Chapter XXIV: A Naval Study for All Time (12)

A circumstance may here be mentioned which has an important bearing on the subject. My letter to the Admiralty, giving my reasons for asking leave of absence for the purpose of rebutting the insinuations against my character, contained most material matter for my exculpation. It was written to Mr. Secretary Croker, but when I afterwards moved for and obtained from the House of Commons an order for the production of my correspondence with the Admiralty, _this letter was not to be found, though all others asked for were!!_ Had the letter been produced, it must have had great weight with the House, the adverse decision of which I mainly ascribe to its nonproduction. Unfortunately, in the haste of the application, no copy was taken.

I have been particular in recording dates, because it has been insinuated to my injury that I _had been tardy_ in giving the information in my power. It is hence my desire to put on record that _the moment_ the necessity for vindicating myself arose not an hour was lost by me in giving the Stock Exchange a clue to the offender, if such De Berenger should turn out to have been.

I will here notice another circumstance, viz. that the very Mr. Gurney who had advised me in the matter of my affidavit, and to whom I had unreservedly communicated every circumstance connected with my private affairs, as well as those connected with the visit of De Berenger, was afterwards chosen by Mr. Lavie, the _solicitor to the committee, as the leading counsel for the Stock Exchange at the subsequent trial against me!_ I simply relate the fact, without comment.

It is not necessary here to weary the reader by the insertion of a lengthy affidavit, which accounted for every act of mine on the day of the alleged hoax. The main facts, as relating to the visit of De Berenger, are these. That early on the morning in question I had gone to a lamp manufactory in the city, for the purpose of superintending the progress of some lamps patented by me, and ordered for the use of the convoy of which I was about to take charge on their voyage to North America. Whilst thus engaged, my servant came to me with a note, which had been given to him by a military officer, who was waiting at my house to see me. Not being able to make out the name, from the scrawling style in which the note was written, and supposing it to have come from a messenger from my brother, who was then dangerously ill with the army of the Peninsula, and of whose death we were in daily expectation of hearing, I threw down the note, and replied, that I would come as soon as possible; and, having completed my arrangements at the lamp manufactory, arrived at home about two hours afterwards, when, to my surprise, I found De Berenger in place of the expected messenger from my brother. The reader may gather from my affidavit what occurred at this interview. (See Appendix.)

The comprehensiveness of the voluntary disclosure contained in the affidavit has been termed indiscreet, and may have been so, as entering on much that might be deemed unnecessary. But I had nothing to conceal, believing it could in no way affect me—nor would it have done so but for the trickery subsequently resorted to. There was nothing extraordinary in the document. A poor but talented man—a prisoner within the Rules of the King’s Bench—came to me in the hope that I would extricate him from his difficulties by taking him to America in the _Tonnant_. After my renewed refusal, on professional grounds, De Berenger represented that he could not return to the Rules in his uniform without exciting suspicion of his absence. The room happened at the time to be strewed with clothes, in process of examination, for the purpose of being sent on board the _Tonnant_, those rejected being thrown aside; and at his urgent request I lent, or rather gave, him a civilian’s hat and coat to enable him to return to his lodgings in ordinary costume. This simple act constituted my offence, and was construed by the Court into complicity in his fraudulent conduct! though under ordinary circumstances, and I was aware of no other, it was simply an act of compassionate good nature.

A very remarkable circumstance connected with this affidavit, and afterwards proved on the trial, was this—that on De Berenger’s arrival in town from Dover, he neither went to the Stock Exchange, nor to his employers, whoever they might be, nor did he take any steps on his arrival in town to _spread the false intelligence which he had originated_. He was proved on the trial to have dismissed his post-chaise at Lambeth—to have taken a hackney-coach—and to have proceeded straight to my house. The inference is plain, that the man was frightened at the nature of the mission he had undertaken, and declined to go through with it, preferring to try once more whether he could not prevail on me to take him on board the _Tonnant_, where he might remain till the ship sailed for North America.

Had I been his confederate, it is not within the bounds of credibility that he would have come in the first instance to my house, and waited two hours for my return home, in place of carrying out the plot he had undertaken, or that I should have been occupied in perfecting my lamp invention for the use of the convoy of which I was in a few days to take charge, instead of being on _the only spot_ where any advantage to be derived from the Stock Exchange hoax could be realised, had I been a participator in it. Such advantage must have been immediate, before the truth came out, and to have reaped it, had I been guilty, it was necessary that I should not lose a moment. It is still more improbable, that being aware of the hoax, I should not have speculated largely for the special risk of that day.

Neither, had I been his confederate, is it more probable that I should have declined to take him on board the _Tonnant_, when, by so doing, I could have effectually concealed him under another name, together with every trace of the plot, and could have either taken him with me, or have shipped him in safety to the Continent.

I will here repeat what has been previously stated, that before my affidavit the committee of the Stock Exchange was ignorant even of the name of _any_ person, that my affidavit alone disclosed the necessary information. In other words, _I voluntarily gave the only information upon which the subsequent trial was based, and this disclosure was so complete as to leave the Stock Exchange nothing to do but to prosecute De Berenger_.

