Chapter IX: Part 9

I would, therefore, beg leave to propose, to appoint a consul without loss of time to reside at Nantes, and to him consign all vessels from the United States. I think it should be an American, some merchant of known character, abilities, and industry, who would consent to serve his country for moderate emoluments. Such persons are to be found in great numbers in the United States. There are many applications from French gentlemen. But I think that a want of knowledge of our language, our laws, customs, and even the humors of our people, for even these must be considered, would prevent them from giving satisfaction, or doing justice. Besides, if it is an honor, a profit, or only an opportunity to travel and see the world for improvement, I think the native Americans have a right to expect it; and further, that the public have a right to expect that whatever advantages are honestly to be made in this way, should return sometime or other to America; together with the knowledge and experience gained at the same time.

These consuls, as well as the foreign Ministers, should all be instructed to transmit to Congress, written accounts of the civil and military constitutions of the places where they are, as well as all the advantages for commerce with the whole world, especially with the United States. These letters preserved, will be a repository of political and commercial knowledge, that in future times may be a rich treasure to the United States. To these consuls, the commercial concerns of the public should be committed, and the vessels of war. It will be necessary sometimes to send a frigate to Europe to bring intelligence, to bring passengers, even, perhaps, to bring commodities, or fetch stores. But I hope no frigate will ever again be sent to cruise, or be put under the command of anybody in Europe, consul or Minister. They may receive their orders from the Navy Board in America, and be obliged to obey them. I have had a great deal of experience in the government of these frigates, when I had the honor to be one of the Ministers Plenipotentiary at the Court of Versailles, and afterwards at Nantes, L'Orient, and Brest, when I was seeking a passage home. Disputes were perpetually arising between officers and their crews, between captains and their officers, and between the officers of one ship and another. There were never officers enough to compose a court martial, and nobody had authority to remove or suspend officers without their consent; so that in short, there was little order, discipline, subordination, or decency.

Another thing, when frigates are under the direction of an authority at a distance of three or four hundred miles, so much time is lost in writing and sending letters and waiting for answers, it has been found an intolerable embarrassment to the service. It is now two years since consuls were expected, and a secretary to this mission. It is a great misfortune to the United States that they have not arrived. Every man can see that it has been a great misfortune, but none can tell how great. There is much reason to believe, that if our establishments here had been upon a well digested plan and completed, and if our affairs had been urged with as much skill and industry as they might in that case have been, that we should at this moment have been blessed with peace, or at least with tranquillity and security, which would have resulted from a total expulsion of the English from the United States and the West India Islands.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO B. FRANKLIN.

Paris, June 29th, 1780.

Sir,

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter of the Count de Vergennes to me, of the 21st of this month, and a copy of my answer to his Excellency, of the 22d.

This correspondence is upon a subject that has lain much out of the way of my particular pursuits, and, therefore, I may be inaccurate in some things; but, in the principles, I am well persuaded I am right. I hope that things are explained so as to be intelligible, and that there is nothing inconsistent with that decency, which ought in such a case to be observed.

If your Excellency thinks me materially wrong in anything, I should be much obliged to you to point it out to me, for I am open to conviction.

This affair, in America, is a very tender and dangerous business, and requires all the address, as well as all the firmness of Congress, to extricate the country out of the embarrassment arising from it; and there is no possible system, I believe, that could give universal satisfaction to all; but this appears to me, to promise to give more general satisfaction, than any other that I have ever heard suggested. I have added copies of the whole correspondence.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

COUNT DE VERGENNES TO JOHN ADAMS.

Translation.

Versailles, June 30th, 1780.

Sir,

I have received the letter, which you did me the honor to write me on the 22d inst. on the subject of the resolution of Congress of the 18th of March last. I have already informed you, that it was by no means my intention to analyse this resolution, as it respects the citizens of the United States, nor examine whether circumstances authorise the arrangement or not. I had but one object in writing to you with the confidence I thought due to your knowledge and your attachment to the alliance, which was to convince you that the French ought not to be confounded with the Americans, and that there would be a manifest injustice in making them sustain the loss with which they are threatened.

The details into which you have thought proper to enter have not changed my sentiments; but I think that all further discussion on this subject will be needless, and I shall only observe, that if the King's Council considers, as you pretend, the resolution of Congress in a wrong point of view, the Chevalier de la Luzerne, who is on the spot, will not fail to elucidate the matter; and if Congress on their part shall not adopt the representations, which that Minister is charged to make to them, they will undoubtedly communicate to us their reasons to justify their refusal.

Should they be well founded the King will take them into consideration, his Majesty demanding nothing but the most exact justice. But should they be otherwise, he will renew his instances to the United States, and will confidently expect from their penetration and wisdom a decision conformable to his demand. His Majesty is the more persuaded that Congress will give their whole attention to this business, as this Assembly, which has frequently renewed the assurance, values, as well as yourself, Sir, the union which subsists between France and the United States, and that they will assuredly perceive that the French deserve a preference before other nations, who have no treaty with America, and who even have not, as yet, acknowledged her Independence.

I have the honor to be, &c.

DE VERGENNES.

* * * * *

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Paris, July 1st, 1780.

