Chapter X: The Black Flag (3)

"Realizing General Forrest's exposure, we involuntarily
ventured the suggestion that, 'You had better get lower down
the hill, General.' Instantly we apologized, as we expected
the General to intimate that it was none of our business
where he went. He, however, stepped down the hill out of
danger and seating himself behind a tree, seemed for a few
moments in deep study, but soon the head of our cavalry
column arriving, he turned to me and said: 'Captain, as soon
as you hear me open on the right and flank of the enemy over
yonder,' pointing to the enemy's position, 'charge with your
artillery down that lane and cross the branch.' The genial
and gallant Captain Rice coming up at this time and hearing
the order, turned to me and said: 'By G--d! whoever heard of
artillery charging?' Captain Brice's Battery had been
stationed at Columbus, Miss., and other points on local
duty, and only a few months previous had been ordered and
assigned to our command. He accepted his initiation into the
ways and methods of horse artillery with much spirit and
good grace.

"Meanwhile, watching Forrest at the head of the cavalry
moving through the woods and across the field in the
direction of the enemy's right, I directed Lieutenants
Tully, Brown and H. H. Briggs, whose sections had been held
in the road below the Hadden house for an emergency, to be
ready to move into action at a moments notice. The enemy,
observing our cavalry passing to their right, began to break
and retire through the woods. Forrest, seeing this, dashed
upon them in column of fours. At the same moment Lieutenant
Brown pressed his section down the road, even in advance of
the skirmish line, and opened a terrific fire upon the
enemy, now breaking up and in full retreat. Lieutenant
Briggs also took an advanced position and got in a few
well-directed shots. Brown's section and a section of Rice's
Battery were pushed forward across Phillips' branch and up
the hill under a sharp fire, the former taking position on
the right of the road and the latter in the road just where
the road turns before reaching Dr. Agnew's house.

"Our skirmishers had driven the enemy's skirmishers upon
their main line, when we were about to make another
artillery charge, but distinctly hearing the Federal
officers giving orders to their men to stand steady and
yell, 'Remember Fort Pillow.' 'Charge! charge! charge!' ran
along their lines, and on they came. Our right was pressed
back on the 'negro avengers of Fort Pillow.' They moved
steadily upon our guns and for a moment their loss seemed
imminent. Our cannoneers, standing firm and taking in the
situation, drove double-shotted cannister into this
advancing line. The cavalry rallying on our guns sent death
volleys into their ranks, which staggered the enemy and
drove them back, but only to give place to a new line that
now moved down upon us with wild shouts and got almost
within hand-shaking distance of our guns.

"Lyon coming up opportunely at this moment formed his
brigade on our right, and springing forward with loud
cheers, hurled them back with so stormful an onset that
their entire line gave way in utter rout and confusion.
Lieutenant Brown's horse was shot under him. The gallant
young soldier, Henry King, of Rice's Battery, fell with his
rammer staff in hand, mortally wounded. His grave now marks
the spot where he fell. Several members of the artillery
were wounded and a great many battery horses were killed.
The reason for this desperate stand was soon discovered. The
road was filled with their wagons, ambulances and many
caissons, the dying and wounded. Cast-away arms,
accoutrements, baggage, dead animals and other evidences of
a routed army were conspicuous on every side. The sun had
set, but the weary and over-spent Confederates maintained
the pursuit for some five or six miles beyond and until it
became quite too dark to go further. A temporary halt was
ordered, when a section from each battery was directed to be
equipped with ammunition and the best horses from their
respective batteries and be ready to continue the pursuit at
daylight."

The rout was all the enemy could desire, the Federals fought with a valor creditable to any troops, but were badly worsted, through the incompetency of Sturgis. They were driven back to Ripley, in a most disastrously confused state, leaving behind their trains, artillery, dead and wounded. But for the gallantry of the Phalanx, the enemy would have captured the entire force.

The same writer describes the rout:

"Johnson, pressing his brigade forward upon the enemy's
position at Brice's Quarter, with Lyon supporting the
artillery in the road below Brice's house, the position was
soon captured with many prisoners and three pieces of
artillery. Hallers and Mayson's sections were moved up at a
gallop and established on the hill at Brice's Quarter and
opened a destructive fire with double-shotted cannister upon
the enemy's fleeing columns and wagon trains. The bridge
over Tishamingo creek, still standing, was blocked up with
wagons, some of whose teams had been killed. Finding the
bridge thus obstructed the enemy rushed wildly into the
creek, and as they emerged from the water on the opposite
bank in an open field, our artillery played upon them for
half a mile, killing and disabling large numbers. Forrests
escort, under the dashing Lieutenant Cowan, having become
detached in the meantime, had pressed around to the west
side of the creek and south of the Ripley road, and here
made one of its characteristic charges across an open field
near the gin house, upon the enemy's wagon train, capturing
several wagons.

"Meanwhile Barteau was not idle. He had moved his regiment,
as we have stated, across to get in the enemy's rear, and in
his own language says: 'I took my regiment across the
country westward, to reach the Ripley road, on which the
enemy was moving, and being delayed somewhat in passing
through a swampy bottom, I did not reach that road, at
Lyon's gin, three miles from Brice's Cross Roads, until
probably 1 o'clock. I then learned that the last of the
Federal regiments, with all their train, had passed by rapid
march, and as there was now a lull in the engagement (for I
had been hearing sharp firing in front), I greatly feared
that Forrest was defeated and that the Federals were pushing
him back, so I moved rapidly down the road till I reached
the open field near the bridge.'