Let me ask the common-sense question, whether this was the act of a guilty person, who by concealing his knowledge could have effectually prevented all further investigation? Or, to put the question in another form—would it not have been the act of an insane person, if guilty, to have denounced another to his own conviction, when by holding his peace both would have been safe from detection? To have done such an uncalled-for act, would have been little in accordance with the _acumen_ for which the public had for many years given me credit. In one respect, my affidavit might have been an error, but it was not the _error of a guilty man_; viz. in not deferring to the opinion of my legal advisers, who wished me to confine myself to the single fact that the pretended Du Bourg had been traced to my house, and that I suspected De Berenger to be the person.

My fault was, that being conscious—till too late—that nothing in the whole affair could in any way concern me—I was careless about my defence—had nothing to do with the brief beyond a few rough notes (see Appendix)—and never even read it after it was finally prepared for counsel. This was not the act of a guilty man. Yet, had I been guilty, I should have had every chance in my favour of acquittal; first, by concealing the fact that De Berenger was the stranger who came to my house on the 21st of February, in military uniform—and, without this voluntary information on my part, the case must have disappeared; secondly, had I really been guilty, my chance of acquittal would have been greater than if innocent—because the knowledge of facts which I must have possessed if guilty, and _could not have possessed_ if innocent, would have enabled me to make an effectual defence in place of the aimless defence which was made.

If proof of my non-participation in the hoax were required, it existed, so far as the statement of such a person was credible, in the handwriting of De Berenger himself, immediately after my affidavit disclosing his name in furtherance of the purposes of justice; a proceeding on my part which might naturally be supposed to embitter him against me. So far from this being the case, an innate sense of justice on the part of De Berenger led him to admit even the truth of the declaration contained in the affidavit as regarded himself.

“13, Green Street, April 27th, 1814.

“SIR,—Having, I trust, given ample time and opportunity to those who
have endeavoured to asperse my character to learn from your own mouth
the circumstances which induced you to call upon me on the 21st of
February last, I feel it now due to myself no longer to delay this my
earnest request, that you will afford me that explanation.

“I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,
(Signed) “COCHRANE.

“Baron de Berenger.”

[De Berenger to Lord Cochrane:—]

“King Street, Westminster, April 27th, 1814.

“MY LORD,—I have the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your
Lordship’s favour, which has this moment been delivered.

“Rest assured, my Lord, that nothing could exceed the pain I felt when
I perceived how cruelly, how unfairly my unfortunate visit of the 21st
of February was interpreted (_which, with its object, is so correctly
detailed in your affidavit_); but my agony is augmented, when I
reflect that acts of generosity and goodness towards an unfortunate
man have been, and continue to be, the accidental cause of much
mortification to you: a fear of increasing the imaginary grounds of
accusation caused me to refrain from addressing you.

“I have the honour, &c.,
“CHAS. RANDOM DE BERENGER.”

The tone of this letter, which, without answering in express terms my query as to the object of his visit on the 21st of February, declares the truth of my affidavit as to the same, and also to what occurred during the short time he remained there.[96] This indisposed me for further communication with the writer, who, finding such to be the case, commenced a series of vituperative epistles, the object of which was evidently the extortion of money. The whole of these letters were transmitted by me to the public press, without reply or comment, and were so published at the time.

-----

Footnote 96:

See my affidavit in the Appendix.

-----

A no less important admission emanated from De Berenger. The press had by some means or other got hold of the fact that this man, whom I had denounced to the Stock Exchange, was _in communication with certain members of the Government for the purpose of implicating me_! The communication does not appear to have resulted in anything further than was known from my affidavit, and I have reason to know that from fear of the man’s character, the Government abstained from committing themselves with him.

“King’s Bench, July 19th, 1814.

“Whereas several newspapers have asserted that I have written to Lord
Sidmouth, whilst others state that I have addressed the committee of
the Stock Exchange, &c. disclosing particulars to prove Lord
Cochrane’s guilt, I feel justified thus solemnly, publicly, and
positively to declare, That, _since my confinement here_, I have
neither written, or otherwise applied, directly or indirectly, to any
of the offices of Government for the purpose of disclosure. That I
have not written to any one on the subject of the 21st of February
last, _since the 11th instant_ (July), excepting one private letter to
Lord Cochrane. That the assertions in the newspapers are totally
false, &c. &c.

“CHARLES RANDOM DE BERENGER.”

The plain inference is, that De Berenger did so _before the trial_, and whilst he was writing to me that the contents of my affidavit, as regarded himself, contained the exact truth. That he had such communication with both Government and Stock Exchange, before the trial, is beyond doubt, and part of the reasons which warrant my assertion, that a higher authority than the Stock Exchange was at the bottom of my prosecution. Deeply degraded as was the man, he affords the strongest _presumptive_ evidence of my non-participation in the hoax. In the next chapter I trust to adduce such _positive_ evidence as shall place the matter beyond doubt.

I do not blame the Judge for not taking these matters into account, for, confident in my entire innocence, I could not see their importance or bearing, and did not even communicate them to my solicitor till too late.

Bitter after-knowledge has however convinced me of the error of carelessness—even from a consciousness of innocence—when once entangled in the meshes of law—a word by no means synonymous with justice.

Of the subject of the prosecution itself, I will here say one word. It was that of one set of stock-jobbers and their confederates trying—by means of false intelligence—to raise the price of “_time bargains_” at the expense of another set of stock-jobbers, the losers being naturally indignant at the successful hoax. The wrong was not then, and still is not, on the statute-book. Such a case had never been tried before, nor has it since—and was termed a “conspiracy;” or rather, by charging the several defendants—of most of whom I had never before heard—in one indictment, it was brought under the designation of a “conspiracy.” The “conspiracy”—such as it was—was nevertheless one, which, as competent persons inform me, has been the practice in all countries ever since stock-jobbing began, and is in the present day constantly practised, but I have never heard mention of the energy of the Stock Exchange even to detect the practice.