Sir,

I had this morning the honor of your letter of the 30th of June.

It is very certain, that the representations from his Majesty, which may be made by his Minister, the Chevalier de la Luzerne, will be attended to by Congress with all possible respect; and its due weight will be given to every fact and argument, that he may adduce; and I am well persuaded, that Congress will be able to give such reasons for their final result, as will give entire satisfaction to his Majesty, and remove every color of just complaint from his subjects.

As in my letter of the 22d of last month, I urged such reasons as appeared to me incontestible, to show that the resolution of Congress of the 18th of March, connected with the other resolution, to pay the loan office certificates, according to the value of money at the time they were emitted, being a determination to pay the full value of all the bills and certificates, which were out; and the depreciation of both being more the act and fault of their possessors than of government, was neither a violation of the public faith, nor an act of bankruptcy. I have the honor to agree with your Excellency in opinion, that any further discussion of these questions is unnecessary.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, July 6th, 1780.

Sir,

In the public papers of the latter end of June, are lists of the vessels of war and privateers taken and destroyed by the powers at war.

VESSELS TAKEN FROM FRANCE.

Vessels. Guns.

Protée, 64 Taken by Admiral Digby,
Fortune, 42 " " " Rowley,
Blanche, 36 " " " "
Prudente, 36 Ruby, Everett,
Danaë, 34 Experiment, Wallace,
Sartine, 32 Admiral Vernon,
Licorne, 32 " "
Alcmène, 30 Proserpine, Sutton,
Oiseau, 26 Apollo, Pownal,
Adventure, 26 Admiral Arbuthnot,
Pilote, 14 Commodore Reynolds,
Mutin, 14 Commodore Reynolds,
Coureur, 14 Admiral Keppel.

_Destroyed._

Valeur, 26 Experiment, Wallace,
Recluse, 24 " "

VESSELS TAKEN BY FRANCE.

Ardent, 64 D'Orvilliers,
Experiment, 50 D'Estaing,
Minerva, 32
Montreal, 32 Le Bourgoyne,
Fox, 28 La Junon,
Active, 28
Ariel, 20 D'Estaing,
Lively, 20 D'Orvilliers,
Ceres, 18 D'Estaing,
Weazel, 16
Senegal, 16
Zephyr, 14
Alert, 10 D'Orvilliers,
Thunder Bomb, 8 D'Estaing.

_Destroyed._

Juno, 32 At Rhode Island,
Flora, 32
Lark, 32
Orpheus, 32
Quebec, 32 By the Surveillante,
Cerberus, 28 At Rhode Island,
Rose, 20 At Savannah,
Falcon, 18 At Rhode Island,
King Fisher, 16 " " "

PRIVATEERS TAKEN FROM FRANCE.

Lion, 40
Monsieur, 40
Duc de Cogny, 36
Belhune, 30
Ménagère, 30
Hercule, 30
Comte d'Artois, 28
Lis, 28
Sphinx, 20 Retaken by the French,
Helena, 16 " " "
Jackall, 10 " " "

VESSELS TAKEN FROM SPAIN.

Phoenix, 80 By Admiral Rodney,
Monarca, 70
Princessa, 70
Ammonica, 32 Pearl, Montagu,
Margarita, 28 Johnstone.

_Destroyed._

S. Domingo, 70 By Admiral Rodney,
S. Eugenio, 70
S. Julian, 70

PRIVATEERS TAKEN FROM THE SPANIARDS.

Guipuscoa, 64
San Carlos, 52
San Carlos, 32
San Rafael, 30
Sta Teresa, 28
Sta Bruna, 26
Solidad, 26

VESSELS OF WAR TAKEN FROM CONGRESS.

Hancock, 32 Rainbow, Sir George Collier,
Raleigh, 32 Experiment, Wallace,
Providence, 32 Admiral Arbuthnot,
Boston, 32 " "
Delaware, 30 Lord Howe,
Virginia, 30 St Albans, Onslow,
Oliver Cromwell, 24 Beaver Sloop, Jones,
Hampden, 20 Sir George Collier,
Trumbull, 20 Venus, Ferguson,
Cumberland, 20 Pomona, Waldgrove,
Ranger, 20 Admiral Arbuthnot,
Alfred, 20 Ariadne, Pringle,
Hunter, 18 Sir George Collier,
Cabot, 18 Hope, Dawson,
Lexington, 16 Alert, Bazeley.

_Destroyed._

Bricole, pierced for
60, mounting 40 Admiral Arbuthnot,
Bon Homme Richard, 44 Serapis, Pearson,
Randolph, 36 Yarmouth, Vincent,
Warren, 32 Sir George Collier,
Washington, 32 Captain Henry,
Effingham, 28 " "
Queen of France, 28 Admiral Arbuthnot,
Fruit, 26 " "
General Moultrie, 20 " "
Notre Dame, 16 " "

_N. B._ Seventeen armed ships, from fourteen to twentyfour guns, destroyed by Sir George Collier, at Penobscot; three frigates, and two sloops destroyed by the same, upon the stocks at Portsmouth, the gallies destroyed upon Lake Champlain, in Georgia, &c., the ships destroyed in Egg Harbor, at Bedford, &c.

