Chapter XI: The Phalanx in Virginia (2)

But the situation of the Phalanx before Petersburg was far from being enviable. Smarting under the thrashing they had received from Hinks' division, the confederates were ever ready now to slaughter the "niggers" when advantage offered them the opportunity. A steady, incessant fire was kept up against the positions the Phalanx occupied, and their movements were watched with great vigilance. Although they did not raise the black flag, yet manifestly no quarter to negro troops, or to white troops that fought with them, was the confederates' determination.

"Judging from their actions, the presence of the negro
soldiers, both in the Eighteenth and Ninth Corps," says
Woodbury, "seemed to have the effect of rendering the enemy
more spiteful than ever before the Fourth Division came. The
closeness of the lines on the front of the corps rendered
constant watchfulness imperative, and no day passed without
some skirmishing between the opposing pickets. When the
colored soldiers appeared, this practice seemed to increase,
while in front of the Fifth Corps, upon the left of our
line, there was little or no picket firing, and the outposts
of both armies were even disposed to be friendly. On the
front of the Ninth, the firing was incessant, and in many
cases fatal."

"General Potter, in his report, mentions that, when his
division occupied the front, his loss averaged some fourteen
or fifteen officers killed and wounded per diem. The
sharpshooters on either side were vigilant, and an exposure
of any part of the person was the signal for the exchange of
shots. The men, worn by hard marching, hard fighting and
hard digging, took every precaution to shield themselves,
and sought cover at every opportunity. They made fire proofs
of logs and earth, and with tortuous covered ways and
traverse, endeavoring to secure themselves from the enemy's
fire. The artillery and mortars on both sides were kept
almost constantly at work. These were all precursors of the
coming, sanguinary struggle for the possession of Cemetery
Hill. Immediately in front of the salient occupied by the
Ninth Corps, the rebels had constructed a very strong
redoubt, a short distance below Cemetery Hill. In the rear
of the redoubt ran a ridge nearly at right angles with the
rebels' lines, to the hill. It appeared that if this redoubt
was captured, the enemy's line would be seriously
threatened, if not entirely broken up. A feasible plan for
the destruction of the redoubt, was seriously discussed
among the soldiers of the corps; finally Colonel Pleasants,
of the 48th Pennsylvania Regiment, devised a plan to run a
mine under the intervening space between the line of the
corps and the redoubt, with the design of exploding it,
directly under the redoubt. To this plan General Burnside
lent his aid, and preparations were made for an assault upon
Cemetery Hill, at the time of its explosion. The work of
digging and preparing the mine was prosecuted under the most
disadvantageous circumstances. General Meade reluctantly
gave official sanction, and the work of excavation proceeded
with, despite the fact that General Burnside's requisitions
for supplies were not responded to. Nevertheless, in less
than a month the mine was ready, and after considerable
discussion, and not without some bickering, the plan of
attack was arranged, which, in brief, was to form two
columns, and to charge with them through the breach caused
by the explosion of the mine. Then to sweep along the
enemy's line, right and left, clearing away the artillery
and infantry, by attacking in the flank and rear. Other
columns were to make for the crest, the whole to co-operate.
General Ferrero, in command of the Phalanx division was
informed, that in accordance with the plan of attack, he was
to lead in the assault, when the attack was made, after the
mine had been fired. He was ordered to drill his troops
accordingly. After a careful examination of the ground,
Ferrero decided upon his methods of advance,--not to go
directly in the crater formed by the explosion, but rather
upon one side of it, and then to take the enemy in flank and
reverse. When he informed his officers and men that they
would be called upon to lead in the assault, they received
the information with delight. His men, desirous of emulating
their comrades of the Third Division of the Eighteenth
Corps, felt that their cherished hope,--the opportunity for
which they had prayed,--was near at hand; the hour in which
they would show themselves worthy of the honor of being
associated with the Army of the Potomac. They rejoiced at
the prospect of wiping off whatever reproach an ill-judged
prejudice might have cast upon them, by proving themselves
brave, thereby demanding the respect which brave men
deserve. For three weeks they drilled with alacrity in the
various movements; charging upon earthworks, wheeling by the
right and left, deployment, and other details of the
expected operations. General Burnside had early expressed
his confidence in the soldierly capabilities of the men of
the Phalanx, and now wished to give them an opportunity to
justify his good opinion."

His white troops, moreover, had been greatly exposed throughout the whole campaign, had suffered severely, and had been so much under the fire of the sharpshooters that it had become a second nature with them to dodge bullets. The negro troops had not been so much exposed, and had already shown their steadiness under fire in one or two pretty severe skirmishes in which they had previously been engaged. The white officers and men of the corps were elated with the selection made by General Burnside, and they, too, manifested an uncommon interest in their dark-hued comrades. The demeanor of the former toward the latter was very different from that of the other corps, of which that particular army was composed. The 9th Corps had seen more service than any other corps in the Army of the Potomac. Its operations in six States had given to the men an experience calculated to destroy, very greatly, their race prejudice; besides a very large portion of the regiments in the corps came from the New England States, especially Massachusetts, Vermont and Rhode Island, where race prejudice was not so strong; consequently the treatment of the men in the 4th Division was tempered by humanity, and pregnant with a fraternal feeling of comradeship. And then there was a corps pride very naturally existing among the white troops, which prompted a desire for the achievement of some great and brilliant feat by their black comrades. This feeling was expressed in more than one way by the entire corps, and greatly enhanced the ambition of the Phalanx to rout the enemy and drive him out of his fortifications before Petersburg, if not to capture the city.