"This could not have been the Ripley Guntown road, as that
road was filled with Federal troops, wagons and artillery
from Dr. Agnew's house to the cross roads, a distance of two
miles. 'Having placed some sharpshooters, whose sole
attention was to be directed to the bridge,' he continues,
'I extended my line nearly half a mile, and began an attack
by scattering shots at the same time. Sounding my bugle from
various points along the line, almost immediately a
reconnoitering force of the enemy appeared at the bridge,
and being fired upon returned. This was followed, perhaps,
by a regiment, and then a whole brigade came down to the
creek. My men, taking good aim, fired upon them coolly and
steady. Soon I saw wagons, artillery, etc., pushing for the
bridge. These were shot at by my sharpshooters. I now began
to contract my line and collect my regiment, for the
Federals came pouring in immense numbers across the creek.
Your artillery was doing good work. Even the bullets from
the small arms of the Confederates reached my men. I
operated upon the flank of the enemy until after dark.'

"The wagons blockading the bridge were soon removed by being
thrown into the stream and a section from each battery was
worked across by hand, supported by the escort, and brought
to bear upon a negro brigade with fearful loss; the other
two sections were quickly to the front, ahead of any support
for the moment, and drove the enemy from the ridge back of
Holland's house across Dry creek. The cavalry in the
meantime had halted, reorganized and soon joined in the
pursuit. The road was narrow, with dense woods on each side,
so that it was impossible to use more than four pieces at a
time, but that number were kept close upon the heels of the
retreating enemy and a murderous fire prevented them from
forming to make a stand.

"The ridge extending southward from the Hadden house offered
a strong natural position for defensive operations. Upon
this ridge the Federals had established a line of battle,
but a few well directed shots from the artillery stationed
near the Holland house and a charge by our cavalry across
Dry creek readily put them to flight. A section of each
battery was ordered at a gallop to this ridge, which was
reached in time to open with a few rounds of double-shotted
cannister upon their demoralized ranks as they hastily
retreated through the open fields on either side of Phillips
branch. Our cannoneers were greatly blown and well nigh
exhausted from excessive heat and continuous labor at their
guns for full five hours. We noticed a number drink with
apparant relish the black powder water from the sponge
buckets."

The enemy followed the fleeing column, capturing and wounding many at the town of Ripley. Next morning the Federals made a stand. Again the Phalanx bore the brunt of the battle, and when finally the troops stampeded, held the confederates in check until the white troops were beyond capture. But this was all they could do, and this was indeed an heroic act.

The confederate says:

"Long before daylight found us moving rapidly to overtake
the flying foe. We had changed positions. The cavalry now
being in advance, overtook the enemy at Stubb's farm; a
sharp skirmish ensued, when they broke, leaving the
remainder of their wagon train. Fourteen pieces of artillery
and some twenty-five ambulances, with a number of wounded,
were left in Little Hatchie bottom, further on. The
discomfited Federals were badly scattered throughout the
country. Forrest, therefore, threw out his regiment on
either side of the roads to sweep the vicinity. A number
were killed and many prisoners captured before reaching
Ripley, twenty-five miles from Brice's Cross Roads. At this
point two strong lines were formed across the road. After a
spirited onset the Federals broke, leaving one piece of
artillery, two caissons, two ambulances. Twenty-one killed
and seventy wounded were also left on the field. Colonel G.
M. McCraig, of the One Hundred and Twentieth Illinois
Infantry, was among the killed; also Captain W. J. Tate,
Seventh Tennessee Cavalry. This was accomplished just as the
artillery reached the front.

"Lieutenant Frank Rodgers, of Rucker's staff, the night
previous, with a small, select detachment of men, assisted
by Captain Gooch, with the remnant of his company, hung
constantly upon the Federal rear, with a daring never
surpassed. Their series of attacks greatly harrassed and
annoyed the enemy, numbers of whom were killed and wounded.
The artillery followed to Salem, twenty-five miles distant
from Ripley."

The Phalanx regiments would not consent to be whipped, even with the black flag flying in their front, and deserted by their white comrades. A correspondent of the Cleveland _Leader_, in giving an account of this "miserable affair," writes:

"About sunrise, June 11, the enemy advanced on the town of
Ripley, and threatened our right, intending to cut us off
from the Salem Road. Again the colored troops were the only
ones that could be brought into line; the Fifty-ninth being
on the right, and the Fifty-fifth on the left, holding the
streets. At this time, the men had not more than ten rounds
of ammunition, and the enemy were crowding closer and still
closer, when the Fifty-ninth were ordered to charge on them,
which they did in good style, while singing,

"'We'll rally round the flag, boys.'

"This charge drove the enemy back, so that both regiments
retreated to a pine grove about two hundred yards distant.

"By this time, all the white troops, except one squadron of
cavalry, that formed in the rear, were on the road to Salem
and, when this brigade came up, they, too, wheeled and left,
and in less than ten minutes this now little band of colored
troops found themselves flanked. They then divided
themselves into three squads, and charged the enemy's lines;
one squad taking the old Corinth Road, then a by-road, to
the left. After a few miles, they came to a road leading to
Grand Junction. After some skirmishing, they arrived, with
the loss of one killed and one wounded.