I do not make these remarks to palliate deception, even at the expense of Stock Exchange speculators. My object is, that the present generation, knowing that in my early life I was imprisoned and fined 1000_l._ for an alleged offence against the Stock Exchange fraternity, may understand the exact character of the accusation. It is clear that the influence and vindictiveness with which this most unjustifiable prosecution was carried out as against me, arose from motives far deeper than the vindication of stock-jobbing purity, viz. from a desire in more influential quarters to silence, if possible, an obnoxious political adversary; the visit of De Berenger to my house, as disclosed by myself, and his acquaintance with my uncle as before stated, affording a basis for the accomplishment of this object.

Happily, Providence has implanted in the breast of man an amount of moral and physical energy proportioned to the wrongs and inflictions he may be called upon to bear, and, even in my eighty-fifth year, I am still left sound in mind, and with a heart unbroken, to tell my own story.

CHAP. XXXIX.

ADMIRALTY INFLUENCE AGAINST ME.—APPOINTMENT OF MR. LAVIE AS
PROSECUTOR.—THE TRIAL.—CRANE, THE HACKNEY COACHMAN.—INDECISION OF
HIS EVIDENCE.—LORD ELLENBOROUGH’S CHARGE, AND UNJUSTIFIABLE
ASSUMPTIONS.—REPORT OF THE TRIAL FALSIFIED; OR, RATHER, MADE UP FOR
THE OCCASION.—EVIDENCE, HOW GOT UP.—PROVED TO BE POSITIVE
PERJURY.—THIS CONFIRMED BY SUBSEQUENT AFFIDAVITS OF RESPECTABLE
TRADESMEN.—ANOTHER CHARGE IN STORE FOR ME, HAD NOT THIS
SUCCEEDED.—THE CHIEF WITNESS’S CONVICTION.—HIS SUBSEQUENT
TRANSPORTATION AND LIBERATION.—AFFIDAVITS OF MY SERVANTS, THOMAS
DEWMAN, MARY TURPIN, AND SARAH BUST.—MY SECOND AFFIDAVIT.—APPEAL
FROM MY CONVICTION REFUSED.—EXPULSION FROM THE HOUSE.—MINORITY IN MY
FAVOUR.

Had I been aware of a very curious coincidence connected with the trial which followed, my confidence, arising from consciousness of innocence, would have vanished in an instant; so that instead of indifference about the result, I should have seen the necessity of meeting every accusation with the most deliberate caution, supporting the same by every attainable evidence, in place of no evidence at all.

The fact alluded to is this—that the same Mr. Lavie who had displayed so much tact on Lord Gambier’s court-martial _was selected as solicitor to the prosecution in the present case_, to the exclusion of the appointed solicitor to the Committee of the Stock Exchange! The fact was significant, as affording additional suspicion that an influence other and higher than that of the Committee was at work.

As in various publications connected with Lord Gambier’s trial I had spoken very freely of Mr. Lavie as regarded the fabricated charts, exposed at the commencement of this volume, there could be no doubt of his not unreasonable personal animosity towards myself. But when, _after the trial_, I became for the first time aware that he had been employed to conduct it, the enigma was solved as to how I, from having voluntarily given the only information upon which the case could have originated at all, came to be mixed up in one common accusation with a number of persons, of most of whose very names I had never before heard.

More than this, it then became but too apparent that from the selection of Mr. Lavie as prosecuting attorney, I was not so much the subject of a Stock Exchange prosecution as of the political vindictiveness of which I have spoken, and which had gone out of the usual course to secure his services. That there was collusion between a high official at the Admiralty and the Committee of the Stock Exchange on this point, I do not hesitate for one moment to assert; nor do I think, from previous revelations in this work, that many of my readers will be inclined to differ with me.

I will not, however, dwell upon this matter. Whoever selected Mr. Lavie had a perfect right so to do, as Mr. Lavie had to accept the conduct of the case; the result of which is attributable to my being so satisfied of my own innocence as to decide that an accusation which so little concerned me ought not to take me from the more important duties in which I was employed. Had I been aware at the time of Mr. Lavie’s appointment, I should have known its meaning, and prepared accordingly.

The principal circumstance which was held to have implicated me in the hoax practised on the Stock Exchange was this:—That (as gathered from my own voluntary information) De Berenger came to my house on the 21st February; but that instead of being dressed in a green uniform, as set forth in my affidavit, he was in scarlet uniform, that being the alleged costume in which he had disseminated the false intelligence at Dover. If this point could be proved, it was inferred that I must have had a motive in wrongly describing the uniform in my affidavit, and that motive could be none other than my own knowledge of the hoax which had been perpetrated. How this inference was arrived at will appear in the sequel.

The main question relied on by the prosecution related to the colour of De Berenger’s coat, whether _scarlet_ or _green_: the point held by the Court being, that if _scarlet_, I must have made a false declaration in my affidavit as to its colour, and therefore must have at least known how De Berenger had been engaged. A _non sequitur_ truly, but nevertheless the one relied on for my conviction as one of the conspirators.