These high hopes were soon dissipated, however. General Meade had an interview with General Burnside on the 28th; the subject was fully discussed as to the plan of the assault, as proposed by General Burnside, and made known to Meade by Burnside, in writing, on the 26th. It was at this meeting that General Meade made his objections to the Phalanx leading the assault. General Burnside argued with all the reason he could command, in favor of his plans, and especially for the Phalanx, going over the grounds already cited; why his white troops were unfit and disqualified for performing the task of leading the assault, but in vain. Meade was firm in his purpose, and, true to his training, he had no use for the negro but as a servant; he never had trusted him as a soldier. The plan, with General Meade's objection was referred to General Grant for settlement. Grant, doubting the propriety of agreeing with a subordinate, as against the commander of the army, dismissed the dispute by agreeing with Meade; therefore the Phalanx was ruled out of the lead and placed in the supporting column. It was not till the night of the 29th, a few hours before the assault was made, that the change was made known to General Ferrero and his men, who were greatly chagrined and filled with disappointment.

General Ledlie's division of white troops was to lead the assault, after the explosion of the mine on the morning of the 30th. It was on the night of the 29th, when General Burnside issued his battle order, in accordance with General Meade's plan and instructions, and at the appointed hour all the troops were in readiness for the conflict. The mine, with its several tons of powder, was ready at a quarter past three o'clock on the eventful morning of the 30th of July. The fuses were fired, and "all eyes were turned to the confederate fort opposite," which was discernible but three hundred feet distant. The garrison was sleeping in fancied security; the sentinels slowly paced their rounds, without a suspicion of the crust which lay between them and the awful chasm below. Our own troops, lying upon their arms in unbroken silence, or with an occasional murmur, stilled at once by the whispered word of command, looked for the eventful moment of attack to arrive. A quarter of an hour passed,--a half hour, yet there was no report. Four o'clock, and the sky began to brighten in the east; the confederate garrison was bestirring itself. The enemy's lines once more assumed the appearance of life; the sharpshooters, prepared for their victims, began to pick off those of our men, who came within range of their deadly aim. Another day of siege was drawing on, and still there was no explosion. What could it mean? The fuses had failed;--the dampness having penetrated to the place where the parts had been spliced together, prevented the powder from burning. Two men (Lieut. Jacob Douty and Sergeant--afterwards Lieutenant--Henry Rees,) of the 48th Pennsylvania volunteered to go and ascertain where the trouble was. At quarter past four o'clock they bravely entered the mine, re-arranged the fuses and relighted them. In the meantime, General Meade had arrived at the permanent headquarters of the 9th Corps. Not being able to see anything that was going forward, and not hearing any report, he became somewhat impatient. At fifteen minutes past four o'clock he telegraphed to General Burnside to know what was the cause of the delay. Gen. Burnside was too busy in remedying the failure already incurred to reply immediately, and expected, indeed, that before a dispatch could be sent that the explosion would take place. General Meade ill-naturedly telegraphed the operator to know where General Burnside was. At half-past four, the commanding general became still more impatient, and was on the point of ordering an immediate assault upon the enemy's works, without reference to the mine. Five minutes later he _did_ order an assault. General Grant was there when, at sixteen minutes before five o'clock, the mine exploded. Then ensued a scene which beggars description.

General Badeau, in describing the spectacle, says:

"The mine exploded with a shock like that of an earthquake,
tearing up the rebels' work above them, and vomiting men,
guns and caissons two hundred feet into the air. The
tremendous mass appeared for a moment to hang suspended in
the heavens like a huge, inverted cone, the exploding powder
still flashing out here and there, while limbs and bodies of
mutilated men, and fragments of cannon and wood-work could
be seen, then all fell heavily to the ground again, with a
second report like thunder. When the smoke and dust had
cleared away, only an enormous crater, thirty feet deep,
sixty wide, and a hundred and fifty long stretched out in
front of the Ninth Corps, where the rebel fort had been."

The explosion was the signal for the federal batteries to open fire, and immediately one hundred and ten guns and fifty mortars opened along the Union front, lending to the sublime horror of the upheaved and quaking earth, the terror of destruction.

A confederate soldier thus describes the explosion, in the Philadelphia _Times_, January, 1883:

"About fifteen feet of dirt intervened between the sleeping
soldiers and all this powder. In a moment the superincumbent
earth, for a space forty by eighty feet, was hurled upward,
carrying with it the artillery-men, with their four guns,
and three companies of soldiers. As the huge mass fell
backwards it buried the startled men under immense
clods--tons of dirt. Some of the artillery was thrown forty
yards towards the enemy's line. The clay subsoil was broken
and piled in large pieces, often several yards in diameter,
which afterwards protected scores of Federals when
surrounded in the crater. The early hour, the unexpected
explosion, the concentrated fire of the enemy's batteries,
startled and wrought confusion among brave men accustomed to
battle."