VESSELS OF WAR TAKEN BY CONGRESS.

Vessels. Guns.

Serapis, 44 Paul Jones,
Drake, 18 Ranger, Paul Jones,
Thorn, 16 Boston, Tucker,
Countess of Scarborough, 22 Paul Jones.

_Destroyed._

Augusta, 64 At Mud Fort,
Acteon, 28 At Fort Sullivan,
Mermaid, 21 Off Cape Henlopen,
Merlin, 18 At Mud Fort.

VESSELS OF WAR DESTROYED BY ACCIDENT.

_English._

Somerset, 64
Repulse, 32
Arethusa, 32
Liverpool, 28
Syren, 28
Leviathan, 26
Grampus, 26
Tortoise, 26
Glasgow, 24
Vestal, 20
Mercury, 20
Cruiser, 16
Otter, 16
Pomona, 16
Zebra, 16
Cupid, 16
Savage, 16
Pegasus, 14
Spy, 14
Swallow, 14
Viper, 14

_French._

Roland, 64
Zephyr, 32
Monarque, 64
Fox, 28

_Spanish._

Pondersoso, 70
Notre Dame,
St Joseph, 70
Rosa, 30
Congres,
Carmes, 36

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, July 6th, 1780.

Sir,

In looking over the long list of vessels belonging to the United States, taken and destroyed, and recollecting the whole history of the rise and progress of our navy, it is very difficult to avoid tears. Nevertheless, what we have done and lost, shows what we can do. Our resources of materials, artists, and seamen, are not exhausted. But it is impossible not to inquire, whether we have not committed errors in the destination of our vessels? Whether our navy is equal to the attack or defence of places? Whether our articles of war for the government of the marine, are adequate to the introduction of that obedience and discipline that are necessary? Whether cruising for the protection of our own trade, against the depredations of privateers and smaller vessels of war of our enemies, and for the purpose of making prizes of transports and merchant ships, is not the object fittest in the present stage of our naval history, to encourage seamen to engage in our service, to form officers, to supply the United States with many things, and to weaken and distress our foes? Officers who have a thirst for glory, and wish to distinguish themselves by brilliant battles, ought not to be discouraged, but I cannot but think, that at this period they would do more essential service to their country, by a line of conduct leading to fewer laurels, but more wealth.

In all events, however, it is to be hoped and presumed, that Congress will give great attention to their navy, to the augmentation of ships, the multiplication of seamen, the improvement of discipline, and the formation of officers. Americans, I see, must cherish their own navy. I fear that no other nation would grieve very much at the total destruction of it, before the conclusion of a peace. I am sorry to say this; but I have heard such hints as convince me, that it is my duty to put Congress on their guard, and to entreat them to leave nothing unattempted to put their marine upon the best footing in their power.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, July 7th, 1780.

Sir,

On the 27th of June Mr Hartley, after a speech of an hour long, moved, that the House would give him leave to bring in a bill, to the end to empower the Court, to adopt the most proper means to make peace with America. After a short debate, the question being put, the majority was for the negative. This motion is said to have had the less success, because it is founded on a principle absolutely false and derogatory to the royal prerogative. The King of England, to make peace, wants nothing but the will. It is in this case only that he is absolute. The American war was commenced without the participation of Parliament. Why should they give the King new powers to bring it to a conclusion? There is but one means of forcing him to it, and that is by refusing him the necessary subsidies; and they are now further from this than ever. But it is ridiculous to labor to clothe the King with powers, which are inherent in his title. It is, in other words, to permit him to be a King.

The bill is of the following tenor. "Whereas for some years there have arisen unfortunate disputes between Great Britain and several Provinces of North America, which have occasioned the calamities of war; to the end to prevent a greater effusion of blood, and to re-establish peace, be it enacted, that his Majesty be permitted by virtue of letters patent, to nominate Commissioners with power to treat, consult, and agree upon the means of restoring peace, in concert with persons authorised for this purpose by the said Provinces of North America. That, to facilitate the good intentions of this bill, be it enacted, that the King give power to the said Commissioners, to cause to be suspended all hostilities by land and by sea, for so long a time and under such conditions and restrictions as they shall judge proper. That, to the end to establish upon a good foundation, a cordial reconciliation and a durable peace between Great Britain and the said Provinces, by reinstating them in their ancient friendship, his Majesty may legally permit his said Commissioners to grant and to ratify, from time to time, any article of pacification, which thus granted and ratified, shall have its full and entire effect for ten years, to be dated from the 1st of August of the present year. That, for removing every obstacle, which may oppose itself, to the full execution of any article of pacification, his Majesty shall be at liberty, by any order in writing, signed with his hand and countersigned by one or more Secretaries of State, to authorise the said Commissioners to suspend, during ten years, to be dated from the 1st of August of the present year, the execution of any act of Parliament, which concerns the said Provinces, so far as the said acts, their clauses or conditions, may put any obstacle to the full effect, and to the execution of any article of pacification between Great Britain and the said Provinces. That, to the end to establish a durable reconciliation, and a perpetual peace between Great Britain and the said Provinces, be it enacted, that all and every article of pacification, resolved and ratified for ten years as aforesaid, shall be from time to time communicated to both Houses of Parliament, to be by them examined, as forming the base of a sincere and durable union; and that every one of the said articles having been once approved in Parliament, shall have forever its full and entire effect. That the present act shall remain in force until the 31st of December."