The evidence was this—that when De Berenger arrived from Dover at the Marsh Gate, Lambeth, he exchanged the post-chaise in which he had been travelling for a hackney coach, in which he drove to my house,—which was true enough. The waterman on the stand was called as the first link in the chain; but as he said “he did not see that he could recollect De Berenger, having only seen him for half a minute,” (_Report_, p. 120,) this evidence is not worth commenting on, unless to remark that, failing to recognise De Berenger in court, the extraordinary course was taken of pointing him out, and then asking the witness if “he _thought_ he _was like_ the man who got into the coach?” The reply was “he _thought_ he was, but he only saw him for half a minute.”—(_Ibid._)

The next witness brought forward was a man named Crane—the hackney coachman who drove De Berenger. In his examination, Crane did not say a word about the colour of De Berenger’s coat, but in his cross-examination swore that he had on a “red coat underneath his great coat” (_Report_, p. 124). At the same time he stated that De Berenger had with him “_a portmanteau big enough to wrap a coat in_.” Other witnesses proved that he had drawn down the sun blinds in the vehicle, so that he had abundant opportunity to exchange his red coat in which he appeared at Dover, for the green sharpshooter’s uniform, and this no doubt he had done. The person of whom the red uniform had been purchased also deposed, that he had carried it away from his shop in a portmanteau, so that there was no doubt of the capacity of the latter to contain the coat. In short, he left London in the uniform of the rifles, and put on the scarlet uniform at Dover, to assume the pretended rank of a staff officer. On his return to London he in like manner, no doubt, changed his uniform by the way.

It has been shown that the waterman who opened the coach-door for De Berenger refused to identify him, but swore that the person alluded to had a red coat beneath his military coat. It is also remarkable that the hackney coachman, Crane, could not be got to identify him, though, like the waterman, he swore to the red coat. The subjoined is Crane’s evidence on the subject:—

MR. ADOLPHUS.—“Have you seen that person since that you drove that
morning?”

CRANE.—“Yes; I saw him in King Street, Westminster.” (At the
messenger’s house, where Crane was taken by Mr. Lavie for the purpose
of being identified by this witness.)

MR. ADOLPHUS.—“Do you see him in court?”

CRANE.—“I _think_ this is the gentleman here.”

MR. ADOLPHUS.—“Were you of the same opinion when you saw him in King
Street?”

CRANE.—“When I came down stairs he looked very hard at me.”

MR. ADOLPHUS.—“Did you know him then?”

CRANE.—“Yes: it was _something of the same appearance_, but he had
altered himself very much by his dress.”

MR. RICHARDSON.—“He was pointed out there as being the person in
custody?”

CRANE.—“No: I walked down stairs, and met the gentleman coming up
stairs.”

MR. RICHARDSON.—“You thought you saw a resemblance?”

CRANE.—“Yes, I thought he was _something like_ the same gentleman that
I had carried.”

MR. RICHARDSON.—“You do not pretend to recollect every person you
carry in your hackney coach every day?”

CRANE.—“_No_, but this gentleman that I took from a post chaise and
four: when he got out at Green Street, I saw that he had a red coat
underneath his great coat.”

Thus, neither the waterman nor the hackney coachman would swear to _the man_, but to a red coat only. I have no hesitation in saying, that in a court of justice in the present day no weight whatever would have been attached to such evidence. I will, however, assume that the evidence was such as to carry weight, and that it was in every respect unexceptionable, because I shall shortly come to the reason why they swore to the coat, but not to the man who wore it.

The case against me then stood thus. _One_ witness (the waterman), but no more, swore to the under coat of a person whom he had seen step from one vehicle into another; and _one_ witness, but no more (the hackney coachman) swore to the person whom he brought to my house, as having on a red coat beneath his military coat, but would not swear positively to the wearer. It was, however, to support this extraordinary evidence that my voluntary declaration in my affidavit, of lending De Berenger an old hat and coat, because he alleged that he could not return to his lodgings in the King’s Bench in uniform, without exciting suspicion of his absence from the rules, and thus endangering his securities—was charged against me as involving confederacy.

On the evidence here adduced—and there was not a tittle beyond it, on the subject of the coat—the point was held by Lord Ellenborough to be established that De Berenger stripped off the red coat in my house! and as it was afterwards found in the river, his lordship charged the jury in a way which bore the construction of my having been also a participator in _that act_, though there was not a particle of evidence on the trial which could give even the shadow of such a conclusion, nor was there even a pretence on the part of the prosecution that such was the case. His Lordship’s address to the jury on this head is amongst the most remarkable that ever fell from the lips of an English judge.

“Now, gentlemen, he (_De Berenger_) is brought to the house of Lord
Cochrane; _further evidence afterwards arises upon the subject of his
being there_. We will at present follow the dress to its conclusion.
George Odell, a fisherman, says, ‘In the month of March, just above
Old Swan Stairs, off against the Iron Wharfs, when I was dredging for
coals, I picked up a bundle which was tied with either a piece of
chimney line or window line in the cover of a chair bottom; there were
two slips of a coat, embroidery, a star, and a piece of silver, with
two figures upon it; it had been sunk with three pieces of lead and
some bits of coal; I gave that which I found to Mr. Wade, the
Secretary of the Stock Exchange; it was picked up on the Wednesday,
and carried there on the Saturday. I picked this up on the 24th of
March.’ _You have before had the animal hunted home, and now you have
his skin_, found and produced as it was taken out of the river, cut to
pieces; the sinking it could have been with no other view than that of
suppressing _this piece of evidence_, and preventing the discovery
which it might otherwise occasion; this makes it the more material to
attend _to the stripping off the clothes which took place in Lord
Cochrane’s house_.”—(_Report_, p. 478.)