Says a Union account:

"Now was the time for action, forward went General Ledlie's
column, with Colonel Marshall's brigade in advance. The
parapets were surmounted, the abatis was quickly removed,
and the division prepared to pass over the intervening
ground, and charge through the still smoking ruins to gain
the crest beyond. But here the leading brigade made a
temporary halt; it was said at the time our men suspected a
counter mine, and were themselves shocked by the terrible
scene they had witnessed. It was, however, but momentary; in
less than a quarter of an hour, the entire division was out
of its entrenchments, and was advancing gallantly towards
the enemy's line. The ground was somewhat difficult to cross
over, but the troops pushed steadily on with soldiery
bearing, overcoming all the obstacles before them. They
reached the edge of the crater, passed down into the chasm
and attempted to make their way through the yielding sand,
the broken clay, and the masses of rubbish that were
everywhere about. Many of the enemy's men were lying among
the ruins, half buried, and vainly trying to free
themselves. They called for mercy and for help. The soldiers
stopped to take prisoners, to dig out guns and other
material. Their division commander was not with them, there
was no responsible head, the ranks were broken, the
regimental organizations could not be preserved, and the
troops were becoming confused. The enemy was recovering from
his surprise, our artillery began to receive a spirited
response, the enemy's men went back to their guns; they
gathered on the crest and soon brought to bear upon our
troops a fire in front from the Cemetery Hill, and an
enfilading and cross-fire from their guns in battery. Our
own guns could not altogether silence or overcome this fire
in flank, our men in the crater were checked, felt the
enemy's fire, sought cover, began to entrench. The day was
lost, still heroic men continued to push forward for the
crest, but in passing through the crater few got beyond it.
Regiment after regiment, brigade followed brigade, until the
three white divisions filled the opening and choked the
passage to all. What was a few moments ago organization and
order, was now a disordered mass of armed men. At six
o'clock, General Meade ordered General Burnside to push 'his
men forward, at all hazards, white and black.' His white
troops were all in the crater, and could not get out. As
instructed, he ordered General Ferrero to rush in the
Phalanx; Colonel Loving was near when the order came to
Ferrero; as the senior staff officer present, seeing the
impossibility of the troops to get through the crater, at
that time countermanded the order, and reported in person to
General Burnside, but he had no discretion to exercise, his
duty was simply to repeat Meade's order. The order must be
obeyed; it was repeated; away went the Phalanx division,
loudly cheering, but to what purpose did they advance? The
historian of that valiant corps, presumably more reliable
than any other writer, says:

"'The colored troops charged forward, cheering with
enthusiasm and gallantry. Colonel J. K. Sigfried, commanding
the first brigade, led the attacking column. The command
moved out in rear of Colonel Humphrey's brigade of the Third
Division. Colonel Sigfried, passing Colonel Humphrey by the
flank, crossed the field immediately in front, went down the
crater, and attempted to go through. The passage was
exceedingly difficult, but after great exertions the brigade
made its way through the crowded masses in a somewhat broken
and disorganized condition, and advanced towards the crest.
The 43rd U. S. Colored troops moved over the lip of the
crater toward the right, made an attack upon the enemy's
line of intrenchments, and won the chief success of the day,
capturing a number of prisoners and rebel colors, and
_re-capturing_ a stand of national colors. The other
regiments of the brigade were unable to get up, on account
of white troops in advance of them crowding the line. The
second brigade, under command of Colonel H. G. Thomas,
followed the first with equal enthusiasm. The men rushed
forward, descended into the crater, and attempted to pass
through. Colonel Thomas' intention was to go to the right
and attack the enemy's rifle-pits. He partially succeeded in
doing so, but his brigade was much broken up when it came
under the enemy's fire. The gallant brigade commander
endeavored, in person, to rally his command, and at last
formed a storming column, of portions of the 29th, 28th,
23rd, and 19th Regiments of the Phalanx division.'

"'These troops' made a spirited attack, but lost heavily in
officers and became somewhat disheartened.
Lieutenant-Colonel Bross, of the 29th, with the colors in
his hands, led the charge; was the first man to leap upon
the enemy's works, and was instantly killed. Lieutenant
Pennell seized the colors, but was shot down, riddled
through and through. Major Theodore H. Rockwood, of the
19th, sprang upon the parapet, and fell while cheering on
his regiment to the attack. The conduct of these officers
and their associates was indeed magnificent. No troops were
ever better lead to an assault; had they been allowed the
advance at the outset, before the enemy had recovered from
his first surprise, their charge would have been successful.
But it was made too late. The fire to which they were
exposed was very hot and destructive; it came from front and
flank, it poured into the faces of the men. It enfiladed
their lines. The enemy's rage against the colored troops had
its bloody opportunity."

And they made use of it.

Captain W. L. Fagan, of the 8th Alabama Regiment, thus gives an account of the fight, from the confederate side:

"The crater combat, unlike other battles in Virginia, was a
series of deeds of daring, of bloody hand-to-hand fighting,
where the survivor could count with a certainty the men he
had slain. A few days ago a soldier said to me: 'I killed
two at the crater; they were not three feet from me when
they fell. I had followed the fortunes of the Confederacy
from Williamsburg to Appomattox Court House, and had, to the
morning of July 30, only seen two bayonet wounds;--one
received at Frazier's Farm, the other at Turkey Ridge, June
3, 1864.' Men stood face to face at the crater. Often a
bayonet thrust was given before the Minie ball went crashing
through the body. Every man took care of himself, intent on
selling his life as dearly as possible. The negroes did not
all stampede. They mingled with the white troops. The troops
of Mahone, Wilcox and Wright were greeted with defiant
yells, while their ranks were mowed down by withering fires.
Many officers commanding negro troops held their commissions
for bravery. Encouraged, threatened, emulating the white
troops, the black men fought with desperation. Some
Confederate soldiers recognized their slaves at the crater.
Captain J----, of the Forty-first Virginia, gave the
military salute to 'Ben' and 'Bob,' whom he had left hoeing
corn down in Dinwiddie. If White's Division had occupied
Reservoir Hill, Richmond would have been evacuated."