"Another and the largest squad covered the retreat of the
white troops, completely defending them by picking up the
ammunition thrown away by them, and with it repelling the
numerous assaults made by the rebel cavalry, until they
reached Collierville, a distance of sixty miles. When the
command reached Dan's Mills, the enemy attempted to cut it
off by a charge; but the colored boys in the rear formed,
and repelled the attack, allowing the whole command to pass
safely on, when they tore up the bridge. Passing on to an
open country, the officers halted, and re-organized the
brigade into an effective force. They then moved forward
until about four, P. M.; when some Indian flank skirmishers
discovered the enemy, who came up to the left, and in the
rear, and halted. Soon a portion advanced, when a company
faced about and fired, emptying three saddles. From this
time until dark, the skirmishing was constant.

"A corporal in Company C, Fifty-ninth, was ordered to
surrender. He let his would-be captor come close to him;
when he struck him with the butt of his gun.

"While the regiment was fighting in a ditch, and the order
came to retreat, the color-bearer threw out the flag,
designing to jump out and get it; but the rebels rushed for
it, and in the struggle one of the boys knocked down with
his gun the reb who had the flag, caught it, and ran.

"A rebel, with an oath, ordered one of our men to surrender.
He, thinking the reb's gun was loaded, dropped his gun; but,
on seeing the reb commence loading, our colored soldier
jumped for his gun, and with it struck his captor dead.

"Capt. H., being surrounded by about a dozen rebels, was
seen by one of his men, who called several of his
companions; they rushed forward and fired, killing several
of the enemy, and rescued their captain.

"A rebel came up to one, and said, 'Come my good fellow, go
with me and wait on me.' In an instant, the boy shot his
would-be master dead.

"Once when the men charged on the enemy, they rushed forth
with the cry, 'Remember Fort Pillow.' The rebs called back,
and said, 'Lee's men killed no prisoners.'

"One man in a charge threw his antagonist to the ground, and
pinned him fast; and, as he attempted to withdraw his
bayonet, it came off his gun, and, as he was very busy just
then, he left him transfixed to mother earth.

"One man killed a rebel by striking him with the butt of his
gun, which he broke; but, being unwilling to stop his work,
he loaded and fired three times before he could get a better
gun; the first time not being cautious, the rebound of his
gun badly cut his lip.

"When the troops were in the ditch, three rebels came to one
man, and ordered him to surrender. His gun being loaded, he
shot one and bayoneted another; and, forgetting he could
bayonet the third, he turned the butt of his gun, and
knocked him down."

General Sturgis was severely criticised by the press immediately after the affair. Historians since the war have followed up these criticisms. He has been accused of incompetency, rashness and drunkenness, none of which it is the purpose of this volume to endorse. Possibly his reports furnish a sufficient explanation for the disaster, which it is hoped they do, inasmuch as he is not charged with either treason or cowardice.

[_General Sturgis' Report, No. 1._]

"HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,
COLLIERSVILLE, TENN., June 12, 1864.

"GENERAL:--I have the honor to report that we met the enemy
in position and in heavy force about 10 A. M. on the 10th
instant at Brice's Cross-Roads on the Ripley and Fulton road
and about six miles northwest of Guntown, Miss. A severe
battle ensued which lasted until about 4 P. M., when I
regret to say my lines were compelled to give way before the
overwhelming numbers by which they were assailed at every
point. To fall back at this point was more than ordinarily
difficult as there was a narrow valley in our rear through
which ran a small creek crossed by a single narrow bridge.
The road was almost impassable by reason of the heavy rains
which had fallen for the previous ten days and the
consequence was that the road soon became jammed by the
artillery and ordnance wagons. This gradually led to
confusion and disorder.

"In a few minutes, however, I succeeded in establishing two
colored regiments in line of battle in a wood on this side
of the little valley. These troops stood their ground well
and checked the enemy for a time. The check, however, was
only temporary and this line in turn gave way. My troops
were seized with a panic and became absolutely
uncontrollable. One and a half miles in rear by dint of
great exertion and with pistol in hand, I again succeeded in
checking up the flying column and placing it in line of
battle.

"This line checked the enemy for ten or fifteen minutes
only, when it again gave way and my whole army became
literally an uncontrollable mob. Nothing now remained to do
but allow the retreat to continue and endeavor to force it
gradually into some kind of shape. The night was exceedingly
dark, the roads almost impassable and the hope of saving my
artillery and wagons altogether futile, so I ordered the
artillery and wagons to be destroyed. The latter were burned
and the former dismantled and spiked, that is all but six
pieces which we succeeded in bringing off in safety. By 7 A.
M. next morning we reached Ripley (nineteen miles). Here we
re-organized and got into very respectable shape. The
retreat was continued, pressed rapidly by the enemy. Our
ammunition soon gave out, this the enemy soon discovered and
pressed the harder. Our only hope now lay in continuing the
retreat which we did to this place, where we arrived about 7
o'clock this morning.

"My losses in material of war was severe, being 16 guns and
some 130 wagons. The horses of the artillery and mules of
the train we brought away. As my troops became very greatly
scattered and are constantly coming in in small parties, I
am unable to estimate my loss in killed and wounded. I fear,
however, it will prove severe, probably ten or twelve
hundred. While the battle lasted it was well contested and I
think the enemy's loss in killed and wounded will not fall
short of our own.

"This, general, is a painful record, and yet it was the
result of a series of unfortunate circumstances over which
human ingenuity could have no control.