That this unwarrantable assumption, based on no evidence whatever, of De Berenger’s stripping off his clothes at my house, could have anything to do with a coat found in the river, was positively absurd, and was not supported by a particle of evidence. Besides which, I had some reputation for shrewdness, and should not have been likely to tie up the coat “in an old chair cover, with three pieces of lead and some lumps of coal!” when the winter’s fire in my grate would in five minutes have destroyed the coat and its evidence together, had it been “stripped off” in my house, or had I been a party to its destruction. The position in which the coat was found, showed where it came from, viz. from the Southwark side of the river, where De Berenger’s lodgings were.

The Judge thus proceeded:—

“De Berenger must have had that dress with him, whatever it was in
which he had come in the coach, and _it does not appear that he had
any means of shifting himself_. If he had on an aide-de-camp’s uniform
with a star, and so presented himself to Lord C., how could Lord C.
reconcile it to the duties he owed to society, to government, and to
his character as a gentleman, to give him the means of exchanging it?
It must be put on for some dishonest purpose.

“It is for you, gentlemen, to say whether it is possible he should not
know that a man coming so disguised and so habited,—_if he appeared
before him so habited_,—came upon some dishonest errand, and whether
it is to be conceived a person should so present himself to a person
who did not know what that dishonest errand was, and that it was the
very dishonest errand upon which he had so recently been engaged, and
which he is found to be executing in the spreading of false
intelligence for the purpose of elevating the funds. If he actually
appeared to Lord Cochrane stripped of his coat, and with that red coat
and aide-de-camp’s uniform, star and order, which have been
represented to you, he appeared before him rather in the habit of a
mountebank than in his proper uniform of a sharpshooter. This seems
wholly inconsistent with the conduct of an innocent and honest man;
for if he appeared in such an habit, he must have appeared to any
rational person fully blazoned in the costume of that or some other
crime.” (_Report_, pp. 484, 485, 486.)

The preceding quotations from his Lordship’s address to the jury are taken from the “_revised_” report of the trial. They will appear still more extraordinary as quoted from the report of the _Times_ newspaper, taken _verbatim_ at the time. Of this no one acquainted even with ordinary newspaper reports will doubt the accuracy, and after having perused it, there will be as little doubt but that the “_revised_” report was subsequently altered from what really occurred in Court.

The subjoined is the _Times_ report of the Judge’s speech:—

“_Having hunted down the game_, the prosecutors showed _what became of
his skin_, and it was a very material fact that the defendant De
Berenger _stripped himself at Lord Cochrane’s_. HE PULLED HIS SCARLET
UNIFORM OFF THERE, and if the circumstance of its not being green did
not excite Lord Cochrane’s suspicion, what did he think of the star
and medal? It became him on discovering these, as an officer and a
gentleman, to communicate his suspicions of these circumstances. Did
he not ask De Berenger where he had been in this masquerade dress? It
was for the jury to say whether Lord Cochrane did not know where he
had been. This was not the dress of a sharpshooter, but of a
mountebank. HE CAME BEFORE LORD COCHRANE FULLY BLAZONED IN THE COSTUME
OF HIS CRIME!!”

The reader will not fail to perceive that in the _Times_ verbatim report, which is no doubt correct, the Court in every sentence affirms my _positive guilt_. In the “_revised_” report, his Lordship is made to go throughout on the hypothetical “if,” whilst in the revised report of the trial,—which revised report, I affirm, was made up for the occasion,—I am represented to have been treated with all proper fairness! Every evil which followed afterwards was inflicted on the strength of this revised report, and not on the actual transactions at the trial, as reported in the daily papers.

This “revised” report was, indeed, a very serious matter for me. From the reports in the daily papers, which were unquestionably accurate, the public mind was in a state of great ferment at the unfairness of the trial as regarded myself, and therefore the prosecution got up the “revised” report. On its appearance, the Attorney-General said in the House of Commons (July 20th) “He was glad the period had arrived when the trial could be read at length, and thus _do away the effect of those imperfect statements_ (the reports of the daily papers) which _misled the public mind_.” The Solicitor-General, on the same date, went farther, and accused me of having in my defence _misrepresented and misquoted the Judge_, because I had quoted the reports of the daily papers, not having in fact any other to quote. On the testimony of that “revised” report further investigation was declined by the Admiralty, and I was dismissed from the naval service.

On the strength of Crane’s evidence, the Court had held that “_De Berenger appeared before me blazoned in the costume of his crime—that he pulled off his scarlet uniform in my presence—and that, if the circumstance of its not being green did not excite my suspicion, what did I think of the star and medal?_” It is certain, that, even in the “revised” report of the trial, these unqualified assertions, which, put as they were to the jury, were sufficient for my conviction, _are not supported by one particle of evidence_!!

But more has yet to be said of Crane’s evidence, which led to these expressions on the part of the Judge. It will admit of little doubt that a man who would swear to the colour of a coat, and would not swear positively (by the “revised” report) to the identity of the person who wore it, must have had cogent reasons for a course so extraordinary.