But let the writer of the following tell what the brave black men met after having advanced beyond the crater, where they grappled with the sullen foe filled with the recollection of the capture, in June, of their works, guns and comrades by the "niggers" of the 18th Corps. It was not _lex talionis_ that they observed, but a repetition of the Fort Pillow Massacre. Under the head of "The Confederate Charge," the particulars are given:

"The Federals now held the crater and the inner line.
Generals Lee and Mahone arrived on the field about 7:30 A.
M. A ravine, which deepened on our right, ran parallel with
this inner line and was used by Mahone in which to form his
brigade when preparing to attack. At 8 A. M. Mahone's
Brigade, commanded by Colonel D. A. Weisiger, brought from
the right of Hoke's Division, was formed in this ravine and
advanced to the assault. The Federals, concentrating a
terrific fire of musketry and artillery, ploughed out great
gaps in these fearless Virginians. Nothing daunted, they
pressed forward and recaptured the inner line. The loss of
this brigade was heavy, both in men and officers, more than
two hundred Virginians falling between the ravine and the
captured works. The Federal troops, white and colored,
fought with a desperation never witnessed on former
battle-fields. The negroes, it is said, cried 'No quarter.'
Mahone and Wright's Brigades took only twenty-nine of them
prisoners. The Federals still held the crater and part of
the line. Another charge was necessary and Wright's Georgia
Brigade was ordered up from Anderson's Division. Wright's
Brigade, forming in the ravine, moved forward to drive the
Federals from the line they still held. The enemy, expecting
their attack, poured a volley into the Georgians that
decimated their ranks, killing and wounding nearly every
field officer in the brigade. The men rushing forward,
breasting a storm of lead and iron, failed to oblique far
enough to the right to recapture the whole line, but gained
the line occupied by and contiguous to the line already
captured by Weisiger, commanding Mahone's Brigade. Mahone's
Brigade and Wright's Brigade had captured forty-two
officers, three hundred and ninety men and twenty-nine
negroes.

"It was now about 10 A. M. General Grant made no effort to
reinforce his line or to dislodge Wright and Mahone from the
positions they held. A courier dashed up to General J. C. C.
Sanders, commanding Wilcox's Brigade, informing him that his
brigade was wanted. The men were expecting this courier, as
they were next in line, and they distinctly heard the shouts
of Mahone's and Wright's men, followed by the heavy
artillery firing, while the word had passed down the line
that the salient had not been recaptured. General Sanders
moved his brigade, consisting of the Eighth, Ninth, Tenth,
Eleventh and Fourteenth Alabama Regiments, to the left and
occupied the ravine. There was no shade or water in this
ravine, while the men were exposed nearly four hours to a
scorching sun. The heat was almost beyond human endurance.
Strong men fainted and were carried to the rear. The waves
of hot air at times were almost suffocating. For the first
and only time the men were told what was expected of them.
General Saunders explained the situation to the officers of
the regiments. Each captain spoke to his men, urging them to
retake the salient, or Petersburg and Richmond must be
evacuated. The men were ordered to fix their bayonets
securely, to trail arms--not to fire, not to yell, but to
move quietly up the side of the ravine, and then, every man
run for his life to the breastworks. They were told that
Generals Lee, Beauregard, Hill, Mahone, Hoke and every
general officer of the army would watch them as they moved
forward.

"At 1:30 P. M. the firing had almost ceased and the
Federals, overcome with heat, did not expect an attack.
Saunders formed his brigade and moved quietly up the side of
the ravine. Hardly a word was spoken, for the Alabamians
expected to die or retake that salient. The eye of General
Lee was fixed on them. When they caught sight of the works
their old feelings came back to them and yell they must.
With the fury of a whirlwind they rushed upon the line they
had been ordered to take. The movement was so unexpected and
so quickly executed that only one shell was thrown into the
brigade. The works gained, they found the enemy on the other
side. It was stated that Lee, speaking to Beauregard, said:
'Splendid!' Beauregard spoke with enthusiasm of the
brilliant charge.

"In an instant the Federal army was aroused, and batteries
opened along the whole line, while the infantry fire was a
continuous roar. Only a breastwork divided Wilcox's Brigade
from the Federals. A moment was required for Saunders to
reform, and his brigade mounted the inner line and forced
the enemy backwards to the outer line and the crater. The
crater was full of white and negro soldiers. The
Confederates, surrounding it on every side, poured volley
after volley into this heaped-up mass of terrified negroes
and their brave officers. The negroes ran in every direction
and were shot down without a thought. Bayonets, swords and
the butts of muskets were used. The deafening roar of
artillery and musketry, the yells and imprecations of the
combatants, drowned the commands of officers. A negro in the
crater attempted to raise a white flag, and it was instantly
pulled down by a Federal officer. The Federal colors were
planted on a huge lump of dirt, and waved until Sergeant
Wallace, of the Eleventh Alabama, followed by others, seized
them and tore them from the staff. Instantly a white flag
was raised, and the living, who were not many, surrendered.
The crater was won."

With the exception of General Burnside, no commander of the Army of the Potomac was in favor of the Phalanx participating in a battle. What, then, had the Phalanx to expect of those to whom they had borne the relation of _slave_? The confederates had a right to expect hard fighting when they met the Phalanx, and the Phalanx knew they had to fight hard when they met the confederates. It was the previous associations and habits of the negro that kept him from retaliating for the several massacres that had been perpetrated upon his brother-soldiers. It was not for a want of courage to do it: it was only necessary for those who commanded them to have ordered it, and they would never have taken a confederate prisoner.

