-chief of the Channel Fleet employed in Basque Roads,
between the 17th day of March and the 29th day of April, 1809, and
to try him for the same accordingly.—Given under our hands the 5th
day of June, 1809.

(Signed) “MULGRAVE.
“R. BICKERTON.
“WM. DOMETT.
“R. MOORSOM.

“To Sir Roger Curtis, Bart., Admiral
of the White, and Commander-in-chief
of his Majesty’s ships and vessels
at Spithead and in Portsmouth
Harbour.

“By Command of their Lordships,
“W.W. POLE.”