I will now adduce those reasons:—

It has been stated, that, conscious of my innocence, I took no personal steps for my defence, beyond forwarding a general statement of a few lines to my solicitors (see Appendix), that I never even read the completed brief which they drew up for the guidance of my counsel, nor was I present in court to suggest questions in cross-examination. After my conviction, however, it became necessary to seek additional evidence to support an appeal from the conviction, or an application for a new trial as against myself.

Lord Ellenborough refused the application, _because all the persons tried were not present to concur in it_, though the law gave me no power to compel their attendance. The evidence on which it was grounded, however, is none the less conclusive because Lord Ellenborough and his colleagues declined to receive it, or even _to hear it!!_ but in place of so doing, at once delivered their outrageous sentence against me.

This appeal was grounded on the evidence of several respectable tradesmen, residing in the neighbourhood of Crane, the hackney coachman, they voluntarily and unsolicited by me, but as an act of public justice, going before the Lord Mayor, and making the affidavits from which the subjoined extracts are taken. Not one of these tradesmen was even known to me or my solicitors:—

JAMES MILLER, butcher, of Marsh Gate, Lambeth, made affidavit that he
saw De Berenger “get out of the chaise into a hackney coach—that he
was _dressed in green_, with a grey great coat, and that _there was no
red on any part of his dress_.”

JOSEPH RAIMENT, fishmonger, Westminster Bridge Road, made affidavit
that he saw De Berenger “get out of the chaise into the hackney
coach—that his great coat was partly open, and that _the under dress
was dark green, like that of the sharpshooters_.”

CHARLES KING, stable-keeper, Westminster Bridge Road, made affidavit
that he met William Crane accidentally, and asked him what he had been
doing with Sayer?[97] He answered, that “he had been to see De
Berenger, in order to identify him, but _he could not swear to him, as
many faces were alike_.” But he said, using a protestation in the most
horrible language, too gross to repeat—“he would have a hackney coach
_out of them_,” meaning, as deponent believed, the prosecutors. During
this conversation, a person passed dressed in a grey great coat, which
Crane said was just like De Berenger’s, and that he (Crane) did not
see De Berenger’s under-dress, _as his coat was closely buttoned up_.

“Deponent further saith, that after the trial he saw Crane’s father,
who told him that ‘he was _going after the money_’ (meaning the
reward), adding that ‘_his son was considered a first-rate witness!_’
On this deponent asked Crane the elder ‘how he could consider his son
in that light, as he knew very well that had he (deponent) been
examined, he must have _beat him out of Court_.’ To this Crane’s
father replied, ‘that if he had appeared, there was the place where
the clothes were bought, and the post-boy.’ On deponent being severe
in his remarks, the father said, ‘I don’t know what they did with the
boy, _they had him two days locked up in the police officer’s house,
that he might not be tampered with_.’[98] Deponent asked him if there
had been any advances by the opposite party. He said, ‘None.’

“Deponent further saith, that he has seen William Crane since the
trial, and on deponent accusing him of going too far with his
evidence, he said, ‘_he would swear black was white, or anything else,
if he was paid for it_!’

“Deponent further saith, that before the trial, the said William
Crane’s coach and horses _were of a most miserable description, but
that since the trial he has purchased a hackney coach and horses of
the best description_!

“Deponent further saith, that the said William Crane’s general
character _is most infamous_, and his mode of expressing himself _so
obscene and blasphemous_ as to preclude deponent from stating the
exact words made use of by the said William Crane. This deponent
further saith, that Mr. Keir, and the groom of Colonel Taylor, were
present when Crane said that ‘_he would swear black was white, or
anything else, if he was well paid for it_.’”

RICHARD BALDWIN, servant to Mr. Keir, made affidavit “that, on the 2nd
of July, he was present at a conversation between Charles King and
William Crane, when he heard Crane, in reply to King, who had accused
him of having gone too far in his evidence, say that ‘_he would be
damned if he would not swear black was white, or anything else, if any
one would pay him for it_.’”

THOMAS CRITCHFIELD, Westminster Bridge Road, coach-maker, made
affidavit “that he knew William Crane, and that he heard him say,
previously to the said trial, when speaking of his father, that ‘_he
did not care a damn for his father_, that he was twenty-one years of
age, _and should soon have more money than ever his father had_.’

“Deponent further said that _since_ the trial the said William Crane
has been enabled _to purchase a very good hackney coach, with horses
and harness_, though _previous_ to the trial his coach and horses were
of the most miserable description. Deponent lastly saith, that the
said William Crane _is a man of the most infamous character, and this
deponent positively declares that he would not believe him on his
oath_.”

JAMES YEOWELL, of Silver Street, Falcon Square, ticket porter, made
affidavit “that _a few days after the 21st of February_, William Crane
told him that the person whom he took from a post-chaise and four at
the Marsh Gate, was NO OTHER THAN LORD COCHRANE HIMSELF! that he knew
Lord Cochrane as well as he knew him (deponent). That he _had driven
Lord Cochrane from the Opera House, and other places of amusement
twenty times_, and described Lord Cochrane as a tall man, with a long
face and red whiskers.

“Deponent further saith, that after the trial he (deponent) accused
the said William Crane _of perjury_, in having sworn to De Berenger as
the man taken up by him at the Marsh Gate, whereas he had _previously
declared_ before the Stock Exchange Committee that LORD COCHRANE WAS
THE PERSON! Whereupon Crane refused to converse with him further on
the subject.