Many of those who commanded them needed but public opinion to sustain them, to give such an order as would have made every battle between the Phalanx and the confederates bloody and inhuman. It was but the enlightened sentiment of the North, the religious teaching of the brotherhood of man, the high character and moral training of the statesmen on the side of the Union, that restrained the Phalanx from retaliation, else they possessed none of the characteristics of a courageous, sensitive and high tempered people. The negro is not naturally docile; his surroundings, rather than his nature, have given him the trait; it is not naturally his, but something which his trainers have given him; and it is not a difficult task to untrain him and advance him beyond his apparent unconsciousness of self-duty and self-preservation. Let him feel that he is to be supported in any transaction uncommon to him, and he can act as aggressively as any race of men who are naturally quicker in temperament. It is this characteristic that made the negro what General Grant said he was: in discipline a better soldier than the white man. It was said that he would not fight: there is no man in the South who met him on the battle-field that will say so now.

These are a few of the thoughts that came to me as I listened for an hour, one evening in June, 1883, to the confederate Gen. Mahone, whose acquaintance the writer enjoys, reciting the story of the fight at the crater, where the negro met the confederate, and in a hand-to-hand struggle one showed as much brute courage as the other. It would not be doing the negro justice to accord him less, and yet that courage never led him to acts of inhumanity. It is preferable that the confederates themselves should tell the stories of their butcheries than for me to attempt them. Not the stories told at the time, but fifteen years afterward, when men could reflect and write more correctly. There is one, an orator, who has described the fight, whose reference to the crater so gladdened the hearts of his audience that they reproduced the "yell," and yelled themselves hoarse. No battle fought during the war, not even that of Bull Run, elicited so much comment and glorification among the confederates as that of the crater. It was the bloodiest fight on the soil of the Old Dominion, and has been the subject of praise by poets and orators upon the confederate side. Capt. J. B. Hope eulogized "Mahone's brigade" in true Southern verse. Capt. McCabe, on the 1st of November, 1876, in his oration before the "Association of the Army of Northern Virginia," in narrating the recapture of the works, said:

"It was now 8 o'clock in the morning. The rest of Potter's
(Federal) division moved out slowly, when Ferrero's negro
division, the men, beyond question, inflamed with drink,
(there are many officers and men, myself among the number,
who will testify to this), burst from the advanced lines,
cheering vehemently, passed at a double quick over a crest
under a heavy fire, and rushed with scarcely a check over
the heads of the white troops in the crater, spread to their
right, and captured more than two hundred prisoners and one
stand of colors. At the same time Turner, of the Tenth
corps, pushed forward a brigade over the Ninth Corps'
parapet, seized the Confederate line still further to the
north, and quickly dispersed the remaining brigades of his
division to confirm his successes."

The truth is over-reached in the statement of this orator if he intended to convey the idea that the men of the Phalanx division were drunk from strong drink; but it may be looked upon as an excuse offered for the treatment the courageous negro soldiers received at the hands of their captors, who, worse than enraged by strong drink, gave the battle-cry on their way to the front, "_No quarter to niggers!_" This has been admitted by those in a position, at the time, to know what went on. In his "Recollections of the Recapture of the Lines," Colonel Stewart of the 61st Virginia Regiment, says:

"When nearly opposite the portions of our works held by the
Federal troops, we met several soldiers who were in the
works at the time of the explosion. Our men began ridiculing
them for going to the rear, when one of them remarked, 'Ah,
boys, you have got hot work ahead,--they are negroes, and
show no quarter.' This was the first intimation we had that
we were to fight negro troops, and it seemed to _infuse_ the
little band with impetuous daring, as they pressed toward
the fray. I never felt more like fighting in my life. Our
comrades had been slaughtered in a most inhuman and brutal
manner, and slaves were trampling over their mangled and
bleeding corpses. Revenge must have fired every heart, and
strung every arm with nerves of steel, for the herculean
task of blood."

On the Monday morning after the assault of Saturday, the Richmond _Enquirer_ said:

"Grant's war cry of 'no quarter' shouted by his negro
soldiers, was returned with interest, we regret to hear, not
so heavily as ought to have been, since some negroes were
captured instead of being shot. Let every salient we are
called upon to defend, be a Fort Pillow, and butcher every
negro that Grant hurls against our brave troops, and permit
them not to soil their hands, with the capture of one
negro."

There is no truth in the statement. No such cry was ever made by negro soldiers; and when it is remembered that the confederate congress, in four short months after this declaration, began arming slaves for the defense of Richmond, it is readily seen how deep and with what sincerity such declarations were made. The Southern historian Pollard thus describes the situation after the assault and the ground had again come into the possession of the confederates:

Phalanx soldiers, under a flag of truce, burying their dead after one of the terrible battles before Petersburg.]

"The ground all around was dotted with the fallen, while the
sides and bottom of the crater were literally lined with
dead, the bodies lying in every conceivable position. Some
had evidently been killed with the butts of muskets, as
their crushed skulls and badly smashed faces too plainly
indicated.' Within this crater--this hole of forty by eighty
feet--were lying one hundred and thirty-six dead soldiers,
besides the wounded. The soil was literally saturated with
blood. General Bartlett was here, with his steel leg broken.
He did not look as though he had been at a 'diamond
wedding,' but was present at a 'dance of death.' A covered
way for artillery was so full of dead that details were made
to throw them out, that artillery might be brought in. The
dead bodies formed a heap on each side. The Alabamians
captured thirty-four officers, five hundred and thirty-six
white and one hundred and thirty-nine colored soldiers. The
three brigades had seventeen stands of colors, held by
seventeen as brave, sweaty, dirty, powder-stained fellows as
ever wore the gray, who knew that, when presenting their
colors to division headquarters, to each a furlough of
thirty days would be granted.