Having been disappointed, by another accident, of my English papers, I have been obliged to translate this bill from the Courier de l'Europe, I hope to transmit the original in a few days. It is however of so little consequence, that it is scarce worth transcribing. Other grounds must be taken than that of General Conway, Governor Pownal, or Mr Hartley, before anything will be done in earnest towards peace. The history of Charleston, and the numberless fictions with which the stockjobbers have decorated it, have raised the stocks three and a half per cent, and have given such a temporary intoxication to the people, that scarce anything is talked of but unconditional submission.

The affair of Mobile, the dispersion of both the outward and homeward bound Quebec fleet, the indecisive battles between de Guichen and Rodney, and the anxiety for Walsingham's fleet, and twenty other fears, begin now to sink their spirits again.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

_N. B._ Sir George Saville moved on the same day a resolution, that the American war was unconstitutional, expensive, and ruinous, but this motion was rejected by nearly the same majority.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, July 7th, 1780.

Sir,

On the 21st of last month, the merchants of the city of Amsterdam arrived at the Hague, and presented to their High Mightinesses a petition, conceived in these terms.

"To their High Mightinesses, our Lords, the States-General of the United Provinces.

"The subscribers, all merchants, trading to the West Indies, and established under the jurisdiction of this State, give respectfully to understand, that, to their great regret, the petitioners have learned, by the way of a ship, lately arrived from Curaçoa, the unheard of ill treatment exercised by the English in taking the barques belonging to the subjects of their High Mightinesses, which trade with the French possessions in the said countries, and which, loaded with the productions of the said countries, purchased or consigned, make sail to return to the islands or places which belong to the dominions of their High Mightinesses, without having even to this time, that your petitioners know of, returned either the barques or cargoes; but so far from it, that the cargoes of some of them have been already condemned, and the barques restored empty; a fate which the petitioners fear to see others undergo likewise. And as by these vexations and unparalleled ill treatment, the subjects of your High Mightinesses, contrary to all kinds of right, are deprived of their property and effects embarked, as well as of the liberty which is assured to them by the treaties subsisting between the Crown of England and this State, and by these means see themselves reduced to an impossibility of being able to procure for the ships sent from home to the West Indies, the cargoes necessary for their return, all expeditions and adventures of merchandises from our countries to these places must absolutely cease, and draw after it the inevitable ruin of this branch of commerce, so important as well as that of many of the subjects of your High Mightinesses, both in this country and in the West Indies."

"For these causes, the petitioners pray, in all humility, that your High Mightinesses would be pleased to take this navigation and commerce, forming an object so considerable, under your effectual protection, in the first place, by granting the necessary convoy to ships which go to the West Indies, or which return from thence, and in the next place, to order to cruise in those seas a sufficient number of vessels of war, or even to order them to escort the barques in question, and other trading ships, loaded with productions and effects permitted by the treaties, and making sail for the French Colonies, or returning from them, to the end to secure them from all further insult; which will preserve at the same time the petitioners, as well as many other subjects of the Republic from total ruin. That it may, moreover, please your High Mightinesses to charge the Count de Welderen, your Envoy Extraordinary to the British Court, to make the necessary representations touching the seizure of these barques, to seek to obtain of the English Ministry, that the requisite orders may be sent to the Colonies of his Britannic Majesty, for releasing the aforesaid barques with their cargoes, paying, at the same time, the expenses occasioned by their seizure; in fine, that by the good and efficacious offices of his Excellency, things may be directed in such a manner, that on the part of the Court of St James, they may write to Jamaica and elsewhere, and not interrupt for the future, the subjects of their High Mightinesses in the exercise of this lawful commerce, but to permit them to enjoy a free navigation and commerce, such as have been solemnly accorded and guaranteed to them by the treaty of 1674."

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

B. FRANKLIN TO COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Passy, July 10th, 1780.

Sir,

I received the letter your Excellency did me the honor of writing to me, dated June 30th, together with the papers accompanying it, containing the correspondence of Mr Adams.[6] I have taken some pains to understand the subject, and obtain information of facts from persons recently arrived, having received no letters myself that explain it. I cannot say, that I yet perfectly understand it, but in this I am clear, that if the operation directed by Congress in their resolution of March the 18th occasions, from the necessity of the case, some inequality of justice, that inconvenience ought to fall wholly on the inhabitants of the States, who reap with it the advantages obtained by the measure; and that the greatest care should be taken that foreign merchants, particularly the French, who are our creditors, do not suffer by it. This I am so confident the Congress will do, that I do not think any representations of mine necessary to persuade them to it.

I shall not fail, however, to lay the whole before them; and I beg that the King may be assured that their sentiments, and those of the Americans in general, with regard to the alliance, as far as I have been able to learn them, not only from private letters but from authentic public facts, differ widely from those that seem to be expressed by Mr Adams in his letter to your Excellency, and are filled with the strongest impressions of the friendship of France, of the generous manner in which his Majesty was pleased to enter into an equal treaty with us, and of the great obligations our country is under for the important aids he has since afforded us.