"The unprecedented rains so delayed our march across a
desert country that the enemy had ample time to accumulate
an overwhelming force in our front, and kept us so long in
an exhausted region as to so starve and weaken our animals
that they were unable to extricate the wagons and artillery
from the mud.

"So far as I know every one did his duty well, and while
they fought no troops ever fought better. The colored troops
deserve great credit for the manner in which they stood to
their work.

"This is a hasty and rather incoherent outline of our
operations, but I will forward a more minute account as soon
as the official reports can be received from division
commanders.

"I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your
obedient servant,

"S. D. STURGIS,

"_Brig.-Gen. Commanding._

"To Maj.-Gen. C. C. WASHBURN, Commanding District W. Tenn."

An extract from a letter from Colonel Arthur T. Reeve, who commanded the 55th Colored Infantry in this fight, reads:

"Our (the Federal) command having been moved up on
double-quick--a distance of about five miles--immediately
before their arrival on the field and the consequent fact
that this arm of our force went into the engagement very
seriously blown, in fact, very nearly exhausted by heat and
fatigue, with their ranks very much drawn out, were whipped
in detail and overwhelmed by the very brilliant and vigorous
assaults of your forces. When the engagement first began I
was at the rear of the Federal column, in command of the
train guard, and hence passed over the ground on the way to
the battle-field after the balance of the army had passed,
and am able to speak advisedly of the extreme exhaustion of
the infantry, as I passed large numbers entirely prostrated
by heat and fatigue, who did not reach the field of battle
and must have fallen into your hands after the engagement."

[_General Sturgis' Report, No. 2._]

"MEMPHIS, TENN., June 24, 1864.

"Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the
operations of the expedition which marched from near La
Fayette, Tenn., under my command on the 2nd instant. This
expedition was organized and fitted out under the
supervision of the major general commanding the District of
West Tennessee and I assumed command of it on the morning of
the 2nd of June, near the town of La Fayette, Tenn., in
pursuance of Special Orders, No. 38, dated Headquarters,
District of West Tennessee, Memphis, May 31, 1864, and which
were received by me on the 1st inst. The strength of the
command in round numbers was about 8,000 men,' (which
included the following Phalanx regiments: 59th Regt., 61st
Regt., 68th Regt., Battery I, 2nd Artillery, (Light,) 2
pieces.)

"My supply train, carrying rations for 18 days, consisted of
181 wagons, which with the regimental wagons made up a train
of some 250 wagons. My instructions were substantially as
follows, viz: To proceed to Corinth, Mississippi by way of
Salem and Ruckersville, capture any force that might be
there, then proceed south, destroying the Mobile and Ohio
Railroad to Tupelo and Okolona and as far as possible
towards Macon and Columbus with a portion of my force,
thence to Grenada and back to Memphis. A discretion was
allowed me as to the details of the movement where
circumstances might arise which could not have been
anticipated in my instructions. Owing to some
misunderstanding on the part of the quartermaster, as to the
point on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at which some
forage was to have been deposited from the cars, there was
some little delay occasioned in getting the column in
motion.

"The following incidents of the march are taken from the
journal kept from day to day by one of my staff, Capt. W. C.
Rawolle, A. D. C. and A. A. A. G.:

"'Wednesday, June 1st.--Expedition started from Memphis and
White's Station toward La Fayette.

"'Thursday, June 2nd.--The general and staff left Memphis on
the 5 o'clock A. M. train and established headquarters at
Leaks' House, near La Fayette, and assumed command. Cavalry
moved to the intersection of State line and Early Grove
roads, six miles from La Fayette. It rained at intervals all
day and part of the night.

"'Friday, June 3rd.--Ordered the cavalry to move to within
three four miles of Salem. Infantry marched to Lamar, 18
miles from La Fayette. Owing to the heavy rains during the
day and the bad condition of the roads and bridges, the
train could only move to within four miles of Lamar, and did
not get into park until 11 o'clock P. M., the colored
brigade remaining with the train as a guard.

"'Saturday, June 4th.--Informed General Grierson that the
infantry and train under the most favorable circumstances
could only make a few miles beyond Salem and to regulate his
march accordingly. Train arrived at Lamar about noon, issued
rations to the infantry and rested the animals. It rained
heavily until 1 o'clock P. M., making the roads almost
impassable. Moved headquarters to the Widow Spright's house,
two miles west of Salem, and Colonel Hoge's brigade of
infantry to Robinson's house, four miles from Salem.

"'Sunday, June 5th.--Infantry and train started at half past
four o'clock A. M., and joined the cavalry, two miles east
of Salem. At 10 o'clock A. M., issued rations to the cavalry
and fed the forage collected by them. Infantry remained in
camp during the day; cavalry moved to the intersection of
the LaGrange and Ripley and the Salem and Ruckersville
roads. Col. Joseph Karge, 2nd New Jersey, with 400 men,
started at 6 P. M., with instructions to move via Ripley to
Rienzi, to destroy the railroad; to proceed north, destroy
bridge over Tuscumbia and to join General Grierson at
Ruckersville. Heavy showers during the afternoon.

"'Monday, June 6th.--Infantry and train moved at 4 o'clock
A. M., on the Ruckersville road. Commenced raining at 5 A.
M., and continued at intervals all day. Progress very slow,
marched 13 miles and made headquarters at Widow Childers, at
intersection of the Saulsbury and Ripley and the
Ruckersville and Salem roads. Cavalry moved to Ruckersville.
The advance guard of the infantry encountered a small party
of rebels about noon and chased them towards Ripley on La
Grange and Ripley roads.