"The crater was filled with wounded, to whom our men gave
water. Adjutant Morgan Cleveland, of the 8th Alabama
Regiment, assisted a federal captain who was mortally
wounded and suffering intensely. Near him lay a burly,
wounded negro. The officer said he would die. The negro,
raising himself on his elbow, cried out: 'Thank God. You
killed my brother when we charged, because he was afraid and
ran. Now the rebels have killed you.' Death soon ended the
suffering of one and the hatred of the other. A darkness
came down on the battle-field and the victors began to
repair the salient. The crater was cleared of the dead and
wounded. Men were found buried ten feet under the dirt.
Twenty-two of the artillery company were missing. Four
hundred and ninety-eight dead and wounded confederates were
buried or sent to the hospitals. Between the lines lay
hundreds of wounded federals, who vainly called for water.
These men had been without water since early morning. Some
calling louder than others, their voices were recognized,
and as their cries grew fainter, we knew their lives were
ebbing away. Our men, risking their lives, carried water to
some.

"I find in my diary these lines: 'Sunday, July 31, 1864.
Everything comparatively quiet along the lines. Hundreds of
federal soldiers are lying in front of the crater exposed to
a scorching sun; some are crying for water. The enemy's fire
is too heavy for a soldier to expose himself.' Late on
Sunday evening a flag of truce was sent in and forwarded to
General Lee. General Grant had asked permission to bury his
dead and remove his wounded. The truce was granted, to begin
on Monday at 5 A. M. and conclude at 9 A. M. Punctual to the
hour the federal details came on the field and by 9 A. M.
had buried about three hundred. The work was hardly begun
and the truce was extended. Hour after hour was granted
until it was evening before the field was cleared."

With these selections from the mass of confederate testimony before us, of their "daring, bloody work," given by participants, it is well to read some of the statements of those who battled for the Union on that occasion.

Many of the correspondents at the seat of war, ignorant of the real facts regarding the assault, attributed the failure, not to General Meade's interference with General Burnside's plan, but to the Phalanx division, the men who bore the brunt of the battle and gained for themselves a fame for desperate fighting. But some of those who _were_ acquainted with the facts have left records that tell the true story and give honor to whom honor is due. Gen. Grant is among the number; he perfectly understood the whole matter, knew that General Burnside, not being allowed to carry out his own plans, but at the last moment compelled to act contrary to his judgment, could not fight with that enthusiasm and confidence that he would have done had he been allowed to carry out his own ideas. In his "Memoirs," General Grant gives an account of the explosion of the mine and the assault after placing the blame for the "stupendous failure" where it belongs. I quote a few preliminary words which not only intimate where the trouble lies, but gives the key to the whole matter. Speaking of General Burnside's command, he says:

"The four divisions of his corps were commanded by Generals
Potter, Wilcox, Ledlie and Ferrero. The last was a colored
division; and Burnside selected it to make the assault.
Meade interfered with this. Burnside then took Ledlie's
division--a worse selection than the first could have been.
* * * * Ledlie, besides being otherwise inefficient, proved
also to possess disqualifications less common among
soldiers."

A correspondent of the New York _Evening Post_ says:

"We have been continually notified for the last fortnight,
that our sappers were mining the enemy's position. As soon
as ready, our division was to storm the works on its
explosion. This rumor had spread so wide we had no faith in
it. On the night of the 29th, we were in a position on the
extreme left. We were drawn in about nine P. M., and marched
to General Burnside's headquarters, and closed in mass by
division, left in front. We there received official notice
that the long-looked-for mine was ready charged, and would
be fired at daylight next morning. The plan of storming was
as follows: One division of white troops was to charge the
works immediately after the explosion, and carry the first
and second lines of rebel intrenchments. Our division was to
follow immediately, and push right into Petersburg, take the
city, and be supported by the remainder of the Ninth and
Twenty-eighth corps. We were up bright and early, ready and
eager for the struggle to commence. I had been wishing for
something of this sort to do for some time, to gain the
respect of the Army of the Potomac. You know their former
prejudices. At thirty minutes after five, the ball opened.
The mine, with some fifty pieces of artillery, went off
almost instantaneously; at the same time, the white troops,
according to the plan, charged the fort, which they carried,
for there was nothing to oppose them; but they did not
succeed in carrying either of the lines of intrenchments.

"We were held in rear until the development of the movement
of the white troops; but, on seeing the disaster which was
about to occur, we pushed in by the flank (for we could go
in in no other way to allow us to get in position); so you
see on this failure we had nothing to do but gain by the
flank. A charge in that manner has never proved successful,
to my knowledge; when it does, it is a surprise.

"Our men went forward with enthusiasm equal to anything
under different circumstances; but, in going through the
fort that had been blown up, the passage was almost impeded
by obstacles thrown up by the explosion. At the same time,
we were receiving a most deadly cross-fire from both flanks.
At this time, our lieutenant-colonel (E. W. Ross) fell, shot
through the left leg, bravely leading the men. I immediately
assumed command, but only to hold it a few minutes, when I
fell, struck by a piece of shell in the side. Capt.
Robinson, from Connecticut, then took command; and, from all
we can learn, he was killed. At this time, our first charge
was somewhat checked, and the men sought cover in the works.
Again our charge was made, but, like the former,
unsuccessful. This was followed by the enemy making a
charge. Seeing the unorganized condition and the great loss
of officers, the men fell back to our own works. Yet a large
number still held the fort until two P. M., when the enemy
charged again, and carried it. That ended the great attempt
to take Petersburg.