I have the honor to be, &c.

B. FRANKLIN.

[6] This letter is printed in Franklin's Correspondence. Vol. III. p.
152.

* * * * *

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Paris, July 13th, 1780.

Sir,

By the treaty of alliance of the 6th of February, 1778, his Majesty and the United States agreed, in case of war, to join their councils and efforts against the enterprises of the common enemy; to make it a common cause, and aid each other mutually with their good offices, their councils, and their forces, according to the exigencies of conjunctures; and each of the contracting parties, in the manner it may judge most proper, is to make all the efforts in its power against the common enemy.

I have cited these clauses from the treaty, not as foundations of any demand that I have to make, because they are neither proper to support any demand, nor have I authority to make any if they were, but as an apology for the liberty I take of requesting your Excellency's attention to a few observations upon the present conjuncture of affairs.

It is certain, from the best intelligence from London, as well as from the debates in Parliament, on the several motions which have been made for a pacification, that the British Ministry are inflexibly determined to pursue the war another campaign in America, to send more troops and ships there, if they possibly can obtain them, and to put to the hazard not only the national credit, but their maritime power, and even their political existence, rather than give up their designs of domination over America; and indeed this is not at all to be wondered at, that the Ministers and the nation, who have so far lost their justice, their humanity, and policy, as to deliberately form and pursue the plan of changing the foundations of the laws and governments of thirteen Colonies, and reducing them to slavery, and who have pursued this object with such sanguinary fury for so many years, should persist so as to bury themselves in the ruins of their empire, rather than to fail of their purpose, when it is plain they consider, and that not without reason, the same ruin in the independence of America, and her connexion with France.

The conduct of Count de Guichen, on the 17th of April, and the 15th and 19th of May, in the West Indies, does great honor to the national bravery, as well as to their science in naval tactics, and shows that there is no cause to fear that the enemy will obtain any advantage there. Yet nothing has yet been done on either side that seems decisive.

The advantages, which Spain has gained in West Florida, and particularly of late at Mobile, and the probability that she will succeed in gaining both the Floridas, show that the English are on the losing hand in that quarter; but it is not the loss of both the Floridas, nor of all the West India Islands, in my opinion, that will induce them to make peace, and acknowledge the independence of America in alliance with France. They will see every possession they have beyond the island lopped off, one after another, before they will do this.

I pretend not to know, to what part of America M. de Ternay and M. de Rochambeau are destined, but to whatever part it is, whether Canada, Nova Scotia, New York, Carolina, or Georgia, I have no hopes of anything decisive from their operations, although they should be instructed to co-operate with General Washington. If they should be destined against Canada or Nova Scotia, they may succeed; but this success will not be decisive. If they are intended against New York, I have no hopes of their success. The naval force is not sufficient to command the seas. Admiral Graves, added to the ships before at New York, will be superior; and I shall venture to give my opinion, that without a superiority of naval force, clear and indisputable, New York will never be taken. It is so situated, so fortified, it is garrisoned with troops so accustomed to war, and so embittered and inflamed by cruel passions, carefully nursed up in their breasts by their King and their Generals, and it is universally regarded by them a port of such essential importance, that I confess I should despair of success against it, with an army twice as numerous as that of the Generals Washington and Rochambeau united, while the English are masters of the seas, or even while they have there an equality of naval power.

Most people in Europe have wondered at the inactivity of the American army, for these two years past; but it is merely from want of knowledge and attention. The true cause of it is, the English have confined themselves to their strong holds in seaport towns, and have been sheltered from all attacks and insults by the guns of their men-of-war, and forever will be so, while they have the superiority at sea. If our army had been three times as numerous as it was, it must have remained inactive, without a fleet to co-operate with it; for an attack upon New York without a fleet, would have been only sacrificing the lives of thousands of brave men, without a possibility of succeeding.

Had the English two years ago marched into the country from Philadelphia, instead of retreating back with precipitation to New York, Europe would have heard more of the exertions of the American army, so much more, that in my serious opinion, you would have heard of their total destruction. As it was, they were closely pursued, attacked, and if not beaten, they had much the worst of the action, for besides their loss in killed and wounded, and in those who perished under the fatigue and heat of the day, not less than five hundred deserted from them, and their desertions would have been multiplied in every unsuccessful engagement within the country.

If in the last year the British army had marched out into the country, instead of remaining under cover of their men-of-war, I am equally clear, that they would have been ruined. The English, ever since the alliance, have been fearfully apprehensive of an attack upon their strong holds upon the coast by the French. This it was that induced them to retreat from Philadelphia to New York, and this has kept them almost wholly confined to that garrison the last year. I mention this, merely to wipe off the imputations said to result from the inactivity of our army, since the alliance, by showing the true cause of it, that it proceeds not from any change of sentiments in the Americans, but from the change of the mode of prosecuting the war on the part of our enemies.