“This deponent further saith, that having on the same day again met
William Crane, he inquired if he had received the reward offered by
the Stock Exchange Committee, when he, the said William Crane,
admitted that _he had received a part, and expected more_.”

JAMES LOVEMORE, of Clement’s Lane, made affidavit “that he heard the
said James Yeowell interrogate William Crane as to the person of Lord
Cochrane, and that Crane said he knew Lord Cochrane as well as he did
him (Yeowell), and that he had driven Lord Cochrane from the Opera
House and other places of amusement, _twenty times_, and Crane further
declared that _it was Lord Cochrane_ whom he drove from the
post-chaise and four at the Marsh Gate, Lambeth, and described his
Lordship as a tall man with a long face and red whiskers.”

-----

Footnote 97:

A messenger of the Court.

Footnote 98:

The post-boy admitted on the trial that he had several previous
examinations, and that he _received_ 52_l._ _for his evidence_!

-----

Such was a portion only of the facts which I was prepared with in my appeal to Lord Ellenborough and his colleagues. But, as before said, the same judge refused to listen to the appeal, not on the ground of my having no evidence to rebut the perjury of Crane, but because _all the persons convicted were not present in Court to join in the appeal_. It was the rule of Court, which I had no power to alter, though, as has been seen in a recent chapter, Lord Campbell, in his “Lives of the Chief Justices,” states, that such a case had _only been ruled once, and that in this case it ought to have been overruled_.

In the two affidavits last adduced there is abundant proof that if the resource of the _red coat_ had not been adopted, Crane was prepared to swear that _it was I whom he had driven from the Marsh Gate to my own house_! the conclusion being that I was the pretended De Berenger. Crane evidently knew my personal appearance, as did most persons in London, and said, further, that he knew me from having driven me _twenty times to the Opera_; the fact being that I was never at the Opera but twice in my life, and once in the vestibule, when I was refused admittance from not being in full evening dress, the deficiency consisting in wearing white pantaloons on a very hot day.

It should be remembered, that Crane stated this before the Committee of the Stock Exchange _soon after the 21st of February_, i. e., _before_ I had given the clue to De Berenger in my affidavit as the person who visited my house on the morning of that day. _After_ I had thus disclosed the name of De Berenger, the project of proving by the perjury of Crane that _I was the pretended Du Bourg_, was given up by the prosecution,—from the dissimilarity of his personal appearance to mine; and then—_but not till then_—was the equally atrocious perjury of the _red coat_ resorted to.

Upon the evidence of such a man as Crane was I convicted, and refused an appeal from the conviction, or a new trial because the defendants to the indictment were not all in Court!! It was “_a rule of Court_,” which, as Lord Campbell says, ought to have been in my case overruled, but Lord Ellenborough refused to hear a word of the abundant evidence _then in my hand_ and available for my exculpation. Crane’s evidence that De Berenger had on a red coat, was relied on, but the far more reliable evidence that the coat was “_green_,” as I had stated, was repudiated. Crane had boasted that “_he would swear black was white, if well paid for it_”—and I held in my hand the most reliable evidence that from the money he had been paid for his perjury, he had bought “_a new coach, horses, and harness_.” None of these circumstances were allowed to be received in Court, or even listened to, because all the persons included in the indictment were not present, though, as Lord Campbell has well said, the rule of Court in my case ought, under the peculiar circumstances, to have been overruled.

A few more particulars relative to this _convict_, Crane,—for such was his subsequent fate,—are necessary to enable the reader to judge of my prosecution and those who selected this man as their chief witness.

Not long after the trial, the solicitor of Mr. Cochrane Johnstone wrote me to the following effect relative to a discovery made when too late as to Crane’s character:—

“This fellow has lately been prosecuted by Mr. Dawson, before the
Commissioners of the Hackney Coach Office, for brutality and general
misconduct. This offence was so flagrant that the _severest
punishment_ was inflicted, and at present he is under a long
suspension. He is a worthless rascal, and if Mr. D. can do your
Lordship any service, you have only to command it.”

Enclosed in the above communication was the following extract from the _Times_ newspaper of May 25th, 1814:—

“On Friday last, William Crane, driver of the hackney coach No. 782,
was summoned before the Commissioners on a charge of cruelty to his
horses, and for abuse to a gentleman who noticed his conduct. The
circumstances detailed were so shocking as to induce the Commissioners
to observe that they never _heard a more atrocious case_. They would
have inflicted a pecuniary penalty, but as it must necessarily be paid
by his father, they ordered him instead to be suspended from driving
any hackney coach for three months.”

The trial, which resulted in my conviction, _on this very man’s evidence_, took place on the 8th of June, 1814, _only a fortnight after his conviction of the atrocity just quoted_! so that at the moment of giving his evidence this man was himself under punishment for an offence pronounced by the Commissioners to be “_so shocking that they never heard of a more atrocious case_”!!! Had this information been available at the trial, the jury would have paid but small attention to Crane’s evidence.

Crane was convicted of stealing twenty sovereigns and other property under circumstances no less atrocious. He was sentenced to transportation for seven years, but at the expiration of three years _received a free pardon from the Government on his own petition_.

The subjoined certificate from the officials of Newgate, however, place his conviction and premature pardon by the Secretary of State in 1830 beyond doubt:—

“Office, Newgate, 23rd October, 1830.