"It will be thus seen that the colored troops did not
compose the first assaulting, but the supporting column; and
they were not ordered forward until white troops in greater
numbers had made a desperate effort to carry the rebel
works, and had failed. Then the colored troops were sent in;
moved over the broken ground, and up the slope, and within a
short distance of the parapet, in order, and with steady
courage; but finally broke and retreated under the same fire
which just before had sent a whole division of white
regiments to the right-about. If there be any disgrace in
that, it does not belong exclusively nor mainly to the
negroes. A second attack is far more perilous and unlikely
to succeed than a first; the enemy having been encouraged by
the failure of the first, and had time to concentrate his
forces. And, in this case, there seems to have been a fatal
delay in ordering both the first and second assault."

An officer in the same engagement says:

"In regard to the bravery of the colored troops, although I
have been in upwards of twenty battles, I never saw so many
cases of gallantry. The 'crater,' where we were halted, was
a perfect slaughter-pen. Had not 'some one blundered,' but
moved us up at daylight, instead of eight o'clock, we should
have been crowned with success, instead of being cut to
pieces by a terrific enfilading fire, and finally forced
from the field in a panic. We had no trouble in rallying the
troops and moving them into the rifle-pits; and, in one hour
after the rout I had nearly as many men together as were
left unhurt.

"I was never under such a terrific fire, and can hardly
realize how any escaped alive. Our loss was heavy. In the
Twenty-eighth (colored) for instance, commanded by
Lieut.-Col. Russell (a Bostonian), he lost seven officers
out of eleven, and ninety-one men out of two hundred and
twenty-four; and the colonel himself was knocked over
senseless, for a few minutes, by a slight wound in the head;
both his color-sergeants and all his color-guard were
killed. Col. Bross, of the Twenty-ninth, was killed
outright, and nearly every one of his officers hit. This was
nearly equal to Bunker Hill. Col. Ross, of the Thirty-first,
lost his leg. The Twenty-eighth, Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth
(colored), all charged over the works; climbing up an
earthwork six feet high, then down into a ditch, and up on
the other side, all the time under the severest fire in
front and flank. Not being supported, of course the storming
party fell back. I have seen white troops run faster than
these blacks did, when in not half so tight a place. Our
brigade lost thirty-six prisoners, all cut off after leaving
the 'crater.' My faith in colored troops is not abated one
jot.'"

The Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War investigated the affair, before which General Grant testified. He was severe upon General Ledlie, whom he regarded as an inefficient officer; he blamed himself for allowing that officer to lead the assault. General Grant also testified:

"General Burnside wanted to put his colored division in
front; I believe if he had done so it would have been a
success."

On the morning of the 13th of August, 1864, a brigade of the Phalanx, consisting of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 29th Regiments, crossed from Bermuda Hundreds to the north side of the James river, on pontoons, near Jones' landing, and bivouacked for the night. General Grant was led to believe that General Lee had sent a portion of his troops, at least three divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry, from the front of Petersburg, to re-enforce Gen. Early, then operating in the valley. Consequently he thought it a favorable opportunity to threaten Richmond, and ordered Hancock with the 2nd, and Birney with a part of the 10th Corps, with Gregg's Cavalry, to attack the confederate works on the north side of the James. The object was two-fold: to prevent Lee from re-enforcing Early, confronted by Sheridan's troops; and likewise to drive the confederates from out their works. The troops crossed the James on the 13th, the 2d Corps going to Deep Bottom by transports, the other troops crossing the river by pontoons, and advancing, found the enemy in force. Several spirited engagements took place, after which the main forces withdrew again across the river, to the front of Petersburg. The following account applies to the brigade as well as the 7th Phalanx Regiment, from whose record it is extracted:

"During the forenoon of the 14th the (7th) Regiment acted as
reserve, moving forward occasionally as the line advanced.
Most of the work of the day was done to the right, little
being done in the immediate front except skirmishing. About
5 P. M. a portion of the Seventh and Ninth, forming line in
the edge of some timber, moved across an open field and
charged upon reaching the farther side and captured the
enemy's line of rifle-pits. The companies of the Seventh
pushed on some distance further toward their second line,
but were met with so severe a fire that they fell back to
the captured line; which was held. This charge, known as the
action of Kingsland Road, was made in fine style. The
battalion of the Seventh was commanded by Capt. Weiss--Col.
Shaw having been detailed as Corps Officer of the day, and
Lieut.-Col. Haskell being temporarily in command of the
brigade. Our losses were two men killed, and one officer
(Lieut. Eler) and thirty-two men wounded.

"About 10 o'clock P. M., the troops moved down the road to
the right, and at 1 o'clock Col. Shaw withdrew the pickets
of the corps, re-crossed the pontoons, where we had crossed
in the morning, and moved down the neck. Then followed four
hours of the most wearisome night-marching--moving a few
rods at a time and then halting for troops ahead to get out
of the way; losing sight of them and hurrying forward to
catch up; straggling out into the darkness, stumbling and
groping along the rough road, and all the time the rain
coming down in a most provoking, exasperating drizzle. About
daylight crossed back to the north side and halted for
coffee, and then moved forward some four miles and rejoined
the corps, taking position behind the crest of a hill. The
Eighth and Twenty-ninth were left in a work on the hill.