I am, however, clearly of opinion, and I know it to be the general sense of America, that the English, both in North America and in the West India Islands, have been for these two years past absolutely in the power of their enemies; and that they are so now, and will continue to be so, in such a degree, that nothing will be wanting but attention to their situation, and a judicious application of the forces of the allies to accomplish the entire reduction of their power in America. In order to show this, let me beg your Excellency's attention to a few remarks upon the situation of the English, and upon the method of applying the force of the allies so as to reduce them.

The English are in possession of Canada, a province vastly extensive, and in which there is a great number of ports, at a great distance from each other, necessary to be maintained among a people too, who are by no means attached to them, but who would readily afford all the assistance in their power to the united forces of France and the United States, and who would join them in considerable numbers. In this whole province, the English have not, comprehending the garrisons of all their ports, more than four thousand men.

The English are in possession of Nova Scotia; they have in Halifax and the other parts of the province, and at Penobscot, about three thousand men. But the people of this province being descendants and emigrants from New England, chiefly, are discontented with the British government, and desirous of joining the United States. They are in possession of New York Island, Staten Island, and Long Island, where they have in all of regular British troops, ---- thousand men. The militia, volunteers, &c. of whom they make such an ostentatious display in the despatches of their Generals, and in the gazette of St James, are of very little consideration; their numbers are much exaggerated; it is force, fear, and policy, that enrol the greater part of them; there are perhaps fifteen thousand inhabitants of the city. These, together with the army and navy, are fed and supplied with provisions, and stores, and fuel, and their cattle and horses with forage, brought by sea from Quebec, Halifax, Ireland, and the West Indies, except the small quantity, which they draw from Long Island and Staten Island.

They are now in possession of Charleston, in South Carolina, and Savannah, in Georgia. Their armies and navies in these places, as well as the inhabitants, must be chiefly supplied by sea in the same manner. They are still perhaps in possession of St Augustine, in East Florida, and Pensacola, in the west. From these places, they have drawn of late years great supplies of lumber and provisions for their West India Islands. The number of troops in Georgia and Carolina may amount to ---- thousands. They are in possession of Jamaica, Barbadoes, Antigua, St Christophers, and St Lucia, and other islands. These draw supplies of provisions and lumber, &c. from Quebec, Halifax, Pensacola, and Augustine, that is from the Floridas. The number of troops they have in each island, I am not able to ascertain; but certainly they are not strong in any of them; and the climate in the West Indies, and in Georgia and Carolina, is making a rapid consumption of their men.

From this sketch, it will be easily seen, what a great number of posts they have to sustain; how these are mutually connected with, and dependent on each other, and that their existence in all of them depends upon their superiority at sea, and that to carry on the intercourse and communication between these various places, a vast number of transports, provision vessels and merchant ships are necessary. This is so much the fact, that the English nation has now little navigation left, but what is employed in maintaining the communication of these places with one another and with Europe. Here then it is, that the English commerce and navy is vulnerable; and this it is, which clearly points out to their enemies the only sure and certain way of reducing their power in that quarter of the world; and if it is reduced there, it is brought into a narrow compass everywhere.

The policy and necessity of keeping always a superior fleet both in the West India Islands and on the coast of the continent of North America, is from all this very obvious. The English are so sensible of this, that they dread it as the greatest evil that can befall them. The appearance of the Count d'Estaing upon the coast of North America, never failed to throw the English into the utmost terror and consternation.

The appearance of a French fleet upon our coasts has repeatedly compelled, and ever must compel, the English to call off from their cruises all their frigates and other ships, and to assemble them at New York, for their security and the defence of that place. These are among the happy effects of such a measure, the communication of the United States not only with each other but with the West Indies, with France, and all other parts of Europe, with which they have any concern, is immediately opened, and they are thereby easily furnished, in all parts, with everything fitting and necessary to carry on the war with the greatest vigor. His Majesty's fleets and armies will be amply and much more cheaply supplied, and his subjects will reap, in common with the inhabitants of the United States, the benefits of this free commerce. It will give free sea-room to the few frigates belonging to Congress and the several States to cruise for the merchant ships, provision vessels, and transports of the enemy. It gives opportunity also to the privateers to do the same. There are at this day, notwithstanding the dreadful sacrifices made at Charleston and Penobscot, sacrifices, the necessity of which would have been entirely prevented by a few ships of the line, the Continental frigates, the Confederacy, which is arrived at Philadelphia, the Alliance which will soon be there, the Trumbull, the Deane, the Bourbon, and also a ship of fiftysix guns which is nearly ready for sea. The State of Massachusetts has two frigates and smaller vessels. There are besides these, now in being, belonging to Newburyport, Beverly, Salem, Marblehead, Portsmouth, Boston and Rhode Island, about forty privateers. There are several belonging to Philadelphia.

If a French fleet should constantly remain upon that coast, the number of these privateers would be doubled in a very few months. What havoc then must these armed vessels make, especially if a few French frigates should be also ordered to cruise for prizes among the provision vessels, merchant ships, and transports, passing and repassing to and from America and the West India Islands to Europe, and to and from America and the West Indies, and to and from Quebec, Nova Scotia, New York, Charleston, Savannah, and the Floridas. Such depredations have several times been made by our cruisers alone, as to reduce the English at New York to very great distress, and it would be very easy in this way to reduce them to such misery as to oblige them to surrender at discretion.