“I do hereby certify that William Crane (aged 33) was committed to
this gaol on the 17th of February, 1826, by J.C. Conant, Esq., for
‘stealing a box, a pair of scissors, and twenty sovereigns, the
property and moneys of William Bucknall;’ tried before Mr. Sergeant
Arabin on the 20th of February, convicted and sentenced to
transportation for seven years, and that he was removed on the 23rd of
March following, on board the _Justitia_ hulk at Woolwich.”

Endorsement at the back of this certificate:—

“William Crane has been discharged from the hulks _on petition to the
Secretary of State_, and is now again driving the coach No. 781,
belonging to his father! Crane’s discharge took place Thursday before
last.

“13th November, 1830.”

(No signature, but evidently a police memorandum.)

These facts will be sufficient to convince the reader of my innocence as regarded the evidence of Crane, the hackney coachman. Yet his evidence was laid before the jury as of the highest reliable kind, whilst the very facts relative to his character, even to his being under conviction whilst giving his evidence, Lord Ellenborough and his colleagues refused to hear, because all the parties convicted were not present in Court. It is scarcely possible to imagine greater injustice and folly, even in that day.

So little apparent danger was there of the possibility of my being declared implicated in this hoax, that even my solicitors had not taken the precaution of summoning my servants to give evidence as to the kind of dress worn by De Berenger; though during the period he remained in my house, previous to my arrival from the lamp-maker’s, where, on receiving his letter, I was busily engaged, and amidst the busy operations of packing my clothes, and other effects, to be sent on board the _Tonnant_, he had been seen by nearly all my servants, the selection of clothing being carried on in the very room in which he was waiting my return for nearly two hours.

On my appeal to the Court of King’s Bench, I provided myself with the following affidavits from such of my servants as had come in contact with De Berenger, whilst waiting at my house:—

“THOMAS DEWMAN, servant to Lord Cochrane, maketh oath, and saith, that
he, this deponent, has lived with branches of Lord Cochrane’s family
for nearly twenty years; that he attended Lord Cochrane last year to
take letters and go on errands, and that he has been in the habit of
going to Mr. King’s manufactory almost every day; that this deponent
was in Lord Cochrane’s house, in Green Street, Grosvenor Square, on
the 21st day of February last, when an officer came in a
hackney-coach, about ten o’clock in the morning; that this deponent
opened the door and spoke to the officer in the coach, who asked if
Lord Cochrane was at home; that this deponent replied he was not, upon
which the officer asked the deponent, if he knew where Lord Cochrane
was gone to, which deponent answered that he believed his Lordship was
gone to breakfast with his uncle in Cumberland Street; that the
officer then asked him if he could let him have a slip of paper and a
pen and ink, which this deponent said he could; that this deponent
then opened the coach door, and the officer came into the house, and
went into the parlour, where this deponent gave him a small slip of
paper, upon which he wrote a few lines by way of note, and desired
this deponent to take the same to Lord Cochrane in Cumberland Street;
that this deponent went immediately into Cumberland Street, but
finding that Lord Cochrane was gone, he returned with the note to the
officer in Green Street; that on his return the officer asked deponent
if he knew where he could find him, that deponent then told the
officer he had been ordered by Lord Cochrane to follow him to Mr.
King’s manufactory with a glass globe, and thought it probable he
might meet with his Lordship there, and if he did not, he would then
go to the Admiralty, where he understood his Lordship was to go that
day; that the officer then took back the note from this deponent,
opened it, and wrote a line or two more, and then re-sealed it and
gave it to deponent, requesting him to take it immediately to Mr.
King’s manufactory, and that if he did not meet with Lord Cochrane
there, he would take the note to the Admiralty, and if his Lordship
had not been at the Admiralty, to leave it there; that on the
officer’s requesting deponent to go to Mr. King’s manufactory, he told
the deponent that his finding Lord Cochrane was of consequence, and
therefore begged deponent to be as expeditious as he could, and, if
necessary, to take a coach; that this deponent did not take a coach,
but went instantly to Mr. King’s manufactory, where he met Lord
Cochrane, and delivered him the note, which he opened in deponent’s
presence; that upon opening the note, Lord Cochrane asked deponent
several times if he knew who the gentleman was that had written it,
and upon deponent’s informing him that he did not, Lord Cochrane made
several inquiries as to his appearance and dress, observing that he
could not make out the whole of the note, or who it came from; to this
deponent answered, that he was an army officer; upon which Lord
Cochrane having torn the note, threw it down, and then said, ‘Very
well, Thomas, I’ll go back;’ that from Lord Cochrane’s manner and
appearance, and the questions he put to deponent, on his delivering
the note, this deponent verily believes that his Lordship did not know
from whom it came. And this deponent further saith, that when the
officer came into Green Street, as above stated, he _was dressed in a
great grey coat, such as the Guards wear, which was buttoned very
close round the body up to the breast, and that such part of the under
coat as he could see was of a dark-green_ colour; that upon the
officer’s coming out of the coach into Lord Cochrane’s house, he
brought with him a sword, and a small leather clothes-bag or
portmanteau, which deponent believes might have held a change of
clothes. That this deponent further saith, that he was hired by his
Lordship at Christmas last to go into the country, and relieve Richard
Carter, his Lordship’s sea-steward; that this deponent left London
about the 25th day of February, and Richard Carter, the sea-steward,
then came to town, for the purpose of accompanying Lord Cochrane to
his ship.

“THOMAS DEWMAN.

“Sworn in Court, June 14th,
“1814. By the Court.”