"'Tuesday, June 7th.--Upon information received from General
Grierson that there was no enemy near Corinth, directed him
to move toward Ellistown, on direct road from Ripley, and
instruct Colonel Karge to join him by way of Blackland or
Carrollsville. Infantry moved to Ripley and cavalry encamped
on New Albany road two miles south. Encountered a small
party of rebels near Widow Childers and drove them toward
Ripley. In Ripley, met an advance of the enemy and drove
them on New Albany road. Cavalry encountered about a
regiment of rebel cavalry on that road and drove them south.
Several showers during the afternoon, and the roads very
bad.

"Wednesday, June 8th.--Received information at 4 o'clock A.
M. that Colonel Karge was on an island in the Hatchie River
and sent him 500 men and two howitzers as re-inforcements.
Winslow's brigade of cavalry moved 6 miles on the Fulton
Road. Infantry and train moved five miles on same road.
Colonel Waring's brigade remained in Ripley awaiting return
of Colonel Karge, who joined him at 5 o'clock P. M., having
swam the Hatchie River. Rained hard during the night.

"'Thursday, June 9th.--Sent back to Memphis 400 sick and
wounded men and 41 wagons. Cavalry and infantry moved to
Stubbs', fourteen miles from Ripley; issued five days'
rations (at previous camp.) Rained two hours in the evening.

"'Friday, June 10th.--Encountered the enemy at Brice's
Cross-Roads, 23 miles from Ripley and six miles from
Guntown.'

"At Ripley it became a serious question in my mind as to
whether or not I should proceed any farther. The rain still
fell in torrents; the artillery and wagons were literally
mired down, and the starved and exhausted animals could with
difficulty drag them along. Under these circumstances, I
called together my division commanders and placed before
them my views of our condition. At this interview, one
brigade commander and two members of my staff were,
incidentally, present also. I called their attention to the
great delay we had undergone on account of the continuous
rain and consequent bad condition of the roads; the
exhausted condition of our animals; the great probability
that the enemy would avail himself of the time thus afforded
him to concentrate an overwhelming force against us in the
vicinity of Tupelo and the utter hopelessness of saving our
train or artillery in case of defeat, on account of the
narrowness and general bad condition of the roads and the
impossibility of procuring supplies of forage for the
animals; all agreed with me in the probable consequences of
defeat. Some thought our only safety lay in retracing our
steps and abandoning the expedition. It was urged, however,
(and with some propriety, too,) that inasmuch as I had
abandoned a similar expedition only a few weeks before and
given as my reasons for so doing, the "utter and entire
destitution of the country," and that in the face of this we
were again sent through the same country, it would be
ruinous on all sides to return again without first meeting
the enemy. Moreover, from all the information General
Washburn had acquired, there _could be no considerable_
force in our front and all my own information led to the
same conclusion. To be sure my information was exceedingly
meagre and unsatisfactory and had I returned I would have
been totally unable to present any facts to justify my
cause, or to show why the expedition might not have been
successfully carried forward. All I could have presented
would have been my conjectures as to what the enemy would
naturally do under the circumstances and these would have
availed but little against the idea that the enemy was
scattered and had no considerable force in our front.

"Under these circumstances, and with a sad forboding of the
consequences, I determined to move forward; keeping my force
as compact as possible and ready for action at all times;
hoping that we might succeed, and feeling that if we did
not, yet our losses might at most be insignificant in
comparison with the great benefits which might accrue to
General Sherman by the depletion of Johnson's army to so
large an extent.

"On the evening of the 8th, one day beyond Ripley, I
assembled the commanders of infantry brigades at the
headquarters of Colonel McMillen, and cautioned them as to
the necessity of enforcing rigid discipline in their camps;
keeping their troops always in hand and ready to act on a
moment's notice. That it was impossible to gain any accurate
or reliable information of the enemy, and that it behooved
us to move and act constantly as though in his presence.
That we were now where we might encounter him at any moment,
and that we must under no circumstances allow ourselves to
be surprised. On the morning of the 10th, the cavalry
marched at half-past 5 o'clock and the infantry at seven,
thus allowing the infantry to follow immediately in rear of
the cavalry as it would take the cavalry a full hour and a
half to clear their camp. The habitual order of march was as
follows, viz: Cavalry with its artillery in advance;
infantry with its artillery; next, and lastly, the supply
train, guarded by the rear brigade with one of its regiments
at the head, one near the middle and one with a section of
artillery in the rear. A company of pioneers preceded the
infantry for the purpose of repairing the roads, building
bridges, &c., &c.