I therefore beg leave to submit it to your Excellency's consideration, whether there is any possible way that a marine force can be employed against the English, so much to the advantage of France and the disadvantage of England, as in this way, and whether upon the principles of French interest and policy alone, even without taking into consideration that of the United States, a fleet ought not to be constantly kept in North America. The advantages they will there have in artists, supplies, accommodations, &c. above the English, are obvious.

But the question will arise, where shall they winter? I answer, they can winter with perfect security and advantage, either at Boston, Rhode Island, Delaware, or Chesapeake Bays.

Another question will arise, whether they should all winter together in one port, or be separated to several ports? I apprehend, however, that it would be most prudent to leave it to the discretion of the commander-in-chief of the squadron, to keep the squadron together, or to detach parts of it, according to the exigencies of the service, advising with Congress, or with the Chevalier de la Luzerne, from time to time.

Two ships of the line, with three frigates, stationed at Boston, with orders to cruise occasionally for the protection of French and American trade, and the annoyance of the enemy, the same number at Rhode Island with the same orders, the same number at Delaware river, with similar orders, and a like number in Chesapeake bay, with like orders, which would make eight ships of the line and twelve frigates, I have a moral certainty would, in one year, reduce the power of the English in North America, to absolute annihilation, without striking a blow on land. These ships would make a diversion of an equal force of the English, from the West India Islands, so that they would be in that respect as usefully employed for his Majesty there as anywhere. Eight ships of the line, and twelve frigates, stationed together at Rhode Island, with orders to cruise for the same purposes, would do the same thing.

Which plan would do best, I dare not undertake to say, but until further informed and instructed by Congress I should think however that the best plan would be to station the fleet for the winter, either in Delaware or Chesapeake Bay; and as the war has lately turned to the southward, I am inclined to think that Chesapeake Bay would be the most proper.

But in all events, I beg leave to entreat in the most earnest manner, that a powerful fleet may be ordered to winter somewhere in North America. By this means I think there is a moral certainty, the English will be ruined there, whereas if dependence is had upon the assault and attack of their strong holds, without the most absolute command of the sea, I fear it will end in disappointment and disgrace.

There is the more urgent reasons for laying these considerations before your Excellency, because there is a portion of the people in America who wish to return to the domination of Great Britain, many of whom are artful and sensible men. They take notice of every circumstance of the conduct of France, and represent it in such a light as they think will throw a prejudice against the alliance into the minds of the people. They represent the affair of Rhode Island and of Savannah, and of some other things, as proofs that the Court of France do not mean to give any effectual aid to America, but only to play off her strength against that of Britain, and thus exhaust both. The refugees in England concur with them in these representations, and the Ministry and the members of Parliament in their public speeches represent the same thing.

Even Mr Hartley, who is more for peace than any man in that kingdom, in a printed letter to the inhabitants of the county of York, says, "It is our duty to unravel by negotiation, the combination of powers now acting against us;" and he says further, in express words, that "It is apparent to all the world, that France might long ago have put an end to that part of the war, which has been most distressing to America, if they had chosen so to do." He must mean here the war of their frigates and privateers upon our trade. "Let the whole system of France be considered," says he, "from the beginning down to the late retreat from Savannah, and I think it is impossible to put any other construction upon it but this, viz. that it has always been the deliberate intention and object of France, for purposes of their own, to encourage the continuation of the war in America, in hopes of exhausting the strength and resources of this country, and of depressing the rising power of America." This is not only the language of Mr Hartley, but the general language of newspapers and pamphlets, and, I am well informed, of conversation in England. These are very industriously sent to America, through various channels, which cannot be stopped by laws, art, or power.

The body of the people have great confidence in the sincerity of France; but if these contrary opinions should be suffered to gain ground, as they most assuredly will if something is not done to prevent it, when all the world sees and declares as they do, that it is the best policy of France, if she considered her own interest alone in the conduct of the war, to keep a superior naval force upon the coast of the continent of North America, I leave your Excellency to judge what a melancholy effect it will have upon our affairs. There is no event, in my opinion, which would have so direct a tendency to give force and extent to opinions so dangerous to both nations, as the calling off from the continent your naval force, during the winter, and not keeping a superiority there through the year. I scruple not to give it as my opinion, that it will disunite, weaken, and distress us more than we should have been, disunited, weakened, or distressed, if the alliance had never been made.

The United States of America are a great and powerful people, whatever European statesmen may think of them. If we take into our estimate the numbers and the characters of her people, the extent, variety, and fertility of her soil, her commerce, and her skill, and materials for shipbuilding, and her seamen, excepting France, Spain, England, Germany, and Russia, there is not a state in Europe so powerful. Breaking off such a nation as this from the English so suddenly, and uniting it so closely with France, is one of the most extraordinary events that ever happened among mankind. The prejudices of nations in favor of themselves, and against all other nations, which spring from self-love, and are often nurtured by policy for unworthy purposes, and which have been ever certainly cultivated by the English with the utmost care in the minds of the Americans, as well as of the people of every other part of their dominions, certainly deserve the attention of the wisest statesmen, and as they are not to be eradicated in a moment, they require to be managed with some delicacy.