"About 3:30 P. M. orders came to pile knapsacks and be ready
to march immediately. A little after 4 o'clock the brigade
moved to the right, some three-quarters of a mile, into an
open cornfield, and, after halting a few moments, turned
down a road through the woods to the left with Gen. Wm.
Birney, who ordered Col. Shaw to throw out skirmishers and
advance with his brigade down a road which he pointed out,
find the enemy and attack vigorously, and then rode away.
Finding the road turning to the left, Col. Shaw sent word to
Gen. Birney that the designated road would probably bring
him back on our own line. The order came back from Gen.
Birney to go ahead. The road still bearing to the left, word
was again sent that we should strike our own line if we
continued to advance in the direction we were going. A
second time the answer came to move on. A third messenger
having brought from Gen. Birney the same reply, Col. Shaw
decided to disobey the order and call in the skirmishers.
Before it could be done firing commenced and continued
briskly for several minutes, before the men recognized each
other, and it was discovered that we had been firing into
our own Second Brigade--Col. Osborn's. This sad affair,
which would not have occurred had Col Shaw's caution been
heeded, resulted in the killing of the lieutenant commanding
the picket-line and the wounding of many men on both sides.
After this _fiasco_ the brigade moved out into the
cornfield, where it had halted earlier in the day, and
bivouacked for the night. The regiment had been more or less
exposed all day to shell-fire, but lost from it only four or
five men wounded, in addition to the ten or twelve men
wounded in the skirmish with Osborn's brigade.

"Early on the morning of the 16th, the regiment marched back
to its knapsacks and halted for breakfast. About 10 o'clock
it was ordered out to support two batteries, and remained on
this duty until 3 P. M., changing position frequently, in
the meantime Gen. Terry, with the First Division of the
Tenth Corps, had charged the rebel line, near Fuzzel's
mills, and captured it, together with three colors and some
three hundred prisoners. But the enemy rallied, and with
reinforcements, soon compelled Gen. Terry to relinquish the
captured line. About dark Gen. Wm. Birney came up, and
taking the left wing of the Seventh--the right wing, under
Col. Shaw, was in support of a battery--and two companies of
the Ninth, placed them under command of Lieut.-Col. Haskell,
and ordered him with this handful of men to take an
earthwork in his front which a division a short time before
had failed to carry. The timely arrival of Gen. Terry put an
end to this mad scheme. The regiment lost during the day
eight or ten men wounded.

"The general results of the day's fighting had been
unsatisfactory, for not only had Terry's attack failed in
its object, but the advance on the right, along the Charles
City road, by the troops of the Second Corps and Gregg's
cavalry division, had been equally unsuccessful. The rebel
General Chambliss was among the killed.

"About 2:30 A. M. of the 17th, the left wing of the regiment
was sent back to a line of rifle-pits that had been thrown
up some two hundred yards to the rear, where it was joined
by the right wing in the morning after breakfast.
Picket-firing continued during the day and heavy artillery
firing was heard in the direction of Petersburg. At 4 P. M.
a flag of truce was sent out and two hours given to bring in
the dead from between the lines. Gen. Chambliss' body was
delivered, and we received that of Capt. Williams, of the
Thirty-ninth Illinois. Early in the evening the regiment was
ordered on picket. Considerable picket-firing occurred
during the night and day, the men being with difficulty
restrained from it. We were relieved about noon of the 18th
by the One Hundred and Fifteenth New York and Seventy-sixth
Pennsylvania. * * *

"Early in the morning the Eighth and the Twenty-ninth
Connecticut rejoined the regiment, and after the regiment
was relieved from picket, it, with the Twenty-ninth, fell
back a quarter of a mile, leaving the Eighth and Ninth on
the line. Rations having been drawn, the men got supper and
prepared for a good night's sleep. Suddenly a heavy musketry
fire broke out toward the left which rapidly extended to the
right and the entire line was soon under fire. The regiment
moved forward at double-quick, but by the time it reached
the front and formed line, darkness set in and the enemy
fell back. About 11 P. M. our forces were withdrawn, and,
after several hours spent in marching and halting, the
regiment went into camp two miles from the pontoons. Here it
lay all day of the 19th. The following congratulatory order
was received from corps headquarters, in which the brigade
was spoken of in very flattering terms by Maj.-Gen. D. B.
Birney, commanding:

"'HEADQUARTERS TENTH ARMY CORPS,
FUZZEL'S MILLS, VA., August 19, 1864.

"'_General Orders._--The Major-General commanding
congratulates the Tenth Army Corps upon its success. It has,
on each occasion, when ordered, broken the enemy's strong
lines. It has captured during this short campaign four siege
guns protected by formidable works, six colors and many
prisoners. It has proved itself worthy of its old Wagner and
Fort Sumter renown.

"'Much fatigue, patience and heroism, may still be demanded
of it, but the Major-General commanding is confident of the
response. To the colored troops, recently added to us, and
fighting with us, the Major-General tenders his thanks for
their uniform good conduct and soldierly bearing. They have
set a good example to our veterans, by the entire absence of
straggling from their ranks on the march.

"'By order of Maj.-Gen. D. B. BIRNEY.

"'E.W. SMITH,
_Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General._'

"The special correspondent of the New York _Tribune_ said:

"'Gen. Butler, in a dispatch to the Tenth Corps, on
receiving official report of its work, said: 'All honor to
the brave Tenth Corps; you have done more than was expected
of you by the Lieutenant-General.'