"On this morning, I had preceded the head of the infantry
column and arrived at a point some five miles from camp,
when I found an unusually bad place in the road and one that
would require considerable time and labor to render
practicable. While halted here to await the head of the
column, I received a message from General Grierson that he
had encountered a portion of the enemy's cavalry. In a few
minutes more I received another message from him, saying the
enemy numbered some 600 and were on the Baldwyn road. That
he was himself at Brice's Cross-Roads and that his position
was a good one and he would hold it. He was then directed to
leave 600 or 700 men at the cross-roads, to precede the
infantry on its arrival, on its march towards Guntown, and
with the remainder of his forces to drive the enemy toward
Baldwyn and there rejoin the main body by way of the line of
the railroad, as I did not intend being drawn from my main
purpose. Colonel McMillen arrived at this time and I rode
forward toward the cross-roads. Before proceeding far,
however, I sent a staff officer back directing Colonel
McMillen to move up his advance brigade as rapidly as
possible without distressing his troops. When I reached the
cross-roads, found nearly all the cavalry engaged and the
battle growing warm, but no artillery had yet opened on
either side. We had four pieces of artillery at the
cross-roads, but they had not been placed in position, owing
to the dense woods on all sides and the apparent
impossibility of using them to advantage. Finding, however,
that our troops were being hotly pressed, I ordered one
section to open on the enemy's reserves. The enemy's
artillery soon replied, and with great accuracy, every shell
bursting over and in the immediate vicinity of our guns.

"Frequent calls were now made for re-enforcements, but until
the infantry should arrive, I had none to give. Colonel
Winslow, 4th Iowa Cavalry, commanding a brigade and
occupying a position on the Guntown road a little in advance
of the cross-roads, was especially clamorous to be relieved
and permitted to carry his brigade to the rear. Fearing that
Colonel Winslow might abandon his position without
authority, and knowing the importance of the cross-roads to
us, I directed him in case he should be overpowered, to fall
back slowly toward the cross-roads, thus contracting his
line and strengthening his position. I was especially
anxious on this point because through some misunderstanding,
that I am yet unable to explain, the cavalry had been
withdrawn without my knowledge from the left, and I was
compelled to occupy the line, temporarily, with my escort,
consisting of about 100 of the 19th Penn. Cavalry. This
handful of troops under the gallant Lieut.-Colonel Hess,
behaved very handsomely and held the line until the arrival
of the infantry. About half-past 1 p. m. the infantry began
to arrive. Col. Hodge's brigade was the first to reach the
field and was placed in position by Colonel McMillen, when
the enemy was driven a little. General Grierson now
requested authority to withdraw the entire cavalry as it was
exhausted and well nigh out of ammunition. This I authorized
as soon as sufficient infantry was in position to permit it
and he was directed to reorganize his command in the rear
and hold it ready to operate on the flanks. In the mean time
I had ordered a section of artillery to be placed in
position on a knoll near the little bridge, some three or
four hundred yards in the rear, for the purpose of opposing
any attempt of the enemy to turn our left. I now went to
this point to see that my orders had been executed and also
to give directions for the management and protection of the
wagon-train. I found the section properly posted and
supported by the 72nd Ohio Infantry, with two companies
thrown forward as skirmishers, and the whole under the
superintendence of that excellent officer, Colonel Wilkins,
of the 9th Minn. While here, the head of the wagon train,
which had been reported still a mile and a half in rear,
arrived. It was immediately ordered into an open field near
where the cavalry were reorganizing, there to be turned
round and carried farther toward the rear. The pressure on
the right of the line was now becoming very great and
General Grierson was directed to send a portion of his
cavalry to that point. At this time I received a message
from Colonel Hodge that he was satisfied that the movement
on the right was a feint and that the real attack was being
made on the left. Another section of artillery was now
placed in position a little to the rear of Colonel Wilkins,
but bearing on the left of our main line, and a portion of
the cavalry was thrown out as skirmishers. The cavalry which
had been sent to the extreme right began now to give way,
and at the same time the enemy began to appear in force in
rear of the extreme left, while Colonel McMillen required
re-enforcements in the centre. _I now endeavored to get hold
of the colored brigade which formed the guard to the train.
While traversing the short distance to where the head of
that brigade should be found, the main line began to give
way at various points; order soon gave way to confusion and
confusion to panic. I sent an aid to Col. McMillen informing
him that I was unable to render him any additional
assistance, and that he must do all in his power with what
he had to hold his position until I could form a line to
protect his retreat. On reaching the head of the supply
train, Lieut.-Colonel Hess was directed to place in position
in a wood the first regiment of colored troops I could find.
This was done, and it is due to those troops to say here
that they stood their ground well and rendered valuable aid
to Colonel McMillen_, who was soon after compelled to
withdraw from his original line and take up new positions in
rear. It was now 5 o'clock P. M. For seven hours, these
gallant officers and men had held their ground against
overwhelming numbers, but at last overpowered and exhausted
they were compelled to abandon not only the field, but many
of their gallant comrades who had fallen to the mercy of the
enemy. Everywhere the army now drifted toward the rear and
was soon altogether beyond control. I requested General
Grierson to accompany me and to aid in checking the fleeing
column and establishing a new line. By dint of entreaty and
force and the aid of several officers, whom I called to my
assistance, with pistols in their hands we at length
succeeded in checking some 1200 or 1500 and establishing
them in a line of which Colonel Wilkins, 9th Minnesota, was
placed in command. About this time it was reported to me
that Col. McMillen was driving the enemy. I placed but
little faith in this report, yet disseminated it freely for
the good effect it might produce upon the troops. In a few
minutes, however, the gallant Colonel McMillen, sad and
disheartened, arrived himself, and reported his lines broken
and in confusion. The new line under Colonel Wilkins also
gave way soon after and it was now impossible to exercise
any further control. The road became crowded and jammed with
troops; the wagons and artillery sinking into the deep mud
became inextricable and added to the general confusion which
now prevailed. No power could now check or control the
panic-stricken mass as it swept toward the rear, led off by
Colonel Winslow at the head of his brigade of cavalry, and
who never halted until he had reached Stubbs', ten miles in
rear. This was the greater pity as his brigade was nearly,
if not entirely, intact, and might have offered considerable
resistance to the advancing foe. About 10 o'clock P. M., I
reached Stubbs' in person, where I found Colonel Winslow and
his brigade. I then informed him that his was the only
organized body of men I had been able to find, and directed
him to add to his own every possible force he could rally,
as they passed, and take charge of the rear, remaining in
position until all should have passed. I also informed him
that on account of the extreme darkness of the night and the
wretched condition of the road, I had little hope of saving
anything more than the troops, and directed him therefore to
destroy all wagons and artillery which he might find
blocking up the road and preventing the passage of the men.
In this way about 200 wagons and 14 pieces of artillery were
lost, many of the wagons being burned and the artillery
spiked and otherwise mutilated; the mules and horses were
brought away. By 7 o'clock A. M., of the 11th, we had
reorganized at Ripley, and the army presented quite a
respectable appearance, and would have been able to
accomplish an orderly retreat from that point but for the
unfortunate circumstances that the cartridge boxes were
well nigh exhausted. At 7 o'clock the column was again put
in motion on the Salem road, the cavalry in advance,
followed by the infantry. The enemy pressed heavily on the
rear, and there was now nothing left but to keep in motion
so as to prevent the banking up of the rear, and to pass all
cross-roads before the enemy could reach them, as the
command was in no condition to offer determined resistance,
whether attacked in the front or the rear. At 8 o'clock a.
m. on the 12th, the column reached Colliersville, worn out
and exhausted by the fatigues of fighting and marching for
two days and two nights without rest and without eating.
About noon of the same day a train arrived from Memphis,
bringing some 2,000 infantry, commanded by Colonel Wolf, and
supplies for my suffering men, and I determined to remain
here until next day for the purpose of resting and affording
protection to many who had dropped by the wayside, through
fatigue and other causes. Learning, however, toward evening,
that the commander at White's Station had information of a
large force of the enemy approaching that place from the
southeast, and knowing that my men were in no condition to
offer serious resistance to an enemy presenting himself
across my line of march, I informed the general commanding
the district, by telegraph, that I deemed it prudent to
continue my march to White's Station. Accordingly, at 9 p.
m., the column marched again, and arrived at White's Station
at daylight next morning. This report having already become
more circumstantial than was anticipated, I have purposely
omitted the details of our march from Ripley to White's
Station, as they would extend it to a tiresome length, but
would respectfully refer you for these to the sub-reports
herewith enclosed. Casualties are as follows:

"Killed, 223, wounded, 394; missing, 1623; total, 2240. That
our loss was great, is true; yet that it was not much
greater is due in an eminent degree to the personal
exertions of that model soldier, Col. W. L. McMillen, of the
95th Ohio Infantry, who commanded the infantry, and to the
able commanders under him.

"The strength of the enemy is variously estimated by my most
intelligent officers at from 15,000 to 20,000 men. A very
intelligent sergeant who was captured and remained five days
in the hands of the enemy, reports the number of the enemy
actually engaged, to have been 12,000, and that two
divisions of infantry were held in reserve. It may appear
strange that so large a force of the enemy could be in our
vicinity and we be ignorant of the fact, but the surprise
will exist only in the minds of those who are not familiar
with the difficulty, (I may even say impossibility) of
acquiring reliable information in the heart of the enemy's
country. Our movements and numbers are always known to the
enemy, because every woman and child is one of them, but we,
as everybody knows who has had any experience in this war,
can only learn the movements of the enemy and his numbers by
actually fighting for the information; and in that case the
knowledge often comes too late.

"While I will not prolong this already extended report by
recording individual acts of good conduct, and the names of
many brave officers and men who deserve mention, but will
respectfully refer you for these to the reports of division
and brigade commanders, yet I cannot refrain from expressing
my high appreciation of the valuable services rendered by
that excellent and dashing officer, Col. Joseph Karge, of
the 2nd New Jersey Vols., in his reconnoissance to Corinth
and his subsequent management of the rear-guard, during a
part of the retreat, fighting and defending the rear during
one whole afternoon and throughout the entire night
following.

"To the officers of my staff,--Lieut.-Col. J. C. Hess, 19th
Pa. Cavalry, commanding escort, Capt. W. C. Rawolle, A. D.
C. and A. A. A. G.; Capt. W. C. Belden, 2nd Iowa Cavalry, A.
D. C.; Lieut. E. Caulkins 7th Indiana Cavalry, A. D. C.;
Lieut. Samuel (name illegible) 19th Penn. Cavalry, A. D. C.;
Lieut. Dement, A. A. Q. M.; Lieut. W. H. Stratton, 7th Ills.
Cavalry, A. A. C. S.,--whose names appear in no other
report, I am especially grateful, for the promptness and
zeal with which my orders were executed at all times and
often under trying and hazardous circumstances.