It is too often said in France, where the prejudice against the English has not been fostered into so much rancor, because France never had so much to fear from England, as England has from France, "That the Americans and the English are the same thing," not to make it appear, that there are some remnants of prejudices against the Americans among the French, and it must be confessed there are some in America against France. It is really astonishing, however, that there are so few, and it is the interest and duty of both to lessen them as fast as possible, and to avoid with the nicest care, every colorable cause of reviving any part of them.

I beg your Excellency to excuse this trouble, because the state of things in North America has really become alarming, and this merely for the want of a few French men-of-war upon that coast.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, July 14th, 1780.

Sir,

The advices from the Hague of the 9th of this month are, that the talk had been of a Congress to be held in that place; but as her Majesty, the Empress of Russia, had given to understand, that she desired that the conferences should be held at Petersburg, the States-General have consequently named, upon the proposition of his Serene Highness, the Prince Stadtholder, the Baron de Waassenaar Starrenburg, and the Baron Van Heckeren de Brantzenburg, Deputies to the Assembly of their High Mightinesses, on the part of the Provinces of Holland, West Friesland, and Utrecht, Ministers Plenipotentiaries to go to Petersburg, to the end to assist there at the conferences, which are to be held for the protection of the commerce of neutrals.

And that the Chevalier Llano, now Minister Plenipotentiary of his Catholic Majesty to their High Mightinesses, had arrived at that residence.

The English continue to fill all the newspapers of Europe with the despatches of Clinton, Cornwallis, Tarleton, &c. of their triumphant progress in Carolina, and we are unable to obtain a syllable from any part of America to contradict it, or explain it. It is devoutly to be wished, that Congress would appoint some active and intelligent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and make it his duty to transmit the journals, newspapers, and other intelligence, and duplicates and triplicates of them, to their servants abroad. Vessel after vessel arrives, even directly from Philadelphia, and we cannot get the journals, papers, and scarcely a private letter by them. Surely, the department of foreign affairs is of some importance to the United States, and their most important officers abroad ought not to be less informed, than every private merchant. The successes of the English in Carolina have filled them with the most ridiculous exultations. They have thrown off the mask entirely, and talk now almost universally of nothing but unconditional submission; not an idea of peace is entertained. They are perfectly confident the Congress will not maintain their authority three months. They have filled the world with histories of insurrections at Philadelphia, which drove the Congress to Lancaster, killed the French Minister, &c. &c. &c. The stocks rose three and threefourths per cent. This is the wise nation, that is to govern America, as they think, at their pleasure.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, July 15th, 1780.

Sir,

The news from Petersburg of the 13th of June is, that the last advices received from Mohilew have confirmed the news, that the Empress would return sooner than was at first expected, and that the Emperor, under the name of the Count de Falckenstein, would arrive at the same time, at Petersburg. That the fleet of Cronstadt had been eight or ten days in the road, waiting only for their final instructions to put to sea. It will be separated into three divisions, each of five ships of the line, under the command of the Rear Admirals Barisson, Cruse, and Polibin. Since the departure of a courier, which Mr Harris, the British Envoy, has expedited to his Court, the 26th of last month, a report has been spread, that he has demanded his recall.

The ordinance, which the Empress has passed at Czarsko-Zelo, on the 19th of May, to the end to ascertain the rights and duties of her subjects relative to the neutrality, is too remarkable, in the present conjuncture, not to be given entire to the public. The following is the preamble.

"The maritime war, subsisting for some time between Great Britain, on the one part, and France and Spain on the other, has begun lately to do equal injury to the commerce and the navigation of our faithful subjects. We have not in consequence failed to employ for their protection and indemnification from all the losses, which have been occasioned to them, our most efficacious intercession; in consequence of which several merchants have already obtained, in proportion to their demands, a considerable indemnification. Nevertheless, although we doubt not, that all the others will be equally indemnified by the belligerent powers, yet we cannot regard the particular compensation of individuals, as a sufficient pledge of the safety upon which neutral nations may hereafter depend. From this motive, we have resolved not only to take measures the most effectual for the maintenance of the maritime commerce of our subjects, but to put them in execution, in case of need. They have already been announced to all Europe, by a declaration delivered in the same terms to the three belligerent powers, by which we fix expressly and with precision, the rights and prerogatives of a commercial neutral flag. The one and the other are founded either upon the proper terms of our Treaty of Commerce with the Crown of Great Britain, or upon the evident and immutable principles of the law of nature and nations. But while we require of other nations, for our proper utility the entire and unlimited accomplishment of their duties, we are not less fixed in the intention on our part to observe inviolably, in regard to them, the obligations of the strictest neutrality. Thus it is necessary, that all our subjects should conform themselves vigorously in their maritime commerce, and in the enterprises relative to it, to this our will. In default of which, they will render themselves unworthy of our protection and of our succor. But to the end, that no man may fall into error by ignorance, we order our College of Commerce to notify the Russian merchants trading in our ports, that while they enjoy an entire liberty of trading and sending their vessels to all parts of Europe, they are bound to observe, conformably to our treaties with different powers, and to the ordinances of each place, that which follows."

This is the preamble; the purview shall be sent to Congress as soon as it appears.