"I am, major, very respectfully your obedient servant,

S. D. STURGIS,
MAJ. W. H. MORGAN, A. A. G., _Brig.-Gen. Commanding._
Hdqrs. Dist. West Tenn., Memphis, Tenn.

"Amid these scenes we noted the arrival of 95 more men;
those who had belonged to a _raid_ sent from Memphis, Tenn.,
under command of General Sturgis, and were attacked and
badly defeated by the rebel General Forrest, at a place in
Mississippi. General Sturgis is said to have been
_intoxicated_ during the engagement, and that just as soon
as he saw things were likely to go against him, he turned
away with a portion of his cavalry, and _sought to save
himself from capture_.--'_Life and Death in Rebel
Prisons._'"

Notwithstanding the arrangements usually and speedily entered into by two belligerent powers for the exchange of prisoners of war, it proved a most difficult task for the Federal Government to consummate an arrangement with the confederates, and much suffering was caused among the prisoners in the hands of the latter while negotiations were in progress. The agreement entered into by the commissioners, after a long delay, did not anticipate there being any black soldiers to exchange; nor would the confederate authorities thereafter allow the terms of the cartel to apply to the blacks, because Jefferson Davis and the confederate Congress regarded it as an outrage against humanity, and the rules of civilized warfare to arm the negroes against their masters.

It was a year after the black soldiers had become a part of the Union forces before even a _quasi_ acknowledgment of their rights as prisoners was noted in Richmond. The grounds upon which the greatest difficulty lingered was the refusal of the Federal government at first to accord belligerent rights to the confederates but this difficulty was finally overcome in July, 1862, and the exchange of prisoners proceeded with until the confederate authorities refused to count the black soldiers captured in the interpretation of the cartel. But the time arrived when Grant assumed command of the armies, when it was no longer an open question, for the confederate Congress began devising plans for arming the slaves.

However, the inhuman treatment did not cease with "irresponsible parties," whose conduct was doubtless approved by the rebel authorities, Jefferson Davis having declared General Butler an outlaw, and committed him and his officers and black soldiers to the mercy of a chivalry which affected to regard them as mercenaries. With this spirit infused in the confederate army, what else than barbarity could be expected?

Presentation of colors to the 20th United States Colored Infantry, Col. Bertram, in N. Y., March 5th, 1864.]

FOOTNOTES:

[28] Among the captured rebel flags now in the War Department, Washington, D. C., are several Black Flags. No. 205 was captured near North Mountain, Md., Aug. 1st, 1864. Another Captured from General Pillow's men at Fort Donelson, is also among the rebel archives in that Department. Several of them were destroyed by the troops capturing them, as at Pascagoula, Miss., and near Grand Gulf on the Mississippi.

[29] General Brisbin, in his account of the expedition which, in the Winter of 1864, left Bean Station, Tenn., under command of General Stoneman, for the purpose of destroying the confederate Salt Works in West Virginia, says the confederates after capturing some of the soldiers of the Sixth Phalanx Cavalry Regiment, butchered them. His statement is as follows:

"For the last two days a force of Confederate cavalry, under Witcher, had been following our command picking up stragglers and worn-out horses in our rear. Part of our troops were composed of negroes and these the Confederates killed as fast as they caught them, laying the dead bodies by the roadside with pieces of paper pinned to their clothing, on which were written such warnings as the following: 'This is the way we treat all nigger soldiers,' and, 'This is the fate of nigger soldiers who fight against the South.' We did not know what had been going on in our rear until we turned about to go back from Wytheville, when we found the dead colored soldiers along the road as above described. General Burbridge was very angry and wanted to shoot a Confederate prisoner for every one of his colored soldiers he found murdered, and would undoubtedly have done so had he not been restrained. As it was, the whole corps was terribly excited by the atrocious murders committed by Witcher's men, and if Witcher had been caught he would have been shot."

This gallant soldier,(?) twenty years after the close of the war, writes about the incidents and happenings during the march of the army to Saltville, and says:

"Before we reached Marion we encountered Breckenridge's advance and charged it vigorously driving it back in confusion along the Marion and Saltville road for several miles. In one of these charges (for there were several of them and a sort of running fight for several miles) one of Witcher's men was captured and brought in. He was reported to me and I asked him what his name was and to what command he belonged. He gave me his name and said 'Witcher's command.' Hardly were the words out of his mouth before a negro soldier standing near raised his carbine and aimed at the Confederate soldier's breast. I called out and sprang forward, but was too late to catch the gun. The negro fired and the poor soldier fell badly wounded. Instantly the negro was knocked down by our white soldiers, disarmed and tied. I drew my revolver to blow his brains out for his terrible crime, but the black man never flinched. All he said was, pointing to the Confederate soldier, 'He killed my comrades; I have killed him.' The negro was taken away and put among the prisoners. The Provost Marshal had foolishly changed the white guard over the prisoners and placed them under some colored troops. An officer came galloping furiously to the front and said the negroes were shooting the prisoners. General Burbridge told me to go back quickly and do whatever I pleased in his name to restore order. It was a lively ride, as the prisoners were more than four miles back, being forced along the road as rapidly as possible toward Marion. All the prisoners, except a few wounded men, were on foot, and of course they could not keep up with the cavalry. I soon reached them and never shall I forget that sight while I live. Men with sabres were driving the poor creatures along the road like beasts. I halted the motley crew and scolded the officer for his inhumanity. He said he had orders to keep the prisoners up with the column and he was simply trying to obey his orders. As I was General Burbridge's chief of staff and all orders were supposed to emanate from my office, I thought I had better not continue the conversation. As it was, I said such orders were at an end and I would myself take charge of the prisoners."

[30] "When the successful attempt was made, by tunneling, to escape from Libby Prison in 1862, many of the fugitives were honorably harbored by this unfortunate class till a more quiet opportunity occurred for leaving the city. This I have from one of the escaped officers."